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The Newsroom => Current Operations => Topic started by: milnews.ca on August 15, 2014, 14:28:54

Title: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: milnews.ca on August 15, 2014, 14:28:54
Here we go, folks (http://globalnews.ca/news/1509950/canada-to-help-shuttle-weapons-into-iraq/) ....
Quote
Canada is committing two cargo planes to move military supplies into northern Iraq as part of the international effort to bolster Kurdish forces in the embattled region.

Prime Minister Stephen Harper says a CC-177 Globemaster and a CC-130J Hercules transport will begin shuttling arms provided by allies to the Iraqi city of Irbil over the next few days.

The flights, which include some 30 Canadian Forces personnel, will continue as long as there is equipment and supplies to move
.


The U.S. and France are already sending weapons, while Britain has indicated it’s also prepared to help arm the Kurdish forces fighting militants from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, or ISIL.

The al-Qaida splinter group’s hardline militants have already seized large parts of northern Iraq.

The military aircraft are in addition to the $5 million in humanitarian aid committed last weekend by the Conservative government.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Hamish Seggie on August 15, 2014, 14:31:48
Here we go, folks (http://globalnews.ca/news/1509950/canada-to-help-shuttle-weapons-into-iraq/) ....

Is this another Brer Rabbit and the Tar Baby?
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: milnews.ca on August 15, 2014, 15:22:07
From the PM's office (http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2014/08/15/statement-prime-minister-canada-announcing-further-canadian-support-people-iraq) ....
Quote
Prime Minister Stephen Harper today issued the following statement announcing further assistance to the people of Iraq:

“As the murderous rampage of the terrorist group Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) continues, Canada remains committed to providing assistance to the thousands of Iraqi children, women and men, including Yezidis and Christians, who desperately need it.

“That is why I am announcing today that a Royal Canadian Air Force CC-130J Hercules and a CC-177 Globemaster, along with their crew of approximately 30 Canadian Armed Forces personnel, have been deployed from Canadian Forces Base Trenton to assist in the delivery of critical military supplies from contributing allies to Kurdish forces fighting ISIL.

“This support, which will be provided in close coordination with our allies, will enable Kurdish forces to provide effective protection to Iraqis faced with the barbarous attacks of ISIL. This measure is in addition to the humanitarian assistance Canada is already providing to the country.

“Canada will not stand idly by while ISIL continues its murder of innocent civilians and religious minorities. We continue to monitor the situation in Iraq and are prepared to provide further assistance.

“In the meantime, we call on Iraq’s leadership to take immediate steps to counter ISIL and the terrorists that operate under that banner. We stand ready to support a new Iraqi government that addresses the needs of all Iraqis, regardless of ethnic origin or religious belief.”
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: GAP on August 28, 2014, 12:48:10
Quote
And Canada's not far behind in sending a 6 pack of CF18s, we hope?

and....JTF2 (which is probably already there with the US Special Forces...)
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Chris Pook on August 28, 2014, 12:49:23
And Canada's not far behind in sending a 6 pack of CF18s, we hope?

Defense News (http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140828/CONGRESSWATCH/308280033/US-Lawmaker-Sees-UK-Australia-Turkey-Joining-Strikes-Islamic-State)

Unfortunately our expeditionary 6-Pack has just shifted from Romania, where it was close and doing double duty supplying the "threat" of covering Ukrainian forces in the Black Sea, to the Baltic.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: PPCLI Guy on August 31, 2014, 22:11:13
Canada is doing yeoman service right now (kudos to our RCAF brethren) delivering lethal aid to the Peshmerga.   :salute:
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: BadgerTrapper on September 05, 2014, 20:28:49
http://www.ctvnews.ca/mobile/canada/canada-sending-special-ops-personnel-to-iraq-1.1992540 (http://www.ctvnews.ca/mobile/canada/canada-sending-special-ops-personnel-to-iraq-1.1992540)


Thoughts?
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: tomahawk6 on September 07, 2014, 15:14:37
Canada's CSOR is going to Iraq as trainers to the Iraqi Army. :salute:
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: George Wallace on September 16, 2014, 09:01:37
I don't believe we should be sending in any "token" troops as 'advisers".  I don't believe that we should be sending in a "token" Battle Group either.  We have seen Western nations "come to the rescue" in far flung nations in Africa, the Middle East and South West Asia in the past two decades with little or no solution to the problems.  Somalia is still a hotbed for Al Queda today.  We see the spread of their barbarianism throughout Africa, North Africa through Syria to Iraq, reemerging in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and even whiffs of their spread outside of those confines.
 
The West has no stomach to fight this war on the same scale as the previous two World Wars.  Western nations have to be prodded to make the minimal of contributions to stop the spread of this barbarianism.  They prefer, in their current safety, to turn a blind eye and hope that the problem will disappear on its own.  It may already be too late, as witnessed in Europe, South West Asia, and a smaller scale in North America, to stop the spread.   

Do I agree that we should send in troops?  Not on the scale that our government currently has indicated.  I believe the only way will be for the West, all the West, to come out of their complacency and step up to committing millions of troops, as in the previous two World Wars, to totally eradicate the barbarians.  I look at what the West is doing now as only a "Band-aid" solution that will allow the problem to fester and grow.  Sadly, there is currently no will to commit millions of troops and the problem will grow and spread.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: milnews.ca on September 17, 2014, 08:09:36
In case you're interested, here's the Hansard transcript (http://bit.ly/1p0nizH) from last night's Emergency Debate in the House of Commons on Iraq.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Old Sweat on September 24, 2014, 16:23:31
And now the pressure starts. This CP story is reproduced under the Fair Dealings provision of the Copyright Act.

U.S. wants more help from Canada in Mideast: Harper

By The Canadian Press — CP — Sep 24 2014

OTTAWA - Prime Minister Stephen Harper says Canada is weighing an extended military role in the Middle East.

He says he's just received a request in the last few days, from the U.S. government, for further involvement in the fight against Islamist rebels.

Harper made the announcement in a question-and-answer session before the New York business community.

He says there needs to be some debate within the government before he can make a decision.

When pressed for details on the possible new engagement, he declined to offer details because, as he said, the U.S. government "didn't make the letter public."
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Hamish Seggie on September 25, 2014, 14:24:14
And now the pressure starts. This CP story is reproduced under the Fair Dealings provision of the Copyright Act.

U.S. wants more help from Canada in Mideast: Harper

By The Canadian Press — CP — Sep 24 2014

OTTAWA - Prime Minister Stephen Harper says Canada is weighing an extended military role in the Middle East.

He says he's just received a request in the last few days, from the U.S. government, for further involvement in the fight against Islamist rebels.

Harper made the announcement in a question-and-answer session before the New York business community.

He says there needs to be some debate within the government before he can make a decision.

When pressed for details on the possible new engagement, he declined to offer details because, as he said, the U.S. government "didn't make the letter public."

This is turning into the Brer Rabbit and the Tar Baby story. We have a hand stuck on and if we are not careful we'll have all four limbs stuck.....and we'll lose more troops. Let's hope it doesn't come to that.

Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: milnews.ca on September 25, 2014, 15:11:15
Meanwhile, in the House of Commons, more proof of it being called "Question Period", not "Answer Period" - this from Tuesday (http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Pub=hansard&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=41&Ses=2&DocId=6701057&File=0#Int-8444158) (highlights mine):
Quote
Hon. Thomas Mulcair (Leader of the Opposition, NDP):   Mr. Speaker, the Prime Minister has failed to answer clear questions about his ill-defined military deployment in Iraq.  Yesterday, Conservatives refused once again to answer in this House, but the member for Selkirk—Interlake stated on CPAC that the mission will end on October 4.  Will the Conservative government confirm that the 30-day Canadian commitment in Iraq will indeed end on October 4?

Mr. Paul Calandra (Parliamentary Secretary to the Prime Minister and for Intergovernmental Affairs, CPC):  Mr. Speaker, there is a great deal of confusion with respect to the NDP position on Israel.  I wonder if the Leader of the Opposition could confirm for me whether Alex Anderson, who identifies himself as a fundraiser at the New Democratic Party, speaks for the NDP when he says “[eff] the IDF and all who supports them. I am sick and tired of the media [BS] trying to sell lies and hide an [effing] genocide”.  Does Alex Anderson speak for the NDP when he says these shameful things?

Hon. Thomas Mulcair (Leader of the Opposition, NDP):  Mr. Speaker, I can understand the confusion. We are in the Middle East and we are under the I's, but we are talking about Iraq.  It took over a week for the Prime Minister to answer a simple question about the number of troops involved in the Iraqi deployment. It now appears that Canadian soldiers may require visas approved by the Iraqi government.  Since this military deployment is still ongoing, and since it is set to conclude in 12 days, precisely how many Canadian soldiers are on the ground in Iraq today?

Mr. Paul Calandra (Parliamentary Secretary to the Prime Minister and for Intergovernmental Affairs, CPC):   Mr. Speaker, what does the Leader of the Opposition not understand? Our friends in Israel are on the front lines combatting terrorism.  When people who work for the NDP, like Alex Anderson, who identifies himself as a fundraiser at Canada's NDP, calls what the Israel Defense Forces are doing an effing genocide, and calls the media BS for not supporting the fact that they call it an effing genocide, what does he not understand?  Israel is on the front lines. Canada will continue to support our friends in Israel. We will stand up for peace and security around the world. Unlike them, we are not confused by our position.

Hon. Thomas Mulcair (Leader of the Opposition, NDP):  Mr. Speaker, there are rules in the book about question period. You are our arbiter. We ask you to enforce the rules on relevance and on question period.  When asked at foreign affairs committee just a couple of weeks ago, the minister said that a status of forces agreement with Iraq outlining operating rules for Canadian forces had not yet been completed.  Has that agreement now been completed? If so, when can Canadians see it?

Mr. Paul Calandra (Parliamentary Secretary to the Prime Minister and for Intergovernmental Affairs, CPC):   Mr. Speaker, again, clearly the Leader of the Opposition does not identify or understand the fact that our friends in Israel are on the front lines combatting terrorism in the region.  That is why on this side of the House we support our friends in Israel. Unlike the NDP whose position is all over the place, Canada will stand up for Israel, will stand up for freedom around the world.  The NDP supporter calls it an effing IDF, and all those who support it. He claims that the media is ignoring it, and calls it BS.  We will stand up for Israel. We will stand up for— ....

That, compared to yesterday's exchange (http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Pub=hansard&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=41&Ses=2#Int-8444966):
Quote
Hon. Thomas Mulcair (Leader of the Opposition, NDP):   Mr. Speaker, we are still waiting for answers to the clear questions put to the Conservatives about the military deployment in Iraq.  Yesterday, the Conservatives again refused to answer questions about this and instead chose to make unparliamentary remarks.  The member for Selkirk—Interlake said that the mission will end on October 4. However, he cannot speak for the government because he is not a member of cabinet.  Today in the House, will the Conservative government confirm to Canadians that the 30-day military deployment in Iraq will actually end on October 4?

Mr. James Bezan (Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence, CPC):   Mr. Speaker, our government has been clear both inside and outside the House that the clock started on the 30-day deployment on September 5. At the end of these 30 days, we will look at renewing the mission. The atrocities currently being committed by ISIL cannot be left unanswered.  It is outrageous that the NDP would have us do nothing in the face of that threat. It is time the NDP explained what it would do to stop ISIL and its terrorist regime.

Hon. Thomas Mulcair (Leader of the Opposition, NDP):  Mr. Speaker, it has been confirmed that Canadian soldiers are required to have visas approved by the Iraqi government before they can be deployed. The member for Selkirk—Interlake, even if he is not a minister and cannot really speak for the government, said last night that there were “some difficulties in dealing with logistics”.  Since this military deployment is still ongoing and since it is set to conclude in just 11 days, precisely how many Canadian soldiers are on the ground in Iraq today?

Mr. James Bezan (Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence, CPC):   Mr. Speaker, there is absolutely no fact to that statement at all. I can confirm that we have committed 69 members of the Canadian special armed forces to be in Iraq to provide tactical and strategic advice in a non-combat role, and that is exactly what we are doing. 

Hon. Thomas Mulcair (Leader of the Opposition, NDP):  I know the Conservatives find this complicated, Mr. Speaker, but it was actually a question and not a statement. The question was: how many of them are on the ground in Iraq now?  When asked two weeks ago in committee, the minister said that a status of forces agreement with Iraq outlining operating rules for Canadian Forces had not yet been completed. That was two weeks ago in a parliamentary committee with the foreign affairs minister.  Has that status of forces agreement now been completed and, if so, will the government table it in Parliament, yes or no?

Mr. James Bezan (Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence, CPC):   Mr. Speaker, we have committed to 69 members being deployed to northern Iraq to fight—to be in an advisory role with the Peshmerga, helping it out, along with the invitation of the Iraqi government. We are there strictly in an advisory role, non-combat, and it is very clear what we are trying to do there. It has been laid out by the Minister of National Defence and it has been laid out by the Minister of Foreign Affairs over and over again. The NDP just does not get it.  Why are the New Democrats so opposed to us sending over members of the Canadian Armed Forces who have expertise in the area of counterterrorism?

Hon. Thomas Mulcair (Leader of the Opposition, NDP):   Mr. Speaker, there are no boots on the ground, so they must be in sandals or levitating. They are not in a combat mission, but they are there to fight.  Yesterday, the member for Selkirk—Interlake also hinted that it is entirely possible that the 30-day mission in Iraq could last longer.  Before Canada commits itself any further, when will the Conservatives keep their promise to provide all the information to which Canadians and parliamentarians are entitled and to hold a vote in Parliament after a thorough debate?  We have the right to vote, as the Conservatives promised, on whether Canada is to go to war.

Mr. James Bezan (Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence, CPC):   Mr. Speaker, the Government of Canada has routinely deployed the Canadian Armed Forces around the world in non-combat roles. It has never been the practice to have a vote on such deployments in Parliament.  Just recently, we have HMCS Toronto in the Black Sea, we have troops on the ground in Poland taking part in exercises and members of the Royal Canadian Air Force plus equipment of the RCAF are involved in air policing missions, all part of NATO's Operation Reassurance. We never voted on any of that.  Having said that, the opposition has its own opposition days when it can bring this forward for debate and also a vote ....
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: eliminator on September 25, 2014, 22:24:50
http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/isis-mission-canada-mulls-deploying-cf-18-jets-to-join-u-s-led-strikes-1.2778418

The federal cabinet will meet next week to discuss deploying Canada's CF-18 fighter jets to join a U.S.-led campaign against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, CBC News has learned.

Prime Minister Stephen Harper asked the U.S. what more Canada could do to contribute to American-led coalition efforts in Iraq against ISIS, a Pentagon official said today.

Yesterday, Harper hinted in an interview with the Wall Street Journal that Canada may be ready for an increased role.

"We need to push them to the fringes and make their basic organization and logistical existence very difficult on an ongoing basis," he said. "A lot of that can be done from the air."

Canada currently has some CF-18 fighter jets patrolling eastern Europe, said Thomas Juneau, a former analyst for the Department of Defence.

"Does it mean it's impossible for Canada to deploy CF-18 fighter aircraft in addition to that in the Iraqi theatre?" he asked. "That really depends on how much. For how long."

Harper said he wants to meet with his cabinet before anything is decided. The meeting is expected to take place next week.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: SupersonicMax on September 25, 2014, 22:33:24
En français, still related...

http://tvanouvelles.ca/lcn/infos/regional/quebec/archives/2014/09/20140925-195332.html

Quote
Lutte contre l'État Islamique en Irak
Les militaires de Valcartier sont prêts

Les militaires de Valcartier sont sur le qui-vive.

Les rumeurs se font de plus en plus persistantes à l'effet qu'Ottawa donne le feu vert à une intervention militaire canadienne en Irak pour lutter contre l'État Islamiste. Même si plusieurs militaires doutent que des forces terrestres soient déployées, ils demeurent prêts à combattre.

«Pour l'instant, on ne s'en parle pas vraiment. On regarde ce qu'il se dit aux nouvelles. C'est sûr que c'est à Ottawa que ça se décide» dit un premier militaire rencontré à Shannon.

«Il n'y a pas vraiment de sources qui peuvent dire qu'on va y aller. Il n'y a rien qui se discute pour l'instant. S'ils prennent la décision qu'on y va, on va y aller. En attendant, on reste tranquille à la maison», ajoute un compagnon d'armes.

(TVA Nouvelles)

Le colonel à la retraite Michel Drapeau s'attend à une intervention canadienne en Irak, mais peut-être pas à celle des militaires de Valcartier.

«Je ne penserais pas, même, qu'ils pourraient jouer un rôle logistique. Est-ce que les gens de Bagotville pourraient être impliqués? Je crois que oui, avec les CF-18.»

Une mission qui, selon lui, sera beaucoup plus courte que celle en Afghanistan, qui a duré onze ans.

«On parle peut-être d'un 3, 4, 5 ou 6 mois. Peut-être un travail de surveillance après.»

(TVA Nouvelles)

Au Centre de la famille Valcartier, un protocole est déjà en place pour venir en aide aux militaires et leurs proches, si jamais Ottawa officialisait un déploiement en Irak.

«Il y a plusieurs outils qui sont en place depuis la mission en Afghanistan», explique Sylvie Gagnon.

L'objectif est d'encadrer les familles, surtout celles qui vivraient un premier déploiement.

«Les rassurer, mais aussi offrir des services spécifiques: séance d'information, équipe pour l'emploi, des travailleurs sociaux. On leur explique c'est quoi la mission. Ce sont un peu les services qu'on pourrait retrouver dans un CSLC, mais vraiment adaptés à la situation des militaires.»

Les 6000 militaires de la base, eux, poursuivent leur entraînement en attendant qu'on fasse appel à leurs services.


- mod edit to fix link -

Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Marchog on September 25, 2014, 23:37:24
Bomb them into glass. That's my two cents.

Quote
Lutte contre l'État Islamique en Irak
Les militaires de Valcartier sont prêts

Les militaires de Valcartier sont sur le qui-vive.

Les rumeurs se font de plus en plus persistantes à l'effet qu'Ottawa donne le feu vert à une intervention militaire canadienne en Irak pour lutter contre l'État Islamiste. Même si plusieurs militaires doutent que des forces terrestres soient déployées, ils demeurent prêts à combattre.

«Pour l'instant, on ne s'en parle pas vraiment. On regarde ce qu'il se dit aux nouvelles. C'est sûr que c'est à Ottawa que ça se décide» dit un premier militaire rencontré à Shannon.

«Il n'y a pas vraiment de sources qui peuvent dire qu'on va y aller. Il n'y a rien qui se discute pour l'instant. S'ils prennent la décision qu'on y va, on va y aller. En attendant, on reste tranquille à la maison», ajoute un compagnon d'armes.

(TVA Nouvelles)

Le colonel à la retraite Michel Drapeau s'attend à une intervention canadienne en Irak, mais peut-être pas à celle des militaires de Valcartier.

«Je ne penserais pas, même, qu'ils pourraient jouer un rôle logistique. Est-ce que les gens de Bagotville pourraient être impliqués? Je crois que oui, avec les CF-18.»

Une mission qui, selon lui, sera beaucoup plus courte que celle en Afghanistan, qui a duré onze ans.

«On parle peut-être d'un 3, 4, 5 ou 6 mois. Peut-être un travail de surveillance après.»

(TVA Nouvelles)

Au Centre de la famille Valcartier, un protocole est déjà en place pour venir en aide aux militaires et leurs proches, si jamais Ottawa officialisait un déploiement en Irak.

«Il y a plusieurs outils qui sont en place depuis la mission en Afghanistan», explique Sylvie Gagnon.

L'objectif est d'encadrer les familles, surtout celles qui vivraient un premier déploiement.

«Les rassurer, mais aussi offrir des services spécifiques: séance d'information, équipe pour l'emploi, des travailleurs sociaux. On leur explique c'est quoi la mission. Ce sont un peu les services qu'on pourrait retrouver dans un CSLC, mais vraiment adaptés à la situation des militaires.»

Les 6000 militaires de la base, eux, poursuivent leur entraînement en attendant qu'on fasse appel à leurs services.

For those whose français is lacking, a translation:

Quote
The struggle against the Islamic State in Iraq.

The soldiers in Valcartier are ready.

Rumours are more and more persistent to the effect that Ottawa will give the green light to a Canadian military intervention in Iraq to fight the Islamic State. Even though many soldiers doubt that ground forces will be deployed, they remain ready for combat.

"At the moment, we're not really talking about it, we're watching what is said in the news, it's certainly up to Ottawa to decide" said a high-ranking soldier at Shannon.

"There aren't really any sources that can say that we'll go there. It's not being discussed at the moment. If they decide that we'll go there, we'll go. While waiting, we'll stay quietly at home" added one of his comrades.

(TVA News)

The retired Colonel Michel Drapeau expects a Canadian intervention in Iraq, but possibly not from the personnel at Valcartier.

"I don't even think they could play a logistic role, could the people at Bagotville be involved? I think so, with the CF-18s".

The mission, according to him, would be much shorter than the one in Afghanistan, which lasted 11 years.

"We're talking about 3, 4, 5, 6 months, maybe surveillance work afterwords."

(TVA News)

In the Valcartier family centre (?), a protocol is already in place to help the soldiers and their families, if Ottawa were ever to make official a deployment to Iraq.

"There are several tools that have been in place since the mission in Afghanistan" explains Sylvie Gagnon.

The objective is to take care of families, especially those that are going through their first deployment.

"It's to reassure them, but also to offer them specific services, information sessions, job team (???), social workers. We explain to them what the mission is. It's a bit like the services you'd find in a CSLC, but adapted to the soldiers' situations."

The 6000 soldiers in the base, as for them, they are continuing their training while waiting for their services to be called upon.


Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: tomahawk6 on September 26, 2014, 10:05:22
Probably send the regiment that is so secret it cant be mentioned. ;)
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Dimsum on September 26, 2014, 19:31:05
Video of Mercedes Stephenson interviewing LGen (ret'd) Ken Pennie regarding the US request for expanded Canadian participation.

http://www.ctvnews.ca/ctv-news-channel/video?clipId=452630&playlistId=1.1261638&binId=1.810401&playlistPageNum=1&binPageNum=1
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: milnews.ca on September 26, 2014, 21:16:12
Meanwhile, in the House of Commons, more proof of it being called "Question Period", not "Answer Period" - this from Tuesday (http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Pub=hansard&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=41&Ses=2&DocId=6701057&File=0#Int-8444158) ....
To be fair, here's a bit on the MP's apology (http://www.thespec.com/news-story/4883797-weeping-paul-calandra-apologizes-to-commons-for-non-answer-in-question-period/):
Quote
One of the Conservative government's most colourful guard dogs made a tearful apology to the House of Commons on Friday over his controversial non-answer to an opposition question.

Paul Calandra, Prime Minister Stephen Harper's parliamentary secretary, stood following question period and, his voice cracking with emotion, said he was sorry for failing to answer NDP Leader Tom Mulcair's queries earlier this week about Canada's mission in Iraq.

"I allowed the passion and the anger at something I read to get in the way of appropriately answering a question to the leader of the Opposition," said Calandra, who has spent the last three days on the hot seat of public ridicule.

"For that I apologize to you and to this entire House and to my constituents."

Calandra also suggested to Speaker Andrew Scheer that his response wasn't based on any behind-the-scenes instructions, although Conservative members receive extensive pre-question period prep every day.

"This was my response. I take full responsibility and I apologize to the leader of the Opposition, to you and to all my colleagues." ....
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: E.R. Campbell on October 02, 2014, 16:40:07
This is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from the Globe and Mail, without comment except to ask: isn't LGen (ret'd) Andrew Leslie M. Trudeau's defence guru, does he agree this?

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/canada-must-be-involved-in-iraq-but-not-necessarily-combat-trudeau-says/article20889487/#dashboard/follows/
Quote
(http://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fbeta.images.theglobeandmail.com%2Fmedia%2Fwww%2Fimages%2Fflag%2Fgam-masthead.png&hash=19ff3553db0adc5a5af34a8cb80569c3)
Canadian jets shouldn’t go into Iraq, Trudeau says

DANIEL LEBLANC AND STEVEN CHASE
Ottawa — The Globe and Mail

Published Thursday, Oct. 02 2014

The Liberal Party is withholding its support for a Canadian combat mission in Iraq, with Leader Justin Trudeau saying he remains unconvinced of the need to send Canadian fighter jets to fight against Islamic State extremists.

In a speech and news conference on Thursday, Mr. Trudeau said there is a need for humanitarian aid to deal with the crisis in Iraq, but added he has “serious concerns” about the potential for a Canadian participation in ongoing air strikes.

(http://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fstatic.theglobeandmail.ca%2F873%2Fnews%2Fpolitics%2Farticle20891278.ece%2FALTERNATES%2Fw620%2FOTTK108_Trudeau_20141002.JPG&hash=f7b0b00cc0c9e443abc7d341782218c3)
Liberal Leader Justin Trudeau speaks at a news conference following a Canada2020 event in Ottawa on Thursday, October 2, 2014.
(Sean Kilpatrick/THE CANADIAN PRESS)

“Why aren’t we talking more about the kind of humanitarian aid that Canada can and must be engaged in, rather than, you know, trying to whip out our CF-18s and show them how big they are,” Mr. Trudeau said in a question-and-answer period after his speech to the Canada 2020 conference.

Mr. Trudeau told the crowd that he hasn’t made up his mind on endorsing the expansion of Canada’s military mission, but party officials added afterward that it would take a massive shift in the government’s handling of the matter to obtain Liberal support.

The Prime Minister’s Office quickly attacked Mr. Trudeau for his comments on Canada’s fleet of fighter jets.

“Mr. Trudeau’s comments are disrespectful of the Canadian Armed Forces and make light of a serious issue. Our involvement in the fight against ISIL is, and has been, motivated by a desire to do our part in fighting a group that has made direct terrorist threats against Canada and Canadians, in addition to carrying out atrocities against children, women and men in the region,” said PMO director of communications Jason MacDonald. “As the Prime Minister has said: we take that seriously and will do our part.”

The government has promised to allow a debate and a vote in the House before launching any combat mission in Iraq. Prime Minister Stephen Harper said earlier this week that participating in the international coalition is a “noble and necessary” cause, but has refused to provide details on the potential Canadian contribution to any combat mission.

The Liberals have endorsed the current non-combat mission involving a few dozen Canadian Forces members in Iraq. The party has refused to this point to clearly approve or oppose the possibility of an expanded mission in Iraq, stating Mr. Harper has failed to brief them on the mission or make a clear case for a Canadian involvement.

“Unlike prime ministers for decades before him, Mr. Harper has made no effort to build a non-partisan case for war. Instead he dares us to oppose his war, staking out not moral territory but political territory,” Mr. Trudeau said in his speech. “We don’t know exactly what he has offered the Americans. We don’t know what our role will look like. We don’t know how long our contribution is expected to last. We don’t know how helpful our CF-18s will truly be. In place of these facts we get rhetoric about the nobility of combat.”

Government sources say the Prime Minister will announce Canada’s plans for Iraq on Friday, including whether to extend a 30-day non-combat deployment of military advisers to the region, where extremist Islamists have cut a path of destruction across parts of Syria and Iraq.

Cabinet this week debated a request from the United States for Ottawa to play a combat role in Iraq by supporting air strikes against Islamic State forces. This could include deploying CF-18 fighters, refuelling tankers or even surveillance aircraft to the theatre of war.

While the NDP is not officially opposed to an expanded military mission, Leader Thomas Mulcair distanced himself from what he called “the Prime Minister’s war in Iraq” during Question Period on Wednesday. After a caucus meeting, Mr. Mulcair said that the focus should be on providing humanitarian assistance in the region.

“This is not a UN mission, so we have to be extremely careful before we start listening to the siren songs of those who would propel us full-force into a war,” he told reporters.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Marchog on October 02, 2014, 18:30:36
Quote
“Why aren’t we talking more about the kind of humanitarian aid that Canada can and must be engaged in, rather than, you know, trying to whip out our CF-18s and show them how big they are,”
Does this guy even have a clue?
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Ducimus BTC on October 02, 2014, 19:08:28
Does this guy even have a clue?

Definitely using this as a platform to gain votes ahead of next years election, surprise surprise.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: ModlrMike on October 02, 2014, 20:46:36
The "stop, or I'll say stop again" approach to foreign policy.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Hamish Seggie on October 02, 2014, 21:04:47
The "stop, or I'll say stop again" approach to foreign policy.
Don't forget the strongly worded letter....
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Dimsum on October 02, 2014, 21:13:19
Definitely using this as a platform to gain votes ahead of next years election, surprise surprise.

Every party uses every situation as a platform to gain votes, especially so close to an election.  I would have been surprised if the Libs and the NDP didn't oppose this.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: pointfiveoh on October 02, 2014, 21:15:36
Definitely using this as a platform to gain votes ahead of next years election, surprise surprise.

I second that, he just needs something to badger the PCs with closer to election day, so he sets the stage now. What's sad is if doo-doo hits the fan on Harpers plan some voters will turn liberal just over fears of starting a new war that seems to have already started. Sound political strategy for Trudeau, but I'd rather not have my safety in the hands of a man whose willing to use national security issues as nothing more than a political push to grab votes.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Journeyman on October 03, 2014, 00:16:11
“Why aren’t we talking more about the kind of humanitarian aid that Canada can and must be engaged in, rather than, you know, trying to whip out our CF-18s and show them how big they are,” Mr. Trudeau said
Between the catch-all "humanitarian aid" (which can be used without any thought of who, what, how, where, to what end) and the 'whipping out a penis' innuendo, he's obviously hoping to erode some of the NDP/feminist vote. 

Once again, no thought - no surprise.   Especially when the figurehead says "he hasn't decided" and his staff says "support isn't going to happen."

Forgive me....... :boring:
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: milnews.ca on October 03, 2014, 13:37:26
Text of the resolution being discussed in the House of Commons at this point via CBC.ca (http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/isis-text-of-government-s-motion-on-canada-s-mission-1.2786745):
Quote
That this House

(i) recognise that the leadership of the terrorist group known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has called on its members to target Canada and Canadians at home and abroad;

(ii) further recognise the clear and direct threat that ISIL poses to the people of the region, including members of vulnerable religious and ethnic minority groups who have been subjected to a sustained campaign of brutal sexual violence, murder, and barbaric intimidation by ISIL;

(iii) accept that, unless confronted with strong and direct force, the threat ISIL poses to international peace and security, including to Canadian communities, will continue to grow;

(iv) affirm Canada’s desire, consistent with Canadian values and interests, to protect the vulnerable and innocent civilians of the region, including through urgent humanitarian assistance;

(v) acknowledge the request from the Government of Iraq for military support against ISIL from members of the international community, including from the Government of Canada;

(vi) further acknowledge the participation of Canada’s friends and allies, including numerous countries of the Middle East, in the broad international coalition committed to the fight against ISIL; and

(vii) note that the United Nations Security Council has become seized of the threat posed by international terrorism with the unanimous passage of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2178,

and, accordingly,

(a) support the Government’s decision to contribute Canadian military assets to the fight against ISIL, and terrorists allied with ISIL, including air strike capability for a period of up to six months;

(b) note that the Government of Canada will not deploy troops in ground combat operations; and

(c) continue to offer its resolute and wholehearted support to the brave men and women of the Canadian Armed Forces who stand on guard for all of us.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: milnews.ca on October 03, 2014, 21:12:26
P.M.'s statement in the House today (http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2014/10/03/statement-prime-minister-canada-house-commons):
Quote
“Mr. Speaker, in recent months, the international community has reacted, with virtually unanimous outrage and alarm at the rise of ISIL, the so-called ‘Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.’

“ISIL has established a self-proclaimed Caliphate, at present stretching over a vast territory roughly from Aleppo to near Baghdad, from which it intends to launch a terrorist jihad not merely against the region but on a global basis.

“Indeed it has specifically targeted Canada and Canadians, urging supporters to attack, quote, ‘disbelieving Canadians in any manner’, vowing that we should not feel secure even in our homes.

“It would be convenient to dismiss such statements as the mere rambling of lunatics were it not for the fact that ISIL’s deeds have been fully in line with its words.

“More shockingly, ISIL’s words are matched by its actions.

“In the territory ISIL has occupied it has conducted a campaign of unspeakable atrocities against the most innocent of people.

“It has tortured and beheaded children, it has raped and sold women into slavery, it has slaughtered minorities, captured prisoners and innocent civilians whose only crime is being or thinking differently from ISIL.

“Indeed by late last summer, ISIL stood on the brink of committing large-scale genocide in Northern Iraq.

“It was at that moment that Canada’s allies in the international community, led by President Obama, decided to intervene.

“Canadians have joined in this response.

“On September 5th, I announced that members of the Canadian Army, in a non-combat role, would advise and assist security forces in Iraq battling the terrorists.

“We had already begun, through the Royal Canadian Air Force, moving weapons and supplies donated by our allies to security forces in Northern Iraq.

“And we indicated that Canada was prepared to do more.

“Today we are bringing forward a motion asking this House to confirm its confidence for a government decision to join our allies and partners – the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Australia, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and likely others – in launching air strikes against ISIL.

“In addition to these air strikes, the Government of Canada will, in response to requests from Iraqi authorities as well as other allies and partners, continue to assist in other, non-combat, counter-terrorism roles.

“We will also contribute one air-to-air refuelling aircraft, two Aurora surveillance aircraft, and the necessary air crews and support personnel.

“In addition we are extending the deployment in a non-combat role of the up to 69 members of the Canadian Army advising and assisting security forces in Iraq.

“There will however be no ground combat mission, which is explicitly ruled out in the resolution.

“These contributions are for a period of up to six months.

“Let me be clear on the objectives of this intervention.

“We intend to significantly degrade the capabilities of ISIL.

“Specifically, its ability to either engage in military movements of scale, or to operate bases in the open.

“This will halt ISIL’s spread in the region and greatly reduce its capacity to launch terrorist attacks outside the region.

“To be clear, this will not eliminate ISIL nor automatically ensure that alternative governance is able to occupy its space in Iraq or Syria.

“It will, however, open the opportunity for others to do so.

“But again to be clear, while ISIL will not be eliminated, the risks presented from the territory in which it operates will be significantly reduced to those of other similar ungoverned spaces in the broader region.

“There are, Mr. Speaker, two other matters on which I wish to elaborate.

“First, the resolution confirms the Government of Canada’s intention to strike ISIL and its allies.

“We will strike ISIL where and only where Canada has the clear support of the government of that country.

“At present this is only true in Iraq.

“If it were to become the case in Syria, then we will participate in air strikes against ISIL in that country also.

“The revulsion of the Government of Canada to the actions of the Assad regime is well known.

“But we are participating only in a counter-terrorism operation against the terrorists around ISIL.

“We have no intention of participating in a war against the government of any country in the region.

“Second, let me assure Canadians that the government is seized with the necessity of avoiding a prolonged quagmire in this part of the world.

“The actions we have announced are ones that could be ended with relative ease.

“Indeed, we and our allies are acting now precisely to avoid a situation that was clearly headed to a wider, protracted and much more dangerous conflict.

“Let me also say that the military measures we are taking do not in any way preclude humanitarian actions.

“There is no either/or here.

“In response to horrifying human suffering, we have already been providing emergency shelter and urgent health care for thousands of civilians in Iraq through support to humanitarian organizations on the ground, and substantial assistance to the Government of Iraq.

“This is in addition to large scale financial assistance already being furnished to the significant number of countries in the region that have been impacted by the humanitarian catastrophe in Syria.

“Let me also assure Canadians that the Government will continue to be seized with the broader terrorist threats against Canada.

“We have strengthened laws in this country to deal with the issue of so-called Canadian foreign fighters.

“We have broadened the grounds for passport revocation against such people as well as allowing for the stripping of citizenship from dual nationals who engage in terrorist activities.

“We will soon bring forward additional measures to strengthen the ability of our security services to monitor aspiring terrorists to where possible prevent their return to Canada or to where that is not possible give greater tools to be able to charge and prosecute.

“Mr. Speaker, to return to the matter before us today, I urge all members to consider and to support the motion we have presented.

“I do this, Mr. Speaker, in recognizing that in a democracy, especially one approaching an election, there is rarely political upside in supporting any kind of military action and little risk in opposing it.

“Nevertheless, for regional and global security and, of course, the security of Canadians, this action is necessary.

“The evidence of the necessity of this, Mr. Speaker, there is none better than the fact that the mission has been launched by President Obama, the leader who had withdrawn American troops and proudly ended the war in Iraq.

“Of course, Mr. Speaker, one could say that while the mission is evidently necessary, we don’t have to be the ones doing it because others will.

“But, Mr. Speaker, throughout our history that has never been the Canadian way.

“It has never been the Canadian way to do only the most easy and praiseworthy of actions and to leave the tough things for others.

“Indeed, Mr. Speaker, colleagues, we should be under no illusion.

“If Canada wants to keep its voice in the world, and we should since so many of our challenges are global, being a free rider means you are not taken seriously.

“The threat posed by ISIL is real.

“And it is grave.

“And it is explicitly directed, in part, against this country.

“Left unchecked, this terrorist threat can only grow and grow quickly.

“As a government we know our ultimate responsibility is to protect Canadians and to defend our citizens from those who would do harm to us or our families.

“We also know that our country, like our allies, shares the duty and burden of all free peoples, to act against wider global threats when it is in our capacity to do so.

“And when our allies recognize and respond to a threat that would also harm us, we Canadians do not stand on the sidelines.

“We do our part.

“On Monday, this House will debate the motion put forward for an air combat campaign against ISIL.

“I call on all members of this House to show their support for this mission and of course our support for the brave men and women of the Canadian Armed Forces who are now and always ready and willing to answer the call of their country.”
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: milnews.ca on October 04, 2014, 10:39:09
If you want to check out the House of Commons debate from yesterday, try here (http://bit.ly/1x9kG7S) (links to Hansard) or here (http://bit.ly/1BEWXgx) (6 page PDF of just the IRQ motion debate).
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: E.R. Campbell on October 07, 2014, 10:12:30
And we have M. Trudeau's proposed response, brilliantly depicted courtesy of Graeme MacKay in the Hamilton Spectator:

(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/BzWKv5QCcAIk5Pd.jpg:large)
Source: http://www.artizans.com/image/GMAC2739/justin-trudeau-whips-out-peace-doves-by-voting-against-iraq-mission-color/
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on October 07, 2014, 10:45:15
 ;D  I like it.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: milnews.ca on October 07, 2014, 15:06:56
And they wouldn't be Liberals if they couldn't be ..... "politicially and ideologically flexible" (http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/liberals-will-support-iraqi-combat-mission-after-voting-against-it-garneau-says/article20960695/) ....
Quote
The Liberal Party plans to support the Canadian Forces combat mission in Iraq once it is approved by the House of Commons, even though it will vote against the deployment of six CF-18 fighter jets to conduct air strikes in Iraq ....
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: milnews.ca on October 07, 2014, 16:30:59
Hold on - Garneau now says he meant to say "he supports the troops, not the mission." (https://twitter.com/Justin_Ling/status/519564991775531009)
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: E.R. Campbell on October 07, 2014, 16:34:48
And they wouldn't be Liberals if they couldn't be ..... "politicially and ideologically flexible" (http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/liberals-will-support-iraqi-combat-mission-after-voting-against-it-garneau-says/article20960695/) ....

M. Garneau (Capt(N) (ret'd) Garneau) said, in the link, above, that "...the key issue is “being loyal” to the members of the Canadian Forces, once their mission is approved by Parliament, even in the face of Liberal opposition."

All I can say is Wow! I have described this as being cynical and insulting; it's worse: it is two faced, in the extreme. I'm not sure I can find words to express the contempt I have for the Liberal Party of Canada and its leadership.


Edited to add:

Don't get me wrong. I do not support what the US led West (plus some "bought and paid for" locals) is doing. As I mentioned above I think "half measures" are going to fail, maybe even backfire. I'm of the go big or stay home school of thought ... I don't think we can do much with a 'six pack' of CF-18s; maybe if we sent 60, and the US sent 600 bombers, and maybe if we sent a few brigades, and the US sent dozens f brigades, and maybe if the Australia and Germany and the UK also sent proportionate forces then, maybe again, we might sort out the region, and the "sorting out" must include the Saudis and all the other emirs and princes and so ons, IF we stayed for a few generations to civilize the place ... convince them with the bomb and the noose and the schoolroom that this is not the Middle Ages and the "sky fairies" don't rule here on earth.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: YZT580 on October 07, 2014, 18:33:44
The folks here would never allow any of it.  Re-education would be forcing folks to act contrary to their beliefs: you can only force that on Christians in this country.  The noose would have every people's advocate in the country marching on OW.  The best you could hope for is 60 days and either a restraining order or a court order to refrain from decapitating.  If that didn't work they would also add in a 500 dollar fine an additional 30 days and a second restraining order
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: cupper on October 07, 2014, 20:07:49
The folks here would never allow any of it.  Re-education would be forcing folks to act contrary to their beliefs: you can only force that on Christians in this country.  The noose would have every people's advocate in the country marching on OW.  The best you could hope for is 60 days and either a restraining order or a court order to refrain from decapitating.  If that didn't work they would also add in a 500 dollar fine an additional 30 days and a second restraining order

My head hurts trying to figure out what you are saying. Care to clarify?
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: cryco on October 07, 2014, 20:19:44
I think he meant that if you go big as ER Campbell said and follow up that scenario with a  couple of generations of re-education, the people of this? (not sure if he meant this ,as in the west, or this, as in middle east) country would object to having the west spoon-feed what the people in the Syria/Iraq area to learn and tutor them through life.
After that, I'm lost. And now my head hurts too.
I also agree with E.R.Cambpell though. Go overkill, not just big. Send in as much military as you can and obliterate the fools.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: S.M.A. on October 07, 2014, 22:17:31
Doves emerging from a clueless dauphin's fly (http://army.ca/forums/index.php/topic,115340.msg1331494.html#msg1331494) aside...

It's now official: (EDITED to add more info from full article at link above)

Vancity Buzz (http://www.vancitybuzz.com/2014/10/house-commons-votes-send-600-canadian-soldiers-cf-18-jets-iraq-fight-isis/)

Quote
PARLIAMENT APPROVES MOTION TO SEND 600 CANADIAN SOLDIERS, CF-18 JETS
TO IRAQ WAR AGAINST ISIS


The House of Commons has voted to approve a motion that permits the federal government to join a international coalition to fight the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) threat in Iraq.

The six-month combat mission motion passed 157-134 in Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s majority Conservative government.

Canada joins more than a dozen other countries who have already confirmed their armed intervention in the conflict, a list that includes the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Netherlands, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

By the end of the month, the following Canadian Armed Forces will be deployed overseas for the U.S.-led mission in Iraq:

6 CF-18 Hornet fighter jets for airstrikes and air patrols
1 CC-150 Polaris air-to-air refuelling aircraft
2 CP-140 Aurora surveillance aircraft
1 dedicated airlift aircraft
approximately 600 Canadian Armed Forces personnel

Harper has maintained that ground soldiers will not be deployed to the battle in an effort to limit Canadian casualties.
However, the mission could be expanded to fight ISIL militants in Syria, although federal opposition parties have demanded for a new vote over any expansion of the combat mission into the neighbouring country.

(...SNIPPED)
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Hamish Seggie on October 07, 2014, 22:47:22
Into the Briar Patch we go once more.....
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: PuckChaser on October 07, 2014, 23:34:15
I didn't know CF-18s flew in fleets. Learn something new everyday.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: MCG on October 08, 2014, 00:21:05
Quote
... 600 CANADIAN SOLDIERS ...
It is nice that military requirements always come to such easy rounded numbers.
I suspect this will be an opportunity to validate the AEW through a deployment?
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: cupper on October 08, 2014, 00:47:35
I didn't know CF-18s flew in fleets. Learn something new everyday.

and yet they don't wear an RCN uniform. >:D
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: GR66 on October 08, 2014, 01:46:33
I may not think it's the wise choice to deploy in this case but good hunting and safe return to all those deploying.   :salute:
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: MilEME09 on October 08, 2014, 02:52:25
and yet they don't wear an RCN uniform. >:D

Can we get a carrier to match this new found naval air capability?
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: WeatherdoG on October 08, 2014, 03:29:34
I didn't know CF-18s flew in fleets. Learn something new everyday.

Fleet is an appropriate term to use when referring to aircraft, just as squadron, port, starboard, and nautical mile are also appropriate in the realm of aircraft.

Almost all terminology used in aviation comes from the nautical world, oddly enough having squadrons of armoured troopers is more out of place in modern military terminology than fleets of aircraft.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: jollyjacktar on October 08, 2014, 10:03:39
6 aircraft is hardly a fleet.  It's rather embarrassing.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: LunchMeat on October 08, 2014, 10:07:12
1 to spontaneously combust on the taxiway
2 to actually participate in the sorties
and the other three for spare parts
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: s2184 on October 08, 2014, 10:49:12
I read this article in Alzaheera.  ::)

Quote
Why is Canada joining the anti-ISIL coalition?
Canada's move to join the anti-ISIL coalition is the right decision but made for a lot of the wrong reasons.

In many ways, Canada's decision to take part in international air strikes against ISIL in Iraq was a foregone conclusion. Stephen Harper, the country's prime minister, announced his intention to go to war the week before lawmakers actually debated it. He deployed military reconnaissance teams to the region days ahead of any vote. Not that there was ever any shred of doubt as to whether his motion to deploy Canadian fighter jets into combat over Iraq would carry.

Harper's Conservative Party holds a majority of seats in the House of Commons. It would have been politically significant and hugely symbolic if the opposition parties had backed this mission. They didn't and it didn't matter. In the end, Harper got the mandate he and nearly two thirds of Canadians wanted for air strikes against ISIL. On October 7, members of Parliament voted 157 to 134 in favour of the motion. It was the right decision - but it was made for a lot of the wrong reasons.

For starters, Harper relied on the spurious argument that Canada should go to war in the interest of self-defence. ISIL, he argued, presents a direct danger to Canadian "families". He raised the spectre of "terrorist attacks outside the region, including against Canada". But he did so without offering any concrete proof. ISIL's reach certainly stretches through the Middle East and Europe. However, Canadian authorities have yet to make the case that it poses any kind of an equivalent threat to Canada. The most recent report from Ottawa shows more than 130 Canadians have joined the ranks of foreign jihadist groups, and another 80 have returned. What's questionable is whether any of these would-be jihadists have the desire or the capacity to carry out an attack on Canada itself on ISIL's behalf.

Canadian authorities have yet to make the case that it poses any kind of an equivalent threat to Canada. The most recent report from Ottawa shows more than 130 Canadians have joined the ranks of foreign jihadist groups, and another 80 have returned.


A secondary, but equally misguided fantasy is that Canada's decision to join the international coalition against ISIL will make any real difference at all. The country's military contribution to the international coalition pales in comparison to that of its more powerful allies. Held up against Canada's previous military efforts in Afghanistan, the deployment against ISIL is trifling: half-a-dozen CF-18 fighter jets, two Aurora Surveillance aircraft, an air-to-air refuelling CC-150 Polaris.

Misguided fantasy

In the end, it amounts to a roughly 700-strong deployment. There are no ground troops. No boots on the ground. And, the entire mission comes with a six-month expiry date. On balance, this amounts to a footnote in the fight. Militarily, it is quite literally the least Canada could do. There is no use pretending this rather modest effort will turn the tide against the menace of ISIL but it was the most the government could muster in the face of political opposition that would have rather had Canada limit its mission to a humanitarian one.

In truth, the only thing worse than watching the government overstate the threat ISIL poses to Canadians and their families and exaggerate the impact a handful of Canadian fighter jets would have in dismantling the so-called Islamic Caliphate was hearing the opposition's arguments against the government's modest proposal.

Thomas Mulcair, leader of the NDP and the country's official opposition, suggested Canada's military engagement would result in the mathematically impossible: "Thousands or tens of thousands of [Canadian] veterans". Liberal leader Justin Trudeau resorted to tasteless, nonsensical jokes. He denounced Harper's offer of Canadian air support against ISIL as the Conservatives "trying to whip out [their] CF-18s and show how big they are".

Canada's participation in the international coalition against ISIL deserved more high-minded debate. There are compelling reasons for Canada to join the international coalition against ISIL, not the least of which is the country's historic and moral duty to stand by its allies, in whatever small way it can. Military action has the potential to slow the momentum of ISIL's territorial gains, but is hardly a panacea to the threat it poses.

Canada's opposition should have focused on larger strategic questions: How will Canada limit civilian casualties in airstrikes? How can Canada assist the Iraqi government in building institutional capabilities to combat ISIL? How can Canada exert meaningful diplomatic pressure in the region to stem the flow of weapons and money to ISIL. Another valid question is whether Canada should make a more robust, long-term military commitment to the international military effort against ISIL.

In the end, Canada's decision to participate in international air strikes was the right one. Sending humanitarian assistance to the region is important, but it's not enough. In Canada, the debate will surely continue - because there is no point in pretending six months of air sorties will solve anything. 

Sonia Verma is a Canadian journalist based in the Gulf. She has written for The Globe And Mail, The Times of London and New York Newsday.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial policy.

http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/10/why-canada-joining-anti-isil-co-201410873014849618.html
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Journeyman on October 09, 2014, 11:59:20
I read this article in Alzaheera.  ::)
Why the " ::) " ?

Are you disagreeing with Mulcair suggesting "the mathematically impossible: 'Thousands or tens of thousands of [Canadian] veterans' "?  Or is it the bit about Trudeau resorting to "tasteless, nonsensical jokes"?

I certainly hope you're not taking issue with "Canada's participation in the international coalition against ISIL deserved more high-minded debate," because that is most assuredly true.



ps - They transcribe their own name from Arabic as "Al Jazeera," and as they note with all publications in their Opinion pages: "The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial policy."
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Chris Pook on October 09, 2014, 13:49:46
Why the " ::) " ?

Are you disagreeing with Mulcair suggesting "the mathematically impossible: 'Thousands or tens of thousands of [Canadian] veterans' "?  Or is it the bit about Trudeau resorting to "tasteless, nonsensical jokes"?

I certainly hope you're not taking issue with "Canada's participation in the international coalition against ISIL deserved more high-minded debate," because that is most assuredly true.



ps - They transcribe their own name from Arabic as "Al Jazeera," and as they note with all publications in their Opinion pages: "The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial policy."

I'm with Journeyman on this one.  I can't find anything to object to in the article.

Actually, I am starting to see Al Jazeera in a new light.  It seems to be supplying more attempts to be "even-handed".  At least as much as any heirs of the pamphleteers are even-handed.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Remius on October 09, 2014, 14:03:40
I have to agree.  The article makes some very very valid points.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on October 09, 2014, 16:23:48
6 aircraft is hardly a fleet.  It's rather embarrassing.

It is 6 more than we have there now.  Plus the other assets going.  Comparably, what % of the Army (F Ech types) were deployed to the sandbox at any one time?  Certainly not all, but our contribution there wasn't seen as "embarrassing" right? What % of the Army does the current SOF contribution equal?    While this op will go, there is still the other "stuff" these units do day to day that still must be done.

The crews going into this one might not like the thought of their own fellow service personnel referring to what they are doing as "embarrassing", no matter how 'small' the force there may be/seem to be.

 :2c:
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Remius on October 09, 2014, 16:58:45
It is 6 more than we have there now.  Plus the other assets going.  Comparably, what % of the Army (F Ech types) were deployed to the sandbox at any one time?  Certainly not all, but our contribution there wasn't seen as "embarrassing" right? What % of the Army does the current SOF contribution equal?    While this op will go, there is still the other "stuff" these units do day to day that still must be done.

The crews going into this one might not like the thought of their own fellow service personnel referring to what they are doing as "embarrassing", no matter how 'small' the force there may be/seem to be.

 :2c:

I don't think anyone here thinks what they are doing is embarrassing.  Just that the some people including myself don't think that it's anywhere near what's needed.  And I'm not just refering to our contribution either. 
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: s2184 on October 09, 2014, 22:12:18
Why the " ::) " ?

Are you disagreeing with Mulcair suggesting "the mathematically impossible: 'Thousands or tens of thousands of [Canadian] veterans' "?  Or is it the bit about Trudeau resorting to "tasteless, nonsensical jokes"?

I certainly hope you're not taking issue with "Canada's participation in the international coalition against ISIL deserved more high-minded debate," because that is most assuredly true.

ps - They transcribe their own name from Arabic as "Al Jazeera," and as they note with all publications in their Opinion pages: "The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial policy."

I was not sure about how others were interpreting this article. That is why I put Roll Eyes, expecting some comments.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: E.R. Campbell on October 15, 2014, 17:12:07
The Foreign Minister's office has posted of photo of him with personnel in Camp Canada in Kuwait.

(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/B0A3wJyIIAAxima.jpg:large)

Grip and grin ...
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: milnews.ca on October 15, 2014, 20:35:47
Now that the overall "fight against ISIS/ISIL" is called Op Inherent Resolve (http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=123422), the CF has an op name, too - from the Info-machine Fact Sheet (http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad-current/op-impact.page):
Quote
Operation IMPACT is the Canadian Armed Forces’ (CAF) contribution to coalition assistance to security forces in the Republic of Iraq who are fighting against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

The Government of Canada has extended the CAF mission for up to six months ....
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on October 15, 2014, 22:07:08
The Foreign Minister's office has posted of photo of him with personnel in Camp Canada in Kuwait.

(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/B0A3wJyIIAAxima.jpg:large)

Grip and grin ...

Tfc Tech MCpl had one too many coffee at breakfast...
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Hamish Seggie on October 15, 2014, 22:18:41
Tfc Tech MCpl had one too many coffee at breakfast...

And he should stand closer to the f$$kin razor when he shaves.....
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: E.R. Campbell on October 17, 2014, 08:49:28
Former Prime Minister Jean Chrétien provides his assessment of what Canada is and should be doing in Iraq/the 'war' against IS** in this article which is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from the Globe and Mail:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/canadas-true-role-in-the-mideast-conflict/article21138349/#dashboard/follows/
Quote
(http://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fbeta.images.theglobeandmail.com%2Fmedia%2Fwww%2Fimages%2Fflag%2Fgam-masthead.png&hash=19ff3553db0adc5a5af34a8cb80569c3)
Canada’s true role in the Mideast conflict

JEAN CHRÉTIEN
Contributed to The Globe and Mail

Published Friday, Oct. 17 2014

When I travel to any corner of Canada, complete strangers from every walk of life come up to me on street corners, in restaurants, in airports, to take a moment to talk to me. Sometimes, they thank me for my service during my long career in public life.

There is one sentence that I hear over and over again: “Mr. Chrétien, thank you for keeping us out of the war in Iraq.” It is gratifying to hear, because that decision, more than 10 years ago, was not easy. The country was divided. Many columnists, pundits and editorialists were in favour of participating. Some within my own party disagreed with me, the business community opposed me, and no one was a louder critic than Stephen Harper, then leader of the Official Opposition. He even went on U.S. television and wrote an article in The Wall Street Journal denouncing the Canadian government’s policy.

Today, there is almost universal recognition that we made the right decision. And so, in recent weeks, many people have asked me what I would do about the current situation in Iraq and Syria. Do I agree with Mr. Harper’s position or Mr. Trudeau’s? What should Canada do?

Here is my answer. ‎

There is no more serious decision for an elected official than sending men and women into conflict. The consequences, at home and abroad, are enormous. A wrong decision, such as the invasion of Iraq in 2003, can have disastrous results that reverberate for years. The current rise of the Islamic State is in large part a result of that war.

I know what it is like to send Canadians into combat. The government I led participated in multilateral combat missions in both Kosovo and Afghanistan because we determined that it was the best contribution Canada could make in those very difficult circumstances. ‎So I am not always opposed to sending Canadians into combat. But these are decisions that must be made with utmost seriousness and consideration. In general, it should also be done with a clear mandate and under the umbrella of the United Nations or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which is clearly not the case here.

We have an obligation to proceed with the utmost caution, and to weigh all the potential consequences before joining a combat mission.

For example, all the war in Iraq did was to make the region and the world a much more dangerous place. The legacy of colonialism in the Middle East had not been forgotten and was only exacerbated by the Western military intervention in Iraq in 2003, with the consequences we face today. Unfortunately, Mr. Harper did not understand that history in 2003, and he does not understand it today.

The current situation is in some ways very different from 2003. The Islamic State’s atrocities must be stopped. But Western countries must be cognizant of the region’s history in deciding how to act.

There are two components to the crisis – one military and one humanitarian. Both must be addressed.

The Iraqi government has asked for U.S. assistance and President Barack Obama has responded with air strikes. But given the history of the region and the sensitivities to Western military interventions, I believe that any U.S.-led military coalition should be composed mainly of Arab countries, with minimal participation by other Western countries.

I have enormous‎ admiration for the men and women of the Canadian armed forces. But the reality is that the military contribution Mr. Harper’s government has authorized will be very marginal.

What it really does is to add Canada to a list of contributing Western countries. The history of the Middle East tells us that this list should be very short, not long.

‎No one underestimates the Islamic State. But the issues are the best ways to combat it and the best contributions Canada can make. ‎If the region sees military intervention as just another knee-jerk Western show of force, we all know what the long-term consequences will be.

This is why I believe the best ‎contribution Canada can make is by engaging in massive, not token, humanitarian assistance. It is why in answer to the questions asked of me, I support Mr. Trudeau’s position.

The Islamic State has created a massive humanitarian crisis. Hundreds of thousands of people have been displaced. Neighbouring countries are dealing with floods of refugees. The World Food Program is almost out of funds and winter is approaching.

The Prime Minister may believe that not participating in the combat mission means Canada will be sitting on the sidelines. He is absolutely wrong – Canada should be on the front line, addressing the humanitarian crisis.

‎For well over 50 years, it has been the Canadian way to open our hearts, our doors and our wallets to victims of great upheavals – Hungarians in the 1950s, Ugandans in the 1970s, Vietnamese boat people in the 1980s, refugees from the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. And I am always thrilled by the great contribution they make after arriving.

Here are two concrete initiatives I would recommend for Mr. Harper to put Canada on the front lines of the humanitarian crisis while a U.S.-led, primarily Arab coalition focuses on the military crisis.

First, Canada should offer to immediately take 50,000 refugees fleeing the Islamic State. I hope the government will move on this quickly.

Second, the government should immediately allocate $100-million‎ for the World Food Program, to help feed refugees facing a harsh winter.

I understand that faced with the barbarism of the Islamic State, many Canadians want their leaders to respond swiftly. It is a natural reaction and is praiseworthy. It’s exactly what I am proposing as a natural extension of Mr. Trudeau’s decision and Canada’s long-standing tradition.


As usual Prime Minister Chrétien tells half truths and gets things half right, albeit for the wrong reasons.

Why didn't we join the USA, in some way, in 2003? They were asking for 'moral support,' political and diplomatic support, not "boots the ground." The reason is simple, Prime Minister Chrétien, unlike Mr Harper and even then Minister of Everything John Manley and most of the punditry, correctly 'read' the Canadian mood: it was anti-American. Indeed, he, M. Chrétien, had helped organize that resurgent anti-Americanism when four Canadian soldiers were killed by "friendly fire" during our first Afghan mission in April of 2002. The national "outpouring of grief" was orchestrated (sometimes in poor taste) from Ottawa and it was heavily tinged with an anti-American bias. Did M.Chrétien know that he would want to use that anti-Americanism (which is never far below the surface in Canada) in the near future? No. He just knew that's it's almost always good politics and Prime Minister Harper has not been above using it himself ~ think about his first comments (after being elected in 2006) about the Arctic. It wasn't principle that kept us out of Iraq; it wasn't good, clear strategic vision; it was low, partisan, political calculation.

As to his prescriptions, he's half right:

     1. We should "immediately allocate $100-million‎ for the World Food Program, to help feed refugees facing a harsh winter." That's a good idea; but, and it's a Big BUT

     2. We should accept zero refugees from the region. We should rarely, and only in the most dire of circumstances, accept any refugees from  anywhere. We should help care for refugees - maybe another $100 Million - in or every near their homelands but bringing
         refugees to Canada is almost always a mistake. A refugee is, by definition, a person who needs temporary refuge because (s)he and her/his family have fled their homes in fear for life and limb. Settling them, permanently, in Canada is not the right
         thing to do - it often makes matters worse for them.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: George Wallace on October 17, 2014, 10:25:06

     2. We should accept zero refugees from the region. We should rarely, and only in the most dire of circumstances, accept any refugees from  anywhere. We should help care for refugees - maybe another $100 Million - in or every near their homelands but bringing
         refugees to Canada is almost always a mistake. A refugee is, by definition, a person who needs temporary refuge because (s)he and her/his family have fled their homes in fear for life and limb. Settling them, permanently, in Canada is not the right
         thing to do - it often makes matters worse for them.

I fully agree.  Beside the fact that they are not looking for a change of cultural values in escaping the violence in their homelands, we have not got the resources to properly screen them if we did bring them here.  As in the past, they could have health issues, criminal associations, or perhaps foreign intelligence affiliations.  We have no idea of whom they may be.  Just opening our doors for "feel good" reasons is not reason enough to accept anyone.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: E.R. Campbell on October 17, 2014, 11:50:25
Let me be clear: the overwhelming majority of refugees who settle in Canada are honest, hard working and damned grateful to be here. They work hard, obey our laws and try their best ... it is the refugee system that is broken, the refugees, themselves, are, mostly, decent, honest people who deserve our help. We need to help in better, more effective and, yes, more generous ways, but we need to respond "over there" not by bringing the refugees here. Our aim should be to protect refugees and return them to their homes when we have helped (maybe militarily) to remove the forces that made them seek refuge elsewhere.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: George Wallace on October 17, 2014, 12:32:23
Let me be clear: the overwhelming majority of refugees who settle in Canada are honest, hard working and damned grateful to be here. They work hard, obey our laws and try their best ... it is the refugee system that is broken, the refugees, themselves, are, mostly, decent, honest people who deserve our help. We need to help in better, more effective and, yes, more generous ways, but we need to respond "over there" not by bringing the refugees here. Our aim should be to protect refugees and return them to their homes when we have helped (maybe militarily) to remove the forces that made them seek refuge elsewhere.

Agreed.  Just bringing them here, just for the sake of helping them, and introducing them to a completely foreign culture is much like the resettlement of Inuit communities to new locations in our not to distant past, perhaps even worse.  They may not actually want to come here.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Chris Pook on October 17, 2014, 16:06:40
I think the net effect would be more "Lebanese-Canadians" and "Hong Kong Canadians".  Citizens of a foreign land holding a Canadian passport and expecting to be bailed out by their "Insurer" when things go wrong.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: S.M.A. on October 30, 2014, 18:23:39
And the CF18 "six-pack" arrives in Kuwait ahead of their planned strikes:

CBC (http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/cf-18s-arrive-in-kuwait-for-anti-isis-mission-1.2817265)

Quote
CF-18s arrive in Kuwait for anti-ISIS mission
By Murray Brewster, The Canadian Press Posted: Oct 29, 2014 2:27 PM ET

Canadian warplanes have taken up position in Kuwait, a country straining in its own way to hold back the tide of Islamic extremism from its borders.

The CF-18 jet fighters and CP-140 Aurora surveillance planes are expected to join a U.S.-led coalition's bombing campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, also known as ISIS or ISIL, within days.

(...SNIPPED)
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on October 30, 2014, 20:40:37
Nice shot of '104 sitting in the 40s during PFIs before departing last Friday night.  Taken from the RCAF FB page.

Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Dimsum on October 30, 2014, 20:51:26
Is it just me or does the shadow (?) look like a happy face?
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: medicineman on October 31, 2014, 00:00:02
Is it just me or does the shadow (?) look like a happy face?

Does look like a happy plane  :nod:.

MM
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on November 02, 2014, 22:53:53
Sorry to intrude on your PostAthon  ;D

Article Link (http://www.canada.com/news/Fisher+Canadian+fighter+jets+launch+first+attack+Islamic+State+targets+Iraq/10347153/story.html)

Canada launches first air strikes against ISIS: CF-18 fighter jets drop laser-guided bombs on targets in Iraq

Canadian fighter jets dropped bombs over Iraq late Sunday night, Iraqi time, Defense Minister Rob Nicholson announced in a statement from Ottawa.

“Today, Canada’s CF-18s conducted their first combat strike since joining the fight against [ISIS] on Oct. 30. Co-ordinated with our coalition partners, two CF-18s attacked [ISIS] targets with GBU12 500-pound laser-guided bombs in the vicinity of Fallujah, Iraq,” Nicholson said

“The approximately four-hour mission included air-to-air refueling from Canada’s Polaris aircraft. All aircraft returned safely to their base.”


Canadian Forces Combat Camera

Canadian Forces Combat CameraA Canadian Armed Forces flight crew member services the CP-140M Aurora Long Range Patrol aircraft as they arrive in Kuwait in support of Operation IMPACT on October 29, 2014. .

Nicholson said the assessment of damage was continuing.

It was the middle of the night in Kuwait, where the Canadian warplanes are based, and nobody connected with Task Force Iraq was available to comment.

Ottawa received word of the attack at about noon Ottawa time (or around 8 p.m. in Iraq).

First word of the successful sortie came in a statement from the minister shortly after 6 p.m. ET.

Few other details were released about the airstrike, which was the first use of bombs by CF-18 Hornets since the war to oust Muammar Gaddafi.

“We are all proud about the first strike,” an officer in Ottawa familiar with the operation said.

“It’s all good news, but we cannot possibly release information because it has to all come out at once at a tech brief where all the information will be covered so that you have the whole picture.”

As of Sunday evening, that brief for journalists was scheduled to be given in Ottawa on Tuesday.

The announcement of the air strike on the fourth day of operations came after the chief spokesman for Task Force Iraq said that the mission had been going well since it started on Thursday, with the CP-140 M Aurora spy planes singled out for praise.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Every time I see the words "spy plane", I laugh to myself.  Even the picture from the same article calls it a LRPA. 8)

Yup, its a spy plane that carries....sonar buoys.   :nod:

- mod edit to fix link -
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Dimsum on November 03, 2014, 02:03:13
Maybe the reporter is paid by the word and the company was cutting costs?   ;)
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: milnews.ca on November 03, 2014, 08:43:27
Every time I see the words "spy plane", I laugh to myself.  Even the picture from the same article calls it a LRPA. 8)
That's because they've cut/pasted the Info-machine's caption/wording. 

Yup, its a spy plane that carries....sonar buoys.   :nod:
To be fair to (in this case) a reporter who's trying to get it right, what does "Long Range Patrol Aircraft" mean to the average reader at a glance?  And the wide range of stuff the planes DO do (check here (http://bit.ly/1yQ3sxb) for one overview) is a little tough to sum up briefly for civilian audiences.  Another info-machine term - "reconnaissance capabilities" (http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=896439) - gives only a slightly better idea of the plane's job.

Maybe you can "lease" out your army.ca handle to Postmedia News as a short, sweet & less out there than "spy plane" descriptor?  Or does someone else hold the copyright?  ;D
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: George Wallace on November 03, 2014, 11:49:58

Maybe you can "lease" out your army.ca handle to Postmedia News as a short, sweet & less out there than "spy plane" descriptor?  Or does someone else hold the copyright?  ;D

 ;D

But the civies will only construe "Eye In The Sky" as "Spy In The Sky" and we are back to square one.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: milnews.ca on November 03, 2014, 12:03:48
;D

But the civies will only construe "Eye In The Sky" as "Spy In The Sky" and we are back to square one.
Or even "Pie in the Sky"?  Or even confuse it with the "cameras tracking the downtown" programs, right?
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: milnews.ca on November 03, 2014, 17:35:11
Bumped with the latest details from the Info-machine (http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad-current/op-impact.page) ....
Quote
.... On 30 October 2014, all ATF-I aircraft commenced air operations over Iraqi airspace.
•Two CF-188 Hornets conducted their first mission over Iraq. During the six-hour mission flown to the west of Baghdad, no targets were engaged. Throughout the mission, the CF-188’s were supported by coalition surveillance and tanker aircraft.
•One CP-140 Aurora flew a six-hour intelligence gathering mission over northwestern Iraq. During its first mission, the aircraft supported intelligence gathering for the Canadian task force and coalition partners, which helps to develop a better understanding of the battle space.
•The CC-150T Polaris flew an approximately six-hour refueling mission. The Polaris is part of a pool of coalition aircraft with air refueling capabilities assigned to support coalition air assets. The first mission for the Polaris resulted in almost 50,000 pounds of fuel being delivered to coalition aircraft ....
A bit more from CENTCOM here (http://bit.ly/1zsBivl).
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on November 04, 2014, 13:01:23
That's because they've cut/pasted the Info-machine's caption/wording. 
To be fair to (in this case) a reporter who's trying to get it right, what does "Long Range Patrol Aircraft" mean to the average reader at a glance?  And the wide range of stuff the planes DO do (check here (http://bit.ly/1yQ3sxb) for one overview) is a little tough to sum up briefly for civilian audiences.  Another info-machine term - "reconnaissance capabilities" (http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=896439) - gives only a slightly better idea of the plane's job.

If they say "long range bomber" they'd know what that means.  I guess I never thought the word "patrol" would throw people off.  They must be confused by a police "patrol" going thru their neighborhoods.   ;D

I know, it's like the news article's that refer to LAVs as "tanks".  We know their not, but we still go  :facepalm: when they do it.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on November 04, 2014, 13:08:13
Pie In The Sky...hmmmm.  Now that is a great idea.  Gotta talk to Flight Feeding and see about that.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: George Wallace on November 04, 2014, 13:26:34
Pie In The Sky...hmmmm.  Now that is a great idea.  Gotta talk to Flight Feeding and see about that.

Beware the flying cow pies.   >:D
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: S.M.A. on November 04, 2014, 13:45:12
Beware the flying cow pies.   >:D

Or Flying Pigs (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PK-1_Wpm7t8#t=00m03s).
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on November 04, 2014, 14:01:13
Beware the flying cow pies.   >:D

I was hoping more for apple!
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: milnews.ca on November 04, 2014, 14:46:09
I know, it's like the news article's that refer to LAVs as "tanks".
Good comparison, actually.
Beware the flying cow pies.   >:D
Ah, khaki balmorals on a windy day - tried on 4 or 5 in Dundurn before I found mine  ;D
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on November 14, 2014, 17:47:09
Article Link (http://Canada's Iraq commander says ISIS 'on defensive' as new airstrike video released)   Video of the hit on the arty piece at the link

Canada's Iraq commander says ISIS 'on defensive' as new airstrike video released

Col. Daniel Constable, the commander of Canada's joint task force fighting against ISIS in Iraq, says his aircraft are finding few targets to strike.

Speaking from the Canadian base in Kuwait, Constable said that the aircraft under his command have carried out only two airstrikes in 68 sorties flown.

Those sorties include all flights by Canadian Forces, including six CF-18 strike aircraft, two Aurora reconnaissance planes and a Polaris refuelling aircraft, since their arrival in Kuwait on Oct. 30.

Constable briefed the media by teleconference Thursday, following Tuesday's airstrike against an apparent artillery installation north of Baghdad belonging to fighters from the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, also known as ISIS or ISIL.

He said the latest strike was on an artillery piece that was firing on Iraqi ground forces from a treeline near Bayji, Iraq.

Bayji is a city about 200 kilometres north of Baghdad that has seen fierce fighting between ISIS forces and the Iraqi army.

Moving target

Constable said the target, which may have been a howitzer, was destroyed by a laser-guided bomb, and there was some indication the ISIS gun crew may have also been killed, but that could not be confirmed.

ISIS fighters were the only ones operating in the area, he said.

He also did not say who called in the airstrike, although one of Canada's Auroras was in the area.

Cockpit video first posted on the Canadian Forces website shows a strike by a laser-guided bomb on a vehicle that appears to be towing a piece of wheeled artillery.

Capt. Melina Archambault of the Combined Joint Operations Centre told CBC News later Thursday that the gun had been hooked on to the vehicle between the time it was first detected by aerial surveillance and the time the CF-18 arrived.

On the video, the vehicle appears to sustain an almost direct hit while travelling on a dirt road between fields. Capt. Archambault could not specify the type of vehicle destroyed.

ISIS 'changing their tactics'

The slow tempo of airstrikes is a reflection of ISIS changing tactics since the current bombing campaign began, said Constable.

"ISIL are now changing their tactics, they're hiding their targets, and that's one of the reasons it's harder to find targets — they're camouflaged."

Forces sometimes hide armoured vehicles in buildings, or even bury them in sand, when the other side enjoys air superiority.

"They're moving away from tanks, into civilian-type vehicles," said Constable, adding that the change makes targeting more difficult, because "we want to be very deliberate. We are very confident we had no civilian casualties or collateral damage in either strike."

Constable added that the lack of airstrikes is not an indication that the airstrikes aren't working. Forcing the enemy to hide weapons it was previously using offensively constitutes progress, he said.

"Thanks to the airstrikes, Iraqi forces now have the confidence to move to offence. ISIL is now in a defensive posture. We are very confident that we are having an impact."

Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Pwegman on November 16, 2014, 12:48:41
with all those targets hidings . sound like a soon to be ground deployment to me. Maybe not from CAF but  they're probably gonna have to dig them out of their holes .  :threat:
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: MCG on November 22, 2014, 22:46:06
Looks like we might take our fight into Syria soon.  Not sure the move will achieve any aims quicker, but there will be more targets for whack-a-mole.

Quote
Iraq targets limited for Canadian fighter jets
International law prevents Canada's military from hitting some targets in the fight against ISIS
CBC News
20 Nov 2014

The Canadian military insists that its bombing campaign in Iraq is being conducted according to international law, which means there are some targets that Canada's aircraft will not hit.

However, Navy Capt. Paul Forget says there's no way to know for certain if Canada's most recent two missions caused civilian casualties.

Previous military briefings on the Iraq mission have made it crystal clear that civilians were not harmed, but today's was different: Forget says the latest targets — a building and enemy positions — make it impossible to say for sure.

Forget, a spokesman for the country's operations command, wouldn't talk about what targets are off-limits for Canada's CF-18 fighters, which have conducted four strike missions in Iraq so far.

Coalition aircraft have been hitting a variety of military and economic targets, everything from tanks and trenches to enemy training camps and oil refineries.

So far, Canada has hit construction equipment being used to dig defensive positions, an artillery piece, a roadside bomb-making warehouse and a line of defensive enemy positions.
http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/iraq-targets-limited-for-canadian-fighter-jets-1.2844006

Quote
Syria could be next target of Canada's CF-18s
CBC News
22 Nov 2014

Behind closed doors, Canadian officials are working feverishly to prepare for Canadian jets to strike targets inside Syria, CBC News has learned.

Sources have told CBC that Canada is close to clearing away “the legal hurdles” that stand in the way of extending the combat mission from Iraq into Syria, should the government decide to expand the mission.

The legal case is critical, because, unlike Iraq, whose government invited Canada and its coalition partners to join the fight against ISIS, Syria under its leader Bashar al-Assad is considered an enemy. The U.S. has laws that allow it to engage in pre-emptive strikes in a sovereign nation, but Canada does not.

"We have, out of necessity, had these discussions with our allies," Justice Minister Peter MacKay told CBC Radio’s The House when asked if preparations are being made to hit ISIS targets in Syria.

"We're operating against an enemy that does not respect any borders,” he said. 

"We want to degrade and cripple their ability and with that objective, we at the Department of Justice are obviously working with other departments to examine certain scenarios,” said MacKay, who also pointed out that they are “not there yet.”

Sending more signals that Canada is looking to expand its mission, Defence Minister Rob Nicholson told a Halifax International Security Forum audience that “the door is not closed” to Canada attacking targets in Syria.

If the legal case is made and the government does decide to attack ISIS targets in Syria, Chief of the Defence Staff Gen. Tom Lawson says the CF-18s are prepared.

“We would be ready for that,” Lawson told CBC Radio’s The House.

Lawson said that the military is already prepared for a much longer mission. “We are absolutely prepared to meet the government’s needs should they decide to commit Canadian troops and Canadian aircraft for a longer period,” he said.

The government has not revealed details about the cost of the Iraq mission, but Lawson said he has provided the figures.

“We provided an estimate to the government,” he said. “I’ll leave it to our elected officials to determine when that will be shared.”

But as Lawson and Nicholson defended the coalition strategy against ISIS, Republican U.S. Senator John McCain arrived at the Halifax International Security Forum with a blistering rebuttal, dismissing the current mission and Canada’s six-month assessment period as “delusional.”

“It's not realistic,” McCain told CBC Radio’s The House.

"It's delusional to say you're going to treat ISIS one way when they're in Iraq and another way when they're in Syria. That's foolish," he said.

When asked about the current strategy of coalition airstrikes supported by Iraqi boots on the ground, McCain, who will be the chair of the Senate armed services committee when Congress reconvenes in January, compared it to the American fiasco in Vietnam.

"There is no strategy that any military person I know believes will succeed in the present stated goal, which is to degrade and defeat ISIS,” McCain said.

McCain argues that a significant number of Western military soldiers will be needed in both Iraq and Syria to stabilize those countries.
http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/syria-could-be-next-target-of-canada-s-cf-18s-1.2845309
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: MCG on December 12, 2014, 12:55:21
So, Syria is not in the future for the CAF's mission ... at least for now.
Quote
No plans to expand Canada's ISIS campaign to Syria: John Baird
Adam Schreck, The Canadian Press
CTV News
06 Dec 2014 (Updated 08 Dec 2014)

MANAMA, Bahrain -- Canada has no plans to follow its neighbour the United States in expanding airstrikes against the Islamic State group into Syria, Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird said Saturday during a visit to the Middle East.

In an interview with The Associated Press, Baird said Canada has a responsibility to contribute to the U.S.-led bombing campaign in part because ISIS has attracted Canadian fighters to its ranks. But he insisted that support would be confined to Iraq for now.

"At this time we're focusing on our current mission. ... We'll stick with Iraq," he said at a security conference in the Gulf island kingdom of Bahrain.

...
http://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/no-plans-to-expand-canada-s-isis-campaign-to-syria-john-baird-1.2136019 (http://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/no-plans-to-expand-canada-s-isis-campaign-to-syria-john-baird-1.2136019)

Meanwhile, CF-188s continue to bring the pain to bad guys ...
Quote
CF-18s bomb Islamic State bunkers near Iraq's 2nd largest city
CTV News
12 Dec 2014

OTTAWA -- Canadian warplanes have conducted another attack on Islamic State forces.

Two CF-18s Hornets bombed an extremist fighting position about 250 kilometres southwest of Mosul, Iraq's second largest city.

National Defence reports the attack, which happened Wednesday, was carried out with laser-guide munitions and a Canadian C-140 Aurora surveillance plane provided intelligence and reconnaissance support.

Over 114 sorties have been carried out since the fighter jets deployed to Kuwait in support of the U.S.-led coalition.

Last week, Canadian jets supporting Iraqi security forces north-east of Mosul also dropped bombs on Islamic State bunkers and two heavy machine gun emplacements.
http://www.ctvnews.ca/world/cf-18s-bomb-islamic-state-bunkers-near-iraq-s-2nd-largest-city-1.2144696 (http://www.ctvnews.ca/world/cf-18s-bomb-islamic-state-bunkers-near-iraq-s-2nd-largest-city-1.2144696)

... and the MND makes a pre-Christmas visit to the troops.  :christmas happy:
Quote
Canada's defence minister visits troops in Kuwait
CTV News
12 Dec 2014

Minister of Defence Rob Nicholson has visited Canadian troops in Kuwait fighting Islamic State fighters, to see first-hand how the mission is progressing.

CTV News Channel’s Mercedes Stephenson reports that the minister made the trip earlier this week after a visit to Ukraine and Poland. The visit was kept secret for security reasons.

Nicholson was able to tour various Canadian Air Force locations and meet with Canadian military leaders who are co-ordinating Operation IMPACT. The operation is Canada’s contribution to the international coalition assisting security forces in Iraq in their fight against IS.

The Canadian air task force is conducting airstrikes against IS fighters and their strongholds as they work to try to prevent the movement from spreading throughout the region.

Nicholson met with Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense Sheikh Khaled Al-Jarrah Al-Sabah, as well as Deputy Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant-General Mohammed Khaled Al-Khuder to discuss military relations.

Nicholson also served dinner to troops and took part in town hall discussions while in Kuwait.

Stephenson was able to speak by video phone with Nicholson while he was in Kuwait. He told her he got a good sense of how the mission is unfolding through the visit.

"They're feeling the pressure, there's no question about that," Nicholson told her.

"The mission was to stop and contain ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and Levant). That is working to the extent that they have been able to contain them relatively well."

He added that Canadians have continued to contribute to airstrikes this week.

"And in each of these cases, they specifically target areas where ISIL has taken hold or is in operation. And, again, I'm very pleased with the results," he said.

Stephenson says the minister also discussed threats to Canadian military here at home in the wake of the attack on Parliament Hill in late October that killed Cpl. Nathan Cirillo, as well as the attack in Quebec that killed Warrant Officer Patrice Vincent.

Nicholson said the threat alert remains high in Canada and military officials are being careful.

Stephenson's full interview with Minister Nicholson will appear this evening on CTV's Power Play on CTV News Channel.
http://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/canada-s-defence-minister-visits-troops-in-kuwait-1.2144964
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on December 19, 2014, 10:09:34
Happy holidays boys.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Bruce Monkhouse on December 22, 2014, 13:42:55
http://www.torontosun.com/2014/12/22/canadian-jtf-e-snipers-fighting-islamic-state-source-says


Normand Lester, QMI Agency
 
First posted:  Monday, December 22, 2014 11:15 AM EST  | Updated:  Monday, December 22, 2014 12:00 PM EST 
MONTREAL — Canadian commandos are engaged in ground operations against the Islamic State (ISIS) in Iraq, QMI Agency has learned.

Members of the elite JTF2 (Joint Task Force 2) unit, armed with high-powered rifles, are involved in operations aimed at killing Islamist fighters far from the front lines, a source tells QMI.
The Canadians are officially in Iraq to accompany and train Kurdish and Iraqian snipers.
However, sources familiar with JTF2 operations tell QMI that the commandos are also shooting ISIS fighters.

Prime Minister Stephen Harper announced in October that Canadian CF-18s would assist in airstrikes against ISIS, and had committed a small number of elite troops to help advise Iraqi and Kurdish forces, but Parliament didn't approve of Canadians engaging in the fight on the ground.
Department of National Defence spokesman Ashley Lemire confirms the Canadian Armed Forces is working in close collaboration with British special forces, but wouldn't provide further details.

A spokeswoman for Canada's special forces umbrella group wouldn't comment on whether JTF2 has fired on ISIS, citing "operational security reasons."
Lt. Julie McDonald would only confirm that special forces members are involved in a training mission.
"Members of Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM) are currently in Iraq and are participating in Operation IMPACT with the goal of teaching and advising Iraqi and Kurdish forces," McDonald told QMI in an e-mail.

She added the Canadians are offering "military training such as shooting, manoeuvres, communications and mission planning, as well as efficient use of weapons against (Islamic State)."
The e-mail goes on to say: "COMFOSCAN personnel are carrying out this training... in an appropriate location, far from what could be considered front-line positions, but in an area that allows them to remain sensitive to the current (ISIS) threat."

McDonald wouldn't say which special forces unit is in Iraq. JTF2 is one of five squads listed on CANSOFCOM's web page.
JTF2 "operators," as they prefer to be called, use a Macmillan TAC-50 rifle nicknamed "Big Mac."
It's the longest-range weapon available to snipers, with a range of 2.3 km.

The Big Mac has been standard issue for elite Canadian snipers since 2000.
QMI was unable to confirm if Canada provided TAC-50s to Iraqi and Kurdish snipers.

JTF2 previously waged a lengthy secret operation in Afghanistan. The Canadians were integrated into American and British special forces units.
Using their TAC-50s, two Canadian snipers set world records in March 2002 in Afghanistan's Shah-i-Kot valley in Afghanistan.

The Canadians killed enemy combatants at ranges of 2,310 and 2,426 metres.
The secret team of five JTF2 commandos killed more than 20 Taliban fighters at similar distances, earning Bronze Star Medals from the United States military.

In 2004, the JTF2 unit received the Presidential Unit Citation from then-president George W. Bush.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Bruce Monkhouse on December 22, 2014, 19:21:07
The Govt. is now denying these reports......

http://www.torontosun.com/2014/12/22/canadian-jtf-e-snipers-fighting-islamic-state-source-says
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: milnews.ca on December 22, 2014, 21:53:10
The Govt. is now denying these reports......

http://www.torontosun.com/2014/12/22/canadian-jtf-e-snipers-fighting-islamic-state-source-says
And here's the official denial (http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=916419&tp=980) ....
Quote
Major-General Michael Hood, Director of the Strategic Joint Staff of the Canadian Armed Forces, issued the following statement:

    “Recent media reports have speculated that members of the Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM) have directly engaged in sniper activity against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). This is not the case. CANSOFCOM’s role in Iraq is to provide training, military advice and assistance teams. Members in Iraq are working within a well-defined mission that was passed in the House of Commons. We have been clear that this mission does not involve ground troops in a combat role.

    “CANSOFCOM is helping to provide Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) with military training such as shooting, movement, communications, and mission planning, as well as how to effectively employ their various weapons systems against ISIL.

    “The support provided to the people of Iraq by the Canadian Armed Forces demonstrates Canada’s resolve to stand with our allies and make positive contributions to international security.”
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: MCG on December 29, 2014, 00:07:45
Rumour mill has the mission being extended for another 6 months. 

Quote
Opposition leaders need to speak up about extending Canada’s military role in Iraq 
Matthew Fisher, Post Media News
Edmonton Journal
27 Dec 2014

Should Canada continue to participate in the U.S.-led fight against Islamic State when the current mission ends this spring?

It is an important question that has received scant attention recently from Liberal Leader Justin Trudeau and the New Democrats’ Tom Mulcair. Yet almost everyone in the military assumes that Stephen Harper’s government soon will announce that when the more than 600 Canadians now serving as trainers in Iraq or with the RCAF in neighbouring Kuwait rotate home they will be replaced by others.

In fact, over the past few days several soldiers have told me that they or some of their colleagues already have received notices telling them to be prepared to deploy to the Middle East by late April. Such notices are almost always followed by formal orders confirming their deployment. So, it is highly likely Ottawa will keep troops in the Middle East for the foreseeable future.

Largely because of hand-wringing by U.S. President Barack Obama, the coalition strategy for how to defeat Islamic State remains a muddle of half-measures. This is because of a universal reluctance by coalition partners to commit the commandos, infantry, armoured and artillery units required to defeat the radicals in western and northwestern Iraq.

Even absent a robust intervention on the ground, the coalition’s air campaign and the training of Iraqi soldiers and their Kurdish peshmerga allies has undoubtedly helped achieve some progress against Islamic State in cities such as Mosul and where its forces have tried to lay siege to cities such as Irbil, Kirkuk and Baghdad. To be truly effective both coalition missions must be extended. They would also be more effective if they were to become adjuncts to a land offensive.

It is the third time that Ottawa has been at war in a decade. It can be reasonably argued that Islamic State is the most vile enemy Canada has fought in many decades. But the conflict over Iraq has been relatively small news back home compared with the attention given to the Canadian Forces’ part in toppling Moammar Gadhafi in Libya or the war that Canada waged against al-Qaida and the Taliban in southern Afghanistan.

It is not as if little is happening. Several hundred thousand Iraqi Christians from Mosul and nearby areas are celebrating Christmas on the run because they refused to convert to Islam and therefore faced being decapitated as apostates. Perhaps most repellent of all have been recent revelations about Islamic State’s grotesque declarations regarding the place of captured women in their self-styled caliphate.

Islamic State has circulated videos showing its fighters joking about women they have taken as prizes of war. It published a chilling 27-point manifesto last month that provided a detailed religious justification for “masters” to “buy, sell, gift” and pass on captured female “slaves” to their male heirs as well as explaining jihadists’ right to have sex with female slaves including pre-pubescent girls.

Because they constantly champion human rights and women’s rights, it has been stunning to find Trudeau’s Liberals and Mulcair’s New Democrats reluctant to have Canada try to do something to defeat Islamic State. Sidestepping the reality that Canada has already done as much or more than any other western nation to assist those displaced by the fighting in Iraq and Syria, they have offered bromides about the need to help refugees. And, in the case of Trudeau, made ill-considered comments about the need to study the root causes of Islamic fundamentalism, as if the West, and by association, Canada, is somehow to blame for the choreographed decapitation of western journalists and aid workers and the machine-gunning deaths of scores of prisoners.

After a brief parliamentary debate in early October, the Liberals and New Democrats opposed the modest number of Canadian military trainers the Harper government dispatched to Iraq and the six-pack of CF-18 Hornets and the reconnaissance and support aircraft that are now bombing Islamic State from bases in Kuwait.

Whatever misgivings they may have about other aspects of how Harper governs, polls indicated that Canadians strongly support his government’s decision to send troops to bomb Islamic State and train Iraqi ground forces. Nevertheless, as the Liberal and New Democrat leaders enter an election year they have continued to insist it is in Canada’s best interests to offer Band-Aids and Pablum to ease suffering rather than a more robust response to Islamic State’s bestial provocations.

Canadians need to know if the recent murders of Warrant Officer Patrice Vincent and Cpl. Nathan Cirillo as well as Islamic State’s joyous slaughter of what it considers to be infidels and its depraved behaviour toward female captives have changed Trudeau and Mulcair’s minds about the Harper government’s military campaign, which is currently slated to end in April. And whether they now embrace the highly likely six-month extension of that mission, which will have Canadian troops still in Iraq and Kuwait until after the federal election.
http://www.edmontonjournal.com/life/Fisher+Opposition+leaders+need+speak+about+extending+Canada+military+role+Iraq/10682525/story.html
Title: CAF helps ISIS bring in new year with a bang
Post by: MCG on January 01, 2015, 19:32:49
Very nice of our guys to drop a spectacular New Years fire works show.

Quote
Canadian military spends New Year's Eve bombing in Iraq
2 CF-18s strike ISIS fighting positions

THE CANADIAN PRESS
CBC News
01 Jan 2015

Two Canadian fighter jets spent New Year's Eve bombing militants' positions in Iraq as part of a international airstrike campaign.

The Defence Department says that on Dec. 31 the two CF-18s struck ISIS fighting positions using precision-guided munitions.

The planes were acting in support of Iraqi security forces' group operations west of Fallujah.
According to information posted by the American and Australian governments, the targets hit in that area were tactical units belonging to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria group.

The group, which has declared a self-styled caliphate, holds about a third of Iraq and neighbouring Syria.

The U.S. government says fighter planes and drones also conducted airstrikes in Syria on Dec. 31, destroying oil derricks, ISIS buildings and fighting positions.
http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/canadian-military-spends-new-year-s-eve-bombing-in-iraq-1.2888061
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Dimsum on January 03, 2015, 20:44:21
http://news.nationalpost.com/2015/01/03/marc-garneau-liberals-isolationist-hardly/

Quote
So what is the highest and best use of Canadian strengths and talents? Yes, we can bomb as well as others, but we can also do other things better than others — like training Iraqi troops to defeat ISIS. We can also be a global leader in humanitarian aid, medical help and reconstruction — it’s all about winning the hearts and minds of local Iraqis and of ISIS’s victims. That’s where the real “heavy lifting” will have to be done. What could be accomplished if we took the considerable dollars we’re spending on bombing and used it for aid, medical support and training?

Our position is the opposite of isolationism. It’s active engagement designed intelligently to be the most effective it can be.

Yes, it's an election year and all things are secondary to it, but really?  Forget "isolationism", we will be the laughingstock of the coalition (and beyond) if we follow that line of thinking without the required security/combat mission to back it up when it invariably turns south. 
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: MCG on January 05, 2015, 12:50:52
It would seem there is going to be a update on the progress of the mission today:  http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/isis-mission-update-expected-today-as-iraq-bombing-raids-continue-1.2889642
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: MCG on January 16, 2015, 14:30:19
More ground targets become available to our fighters as ISIS resumes offensive operations.

Quote
Alberta-based fighter pilots respond to ISIL attacks
Trevor Robb
Edmonton Sun
16 Jan 2014

After being knocked "back on their heels" just over a week ago, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) are fighting back -- and Alberta-based fighter pilots are responding.

Just a week after Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) Brig.-Gen. Dan Constable, who commands Joint Task Force Iraq, told media that ISIL forces were on the defensive, the terror group has since re-launched attacks in an attempt to regain territory in the provinces of Anbar, Nineveh and Saladin -- reportedly killing at least 23 people, including several Kurdish Peshmerga soldiers.

On Thursday, Canadian Armed Forces Captain (Navy) Paul Forget said these attacks from ISIL were successfully defended by Iraq Security Forces (ISF).

"Thanks to the continued pressure implemented by the Iraq Security Forces, supported by the coalition airstrikes, this re-launch effort failed," said Forget, who updated media Thursday from Ottawa.

Since the last media update on Jan.8, CF-18 Hornet fighter jets -- deployed out of Cold Lake -- have undertaken six new airstrikes in support of Iraqi operations, all along the Euphrates River Valley and into northern city of Mosul.

On Jan. 11 and 12, Hornets used precision-guided strikes near the city of Baiji -- just south of Mosul -- targeting an enemy transport truck that was pulling an armoured personnel carrier, as well as an ISIL strong point that included staging and weapons storage facilities, said Forget, who took several questions regarding any uptick in the tempo of airstrikes being conducted.

However, he quickly dismissed any claims that CAF operations are increasing.

"The tempo is continuous. The number of sorties undertaken follows a regular rhythm," said Forget. "Obviously, ISIL undertook, itself, an offensive recently and when they take the offensive they expose themselves, and this allows us to undertake more strikes against them -- they expose themselves and we hit back.

"The tempo hasn't really changed. We haven't increased anything, really."

Forget added CAF operations against ISIL have not changed in the wake of the Paris terrorist attacks, where Al Qaeda-linked gunmen from Yemen killed 12 people at a French satirical newspaper office on Jan. 8.

"These unfortunate events that took place in Paris last week had no effect whatsoever on operations that we're conducting currently in Iraq," said Forget. "I would even say that it made the objective even more clear -- since France is a member of the coalition we have a brotherhood of arms and we're maintaining our efforts against this common enemy."

Since joining the fight against ISIL in October, Canadian jets have flown a total of 335 sorties, including 214 sorties flown by CF-18 Hornets. Canada's CC-150T Polaris refuelling jet has flown 27 sorties and has delivered more than 3.117-million pounds of fuel to coalition aircrafts. The two CC-140 Aurora surveillance aircrafts have flown 64 sorties.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Old Sweat on January 19, 2015, 16:19:33
According to this CP story published on the NationalNewswatch.com site, members of CANSOFCOM returned fire in Iraq. The story is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provision of the Copyright Act.

Canadian soldiers forced to defend themselves in firefight in Iraq: general

By The Canadian Press — CP — Jan 19 2015

OTTAWA - Canadian soldiers opened fire on enemy positions in Iraq over the last week in what a senior officer called an act of self-defence.

Brig.-Gen. Michael Rouleau, commander of special operations command, says the soldiers were visiting front-line positions with Iraqi forces when they came under mortar and machine-gun fire.

The Canadians, whose job is to train and advise the Iraqi military in their battle against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, were at the front to help plan an Iraqi operation.

Rouleau says the Canadians used sniper fire and "neutralized" the enemy positions without taking any casualties.

The general says that while Canadian soldiers are not participating in active combat in Iraq, they do have the right to fire back if fired upon.

He says most of their effort involves training Iraqi soldiers in battlefield skills ranging from medical assistance to mortar fire.
Title: ISIS fight: Canadian special forces came under fire in the last week
Post by: krimynal on January 19, 2015, 17:17:12
Source : http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/isis-fight-canadian-special-forces-came-under-fire-in-the-last-week-1.2917777

Canadian special forces came under ISIS fire sometime in the last week when they went to the front lines in Iraq following a planning session with senior Iraqi leaders, their commanding officer told reporters in Ottawa on Monday.

Brig.-Gen. Michael Rouleau, commander of the Canadian special operations forces command, said forces came under "immediate and effective mortar fire" and responded with sniper fire, "neutralizing the mortar and the machine-gun position."

He said the response was consistent with the inherent right of self-defence and suggested it was an incident typical of military missions, one that wouldn't have been unusual even in past Canadian peacekeeping missions.

Rouleau said Monday's briefing wasn't driven by a need to deliver that news and said his attendance had been planned well before the skirmish.

Lt.-Gen. Jonathan Vance, commander of the Canadian joint operations command, told journalists at a briefing that coalition forces have stopped the advance of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, also known as ISIS.

ISIS has been forced into a defensive posture, Vance said.

"Now we are degrading them," he said of the three-month-old mission.

Stephen Harper confirms 26 Canadian soldiers now in Iraq
Strikes on ISIS in Iraq sparing civilians: Canadian commander
The joint operations command handles missions intended to defend Canada, assist in the defence of North America, and promote peace and security abroad.
Title: Re: ISIS fight: Canadian special forces came under fire in the last week
Post by: Old Sweat on January 19, 2015, 17:22:15
Another report posted here:

http://army.ca/forums/index.php/topic,116553.msg1346879/topicseen.html#new
Title: Re: ISIS fight: Canadian special forces came under fire in the last week
Post by: daftandbarmy on January 19, 2015, 17:31:00
Source : http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/isis-fight-canadian-special-forces-came-under-fire-in-the-last-week-1.2917777

Canadian special forces came under ISIS fire sometime in the last week when they went to the front lines in Iraq following a planning session with senior Iraqi leaders, their commanding officer told reporters in Ottawa on Monday.

Brig.-Gen. Michael Rouleau, commander of the Canadian special operations forces command, said forces came under "immediate and effective mortar fire" and responded with sniper fire, "neutralizing the mortar and the machine-gun position."

He said the response was consistent with the inherent right of self-defence and suggested it was an incident typical of military missions, one that wouldn't have been unusual even in past Canadian peacekeeping missions.

Rouleau said Monday's briefing wasn't driven by a need to deliver that news and said his attendance had been planned well before the skirmish.

Lt.-Gen. Jonathan Vance, commander of the Canadian joint operations command, told journalists at a briefing that coalition forces have stopped the advance of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, also known as ISIS.

ISIS has been forced into a defensive posture, Vance said.

"Now we are degrading them," he said of the three-month-old mission.

Stephen Harper confirms 26 Canadian soldiers now in Iraq
Strikes on ISIS in Iraq sparing civilians: Canadian commander
The joint operations command handles missions intended to defend Canada, assist in the defence of North America, and promote peace and security abroad.

And that, boy and girls, is exactly how the US got drawn into the Vietnam War  ;D
Title: Re: ISIS fight: Canadian special forces came under fire in the last week
Post by: krimynal on January 19, 2015, 17:32:16
sorry didn't see the previous post !

and yeah , seems like this might be an opening to something quite bigger .... question is ... will the CF actually take the bait ....
Title: Re: ISIS fight: Canadian special forces came under fire in the last week
Post by: jollyjacktar on January 19, 2015, 18:35:01
Fair enough.  This incident will make the subject and mission all the more political now. 
Title: Re: ISIS fight: Canadian special forces came under fire in the last week
Post by: Hamish Seggie on January 19, 2015, 18:50:15
sorry didn't see the previous post !

and yeah , seems like this might be an opening to something quite bigger .... question is ... will the CF actually take the bait ....

The military does not decide where it will be employed. The GOC decides that.
Title: Re: ISIS fight: Canadian special forces came under fire in the last week
Post by: krimynal on January 19, 2015, 19:03:23
yeah sorry , should have said let's see if CANADA takes the bait ....
Title: Re: ISIS fight: Canadian special forces came under fire in the last week
Post by: Eye In The Sky on January 19, 2015, 19:13:08
What is 'the bait' we're talking about?
Title: Re: ISIS fight: Canadian special forces came under fire in the last week
Post by: krimynal on January 19, 2015, 19:24:10
personally I would say the bait is bringing in ground troops to Irak ... which I see as a 2 way street .... I am not really looking forward to something like that just because of what happened recently ( Afghanistan war ).  But on the other side , I don't like the fact that the only ground force we have over there are special forces , and are not there to actually bring in the hammer , they are there as a training purpose , I do realize I may be completely in the dark.  This is the reason why I started with PERSONALLY 
Title: Re: ISIS fight: Canadian special forces came under fire in the last week
Post by: uncle-midget-Oddball on January 19, 2015, 20:48:11
Fair enough.  This incident will make the subject and mission all the more political now.

This will without a doubt result in whichever party leader/anti military group standing up and shouting very angrily that we should not have any boots on the ground whatsoever (unless they're handing out parkas etc)..
And personally I'd like to hear the MND or CDS respond to these individuals and parties by asking them a question: "Would you prefer we had nobody on the ground to give our air assets an 'eyes on' view that keeps non-combatant women and children from being killed in potential airstrikes?      No?       Well then stfu." 
But that's just me...
Title: Re: ISIS fight: Canadian special forces came under fire in the last week
Post by: PuckChaser on January 19, 2015, 20:49:57
I'm surprised that no lefty media picked up that Vance told the briefing that ISIL won't be crushed until there is boots on the ground.
Title: Re: ISIS fight: Canadian special forces came under fire in the last week
Post by: George Wallace on January 19, 2015, 21:15:15
This will without a doubt result in whichever party leader/anti military group standing up and shouting very angrily that we should not have any boots on the ground whatsoever (unless they're handing out parkas etc)..


Whoa! Whoa! Whoa!

The parkas and boots are going to Ukraine.


Nothing left to send to Iraq.
Title: Re: ISIS fight: Canadian special forces came under fire in the last week
Post by: uncle-midget-Oddball on January 19, 2015, 21:24:43
Whoa! Whoa! Whoa!

The parkas and boots are going to Ukraine.


Nothing left to send to Iraq.

...bombs  ;D
That's the real reason why the CAF is striking ISIS.... we wanted to send parkas, but since those went to Ukraine all that was left was some bombs.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Old Sweat on January 19, 2015, 22:59:59
John Ivison of The National Post engages in some not unrealistic speculation in this piece reproduced under the Fair Dealing provision of the Copyright Act.

John Ivison: If firefight with ISIS wasn’t start of combat mission, war may be yet to come

January 19, 2015 7:05 PM ET

OTTAWA — Last October, the House of Commons agreed to send “military assets,” in the form of CF-18 fighters, to Iraq to battle the Islamic State. The resolution presented by the government said Canada would not deploy troops on the ground in combat operations.

Yet in a briefing to media on Monday by Lieutenant-General Jonathan Vance and Brigadier-General Michael Rouleau, it was revealed that Canada’s 69 special forces troops have indeed been involved in combat.

Lt.-Gen. Vance said that special forces troops “neutralized” incoming mortar and machine gun fire, while on the frontlines within the last week. Special operations forces also identified targets with lasers and provided “eyes on” reconnaissance for air strikes.

Brig-Gen. Rouleau said the action was taken in self-defence, and an exchange of fire does not mean Canada has started a combat mission.

But the revelation provoked immediate accusations of mission creep, and claims that Parliament is being misled by the government: “We were told all the work would be away from the front lines but obviously that is not the case,” said NDP defence critic Jack Harris.

Jason MacDonald, the prime minister’s spokesman, said in an email Monday the bulk of the special forces work is taking place away from the front lines, and that “a combat role is one in which our troops advance and themselves seek to engage the enemy physically, aggressively, and directly. That is not the case with this mission.”

While the October resolution is not legally binding, the government has committed to no troops on the ground. And yet, by the military’s own admission, troops are not only on the ground, they are involved in firefights with the enemy.

The incongruity stems from the shadowy nature of our special forces’ mandate. We knew there were 69 special operations members in Iraq. We didn’t know what they were doing — quite frankly, it’s a shock to be told as much as we have been. But most informed observers assumed they were acting as frontline combat advisors to Kurdish and Iraqi forces, as well as providing reconnaissance for the air mission. This is still a long way from our experience in Afghanistan.

But there are signs that is the direction in which we may be going.

Lt.-Gen. Vance said ISIS’s advance has been halted but not defeated. A “large-scale reversal” has yet to occur, he said, and the unspoken coda is that that won’t happen without the intervention of ground troops.

He said the Forces are prepared, and preparing, to extend the mission, if they are asked to do so by Parliament.

The government has said it will return to the House of Commons to gain its support at the end of the six month period this spring, though it has no legal obligation to do so.

It seems inevitable that will happen, if only to force the Liberals and New Democrats to re-state their opposition to the mission.

But will the mandate be expanded to include ground forces?

In an election year, it would seem counter-intuitive for the Conservatives to deliberately drive up the risks and costs. The public is onside with a low-level war, in which Canada is seen to be making a solid contribution, without risking mass casualties.

But Stephen Harper has said the criteria on extending the mission will be the risk the Islamic State poses to Canada – and he believes the risk is significant.

“This is a movement that has declared war on Canada specifically and it has shown it has the ability to develop the capacity to execute attacks on this soil,” he said in B.C. this month.

Images made public at the weekend showed blindfolded men accused of homosexuality being pushed by ISIS fighters to their deaths off towers, for the amusement of a watching crowd.

They reinforced the sense that this is an evil that must be confronted wherever it rears its head — and made a mockery of the claims made by a letter writer in Monday’s National Post, who argued that if only Canada would acknowledge its participation in the Afghan war was unethical aggression, and that Israel is guilty of monstrous war crimes, it will find radical Islam becomes a “genuine friend and ally.” How ludicrous. There can be no appeasement or accommodation with such a carcinogenic interpretation of Islam.

But how far does our determination to protect our freedoms go?

The Prime Minister is obviously persuaded that we are engaged in a long conflict with militant Islam that will require resolve and more resources.

It suggests that if the special forces’ firefight did not signal the start of a combat mission, it may not be long before we are, incontrovertibly, at war.
Title: Re: ISIS fight: Canadian special forces came under fire in the last week
Post by: Humphrey Bogart on January 19, 2015, 23:05:02
This will without a doubt result in whichever party leader/anti military group standing up and shouting very angrily that we should not have any boots on the ground whatsoever (unless they're handing out parkas etc)..
And personally I'd like to hear the MND or CDS respond to these individuals and parties by asking them a question: "Would you prefer we had nobody on the ground to give our air assets an 'eyes on' view that keeps non-combatant women and children from being killed in potential airstrikes?      No?       Well then stfu." 
But that's just me...

A most excellent retort it would be!
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Humphrey Bogart on January 19, 2015, 23:18:50
What's everyone so shocked about?  We've been at war since 2001... ISIS/Iraq is merely a campaign in this conflict just as the Taliban/Afghanistan was also a campaign.  People have such short memories!
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: PuckChaser on January 19, 2015, 23:25:17
What's everyone so shocked about?  We've been at war since 2001... ISIS/Iraq is merely a campaign if this conflict just as the Taliban/Afghanistan was also a campaign.  People have such short memories!

Absolutely. Same enemy, new name. The Taliban are even losing recruits to ISIS: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-death-knell-for-foreign-fighters-in-pakistan (https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-death-knell-for-foreign-fighters-in-pakistan)
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: uncle-midget-Oddball on January 19, 2015, 23:43:28
Quote
What's everyone so shocked about?  We've been at war since 2001... ISIS/Iraq is merely a campaign if this conflict just as the Taliban/Afghanistan was also a campaign.  People have such short memories!

I wouldn't say it's a surprise as much as it a very easy lightning rod for politicians and certain media outlets.

 This has gotten so much attention (and negative comments from the opposition) I believe not because of the fact that Canadians are engaged in combat..... but because of where Canadians are engaged in combat. Iraq has been tainted from a political point of view ever since Dubya's 2003 invasion which polarized opinions and political parties in Canada, and helped develop this very prevalent "America is an evil imperialist and so is Harper for standing beside them" rhetoric that we see from so many Canadians and opposition politicians in today's current climate.

Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Humphrey Bogart on January 20, 2015, 00:14:33
I wouldn't say it's a surprise as much as it a very easy lightning rod for politicians and certain media outlets.

 This has gotten so much attention (and negative comments from the opposition) I believe not because of the fact that Canadians are engaged in combat..... but because of where Canadians are engaged in combat. Iraq has been tainted from a political point of view ever since Dubya's 2003 invasion which polarized opinions and political parties in Canada, and helped develop this very prevalent "America is an evil imperialist and so is Harper for standing beside them" rhetoric that we see from so many Canadians and opposition politicians in today's current climate.

I don't think the opposition gets the fact that the dialogue/political landscape in Canada has significantly changed since then.  How sick does this sound?  ISIS did Harper and Co a huge favour when they killed those two soldiers because Canadians now realize, these guys don't like us and we shouldn't like them either and it doesn't matter how much the Trudeau's, and Mulcair's try and tell us otherwise. Uncle Steven realizes Foreign Policy is a big weakness for Trudeau and Co and I think he is going to make this an election issue.  I think Canadians are firmly on his side in this regard. 

Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: E.R. Campbell on January 20, 2015, 02:42:54
First: For Liberals, and for the entire anti-American faction in Canada, Iraq is special: 'tit Jean Chrétien stood up to George W Bush, Dick Cheney, Don Rumsfeld, et al, and especially the Great Satan, Richard Perle, an especially dark bête noire for "liberals.

Second: For the government of the day, we you the CF is in combat when it is politically advantageous to be in combat, they just defend themselves when it is not politically expedient to be in combat. It's an election year, boys and girls, and power always trumps policy.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Old Sweat on January 20, 2015, 09:39:07
It is interesting that the incident was made public at all, and perhaps there is a message there. Remember how incidents in the Balkans such as the Medak Pocket were kept quiet and how casualties were rarely announced.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: PuckChaser on January 20, 2015, 10:55:43
There's a side of me that hopes we're going to be allowed to proactively report incidents like this, so the CAF can control the details about the event and how its spun. If we release what happened, who (within reason) it happened to, and the results/actions taken, the media won't get secondhand info and paint it like a CSOR raid into an ISIS stronghold or something equally ridiculous.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Technoviking on January 20, 2015, 11:20:46
It is interesting that the incident was made public at all, and perhaps there is a message there. Remember how incidents in the Balkans such as the Medak Pocket were kept quiet and how casualties were rarely announced.
After Medak and before now was the Somalia Inquiry.  LGen Vance (et al) were senior captains/junior majors back then, and remember all too well the charade that went along with it.  They understand that in the long run, it's better to be open about things, than to try to sweep away facts.


Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Technoviking on January 20, 2015, 11:25:33
First: For Liberals, and for the entire anti-American faction in Canada, Iraq is special: 'tit Jean Chrétien stood up to George W Bush, Dick Cheney, Don Rumsfeld, et al, and especially the Great Satan, Richard Perle, an especially dark bête noire for "liberals.
I love how history has been spun to make it look like Saint Jean Chrétien told them "No!", when the facts are this:
In 2001, he deployed a BG to Kandahar
In 2002, he said that we didn't have troops to replace those in Kandahar, so they came home
In 2003, with war looming in Iraq, he suddenly found ~2000 troops to send to Kabul (including me), complete without proper warning, equipment, training, etc, and then was able to say "We don't have the troops to send to Iraq".  Later, as the war in Iraq became unpopular, the note changed from "no troops available" to "No!  We won't go, because to go to war, we need UN approval...unless it's in Serbia....and unless...."
[rant]
All modern politicians are of the same stripe: same coin, different sides.  They all want the prestige of being in power, and the appeal to the lowest common denominator in order to retain that power. 
It's time for an absolute monarchy to rid us of the chains of careerists who have no interest in doing the right thing.
[/rant]
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Jed on January 20, 2015, 12:04:13
I love how history has been spun to make it look like Saint Jean Chrétien told them "No!", when the facts are this:
In 2001, he deployed a BG to Kandahar
In 2002, he said that we didn't have troops to replace those in Kandahar, so they came home
In 2003, with war looming in Iraq, he suddenly found ~2000 troops to send to Kabul (including me), complete without proper warning, equipment, training, etc, and then was able to say "We don't have the troops to send to Iraq".  Later, as the war in Iraq became unpopular, the note changed from "no troops available" to "No!  We won't go, because to go to war, we need UN approval...unless it's in Serbia....and unless...."
[rant]
All modern politicians are of the same stripe: same coin, different sides.  They all want the prestige of being in power, and the appeal to the lowest common denominator in order to retain that power. 
It's time for an absolute monarchy to rid us of the chains of careerists who have no interest in doing the right thing.
[/rant]

Your accurate event timeline missed a relevant point;

Preparing for supporting the US and other traditional Allies in Iraq pre Afghanistan after the first go in Kandahar' 

You missed why we sent troops to Afghanistan the second time , ie: we can't be getting Canada committed to helping traditional Allies in Iraq; I know! Let's put our toe in the water elsewhere and say we are busy.

I believe some senior people saw the folly in this reasoning and were promptly sorted out.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Technoviking on January 20, 2015, 13:59:34
Your accurate event timeline missed a relevant point;

Preparing for supporting the US and other traditional Allies in Iraq pre Afghanistan after the first go in Kandahar' 

You missed why we sent troops to Afghanistan the second time , ie: we can't be getting Canada committed to helping traditional Allies in Iraq; I know! Let's put our toe in the water elsewhere and say we are busy.

I believe some senior people saw the folly in this reasoning and were promptly sorted out.
Good points.  I was in a battalion that was ramping up, high readiness and all that, so that if the government of the day said "go", we would be ready.
That's what I mean about the second mission (Kabul).  "Oh, we'd go, but, we're busy...."


Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Retired AF Guy on January 20, 2015, 14:32:14
What's everyone so shocked about?  We've been at war since 2001 633 A.D. ... ISIS/Iraq is merely a campaign in this conflict just as the Taliban/Afghanistan was also a campaign.  People have such short memories!

There... fixed that for you.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Humphrey Bogart on January 20, 2015, 14:59:55
There... fixed that for you.

HAHAHAHA, Originally I considered putting something like this down.  Thunder officially stolen!
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on January 20, 2015, 17:50:18
This is the "new" Canadian way; if someone on the playground punches you, you don't hit them back, you say sorry and then talk about it.

It worries me that so many Canadians are content to sit on the sidelines and let nasty crap happen in the world, as long as they still get their new iPhones on time and they 'get down south' in the winter.

Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: MilEME09 on January 20, 2015, 18:36:24
This is the "new" Canadian way; if someone on the playground punches you, you don't hit them back, you say sorry and then talk about it.

It worries me that so many Canadians are content to sit on the sidelines and let nasty crap happen in the world, as long as they still get their new iPhones on time and they 'get down south' in the winter.

I've been saying this for years, people will cry out that we should do something, but when it actually comes time to do something suddenly they are against it for what ever reason
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Hamish Seggie on January 20, 2015, 18:55:28
I've been saying this for years, people will cry out that we should do something, but when it actually comes time to do something suddenly they are against it for what ever reason

Aren't we sending parkas and winter boots? :facepalm:
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on January 20, 2015, 18:56:24
What!?!?!?!...we have winter boots?  ;D
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Hamish Seggie on January 20, 2015, 19:00:19
What!?!?!?!...we have winter boots?  ;D

No, didn't we send them all away?
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: MCG on January 20, 2015, 23:19:28
I suppose the opposition would also have claimed mission creep if Op ATTENTION guys would have got in a gun fight in Kabul.  What do they expect when soldiers are sent into a war.  Our guys could hide the whole time they are there, but that does not change that the enemy gets a vote.  This is just a sign of convenient, willful ignorance.

Quote
Stephen Harper 'did not tell truth' on ISIS combat mission: opposition
Canadian Forces trainers returning ground fire has 'appearance of mission creep'

JANYCE MCGREGOR, CBC NEWS
20 Jan 2015

NDP Leader Tom Mulcair and Justin Trudeau's Liberals are accusing the Harper government of misleading Parliament after Monday's revelation that Canadian Forces advisers exchanged gunfire with ISIS in what may be the first confirmed ground battle involving Western forces in northern Iraq.

"I asked the prime minister straight up in September whether this was a combat mission, whether Canadian troops would be involved in combat. I got a categorical answer, and the answer was no," Mulcair told reporters during an event at a Toronto child-care centre Tuesday.

"I specifically asked him in the House of Commons whether or not Canadian Forces would be targeting troops on the other side," Mulcair said. "He did not tell the truth."

During a briefing in Ottawa on Monday, Brig.-Gen. Michael Rouleau, the commander of the Canadian special operations forces command, revealed that Canadian Forces trainers working with Iraqi troops came under "immediate and effective mortar fire" from ISIS and responded with sniper fire, "neutralizing the mortar and the machine-gun position."

The troops had been in a planning session several kilometres behind the front lines, Rouleau said, but had moved up for a better view of what they had discussed.

He characterized the exchange of gunfire as consistent with the inherent right of self-defence and suggested an incident like this wouldn't have been unusual even in past Canadian peacekeeping missions.

"We have always been clear that while this is a low-risk mission, it is not without risk and our forces on the ground will protect themselves if fired on in the course of carrying out their mission," Prime Minister Stephen Harper's spokesman Jason MacDonald said in a statement Monday.

'Mission creep'

Liberal MPs gathered in London, Ont., for a caucus retreat this week echoed Mulcair's concern that the government needed to clarify the exact role Canadian troops were playing on the ground.

"The prime minister made assurances to Canadians and to the House that, as we found out yesterday, were not exactly the truth," Liberal Leader Justin Trudeau told reporters Tuesday.

"The prime minister needs to come clean with Canadians on what's going on and why he was lacking in forthrightness with Canadians."

"The government is going to argue obviously that this is not a combat mission in the sense of Canadian soldiers going on the offensive," said foreign affairs critic Marc Garneau.

"They are clearly on the lines, in some cases directing airstrikes, and this is something I think many Canadians did not realize," he said. "I think for some people yesterday that was a surprise."

In September, during a House of Commons foreign affairs committee hearing, Garneau specifically asked Defence Minister Rob Nicholson if he would confirm "that no Canadian soldiers will be in the trenches on the front lines, or taking part on the ground in any offensive or defensive operations."

Nicholson responded: "I've indicated they are not taking a combat role. Their role will be strictly advice and technical assistance."

When Parliament voted last fall on the deployment of aircraft for a bombing mission, Liberals were not supportive, suggesting the appropriate Canadian role to counter the ISIS threat would focus more on humanitarian assistance, training and logistics support.

"It has the appearance of mission creep," said defence critic Joyce Murray. "There appears to be a change."

No front-line role?

While information from Kurdish forces early on suggested Canadian trainers may call in airstrikes, Harper specifically said ground troops would not be accompanying the Iraqi forces into combat.
Now they've exchanged fire.

"The fact that it led so many newscasts indicates that Canadians were surprised — that we thought we were sending aircraft on a combat mission, on a bombing mission, and we suddenly find our ground forces are exchanging fire," said Liberal House leader Dominic LeBlanc.

"The government asked Parliament for a mandate for one sort of mission, and if they've decided now to do a different kind of mission, they should at least have the decency to come back and force their own MPs to vote in favour of the change of the mission," LeBlanc said.

Not every Liberal was surprised by Monday's revelation.

"Everyone expects that the Canadian military, even though they're there for the express purpose of training, if fired upon, they have to defend themselves. And it wasn't an aggressive stance, it was a defensive stance when fired upon and I think the public would be onside with that," said public safety critic Wayne Easter.

"We've asked for a review [of the mission] in six months," he said, adding that since Parliament made its decision, Liberals have supported the troops.

"We will see where we go at that point of time."

In a statement circulated by the Conservative Party, Infrastructure Minister Denis Lebel said that over the past few weeks, jihadists have been shooting at Canadian soldiers. Because the soldiers fired back, the media now "pretends" that the Canadian mission has turned into a ground combat mission, he said.

"Canadian special operation forces must sometimes get close [to] or at the front lines. However, they spend 80 per cent of their time well back of them. This is not a ground combat mission," he said.
"When our soldiers are facing fire from [ISIS] jihadists, they must be able to respond," said Harper's senior Quebec minister.
http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/stephen-harper-did-not-tell-truth-on-isis-combat-mission-opposition-1.2919630
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: acen on January 21, 2015, 08:21:13
No, didn't we send them all away?

We sent away OD IECS gear as well as cold wet weather boots from what I've seen. Seems more like a gift to the enemy than anything else, though the Ukrainians will surely be adopting the prone position, whether by choice or by virtue of their footwear.  :P
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Technoviking on January 21, 2015, 10:56:08
#HashtagWarrior
#Slacktivist
#GimmeMyiPhone
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: milnews.ca on January 21, 2015, 11:39:26
According to this CP story published on the NationalNewswatch.com site, members of CANSOFCOM returned fire in Iraq. The story is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provision of the Copyright Act.

Canadian soldiers forced to defend themselves in firefight in Iraq: general ....
Interestingly, in this longer version of this article (http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2015/01/19/canada-iraq-mission-firefight-isil_n_6502556.html?utm_hp_ref=canada-politics), we have a "definition" of a combat mission from the PMO:
Quote
.... "A combat role is one in which our troops advance and themselves seek to engage the enemy physically, aggressively, and directly,"said Jason MacDonald. "That is not the case with this mission.

"This mission is one in which they are providing advice and assistance to Iraqi forces only and as the general indicated, the bulk of their work takes place well behind the front lines. That said, we have always been clear that while this is a low-risk mission, it is not without risk and our forces on the ground will protect themselves if fired on in the course of carrying out their mission."
I hope the Liberals aching to get in on a U.N. mission in the Congo remember that bit in yellow when they consider "returning to our legacy of peacekeeping" (http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=49733#.VL_Hn6MmVa8) ....
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Jed on January 21, 2015, 12:03:04
Interestingly, in this longer version of this article (http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2015/01/19/canada-iraq-mission-firefight-isil_n_6502556.html?utm_hp_ref=canada-politics), we have a "definition" of a combat mission from the PMO:I hope the Liberals aching to get in on a U.N. mission in the Congo remember that bit in yellow when they consider "returning to our legacy of peacekeeping" (http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=49733#.VL_Hn6MmVa8) ....

Whatever happened to 'Close with and destroy the Enemy' ?
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: milnews.ca on January 21, 2015, 12:21:57
Whatever happened to 'Close with and destroy the Enemy' ?
I think one is a military definition of a specific role (yours), while the other is a political definition of "combat mission" (PMO's) - related, but in a lot of ways pretty different.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Jed on January 21, 2015, 12:49:44
I know, just being a smart a$$.  :)
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on January 21, 2015, 16:42:37
I hope the Liberals aching to get in on a U.N. mission in the Congo remember that bit in yellow when they consider "returning to our legacy of peacekeeping" (http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=49733#.VL_Hn6MmVa8) ....

They are probably hoping more for an image of UN Peacekeepers as shown below, as opposed to attach helicopters; its' not appropriate for us to "whip out our armed forces', after all...

(http://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.unawestminster.org.uk%2Fstyle%2Fimages%2Fpeacekeepers_teddy_bear%2Fpeacekeeper_teddy_bear.jpg&hash=51a71480f274ba360cb6605506bfc6e2)
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: MCG on January 21, 2015, 21:53:30
For all the new articles on combat vs non-combat missions, it is the accompanying photo that I find most interesting.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: SeaKingTacco on January 22, 2015, 00:11:54
Why?
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: dapaterson on January 22, 2015, 00:20:00
Div patch on CADPAT AR, I think is what he's referring to.

We have well and truly jumped the shark - first with High Vis ranks and nametags for a uniform that's supposed to be camouflage, now folks are adding other accoutrements to camouflage uniforms.

What's next - abandoning rank insignia that were in service for two generations?  Oops, already did that...
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Dimsum on January 22, 2015, 00:28:37
Div patch on CADPAT AR, I think is what he's referring to.

We have well and truly jumped the shark - first with High Vis ranks and nametags for a uniform that's supposed to be camouflage, now folks are adding other accoutrements to camouflage uniforms.

It (like the full-colour Canadian flag above it) is backed in velcro, no?  Same with the nametapes, and the rank slides - all of that stuff can be taken off if/when needed. 

Of course, *someone* can then argue that if he's wearing a big red rectangle on operational uniform, why can't the RCAF have full-colour badges and crests (also velcro-backed) on flying clothing?   :whistle:
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: MCG on January 22, 2015, 01:52:04
Why?
The National Post has identified the wearer of the patch as MGen Milner, Comd 1 Cdn Div.  I'm just pondering the potential implications of Comd 1 Div being in Kuwait when there is not (yet?) an Army mission.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: SeaKingTacco on January 22, 2015, 02:08:49
The National Post has identified the wearer of the patch as MGen Milner, Comd 1 Cdn Div.  I'm just pondering the potential implications of Comd 1 Div being in Kuwait when there is not (yet?) an Army mission.

Carpet shopping, perhaps?  :)
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Humphrey Bogart on January 22, 2015, 02:11:44
Carpet shopping, perhaps?  :)

He is over saying sorry to ISIS for all the fellows we just "neutralized" .... Canadians are so apologetic!  Even when we're shooting you with a Macmillan Tac .50 :D
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Technoviking on January 22, 2015, 08:42:04
The National Post has identified the wearer of the patch as MGen Milner, Comd 1 Cdn Div.  I'm just pondering the potential implications of Comd 1 Div being in Kuwait when there is not (yet?) an Army mission.
And here I thought that you were au fait with how things run nowadays?

The Canadian Army is a force generator, and while it's true that 1 Can Div HQ is administratively part of the Canadian Army, its mission (found at this link (http://1stcdndiv.mil.ca/main_e.asp)) may help illustrate to you why the Comd 1 Can Div would be there:

Quote
1st Cdn Div HQ will provide task-tailored, deployable joint headquarters at high readiness to command and control joint, inter-agency, multinational forces to achieve national objectives at home and abroad.

Pay attention now, because the key points are in italics.


So, though this isn't an army mission, Comd 1 Can Div more than likely has a vested interest in operations there, given his formation's mission.



Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Old Sweat on January 22, 2015, 08:58:05
Regarding our SOF mission, according in this article from the Marine Corps Times reproduced under the Fair Dealing Provision of the Copy Right Act, Canadians are operating closer to the front than the Americans are.

Canadians closer to combat in Iraq than U.S. troops

By Andrew Tilghman, Staff Writer 8:45 a.m. EST January 21, 2015

American troops in Iraq appear to be more cautious than Canadians.

A Canadian general revealed Monday that his special operations troops in Iraq are now routinely going out with Iraqi soldiers "to the forward-most Iraqi fighting positions" and providing "eyes on" to help coalition airstrikes by "marking the target with a laser."

The mission described by Canadian Brig. Gen. Mike Rouleau, commander of Canadian Special Operations Forces, is very different from the one U.S. officials say American service members are performing in Iraq.

According to the Pentagon, U.S. troops on the "advise and assist mission" are staying out of harm's way inside headquarters facilities with Iraqi units at the brigade level or higher. These U.S. missions are underway only in several locations, including Baghdad, Taji and Al Asad Air Base in Anbar.

President Obama has said repeatedly that the 3,100 U.S. troops authorized for duty in Iraq will not have a "combat role," and U.S. military officials say today's forces are not operating on the battlefield alongside Iraqi troops. So officially, there are no Americans on the ground providing the kind of "eyes on" laser targeting that the Canadian general described.

"As far as we know, we do not have that capability," Army Maj. Neysa Williams, a spokeswoman for Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve, said in a telephone interview Tuesday. "When the information was released from the Canadian general, that was the first we had heard of it."

Rouleau told reporters in the Canadian capital of Ottawa that his forces got into a firefight last week, marking the first time that Western military officials have acknowledged a direct combat engagement with Islamic State fighters.

The Canadian general said a team of his special operators had "completed a planning session with senior Iraqi leaders several kilometers behind the front lines" and "when they moved forward to … the front lines in order to visualize what they had discussed over a map, they came under immediate and effective mortar and machine-gun fire."

In response, the Canadian forces alongside the Iraqi troops exchanged fire with the militants, "placing effective sniper fire on the enemy positions, neutralizing the mortar and the machine-gun position," Rouleau said.

When reporters asked whether this type of operation reflected an expansion of the U.S.-led coalition's mission in Iraq, Rouleau said it does not, and explained that operating in forward positions with Iraqis is a part of the "advise and assist" mission.

"Let me be clear about the advise and assist training: We do all advise-and-assist training kilometers behind the front lines. This represents about 80 percent of our output. The other 20 percent or so happens in forward positions, mostly close to the front lines but sometimes right at the front lines if that is the only place from where we can accomplish it," Rouleau said.

"I think the situation is a lot more nuanced than just saying if you exchange fire with a belligerent force all of a sudden it's a combat mission. This is an advise-and-assist mission. In the context of that, our ability to bring air power is one of the things that we can add value to the Iraqi forces with. Moreover, we always deploy with the inherent right to self-defense. We have the right to be able to defend ourselves if we're fired upon."

Williams, the Combined Joint Task Force spokeswoman, said she is unaware of any U.S. units with joint terminal attack controllers, or JTACs — the ground troops who specialize in relaying detailed, time-sensitive targeting information to aircraft conducting airstrikes.

The potential use of JTACs in Iraq has been a subject of high-level debate inside the Pentagon. Last year, the head of U.S. Central Command, Army Gen. Lloyd Austin, requested JTACs to help improve the effectiveness of airstrikes, but that request was not approved by higher-level U.S. officials.

The accuracy of airstrikes is an issue of concern for the American-led coalition that has dropped more than 1,700 bombs since the air campaign began in August. U.S. officials have acknowledged in recent weeks that they are conducting investigations into alleged civilian causalities caused by the coalition strikes in Iraq and Syria.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: milnews.ca on January 22, 2015, 12:45:09
They are probably hoping more for an image of UN Peacekeepers as shown below, as opposed to attach helicopters; its' not appropriate for us to "whip out our armed forces', after all...

(http://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.unawestminster.org.uk%2Fstyle%2Fimages%2Fpeacekeepers_teddy_bear%2Fpeacekeeper_teddy_bear.jpg&hash=51a71480f274ba360cb6605506bfc6e2)
Correct - more like this ....
(http://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.helis.com%2Fspotters%2Ffacundo_rovira%2Fmi24_ukraine_uno-884_2.jpg&hash=3c14770832b5569dfcdf2da9ccd36980)
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on January 22, 2015, 14:22:06
Article Link (http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/news/article.page?doc=air-task-force-iraq-takes-part-in-sinjar-mountains-offensive/i55aq34l)

Air Task Force-Iraq takes part in Sinjar Mountains Offensive





Article / January 21, 2015

By: Air Task Force-Iraq Public Affairs

CAMP PATRICE VINCENT, KUWAIT— Throughout December 2014, members of Air Task Force-Iraq, serving on Operation IMPACT, supported the efforts against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in an effort to break their siege of the Sinjar Mountains.

Thousands of Yazidis and other Iraqi civilians fled to the area following attacks on their villages and the town of Sinjar throughout late July and early August 2014.

Several human rights and observer organizations in the region reported that those who fled to the mountains were subjected to starvation, and lacked clean drinking water and medical care for several months as ISIL militants surrounded them. Hundreds of men, women, and children were abducted and killed.

In response to the immediate threat to the approximately 30,000 people trapped on the mountain, coalition aircraft commenced humanitarian aid drops. These air drops included basic supplies such as food, water, and shelter and were conducted at low flight levels by coalition transport aircraft under the threat of ISIL surface-to-air attacks.

In direct support of humanitarian aid drops, CF-18’s provided top cover for a Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) C-130 Hercules transport aircraft on 20 November, ensuring the transport crew was able to safely parachute supplies to waiting refugees below. Canadian fighter jets remained in close proximity to the transport aircraft to protect it from ISIL surface-to-air threats or attacks.

“After orbiting the area overhead and seeing people waiting for the drop from the [RAAF] Hercules, it was nice to finally see the pallets of aid touch the ground and see people rush out to retrieve them,” said a pilot from 425 Tactical Fighter Squadron, 3 Wing Bagotville.

Working as part of a larger, coalition air effort coordinated through the Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC), Canadian aircraft directly supported ground efforts to liberate those displaced persons on Sinjar Mountain.

Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) aircraft flew strikes, surveillance and air-to-air refuelling missions in support of 8,000 Iraqi security forces troops who launched the offensive in late November to oust ISIL militants from positions around the mountains.

CF-18 fighters also carried out strikes using 500lbs and 2000lbs bombs against ISIL vehicles, heavy weapons and bunkers that had been used to guard chokepoints along roads leading to and from the mountains.

“Given the Iraqi forces’ relatively light arms, it’s rewarding to contribute our heavy weapons to achieve effects on the ground,” said a CF-18 pilot from 4 Wing Cold Lake, flying in his first overseas mission. “It’s also rewarding to employ my training after four years as a CF-18 pilot towards aiding in the defeat of an enemy like ISIL.”

Meanwhile, members of the Long Range Patrol detachment, with their CP-140M Auroras, contributed to the overall intelligence gathering in the area by locating targets for coalition air strikes and collecting battle damage assessment information following the attacks.

“We had a high mission tempo during the operation and the technicians were working hard to make sure we got airborne,” said a member of the Long Range Patrol detachment.  “The Block III CP-140 has really been shining on this mission and our crew members have been able to maximize the effectiveness of the camera, radar, and other sensors in the fight. ISIL is having a hard time hiding.”

Enabling fighter coalition strike operations, the crew of the Polaris air-to-air refueller aircraft was active near the area of operations, offloading several hundred thousand pounds of fuel to Canadian and other coalition aircraft throughout the offensive.

On 18 December, reports that a main road leading into the mountains had been retaken from ISIL resulted in a large exodus of refugee Yazidis off the mountain sides, as well as opened a corridor for aid to reach those still in the area. Only a day later, on 19 December, RCAF CF-18s conducted air strikes on ISIL vehicles and a hardened rocket emplacement between Mosul and Sinjar near the town of Tal Afar.

“Each day that I flew over the area, you could see the line advancing as the Iraqi forces pushed forward,” said a CF-18 pilot serving on his first deployment overseas.  “You could also see a definite improvement in Iraqi forces’ abilities.”

Iraqi forces were able to reach Sinjar Mountain on 19 December 2014 to establish a humanitarian corridor. For the deployed Canadian personnel involved with Op IMPACT, it is satisfying to know that the same people whom they had helped with Canadian aircraft are now liberated and receiving the care and protection not experienced since ISIL’s aggression in the summer of 2014.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Old Sweat on January 22, 2015, 14:28:09
The CDS notes that Op Impact has evolved in this CP story by Murray Brewster reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act.

No contradiction in Iraq comments: Lawson

By Murray Brewster — CP — Jan 22 2015

OTTAWA - Canada's top military commander is trying to clear up an apparent contradiction about special forces soldiers directing air strikes in Iraq.

Gen. Tom Lawson, the chief of defence staff, said publicly at end of October that the elite troops would not accompany Iraqi or Kurdish forces into battle, nor would they pinpoint targets for coalition warplanes.

Opposition critics have pointed to those remarks and others from Prime Minister Stephen Harper last September as proof the government misled people about the mission, but Lawson says things have changed since then.

"To be clear, the situation on the ground has evolved since I offered those remarks and we have increased our assistance with respect to targeting air strikes in direct correlation with an increased threat encountered by the (Iraqis)," Lawson said in a written statement.

"Our personnel are not seeking to directly engage the enemy, but we are providing assistance to forces that are in combat."

The Iraqi government, throughout the fall, pressured the U.S.-led coalition to step up the bombing campaign to help contain Islamic State extremists as they overran swaths of the country's north and west.

Brig.-Gen. Mike Rouleau, the commander of Canada's special forces, said Monday his troops have guided 13 bombing missions from the front lines since the end of November.

National Defence has held several briefings since then, but did not reveal the expanded role, which Rouleau denied was an escalation.

Defence Minister Rob Nicholson, in a conference call on Thursday, suggested that guiding air strikes was a possibility considered when the deployment was approved in September and that the government was careful not to tie the hands of soldiers in the field.

"We didn't put limits on their ability to advise and assist the Iraqis," Nicholson said after a meeting of members of the anti-Islamic State coalition in London. "The special forces were there to provide advice and assistance and that's what they've done."

The meeting of 21 countries involved in the fight against the Islamic State covered a broad range of issues outside of the military campaign, which has been the main focus of the Harper government's public comments.

Nicholson reiterated how much humanitarian aid Canada has contributed and spoke in general terms about allied efforts to cut off the flow of funds and foreign fighters bound for the battlefields of Iraq and Syria.

Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on January 22, 2015, 14:56:27
If only our politicians and media would make the focus of OP IMPACT on the actual operation and the good it is doing for the people in that area, instead of their own political agendas and power struggles.  Like every other past operation (for the love of Pete, don't say "conflict" or "war"...), Canadians are putting their lives on the line while others sit back in chairs and 'tsk tsk', most of them never having so much as put on a Cadet uniform.

If anyone thinks that is actually possible, I also have a bridge to sell, and a unicorn tied up in the back yard.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on January 22, 2015, 15:51:17
Article Link (http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/news/article.page?doc=op-impact-from-a-first-officer-perspective/i520ig8g)

Op IMPACT from a First Officer Perspective

Article / January 19, 2015

By A First Officer of the Long Range Patrol Detachment, OP IMPACT

It’s surprising how quickly world events can sneak up on you. I, like many Canadians, had been tracking events in the Middle East for months without a thought of how it might specifically affect me. I was just recently married so my mind was pleasantly occupied with getting used to wedded life. It wasn’t until I attempted to book leave for my honeymoon, and was told to wait, that I realized world events were about to become very real for me. I was told to get ready to deploy.

As time went on, announcements and debates took place in Parliament. Plans began to solidify and our squadron prepared to join the fight in Iraq. I had only six months of operational experience on squadron; one of the most junior First Officers in the Long Range Patrol (LRP) fleet. I had less than 300 flying hours under my belt and had participated in only one major exercise—focused on anti-submarine warfare.

For many others and me, a drastic shift in mindset and mission focus was coming. By the time the Government of Canada had formally ordered the mission, our crews were identified and the preparation and training were underway in earnest for the new challenge.

I was impressed by the hard work and flexibility of our crews and support staff at 14 Wing Greenwood, N.S. as we trained over long days, including weekends and Thanksgiving, to ensure we were as prepared as possible to deploy. This also meant a few hard weeks of theatre and mission-specific training, as well as more routine readiness training, such as refresher training on the pistol and rifle.

What challenges did I expect? I wondered if we would be under fire often, how dangerous the country in which we would be based would be, and how difficult the heat, sand and dust would be to endure.

The challenges we have faced in actuality have proven to be somewhat different.

Initially there were the challenges that always accompany deploying on the initial rotations. We were the first on the ground; things were not fully set up when we arrived.  I learned that we were the key element required to transition a war zone into a smooth operation.

Added to the hard work required of the first rotation, it is difficult to be away from family at the best of times and especially during the holidays.

The heat has proven to be quite mild in the fall and winter; with temperatures similar to a mild summer day back in Canada. However, at night the temperature dips down to near zero quite often, so many of us wish we had brought more warm clothing.

What we didn’t expect was the challenge of an aggressive flying schedule. Working 18-20 hour days, every other day means that fatigue is something we constantly need to be aware of. On top of this, our flights are not always at the same time each day, so our sleep patterns are required to change often and quickly. Given the long work days, it is important we remain alert for signs of fatigue both in ourselves and with our fellow crew mates.

Beyond the fatigue factor, one of the largest challenges is remaining motivated and effective day in and day out. Back home there are normal daily life distractions of family, friends, hobbies and even simple errands that break up your day and take your mind off work. Here there are no such distractions. As a result, the daily routine can develop into a daily grind if you’re not careful.

As a less-experienced member of the crew, I’ve learned it is important to keep the larger operational picture in mind. While being the “unblinking eye” is sometimes unglamorous, this is the task at hand, and it is an important role to fill for the coalition. Our intelligence section and chain-of-command do a great job of keeping us informed on what we, as a coalition, are achieving. This goes a long way toward keeping us motivated and eager to stay in the fight.

So how do we overcome these challenges? The logistical and operational challenges that go with being first on the ground in theatre are immense, and despite some moments that proved frustrating, Air Task Force-Iraq has worked quickly through this phase and is having success.

In the LRP (Long Range Patrol) Detachment, one of the primary ways many of us relieve stress is to ramp up our physical training. Both the Joint Task Force and the Air Task Force are holding fitness challenges. Many of us work out daily. It helps to pass the time and keep us in a good mindset, which goes hand-in-hand with helping us shift our sleep schedules.

Motivation comes from many sources. For many of us, the ability we have here to keep in regular touch with our families has been an immense morale boost.

 We are now through the early months of our deployment. The remaining months will be full of challenges, but the Air Task Force and the LRP Detachment have the tools to overcome them. We are determined to fly over Iraq, to do our part to improve stability in the region and stop the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.  And before long, we will return home to our loved ones.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Hamish Seggie on January 22, 2015, 19:52:25
They are probably hoping more for an image of UN Peacekeepers as shown below, as opposed to attach helicopters; its' not appropriate for us to "whip out our armed forces', after all...

(http://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.unawestminster.org.uk%2Fstyle%2Fimages%2Fpeacekeepers_teddy_bear%2Fpeacekeeper_teddy_bear.jpg&hash=51a71480f274ba360cb6605506bfc6e2)

I remember the days of peacekeeping. The ROE could stated like this: If you must fire at people that are firing at you, make sure one of you has a sucking chest wound or similar wound. If you are not wounded, then the fire wasn't effective and you have no reason to return fire.

Of course I jest........ ;)
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Old Sweat on January 22, 2015, 20:24:35
I just picked up this Sun News report on Facebook about the PM's comment re Canadian troops engaging ISIS forces in Iraq. It is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provision of the Copyright act. The story includes comments from the NDP and the Liberal leader.

If ISIS terrorists fire on Canadian troops, 'we'll kill them': Harper
5:47 pm, January 22nd, 2015
5:19 pm, January 22nd, 2015

JESSICA HUME | QMI AGENCY

OTTAWA - Prime Minister Stephen Harper made it clear that if ISIS terrorists fire at Canadian troops, "we're going to kill them."

Harper's was responding to media questions in St. Catharines, Ont., on Thursday about whether the nature of the Canadian mission in Iraq would shift to more of a combat role.

"This is a robust mission where (Canadian Forces) are going to make (Iraqi Security Forces) effective to take on the Islamic State and deal with them," he said. "And if those guys fire at us, we're going to fire back and we're going to kill them."

Asked if Canada's initial commitment to provide advice to the Iraqi government and security forces as well as a six-month airstrike mission would not change, Harper replied "No."

Questions about the Canadian Forces' role arose earlier this week amid reports soldiers fired back at ISIS militants after coming under attack.

The official Opposition accused Harper of lying about the role of Canadian troops.

"I specifically asked him in the House of Commons whether or not Canadian Forces would be targeting troops on the other side," NDP Leader Thomas Mulcair said this week. "He did not tell the truth."

Earlier Thursday, Chief of Defence Staff Gen. Tom Lawson issued a statement clarifying Canada's role in Iraq.

"The situation on the ground has evolved (since October) and we increased our assistance with respect to airstrikes in direct correlation with an increased threat encountered by the Iraqi Security Forces,"

Lawson said, adding that Canada's troops "are not seeking to directly engage the enemy but we are providing assistance to forces that are in combat."

Defence department officials have given numerous technical briefings to the media since October, none of which included information that there had been an exchange of fire between Canadian troops and ISIS militants.

Defence Minister Rob Nicholson couldn't explain why that information hadn't been provided earlier.

"We haven't done anything we shouldn't be doing," he said, adding that "we didn't put limits on their abilities to advise and assist the Iraqis."

NDP foreign affairs critic Paul Dewar has expressed concerns about "mission creep" for months. His party wants the emphasis on humanitarian contributions and said Thursday he's worried by what he's hearing.

"What has evolved in Iraq is that Canada's role has become increasingly military as opposed to humanitarian," he told QMI Agency. "With Canadian soldiers now involved in frontline combat operations on the ground, Conservatives seem more focused on being part of military actions than on resolving urgent humanitarian need."

Liberal Leader Justin Trudeau was vague when asked whether he thinks Canada's role in the coalition makes the country more vulnerable to terrorist attacks.

"Canada has always played a role in the world and we'll continue to," Trudeau said. "What's extremely important is that Canada is a force for good and presence that is pushing the kind of human values, safety and security around the world."

Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: George Wallace on January 22, 2015, 20:41:12
I remember the days of peacekeeping. The ROE could stated like this: If you must fire at people that are firing at you, make sure one of you has a sucking chest wound or similar wound. If you are not wounded, then the fire wasn't effective and you have no reason to return fire.

Of course I jest........ ;)

Actually......I remember an RCR MCpl, who was my instructor way back when, telling us bright eyed and bushy tailed OCdts a Cyprus story, that if fired upon, they were to fire three rounds into their jeep first then return fire.    >:D
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Kat Stevens on January 22, 2015, 21:00:23
I remember the days of peacekeeping. The ROE could stated like this: If you must fire at people that are firing at you, make sure one of you has a sucking chest wound or similar wound. If you are not wounded, then the fire wasn't effective and you have no reason to return fire.

Of course I jest........ ;)

I seem to remember back in 96 before deploying to Bosnia with 2VP, being briefed by a legal officer words to the effect that "if you return fire and kill someone, you WILL be charged with everything we can find to throw at you."  Gave me a pretty warm squishy feeling.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Hamish Seggie on January 22, 2015, 21:04:39
I seem to remember back in 96 before deploying to Bosnia with 2VP, being briefed by a legal officer words to the effect that "if you return fire and kill someone, you WILL be charged with everything we can find to throw at you."  Gave me a pretty warm squishy feeling.

That sounds about right.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Retired AF Guy on January 22, 2015, 21:36:40
I seem to remember back in 96 before deploying to Bosnia with 2VP, being briefed by a legal officer words to the effect that "if you return fire and kill someone, you WILL be charged with everything we can find to throw at you."  Gave me a pretty warm squishy feeling.

I heard the same thing from a co-worker who was in Bosnia around the same time, except I believe he was with the RCR.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: YZT580 on January 22, 2015, 23:31:19
Harper sounded pretty clear regarding the ROE. 
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Hamish Seggie on January 23, 2015, 00:50:29
Actually......I remember an RCR MCpl, who was my instructor way back when, telling us bright eyed and bushy tailed OCdts a Cyprus story, that if fired upon, they were to fire three rounds into their jeep first then return fire.    >:D

Which leaves two rounds in the mag.


We only were issued five rounds......
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: milnews.ca on January 23, 2015, 06:04:18
One media outlet's "mission creep" (http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2015/01/22/Canada-denies-mission-creep-after-troops-kill-ISIS-militants.html) is another's "evolution" (http://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/situation-in-iraq-has-evolved-canada-s-top-soldier-says-1.2200553) ....
Quote
....  On Thursday morning, Chief of Defence Staff Gen. Tom Lawson issued a statement to clarify comments he made last October, when he told CTV’s Question period that Canadian special ops would not be guiding airstrikes from the ground.

“To be clear, the situation on the ground has evolved… and we have increased our assistance with respect to targeting airstrikes in direct correlation with an increased threat encountered by the (Iraqi Security Forces),” Lawson said in a statement to CTV News.

Canadian special ops “are not seeking to directly engage the enemy, but we are providing assistance to forces that are in combat,” he went on ....

More from the CDS (http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=924269&tp=980):
Quote
“I understand that there may be some questions about my comments on Oct. 19th about the nature of activities being undertaken by Canada’s Special Operations Forces in Iraq. To be clear, the situation on the ground has evolved since I offered those remarks, and we have increased our assistance with respect to targeting air strikes in direct correlation with an increased threat encountered by the ISF.

“Our SOF Personnel are not seeking to directly engage the enemy, but we are providing assistance to forces that are in combat. The activities of Canada’s Special Operations Forces in Iraq, as described by Generals Vance and Rouleau on January 19th, are entirely consistent with the advise and assist mandate given to the Canadian Armed Forces by the government. You should be justifiably proud of your men and women in uniform.”
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Old Sweat on January 26, 2015, 13:33:46
This CP story, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act reports that Canadian Special Forces have come under fire twice in the past week.

Special forces troops involved in two more firefights with ISIL fighters

By The Canadian Press — The Canadian Press — Jan 26 2015

OTTAWA - Canadian special forces troops have been involved in more firefights with Islamic State extremists.

Navy Capt. Paul Forget says the elite troops, who were advising Kurdish fighters in battlefield planning, came under fire twice while visiting the front over the last week.

He says in both cases the Canadian troops returned fire and "neutralized" the threats.

The gun battles are in addition to an incident outlined last week by the commander of special forces, Brig.-Gen. Michael Rouleau.

As well, Forget says CF-18 jetfighters have conducted 12 more air strikes supporting Iraqi forces who are preparing to liberate Mosul, the country's second largest city.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: krimynal on January 26, 2015, 13:48:54
can't wait to see what the liberals and NPD are going to say about those 2 encounters !
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: MCG on January 26, 2015, 14:57:14
The NDP has already been asking for another debate in the House of Commons. 
Quote
NDP calls for debate on military role in Iraq
Lee Berthiaume
Ottawa Citizen
26 Jan 2015

 The Official Opposition NDP plans to call for an emergency debate on the war against the Islamic State after revelations Canadian military personnel have been on the front lines in Iraq.
 
Senior military officials said this week that Canadian soldiers on the ground have directed 13 bombing attacks against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) since November. They have also "neutralized" other enemy forces with sniper fire after being shot at.
 
Opposition parties accuse the Conservative government of misleading Parliament and Canadians about the fight against ISIL, saying the government promised Canadian troops would not be involved in combat on the ground.
 
NDP defence critic Jack Harris says he'll ask House of Commons Speaker Andrew Scheer for an emergency debate on Iraq when MPs return from the Christmas break on Monday, because the government needs to answer to Canadians and Parliament. It will be up to Scheer to decide whether to grant the request.
 
"We've got a situation here where the people of Canada and Parliament have been misled about the nature of the operation," Harris said. "Canadian ground troops were actually engaged in calling for airstrikes and spending 20 per cent of their time on the front lines, which is not what people expected, and is contrary to so many of the (government's) statements."
 
The government has said calling in airstrikes does not constitute combat, and that Canadian troops have a right to defend themselves if shot at. Prime Minister Stephen Harper said this week that he was proud of the work the commandos are doing in Iraq.
 
But defence chief Gen. Tom Lawson said in an interview in October that the 69 special forces troops in Iraq would not be calling in bombing strikes.
 
Lawson now says the situation "evolved" after he made those comments, and that calling in airstrikes and putting troops within shooting distance of ISIL forces is "entirely consistent with the advise-andassist mandate given to the Canadian Armed Forces by the government."
 
Harris said the entire mission has been shrouded in secrecy and confusion. Parliamentarians have had only one briefing from the military or government about Canada's combat mission in Iraq since October, and the NDP critic said it's time to shine some light on what's happening.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: milnews.ca on January 26, 2015, 15:50:19
For reference, here's a round-up of how the Government has described the mission over time:

5 Sept 2014, CTV.ca (http://www.ctvnews.ca/mobile/canada/canada-sending-special-ops-personnel-to-iraq-1.1992540):
Quote
....  “This is not a combat mission and our role is clearly defined. Canada is joining our allies in providing critical advice to forces in northern Iraq as they continue to hold back the terrorist advance,” (PM Stephen) Harper told reporters.  “But while this mission is low risk, it’s not without risk. Our men and women in uniform are ready to answer this call, and I thank them for always being prepared to defend Canadian values and interests in a dangerous world.” ....

24 Sept 2014, Parliamentary Secretary for NatDef, in the House of Commons (http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Pub=hansard&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=41&Ses=2#Int-8444966):
Quote
.... I can confirm that we have committed 69 members of the Canadian special armed forces to be in Iraq to provide tactical and strategic advice in a non-combat role .... we have committed to 69 members being deployed to northern Iraq to fight—to be in an advisory role with the Peshmerga, helping it out, along with the invitation of the Iraqi government. We are there strictly in an advisory role, non-combat, and it is very clear what we are trying to do there ....

30 Sept 2014, Question Period, House of Commons (http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=41&Ses=2&DocId=6708288#Int-8453588):
Quote
Hon. Thomas Mulcair (Leader of the Opposition, NDP):   Mr. Speaker, the Prime Minister said that the rules of engagement are to advise and assist the Iraqis, but the question is, assist them how? For instance, are Canadian soldiers currently going on patrols with Iraqis or Kurds?

Right Hon. Stephen Harper (Prime Minister, CPC):   Mr. Speaker, I said “ advise and assist the Iraqis”.  [English]  If I could just use the terminology in English, it is quite precise. It is to advise and to assist. It is not to accompany. I think that was laid out before the parliamentary committee.

Hon. Thomas Mulcair (Leader of the Opposition, NDP):  Mr. Speaker, are they going into combat zones?

Right Hon. Stephen Harper (Prime Minister, CPC):   Mr. Speaker, I just said that Canadian soldiers are not accompanying the Iraqi forces into combat.

Hon. Thomas Mulcair (Leader of the Opposition, NDP):  Mr. Speaker, have Canadian Forces assisted in targeting ISIS troops?

Right Hon. Stephen Harper (Prime Minister, CPC):  Mr. Speaker, once again, as I have said, the purpose of Canadian Forces in Iraq is to assist and to advise the Iraqi forces as they have been resisting, particularly in the north, a force bent on the genocide of the people who live there. These are the actions they are undertaking. While there is some risk, there is not a direct combat role.  I say once again, we are very proud of people who do this work on our behalf and keep all of us, not just in that part of the world but all of us here in Canada, safe.

Hon. Thomas Mulcair (Leader of the Opposition, NDP):  Mr. Speaker, is targeting or coordinating attacks by others a combat role, yes or no?

Right Hon. Stephen Harper (Prime Minister, CPC):  Mr. Speaker, as you can understand, I neither have the will nor the desire to get into detailed discussions of military operations here.  As I have said repeatedly, the Canadian Forces involved in Iraq are not involved in combat. They are there to assist Iraqi and Peshmerga forces in undertaking combat against a brutal enemy that is intent on their slaughter. We will go there and we will assist them and make sure we stop that kind of problem there and not at our own shores.

3 Oct 2014, PM statement, in the House of Commons (http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2014/10/03/statement-prime-minister-canada-house-commons):
Quote
.... On September 5th, I announced that members of the Canadian Army, in a non-combat role, would advise and assist security forces in Iraq battling the terrorists .... we are extending the deployment in a non-combat role of the up to 69 members of the Canadian Army advising and assisting security forces in Iraq.  “There will however be no ground combat mission, which is explicitly ruled out in the resolution ....

3 Oct 2014, from the motion passed by the House of Commons (http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/isis-text-of-government-s-motion-on-canada-s-mission-1.2786745):
Quote
.... the Government of Canada will not deploy troops in ground combat operations ....

17 Oct 2014, Toronto Star (http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2014/10/17/airstrikes_alone_wont_defeat_islamic_state_canadas_top_general_says.html):
Quote
.... Brig.-Gen Michael Rouleau, commander of the Canadian Special Operations Forces Command, said the soldiers are helping teach local forces on the tactics that go into a successful attack.  “We’re helping train them in elements like shoot, move, communicate. How you manoeuvre elements around the battle space, how you can most effectively bring your various weapon systems to bear,” Rouleau said.  And he suggested those lessons are happening in the heart of the action on a battlefield where the frontline is hard to define, rather than in the relative safety of a distant training centre.  “We’re getting with these forces where they are,” he said.  “What we’re dealing with in Iraq is a very hybrid battle space, where it’s difficult to define discernible front lines, friendly people, bad people.”  But while their mission is to “advise,” they’re not authorized to “accompany” the Iraqi forces on their combat missions, though Lawson said that is a “difficult line to define.” ....

late October 2014, CDS (https://ca.news.yahoo.com/isis-mission-ground-combat-situation-154227342.html):
Quote
.... Last October, Lawson told CTV's Question Period host Robert Fife that Canadian troops sent to advise Iraqi and Kurdish forces battling ISIS "would have nothing to do" with pinpointing targets for airstrikes.  "All coalition troops on the ground in Iraq are being used in the same role — advise and assist, but not accompany, and not engage in direct combat," Lawson said last October. "It's very important that it's Iraqi soldiers who do that."  He also agreed that helping out with laser targeting would be a "semi-combat role." ....

22 Dec 2014, Major-General Hood, Director of Strategic Joint Staff (http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=916419&tp=980):
Quote
.... CANSOFCOM’s role in Iraq is to provide training, military advice and assistance teams. Members in Iraq are working within a well-defined mission that was passed in the House of Commons. We have been clear that this mission does not involve ground troops in a combat role.  “CANSOFCOM is helping to provide Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) with military training such as shooting, movement, communications, and mission planning, as well as how to effectively employ their various weapons systems against ISIL ....

19 Jan 2015, PMO spokesperson (http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2015/01/19/canada-iraq-mission-firefight-isil_n_6502556.html?utm_hp_ref=canada-politics):
Quote
.... "A combat role is one in which our troops advance and themselves seek to engage the enemy physically, aggressively, and directly,"said Jason MacDonald. "That is not the case with this mission.  "This mission is one in which they are providing advice and assistance to Iraqi forces only and as the general indicated, the bulk of their work takes place well behind the front lines. That said, we have always been clear that while this is a low-risk mission, it is not without risk and our forces on the ground will protect themselves if fired on in the course of carrying out their mission."

20 Jan 2015, MP web page posting (French (http://www.denislebel.ca/nouvelles-locales/id=507) - Google English (https://translate.google.com/translate?sl=fr&tl=en&js=y&prev=_t&hl=en&ie=UTF-8&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.denislebel.ca%2Fnouvelles-locales%2Fid%3D507&edit-text=))
Quote
.... Les forces d'opération spéciales canadiennes doivent parfois se rapprocher des lignes de front. Or, elles passent 80% de leur temps bien en retrait de celles-ci. Ce n'est donc pas une mission de combat terrestre. Ceci étant dit, lorsque nos soldats sont sous les tirs des djihadistes de l'ÉIIL, ils doivent pouvoir répondre.

.... Canadian special operations forces may have to move closer to the front lines . However, they spend 80 % of their time well back from them. This is not a ground combat mission. That said, when our soldiers are under fire from (ISIL) jihadists , they must be able to respond.

22 Jan 2015, CDS statement (http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=924269&tp=980):
Quote
.... I understand that there may be some questions about my comments on Oct. 19th about the nature of activities being undertaken by Canada’s Special Operations Forces in Iraq. To be clear, the situation on the ground has evolved since I offered those remarks, and we have increased our assistance with respect to targeting air strikes in direct correlation with an increased threat encountered by the ISF.  Our SOF Personnel are not seeking to directly engage the enemy, but we are providing assistance to forces that are in combat. The activities of Canada’s Special Operations Forces in Iraq, as described by Generals Vance and Rouleau on January 19th, are entirely consistent with the advise and assist mandate given to the Canadian Armed Forces by the government ....
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: krimynal on January 26, 2015, 15:57:41
theres a time where you need to stop making things up , and actually go try something. 

I mean yeah you train the people there to do the job , but sometimes you actually need to get in a shitty situation to know if they are doing it right or not.  Would you let them call in an airstrike ?? honestly , you would probably go there , be next to them make sure they don't screw it up.  Then sadly yeah , you are on the frontline.

chances are , you are in a battlefield crap is gonna happen.  Are we suppose to just be there , get shot at , and be like "oh no , what are the Canadians think about us if we shoot back ???" .... Jesus heck sometimes the regular people ( and mostly politicians ) are completely lost.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: upandatom on January 26, 2015, 18:12:06
theres a time where you need to stop making things up , and actually go try something. 

I mean yeah you train the people there to do the job , but sometimes you actually need to get in a shitty situation to know if they are doing it right or not.  Would you let them call in an airstrike ?? honestly , you would probably go there , be next to them make sure they don't screw it up.  Then sadly yeah , you are on the frontline.

I was thinking this. Would you trust them with laser guided weapons and target tagging equipment. I wouldn't. I realise that the ISF is better trained the ANP and ANA and are a much more independent force, they still need guidance and direction.
Part of being mentors and assistant providers is watching them, directing them in live scenarios. They go to the front and lose multiple times, your going to want to see why they are losing, having issues. In turn, you go to the front, watch and learn. At the front, of course you are going to get shot at, or near, and in turn your going to shoot back.

This is just another excuse for politicians to run their mouths.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Hamish Seggie on January 26, 2015, 19:40:38
I, for one, agree with our guys shooting back. Good on them.

The GOC could make political hay out of this by stating the troops are there to assist and train, and if necessary engage the enemy. After all.....isn't that what the Libs and Dippers all about? Protecting those who can't protect themselves?
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: milnews.ca on January 27, 2015, 07:03:08
The GOC could make political hay out of this by stating the troops are there to assist and train, and if necessary engage the enemy. After all.....isn't that what the Libs and Dippers all about? Protecting those who can't protect themselves?
But we also remember the last time a government official was so clear and unequivocal (http://briarpatchmagazine.com/articles/view/detestable-murderers-and-scumbags-making-sense-of-canadas-deployment-in-afg), right?  If there was political hay to be made saying "we're going to help kill people," it would have been said that clearly.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: milnews.ca on January 27, 2015, 12:57:24
From Canada's public safety minister (http://www.marketwired.com/press-release/minister-blaney-condemns-threats-by-isil-1986121.htm) ....
Quote
Today, the Honourable Steven Blaney, Canada's Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, made the following statement in response to the online posting of an ISIL audio message calling for attacks in Canada:

"The international jihadist movement has declared war on Canada and our allies.

That's why our Government committed the Canadian Armed Forces to the broad international coalition against the so-called Islamic State. No Canadian government should ever stand on the side-lines while our allies act to deny terrorists a safe haven - an international base - from which they would plot violence against us.

There is work to be done here at home as well. This Friday we will put legislation before Parliament that will help authorities stop planned attacks, get threats off our streets, criminalize the promotion of terrorism, and prevent terrorists from travelling and recruiting others."
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Old Sweat on January 27, 2015, 15:45:34
According to the Globe and Mail in this story reproduced under the Fair Dealing provision of the Copyright Act, General Lawson has met with senior Kurdish leaders in Iraq.

Top Canadian general holds undisclosed talks with Kurds in Iraq

STEVEN CHASE

OTTAWA — The Globe and Mail
Published Tuesday, Jan. 27 2015, 12:56 PM EST

Last updated Tuesday, Jan. 27 2015, 1:12 PM EST

Canada’s top general held undisclosed meetings with top Kurdistan officials this week in northern Iraq, the same region where this country’s special forces are helping Kurds take on Islamic State fighters.

General Tom Lawson, Chief of Canada’s Defence Staff, met with Masrour Barzani, chancellor of the Kurdistan Region Security Council on Sunday, according to BasNews, a news agency in Erbil, Iraq.

The leadership of the independent-minded Kurds, who want to retain autonomy in Iraq, pressed Gen. Lawson for greater military support from the West in order to advance their battle against Islamic State militants.

Nearly 70 Canadian special forces soldiers are acting as military advisers to the Kurds in the Erbil region and have ended up shooting and killing Islamic State fighters in the course of their duties.

The military had not notified media about Gen. Lawson’s trip, or the meeting, and declined immediately comment on the matter Tuesday morning, citing security concerns.

It’s infrequent but not unprecedented for a Canadian military official to meet civilian leadership in another country instead of, say, Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird taking the lead.

According to BasNews, Mr. Barzani told Gen. Lawson that Kurdish peshmerga have taken control of the “strategically vital area of Kasike” that connects cities such as Mosul, still held by the Islamic State, to the Syrian border.

The agency said the Kurdish leader emphasized the need for further military support from the U.S.-led international coalition that is supporting the fight to beat back Islamic State extremists.

Mr. Barzani reportedly said that without additional help, the peshmerga will not only be thwarted in their advance, but risk losing territorial gains they’ve already made.

One request is for armored vehicles to help Kurdish fighters and other Iraqi security forces navigate a battlefront where jihadists have planted bombs, also known as improved explosive devices.

The Erbil news agency said Gen. Lawson told his host that “Canada understands the importance of the peshmerga forces in the conflict, and is impressed by the Kurds’ military ability.”

The sides agreed to maintain and develop the military relationship they share, BasNews reported.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: milnews.ca on January 27, 2015, 15:54:33
Here's the original BasNews piece in German (http://basnews.com/de/news/2015/01/25/lawson-faszinierend-verfolgen-wir-die-erfolge-der-peschmerga-kaempfer/) - Google English translation (http://bit.ly/1uZzbis) below:
Quote
BasNews (editorial) - KRG security chief Masrour Barzani met on Sunday with the Canadian Chief of Staff Tom Lawson in Erbil. Lawson praised the Kurdish Peshmerga fighters for their military achievements against "Islamic state" (IS).

Talks between Masrour Barzani and Tom Lawson acted in the first line on the extension of the military supports the Peshmerga forces by the Canadian Forces.

Barzani said the Kurdish forces with the large-scale military offensives in recent days on the Dschihadistenmiliz in the municipality Wanke in Mosul had brought strategically important routes to Mosul, Tal Afar and Sinjar under their control. By killing of 27 IS-emirs by peshmerga fighters the terror group have also come in for heavy losses, as Barzani.

The security chief of the Kurdistan region thanked the Canadian government for military support of the Peshmerga forces and drew attention to the increasing demand for military equipment, which are necessary to combat the terrorist organization. Masrour Barzani recalled the explosives on the possessed, the Islamists, and called for the deployment of armored vehicles.

"Our Kurdish Peshmerga forces are the only power that have achieved the success of this magnitude against the terrorist organization," added KRG security chief Masrour Barzani.

Tom Lawson, however, assured further support for the fight against terrorism and said, "The Canadian government attaches great importance to the fight against terrorism. For this reason, we have important relationships with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). With great fascination we pursue the military successes of the Peshmerga forces. "

The delegation, led by the Canadian Chiefs of Lawson brought the Peshmerga fighters a fully loaded military transport aircraft of the type C-17 in military goods.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: milnews.ca on January 28, 2015, 07:23:48
Sun Media's Parliamentary Bureau Chief (and army.ca member) David Akin (http://forums.army.ca/forums/index.php?action=profile;u=17966;sa=summary) seems to sum up the mission debate quite well via Twitter:

"On the technical point of what PM said or didn’t say about the mission last fall compared to what’s happening: Opposition wins (https://twitter.com/davidakin/status/560156251901153280) .... But on the political point — Do Canadians really care about that technical point compared to the current mission? — government prevails." (https://twitter.com/davidakin/status/560156451885572096)

Meanwhile ....
Here's the original BasNews piece in German (http://basnews.com/de/news/2015/01/25/lawson-faszinierend-verfolgen-wir-die-erfolge-der-peschmerga-kaempfer/) - Google English translation (http://bit.ly/1uZzbis) below:
The English-language version of the article (http://basnews.com/en/news/2015/01/26/masrour-barzani-peshmerga-need-more-armored-vehicles-to-advance/) seems to focus more on the Kurdish need for mo' AFVs:
Quote
The Kurdistan Region Security Council has emphasized the need for more armored vehicles in order to protect recent gains and continue advancing the frontlines against Islamic State (IS) militants.

Chanceler of Kurdistan Region Security Council, Masrour Barzani, on Sunday met with the Chief of the Defence Staff of the Canadian Armed ForcesGeneral Thomas J. Lawson and Canadian military delegation in Erbil.

During the meeting, Barzani told Lawson that the Peshmerga have taken control of the strategically vital area of Kasike that connects Mosul and Tel Afar to the Syrian border.

Hundreds of IS militants were killed during the clashes, including 27 IS leaders.

He detailed the need for further military support from coalition countries.

Without more support, the Peshmerga will not only not be able to advance, there is a risk that they will be unable to defend recent gains effectively, claimed Barzani.

Armored vehicles are need for use on the frontline, as Islamic State have planted IEDs throughout the areas in which the Peshmerga are advancing.

(....)

Canada is a significant supporter of the Kurdistan Region, taking part in the shelling of IS targets in Iraq and delivered a C17 of arms on Sunday.

Lawson reassured Barzani that Canada understands the importance of the Peshmerga forces in the conflict, and is impressed by the Kurds’ military ability.

The military relationship between Canada and the Peshmerga forces remains strong, he said ....
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: upandatom on January 28, 2015, 12:32:56
If anyone hasnt seen it, There is a frontline documentary on Netflix right now about Iraq, and how and why things have ended up the way they have become, also one about Syria too, I think its called Losing Iraq.

It was pretty informative for someone who didnt know much of the history in Iraq as I was more occupied with learning more about Afghanistan.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Old Sweat on January 28, 2015, 12:34:07
This CBC story, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act, claims that Canadian JTACs are controlling air strikes, a role Americans are not allowed to do.

ISIS fight: Canadian advisers guiding airstrikes but U.S. barred from doing same

Some say Canadians are taking on combat role in Iraq that U.S. advisers are prohibited from doing

CBC News Posted: Jan 27, 2015 8:25 PM ET Last Updated: Jan 28, 2015 8:16 AM ET

The Canadian government has acknowledged that Canadian advisers have been acting as forward observers, calling in airstrikes on ISIS positions and marking the targets with lasers.

U.S. soldiers are not allowed to direct airstrikes on ISIS positions in Iraq, the Pentagon said on Tuesday, a practice that their Canadian military allies have been engaged in despite it being seen by some as a combat manoeuvre.

The Canadian government has acknowledged that Canadian advisers have been acting as forward observers, calling in airstrikes on ISIS positions and marking the targets with lasers.

But those roles are seen as combat roles. U.S. military Cmdr. Elissa Smith at the Pentagon told CBC News that that particular role — sometimes called JTAC or joint terminal attack controller — is one U.S. advisers on the ground in Iraq are barred from doing.

"The advisers are assisting with planning ground operations, intelligence sharing, integrating air support into their operations, not as JTACs, but as planners," Smith said. "Their movements are carefully planned in advance in order to ensure that they are not inadvertently put into combat situations.

"We've been very clear that U.S. advisers are removed from actual or expected combat situations as part of our advise and assist mission in Iraq."

Last week, Brig.-Gen. Mike Rouleau, the commander of Canadian special forces, said his soldiers have directed 13 strikes.

Walter Dorn, who teaches defence studies to Canadian officers at Royal Military College, said what the JTACs are engaged in is "definitely combat."

"It's not just self-defence. It's actually engaging in combat and making a difference on the ground, in the field. And we originally said we are not going in there to engage in combat," he said.

When it comes to airstrikes, Steve Day, the former commander of Canada's elite JTF2 unit, said Western air forces always prefer to have their own trained soldiers guiding those attacks.

"The gold standard is to always receive intelligence from your own Western sources. So, it's always best, especially in built-up areas, to have a Western set of eyes looking at the target."

This is another case where Canadian forces seem to be going further than their coalition allies — at least publicly.

Although the U.S. is leading the coalition, officials say American military advisers aren't accompanying Iraqi forces on the frontlines. But Canadians have gone close to the frontlines. At one point, the military estimated Canadian advisers spent 20 per cent of the time there. And those advisers have now been involved in three firefights.

In response to a question from CBC News on Monday, a spokeswoman for the Combined Joint Task Force, which is co-ordinating the international coalition's mission in Iraq, said, "Canada is the only coalition member whose soldiers have been involved in firefights."

The spokeswoman said she couldn't explain why, but when asked again on Tuesday by CBC News, she added:

"I can only respond on incidents that have been confirmed and reported to the high headquarters. The incidents with the Canadians are the only incidents that [have] been reported."

However, Britain's Mail on Sunday, citing sources, reported that the U.K.'s elite SAS troops, who were officially in Iraq in a reconnaissance role, were conducting raids against ISIS fighters last November.

David Perry, a senior security and defence analyst for the CDA Institute, said countries often don't want to talk about what their special forces are up to.

"We've seen it before in Libya and Afghanistan," he said. "Different governments for different reasons have been very reluctant and sensitive to discuss what their special operations forces do when they're out there on the ground."

Asked about the rules of engagement back in September, Prime Minister Stephen Harper said Canadian troops were in Iraq "to advise and to assist. It is not to accompany."

But Harper was hammered in question period Tuesday about whether the government misled Canadians about the mission in Iraq,

He said that Canadian troops are executing the mission that Canadians and Parliament have given them.

"They are advising, they are assisting," he said. "Guess what, if fired upon, they are going to shoot back; and if they kill some of the ISIL terrorists, Canadians are going to support that, no matter what the New Democrats think."

An Iraqi news agency, BasNews, reported Tuesday that Chief of Defence Staff Tom Lawson was in Erbil over the weekend to meet with Kurdish officials, including Masrour Barzani, the chancellor of the Kurdistan Region Security Council.

Canada's Defence Department confirmed Lawson's travel to the region later in the day, saying the purpose of the meetings was to "exchange information, and to update them on Canada’s ongoing contributions to the advise and assist mission."

The CDS also delivered a new shipment of non-lethal military gear from Canada, including clothing to equip the Iraqis for cold weather.

Canada's combat mission is up for renewal in April.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on January 28, 2015, 17:53:05
If anyone hasnt seen it, There is a frontline documentary on Netflix right now about Iraq, and how and why things have ended up the way they have become, also one about Syria too, I think its called Losing Iraq.

It was pretty informative for someone who didnt know much of the history in Iraq as I was more occupied with learning more about Afghanistan.

For those who don't have Netflix:

PBS Frontline - Losing Iraq (http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/losing-iraq/)  29 Jul 2014

PBS Frontline - Syria's Second Front (http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/syrias-second-front/#-syrias-second-front) 11 Feb 2014

PBS Frontline - Children of Aleppo (http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/syrias-second-front/#children-of-aleppo)  11 feb 2014
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Dimsum on January 29, 2015, 03:46:42
From the National Post.

This bit jumped out for me since Bill Shorten (leader of the Opposition in Australia) recently returned from a trip to Iraq where he publicly stated his bi-partisan support for the Australian operation there. 

Quote
The ensuing hullabaloo is a reminder of the childish, uninformed level of debate in Canada about military issues. We are so different in this regard from our allies. One need only look at the Australians — who have three times as many special forces in Iraq as Canada does — and the more mature way they discuss defence matters.

There is a broad national consensus on defence Down Under instead of our deep chasm between handwringers and realists. Our elites want Canada to be heroic in some touchy-feely way but at the same time to remain boy scouts, unbloodstained, to let others carry the fight for us. They want to play armchair quarterback in a game they not only despise but do not understand.

http://news.nationalpost.com/2015/01/28/matthew-fisher-openness-over-combat-with-isis-bites-harper-government/

Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: MCG on January 29, 2015, 11:42:42
"On the technical point of what PM said or didn’t say about the mission last fall compared to what’s happening: Opposition wins (https://twitter.com/davidakin/status/560156251901153280) .... But on the political point — Do Canadians really care about that technical point compared to the current mission? — government prevails." (https://twitter.com/davidakin/status/560156451885572096)
That is about how I see it too.  If you want to nit-pick symantics, then the government words do not match actions (specifically with respect to the topic of accompanying and not so much on the topic of combat ops), but our actions would appear to be the right thing to do.  So, let's get on with it.

If the press can be called reliable on the topic, the RoE have not changed since the mission started.  Does that mitigate against the accusations of mission creep?

Quote
Canadian snipers kill IS militants
Analyst says troops' actions cannot be considered a dramatic shift in role, and rules of engagement have not changed

GLOBE AND MAIL
STEVEN CHASE
27 Jan 2015

STEVEN CHASE OTTAWA Canadian snipers on the front lines in Iraq have once again killed Islamic State militants during what was supposed to be a non-combat mission advising Kurdish forces - part of an evolving role for this country's soldiers as the battle accelerates to win back the northern city of Mosul.
 
On Monday, the Canadian Armed Forces announced this country's special forces soldiers had twice exchanged fire with the enemy in Iraq in the last week, bringing the total number of such clashes with Islamic State extremists to three.
 
The military says in the latest two instances Canada's troops were "examining the terrain" near the battlefront as part of their work as military advisers to Kurdish peshmerga when they came under attack and fought back in self-defence. It's similar to the explanation given for the first incident in mid-January.
 
In all cases, Defence officials say, it was Canadian snipers who returned fire and "neutralized the threat," a phrase sources say means they killed enemy fighters. The military would not say how close Canada's soldiers came to Islamic State forces, but the effective range of the C-14 Timberwolf sniper rifle, one of those used by this country's troops, is 1,500 metres.
 
These encounters with Islamic State forces, as well as last week's revelations that special forces soldiers have directing air strikes against ground targets in 13 cases, represent an expansion of Canada's ground activities in the conflict and pose a challenge for a Conservative government that sent troops on the understanding their actions would be limited to advice and training.
 
The Conservatives struggled Monday to paper over contradictions in what Canadians have been told about the mission facing nearly 70 special forces soldiers and to allay concerns raised by rivals that this country's troops may be drawn deeper into the conflict and risk casualties.
 
The military now says Canada's troops spend about 20 per cent of their time near the front lines as part of advising and training the Kurds.
 
In September, Prime Minister Stephen Harper defined the military advisory mission quite narrowly.
 
"If I could just use the terminology in English, it is quite precise.

It is to advise and to assist. It is not to accompany," Mr. Harper told the Commons.
 
On Monday, however, Defence Minister Rob Nicholson offered a more expansive definition of Canada's ground role.
 
"I am not sure we could train troops without accompanying them.

We have been very clear that we would be in the business of assisting and training these individuals." NDP Leader Tom Mulcair called on the Conservatives to concede Canada is now in ground combat.
 
Liberal Leader Justin Trudeau said he supports the right of Canadian soldiers to defend themselves when under fire but adds it's unexpected to hear these military advisers are now "routinely on the front lines." Mr. Nicholson said the Conservatives don't believe in leaving the "heavy lifting" to others.
 
"That has never been the Canadian way for 200 years." David Perry, a Conference of Defence Associations Institute analyst, said what's happening to date cannot be considered a dramatic shift in role, pointing out the rules of engagement for Canadian troops have not changed.
 
He said the forces that Canada is advising are heading toward Mosul to help liberate the Iraqi city and as they reclaim territory, they and their advisers are encountering tougher fights.
 
"If this is ground combat, then how come we are hardly ever doing it? I would imagine it would be a hell of a lot more than three firefights and 13 involvements in air strikes." Roland Paris, director of the Centre for International Policy Studies at the University of Ottawa, said mission creep is under way.
 
"The U.S. military indicated last week that American troops currently in Iraq are not being deployed with Iraqi units to front-line positions.
 
Rather, they are training Iraqis behind the wire at four major military bases.

The assertion that deploying Canadian troops to the front lines is an inevitable element of advising and assisting is, therefore, misleading," he said. 


... and I may have found a use for the TAPV that will please the vehicle's detractors. 
Quote
Kurds ask for armoured vehicles
The Toronto Sun
29 Jan 2015

 OTTAWA--Kurdish forces have asked Canada for weapons, including armoured vehicles, to battle Islamic State terrorists, but the Harper government declined to say Wednesday whether it would grant the request.
 
The Kurds are preparing for a spring offensive that will include trying to retake Mosul, a city in northern Iraq that fell to Islamic State in June. They apparently made the request this week to Chief of Defence Staff Gen. Tom Lawson, who was in Iraq.
 
Defence Minister Rob Nicholson avoided the question in the House Wednesday.

"We have special forces on the ground and we have provided lethal weapons on behalf of other countries to Iraq and we have provided non-lethal weapons as well," Nicholson said during question period.
 
Liberal Leader Justin Trudeau was equally reluctant to say whether Canada should send the weapons.
 
Trudeau said only that Canada should "continue to be a strong member of the coalition" and that Canadian troops should "be able to push back" if Islamic State militants shoot at them.
 
The New Democrats -- who prefer to focus on what they see as Prime Minister Stephen Harper's lack of honesty about the mission-- said they're not surprised the Kurds have requested weapons.
 
"Soldiers want weapons to fight -- that's a given," NDP defence critic Jack Harris said. "The question is what's the role for Canada."
 
In September, the feds insisted Canadian soldiers wouldn't be in a combat mission or on the frontlines, but Canadian troops have returned fire on Islamic State militants three times since their mission began.
 
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Rifleman62 on January 29, 2015, 12:42:27
You can bet your bottom dollar, if ISIS massacred a bunch of women (after they had finished with them)/children, then staged a bomb blast with civilian casualties and said it was the Cdns, the would be an uproar. It has been done before.

I think the Government is prudent to have our own troops light up targets.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: milnews.ca on January 29, 2015, 12:52:19
If you want to nit-pick symantics, then the government words do not match actions (specifically with respect to the topic of accompanying and not so much on the topic of combat ops), but our actions would appear to be the right thing to do.  So, let's get on with it.
You've described the political fight, zackly!

That said, let's see how people respond if the Liberals get in and "adjust their wording" just a bit, in "peacekeeping" in Congo (http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/01/05/uk-congodemocratic-rebels-idUKKBN0KE1M020150105), as some on that side seem so enamoured about doing.

You can bet your bottom dollar, if ISIS massacred a bunch of women (after they had finished with them)/children, then staged a bomb blast with civilian casualties and said it was the Cdns, the would be an uproar. It has been done before.

I think the Government is prudent to have our own troops light up targets.
True - but keep in mind that if the yellow bit happened, the orange bit wouldn't matter in the public-info fight.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: upandatom on January 29, 2015, 13:39:31
I may be wrong in this-

This ISIL/ISIS war, is it not more traditional warfare. Enemies more clearly marked, for the most part, clear and definitive lines drawn?

If we start handing Armoured vehicles over, the Iraqis/Kurds start to take ground back at even faster rate with our vehicles (needless to say who is going to train them on the vehicle systems), does logic not dictate they will start to use Insurgency methods and IEDs become more prevalent on the battlefield, and lines start to dissapear.

The only way I do not see this happening is if the locals truly hate ISIS/ISIL and what they stand for as extremists. The locals then take cause and point out the Extremists and the IEDs.


What about the more legal matter of the Iraqis lighting up targets, that could be incorrect/misdirected targets, and the Canadian pilots dropping bombs on innocents, If I was a pilot, id prefer to have SOFCOM directing me then the Iraqis.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: MCG on January 29, 2015, 22:45:59
Looks like the CDS may have taken the heat off the government, but depending on which source you read he put it out or he put it onto himself.

Quote
Defence chief denies Canada in combat mission
CTV News
29 Jan 2015

 Canada's top general acknowledged Thursday that the country's military mission in Iraq has “evolved,” but continued to deny that Canadian soldiers are engaged in a combat mission against Islamic State militants.

Gen. Tom Lawson came under heavy questioning from opposition MPs during an appearance before a House of Commons committee Thursday, saying that certain actions "can appear in any mission" to appear to be combat.

Senior military officials revealed earlier this month that Canadian special forces have come under fire from ISIS militants three times and have returned fire. Commandos are also identifying targets for coalition airstrikes, even though Lawson told CTV's Question Period October that special ops would do no such thing.

 On Thursday, Lawson took responsibility for the decision to allow Canadian commandos to identify targets for airstrikes, telling the committee that he did not foresee the need for such action when he made his comments on Question Period.

The special forces' advise and assist training mission was going so well, however, that they were able to move on to teaching how to identify airstrike targets.

"So, in fact I provided them, within the advise-and-assist mission, the authority to go ahead with that," Lawson said.

The military only revealed earlier this month that Canadian commandos have been guiding in airstrikes since late November.

Lawson told the committee that a combat mission "is very different" than what special forces have been doing on the ground.

"It would use us directing our fire power against ISIS, which is not what we have the mandate to do," Lawson said, noting that special ops have defended themselves when they have come under enemy fire.

There are approximately 69 Canadian special forces in northern Iraq, training Iraqi forces in their fight against ISIS militants.

Defence Minister Rob Nicholson told the committee Thursday that "it has been an evolutionary process" assisting Iraqi forces with "strategic and tactical planning."

But the fact remains, he said: "This is not a combat mission."

Conservative MP Laurie Hawn asked Lawson whether a sniper's individual rounds would not fall under the definition of a firefight.

Lawson responded that while he is "not sure of that," it does not fall into the definition of combat.

The opposition was incensed at the seeming parsing of words.

"When you have soldiers on the ground, on the front line, whether you call it a combat mission or not, it is combat," NDP foreign affairs critic Paul Dewar said at committee.

Meanwhile, the opposition also demanded to know the cost of the Iraq mission. The Pentagon estimates that the cost of the U.S. contribution to the coalition will top $1 billion.

Nicholson said the cost remains a moving target, but MPs can expect to see the figures in public accounts records to be released later this year.
http://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/defence-chief-denies-canada-in-combat-mission-1.2211760


Quote
ISIS fight: Tom Lawson reassures MPs about risk to special forces
Foreign affairs, defence ministers face opposition at committee, along with top soldier Tom Lawson

By Laura Payton, CBC News
29 Jan 2015

Chief of Defence Staff Tom Lawson says Canada's special forces aren't put into places where they expect to come under fire.

Speaking to MPs at the House foreign affairs committee, Lawson said despite spending 20 per cent of their time near the front lines, the special forces have had to return fire only three times.

"So although the risk is low, and we continue to think it is low in that role, it is not zero," Lawson said.


"We in no way put our special operations troops anywhere near where we believe they will come under fire."

Lawson was at committee to brief MPs on the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) with Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird and Defence Minister Rob Nicholson.

MPs questioned Lawson, Baird and Nicholson on the scope of the mission and whether Canadian soldiers are involved in ground combat, leading at times to some testy exchanges. Government MPs accused the opposition of not supporting the Canadian Armed Forces and NDP foreign affairs critic Paul Dewar at one point heckled Nicholson when he didn't feel Nicholson was answering his questions.

Defence officials recently revealed that special forces operators who had been described as working in an "advise and assist" role have actually exchanged fire with ISIS forces three times.

Not combat, top soldier says

On Thursday, NDP defence critic Jack Harris lodged a formal complaint against Prime Minister Stephen Harper for providing "misleading information" to the House of Commons on the scope of Canada's military efforts in Iraq.

Liberal MP Marc Garneau read the Canadian Armed Forces' definition of a combat operation, which includes the necessity of lethal force, and asked whether that is what the military is doing in Iraq.

"It is not," Lawson said.  The Canadian special forces operators, he said, are providing Peshmerga, the Kurdish forces with whom the Canadians are working, the ability to "heighten the accuracy of the weapons" used.

Accompanying troops has a different meaning in military doctrine than in normal language, Lawson added.

"In military terms, as you are quoting doctrine, it has a very clear other meaning. And that is that you are now up front, with the troops that you have been assigned to, with your weapons being used to compel the enemy. So there is no confusion with our special operators on that accompany role."

Calling in targets

Canadian officials have said the special forces are calling in, or painting, targets for the Iraqi forces, though Nicholson wouldn't say when that happened.

"This has been an evolutionary process, working with them right from the start," Nicholson said.  "They're moving forward and that's what we are very, very proud [of]."

Harris said the real issue is whether Canadians were misinformed by the prime minister.  "Canadians have to be able to trust what they're told by the prime minister. If we see evolution, what we call mission creep and potential escalation, the question is what's next and what's this going to lead to. That's very concerning here when we don't really trust what this government is telling Canadians and telling Parliament."

The House of Commons voted in support of a six-month air bombing mission in October (the government doesn't need parliamentary approval to deploy the military).

The government committed 600 troops, one CC-150 Polaris air-to-air refuelling aircraft, two CP-140 Aurora surveillance aircraft, and the necessary air crews and support personnel. Canada also sent six CF-18 fighter jets and one dedicated airlift plane to enhance the refuelling, air surveillance and transportation capacity of coalition members.

Those are in addition to a commitment of up to 69 special forces troops who work on the ground with Iraqi forces.
http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/isis-fight-tom-lawson-reassures-mps-about-risk-to-special-forces-1.2936134
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Dolphin_Hunter on January 30, 2015, 05:42:46
So I guess delivering gifts from the belly of a CF-18 isn't considered combat..
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: milnews.ca on January 30, 2015, 08:31:10
So I guess delivering gifts from the belly of a CF-18 isn't considered combat..
Here's what the PM said in September (http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=41&Ses=2&DocId=6708288#Int-8453591) (also attached if link doesn't work):
Quote
It is to advise and to assist. It is not to accompany .... Canadian soldiers are not accompanying the Iraqi forces into combat ....
Unless there were no Iraqi troops with the Canadians painting the targets, some people think that means  "accompaniment".

Do I agree with what's happening now?  I have no problem seeing Canadian troops killing truly bad guys.

Is it what the PM said it would be?  Not according to the wording he used in September.

Has the mission changed without taxpayers being told?  It looks like it.

Should taxpayers know what its military is up to?  I'll let those smarter than me wrestle with the OPSEC vs. transparency balance  ;D
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: 3rd Horseman on January 30, 2015, 08:31:51
So much for "Deeds not Words"
Larson is a no buddy, Roulue was weak in the Regiment at best other then hockey and being an CMR keener, did he not quiet the CF at one point?
Combat is combat. The PM is lying as have they all lately, so is Larson.
  This very argument about what is combat what is not has been used as a defense at the War Crimes in the Hague for Yugo. Canadian government know that the use of air power in any form be it recce, target acquisition, directing targeting or delivering the bomb......its all considered a hostile act under the rules of war. So the CF-18 is involved in combat....the Tracker from Greenwood acquiring targets is involved in combat, and last but not least the advisers who train and follow there trainees to the front line and assist them are in combat.

 So lets hope the so called leaders of our country and Army get there crap together and start doing what they have authority to do or stop doing what they dont have authority to do. And if that included combat then get on with it and tell the country they are in combat and tell the politicians to tell it like it is.

Lets hope this does not go the way all battles have gone for the last 20 years, lies and misinformation which disrespects those who are doing the fighting and risking life for the good of the world.

Rags
3rd Horseman     
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: milnews.ca on January 30, 2015, 08:38:22
So lets hope the so called leaders of our country and Army get there crap together and start doing what they have authority to do or stop doing what they dont have authority to do.
It's not so much doing the job, there appears to be some hesitancy about how the job is described/talked about.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Humphrey Bogart on January 30, 2015, 09:09:00
Roulue was weak in the Regiment at best other then hockey and being an CMR keener, did he not quiet the CF at one point?

A "weak in the regiment" and "CMR Keener" who was good enough to pass JTF2 selection and also serve numerous years with JTF2 and CANSOFCOM?  What does that make you?

You call people out for having an agenda but it sounds like you have one yourself.  Hate the mission but don't discredit good soldiers like General Rouleau.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: George Wallace on January 30, 2015, 10:23:06
This argument only shows the naivete of the Canadian Public.  Seriously.  It is a WAR ZONE.  We have people on the ground instructing Iraqi and allied forces in a Region with no defined Front Lines, where the war-fighting is that of an asymmetric war.  There is no guarantee that they will be safe in the rear teaching in classrooms.   At the same time there is no guarantee that one of our fighters or other aircraft will NOT be shoot down.  There is a risk when you send any CAF personnel into a WAR ZONE.  It is insane for anyone to think that they should not be allowed to defend themselves.   
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: krimynal on January 30, 2015, 10:29:16
Like I said in a previous post , as a mentor and a trainer .... you HAVE to be on the ground to see how they act , why they lose , what happens , etc. etc. etc. 

I don't even understand why the Canadian Public makes a big deal out of that , here they are all bashing against Harper sending in troops and having the troops defend itself.  But they want to elect Muclair and Trudeau ?? when they both said they would rather send in humanitarian aid over forces.

On paper this sound fantastic ... what happens once you drop humanitarian aid in a war zone that isn't controlled by any type of security ? they either get killed , capture or the "bad guy" take control of the aid , and use them to their advantage.  Now how would the Canadian Public reply to that ? We should have send in Troops to ensure security.

Basically , do everything to help them , as long as it doesn't involve any type of Canadian involvement !
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Humphrey Bogart on January 30, 2015, 10:36:47
Well the debate hasn't really been about whether Canadian Soldiers are allowed to shoot back or not, even the NDP have stated that if Canadian Soldiers are fired on they of course should shoot back.  The debate has been about whether Stephen Harper misled the Canadian public WRT the scope of the mission.

I believe the opposition parties are starting to sense that Canadians aren't going to bite on this one as they seem to be putting a check fire on some of their rhetoric. 
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: milnews.ca on January 30, 2015, 10:41:16
I don't even understand why the Canadian Public makes a big deal out of that , here they are all bashing against Harper sending in troops and having the troops defend itself.
The debate has been about whether Stephen Harper misled the Canadian public WRT the scope of the mission.
:nod:  I think those doing the bashing are unhappy with the PM/Government saying in September, "no, Canadian troops won't be going with Iraqi troops into battle" and now saying, "of course Canadian troops are moving toward the fight and painting things to get blown up/sniping bad guys".

To be fair, though, we're hearing a bit more of how things unfolded (http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2015/01/29/directing-airstrikes-well-within-iraq-noncombat-mission-mandate-military-commander-says.html) ....
Quote
.... Lawson told the committee he “had not anticipated” Canadian special forces would be in a position to safely direct airstrikes when he ruled them out last October.

“What I had not anticipated at that time in October was that those tactical air controllers would be able to develop techniques that would allow them, in the relative safety of their advise and assist positions, to be able to help the . . . Iraqi security forces bring weaponry of coalition bombers to bear,” Lawson explained his reversal.

“In fact I provided them, within the advise and assist mission, the authority to go ahead with that, well within the mandate given to us by the government.” ....
Sounds like someone's now able to paint targets by "advising and assisting" but without "accompanying"  ;)

I believe the opposition parties are starting to sense that Canadians aren't going to bite on this one as they seem to be putting a check fire on some of their rhetoric. 
:nod:  I still think this from Sun Media nails it ....
"On the technical point of what PM said or didn’t say about the mission last fall compared to what’s happening: Opposition wins (https://twitter.com/davidakin/status/560156251901153280) .... But on the political point — Do Canadians really care about that technical point compared to the current mission? — government prevails." (https://twitter.com/davidakin/status/560156451885572096)
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: krimynal on January 30, 2015, 10:42:59
same principles apply .... at the beginning they were there to instruct and mentor , but when it comes down to actually make it happen , you need to follow them , that's a pretty basic and simple fact ... Yet the opposition is trying as hard as they can to make it sound SO bad , to me they just look completely stupid , but that's my personal opinion !
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Colin P on January 30, 2015, 11:05:08
Like I said in a previous post , as a mentor and a trainer .... you HAVE to be on the ground to see how they act , why they lose , what happens , etc. etc. etc. 

I don't even understand why the Canadian Public makes a big deal out of that , here they are all bashing against Harper sending in troops and having the troops defend itself.  But they want to elect Muclair and Trudeau ?? when they both said they would rather send in humanitarian aid over forces.

On paper this sound fantastic ... what happens once you drop humanitarian aid in a war zone that isn't controlled by any type of security ? they either get killed , capture or the "bad guy" take control of the aid , and use them to their advantage.  Now how would the Canadian Public reply to that ? We should have send in Troops to ensure security.

Basically , do everything to help them , as long as it doesn't involve any type of Canadian involvement !

It's not the Canadian Public making a big deal out of it, it's politicians pandering to their base, in this case latte sippers and Unicorn herders.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Old Sweat on January 30, 2015, 11:13:25
This story from the Toronto Star reproduced under the Fair Dealings provisions of the Copyright Act indicates the Canadian public supports the mission.

Support for airstrikes in Iraq at 63 per cent: Forum

Mission has strong support in Prairies and Alberta while those in Quebec are least likely to approve, poll finds.

A new poll by Forum Research found that support for CF-18 airstrikes in Iraq remains largely unchanged since November.

By: Alex Boutilier Staff Reporter, Published on Fri Jan 30 2015

OTTAWA—As parliament continues to debate the role of Canadian Forces in the fight against the Islamic State group, a new poll shows support remains strong for CF-18 airstrikes in Iraq.
The poll, released by Forum Research, found that 63 per cent of Canadians somewhat or strongly approve the Conservatives’ decision to send six CF-18 fighter jets for airstrikes in Iraq.
The support, largely unchanged since November, was strongest among Conservative voters (82 per cent). Regionally, Forum found more support in the Prairies and Alberta (70 per cent and 67 per cent), while Quebec respondents were least likely to support the mission (39 per cent disapproved).
When Forum pointed out that Canadian troops were fired on multiple times — and have returned fire — a slight majority (60 per cent) of Canadians approved of Canadian ground troops engaging Islamic State group fighters on the ground in Iraq.
A strong majority of Conservative voters (82 per cent) approved ground combat, while support was more muted among opposition voters (59 per cent of identified Liberals approved, while 43 per cent of New Democrat voters approved).
The poll also found that almost three in four Canadians (73 per cent) believed that the Canadian Forces will suffer casualties in the fight against the Islamic State group. As many as 69 special forces members are on the ground, although Parliament has approved a non-combat aid and assist role only.
The automated phone survey of 1,382 voting-aged Canadians was conducted on Jan. 27 and 28. Results are considered accurate within 3 percentage points, 19 times out of 20.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Oldgateboatdriver on January 30, 2015, 11:16:06
I think both the opposition and the members of this site are basically in agreement: The problem (if any) is a political one - on what the government said or did not say the mission would entail - not on the actual actions of the military.

However, considering the fact that most SMA's on this site seem pretty clear that assisting would likely lead to accompanying trained forces near combat areas to solidify their training in designating targets, I must say that I have lost some confidence in the competence of our fearless leader (4 maple-leaves) when he states that he could not foresee such development.

I am less than impressed also with at least one of his responses: That "he" authorized this going along (I won't say "accompanying") with the trainees near the front. Either he missed the part where he should have indicated at the same time that doing so was within the terms he was given for the operation, or else, if the terms changed, indicate that they were modified by the government along the way.

This may seem minor but it isn't. It is the very fundamental of civilian control of the military. It is for the government to decide what we are or are not to do, then for us to decide how we are going to do it within those limits. But we cannot change the limits ourselves.

If those limits were changed along the way (there is no information to that effect one way or the other), then it was up to the government to explain it to Parliament and to Canadians; if these limits were unchanged from the beginning, then (1) from a political point of view the government should communicate that fact clearly and (2) the military leadership should make it clear that it is acting within the terms it was given.

And BTW, it is perfectly fine for the opposition to try and get those very facts to the Canadians. It is their job to do so and hold the government accountable for either bad communications of changes made in secret.

Just my humble opinion.
 
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on January 30, 2015, 12:59:08

 So the CF-18 is involved in combat....the Tracker from Greenwood acquiring targets is involved in combat, and last but not least the advisers who train and follow there trainees to the front line and assist them are in combat.


I think any Tracker is on cement pads.  And none of those will be found at ZX. :)
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: 3rd Horseman on January 30, 2015, 13:09:03
I think any Tracker is on cement pads.  And none of those will be found at ZX. :)

Yes you are correct I stand corrected the Aurora is what Im talking about. Didnt think anyone one would confuse a 1950s Bonaventure launched air craft with the "Tracker" being employed for surveillance in the desert in 2015, I just used the army slang for it Tracker. Cause thats what it does. I figured it was obvious when I said greenwood.

3rd Horsman   
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Loachman on January 30, 2015, 16:09:47
3rd Horsman

I have never, in forty-two years in uniform, heard anybody refer to an Aurora as a "Tracker".

You even got your own name wrong.

Credibility, Credibility - wherefor art thou, Credibility?
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Humphrey Bogart on January 30, 2015, 16:42:47
I have never, in forty-two years in uniform, heard anybody refer to an Aurora as a "Tracker".

You even got your own name wrong.

Credibility, Credibility - wherefor art thou, Credibility?

My thoughts exactly, I was skeptical the minute he called out General Rouleau who is probably one of the smartest GO's we have and a soldier through and through.

Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: daftandbarmy on January 31, 2015, 01:13:06
This story from the Toronto Star reproduced under the Fair Dealings provisions of the Copyright Act indicates the Canadian public supports the mission.

Support for airstrikes in Iraq at 63 per cent: Forum

Excellent. Now let's put a brigade in there to launch some fairly large raids and take some scalps in proper fashion, which will do more than a few airstrikes to convince ISIS that they are on a losing ticket.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on January 31, 2015, 01:23:41
Didnt think anyone one would confuse a 1950s Bonaventure launched air craft with the "Tracker" being employed for surveillance in the desert in 2015, I just used the army slang for it Tracker. Cause thats what it does. I figured it was obvious when I said greenwood.

3rd Horsman

Not to those of us who actually crew Auroras - I have a fairly good idea what they do  ;).  I'm ex-army, and I never heard an Argus or Aurora called a tracker...because there was a Tracker flying the same time those did (at one point). 

Cheers

Tracker
(http://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fjproc.ca%2Frrp%2Frrp3%2Ftracker6.jpg&hash=604bea571009cd51b9e514a718a15f70)

Argus
(http://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.canadianwings.com%2FcmsAdmin%2Fuploads%2Fserials%2F10739_Argus.jpg&hash=6f147e18bedbd8e1a20a114bfe98175b)

Aurora
(http://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fcanadianforces.webstarts.com%2Fuploads%2Fcp-140_aurora.jpg&hash=a9bb02ffc41a4ad2cc958bdc63410921)
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: 3rd Horseman on January 31, 2015, 08:36:22
Yawn,

To make it clear to Royal Drew I did not call Mike out. Mike is a nice guy he was fun to have around as a young officer. That does not change the facts as a Gunner officer he was weak at best. Had a lot to do with too much hockey no field time and he departed the Regt early in his career after being in Germany where ya learn almost nothing as a young officer on a good day add hockey ya learn zero.

As for the Argus and Auroura.......They track things dont they? Ah ya they do.

3rd Horseman
     
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Oldgateboatdriver on January 31, 2015, 10:16:13
No they don't.

Take it from someone who has spent a career at sea, greatly benefiting from the services of those angels over head (all of them, Trackers, Auroras, Argus and Arcturus'). And you always have to be very specific in identifying them because they don't all do the same thing the same way.

To go back to the point, they don't "track" things. They locate, identify … and do the hard kill, at least at sea. I gather they do the same thing over land, just without the kill capacity at the end, but also collate the intel picture and serve as communication hub. I would not call all that  "tracking" and I am not even in the Air Force. I bet that if I were, I would know all sorts of other things they can do as they are marvellous multipurpose platforms.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: SupersonicMax on January 31, 2015, 11:20:31
The Hornet also "tracks" things.  Do you call these Trackers as well?
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Scott on January 31, 2015, 11:39:55
Forget it, you're all wrong - he's right. You misunderstood him. Try harder. He didn't call Rouleau out, you misunderstood what he posted.

Same posting style, just six years removed from the last. Don't worry, I went through some of the old ones and didn't have to get far to see the trend.

Yawn is right, the others are wise to this - but you're still the only one in step, yeah?

Scott
Staff
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Good2Golf on January 31, 2015, 11:59:20
Kind of funny to hear someone pretend that in 4 CMBG there was no consideration as to how well the brigade's soldiers could play hockey.  :rofl:
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: SeaKingTacco on January 31, 2015, 12:52:39
Hey, I can play this game, (apologies in advance to all the gunners and mortar men, except Horsey):

Basically, since an 81mm mortar, an L5 and an M777 all do indirect fire, their names are interchangeable, too?

 ::)
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Simian Turner on January 31, 2015, 14:06:02
So much for "Deeds not Words"
Larson is a no buddy, Roulue was weak in the Regiment at best other then hockey and being an CMR keener, did he not quiet the CF at one point?

3rd Horseman   

3rd Horseman,

I was on Arty trg with the two brothers named Rouleau and you are confusing them. One was a weak Arty Offr who graduated from CMR, played hockey and went on to become a Colonel Public Affairs Officer (Marc).  Younger brother, Mike, on the other hand did not go to Military College.  He joined as a teenager and was impressive from day one.  He did leave the military at one point after being injured and joined the Ottawa Police Force.  Mike rejoined and resumed his SOF career.  He is battle proven and street smart beyond his years.  If you knew them like I do you would not confuse them for a second -  one would bore you to death and the other would spit chew in your face as his steely-eyed stare brought you to your knees.

Once a Gunner Officer, but never served in 3rd.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Good2Golf on January 31, 2015, 14:22:30
ST, there you go letting actual facts come into the discussion.  Rouleau-younger was DCO of 5e RALC as well, and I know the Regt didn't consider Dep Comd to be a fluff position.

Regards
G2G
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: daftandbarmy on February 01, 2015, 11:46:52
3rd Horseman,

I was on Arty trg with the two brothers named Rouleau and you are confusing them. One was a weak Arty Offr who graduated from CMR, played hockey and went on to become a Colonel Public Affairs Officer (Marc).  Younger brother, Mike, on the other hand did not go to Military College.  He joined as a teenager and was impressive from day one.  He did leave the military at one point after being injured and joined the Ottawa Police Force.  Mike rejoined and resumed his SOF career.  He is battle proven and street smart beyond his years.  If you knew them like I do you would not confuse them for a second -  one would bore you to death and the other would spit chew in your face as his steely-eyed stare brought you to your knees.

Once a Gunner Officer, but never served in 3rd.

And that, ladies and gentlemen, is how our PERs SHOULD be written up  :nod:
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: 3rd Horseman on February 01, 2015, 20:23:32
Sorry about the high jack it was a good thread for that I apologize,

I know them both I did not confuse them. His stare never phased me.

I will depart the thread and let the good discussion continue.

3rd Horseman
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: MJP on February 01, 2015, 20:30:47

I will depart the thread and let the good discussion continue.

3rd Horseman

That is the best contribution you can make right there.  Thanks  man.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Technoviking on February 02, 2015, 10:33:23
So....back on topic....


Any news from our forces over there?  I scoured the interwebs and found nothing more recent than 31 Jan.

Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: MCG on February 02, 2015, 12:17:25
The only hits in the news feed from today are more editorials on the political wordsmith game.  The media seem to be settling to the conclusion that the Conservatives have won; the other parties should stop digging for a scandal in the past and start influencing/looking to the future.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Technoviking on February 02, 2015, 14:33:18
The only hits in the news feed from today are more editorials on the political wordsmith game.  The media seem to be settling to the conclusion that the Conservatives have won; the other parties should stop digging for a scandal in the past and start influencing/looking to the future.
Well, if all there is in the news is stuff on politicians being, well, politicians, then I guess that no news is good news.  Thanks for the update.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: upandatom on February 04, 2015, 16:57:38
same principles apply .... at the beginning they were there to instruct and mentor , but when it comes down to actually make it happen , you need to follow them , that's a pretty basic and simple fact ... Yet the opposition is trying as hard as they can to make it sound SO bad , to me they just look completely stupid , but that's my personal opinion !

Unless people have been deployed or on any sort of military leadership course that teaches instruction, mentoring, leading, they wont understand "Mentoring" in the mindset of a military member. On those courses, the staff followed along, they took note of what occured, and let you know how you could do it better, effectively, etc. You can not do that from a classroom.

In essence the way they see it happening is,
1. Teach in the class/lesson plan/Battle plan
2. Send them out to the front,
3. Attack or defend an objective.
4. Have the Iraqi explain how it went down.

When it should be
1. Teach in the class/lesson plan/battle plan
2. Send them out to the front, ACCOMPANY
3. Attack or defend an objective. WATCH (Fire back if you are under contact)
4. Have the Iraqi explain how it went down. (Let them perform their own AAR and see how they thought it went)
5. Give the Mentors assessment (inform them of weaknesses and strengths and how they can play their strengths to their advantage)
6. Repeat


SH!t simple, OPSEC plays above all in this case, of course he cant divulge what the SOFCOM true intent is, that just puts them in more harms way.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: milnews.ca on February 04, 2015, 17:11:56
.... it should be
1. Teach in the class/lesson plan/battle plan
2. Send them out to the front, ACCOMPANY
3. Attack or defend an objective. WATCH (Fire back if you are under contact)
4. Have the Iraqi explain how it went down. (Let them perform their own AAR and see how they thought it went)
5. Give the Mentors assessment (inform them of weaknesses and strengths and how they can play their strengths to their advantage)
6. Repeat
And if it wasn't for this little quote in the House of Commons ....
Quote
.... 30 Sept 2014, Question Period, House of Commons (http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=41&Ses=2&DocId=6708288#Int-8453588):
Quote
Right Hon. Stephen Harper (Prime Minister, CPC):   Mr. Speaker, I said “ advise and assist the Iraqis”.  [English]  If I could just use the terminology in English, it is quite precise. It is to advise and to assist. It is not to accompany. I think that was laid out before the parliamentary committee ..... Mr. Speaker, I just said that Canadian soldiers are not accompanying the Iraqi forces into combat ....
....
.... the wordsmiths wouldn't have as much to wordsmith about.  It's all about calling a spade a spade, and when people are willing to do so, or not.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: daftandbarmy on February 04, 2015, 18:07:19
The Iraqis would probably do better with a Loan Service approach, something like that operated between Oman and the UK: http://www.defenceviewpoints.co.uk/articles-and-analysis/british-treaty-obligations-to-oman

Loan Service personnel are attached to the Omani military from the UK, wear Omani kit, train and lead Omani troops under this agreement. Most of those I know who have done this were under 2 year contracts that included generous allowances and leave packages.

And they had a hell of a good time. Many went back for more tours.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Rifleman62 on February 04, 2015, 19:21:01
A fellow I went to high school with, who joined the Light Infantry in the UK, did that. Pretty good wages.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: jollyjacktar on February 04, 2015, 20:00:54
Oh, but then there would be the cries from the usual suspects that we're now supplying mercenaries to regimes here and there.  Good Christ, the amount of tin foil that would be required for hats would eclipse the industrial output efforts of Fort Mac on a good day.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: upandatom on February 05, 2015, 12:24:56
A fellow I went to high school with, who joined the Light Infantry in the UK, did that. Pretty good wages.

Thats how the Brits operation in IMATT in Sierra Leone, they were making some crazy amount of money 75k Pounds year plus, and it was treated more like a posting, they would spend 1-2 years, but lived on the Compound. It was a great go for them.

From what I gather is they were paid normal wages by the UK and then a "loan wage" for the SL Government capped it off that was basically the Brits giving them more money (Aid money or whatever)that was given the the SL.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: daftandbarmy on February 05, 2015, 13:16:54
Thats how the Brits operation in IMATT in Sierra Leone, they were making some crazy amount of money 75k Pounds year plus, and it was treated more like a posting, they would spend 1-2 years, but lived on the Compound. It was a great go for them.

From what I gather is they were paid normal wages by the UK and then a "loan wage" for the SL Government capped it off that was basically the Brits giving them more money (Aid money or whatever)that was given the the SL.

I once (foolishly) turned down a job like that in Mozambique. The posting came with a big ranch house, a driver, cook and gardener.

A mate of mine took the job and loved it. Still goes down there for vacations etc....
Title: Re: Pan-Islamic civil war merged mega thread (Sunni vs Shia, and the expansion of IS(IS/IL))
Post by: Eye In The Sky on February 05, 2015, 17:54:36
Article Link (http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad-current/op-impact-airstrikes.page)

5 February 2015

On 5 February 2015, while taking part in coalition missions in support of Iraqi security forces ground operations conducted northwest of Baghdad, CF-188 Hornets successfully struck an ISIL compound used as a staging area using precision guided munitions.

3 February 2015

On 3 February 2015, while taking part in coalition missions in support of Iraqi security forces ground operations conducted southwest of Mosul, CF-188 Hornets successfully struck an ISIL IED factory and storage facility using precision guided munitions.


As of 1500 (Eastern Standard Time) 4 February 2015, Air Task Force-Iraq conducted 435 sorties:
•CF-188 Hornet fighter jets conducted 284 sorties;
•CC-150T Polaris aerial refueller conducted 72 sorties, delivering some 4,063,000 pounds of fuel to coalition aircraft; and
•CP-140 Aurora aircraft conducted 79 reconnaissance missions.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: jollyjacktar on February 05, 2015, 18:55:34
Mozambique is on my to visit list for the next time we vacation in the area.  It has a lot of offer as a vacation spot.  Shame you missed out on that daft.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Dimsum on February 05, 2015, 21:17:18
Mozambique is on my to visit list for the next time we vacation in the area.  It has a lot of offer as a vacation spot.  Shame you missed out on that daft.

Call me paranoid, but I generally avoid countries where an AK-47 is part of the national flag and coat of arms. 
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: daftandbarmy on February 06, 2015, 02:47:44
Call me paranoid, but I generally avoid countries where an AK-47 is part of the national flag and coat of arms.

Oh pshaw... we all know that the Portugese colonial legacy is one of peace and enlightenment, right?  ;D
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: milnews.ca on February 06, 2015, 18:00:26
You can bet your bottom dollar, if ISIS massacred a bunch of women (after they had finished with them)/children, then staged a bomb blast with civilian casualties and said it was the Cdns, the would be an uproar. It has been done before.
Along those lines (http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-us-hostage-death-militants-claim-female-american-aid-worker-kayla-jean-mueller-has-been-killed-by-jordanian-air-strikes-10029845.html) ....
Quote
American officials are desperately trying to confirm the veracity of a claim by Isis which said a female US hostage being held by the militants had been killed by a Jordanian air strike.

In a message posted on social media, Isis claimed that Kayla Jean Mueller died when Jordanian planes struck targets close to Raqqa, the de facto capital of Isis-controlled territory. Ms Mueller, an aid worker from Arizona, was taken hostage in Syria in August 2013.

The message from the militants was subsequently published by the SITE Intelligence Group, which track extremists activity ....
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: cryco on February 06, 2015, 20:19:57
That's what i though when I heard the story. Perfect opportunity to try and sour relations between Jordan and US (not that it would).
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: YZT580 on February 06, 2015, 20:48:29
this is a sad statement but far better a bomb than a knife or one of their other favoured methods of execution.  At least the bomb is unexpected and relatively quick and her torment has now ended. 
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: milnews.ca on February 06, 2015, 20:55:43
this is a sad statement but far better a bomb than a knife or one of their other favoured methods of execution.  At least the bomb is unexpected and relatively quick and her torment has now ended.
True, as far as it goes, but that assumes that if the hostage is dead, it really was Jordanian fast air that did it.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Good2Golf on February 06, 2015, 22:27:33
^ :nod:
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: YZT580 on February 06, 2015, 23:57:27
you are absolutely correct.  If she is dead I truly hope that it was a result of 'friendly fire'.  I cannot think of a more appropriate phrase than that one.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Good2Golf on February 07, 2015, 11:07:25
One has to pretty much assume that ISIS would never actually exchange anyone, based on their doctrine.  Any "hostage negotiations" are most likely being used purely to increase their effort to terrorize and influence, and not in any way an effort to actually trade hostages held for either their own or money, etc...

My gut feel though, is that Ms. Mueller was not killed by an air strike, but rather ISIS used that as a way of deflecting true accountability for their actions.

G2G

Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: milnews.ca on February 07, 2015, 11:14:44
My gut feel though, is that Ms. Mueller was not killed by an air strike, but rather ISIS used that as a way of deflecting true accountability for their actions.
Agreed - not to mention starting to build up the layers of the "lookit the West killing civilians" meme I'm surprised we haven't heard more of from "the usual suspects".
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: MCG on February 13, 2015, 02:01:36
Newest SITREP on the mission: more bombs dropped, another CANSOF gunfire exchange with ISIS, and the CAF has developed plans to either extend the mission or come home in April.

http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canadians-trade-fire-with-isis-as-military-waits-on-possible-extension-1.2955157
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on February 13, 2015, 20:40:51
Some great shots of inside the CP140M.

http://www.combatcamera.forces.gc.ca/netpub/server.np?find&catalog=photos&template=detail_eng.np&field=itemid&op=matches&value=67401&site=combatcamera

http://www.combatcamera.forces.gc.ca/netpub/server.np?find&catalog=photos&template=detail_eng.np&field=itemid&op=matches&value=67376&site=combatcamera

Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: milnews.ca on February 16, 2015, 08:19:02
Survey says (http://bit.ly/1AdBoFH) ....
Quote
Support for Airstrike Mission Against ISIS Rises to 76% (up 12 points since start of mission); Majority (83%) Believes it’s a Combat Mission
Seven in Ten (69%) Support the Use of Canadian Forces on the Ground in a Combat Mission against ISIS in Iraq

( .... )

These are some of the findings of an Ipsos Reid poll conducted between February 9 to 12, 2015 on behalf of Global News. For this survey, a sample of 1,005 Canadians from Ipsos' Canadian online panel was interviewed online ....
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: jollyjacktar on February 16, 2015, 09:55:25
The results of that poll must really be giving the Liberals conniption fits.  I know it has been noted that JT is doing a very fast back pedal joined by Mr's Leslie and Garneau.  They probably look similar to a synchronised swimming team and if you can picture them in Borat Mankinis too boot, well...  ;D

Hoots of dismay have also been muted from Ms. May as of late too.  It's about the only thing the CPC have going correctly for it at the moment that the others can't do a damn thing about. 
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Colin P on February 16, 2015, 11:21:02
this is a sad statement but far better a bomb than a knife or one of their other favoured methods of execution.  At least the bomb is unexpected and relatively quick and her torment has now ended.

stuff happens in wartime http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Carthage

although I doubt very much it was bombs that killed her
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Old Sweat on February 19, 2015, 19:59:59
This CP story, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provision of the Copyright Act, reports that another CF18 mission was flown last Friday. Of interest, it also notes that DND has requested a supplemental estimate to cover the costs of this mission, among other items.

Canadian jets destroyed Islamic State bomb factory on Friday:

By The Canadian Press — The Canadian Press — Feb 19 2015

OTTAWA - The military says Canadian CF-18 fighter jets conducted a single attack in Iraq last week, leading a coalition strike that destroyed a factory making improved explosive devices.

Navy Capt. Paul Forget says the attack on Friday was a success.

He says coalition air attacks and Iraqi ground efforts continue to degrade the operational ability of the group known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.

Since the Canadian mission began last fall, CF-18s have flown 328 missions.

A Canadian Polaris tanker aircraft has flown 82 sorties and delivered more than two million kilograms of fuel to coalition aircraft.

Forget says another 91 missions flown by Canadian Aurora reconnaissance planes bring the total number of Canadian sorties to 501.

The update came on the same day that the government fufilled a promise to release more information on the cost of the war against ISIL.

National Defence, through the latest round of supplementary spending estimates, asked for a budget top-up to the end of the fiscal year of $139 million, of which $122 million was for the combat mission in Iraq.

An additional $17 million is being sought for expenses related to Canadian involvement in the NATO mission to eastern Europe, which took place in the aftermath of Russia's annexation of Crimea.

Until Defence Minister Jason Kenney finally broke the government's silence this week, the Conservatives had been under fire for refusing to disclose the cost of deploying CF-18s and special forces advisers in the war-ravaged nation.

The additional budget request released Thursday shows that the bombing campaign itself accounts for $73 million of the Iraq war costs.

Canada has also deployed up 69 special forces advisers in northern Iraq, who took along vehicles and other specialized equipment.

Kenney warned earlier this week that the costs would increase if the government chooses to extend the mission — something that by all indications appears to be a likely possibility.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: milnews.ca on February 20, 2015, 05:39:02
And here's a breakdown of the incremental costs for Op IMPACT (as well as a bit of $ for Op REASSURANCE) ....
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: PPCLI Guy on February 20, 2015, 08:44:14
Quote
leading a coalition strike that destroyed a factory making improved explosive devices.

I beleive this si the first time that we have led an attack.  Well done.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: SupersonicMax on February 20, 2015, 12:01:41
Nope, not the first time.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Retired AF Guy on February 20, 2015, 18:31:51
Nope, not the first time.

Just the first time anyone has mentioned it.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Rider Pride on February 21, 2015, 04:27:10
IMHO: If this mission gets extended, you will likely see a larger SF task force, and additional Regular Forces support in the form of medical and logistical units being pushed in to form a more substantial logistics chain home. It also would not surprise me if select small groups of Cbt arms have the opportunity to come in the form of force protection.

Conservative government has a majority and is making political hay of this mission. It would not hurt them to expand it now.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: milnews.ca on February 21, 2015, 08:37:46
IMHO: If this mission gets extended, you will likely see a larger SF task force, and additional Regular Forces support in the form of medical and logistical units being pushed in to form a more substantial logistics chain home. It also would not surprise me if select small groups of Cbt arms have the opportunity to come in the form of force protection.

Conservative government has a majority and is making political hay of this mission. It would not hurt them to expand it now.
As long as folks still support the mission in general (http://www.ipolitics.ca/2015/02/20/canadians-support-for-iraq-mission-still-high-says-poll/) (usual caveats re:  any polling), and in spite of the howling of the opposition, this might be enough of a nudge up to increase our presence while still keeping it palatable to the voters.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Ditch on February 21, 2015, 13:09:34
select small groups of Cbt arms have the opportunity to come in the form of force protection.
Force protection for what assets?  Our RCAF brethren are fully ensconced on well defended ally installations.  We didn't even use the army as gate guards at Mirage - just off-duty flight crew.

It will be interesting times indeed if this mission gets extended/expanded - maybe a reversal to the budgetary needs?
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: S.M.A. on February 21, 2015, 14:12:39
IMHO: If this mission gets extended, you will likely see a larger SF task force, and additional Regular Forces support in the form of medical and logistical units being pushed in to form a more substantial logistics chain home.

And speaking of an extended mission (with an  expanded mandate)...

CBC (https://ca.news.yahoo.com/canada-considers-taking-fight-against-152531570.html)

Quote
Canada considers taking fight against ISIS to Libya, Syria
CBC – 2 hours 44 minutes ago

Defence Minister Jason Kenney has indicated the government is not ruling out taking Canada's military mission against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) group beyond Iraq — to Syria and Libya.

Evan Solomon, host of CBC Radio's The House, asked Kenney about participating in missions in those countries.

"Well, we're going to look at all of the options," Kenney said an interview broadcast Saturday.

(...SNIPPED)

Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Tow Tripod on February 21, 2015, 21:15:41
Say what you want but peace and security is more important in Central Europe than a few thousand wing nuts in the Middle East.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: MJP on February 21, 2015, 21:44:36
Force protection for what assets?  Our RCAF brethren are fully ensconced on well defended ally installations.  We didn't even use the army as gate guards at Mirage - just off-duty flight crew.

Nope,  there may have a time when this was true but I was army and part of the force protection crew in 2003.  It was army folks in 2004 when we were on our way to Kabul and army reservists when I transistioned through in 2006.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Ditch on February 22, 2015, 02:09:45
Are we both talking about the same staging base? Mirage (aka UAE)?  My timeframe for the aircrew standing guard would be 2005-2008.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: MJP on February 22, 2015, 10:10:12
Are we both talking about the same staging base? Mirage (aka UAE)?  My timeframe for the aircrew standing guard would be 2005-2008.

Yes, Mirage.  I didn't go through after 2006 so I can't speak onif it changed.  But 2003-2006 it was  combat arms (reg/reg) task.  Before we arrived in 2003 the MPs who had a million people there who did the guard duty.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Rider Pride on February 23, 2015, 12:26:25
Force protection for what assets?  Our RCAF brethren are fully ensconced on well defended ally installations.  We didn't even use the army as gate guards at Mirage - just off-duty flight crew.

Don't limit yourself to the past. The Army will be looking for tasks to play in the new theater as it matures. And this will be especially true if the Conservative renew thier majority in the fall.

Title: Re: Pan-Islamic civil war merged mega thread (Sunni vs Shia, and the expansion of IS(IS/IL))
Post by: E.R. Campbell on March 07, 2015, 14:26:14
CBC News is reporting (http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/andrew-joseph-doiron-petawawa-ont-soldier-killed-in-iraq-1.2985862) that "Andrew Joseph Doiron, Petawawa, Ont. [has been] killed in Iraq: 1st Canadian soldier killed in Iraq was based at Garrison Petawawa, according to Canadian Forces"

This is the picture posted by CBC News:

(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/B_g5yXuUwAAJXXW.jpg)

The CBC says he was killed by "friendly fire," specifically: "Members of the Special Operations Forces were mistakenly engaged by Iraqi Kurdish forces following their return to an observation post behind the front lines," and "three other soldiers were injured and were being treated in Iraq."
Title: Re: Sgt Andrew J. Doiron, PPCLI & CSOR - 06 Mar 2015
Post by: JS2218 on March 08, 2015, 10:36:42
Very sad. RIP  :cdn:

And then there's this...

Quote
Kurdish official blames Canadians for soldier’s death

BRAM JANSSEN
IRBIL, Iraq — The Associated Press

A Canadian special forces soldier was killed in a friendly fire incident after he and others ignored an order to stay in their car and showed up to the front line unannounced, a spokesman for Iraq’s Kurdish forces said Sunday.

The death Friday of Sgt. Andrew Joseph Doiron marked Canada’s first casualty as part of the U.S.-led coalition’s war on the extremist Islamic State group. Canadian officials could not be immediately reached for comment Sunday on the peshmerga claim, though Canada’s defence minister previously acknowledged Doiron’s death came as a result of “a case of mistaken identity.”

Peshmerga spokesman Halgurd Hekmat said a group of Canadian soldiers showed up unannounced Friday to the village of Bashiq, in Iraq’s Nineveh province near the militant-held city of Mosul. The area had seen heavy fighting against Islamic State militants the previous day.

“When they returned, the peshmerga asked them to identify themselves,” Hekmat told The Associated Press. “They answered in Arabic, that’s when peshmerga started shooting. It was their fault.”

Hekmat added that he doesn’t know why the Canadians were there. “I consider it an improper action by the Canadians and illogical,” he said.

Two Kurdish officials later told the AP that Doiron’s body was flown to Canada early Sunday following a military ceremony at Irbil International Airport. They spoke on condition of anonymity as they were not authorized to brief journalists.

Canada’s defence department on Saturday announced the death of Doiron, a soldier in the Canadian Special Operations Regiment based at Garrison Petawawa, Ontario. Three other Canadian soldiers were wounded in the incident and are in stable condition, Canadian Defence Minister Jason Kenney said.

Canada has 69 special forces soldiers with Kurdish peshmerga fighters in what the government calls an advising and assisting role. They were sent to help train Kurdish fighters last September in a mission that was billed as noncombat with the elite troops working far behind the front lines The fact that Canadian special forces have been training and assisting on the front lines and directing airstrikes has stirred controversy in the country, but Kenney said the rules of engagement will remain the same.

Kenney said Doiron’s death had “nothing to do with combat,” saying it was a case of mistaken identity on the part of Kurdish fighters at night.

“It was caused by a failure of identification. There will be an inquiry,” Kenney said.

The Islamic State group currently holds a third of Iraq and Syria. The U.S.-led coalition began airstrikes targeting the extremists in August.

So far, four other troops have been killed as part of the coalition, not counting Iraqi forces. They include a U.S. Marine presumed lost at sea in October, a Marine killed in a noncombat incident in Baghdad in October, a U.S. Air Force pilot killed in December when his jet crashed in Jordan and a captive Jordanian pilot burned to death in a cage by the Islamic State group.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: MCG on March 08, 2015, 15:40:28
The partisan-media controversy now begins.  Hopefully, our politicians can direct themselves away from turning Sgt Doiron into a political tool.

Quote
Defence minister disputes Kurdish account of 'friendly fire' incident in Iraq
Michelle Zilio and Emily Chan
CTV News
08 Mar 2015

Defence Minister Jason Kenney is maintaining that Canadian soldiers were well behind the front lines in Iraq when a sergeant was shot and killed in a “friendly fire” incident Friday, despite contradicting reports from Kurdish forces.

A spokesman for the Kurdish forces in Iraq told The Associated Press Sunday that the Canadians showed up to the village of Bashiq, north of Mosul, unannounced and ignored an order to stay in their vehicle. Halgurd Hekmat said: "The peshmerga asked them to identify themselves. They answered in Arabic, that's when peshmerga started shooting."

Speaking to CTV's Question Period Sunday, Kenney disputed the Kurdish account.

“They weren’t on the front lines," said Kenney.

“My understanding is that the observation post where the troops were approaching -- at about 11 p.m. on Friday night, close to Irbil -- was about 200 metres behind the fort line of our troops, so 200 metres from the front. They had been there earlier in the day, and they were returning to the observation post when it was dark out, and apparently it was a case of mistaken identity,” said Kenney.

Sgt. Andrew Joseph Doiron, of the Canadian Special Forces Operations Regiment, was killed. Three other Canadian soldiers were wounded.

Kenney said friendly fire is "regrettably a reality of any kind of military deployment." And while he said an investigation has already commenced with special operations commanders out of Irbil, Kenney didn't commit to an independent investigation.

Despite Friday's incident, Kenney maintained that Canada's role in Iraq is not a combat one.

“This was not a combat operation. They were not in contact with the enemy, with ISIL; rather fire was brought on them as a result of mistaken identity," said Kenney.

But the NDP is questioning that. The party's defence critic says Canadians have been misled by Prime Minister Stephen Harper on the mission in Iraq, who originally told Parliament that Canada's role was to advise and assist the Iraqis.

“We’ve been promised by the prime minister from the beginning that there are not going to be boots on the ground. We’ve got the defence minister claiming that they’re not combat deaths, yet in 2002, when we lost four soldiers to so-called friendly fire to the Americans, they were called the first combat deaths since Korea," Jack Harris said on Question Period.

Harris called for a "full-blown investigation" into Friday's incident.

Liberal defence critic Joyce Murray was careful when commenting on the incident.

“I think it’s early to be speculating or to be linking this with other matters,” she said.

The incident comes as the government prepares to debate whether it will extend Canada’s six-month mission in Iraq. The opposition has been calling for more transparency as the mission’s expiry date – April 7 – approaches.
http://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/defence-minister-disputes-kurdish-account-of-friendly-fire-incident-in-iraq-1.2269444
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on March 08, 2015, 15:49:14
The partisan-media controversy now begins.  Hopefully, our politicians can direct themselves away from turning Sgt Doiron into a political tool.
http://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/defence-minister-disputes-kurdish-account-of-friendly-fire-incident-in-iraq-1.2269444

My read of the NDP comments tells me that ship has already sailed and isn't likely to return to port.  Why focus on facts when you can stir the pot right?
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Oldgateboatdriver on March 08, 2015, 16:22:44
True enough, but for Minister Kenney to make stupid statements such as "It was not at the front because the OP was 200 meters from the front" is like saying "it was not downtown Toronto because it was 200 meters from the corner of King and Bay street". It not only is stupid as a statement, but also sounds stupid to the Canadian population, not to mention dishonest. Even some of the least educated Canadians know that this is not a WWI situation with a specifically defined "line" considered the Front, and that by almost definition, an OP is at a place where fighting is likely and thus "at the front". Minister Kenney's statement makes him either deceitful or ignorant to most people.

Much better was the explanation given by retired Colonel Petrolakos (? not sure on the spelling or exact name) on CTV: The SOF personnel are not involved in combat operations - that is they do not actively participate in actions against the enemy, but their role as adviser and trainer can take them anywhere, including near or at the front, in order to advise properly and assess the training they gave their counterparts. They however, do not fight except when needed to defend themselves. He then indicated that such were the terms of service from the starts of the deployment and that what they were doing at the time of the incident was clearly within those terms.

Why could Kenney not be so clear and forthcoming?
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Humphrey Bogart on March 08, 2015, 16:56:36
True enough, but for Minister Kenney to make stupid statements such as "It was not at the front because the OP was 200 meters from the front" is like saying "it was not downtown Toronto because it was 200 meters from the corner of King and Bay street".

because clearly real bullets don't travel further than 200m  :facepalm: ISIS must only shoot at the Kurds with paintball guns???

Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on March 08, 2015, 17:26:43
True enough, but for Minister Kenney to make stupid statements such as "It was not at the front because the OP was 200 meters from the front" is like saying "it was not downtown Toronto because it was 200 meters from the corner of King and Bay street". It not only is stupid as a statement, but also sounds stupid to the Canadian population, not to mention dishonest. Even some of the least educated Canadians know that this is not a WWI situation with a specifically defined "line" considered the Front, and that by almost definition, an OP is at a place where fighting is likely and thus "at the front". Minister Kenney's statement makes him either deceitful or ignorant to most people.

I disagree.  I also dont expect civilians regardless of occupation or position to understand and be able to articulate military terms and concepts the way serving members do.   We aren't even able to do it ourselves across the RCN, Cdn Army and RCAF, nor between trades and classifications.  Why would we expect any civilian to be able to do something we can't?   Can the average MARS officer explain how all arms call for fire works?  Can an infantry platoon commander speak aabout RMP and ASUW?  If they do will it be without error?

However you have indicated that there is no "front", a concept I suggest civilians see in their head as a straight line between 2 armies.  In my 25 years in uniform (17 army) we never used the term front.  We did use FEBA, LOD, FLOT, Rear areas, and such to identify various areas in the battle space/AOR.   Even in WWII the "front" wasnt a straight line and blue on blue happened.   War is waged by humans and humans make mistakes, more so under stress and under fire.

Concepts like FEBAs and FLOTs might seem trival to many, and IMO those many are the people who are lucky enough to never have to operate in or above them.

If the front is so difficult to point to distinctly on a map because as you say, there really isn't one,  I find it hard to understand how anyone not in theatre can determine if troops are behind, beside, or in front of it. 

When I did army stuff, there were imaginary lines on the ground, say a report line, a phase line, a LOD or a boundary.   200m behind the LOD was not on or across it, it was behind it.  I see 200m behind the FLOT as behind the FLOT.  It's not on it or past it.  It's behind.  If I was told to remain 200m behind a phase line until H hour +5, I was as close as tactically possible to that 200m and there was not a thing wrong with that;  that is how tactical control measures are trained and used in my experience on the ground and in the air.

FWIW, I have done OPs in the BAA as part of a RAS task before, no where near "the front".

I also highly doubt the average Canadian knows what the letters O.P. or L.P. even stand for let alone what they are and how they are used.

Quote
Much better was the explanation given by retired Colonel Petrolakos (? not sure on the spelling or exact name) on CTV: The SOF personnel are not involved in combat operations - that is they do not actively participate in actions against the enemy, but their role as adviser and trainer can take them anywhere, including near or at the front, in order to advise properly and assess the training they gave their counterparts. They however, do not fight except when needed to defend themselves. He then indicated that such were the terms of service from the starts of the deployment and that what they were doing at the time of the incident was clearly within those terms.

Why could Kenney not be so clear and forthcoming?

Ref what I said above, expecting a politician to explain military concepts with the clarity a Senior Officer can is unrealistic.   
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: milnews.ca on March 08, 2015, 17:34:17
Much better was the explanation given by retired Colonel Petrolakos (? not sure on the spelling or exact name) on CTV: The SOF personnel are not involved in combat operations - that is they do not actively participate in actions against the enemy, but their role as adviser and trainer can take them anywhere, including near or at the front, in order to advise properly and assess the training they gave their counterparts .... Why could Kenney not be so clear and forthcoming?
Because if the Minister used those words, the headline would be "Minister Admits Canadian Troops Can Be in Combat".  Also, there's that little thing about the PM saying "the troops won't accompany the good guys into the fight" (http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=41&Ses=2&DocId=6708288#Int-8453591).
because clearly real bullets don't travel further than 200m  :facepalm: ISIS must only shoot at the Kurds with paintball guns???
This is what you get when the Message o' the Day is "Canadian troops are not on a combat mission."

Meanwhile, a bit more of the latest from Kurdish media (http://bit.ly/1aVCJsP):
Quote
The Kurdistan Region’s Peshmerga Ministry has opened an investigation into the shooting incident in which a Canadian military adviser was killed and two others injured near the Bashiqa frontline, north of Mosul.

At 1 a.m. on Saturday morning, a Canadian commando was killed after Peshmerga fighters mistook him and two of his colleagues for Islamic militants and opened fire on them as they approached a frontline at night.

Sgt. Andrew Joseph Doiron, 31, was killed and two other unnamed soldiers injured.

The soldiers were members of the Canadian Special Operations Regiment.

On Sunday, the KRG’s Peshmerga Ministry released a statement saying that the Canadian adviser was killed as a result of “friendly fire”. They have opened an investigation into the circumstances surrounding the incident.

The Ministry also sent its condolences to the family of Doiron, and all Canadians and wished the wounded soldiers a full and speedy recovery.

On Saturday Peshmerga Commander Mosa Gardi on the Bashiqa frontline told BasNews that the Canadian advisors were in Erbil being treated for their injuries.

“On Friday night there was intensive fighting between Peshmerga and IS militants, when the insurgents attacked our forces in Qapani village near Bashiqa, north of Mosul,” said Gardi.

“During fighting the Canadian advisers left their vehicle and walked to the area. They got very close to the fighting without our coordination and when the Peshmerga saw them, they asked who they were. The Canadians answered in Arabic, leading the Peshmerga to believe they were IS militants, and shot them,” revealed the commander.

“They were transferred to Erbil hospital by helicopter,” added Gardi.

He said if it wasn’t for their driver all three may have been shot dead. He told the Peshmerga that they were Canadian advisors and not IS militants ....
Title: Re: Sgt Andrew J. Doiron, PPCLI & CSOR - 06 Mar 2015
Post by: Valhrafn on March 08, 2015, 23:53:49
Very sad. RIP  :cdn:

And then there's this...
RIP SGT Doiron

Here's part of an article from the CBC:

"When they returned, the peshmerga asked them to identify themselves," Hekmat told the AP. "They answered in Arabic, that's when peshmerga started shooting. It was their fault."

But a high-level Canadian government source disputed that account, telling CBC News that Doiron and three fellow soldiers were a couple hundred metres from the front line and had pre-arranged a rendezvous with Kurdish troops that went awry.

The Canadian team had been at the location earlier in the day "to co-ordinate events to take place later" and had arranged a time to return that night, with pre-determined signals to identify themselves to the Kurdish troops, according to the source, who spoke on condition of anonymity. "Special forces don't freelance," he said, disputing the Kurdish account that they showed up unannounced. He added that the soldiers had operated using this system before.

The Canadians arrived for the rendezvous and were acknowledged by two separate groups of peshmerga fighters without incident, the source said. A third peshmerga group, however, engaged them by opening fire.

Separately, Defence Minister Jason Kenney was also adamant that the Canadian soldiers were well behind the front lines when Doiron was killed. "They were approaching a Kurdish observation post behind the forward operating line," he said in an interview with CBC News. "They clearly identified themselves, and our understanding is that they were given permission to proceed toward the observation post...."

http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/andrew-doiron-s-death-in-iraq-sparks-dispute-over-what-happened-1.2986169
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Rider Pride on March 09, 2015, 05:06:07

Even some of the least educated Canadians know that this is not a WWI situation with a specifically defined "line" considered the Front, and that by almost definition, an OP is at a place where fighting is likely and thus "at the front".

You are incorrect in your assumption. There are clearly defined front lines in that region.


Quote
On Saturday Peshmerga Commander Mosa Gardi on the Bashiqa frontline told BasNews that the Canadian advisors were in Erbil being treated for their injuries.

“On Friday night there was intensive fighting between Peshmerga and IS militants, when the insurgents attacked our forces in Qapani village near Bashiqa, north of Mosul,” said Gardi.

“During fighting the Canadian advisers left their vehicle and walked to the area. They got very close to the fighting without our coordination and when the Peshmerga saw them, they asked who they were. The Canadians answered in Arabic, leading the Peshmerga to believe they were IS militants, and shot them,” revealed the commander

Complete and utter bull crap.
Title: Re: Re: Sgt Andrew J. Doiron, PPCLI & CSOR - 06 Mar 2015
Post by: GAP on March 09, 2015, 14:14:27
Federal parties would do well to avoid politicizing death of Canadian soldier
http://news.nationalpost.com/2015/03/08/michael-den-tandt-federal-parties-would-do-well-to-avoid-politicizing-death-of-canadian-soldier/ (http://news.nationalpost.com/2015/03/08/michael-den-tandt-federal-parties-would-do-well-to-avoid-politicizing-death-of-canadian-soldier/)
Michael Den Tandt | March 8, 2015

It would be a comfort indeed if Canada’s political class, setting aside partisanship as they’ve so often said they’d like to do, were to avoid crassly transforming the death of Sgt. Andrew Joseph Doiron in Iraq, apparently by “friendly” fire, into a political football. It would be a comfort but it is not at all likely. In an election year the temptation for all three federal parties to politicize this, and other casualties that may follow, will be nigh irresistible. That is lamentable.

Sgt. Doiron, and other Canadian Forces members waging war on Canada’s behalf against the Islamist State of Iraq and al-Sham, deserve better than the misguided, hypocritical and often ignorant jaw-boning that characterized the early debate in Ottawa over the Afghan mission, as casualties there began to mount.

To start, we may as well cut straight to it: Were Sgt. Doiron’s death and the injuries of three of his fellow soldiers the result of a combat mission, or mere training? This will inevitably be the axis of political discussion, just as it was in the Afghan war debates between 2006 and 2009. Now, as so often back then, the answer is this: Of course it’s combat, and of course, based on the mission parameters, it’s training. It can be both. It often is.

Axis Number Two: Since Sgt. Doiron’s death is being put down to a tragic misunderstanding, whose fault was it? In the wake of reports Sunday that the Kurdish Peshmerga have blamed the Canadians for disobeying an instruction to remain in their car, this will become the next political question of the hour. Are Canadian special forces soldiers properly trained for their mission? Did they have clear rules of engagement? As is customary, Monday-morning quarterbacking from the Opposition benches will be carefully veiled in assurances that these are merely questions being raised on our soldiers’ behalf, for their own protection. Whereas the Conservative government will treat any and all Opposition questions about the mission as expressions of surly disloyalty to the troops, if not outright sympathy for the enemy.
More on link
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: PanaEng on March 09, 2015, 17:12:41
You are incorrect in your assumption. There are clearly defined front lines in that region.


Complete and utter bull crap.

You have a source to back up your comment?
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: cupper on March 09, 2015, 23:39:14
A Rare Interview with a Canadian Commander Fighting the Islamic State

http://www.vice.com/read/vice-speaks-to-a-canadian-commander-fighting-isis-in-iraq-273

Quote
If Canada's CF-18 Hornet fighter jets are the muscle in the nation's war against the Islamic State, then its CP-140 Auroras are the eyes and ears.

The high-tech surveillance aircraft are arguably the most advanced manned reconnaissance aircraft in the world, and they're Canada's secret weapon in outsmarting the Islamic State's evolving tactics.

VICE reached the Long-Range Patrol Detachment Commander—the man responsible for the Auroras—from his base in Kuwait. For security concerns, VICE was not provided with the commander's name.

The commander spoke with VICE the morning before Sergeant Andrew Dorion was killed in action after Kurdish soldiers accidentally opened fire on his unit in northern Iraq.

Dorion was in Iraq as a special forces advisor to the Kurdish Peshmerga. The Aurora commander is part of the airborne portion of Operation IMPACT—code for Canada's operation against the Islamic State—which is doing the intelligence work behind the bombing campaign.

As part of IMPACT, Canada has contributed seven CF-18s to the bombing campaign against the Islamic State, as well as two of the CP-140s and three other support aircraft. Canada has also sent 69 advisors, including Dorion.

The commander painted a picture of high morale and optimism in Kuwait, where the pilots and crew for the aircraft are stationed. That mood has no doubt been dampened by the friendly fire death on Friday night.

Notwithstanding the accident, the commander underscored the successes of the mission.

Criticism had been levied at the mission from the opposition NDP and Liberals, who've said that the mission is ineffective and have accused the governing Conservatives of jumping into a mission without a plan. They've argued that the Islamic State's evolving tactics mean airstrikes are of marginal effect, pointing out that Canada's CF-18s have dropped relatively few bombs.

"Are we in danger of being ineffective in a very short period of time?" asked NDP defense critic Jack Harris in a Parliamentary committee in November.

The Aurora commander says it's quite the opposite. One of the main purposes of the high-tech aircrafts is to monitor the Islamic State's movements and help develop counter-tactics to outsmart the versatile fighting force.

While he says it's obviously a challenge, the Auroras are being used to track vehicle movements through the long stretch of desert, and can help discern whether it's a local merchant, or an Islamic State convey posing as one.

"It's striking that right balance between surveillance and reconnaissance that really makes the difference in actually countering these sort of tactics," he says.

That sort of utility can be of great use to the Iraqis, Kurds, and coalition forces on the ground.

"Mostly what we'll do is we'll collect information from a variety of different sensors from the platform and provide it in as near real time as possible and from there it will be synthesized with a lot of other information from other platforms," he says. That cocktail of intelligence is mixed by the coalition, and can then be shared with forces on the ground.

The commander couldn't get too far into the specifics of the aircraft, what sort of data is being collected, or exactly what coalition's changing tactics are—it is, after all, an ongoing war—but he did provide context about Canada's contribution with the mission. An interview with media from the theater is an incredibly rare occurrence.

The commander also gave a sense of the personal aspects of being deployed—the food, the facilities, and connecting back home.

Evidence of the fact that he's been pretty far removed from his life back home, the commander bragged that the base has all the latest movies, such as the latest installment of the Hunger Games franchise (five months old) or the last of the Hobbit series (four months.)

"Maybe they're not the latest anymore," the commander adds on reflection. "I haven't been back in Canada."

He does have internet access, though, which means he can see his wife and kids via Facetime every few days. That's a good boost to morale for everyone.

"I'll be honest, it's been remarkably smooth sailing because there has been such good support here," he says.

The commander still isn't sure if he'll be in Kuwait for another six months, but most signs indicate that Defence Minister Jason Kenney plans to extend Operation IMPACT beyond its current mandate, which ends on April 7.

While communications between Canada and the base in Kuwait are quite good—VICE has been in touch with Canadian Forces personnel on base for weeks—they're not perfect. The interview ended abruptly when the commander's satellite connection cut out.

VICE: What's the day-to-day like, over there?
Commander: Every single day, except for planned maintenance days, we launch the Auroras on a mission. While the time of day varies, the whole idea is that we try to provide the capabilities that the coalition needs, when they need it. So every single day we launch a mission. It means long days for the air crews, and for the ground crews that are preparing the mission—typically the air crews are going to work an 18-hour day. That's not just the flying, that's everything that goes into it. They tend to work themselves pretty hard.

What role are the Auroras playing in the coalition?
The Auroras are a surveillance and reconnaissance platform, so they can be used on a wide variety of tasks: everything from being at the cold face of a fight, so to speak, to where you're actually supporting people on the ground, to reconnaissance operations where you're looking for where the fight will be, not so much today, but tomorrow, the next day, maybe a month out. You'll spend a lot of time assigned to an area, where you'll be given a list of objects or points of interest to observe, but then we'll also get a certain amount of freedom based on our training that allow us to, if something of interest comes along or if we see something out of the ordinary while we're out there, to pursue that as a lead, to gather more information and then report that back. The missions vary quite a bit. Sometimes, you go out and mow the lawn—you go and watch points that you've been to before to develop a better sense of what is going on—and at other times you're being more dynamically employed to look at very specific things that might be time sensitive, and you need to get there and do your job at a prescribed time. It's a wide variety of things, but it's very rewarding work when you do it.

How unique are the Auroras?
The big thing that the Aurora brings to the table is that it's a manned platform. There's always a requirement for both a manned and unmanned platforms—coalition members have both of those platforms in theater. The value of the Aurora, in being a manned platform, brings is that it allows you to then go out to an area that's difficult and react really quickly. As a bigger platform, it has bigger engines, it's much more robust, and you can fly a lot faster from one area to another to be more reactive and responsive. On top of that, the Auroras have gone through their upgrades in the last couple of years. We actually have absolutely cutting-edge equipment onboard the Aurora right now and I would argue, from my perspective, we are one of the best equipped assets here to do a surveillance mission. I would easily put us on par with any of our coalition assets out here.

What sort of data are you actually collecting in these missions?
The Aurora has a wide variety of sensors, some of which are recently upgraded, as part of our upgrade program. Everything from highly complex imaging radar systems to electro-optical systems that allow you to view objects from a great distance away at day and night, to other systems that collect electronic emissions across a broad spectrum that allow us to then, from there, be able to actually create a picture of what's happening on the ground, either with an actual camera-type picture, or with a radar image that allow us to look right through clouds. Once we synthesize all that information together, even aboard the aircraft, you can create a really good picture of what's happening, whether you can actually see the object with the camera, or if it's with a radar or you're actually listening in to the electronic emissions that are coming from it.

How do the Auroras reduce the likelihood of civilian casualties or collateral damage?
One of the key tasks that we'll be assigned is that we'll go out and we'll look at points of interest. Sometimes, for those points of interest, we're looking at developing a really solid understanding of the pattern of life that's around that object so that you can better determine whether or not it's actually a target of interest, and when you might prosecute a strike on it both to achieve your objectives and also to minimize collateral damage. So I can think of several missions that I've personally been on, where we've spent hours circling a target of interest—getting a feel for the traffic flow for a targeted area, the number of people walking around, the activity in and around buildings or whole towns—in order to better understand what's going on. And that can be quite a laborious process, and quite time-consuming, because if you don't fully understand everything that's going on in the vicinity of a potential target, you potentially expose yourself to having unintended consequences. So that's where the Aurora pays its dividends, because we really have the ability to linger over an area for a long periods of time and go back to it on a repeated basis and help develop that pattern of life.

What sort of challenges are posed by the landscape?
The predominant challenge that we experience now is that the characters of the battle space have changed even since Canadians arrived. Last summer when the Islamic State was moving in large formations it was very much a conventional warfare battle space. You had large troop movements, large movements of equipment. In large part due to the coalition presence of airpower, that has forced the Islamic State to change their tactics. They no longer move in these large groups, they have to be much more cagey about what they do. And that's ultimately the challenge. They now go to great lengths to mix what they do with the local population, to try to confuse us and make it difficult to ascertain whether something is enemy or neutral or even friendly, for that matter. They're spending most of their time moving in smaller groups making and concealing their activities in and around large population centers, so they can make it the most difficult for us. That's the predominant challenge.

Couple that with the fact that the population centers in Iraq are sometimes distributed sometimes across large open desert. So you have some spaces, especially along the river, where there are lots and lots of population. But then there are parts out in the middle of the desert where there are towns that have developed along trading routes. So you can actually have trucks in the middle of the desert driving from one town to the other. It can be quite difficult to determine, sometimes, whether that truck driving through the desert just happens to be a local merchant driving from one supply point to a local town that he services, or whether that's something of interest—the Islamic State has adjusted their tactics to mimic those local movements, which makes it a challenge. So you have to go linger in an area to gain lots of information but also be able to go wide ranging in order to cover a wide area of space.

In a personal sense, what's it like on-base out there?
It's a very well-appointed base that we have here. We've done a fairly remarkable job in making it comfortable for the folks that are here. Everyday I have access to gym facilities, both right where the Canadians are, plus shared facilities where we have other coalition partners that we work alongside. We probably have more food than we should have, which means on a daily basis we have to encourage guys to get out to the gym. The mess hall we have here is actually quite outstanding. It is a menu that rotates every two weeks, but hey, you can get crab legs every two weeks, so that's not half bad.

But is there a Tim Hortons?
There isn't a Tim Hortons, but there is a chain of coffee shops you can go to that are here. They produce a Starbucks-like cup of coffee. We have had the odd Timmies run. In fact, I think just yesterday, the senior leadership organized a Timmies run from the local Tim Hortons in Kuwait City, which was a huge boost to morale for everybody. I think the last one that we had was on Christmas Day. Both were extraordinarily well-attended by people and there were far more donuts and coffee that we could shake a stick at. It's been very good.

Are you hunkered down for the long haul?
Certainly the Auroras have always been ready to deploy. It's one of our standing tasks: always be ready to deploy internationally. Back home, that's the job I have: commanding a squadron to make sure that that happens. So we are ready to go, if the government decides to extend the mission. What it really comes down to, is that when the government makes its decision, we always have prudent plans in place to react to whatever decision that they come up with. We give them options, they make the decision.

What sort of preparations need to be made if your mission is extended?
I think the big thing is helping the families of those who have to come back for future deployments. Obviously, as with any military, you have a limited pool of people. In the Aurora community, we've had quite a number of folks who've been exposed to theater, who've been on deployment here. The longer we go on, the better the chance that we'll have to start bringing people back to theater, which would be considered a normal thing. This is ultimately the job people people train for.

This interview has been edited for style, clarity, and length.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: milnews.ca on March 11, 2015, 15:58:50
In addition to the Kurdish investigation (http://basnews.com/en/news/2015/03/08/peshmerga-ministry-to-investigate-death-of-canadian-adviser/), the Iraqi Government has committed to look into the friendly fire incident (http://basnews.com/en/news/2015/03/11/iraqi-pm-baghdad-to-investigate-canadian-friendly-fire-incident/):
Quote
Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi on Tuesday spoke to Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper and promised that Baghdad would investigate the killing of a Canadian soldier in a “friendly fire” incident with Peshmerga forces.

Last week on the Bashiqa frontline, north of Mosul, Peshmerga forces shot and killed the Canadian soldier and wounded three more.

According to a statement released by the Iraqi PM’s office on Tuesday, Abadi called Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper to offer his condolences over the death of Sergeant Andrew Joseph Doiron.

Abadi also wished the three injured Canadian Special Operations Forces soldiers a speedy recovery.

Abadi promised his government would investigate the case. By establishing the truth, he said, nothing like it should happen again ....
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on March 11, 2015, 17:34:41
You have a source to back up your comment?

Nothing that can be posted on here.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Pencil Tech on March 12, 2015, 10:09:15
Sorry folks, I've totally lost my religion where this mission is concerned. I'm not in the military anymore so I don't feel I have to be silent where government policy is concerned. Western intervention in the Middle East has caused nothing but chaos in Iraq, Libya, Syria, etc. and this goes back as far as the First World War era and you all know it. Canada has no strategic interest in this conflict and we have no particular strategy apart from tagging along with the rest of the "coalition" in this ill-defined effort to "degrade" ISIS. ISIS is as evil as it gets, yes, but they're no more evil than Saudi Arabia and we never stop kissing the Saudi royal family's rear end, eg. when the king died no fewer than TWENTY U.S. officials attended the funeral. SA have beheaded more people in the last three months than ISIS. If our government said "We are in Iraq to help defend Kurdistan. Period." I would support that mission because these people somehow miraculously are culturally immune from the usual Islamic tribal conflict of most of the region, and actually seem to WANT a modern democratic and pluralist society. But that's not why we're there. Why are we there? We need to get out of there because we are not going to achieve any kind of positive outcome (look at Libya, come on honestly) and we're just delaying the inevitable, i.e. these people killing each other until they get tired of it and they've settled all their ethnic and Sunni-Shia issues.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: E.R. Campbell on March 12, 2015, 10:23:48
Sorry folks, I've totally lost my religion where this mission is concerned. I'm not in the military anymore so I don't feel I have to be silent where government policy is concerned. Western intervention in the Middle East has caused nothing but chaos in Iraq, Libya, Syria, etc. and this goes back as far as the First World War era and you all know it. Agreed  Canada has no strategic interest in this conflict and we have no particular strategy apart from tagging along with the rest of the "coalition" in this ill-defined effort to "degrade" ISIS.  Disagree: we do have an "interest," it is to show active support for the USA. Many Canadians may not like it but "doing our share" is a cornerstone of our foreign policy; so is accepting US 'leadership,' even (maybe especially) when it is suspect. ISIS is as evil as it gets, yes, but they're no more evil than Saudi Arabia and we never stop kissing the Saudi royal family's rear end, eg. when the king died no fewer than TWENTY U.S. officials attended the funeral. SA have beheaded more people in the last three months than ISIS.  Agreed!!! If our government said "We are in Iraq to help defend Kurdistan. Period." I would support that mission because these people somehow miraculously are culturally immune from the usual Islamic tribal conflict of most of the region, and actually seem to WANT a modern democratic and pluralist society. But that's not why we're there. Why are we there?  I repeat: we're there to support the USA, even when it's flailing about like a blind, mindless, gigantic bull in a china shop.  We need to get out of there because we are not going to achieve any kind of positive outcome  Agreed (look at Libya, come on honestly) and we're just delaying the inevitable, i.e. these people killing each other until they get tired of it and they've settled all their ethnic and Sunni-Shia issues. Agreed, again
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Pencil Tech on March 12, 2015, 11:05:22
Mr. Campbell, I get your point. It may be that supporting the US is ultimately in our stategic interests, to the point that it overrides all other concerns, but what if the US were completely isolationist, and non-interventionist with regard to anything happening in the world? Would that mean that we should also then be completely isolationist? Or would we have to go looking for another leader to follow, rather than having an independent foreign policy?
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Cloud Cover on March 12, 2015, 11:18:33
I personally am having a hard time accepting that Canadian soldiers were shot to pieces just so we can be seen to supporting the USA. We do have our own interests in that region now, namely that it seems to be a place where some young Canadians who have become deranged have decided to fight for religion and kill innocent people on the streets of Iraq, Syria, and Canada. The war is also here, now.

Even if the US was to pull away from the region, would we not at least have some consideration about the foregoing?   Do we stand for nothing but supporting the interests of a self indulgent nation to our south that is suffering from a severe case of ADD and memory lapse? I think not, I hope not, I will not.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: PanaEng on March 12, 2015, 11:30:52
Nothing that can be posted on here.
Here are your clearly defined front lines:
http://static1.businessinsider.com/image/54f85dedecad04621e6eb466-954-702/screen%20shot%202015-03-05%20at%208.44.27%20am.png (http://static1.businessinsider.com/image/54f85dedecad04621e6eb466-954-702/screen%20shot%202015-03-05%20at%208.44.27%20am.png)
from one source. It would be a stretch to say that the front lines are clearly defined.
Here is another, a bit older, that clearly does not show well defined front likes: http://static.businessinsider.com/image/548050686bb3f714404d6d65-1200/image.jpg (http://static.businessinsider.com/image/548050686bb3f714404d6d65-1200/image.jpg)
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on March 12, 2015, 17:14:31
Ok. 
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: MCG on March 12, 2015, 20:40:08
A lot of articles today with a headline that MND has denied the Canadian contingent in Iraq will grow, but the details in the narrative seem to suggest he only denied the possibility of an increased CANSOF contingent.  Meanwhile, the Foreign Affairs Minister hints that our future involvement in Iraq may have similarities to Afghanistan.  It seems pretty clear that he is talking about foreign aid investment.  But lets not allow facts to get in the way of a good rumour.  Clearly, the ministers are trying to tell us that the Canadian Army will step foot into Iraq as the dominante Canadian presence and likely filling a role akin to the Kabul training mission but possibly even a Kandahar like OMLT.

... and, no - I don't really suspect any of that.  There is nothing to actually support such a conclusion at this time.  That does not seem to stop opposition from hinting at such possiblity.
Quote
Kenney denies plan to boost force in Iraq
Lee Berthiaume
Ottawa Citizen
12 Mar 2015

The government isn't planning to increase the number of special forces advisers in Iraq, Defence Minister Jason Kenney said Wednesday while sidestepping questions about a tweet some allege was intentionally misleading and intended to bolster support for the mission.

The Citizen reported this week military officers are expecting the government to extend the war against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) past April, and an expansion of the training contribution is possible.

But Kenney poured cold water on those prospects during an appearance before the Commons defence committee Wednesday, saying: "We certainly have no intention of increasing the number of (special operations troops) in the region."

Canada deployed 69 commandos to northern Iraq in September to help train Kurdish forces in their fight against ISIL. One of those soldiers, Sgt. Andrew Doiron, was

killed and three others were injured when the Kurds opened fire on them near the front lines in a friendly fire incident Friday night.

Kenney said the government is not anticipating more casualties, but he added that the advisory mission isn't without risk.

The six-month advisory mission and Canada's involvement in the U.S.-led bombing campaign against ISIL are scheduled to expire on April 7. Kenney said the government hasn't decided whether to renew the mission, but he promised MPs will be asked to vote on an extension if it is proposed.

Meanwhile, Kenney was unapologetic after tweeting a picture he suggested was of Muslim women put in chains by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), but which was actually from a ceremony that re-enacts the persecution of the prophet Muhammad's family.

During the committee appearance, Kenney was asked about the photo amid opposition suggestions that such a tweet was unbecoming of a Canadian Defence minister.

"Shouldn't the public of Canada really expect when a minister of Defence communicates (by Twitter) that it will be based in reality, not on the basis of some mistaken understanding of what's going on in other parts of the world?" NDP defence critic Jack Harris asked.

"Would you be prepared to refrain from this kind of offensive and erroneous propaganda attempts in the future?" Harris added.

"Should the minister of National Defence not ensure that communications such as on social media are accurate?" Kenney replied. "Absolutely."

But rather than apologize, Kenney instead listed the numerous ways ISIL has trampled and violated the rights of women, children and religious minorities in Iraq, Syria and the surrounding region.

"One of the most important reasons for our Operation Impact is to protect the innocent, including women and children, from the sexual slavery and human trafficking of ISIL, which was the point (of the tweet)," he said, using the military's name for Canada's mission in Iraq.

"I stand by that message on International Women's Day, which is, we are there in part to defend the women and children of Iraq."

Kenney previously refused to apologize after his office was implicated in faking a citizenship reaffirmation ceremony for television when he was Immigration minister in 2011. There have also been questions about his decision to allow the release of photos potentially identifying Canadian special forces troops in Iraq.

Quote
Canada’s role in Iraq could mirror Afghanistan, foreign minister says
Kim Mackrael
The Globe and Mail
05 Mar 2015

Ottawa — Foreign Affairs Minister Rob Nicholson says Canada’s longer-term role in Iraq could mirror its assistance to Afghanistan as the Conservative government prepares for a possible extension to a combat mission that is due to expire next month.

Mr. Nicholson, who made a covert stop in Baghdad and Erbil earlier this week, said the government will determine in the coming weeks whether to continue Canada’s military contribution to the fight against Islamic State militants. The Conservative government has signalled its interest in extending the mission beyond its six-month mandate, but has not announced a decision to do so.

“Our mandate is until April 7, but we’ve indicated that Canada is not a country that stands on the sidelines, and we’re looking at ways that we have contributed and what is available for the future,” Mr. Nicholson said in a conference call from Jordan on Thursday. “As I say, I indicated that we’re in this for the longer term to make sure that we do what we can to help.”

Asked to explain what he meant by a longer-term commitment, Mr. Nicholson suggested Ottawa would take a similar approach in Iraq to the one it had in Afghanistan by continuing to provide assistance to the country over a longer period.

“Being in this for the long term – it’s similar to what we did in Afghanistan, for instance,” Mr. Nicholson said. “We were in Afghanistan, but we indicated that we would continue our assistance, and we have, in Afghanistan.”

The Canadian military mission to Afghanistan lasted 12 years, and Ottawa spent more than $2-billion on development assistance to the country during that time. Afghanistan remained among Canada’s top foreign-aid recipients after the mission ended.

“It’s not just military, it has to be a bigger picture in terms of what the solutions are,” Mr. Nicholson said. He pointed out that Canada has donated more than $100-million in humanitarian assistance to the region, and said: “This is going to continue.”

Canada’s military contribution to the fight against Islamic State militants includes six fighter planes, two surveillance aircraft and an aerial refuelling tanker. In addition, 69 special forces soldiers are assisting Iraqi security forces on the ground in northern Iraq.

The Canadian military has already begun training troops to ensure they are prepared for a possible extension, said Royal Canadian Navy Captain Paul Forget of Canadian Joint Operations Command.

“That planning’s been in the works for some time,” he said during a briefing on the mission on Thursday afternoon. “The personnel have been identified, the pre-deployment training has been put into place to ensure that those personnel are ready for the challenges that lie ahead should the mandate be announced for an extension.”

Captain Forget said the military is also ready to bring soldiers back to Canada should the government decide not to extend the mission.

Tony Battista, executive director of the Conference of Defence Associations , said it would be difficult to imagine the Canadian government walking away from the mission in Iraq at this point.

In addition to continued participation in coalition airstrikes, he said Ottawa could consider providing more intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assistance as well as medical and logistical support. The government could also consider a modest increase in the number of special forces troops now serving in Iraq, he added.

Mr. Nicholson’s comments are not the first to suggest Ottawa is looking to lengthen the mission. Last month, Defence Minister Jason Kenney said the government is inclined to maintain a “meaningful role” in the fight and pointed to broad public support for the current deployment.

During his trip to Iraq, Mr. Nicholson met with Iraq’s Foreign Minister, its Prime Minister and the speaker of Iraq’s Council of Representatives. He met with the President of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, Masoud Barzani, in Erbil, and with Canadian soldiers who are in the region.

Mr. Nicholson also held meetings this week with the foreign ministers of France and the United Arab Emirates and with the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Jordan, according to the Department of Foreign Affairs.

NDP defence critic Jack Harris said he was disturbed by Mr. Nicholson’s comments about remaining involved in Iraq for the longer term and by the comparison the minister drew to Canada’s role in Afghanistan.

“These kinds of comments seem to indicate that Canadians should watch out for the kind of open-ended commitment that we’ve seen in Afghanistan,” he said.
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/foreign-affairs-minister-nicholson-to-speak-about-secret-trip-to-iraq/article23305564/
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: PanaEng on March 13, 2015, 11:18:43
some more on the events surrounding Sgt Doiron death.
http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/andrew-doiron-s-colleagues-held-fire-when-kurds-turned-guns-on-them-1.2993010 (http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/andrew-doiron-s-colleagues-held-fire-when-kurds-turned-guns-on-them-1.2993010)

Quote
Things went horribly wrong when they arrived at the third and final checkpoint. According to the Canadian investigation, a young, possibly inexperienced Peshmerga fighter near the roadblock suddenly opened fire when the code word was used.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: MCG on March 17, 2015, 01:49:49
Get ready for another 12 months in Kuiwait, Iraq and maybe Syria.

Quote
ISIS mission: Canada extension could signal year-long commitment
Current mission to Iraq expires in April, but could possibly expand to Syria

Murray Brewster
CBC News
16 Mar 2015

The federal cabinet is poised to decide on extending the combat mission against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and should it be approved, several defence sources say it likely would involve a commitment of more than six months, possibly up to a year.

Defence Minister Jason Kenney wouldn't indicate on Monday which way the debate is going, but said a verdict will come in the very near future and that "we're considering various options."

He said it is a matter of looking at what meaningful contribution Canada can make to degrading the capability of extremists to wage their bloody campaign.

Kenney and other senior Conservatives have dropped broad hints for weeks that the threat posed by extremists in Iraq and Syria is not something that should be left unchecked by Canada — or its allies.

The parliamentary mandate of the existing mission is to expire within the next few weeks.
The question of duration for an extended commitment is simply a political calculation, one source said.

An extension of six months would require another evaluation and renewal in October at time when the government is expected to be campaigning for re-election.

The Harper cabinet doesn't need Parliament to authorize a renewed commitment at any time, but the Conservatives have sought all-party support in the House of Commons for such missions, even if they have rarely received it.

Kenney dampened speculation last week that the government would authorize an increase in the number of special forces troops, who are providing Kurdish Peshmerga fighters with training and assistance, including the guiding of air strikes.

It's unclear whether cabinet would consider changing the scope of how the elite soldiers carry out their mission by authorizing offensive operations and commando-style raids into Islamic State territory.

Kenney was circumspect when asked about it last week.

The air force has six CF-18 jets bombing Islamic State targets along with two surveillance planes and an aerial tanker operating out of bases in Kuwait. The warplanes have been limited to targets in Iraq.

NDP Leader Tom Mulcair said his party would oppose any continuation of the mission that involved bombing raids into Syria, which he said would put Canada alongside Bashar al-Assad's regime.

"Of course, you're dealing with a very cruel dictatorship in that country and before putting our brave men and women in uniform at the beck and call of someone of that ilk, we'd really have to know what we're doing."

Defence analysts have said any potential Canadian extension would most likely resemble U.S. President Barack Obama's war resolution before the U.S. Congress, which removes geographic limits and softens the language about the employment of American combat troops.

Like Canada, the U.S. originally ruled out putting "boots on the ground" in the form of conventional combat forces.
http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/isis-mission-canada-extension-could-signal-year-long-commitment-1.2997425
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Old Sweat on March 18, 2015, 13:49:20
CTV has posted a short item on the National Newswatch site to the effect that PM Harper has announced that next week Parliament will be asked to extend the mission for a year.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: milnews.ca on March 18, 2015, 14:06:11
CTV has posted a short item on the National Newswatch site to the effect that PM Harper has announced that next week Parliament will be asked to extend the mission for a year.
A bit more on that (http://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/government-to-request-extension-and-expansion-of-iraq-mission-harper-1.2285954) ....
Quote
The federal government will seek Parliament’s approval to extend and expand Canada’s mission against Islamic State militants in Iraq, Prime Minister Stephen Harper said Wednesday.

Harper said he will put a motion before MPs when the House returns next week.

“Next week, it is the government’s plan to move forward with a request from Parliament for extension and expansion of the mission,” Harper told reporters while making a separate trade announcement in Mississauga, Ont.

Asked whether the mission would be expanded into Syria, Harper said he would “address those issues” when putting forward his proposal.

“The current authorization laid open the possibility of going into Syria, though we have not done that,” Harper said.

The mandate for Canada’s six-month mission to Iraq is set to expire on April 7, and the government had previously indicated that it would seek Parliament’s approval for an extension ....
Title: Re: Pan-Islamic civil war merged mega thread (Sunni vs Shia, and the expansion of IS(IS/IL))
Post by: Eye In The Sky on March 19, 2015, 17:17:04
http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad-current/op-impact-airstrikes.page

First half of March appears to have proven  fruitful.
Title: Re: Re: Pan-Islamic civil war merged mega thread (Sunni vs Shia, and the expansion of IS(IS/IL))
Post by: jollyjacktar on March 19, 2015, 19:48:51
Good reading.  The more cockroaches they stomp, the better.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: milnews.ca on March 24, 2015, 10:10:55
And here's the wording of the motion The Canadian Press is sharing (http://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/text-of-motion-to-extend-canada-s-war-against-islamic-state-1.2294246):
Quote
That, whereas
(i) the terrorist group known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has repeatedly called on its members to target Canada and Canadians at home and abroad;

(ii) ISIL poses a clear and active threat to the people of the Middle East, including members of vulnerable religious and ethnic minority groups who have been subjected to a brutal and barbaric campaign of sexual violence, murder, and intimidation by ISIL;

(iii) unless confronted with strong and direct force, the threat that ISIL poses to Canada and to international peace and security, will grow;

(iv) Canada desires, consistent with Canadian values and interests, to protect the vulnerable and innocent civilians of the region, including through urgent humanitarian assistance;

(v) the Government of Iraq has requested military support against ISIL from members of the international community, including from the Government of Canada;

(vi) Canada is part of a broader international coalition of allies and partners, including numerous countries of the Middle East, committed to the fight against ISIL;

(vii) the United Nations Security Council remains seized of the threat posed by international terrorism with the unanimous passage of the United Nations Security Council resolution 2178;

(viii) the deployment of Royal Canadian Air Force assets has played an important role in degrading, destabilising, and weakening ISIL's position and operations in the region;

(ix) the advise and assist mission of the Canadian Special Operations Forces in Northern Iraq has increased the capabilities of Kurdish-Iraqi Security Forces to combat ISIL; and

(x) continuing to degrade ISIL will require striking its operations and infrastructure where they are located, including in Syria;

Accordingly, this House

(a) continues to support the Government's decision to contribute Canadian military assets to the fight against ISIL, and terrorists aligned with ISIL, including air strike capability with authorization to conduct airstrikes in Iraq and Syria;

(b) supports the Government's decision to extend the mission to a date not beyond March 30, 2016;

(c) notes that the Government continues not to deploy troops in a ground combat role; and

(d) offers its resolute and wholehearted support to the brave men and women of the Canadian Armed Forces who stand on guard for all of us.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: MCG on March 24, 2015, 12:06:58
I am surprised this bit was written as such:
Quote
Accordingly, this House

...

(c) notes that the Government continues not to deploy troops in a ground combat role;

...
It is still technically true (as it was when combat vs combat role first consumed the attention of media and Parlaimentarians), but it risks distracting discussion from substance to semantics (again).
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Dimsum on March 25, 2015, 09:04:18
From Vice News:

Quote
On Tuesday morning, Prime Minister Stephen Harper unveiled his plan to extend his bombing campaign against the Islamic State, putting Canada on a short list of nations that have opted to launch airstrikes against the strongholds near the caliphate's capital.

Harper announced that Canada would be contributing personnel and planes to the mission until March 2016, and that Canadian fighter jets would be hitting targets in Syria for the first time.

https://news.vice.com/article/the-canadian-government-is-about-to-start-bombing-the-islamic-state-in-syria
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: milnews.ca on March 25, 2015, 16:21:46
Kurds invite Canada to take part in Doiron death investigation (http://basnews.com/en/news/2015/03/17/canadians-invited-to-participate-in-krg-inquiry-of-soldiers-death/):
Quote
The Kurdistan Region’s Ministry of Peshmerga has announced that they are waiting for the results of an investigation into the death of a Canadian soldier, and the wounding of three others.

In a statement released on 17th March, the Peshmerga Ministry says that investigations are ongoing, and invited Canadian authorities to take part in the inquiry ....
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Dimsum on March 26, 2015, 02:17:13
By Terry Glavin:

Quote
Some sense of proportion: The death toll of 158 Canadian soldiers during more than a decade of hard-won gains in Afghanistan is only slightly greater than the number of dead Muslims — 137 innocents at last count – butchered in a single jihadist suicide bombing last week at a mosque in Yemen. Some further proportion: the contribution Prime Minister Harper is making to the half-baked U.S.-led coalition is only another year’s modest commitment of a mere half-dozen Canadian fighter jets, a couple of Aurora patrol planes and a Polaris transport plane, a ground crew and a few dozen Special Operations Regiment advisers and trainers up in Kurdistan.

You’d think we were invading Russia.
http://news.nationalpost.com/2015/03/25/terry-glavin-opposition-is-selling-fairy-tales-on-the-mission-against-isis-canadians-are-not-so-gullible/
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on March 29, 2015, 14:10:37
That para gives a nice thanks to those deployed.  Lol
Title: Parliament approves air strikes against ISIS in Syria
Post by: S.M.A. on March 30, 2015, 22:29:42
And Canada becomes the first western country that's also a US ally to approve air strikes against ISIS in Syria; until now the only nations joining the US air strikes over Syria had been Arab nations like the UAE and the Saudis:

Reuters (http://ca.reuters.com/article/topNews/idCAKBN0MR03E20150331)

Quote
Canadian Parliament backs air strikes on Islamic State in Syria
Mon Mar 30, 2015 9:05pm EDT

TORONTO (Reuters) - Canadian legislators on Monday voted to back the government's plans to bomb Islamic State positions in Syria, a move that opposition parties say threatens to drag Canada into a long war.

The House of Commons approved the plan 142-129. The result was never in doubt, since the ruling Conservatives have a majority in the chamber.

The vote also approved the extension of Canada's six-month mission by a year to the end of March 2016.

Canada has around 70 special forces troops in northern Iraq and six Canadian jets are taking part in U.S.-led bombing attacks against Islamic State in Iraq.

(...SNIPPED)

Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: MCG on March 31, 2015, 01:55:02
From:  http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/isis-mission-mps-pass-motion-to-support-extension-expansion-into-syria-1.3014511
Quote
Should they form government, the NDP have said they'd immediately pull Canada out of the bombing campaign, and Liberal Leader Justin Trudeau has said he would do the same.

The Liberals, would, however, increase the number of soldiers sent to train Iraqis to fight ISIS.

But with no clear end goal for the bombing mission, Trudeau said Monday, it's not one his party can support.

"Will our involvement in this mission end next March, or was the foreign affairs minister being more truthful when he explicitly compared this war to Afghanistan, saying that we are in this for the longer term," Trudeau said.  "We cannot allow rhetorical appeals to moral clarity to disguise the absence of a plan."

Among other things, Trudeau called for a massive expansion of Canada's resettlement program for refugees from the conflict and for more Canadian soldiers to be involved in training Iraqi forces.
What would an expanded resettlement program be?  Is that solving the region's problems by exporting its victims to Canada, or building new cities in neighbouring countries?

A bigger training mission would probably make a few people happy.  It could create opportunity for the Army to join the RCAF and CANSOFCOM with a visible role in this mission.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Dimsum on March 31, 2015, 19:56:08
From former CDS, Gen (Ret'd) Rick Hillier on FB:

Quote
Some of those who are elected to political office, in our Parliament, as our leaders should be ashamed today. 37 of them could not find it a high enough priority to be in the House of Commons when Parliament voted to extend and expand the mission against ISIL. They could not prioritize their lives and schedules sufficiently to be there when that most sacred trust - sending Canada's sons and daughters in harms way, to do violent things on our behalf - was decided. Shame on you. I'd like to hear each of them explain their priorities and why they could not be in the House to each of the moms and dads, husbands and wives and children of those we are sending and who there now. It pisses me off!

http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/ex-general-rick-hillier-angry-at-mp-no-shows-for-isis-vote-1.3016401

Vote for it, vote against it, whatever.  At least show up to work and do your job.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: jollyjacktar on March 31, 2015, 20:26:02
From former CDS, Gen (Ret'd) Rick Hillier on FB:

http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/ex-general-rick-hillier-angry-at-mp-no-shows-for-isis-vote-1.3016401

Vote for it, vote against it, whatever.  At least show up to work and do your job.

Retired B/Gen Gordon O'Conner was one of the MIA.  I am disgusted by his missing the vote.  Pathetic.

Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: cavalryman on March 31, 2015, 20:28:00
From former CDS, Gen (Ret'd) Rick Hillier on FB:

http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/ex-general-rick-hillier-angry-at-mp-no-shows-for-isis-vote-1.3016401

Vote for it, vote against it, whatever.  At least show up to work and do your job.

I see Rick's lost none of his bombast.  Telling though that the majority of unjustified absences were from the government benches.  Very few unjustified absences on the Liberal and NDP benches.  Make of that what you will.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: E.R. Campbell on March 31, 2015, 20:47:44
I see Rick's lost none of his bombast.  Telling though that the majority of unjustified absences were from the government benches.  Very few unjustified absences on the Liberal and NDP benches.  Make of that what you will.


MPs routinely do something called "pairing:" when one MP wants to/needs to miss a vote he will ask an MP from the opposite side to "pair" with him and also miss it, thus keeping the results in balance. It is good, accepted parliamentary practice. I didn't count the votes but I'm wiling to bet that many of the no shows were properly paired.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: uncle-midget-Oddball on March 31, 2015, 20:54:01

MPs routinely do something called "pairing:" when one MP wants to/needs to miss a vote he will ask an MP from the opposite side to "pair" with him and also miss it, thus keeping the results in balance. It is good, accepted parliamentary practice. I didn't count the votes but I'm wiling to bet that many of the no shows were properly paired.

Math doesn't quite add up for the no shows being paired to miss;
19 members of the governing party missed the vote, whereas only 9 members of the oppostion, both NDP and Liberals weren't there to vote.

*Edit: counted again, and with independent no shows the number for opposing absent members is 13.  I'm working on my ABC's this week, I'll practice my numbers a bit more later.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Privateer on March 31, 2015, 20:55:51
The CBC article said that no "pairs" were recorded, which I took to mean that (it appears that) there were no pairs.  I have seen pairing recorded in Hansard when it happens...

Just checked Hansard.  It shows pairs as "nil" for the vote.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: E.R. Campbell on March 31, 2015, 21:41:29
The CBC article said that no "pairs" were recorded, which I took to mean that (it appears that) there were no pairs.  I have seen pairing recorded in Hansard when it happens...

Just checked Hansard.  It shows pairs as "nil" for the vote.


Then I suspect some CPC MPs are going to be in trouble because my understanding was that the PM wanted a double line whip on this vote.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: GAP on March 31, 2015, 23:26:22
From what I can see, they are mostly the B or even the C team members.......
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: milnews.ca on April 01, 2015, 23:52:57
From what I can see, they are mostly the B or even the C team members.......
I'd say three cabinet ministers are more than just B Team members not voting.  We'll see how much trouble they get into - or not - for not showing up.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on April 03, 2015, 00:53:15
Article / March 30, 2015

By: Air Task Force – Iraq Public Affairs

CAMP PATRICE VINCENT, KUWAIT—Canada’s military commitment to the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant includes the deployment of Air Task Force Iraq (ATF-I), consisting of several aircraft types and crews who operate over hostile portions of Iraq every day.

These dedicated aircrew are highly trained to conduct their missions in support of the Middle East Stabilization Force, including mandatory advanced training in survival, evasion, resistance to interrogation, and escape; also known as SERE training. While Op IMPACT RCAF aircrew are fully trained in SERE and Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) procedures, the desert environment poses its own unique challenges, including lack of cover from potential enemy forces and hot weather that can quickly cause dehydration.

To help keep their SERE skills at their peak, ATF-I aircrew recently joined several Coalition aircrew to participate in a CSAR exercise, known as the  “SHAMAL SERIALS”, led by the U.S. Army’s 34th Combat Aviation Brigade in Kuwait. The ATF-I aircrew who participated in this exercise were a mix of pilots, air combat systems officers, and airborne electronic sensor operators.

“Overall, the feeling I got from the eight members of my crew who participated was quite positive; they learned quite a bit about CSAR and really enjoyed their experience,” said a CP-140 Aurora aircraft commander with ATF-I’s Long Range Patrol Detachment.

The day-long exercise took place in a barren training area equipped with mock-up villages and ranges. Participants were dropped off by helicopter in the desert and made their way on foot between training stations.  At each stop, the participants received instruction from American experts in personnel recovery.

The ATF-I aircrew were able to refresh their skills using a ground-to-air radio to call for help and extraction, as well as practice their emergency first aid skills through the use of tourniquets and other field dressings.  Aircrew also practiced more traditional skills such as shooting compass bearings and using a mirror to signal rescue aircraft in the event their radio was lost or damaged.

“The practical demonstrations of the teaching points greatly enhanced learning,” said one captain. “This included the use of actual AH-64 Apache helicopters when calling for Emergency Close Air Support (ECAS).”

The ECAS station was taught by Joint Terminal Attack Controllers of the United States Air Force.  The purpose of ECAS is to provide combat air support to downed aircrew, protecting their escape or location until rescue aircraft can arrive.  The training involved exercise participants locating and describing targets in a mock-up village and requesting Apache gunship support.

U.S. Army instructors concluded the exercise serials by providing advice on tactical drills when escaping from an urban area, as well as marksmanship principles during a live-fire 9mm pistol range to prepare aircrew in the event that they have to defend themselves. With the pistol shoots complete, aircrew then walked to a designated rendezvous where they were extracted by helicopter for evacuation back to camp.

“This exercise took two months to plan and we usually try to do at least one serial a month for our pilots,” said a US 34th Combat Aviation Brigade Sergeant 1st Class who helped plan the event. “We typically run them to requalify our own members, predominantly helicopter crews; but we were happy to learn that the Canadians and [other coalition members] were able to come this time.”

 Article and images link  (http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/news/article.page?doc=op-impact-royal-canadian-air-force-members-take-part-in-combat-search-and-rescue-exercise/i7kv5l2r)
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: MCG on April 08, 2015, 19:29:18
Canada's first air strike in Syria is complete.  Two CF-18 joined eight other allied aircraft, hitting an ISIS garrison.

http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/isis-mission-canada-conducts-1st-airstrike-in-syria-1.3025559
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: milnews.ca on April 08, 2015, 23:13:41
From the Info-machine (http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=959969&tp=1):
Quote
Today, Canada's CF-18 Hornets conducted their first airstrike in Syria since the Government’s decision to extend and expand Operation IMPACT, Canada’s military contribution to the US-led coalition against the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

Following the planning and coordination process conducted with our coalition partners, two Canadian CF-18s, using precision-guided munitions, were involved in an airstrike against an ISIL garrison near Ar Raqqah, Syria. A total of 10 coalition aircraft, including six aircraft from the US were involved in this airstrike ....
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: JS2218 on April 11, 2015, 09:42:08
Retired B/Gen Gordon O'Conner was one of the MIA.  I am disgusted by his missing the vote.  Pathetic.

Have you called or emailed to ask where he was? Some of them were across the world (i.e. Vietnam) on legitimate parliamentary business. Mr. O'Connor has had health problems owing to his age. *Hopefully* they all had a valid reason.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Dimsum on April 16, 2015, 02:19:21
Another piece on the Aurora from Matthew Fisher on the National Post, and yes the "C-140" is a typo:

Quote
During a recent seven-hour intelligence-gathering mission that mostly took place to the west and north of Baghdad, the C-140 Aurora crew that Brig. Gen. Daniel Constable flew with observed an intense firefight between the jihadist fighters and Iraqi security forces near the disputed town of Fallujah.

http://news.nationalpost.com/news/world/flying-with-the-canadians-fighting-isil-from-above-iraq-and-syria
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on April 18, 2015, 14:46:28
Great article IMO.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on April 18, 2015, 17:10:40
 Article Link  (http://news.nationalpost.com/news/world/fisher-canadian-contribution-to-fight-against-isil-744123)

Canada punching above its weight in fight against ISIL forces, U.S. military commander say

A Base Somewhere in Southwest Asia — A senior planner closely involved in directing the U.S.-led coalition’s air war against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant says that Canada had contributed far more to the campaign than the relatively small number of Canadian Special Forces personnel and aircraft might suggest.

“I would submit it is a combination of all the coalition contributions that come together to produce capability. It is the sum of all the parts, if you will, and Canada is a key coalition member,” U.S. Marine Brig.-Gen. Tom Weidley said in an interview at a secret base in the desert where coalition commanders, including some Canadian officers, both collect and analyze intelligence from the battlefields in Iraq and Syria and advise Kurdish and Iraqi forces.

Canada’s deployment of approximately 70 Special Forces advisers with Peshmerga forces in northern Iraq and of 9 RCAF aircraft that have been flying missions out of Kuwait were significant force multipliers, said the general, who commanded a Super Cobra assault helicopter squadron that flew combat missions in Iraq when the U.S. had ground forces there.

Elaborating on the mission of Canada’s elite trainers, whose presence in Iraq has until now largely been clouded in secrecy, Weidley said, “They provide training, education and their experiences to the Kurdish Peshmerga, whether in the conduct of operations, in the integration of aviation fire support or in terminal control advice. They become integral to what the Peshmerga are capable of doing.”

In what were the first public comments from an American general about Canada’s role in the war against ISIL, Weidley added: “Every Peshmerga fighter the Canadians touch enhances a future Peshmerga leader. Those intangibles grow over time. That Peshmerga fighter is going to train his subordinates and it continues to grow as that leader moves up in the chain. Small numbers of trainers have the ability to make a huge impact across the battle space.”

About 6,500 hand-picked Iraqi and Peshmerga security forces had already been trained for between four and six weeks each at five different centres and about 5,000 more were currently in training, according to the general.

The Canadians and mentors from other Western nations such as Britain, France and the Netherlands have been providing training in everything from the law of war, basic marksmanship and counter-IED skills to mine clearing, the integration of aviation fire and squad, platoon and company level attacks.

“We are not looking to create Canadian-equivalent infantry battalion structures,” Weidley said. “The goal is to take those Iraqi units and get them to a level where they can be successful against Daesh (the Arabic acronym for ISIL) in the current fight.”

Although well back from the front lines, Weidley looked very much like a Marine straight out of Central Casting. Barrel-chested with ramrod straight posture, he sported a brush cut that looked as if you could polish shoes with it. Using common Marine parlance, he described the Canadian troops now serving in the Middle East as “brothers.”

Liberal Justin Trudeau has mocked the fighting abilities of Canada’s Hornet fighter jets and the fact that they were more than 30 years old.

While unaware of those remarks, the general said the RCAF’s warplanes were “an absolutely capable platform in this environment. They provide a great deal of flexibility in the ordnance they can carry in order to address different targets. They have a tremendous array of sensors and data sharing capabilities.”

As for the Aurora spy aircraft, “I have seen some of the products that they have provided and they are superb,” he said. “It is the synthesis of that ability to rapidly bring that information to bear that has an operational effect on the battle space. Working in combination with the other intelligence gathering platforms they give us a fused picture of what is actually happening on the ground.”

An area of great interest to Weidley’s headquarters was the Euphrates River Valley, all the way from Iraq to the Syrian city of Raqqa and beyond that to the northwest toward the Turkish border.

“Because they control the lines of communication those have become the focus of a lot of our intelligence collection in order to strike at Daesh’s revenue generating capabilities with oil refineries and wells,” Weidley said. “Coalition ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) capabilities including Canadian ones are helping us develop an understanding of the networks that Daesh uses to distribute weapons and move troops from Syria to Iraq. It is a lot of space and takes a lot of dedicated assets to do that.”

While it was difficult to “quantitatively” gauge the success of the coalition and their Iraqi and Kurdish partners “we continue to see progress every day,” he said. Proof of this, he said, was that territory had recently been regained from ISIS after what had been large-scale offensive Iraqi and Kurdish operations.

“This isn’t a near-term fight. It is a fight that is going to take some time.”











Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on April 18, 2015, 17:23:09
As of 15 April 2015, Air Task Force-Iraq conducted 778 sorties:

- CF-188 Hornet fighters conducted 506 sorties;

- CC-150T Polaris aerial refueller conducted 131 sorties, delivering some 7,701,000 pounds of fuel to coalition aircraft;

- and CP-140 Aurora aircraft conducted 141 reconnaissance missions.

Title: Re: Islamic Terrorism in the West ( Mega thread)
Post by: daftandbarmy on April 28, 2015, 19:47:19
BZ CANSOF  :salute:

‘The Canadians are among our most important guys': Peshmerga praise elite commandos in fight against ISIL

BASHIQA MOUNTAIN, Iraq — It is clear from talking with front line Kurdish Peshmerga that Canadian special forces have done more on the ground in the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant than their coalition partners, including the U.S., and are going to play a critical part in the coming action to expel these fanatical hardliners from Mosul.

The silence from Canadian Special Operations Forces Command about this fits with the secretive unit’s habitual reluctance to allow media access of any kind to its commandos when they are forward deployed or after they return from such missions. But it does not fully explain why CANSOFCOM has declined requests by Postmedia since last fall for general information from its operators here on what has been described as a training mission.

In a first, CANSOFCOM opened the door slightly earlier this year when it acknowledged in Ottawa that a few of the approximately 70 advisers it has in Iraq had defended themselves several times by shooting back when they were fired upon by ISIL jihadists. This was revealed before the tragic death of Sgt. Andrew Doiron in a friendly-fire incident with the Peshmerga on March 6 on a barren ridge that has a strategically crucial view of Mosul, one of the places where this war will be won or lost.

During interviews conducted in the autonomous region’s capital, Erbil, and in two location at the front, five Kurdish Peshmerga generals and a slew of junior officers and foot soldiers praised the elite commandos from the Canadian Special Operations Regiment and Joint Task Force 2. This was not simply the Peshmerga being polite to a visitor. They stressed again and again how immensely grateful they were to Canada for the unique role CSOR and JTF2 have been playing in the war against ISIL.

An infantry general responsible for a stretch of the front near Kirkuk told me he was envious because the Canadians were deployed with a fellow general he had visited near Mosul. Another infantry general told me “the Canadians are among our most important guys.”

American and French advisers have been on the front lines from time to time, the Peshmerga told me. But the consensus was that Canada has been more willing to go deep into the field to help them than any other country.

The difference between Canada and its partners in this fight against a resourceful, particularly vicious foe, is in how Ottawa has defined its training and mentoring role with the Peshmerga. Like Britain, Australia and New Zealand, among others, Canada has offered a range of courses inside protected training bases on how to fight.

But as near as I can tell — and this is a world where operatives seldom confirm anything — Canada is the only nation in the U.S.-led coalition that has regularly sent teams of military spotters far forward to identify ISIL targets and the only country whose observers have used lasers to pinpoint those targets for coalition warplanes to destroy.

To know what ISIL is doing and to direct air power to try to stop them, Peshmerga serving near Mosul told me that almost every night and sometimes during the day, Canada moves small groups of special forces to within shouting distance of ISIL positions.

Small wonder, then, that Canadians have come under attack or been caught in the crossfire a few times. While admitting that it was Peshmerga troops who killed Doiron, one senior officer told me that on the night that the Moncton, N.B., native died the Peshmerga and ISIL had also exchanged gunfire in the same area.
I know from having stood with the Peshmerga on the same ridge that Canadian forward air controllers have operated from that they have been close enough to ISIL fighters to see their quarry and their black flags and to hear them talk with each other over their two-way radios using their “noms de guerre,” always preceded by the honorific “abu”, which means “father of” in Arabic.

Another noteworthy thing that Canada has done that their Western partners apparently have not, is to have a few of its advisers camp a short distance behind the front, so that the Peshmerga can easily slip away from their heavily fortified bunkers to a nearby staging area to be mentored in a broad range of military skills before quickly returning to the fight. Canada has also been the only country to provide the Peshmerga with high-tech demining robots that work by remote control.

None of this means that Ottawa has taken up a combat mission in Iraq. The special forces it has in Iraq are too few in number and too lightly armed to undertake even modest offensive operations. The weapons the Canadians have with them are only sufficient to defend themselves against attack.

It would compromise operational security for CANSOFCOM to provide specific details about what its troops have been doing on Bashiqa Mountain and elsewhere in northern Iraq. But Canadians should at least be told that their most highly trained, combat-tested warriors have become central to what the coalition is trying to achieve against the most virulent strain of radical Islam yet seen.

Despite CANSOFCOM’s information blackout, the Peshmerga loudly attested to me how highly they value Canada’s presence with them at the front.


Read more: http://news.nationalpost.com/news/within-shouting-distance-of-isil-755418#ixzz3Ye9hhvJm

Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: daftandbarmy on April 29, 2015, 15:37:48
As of 15 April 2015, Air Task Force-Iraq conducted 778 sorties:

- CF-188 Hornet fighters conducted 506 sorties;

- CC-150T Polaris aerial refueller conducted 131 sorties, delivering some 7,701,000 pounds of fuel to coalition aircraft;

- and CP-140 Aurora aircraft conducted 141 reconnaissance missions.

I have no idea of course, but that sounds like a lot.

How does it compare with Libya?
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on April 29, 2015, 16:07:25
Scroll down to the Air Component section for info:

http://www.forces.gc.ca/sites/FORCES_Internet/operations-abroad-past/op-mobile-metrics.page

Hornets 946 sorties

Tankers (combined) 389 sorties

Aurora 181 sorties

Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on April 29, 2015, 16:18:19
As of 27 April 2015, Air Task Force-Iraq conducted 834 sorties:

CF-188 Hornet fighters conducted 542 sorties;

CC-150T Polaris aerial refueller conducted 141 sorties, delivering some 8,293,000 pounds of fuel to coalition aircraft; and

CP-140 Aurora aircraft conducted 151 reconnaissance missions.

Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on April 29, 2015, 16:45:30
Article Link (http://news.nationalpost.com/news/within-shouting-distance-of-isil-755418)

‘The Canadians are among our most important guys': Peshmerga praise elite commandos in fight against ISIL

BASHIQA MOUNTAIN, Iraq — It is clear from talking with front line Kurdish Peshmerga that Canadian special forces have done more on the ground in the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant than their coalition partners, including the U.S., and are going to play a critical part in the coming action to expel these fanatical hardliners from Mosul.

The silence from Canadian Special Operations Forces Command about this fits with the secretive unit’s habitual reluctance to allow media access of any kind to its commandos when they are forward deployed or after they return from such missions. But it does not fully explain why CANSOFCOM has declined requests by Postmedia since last fall for general information from its operators here on what has been described as a training mission.

In a first, CANSOFCOM opened the door slightly earlier this year when it acknowledged in Ottawa that a few of the approximately 70 advisers it has in Iraq had defended themselves several times by shooting back when they were fired upon by ISIL jihadists. This was revealed before the tragic death of Sgt. Andrew Doiron in a friendly-fire incident with the Peshmerga on March 6 on a barren ridge that has a strategically crucial view of Mosul, one of the places where this war will be won or lost.

During interviews conducted in the autonomous region’s capital, Erbil, and in two location at the front, five Kurdish Peshmerga generals and a slew of junior officers and foot soldiers praised the elite commandos from the Canadian Special Operations Regiment and Joint Task Force 2. This was not simply the Peshmerga being polite to a visitor. They stressed again and again how immensely grateful they were to Canada for the unique role CSOR and JTF2 have been playing in the war against ISIL.

An infantry general responsible for a stretch of the front near Kirkuk told me he was envious because the Canadians were deployed with a fellow general he had visited near Mosul. Another infantry general told me “the Canadians are among our most important guys.”

American and French advisers have been on the front lines from time to time, the Peshmerga told me. But the consensus was that Canada has been more willing to go deep into the field to help them than any other country.

The difference between Canada and its partners in this fight against a resourceful, particularly vicious foe, is in how Ottawa has defined its training and mentoring role with the Peshmerga. Like Britain, Australia and New Zealand, among others, Canada has offered a range of courses inside protected training bases on how to fight.

But as near as I can tell — and this is a world where operatives seldom confirm anything — Canada is the only nation in the U.S.-led coalition that has regularly sent teams of military spotters far forward to identify ISIL targets and the only country whose observers have used lasers to pinpoint those targets for coalition warplanes to destroy.

 more at link

Title: Latest info on death of SGT Andrew Doiron
Post by: milnews.ca on May 12, 2015, 18:33:35
This from the Info-machine (http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=973589&tp=930) - also attached if link doesn't work for you:
Quote
Findings of the Friendly Fire investigations regarding the death of Sergeant Doiron

May 12, 2015

Introduction

This summary outlines the events that led to the March 6, 2015, friendly fire incident involving four members of the Canadian Special Operations Task Force (SOTF) in Iraq and the Iraqi Kurdish forces which resulted in the death of Sergeant Andrew Joseph Doiron and caused injuries to three other task force members.

This summary addresses the findings of two distinct investigations and one inquiry looking into the incident namely the Summary Investigation (SI) ordered by the Commander of Canadian Special Operation Forces Command (CANSOFCOM), the Canadian Forces National Investigation Service (CF NIS) investigation, as well as the Commander’s Inquiry conducted by Coalition Special Forces. The two investigations and the inquiry were conducted independently and were formed to look at different aspects of the incident.

The CANSOFCOM investigation examined the circumstances surrounding the friendly fire incident in order to provide a clear understanding of the facts, and to identify and recommend any measures to prevent a reoccurrence. The independent CF NIS investigation was initiated, as is the normal process, upon confirmation of Sergeant Doiron’s death. The primary purpose of the CF NIS investigation was to determine whether criminality played a role in the incident and, if necessary, recommend charges. The Coalition inquiry into the incident focused solely on a review of coalition processes and procedures in light of the incident.

Findings

Both of the investigations and the inquiry concluded that the tragic incident was the result of a confluence of several unrelated events that combined to cause a dangerous situation for both the members of CANSOFCOM and the Iraqi Kurdish forces assigned to protect a dangerous outpost, at night, on the forward edge of the active front line across from fighters from the so- called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). All evidence points to the March 6 incident as being one of mistaken fratricide between Iraqi Kurdish forces and CANSOF operators. The actions taken by the CANSOF operators, including by Sergeant Doiron, were correct and justified.

The findings of the Summary Investigation concluded the following:

    Sgt Doiron’s detachment was operating well within their authorities and tactical competencies of advising and assisting Iraqi Kurdish forces in the area. The detachment was at that same location, at the request of Kurdish forces, earlier that day and again that night, to conduct tasks in line with their mandate. These tasks included advice on the improvement of Kurdish defensive positions as well as conducting planning in support of future deliberate Kurdish operations.
    CANSOFCOM’s intent that night was coordinated with the Kurdish forces and the tactical-level risk mitigation and battlefield de-confliction measures taken were prudent, logical and consistent with established practice up to that point. The CANSOF chain of command at the forward Kurdish Sector positions was aware of, and had informed, Kurdish forces of the planned visit.
    Sgt Doiron performed his job to the highest standards both prior to and throughout the incident. He visited all of the Kurdish defensive positions during the day and had briefed his plan for returning that same night. Prior to his departure that evening, Sergeant Doiron again confirmed the night time scheme of manoeuvre with his own soldiers and set out to visit each one of the Kurdish defensive positions.
    Unknown to Sergeant Doiron and his detachment at the time, the Iraqi  Kurdish forces at that final position had conducted a shift change sometime during the day. Also unknown to Sgt Doiron, these Kurdish replacement soldiers were not informed that the CANSOF team would be returning later that night.
    The identification procedures used by Sergeant Doiron and his detachment were wholly consistent with what had been used since the start of the mission in October, 2014 and were well practiced with the Kurdish forces. Nevertheless, it must always be noted that the complexities of conducting a link up with other forces during the night is a complicated task due to the difficulties in accurately identifying and visually distinguishing friendly forces in very low light conditions as experienced on that night.
    The Iraqi Kurdish forces manning the final position expected an ISIS attack that evening.  It is reasonable to conclude that the Kurdish soldiers were extremely sensitive to the heightened danger they believed they were facing. As a result, it is reasonable to believe that they would have perceived any movement, regardless of the nature, to be life-threatening. This is what is believed to have motivated the members of the final Kurdish position to engage the CANSOF operators. It was also determined that no Arabic was spoken by the CANSOF operators on the approach to the final position that night, and that Arabic was only spoken after the accident, during the coordination of the medevac.
    The conduct of all post-incident activities, including the immediate response, as well as the coordination and synchronization of equipment and resources to care for, and evacuate, Sergeant Doiron and the other wounded members of his detachment worked effectively. Iraq Kurdish forces assisted in the ground evacuation of the injured, the CANSOF operators took the appropriate steps to care for themselves and their comrades, the helicopter medevac provided excellent support to the ground forces and the coordination and experience of a forward surgical team provided critical support during a very difficult situation.
    Sergeant Andrew Joseph Doiron died of his wounds on March 7, 2015 as a result of the injuries he sustained during the friendly fire incident with Kurdish forces.

Further, the CF NIS investigation into the events determined that no service or criminal offences had been committed by CAF members.  The CF NIS report points to mistaken identity and a breakdown in communication in a setting characterized by tension, fatigue and confusion as the main factors leading to the death of Sergeant Doiron.

The Coalition inquiry into the incident concluded that the Canadian team followed all pre-established procedures and that they had conducted their operations appropriately and in concert with all pre-approved and accepted protocols.  The results of this examination were passed from operational commander to operational commander, namely from the Commander of the Coalition Special Forces to the Commander of CANSOFCOM.

Conclusion

The evidence from both investigations and the Coalition inquiry point to the incident on March 6, 2015 as being one of mistaken identity between Iraqi Kurdish forces and CANSOF operators. Kurdish forces occupying that final defensive position, unaware of the scheduled arrival of Sgt Doiron’s detachment, despite the daytime visit, operating in night-time conditions, in anticipation of an ISIS attack, engaged the CANSOF operators despite the prior coordination and professional conduct of Sergeant Doiron and his detachment.

In light of these findings, CANSOFCOM has implemented additional protocols when conducting similar activities at night, in order to mitigate the risks to CANSOFCOM and Iraqi Kurdish forces in the future.
Title: (Redacted) CFNIS Report on Sgt. Doiron's Death
Post by: milnews.ca on May 13, 2015, 05:03:15
More details in attached ....
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on May 13, 2015, 15:20:19
As of 11 May 2015, Air Task Force-Iraq conducted 896 sorties:

CF-188 Hornet fighters conducted 582 sorties;

CC-150T Polaris aerial refueller conducted 151 sorties, delivering some 8,911,000 pounds of fuel to coalition aircraft; and

CP-140 Aurora aircraft conducted 163 reconnaissance missions.

Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: milnews.ca on May 14, 2015, 10:11:04
Some other OP Impact stats from the Info-machine (also attached if you can't see the graphic):
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/CE7TCXbWIAAMMGo.jpg)
Source (https://twitter.com/CanadianForces/status/598647838604562432)
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on May 24, 2015, 03:52:05
As of 20 May 2015, Air Task Force-Iraq conducted 937 sorties:

CF-188 Hornet fighters conducted 610 sorties;

CC-150T Polaris aerial refueller conducted 157 sorties, delivering some 9,306,000 pounds of fuel to coalition aircraft; and

CP-140 Aurora aircraft conducted 170 reconnaissance missions.

Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Technoviking on May 24, 2015, 08:03:51
 :salute:
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Quirky on May 30, 2015, 23:20:46
As of 20 May 2015, Air Task Force-Iraq conducted 937 sorties:

CF-188 Hornet fighters conducted 610 sorties;

CC-150T Polaris aerial refueller conducted 157 sorties, delivering some 9,306,000 pounds of fuel to coalition aircraft; and

CP-140 Aurora aircraft conducted 170 reconnaissance missions.

Great job but it hasn't stopped the advance of ISIS.

Maybe we should just leave Iraq/Syria alone and let fate decide the outcome. IMO, our presence there is nothing more than giving our fast jets something to do besides play peek-a-boo with the bears.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Dolphin_Hunter on May 31, 2015, 06:06:35
Great job but it hasn't stopped the advance of ISIS.

Maybe we should just leave Iraq/Syria alone and let fate decide the outcome. IMO, our presence there is nothing more than giving our fast jets something to do besides play peek-a-boo with the bears.

Yes and no.  There is more going on that what we hear in the media, well all know Ramadi fell, and we all know why.  We can only do so much, but I don't think it is as bad as the media would have you believe.  If we sit back and let fate decide the outcome, (IMHO) we would be in a world of hurt years from now.  What we need (again my opinion) is the Muslim leaders from around the world to step up and start publicly condoning this extreme behaviour.  I have yet to hear/see anything from anyone, just the occasional "we are a peaceful religion" quip on the news.  If there was a collective stand against extremeism there would be fewer individuals heading to the middle east to fight.   We need Iran to stop publishing bullshit news stories, and take a more active role in this fight.  We need Turkey to stop sending arms to the rebels in Syria, they could also stop taking ISIS oil too, yeah that'd be great... Finally we need the people of Iraq to stand up and say enough is enough, lets ******* clean house.     
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: YZT580 on May 31, 2015, 12:08:35
Well spoken Dolphin
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Humphrey Bogart on May 31, 2015, 12:34:01
Great job but it hasn't stopped the advance of ISIS.

Maybe we should just leave Iraq/Syria alone and let fate decide the outcome. IMO, our presence there is nothing more than giving our fast jets something to do besides play peek-a-boo with the bears.

Ehm.... Actually it has stopped their advance.  One year ago they were at the gates of Baghdad, not the case anymore is it?  Airpower has given the Kurds and our Iraqi allies an upper hand in this fight.  It's now become a war of attrition and the Shiites and Kurds in the area outnumber the Sunni.  The war will drag on for awhile but resources and manpower are finite. 
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Good2Golf on June 01, 2015, 12:20:58
Yeah, Drew....love the completely uninformed rectal plucks from some people...they should be careful with how much they pluck from their brain***, as too much, and they'll drop their IQ below what it is already.  :nod:
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on June 01, 2015, 16:49:17
Great job but it hasn't stopped the advance of ISIS.

Maybe we should just leave Iraq/Syria alone and let fate decide the outcome. IMO, our presence there is nothing more than giving our fast jets something to do besides play peek-a-boo with the bears.

I thought I was reading a CBC article comment for a second, or maybe listening to a dobber talk on the CC patio.   ^-^

I'm going to throw out a WAG that you haven't turned wrenches in the ATF-I lines yet.  As has been mentioned before, you because you aren't seeing it on CBC or Youtube doesn't mean shyte isn't happening.  Air power alone won't win the ground war, and that aspect of it isn't a ATF-I task.  The ATF-I task is being carried out and with success, even if limited in some people's view.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on June 01, 2015, 17:11:06
Yes and no.  There is more going on that what we hear in the media, well all know Ramadi fell, and we all know why.  We can only do so much, but I don't think it is as bad as the media would have you believe.  If we sit back and let fate decide the outcome, (IMHO) we would be in a world of hurt years from now.  What we need (again my opinion) is the Muslim leaders from around the world to step up and start publicly condoning this extreme behaviour.  I have yet to hear/see anything from anyone, just the occasional "we are a peaceful religion" quip on the news.  If there was a collective stand against extremeism there would be fewer individuals heading to the middle east to fight.   We need Iran to stop publishing bullshit news stories, and take a more active role in this fight.  We need Turkey to stop sending arms to the rebels in Syria, they could also stop taking ISIS oil too, yeah that'd be great... Finally we need the people of Iraq to stand up and say enough is enough, lets ******* clean house.   

I thought this kind of logic and thought process was STRICTLY prohibited in the Det lines??   >:D
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Quirky on June 01, 2015, 18:41:59
I'm going to throw out a WAG that you haven't turned wrenches in the ATF-I lines yet.

Been there, done that. My opinion is based on what I've seen from our front lines. If I had a choice, I wouldn't be wasting away in that desert crap hole again.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Humphrey Bogart on June 01, 2015, 19:00:28
Been there, done that. My opinion is based on what I've seen from our front lines. If I had a choice, I wouldn't be wasting away in that desert crap hole again.

Cool, well with people like you turning the wrenches, who needs ISIS.  May as well put up the white flag already as it seems you've already surrendered the initiative.  Do us all a favour and GTFO already so we can find someone that will do the job with at least a little zeal.   I'm certain you're probably content to sit back and collect a paycheque though. 

The last thing this military needs is more Bees In Trees Collecting Honey.     
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on June 02, 2015, 13:33:08
Been there, done that. My opinion is based on what I've seen from our front lines. If I had a choice, I wouldn't be wasting away in that desert crap hole again.

I know people who have XXX hours logged over the badlands and don't have an opinion based on being "at or near the front lines" (flying over/around them isn't the same as being boots on the ground, right?), and I am not trying to be condescending towards you or any 500 series types but unless you guys are listening to the briefs and seeing the small/medium/big picture and then working that airspace, I'll nicely suggest you probably don't have as much 'fact' as you have 'opinion'.  Again, I am not being condescending, just realistic.  It's just the different jobs we do for the big blue machine that differentiates what info we are privy to.







Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Quirky on June 03, 2015, 17:29:55
Do us all a favour and GTFO already so we can find someone that will do the job with at least a little zeal.

I care about getting my job done so the aircraft can meet its mission, we didn't miss one sortie due to maintenance during roto 0. I don't give a damn what the end result of that is, the middle east can burn in hell for all I care, you'll find the exact same sentiment among my peers.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: PuckChaser on June 03, 2015, 19:18:14
Maybe you've just touched on the difference between an Army and AirForce mentality. We (Royal We, we're screwed if Sigs is doing this) have to hold the ground and give a crap what happens there. Turning wrenches on a CF-18, as important as that may be, affords you the luxury of disassociating yourself with any of the conditions in the area because you can tunnel into your work without consequence.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: SupersonicMax on June 03, 2015, 19:58:09
I wouldn't generalize to Air Force. It is hard for pilots to dissociate themselves with what's going on on the ground.  Having seen both fighter wings in 2 different theatres over the last 4 years, I can guarantee most techs are also interested on what's going on and how we are helping.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: PuckChaser on June 03, 2015, 20:18:12
Yeah, its far easier for pilots and aircrew who are flying missions to get "sold" on whats happening on the ground, especially when you're running CAS. Was more leaning towards the ground crew, who'll never see where the shiny planes are headed.

Then again, this guy might just be here for a paycheque, and I'm over analyzing.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Hamish Seggie on June 03, 2015, 20:25:25
Perspective changes with time and progression in trade and rank. We didn't think a few Balkan countries were all that great either.....nor did we think a Mediterranean island nation all that great.

Turns out it was worthwhile.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Harrigan on June 15, 2015, 01:25:18
   We need Iran to stop publishing bullshit news stories, and take a more active role in this fight.   

Iran is already taking a very active role in the fight, and has been since December.

http://edition.cnn.com/2015/04/22/middleeast/iran-fighting-isis/

http://www.cbsnews.com/news/iran-fight-against-isis-iraq-effective-could-lead-to-consequences/

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/iran-launches-piloted-air-strikes-against-isis-flying-in-to-iraqi-airspace-for-first-time-9899487.html

Harrigan
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eagle Eye View on July 07, 2015, 16:53:25
In case anyone asked:

RAAUZYUW RCCPJAQ1041 1881744-UUUU--RCEMDUS RCEMEYS RCEMFWS RCEMFXA
RCEMGBS RCEMHNS RCEMHZS RCEMKDS RCEMLES RCEMMTS RCEMNGS RCEMPDS
RCEMRKS RCEMSDS RCEMTOS RCEMWCS RCEMWFS RCEMWRS RCEMWVA RCEMWWA
RCEMWYA RCEMZZA RCEOCEA RCEODEP RCEOJOC RCEONWA RCEOPRA RCFPKGA.
ZNR UUUUU ZOC
RIFTST T NCISS LATINA
RXFENDC T NADEFCOL
RXCAFDA T CA NLR HQ SACT
RXFKBA T CFSU E DET RAMSTEIN
RXFKI T CFSU E DET BRUNSSUM
RAYASAP T CANSTANDREP CANBERRA
R 301812Z JUN 15
FM NDHQ CMP OTTAWA
TO CANFORGEN
BT
UNCLAS CANFORGEN 118/15 CMP 054/15
SIC WAC
SECTION 1 OF 2
SUBJECT: ADDITION OF QUALIFYING SERVICE - CAMPAIGN AND SERVICE
MEDALS
BILINGUAL MESSAGE/MESSAGE BILINGUE
REFS: A. CANFORGEN 003/09 CMP 002/09 081950Z JAN 09
B. CANFORGEN 047/09 CMP 021/09 041418Z MAR 09
C. CANFORGEN 096/09 CMP 042/09 201315Z MAY 09
D. CANFORGEN 184/14 CMP 084/14 201429Z OCT 14
E. CANFORGEN 080/10 CMP 037/10 011817Z APR 10
F. CANFORGEN 192/14 CMP 090/14 311801Z OCT 14
1. AFC HAS APPROVED THE ADDITION OF THE FOL SVC TO THE ELIGIBILITY
LISTS FOR CERTAIN CAMPAIGN AND SERVICE MEDALS, AS FOLLOWS:
A. GENERAL CAMPAIGN STAR SOUTH-WEST ASIA (GCS-SWA):
- FURTHER TO PARA 1. A(2) OF REF E, THE END DATE FOR THE NAVAL



PAGE 2 RCCPJAQ1041 UNCLAS
THEATRE IS 14 MAY 2014
B. GENERAL CAMPAIGN STAR EXPEDITION (GCS-EXP):
- SERVICE BY CAF MEMBERS INSIDE THE THEATRE OF OPERATIONS CONSISTING
OF THE POLITICAL BOUNDARIES OF SYRIA, ITS AIRSPACE AND TERRITORIAL
WATERS, SINCE 20 APRIL 2015 (OP IMPACT)
C. GENERAL SERVICE MEDAL SOUTH-WEST ASIA (GSM-SWA):
(1) ELIGIBILITY SHALL BE SUSPENDED FOR CAF MEMBERS DEPLOYED TO
QATAR, AL UDEID AIR BASE, ON 4 OCTOBER 2014 UNTIL THE DAY FOLLOWING
THE CONCLUSION OF OP IMPACT. ELIGIBILITY IN THAT LOCATION WILL BE
RESTORED AT THE CONCLUSION OF OP IMPACT
(2) SERVICE OF CAF MEMBERS DEPLOYED TO FORWARD LOGISTICS SITES (FLS)
IN DIRECT SUPPORT TO CANADIAN SHIPS ATTACHED TO THE COMBINED TASK
FORCE (CTF) 150, 151 OR 152 (OP ARTEMIS), WHILE CONDUCTING
ACTIVITIES IN THE PORTS LOCATED IN THE FOLLOWING COUNTRIES: REPUBLIC
OF DJIBOUTI, OMAN, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, KENYA, INDIA, EGYPT,
TANZANIA, BAHRAIN AND PAKISTAN, AND ANY OTHER PORTS CONTIGUOUS TO
THE NAVAL THEATRE CONSISTING OF THE PERSIAN GULF, THE GULF OF OMAN,
THE GULF OF ADEN, THE RED SEA, THE SUEZ CANAL AND THOSE PARTS OF THE
INDIAN OCEAN AND THE ARABIAN SEA THAT ARE WEST OF SIXTY-EIGHT
DEGREES EAST LONGITUDE AND NORTH OF FIVE DEGREES SOUTH LATITUDE,



PAGE 3 RCCPJAQ1041 UNCLAS
FROM 22 APRIL 2012 TO 14 MAY 2014
D. GENERAL SERVICE MEDAL EXPEDITION (GSM-EXP):
- SERVICE BY CAF MEMBERS DEPLOYED TO KUWAIT AND QATAR SINCE 5
OCTOBER 2014 (DURING OP IMPACT). THIS INCLUDES BUT IS NOT LIMITED TO
THE FOLLOWING LOCATIONS: ALI AL SALAM AIR BASE, AHMED AL JABAR AIR
BASE, AL MUBARAK AIR BASE, CAMP ARIFJAN, THE STRATEGIC LINES OF
COMMUNICATIONS (SLOC) DETACHMENT KUWAIT OR OPERATIONAL SUPPORT HUB
KUWAIT, AND AL UDEID AIR BASE
E. OPERATIONAL SERVICE MEDAL EXPEDITION (OSM-EXP):
(1) SERVICE OF CANADIAN PERSONNEL PARTICIPATING IN US CENTCOM-LED
MULTINATIONAL COMBINED MARITIME FORCE (CMF) OPERATIONS (OP ARTEMIS)
UNDER THE COMMAND AND CONTROL OF COMBINED TASK FORCES (CTF) 150, 151
OR 152, IN THE THEATRE OF OPERATIONS CONSISTING OF THE BOUNDARIES OF
THE ARABIAN GULF, THE GULF OF OMAN, THE GULF OF ADEN, THE RED SEA,
THE SUEZ CANAL AND THOSE PARTS OF THE INDIAN OCEAN AND ARABIAN SEA
THAT ARE WEST OF SEVENTY-FIVE DEGREES EAST LONGITUDE AND NORTH OF
THIRTY DEGREES SOUTH LATITUDE, SINCE 15 MAY 2014
(2) SERVICE OF CAF MEMBERS DEPLOYED TO FORWARD LOGISTICS SITES (FLS)
IN DIRECT SUPPORT TO CANADIAN SHIPS ATTACHED TO THE COMBINED TASK
FORCE (CTF) 150, 151 OR 152 (OP ARTEMIS), WHILE CONDUCTING



PAGE 4 RCCPJAQ1041 UNCLAS
ACTIVITIES IN THE PORTS LOCATED IN THE FOLLOWING COUNTRIES: REPUBLIC
OF DJIBOUTI, OMAN, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, KENYA, INDIA, EGYPT,
TANZANIA, BAHRAIN AND PAKISTAN, AND ANY FUTURE PORTS CONTIGUOUS TO
THE NAVAL THEATRE CONSISTING OF THE PERSIAN GULF, THE GULF OF OMAN,
THE GULF OF ADEN, THE RED SEA, THE SUEZ CANAL AND THOSE PARTS OF THE
INDIAN OCEAN AND THE ARABIAN SEA THAT ARE WEST OF SEVENTY-FIVE
DEGREES EAST LONGITUDE AND NORTH OF THIRTY DEGREES SOUTH LATITUDE,
SINCE 15 MAY 2014
F. SPECIAL SERVICE MEDAL NATO (SSM-NATO):
(1) SERVICE OF CAF MEMBERS WHO DEPLOYED TO CAMPIA TURZII, ROMANIA,
LITHUANIA AND SPANGDAHLEM AIRBASE IN GERMANY AS PART OF THE AIR TASK
FORCE (ATF), OR WHO DEPLOYED TO EASTERN AND CENTRAL EUROPE AS PART
OF THE LAND TASK FORCE (LTF), SINCE 29 APRIL 2014 (OP REASSURANCE)
NO MULTIPLYING FACTOR
(2) SERVICE ONBOARD SHIPS DEPLOYED UNDER THE STANDING NATO MARITIME
GROUP 2 (SNMG 2) SINCE 29 APRIL 2014 PROVIDED THE SERVICE IS NOT
RECOGNIZED BY A NATO MEDAL. ONLY TIME SPENT UNDER NATO COMMAND IS
ELIGIBLE - TRANSIT TIME DOES NOT COUNT. NO MULTIPLYING FACTOR
G. SPECIAL SERVICE MEDAL EXPEDITION (SSM-EXP):
(1) ELIGIBILITY SHALL BE SUSPENDED FOR CAF MEMBERS DEPLOYED TO



PAGE 5 RCCPJAQ1041 UNCLAS
KUWAIT IN THE STRATEGIC LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS (SLOC) DETACHMENT
KUWAIT OR THE OPERATIONAL SUPPORT HUB KUWAIT ON 4 OCTOBER 2014 UNTIL
THE DAY FOLLOWING THE CONCLUSION OF OP IMPACT. ELIGIBILITY IN THAT
LOCATION WILL BE RESTORED AT THE CONCLUSION OF OP IMPACT
(2) SERVICE OF CAF MEMBERS DEPLOYED TO FORWARD LOGISTICS SITES (FLS)
IN DIRECT SUPPORT TO CANADIAN SHIPS ATTACHED TO THE COMBINED TASK
FORCE (CTF) 150, 151 OR 152 (OP ARTEMIS), TO THE OPERATIONAL SUPPORT
HUB KUWAIT, AND WHILE CONDUCTING ACTIVITIES IN THE PORT OF SHUWAIKH
IN KUWAIT SINCE 22 APRIL 2012 (EXCEPT OP IMPACT PERIOD WHICH
QUALIFIES FOR GSM-EXP)
(3) FURTHER TO PARA 1. A(2) OF REF F, THE END DATE HAS BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS ONGOING OPERATION (OP RENDER SAFE)
2. A PERSON CANNOT QUALIFY FOR TWO CAMPAIGN OR SERVICE MEDALS FOR
THE SAME PERIOD OF TIME. THEREFORE, IAW PARAS 1.C(1) AND 1.G(1), ANY
MEDALS AWARDED FOR SERVICE IN THOSE LOCATIONS AFTER 4 OCTOBER 2015
WILL NEED TO BE RELINQUISHED BEFORE APPLICATIONS CAN BE SUBMITTED
FOR APPROPRIATE RECOGNITION IAW PARA 1.D
3. OTHER DETAILS MAY BE FOUND ON THE DH R WEB SITE AT
HTTP://WWW.CMP-CPM.FORCES.GC.CA/DHR-DDHR/CHC-TDH/INDEX-ENG.ASP
4. APPLICATIONS FOR ELIGIBLE PERS SHALL BE MADE IAW REFS A, B AND D



PAGE 6 RCCPJAQ1041 UNCLAS
5. AT TIME OF APPLICATION, PROOF OF SERVICE SHALL BE SUPPLIED IAW
REF C (FOR EXAMPLE: PERSONNEL SERVING AS AIRCREW SHALL SUPPLY COPIES
OF THEIR FLIGHT LOG SHOWING THE DEPLOYED SERVICE IN QUESTION)
END OF ENGLISH TEXT
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Infanteer on July 07, 2015, 17:05:19
I'm a bit disappointed that they decided to use a "catch-all" medal (the GCS-Exp) as opposed to minting a new GCS Ribbon specifically for Op IMPACT, which is a significant combat mission for the CAF.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: PuckChaser on July 07, 2015, 17:11:45
I'm a bit disappointed that they decided to use a "catch-all" medal (the GCS-Exp) as opposed to minting a new GCS Ribbon specifically for Op IMPACT, which is a significant combat mission for the CAF.
Especially if it transitions to a larger mission later.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: eliminator on July 07, 2015, 17:26:00
I'm a bit disappointed that they decided to use a "catch-all" medal (the GCS-Exp) as opposed to minting a new GCS Ribbon specifically for Op IMPACT, which is a significant combat mission for the CAF.

Still better than the NATO medal that was awarded for Op MOBILE...
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on July 08, 2015, 10:25:21
I'm a bit disappointed that they decided to use a "catch-all" medal (the GCS-Exp) as opposed to minting a new GCS Ribbon specifically for Op IMPACT, which is a significant combat mission for the CAF.

Agreed, however this is what most people were expecting.  It is a nice ribbon at least, as well as the GSM-Exp.

(http://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca%2Fdhr-ddhr%2Fpub%2Fimages%2Fmedals.jpg&hash=15fa75dc8c6ad2db7c66a75f6be5c64a)

Quote
D. GENERAL SERVICE MEDAL EXPEDITION (GSM-EXP):
- SERVICE BY CAF MEMBERS DEPLOYED TO KUWAIT AND QATAR SINCE 5 OCTOBER 2014 (DURING OP IMPACT). THIS INCLUDES BUT IS NOT LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING LOCATIONS: ALI AL SALAM AIR BASE, AHMED AL JABAR AIR BASE, AL MUBARAK AIR BASE, CAMP ARIFJAN, THE STRATEGIC LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS (SLOC) DETACHMENT KUWAIT OR OPERATIONAL SUPPORT HUB
KUWAIT, AND AL UDEID AIR BASE

It's actually Ali Al Salem. 
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: SupersonicMax on July 08, 2015, 10:55:27
A bit disappointed that aircrew require 30 missions to be eligible for the Star.  No fighter pilot will get it (or very few).
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on July 08, 2015, 11:08:19
A bit disappointed that aircrew require 30 missions to be eligible for the Star.  No fighter pilot will get it (or very few).

Despite what "awwwww...poor fighter pilots!" comments may follow, I am hoping they adjust something for this.

Why?

- fighter pilots are the folks who are operating in what I will call 'the threat envelope' for that theatre. 
- fighter pilots are the ones putting iron on the ground.  http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad-current/op-impact-airstrikes.page
- fighter pilots are the ones who are conducting the deep fight (Syria)

The ISR and Tanker fleets are in the fight but not the same way.  Speaking for the 140 community, I don't know one person who thinks us and the tanker dudes should be getting the throwing star while the 18s don't.  Something is wrong there.

I have, however, heard more than a few comments on how the aircrews are getting the same risk allowance as the folks who sit in air conditioned offices and never leave the camps.   ::)

For those curious, info on the eligibility on the GCS-Exp (http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhr-ddhr/chc-tdh/chart-tableau-eng.asp?ref=GCS_EXP) prior to the CANFORGEN:

General Campaign Star – EXPEDITION (GCS-EXP)

The GCS with EXPEDITION ribbon is awarded to Canadian Forces members and members of allied forces working with the Canadian Forces who served in approved locations outside Canada and inside a specific theatre of operations in the presence of an armed enemy for at least 30 cumulative days commencing on January 1, 2003 provided that the service has not been otherwise recognized by another service medal.

The only approved eligible service for this ribbon thus far is military service within the political boundaries and airspace of Iraq from 20 January 2003 onwards provided the service has not been recognized by another service medal.

Aircrew flying into the theatre accumulate one day of service for the first sortie flown on any day, additional sorties flown on the same day receive no further credit.

The first and last days in theatre count as full days.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Underway on July 08, 2015, 11:43:37
I'm a bit disappointed that they decided to use a "catch-all" medal (the GCS-Exp) as opposed to minting a new GCS Ribbon specifically for Op IMPACT, which is a significant combat mission for the CAF.

I won't be suprised if it changes in the future.  It won't be the first time a medal has changed half way through the mission.  In this case all it would be is a ribbon change, no bling modifications required.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: eliminator on July 08, 2015, 12:38:29
I won't be suprised if it changes in the future.  It won't be the first time a medal has changed half way through the mission.  In this case all it would be is a ribbon change, no bling modifications required.

Or they could just designate the GCS/GSM-EXP ribbons as "Iraq". Then design a new EXP ribbon or get rid of the a EXP all together for the two medals since there's already the OSM and SSM EXP.

It could have been much worse, they could have just awarded the GCS/GSM-SWA given the Op's location.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: jollyjacktar on July 08, 2015, 14:09:15
Despite what "awwwww...poor fighter pilots!" comments may follow, I am hoping they adjust something for this.

Why?

- fighter pilots are the folks who are operating in what I will call 'the threat envelope' for that theatre. 
- fighter pilots are the ones putting iron on the ground.  http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad-current/op-impact-airstrikes.page
- fighter pilots are the ones who are conducting the deep fight (Syria)

The ISR and Tanker fleets are in the fight but not the same way.  Speaking for the 140 community, I don't know one person who thinks us and the tanker dudes should be getting the throwing star while the 18s don't.  Something is wrong there.

I have, however, heard more than a few comments on how the aircrews are getting the same risk allowance as the folks who sit in air conditioned offices and never leave the camps.   ::)


Well said.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: BobSlob on July 08, 2015, 14:33:22
I have, however, heard more than a few comments on how the aircrews are getting the same risk allowance as the folks who sit in air conditioned offices and never leave the camps.   ::)

Come on, surely the guys hanging out watching movies all day in the theater have the same risk as the ones dropping bombs over hostile territory! </sarcasm>
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eagle Eye View on July 08, 2015, 14:39:25
Quote
A bit disappointed that aircrew require 30 missions to be eligible for the Star.  No fighter pilot will get it (or very few).

I agree, it will require a few tours to qualify for it.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Infanteer on July 08, 2015, 15:06:31
A bit disappointed that aircrew require 30 missions to be eligible for the Star.  No fighter pilot will get it (or very few).

That really is unfortunate - not sure where AFC was getting its metrics from.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Dimsum on July 08, 2015, 15:25:52
That really is unfortunate - not sure where AFC was getting its metrics from.

...or, they expect everyone to cycle through at least twice? 
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: SupersonicMax on July 08, 2015, 15:44:16
Guy A does 1 ROTO, gets posted in a non-flying position during summer time.  He has flown 14 missions in his 56 days.

Guy B does 2 ROTOs and flies 29 missions over 112 days.

Guy C does 2 ROTOs and flies 30 missions over 112 days.

All 3 scenarios are very likely.  Only C gets the star.  Very few people will cycle for a second full tour (I can probably count 12) and not all of them will get to fly that much.

My take on it:  if you have flown over Iraq or Syria in direct support of combat (ie: supporting the ATO, includes CP-140 and Airbus).
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on July 08, 2015, 16:38:16
Is part of the problem the 'multiple sorties in 1 day = 1 sortie' for the fighter community?
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: SupersonicMax on July 08, 2015, 16:59:49
No, with 8 hours sortie, we fly only 2-3 times a week...
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: SeaKingTacco on July 08, 2015, 18:26:21
8 hrs in an ejection seat would suck. I can barely tolerate 2.5 in a sea King seat anymore, and I generally get to move around and do hoisting on most flights.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Dimsum on July 08, 2015, 19:24:35
8 hrs in an ejection seat would suck. I can barely tolerate 2.5 in a sea King seat anymore, and I generally get to move around and do hoisting on most flights.

The RAAF Hornets and Supers are based out of the UAE.  Imagine how long their transit must be to get to the same AO.  No thanks.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Quirky on July 09, 2015, 01:41:29
A bit disappointed that aircrew require 30 missions to be eligible for the Star.  No fighter pilot will get it (or very few).

Considering the current Hardship/Risk I'm not surprised to hear other disappointments. I can't speak for Club Med at Salem, but it should be at least a 3/3 at Jaber. One of the biggest carrots of deploying is to make money - tax free. Volunteers, moral and a general GIAF factor goes down when you aren't being compensated accordingly.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Dolphin_Hunter on July 09, 2015, 07:58:27
I am disappointed on how qualifying time is calculated.  I personally think it should be 15 missions, mainly because I think that this would capture the fighter fleet.   They really should reassess how the medals are awarded, the 30 days/30 missions just doesn't make sense from where I am sitting, as it takes much more than 30 days for aircrew to get 30 missions.   Plus, I doubt anyone (aircrew) is going to qualify for a rotation bar, which is another reason why I think they should reassess the policy.

I am also disappointed in the explaination I was given in Kuwait when the General was asked about a different risk level for aircrew, her reply that we get to keep our aircrew allowance was enough to make up for the extra risk.  I am of the opinion that if the camp is getting RA2, then one could easily assume that aircrew should be getting RA3 which would push us into the tax free zone, which is much more than our aircrew allowance.   I am cynical, but sometimes I feel it that when they make these decisions the RCAF and how we operate is an after thought.

On another note I did read this in an older CANFORGEN

WITH THE NEW PRINCIPLE OF ROTATION RECOGNITION, THE EXISTING PROVISION STATING THAT ONE CANNOT EARN BOTH THE GCS AND GSM IN RESPECT OF THE SAME OP IS AMENDED SO THAT IT IS NOW POSSIBLE FOR A PERSON TO EARN AND WEAR BOTH THE GCS AND THE GSM FOR A GIVEN THEATRE AS LONG AS THE PERSON DOES NOT MEET THE CRITERIA FOR BOTH DURING THE SAME 6 MONTHS PERIOD. WHEN A PERSON MEETS THE CRITERIA FOR THE GCS-SWA OR A BAR TO IT AND THE GSM-SWA OR A BAR TO IT WITHIN A PERIOD OF 180 DAYS, THE PERSON SHALL ONLY BE AWARDED THE GCS OR A BAR TO IT

So does this mean that since I have my GCS qualification, that the next time I go back can I qualify for the GSM?
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Technoviking on July 09, 2015, 08:55:00
One of the biggest carrots of deploying is to make money - tax free.
Sadly, this seems to be more and more the case.  IMPO, if I were to choose between people who want to earn and those who want to serve, I'll choose those who want to serve, 100 times out of 100.

We have people on one side motivated by materialistic and personal gain fighting people who are motivated by eternal salvation.  Against them we cannot win.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Good2Golf on July 09, 2015, 09:01:49
FF quals for GCS-EXP seems inconsistent with theatre precedents.  JTF-Afg Air Wing was 30 days in to qualify for GCS-SWA, no minimum number of sorties required. 

RA/HA being the same for "inside/outside the wire" will continue to be an issue, as it was in the past.  Leadership seemed content to make the distinction between support bases back in the AO (GSM for those at Mirage) and operational bases forward (GCS [or SWASM] for those in AFG itself), but (generally) no subset once you're in theatre at the same location...although IIRC, there were some special cases of 5/4 versus the wider 4/4 in AFG. I see some logic in what the TF Comd is saying, if one looks at AIRCRA being still provided while on RA/HA, but, one could also make the case for raising the RA for all pers who are demonstrably at greater risk due to the very nature of what they're doing...aircrew, D&S, etc...

Considering the current Hardship/Risk I'm not surprised to hear other disappointments. I can't speak for Club Med at Salem, but it should be at least a 3/3 at Jaber. One of the biggest carrots of deploying is to make money - tax free. Volunteers, moral and a general GIAF factor goes down when you aren't being compensated accordingly.

Carrots?  ???  While I admit it was a nice perk when I got home, it SAF wasn't my principal motivation for doing a tour in the sandbox.  There are combat arms folks getting out in droves because there isn't the level of operations that there used to be -- while some may bemoan the tour money that also dried up, I think the primary demotivator is the lack of doing what you signed up to do.  I get it that to each his or her own motivation, but if that is a wider prime motivator, that's a bit of an unfortunate comment on the current state of things.

:2c:

G2G
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: SupersonicMax on July 09, 2015, 11:47:32
It is unfortunate that money is a motivator but it is the reality.  I personally think anyone who deploys should get tax free salary (just like the Americans).  Not for the Hardship and Risk, but for the sacrifices the individuals have to make.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Humphrey Bogart on July 09, 2015, 12:24:15
It is unfortunate that money is a motivator but it is the reality.  I personally think anyone who deploys should get tax free salary (just like the Americans).  Not for the Hardship and Risk, but for the sacrifices the individuals have to make.

I find the whole hardship/risk allowance to be bogus.  I am content with being fed, clothed and given plenty of ammunition.  When it comes to pay we are already close to the best paid force in the world, now the government needs to give us more money to actually do our flipping jobs?  Whoever thinks they deserve a golden handshake for sitting in Kuwait why don't you step aside and let the REAL soldiers get on with the business at hand.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: SupersonicMax on July 09, 2015, 12:45:33
Then why do we have allowances such as Hardship and Risk?  Or Environmental Allowances?  Or PLD? After all, we are all volunteers.

Certain circumstances go beyond what would be considered normal in our society and people are compensated for it.  There is a two tiered system already (tax free vs taxed).  Make it universal: tax free for everybody.

I guarantee you work for a contractor that does similar jobs than people here and they make more than most people in make. 

Yup, compensating your people for what the risk and hardship they face, and the sacrifices they make is part of successful HR strategy. When a majority of people feel wronged, we may be up to something...

But I guess I am not a "real" soldier, therefore my opinion doesn't count.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Ostrozac on July 09, 2015, 12:50:26
Well, I've never served in Kuwait, so I jump into this hornet's nest with reluctance, but I'll take a stab.

I did multiple tours in Yugoslavia, back in the day, with minimal financial rewards, but we did get extremely generous leave packages. I also did multiple tours in Afghanistan, with incredibly generous financial rewards, but the same leave packages. Honestly, in the second case, I liked the extra leave and HLTA more than the cash. But with the Air Force model of short deployments for aircrew, the members are getting the short end of the stick for both cash and leave.

But I can see RoyalDrew's point. My Grandpa deployed in 1939 for the duration (albeit with generous local leave in the UK while they were waiting for Overlord to kick off). Would I have been willing to sign on for a 3 or 4 year deployment to Afghanistan, so long as I got generous R&R and leave packages? Probably. KAF had a bigger population than Petawawa, and better shopping.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Humphrey Bogart on July 09, 2015, 12:59:56
Then why do we have allowances such as Hardship and Risk?  Or Environmental Allowances?  Or PLD? After all, we are all volunteers.

Certain circumstances go beyond what would be considered normal in our society and people are compensated for it.  There is a two tiered system already (tax free vs taxed).  Make it universal: tax free for everybody.

I guarantee you work for a contractor that does similar jobs than people here and they make more than most people in make. 

Yup, compensating your people for what the risk and hardship they face, and the sacrifices they make is part of successful HR strategy. When a majority of people feel wronged, we may be up to something...

But I guess I am not a "real" soldier, therefore my opinion doesn't count.

Never said it doesn't count, I just think it's wrong.  We have a somewhat dangerous job, well some of us do sometimes, that includes you fighter Jocks when you're up there zipping around dropping bombs on Jerry Jihad, thanks for the services btw.  If anyone signed up for the military not knowing they could be potentially put in harms way I don't really know what sort of kool-aid their parents fed them? 

The military is a business and any successful business needs to be affordable.  Our brand of war is particularly unaffordable hence why we have such outdated equipment, no new boots since Ive been in the forces, no new ships, the list goes on and on.  Stop worrying about getting that extra $500 bucks on your pay cheque and maybe my feet won't fall apart next time I go for a March in my decrepit pair of Mark IIIs. 

Well, I've never served in Kuwait, so I jump into this hornet's nest with reluctance, but I'll take a stab.

I did multiple tours in Yugoslavia, back in the day, with minimal financial rewards, but we did get extremely generous leave packages. I also did multiple tours in Afghanistan, with incredibly generous financial rewards, but the same leave packages. Honestly, in the second case, I liked the extra leave and HLTA more than the cash. But with the Air Force model of short deployments for aircrew, the members are getting the short end of the stick for both cash and leave.

But I can see RoyalDrew's point. My Grandpa deployed in 1939 for the duration (albeit with generous local leave in the UK while they were waiting for Overlord to kick off). Would I have been willing to sign on for a 3 or 4 year deployment to Afghanistan, so long as I got generous R&R and leave packages? Probably. KAF had a bigger population than Petawawa, and better shopping.

Yep, two of my great uncle's served in the North Shore Regiment during the war and both landed on D-Day, one of my great uncle's best friends was killed minutes after hitting the beach after a stray bullet hit the Bangalore torpedo he was carrying blowing him to pieces (I've been to his grave site in Beny-sur-Mer but his name is alluding me).  Both my great uncles were wounded multiple times and they had (RIP) the scars to show it.  Both made it all the way to Germany and one even married an English woman he met while on training in England.  They didn't get paid much and were barely compensated, they always said when they talked about the war that they just did what had to be done.  That's real hardship.

 

Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: SupersonicMax on July 09, 2015, 13:09:48
If you knew....  My extra patterns in the Hornet today could probably pay for 1 pair of boots for all Army members...  Oh, and I did it because I had extra gas and I could, no other reason (other than the added landing training). The extra 500$ a month a person (which is not taken from the CAF purse for tax exemptions) will not have a quantifiable effect on what you get in the field.

I personally don't GAF about allowances and pay.  I would do this job for free (alright, maybe not anymore now that I have a family) But I see how it can seriously affect morale and simple solutions like tax free deployments would, I am sure, pay huge dividends in the long run.  In the end, it's less than 0.1% of the adult population.  It would have no impact on government revenue.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Technoviking on July 09, 2015, 13:15:30
I get what you're saying, Max.  Yes, the extra pay is nice (or so I hear: my ex squandered every penny of my three tours I went one while we together.  Booze ain't cheap, doncha know!) but if we want people to deploy for the right reasons, then I suggest that the materialistic reasons and incentives are not the right ones. Compensation is one thing, but an incentive is another.  I simply suggest that the incentive ought to be less materialistic and more..."noble".  That's all.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: SupersonicMax on July 09, 2015, 13:28:33
As much as I agree with you, it is just not the demographic we have anymore.  Not so much in the combat branches, but certainly in the support trades.  Most combat branches or operations branches do what they do because they enjoy it and wouldn't do anything else in the world.  I personally run on adrenaline I get from flying, no kidding.  Talk to my wife and ask her what happens if I don't fly for a couple of weeks.

Most of the support trades (from experience) do it because they have to (or it certainly feel that way when I interact with them).  Either because they are under obligatory service, they are close to retirement and want to "tough it out" till then or because they became slave to the military (they feel they wouldn't be able to transfer to a civy job).  The simple answer is to just let them get out if they are not happy.  The problem in technical trades is that we then lose a ton of experience that is irreplaceable in the near and medium term, leading to shortage of qualified personnel. So in that sense, the military is somewhat stuck between a rock and a hard place. 

We used the "get out if you are not happy" method last year when we posted techs from Bagotville to Cold Lake.  Turns out none of them were bluffing and instead of missing pers in Cold Lake only, we found ourselves having to fill positions at both Wings.  But I disgress.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Good2Golf on July 09, 2015, 16:35:43
Max, probably an interesting distinction that you're making, and one that I tend to agree with (ops/sp, newer/older generations).  Operators tend to enjoy operating on the whole, and I have seen many motivated supporters, but they as a group seem to "enjoy things more" when there is incremental compensation for supporting deployed ops.  That may have been the limitations of my own perspective though, although like you, I was enjoying what I was doing due to the nature of that activity.  If I had been inside a wire for a year, perhaps I might have gotten grumpy and looked to things like compensation to balance making the tour "worth it."

 :2c:

G2G
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: PuckChaser on July 09, 2015, 17:14:36
As much as I agree with you, it is just not the demographic we have anymore.  Not so much in the combat branches, but certainly in the support trades.  Most combat branches or operations branches do what they do because they enjoy it and wouldn't do anything else in the world.

I'm glad you said most, because unfortunately some of those conducting operations right now think they should be making more money than their maint pers in Kuwait. I unfortunately cannot link the article (due to: http://army.ca/forums/index.php/topic,99046.0.html (http://army.ca/forums/index.php/topic,99046.0.html)). So some of those people are not just in it because they love it. I find it especially hard to swallow, if those individuals who complained (to a media outlet no less) are officers in the Pilot occupation, making both aircrew pay and significantly more money monthly than the NCM maint pers who are likely working extremely hard/long hours to ensure airframes are available for those missions.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Quirky on July 09, 2015, 17:21:50
Whoever thinks they deserve a golden handshake for sitting in Kuwait why don't you step aside and let the REAL soldiers get on with the business at hand.

I'm happy being a fake soldier sleeping on a mattress and getting a shower every night. If you real soldiers want to bust up your knees and other joints playing around in mud, dirt and sand, by all means go for it.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Humphrey Bogart on July 09, 2015, 18:41:44
I'm glad you said most, because unfortunately some of those conducting operations right now think they should be making more money than their maint pers in Kuwait. I unfortunately cannot link the article (due to: http://army.ca/forums/index.php/topic,99046.0.html (http://army.ca/forums/index.php/topic,99046.0.html)). So some of those people are not just in it because they love it. I find it especially hard to swallow, if those individuals who complained (to a media outlet no less) are officers in the Pilot occupation, making both aircrew pay and significantly more money monthly than the NCM maint pers who are likely working extremely hard/long hours to ensure airframes are available for those missions.

All the tour incentives are ridiculous and anyone who thinks they deserve more than someone else for whatever task/role/job they filled needs to take a reality check.  One thing I am for is skill based incentives, so something like dive pay or parachute pay is G2G.  Also G2G in my books is spec pay as someone in a highly skilled trade like an aircraft mechanic should be paid more than an infantry corporal for his services, ditto pilots and SOF as well.  All the other incentives like LDA, Sea Pay, Field Pay, Hazard Pay, Hardship Allowance, etc... These all make little sense to me and should go the way of the DoDo. 

Nobody forced any of us to join the service or into a particular trade.  I joined the infantry because I wanted to shoot guns and push myself, the fact I am paid to do this is a bonus in and of itself!  I don't think being infantry makes me in any way superior to a support trade, all of whom are equally important to making the big machine turn. 

I'm happy being a fake soldier sleeping on a mattress and getting a shower every night. If you real soldiers want to bust up your knees and other joints playing around in mud, dirt and sand, by all means go for it.

You misunderstand me, I respect all trades but expect people to do their jobs when called upon and don't think they should receive extra compensation just for doing their jobs.  We are all volunteers who knew the conditions when we signed up.  If we need "carrots" dangled infront of us to get us out the door than we have truly reached a sad state of affairs. 

As for people threatening to leave if they are posted, don't get what they want, etc... I say go ahead, the military will adapt, it always does.  The loss of a few people who probably lack motivation anyways will be offset by the good men and women who will no doubt pick up the slack.

"A few honest men are better than numbers" - Oliver Cromwell
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: PuckChaser on July 09, 2015, 19:27:33
Even just having foreign service pay, and when in an operational theatre you're tax free up to the current 8k max is very fair. Don't get me wrong, I love all the HA/RA money, but I'd still be on the first chalk if it wasn't there. The swedes don't even get tax free or extra allowances and they still volunteer.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Technoviking on July 09, 2015, 19:57:40
I'm happy being a fake soldier sleeping on a mattress and getting a shower every night. If you real soldiers want to bust up your knees and other joints playing around in mud, dirt and sand, by all means go for it.

:rofl:

Milpoints inbound :) 
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: jollyjacktar on July 09, 2015, 20:36:14
"A few honest men are better than numbers" - Oliver Cromwell

Quantity has a quality all it's own - Joseph Stalin
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Humphrey Bogart on July 09, 2015, 20:51:46
Quantity has a quality all it's own - Joseph Stalin

Now if we were to suddenly activate the Militia, Naval Reserve, Air Reserve, etc... and mobilize for a gigantic war I would agree with you; however, we are not doing that.  We have a small regular force that is supposed to represent that quality which when we need to surge is there for that purpose.

We have neither the necessary mass or resources dedicated to our organization to have that quantity so what we put out better be quality.  Whether we are doing that or not is questionable.  I tend to agree with Rick Hillier in his assessment that we could probably shrink the Regular Force to 58,000 all ranks with no substantial loss to our combat capability. 
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: jollyjacktar on July 09, 2015, 21:18:22
Seeing as our combat capability is rather small at any rate, I suppose that is true.  I do doubt, however, that will a small force that you're going to be able to "surge" anything.  I equate surges with numbers, big numbers. 

Yes, the Permanent Force was used as the training cadre to bring the civilians who flooded in the forces during the war's early days.  I seriously doubt also that we would be able to make that happen again.  Too many things not in our favour.  Training/recruiting systems could not handle the job, equipment today is too expensive and sophisticated to make in mass numbers just for starters.  As Gwynn Dyre stated in his book, War, (IIR) "the next world war will be a come as you are war"
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Humphrey Bogart on July 09, 2015, 21:46:46
Seeing as our combat capability is rather small at any rate, I suppose that is true.  I do doubt, however, that will a small force that you're going to be able to "surge" anything.  I equate surges with numbers, big numbers. 

Yes, the Permanent Force was used as the training cadre to bring the civilians who flooded in the forces during the war's early days.  I seriously doubt also that we would be able to make that happen again.  Too many things not in our favour.  Training/recruiting systems could not handle the job, equipment today is too expensive and sophisticated to make in mass numbers just for starters.  As Gwynn Dyre stated in his book, War, (IIR) "the next world war will be a come as you are war"

I agree, we probably need a rethink of our whole mobilization strategy but it's not going to happen in our lifetime unless SHTF.  Dyer also talks about how our equipment has become so sophisticated and lethal but is otherwise untested against a peer enemy.  This places us in a situation much like WWI where we will probably end up blowing the crap out of each other and blow through our war stock in two weeks, at which point it will be back to Trench Warfare.  I tend to agree with him.

Glad you referenced his book, I have a copy on my shelf and generally enjoy his stuff. 

I'll part with this:

"New weapons require new tactics. Never put new wine into old bottles." - Heinz Guderian
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on July 09, 2015, 22:44:56
Considering the current Hardship/Risk I'm not surprised to hear other disappointments. I can't speak for Club Med at Salem, but it should be at least a 3/3 at Jaber.

Oh ya, ASAB was paradise.  I know CPV had it's moments (from what we heard) but we weren't exactly sipping drinks from the poolside bar.

You do know that both were assessed 3 for Hardship, and 2 for Risk right?  Not sure where you are getting the 3/3 if that other 3 is Risk.  If you want to split hairs, let's discuss anyone who didn't actually go into/over theatre getting the same RISK allowance as those who did.  Not sure where the logic in that is.  Or, isn't.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: George Wallace on July 09, 2015, 22:55:39
Could say that the "rot" has run so deep now, that it is a wonder we all didn't die years ago of "Black Lung".   :warstory:
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on July 09, 2015, 23:01:40
I'm glad you said most, because unfortunately some of those conducting operations right now think they should be making more money than their maint pers in Kuwait. I unfortunately cannot link the article (due to: http://army.ca/forums/index.php/topic,99046.0.html (http://army.ca/forums/index.php/topic,99046.0.html)). So some of those people are not just in it because they love it. I find it especially hard to swallow, if those individuals who complained (to a media outlet no less) are officers in the Pilot occupation, making both aircrew pay and significantly more money monthly than the NCM maint pers who are likely working extremely hard/long hours to ensure airframes are available for those missions.

Lets compare it to Afghanistan then.  Should, and did, the folks who never left KAF get the same RA level as those who lived and breathed outside the wire? 

It's kind of hard to imagine to some people, maybe, who've never done air ops before; they think we have it made and in some ways, we do over the army fighting end.  BUT in the current theatre, man if you go down away from home plate, the folks that are looking to get your hands on you like to burn aircrew alive.  In a cage.  And film it.

If that idea, concept, whatever in itself doesn't show there huge difference in RISK between the folks going on the missions, and the ones who support it, but never go into theatre, well then I guess there is nothing that can show that difference or people just don't want to see it.

But, you sure as hell feel it at zero dark stupid when you are over the badlands, not behind the multiple layers of protection at homeplate.

Personally, I think there are 4 actual risk levels in the current theatre; supporters who never see Iraq and ISIS except on their laptops, tanker and CP-140 crews (with a higher risk to the 140 folks, but not enough to justify a higher RA), CF-18 pilots who do things the other zoomies don't, and lastly the CSOR folks and friends who live and operate in the badlands. 

 :2c:
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: PuckChaser on July 09, 2015, 23:35:41
If we went strictly by location, the CLP security teams based in KAF would get less RA than the RRB crew who hangs out at Ma'Sum Ghar and will leave only for HLTA and RIP.

Why do we need to subdivide based on trade/employment? Pilots have a risky job, they get a special payscale and aircrew allowance (which is approved in concert with theatre allowances). CSOR operators are getting their HA/RA, plus SOA Cat 2 because of not only their training, but their consistent exposure to risk and hardship. The maint/support guys are getting spec pay based on training, and HA/RA. Seems like things are already divided up quite nicely, but not in a neat little umbrella that we can call "Risk Levels". Should we further make it complicated by giving Pilots/Aircrews an extra Risk Level, but only for the time they're actually in the air in the ops box? After all, they're only temporarily increasing their risk, after the mission is over they're back in the same camp as the maint guys (who might be putting in 20 hour days to keep airframes going, so maybe we give them an extra hardship level?). That'd be a nightmare for the clerks to sort everything out.

The current system has flaws, but you're never going to get rid of the people who think they deserve more money than X, because they're really only doing it for the cash. We could give OP IMPACT complete 5/5 (I think that's the max?) and you'd still have people bitching that the support staff are making too much money.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on July 10, 2015, 00:26:27
Why do we need to subdivide based on trade/employment? Pilots have a risky job, they get a special payscale and aircrew allowance

I get aircrew allowance doing 4th crewman in the circuit on PPFs.  There is no 'theatre level AIRCRA', its covered in RA.  So, explain in logical terms why a clerk sitting in an a/c office in Kuwait gets the same risk as the crews going over the badlands; is the clerk exposed to the same risk?  Think about it.

Quote
Should we further make it complicated by giving Pilots/Aircrews an extra Risk Level, but only for the time they're actually in the air in the ops box? After all, they're only temporarily increasing their risk, after the mission is over they're back in the same camp as the maint guys

Yup, that's pretty much the solution right there.  Whats so hard about it, it has been done before and is exactly how they figure out which gong we get.  So...

Quote
(who might be putting in 20 hour days to keep airframes going, so maybe we give them an extra hardship level?).

If tech's are doing 20 hour days, the solution doesn't lie in HA or RA lvls, that's a huge problem not tied to that. 

Seriously, think about this.  Someone who sits in an A/C office, never sees the theatre or even comes close to it, getting the same RISK allowance as the people who are operating in the theatre.  Makes sense, does it?  Really?  Take a piece of paper.  Write out the risks the clerk faces, then write out the risks the crews face if they have a very bad day.

As you said, the CSOR folks are getting higher risk because they FACE higher risk.  Same principle as the support folks who never leave the camp compared to the crews flying over the badlands.

System flaws aside, I've yet to see a good argument for why a clerk or MSE Op or Log O would be exposed to the same amount of RISK as a CF-18 pilot who flies into Iraq and Syria and bombs the bad guys, but I don't suspect I will.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Quirky on July 10, 2015, 02:36:43
Oh ya, ASAB was paradise.  I know CPV had it's moments (from what we heard) but we weren't exactly sipping drinks from the poolside bar.

You do know that both were assessed 3 for Hardship, and 2 for Risk right?  Not sure where you are getting the 3/3 if that other 3 is Risk.  If you want to split hairs, let's discuss anyone who didn't actually go into/over theatre getting the same RISK allowance as those who did.  Not sure where the logic in that is.  Or, isn't.

Yes I know its currently 3/2 but I hope that 2 goes up. I would have loved to be in ASAB and I took every opportunity I could get to go there for any reason. I don't think ASAB deserves a 3 for hardship considering the mass differences there were in base amenities, then again I don't know how they calculate it. AJAB started to get a bit better at the latter end of ROTO 0, but it was still pretty much bare bones in comparison.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Infanteer on July 10, 2015, 04:35:29
Seriously, think about this.  Someone who sits in an A/C office, never sees the theatre or even comes close to it, getting the same RISK allowance as the people who are operating in the theatre.  Makes sense, does it?  Really?  Take a piece of paper.  Write out the risks the clerk faces, then write out the risks the crews face if they have a very bad day.

As you said, the CSOR folks are getting higher risk because they FACE higher risk.  Same principle as the support folks who never leave the camp compared to the crews flying over the badlands.

System flaws aside, I've yet to see a good argument for why a clerk or MSE Op or Log O would be exposed to the same amount of RISK as a CF-18 pilot who flies into Iraq and Syria and bombs the bad guys, but I don't suspect I will.

How do you differentiate between levels of risk?  Say (using a Kandahar construct), between a CP-140 crew member who's facing some risk of his plane falling out of the sky or the odd chance of a SAM in his AO vs. an infantry soldier who is getting into 3 TICs a day and walks IED infested trails when he leaves his patrol base?
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Harrigan on July 10, 2015, 07:58:36

Carrots?  ???  While I admit it was a nice perk when I got home, it SAF wasn't my principal motivation for doing a tour in the sandbox.  There are combat arms folks getting out in droves because there isn't the level of operations that there used to be -- while some may bemoan the tour money that also dried up, I think the primary demotivator is the lack of doing what you signed up to do.  I get it that to each his or her own motivation, but if that is a wider prime motivator, that's a bit of an unfortunate comment on the current state of things.

:2c:

G2G

Agree.  It shouldn't be this way, but we reap what we sow. 

"56 day rotations" were not initiated by accident, and certainly not driven from the pointy end.  It was a way to get people in and out of theatre before they passed the magic point (60 days?) where it triggered a host of allowances.  It was not the best use of aircrew resources, but that was secondary to the monetary calculation.

The troops can figure this out.  If they are treated like a commodity, they'll act like a commodity and volunteer only when compensated accordingly. 

It is unfortunate that we have gotten to that stage in the CF, but that is where we are.  It shouldn't come as a shock to anyone.

Harrigan
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: medicineman on July 10, 2015, 10:57:04
Agree.  It shouldn't be this way, but we reap what we sow. 

"56 day rotations" were not initiated by accident, and certainly not driven from the pointy end.  It was a way to get people in and out of theatre before they passed the magic point (60 days?) where it triggered a host of allowances.  It was not the best use of aircrew resources, but that was secondary to the monetary calculation.

The troops can figure this out.  If they are treated like a commodity, they'll act like a commodity and volunteer only when compensated accordingly. 

It is unfortunate that we have gotten to that stage in the CF, but that is where we are.  It shouldn't come as a shock to anyone.

Harrigan

I seem to recall that the 56 day rotations weren't due to allowances - those kick in 2 weeks after being in theatre generally - but to avoid VCDS waivers so they could be rotated more frequently.  Specialist MO's had the same deal going in and out of KAF with the Role 3 MNMU - this way they could send them back more frequently.

MM
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Chris Pook on July 10, 2015, 11:37:08
Four pages on gongs and allowances.

How are things going in Iraq?

I guess that is why buttons and bows aren't just PMO/Heritage thing.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Harrigan on July 10, 2015, 11:59:37
I seem to recall that the 56 day rotations weren't due to allowances - those kick in 2 weeks after being in theatre generally - but to avoid VCDS waivers so they could be rotated more frequently.  Specialist MO's had the same deal going in and out of KAF with the Role 3 MNMU - this way they could send them back more frequently.

MM

I believe HLTA was based on 60 days.  You have hit on the other main reason: a way to get around that meddlesome requirement to give people at least 12 months at home* between 6 month rotations.  If you send them on 3 x 56 day Rotos in a year, we can get 6 months out of a member without any follow-on 12 month requirement.  That can be done indefinitely - and in some units - was. 

Again, though, the troops figure it out, and see it for what it was - a method used by the CF to get around the rules that are meant to protect the member.  And if the CF shows no loyalty to the member, do you blame them for "looking out for themselves"?

Harrigan

* understanding that 'at home' doesn't actually mean 'in garrison'
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Harrigan on July 10, 2015, 12:01:16

How are things going in Iraq?


http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/SOMNIA/article25404069/

I wonder if we have any "national caveats"?

Harrigan
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Halifax Tar on July 10, 2015, 12:44:38
I went to Afg the first time with high hopes and dreams of "making a difference".  The second time I went for cold hard cash.  Don't get me wrong I did everything that was required of me and more. 

But when the government of the day, who sends me into harms way, isn't willing to own up to its responsibilities should I get wounded, and without saying it, would rather I die than be wounded because its cheaper in the long run then ya this is just about cash for me.

I am deploying again in the next few months until late next summer.  Know what my first question was ?  How much extra are we making ?  I'm not ashamed of that at all.  And anyone who thinks these are all about helping people and making a difference is sadly mistaken and has drunk too much of the koolaide.

Feel free to flame away.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Underway on July 10, 2015, 12:48:42
It really depends on the "troop" whether the 56 day deployment is a good or bad thing.  Now being a family man I would love a 56 day deployment to get out, do some work and then come home to see my kids.  I'd rather the break up in the tour than the 6 months + 7 months pre-deployment, even with the extra leave and HLTA and loosing 12 months at home after the deployment.  If you have to go then its easier to sell to the spouse and kids that you'll only be gone for 2 months, no biggie.  Easier for reservists to get the time off work, jump in help out.  It's no different in many ways to lots of types of civi work.  It actually might lead to better retention as the CAF workforce gets older in general.

Also hasn't the airforce been doing these exact types of deployments domestically for years.  Send some guys up to work at the northern airfields for 2 months, rotate them out?

As for risk allowance etc...  this is going to make me sound like a jerk but I'm going to play devils advocate.  Just because you are dropping bombs doesn't mean there is a risk.  If you're at the coal face generally there is a greater risk and I support that generally they should get more risk allowance.  But aren't we just assuming?  Really...whats the air defence capability of ISIL? There might be more risk from a mechanical issue on the aircraft than getting hit with enemy fire.  It might just be a day on the range for these guys (not that I know...).  I would not be suprised if statistically speaking I have a higher risk of being killed on my daily commute than a fighter pilot dying to enemy fire while flying over ISIL (once again... I don't know and am happy to be proven wrong).  Risk might be higher that you have a suicide bomber at the gate or a rocket attack at the airfield  (or a car accident on base).

Also risk is relative and subject to change.  In retrospect KAF was a safer place to be than Massum Ghar, but what if the battlespace changed and the Taliban did a mass attack at KAF, while ignoring MG?  MG goes silent and now KAF is constantly under siege.  What's my risk as a gate guard at KAF searching vehicles and people for suicide bombs, vice the pay clerk in CNS?  What if (as happened to me) you start the tour with a nice safe job in CNS with an air conditioned office halfway through the tour get an extra 2 months tacked on travelling outside the wire on a regular basis as the job evolved or changed?  What's my risk now? Do I have a punch card with my number of patrols outside the wire or number of TIC's I got in?  Or how about the guys who were there in 2007 vice 2010.  It was quite a bit more quiet in 2010 so maybe we should have clawed back some of their allowance.

It's not a perfect system but you can see some of the issues with risk allowance in the first place and why there are percieved unfair treatments.  I think it can be better, but some of the people here going off are not thinking of all the variables and how difficult it may be to get it right.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: GAP on July 10, 2015, 14:33:42
A 57 day rotation is just mind boggling.....no sooner are you aclimatized and orientated then you are gone, replaced by a new guy just getting aclimatized and orientated.

Them's union hours..... ::)
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on July 10, 2015, 16:01:53
How do you differentiate between levels of risk?  Say (using a Kandahar construct), between a CP-140 crew member who's facing some risk of his plane falling out of the sky or the odd chance of a SAM in his AO vs. an infantry soldier who is getting into 3 TICs a day and walks IED infested trails when he leaves his patrol base?

I actually wouldn't compare the 2, the same as I wouldn't compare Afghanistan to Iraq/Syria.   What I am saying, or trying to, is the risk level for Op IMPACT folks looks something like this.  This is just my opinion from being there and seeing reality.

1.  JTFSC pers/anyone who doesn't leave the camp - nil, not much different than home.
2.  Tanker Det aircrew - some, less than 140 det types
3.  LRP Det aircrew - some, more than the tankers, less than the CF-18
4.  CF-18 Det pers - more than folks in 1, 2 or 3, less than CSOR boots on the ground folks.
5.  CSOR boots on the ground folks.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on July 10, 2015, 16:10:59
A 57 day rotation is just mind boggling.....no sooner are you aclimatized and orientated then you are gone, replaced by a new guy just getting aclimatized and orientated.

Them's union hours..... ::)

It's not quite like that, and maybe 56 days is just a number being chucked around here but not reality. 
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on July 10, 2015, 16:23:21
As for risk allowance etc...  this is going to make me sound like a jerk but I'm going to play devils advocate.  Just because you are dropping bombs doesn't mean there is a risk.  If you're at the coal face generally there is a greater risk and I support that generally they should get more risk allowance.  But aren't we just assuming?
I dunno, I'm guessing the guys driving bomb trucks are the type of guys who get noticed more than those not dropping ordinance.  I don't assume, I just have an opinion from my own experience.

Quote
Really...whats the air defence capability of ISIL?
  Nothing anyone on here who actually knows is going to talk about on here or outside Sqn lines, IMO.

Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Dolphin_Hunter on July 10, 2015, 16:39:39
Really... What's the air defence capability of ISIL?

Enough to warrant aircrews a higher risk level than the guys in camp.

Work the Google, you will see that they have and use AD systems, that's all you get for free.

Everyone keeps comparing this mission to Afghanistan, it's a completely different mission, with different risks.  I know the system isn't perfect, but the only real risk the folks in camp run is being hit by a motor vehicle (Ali Al Salem).  No one is getting shot at in camp.

Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on July 10, 2015, 16:48:35
the only real risk the folks in camp run is being hit by a motor vehicle (Ali Al Salem).

*Midnight omelettes* aren't considered a risk?

Well, we give out different medals for the same theatre/operation depending on where people do their business.  Maybe the wording used in the descriptions of those are simple enough to differentiate the differences in risk. 

GCS-EXP (http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhr-ddhr/chc-tdh/chart-tableau-eng.asp?ref=GCS_EXP)

The General Campaign Star (GCS) is awarded to members of the Canadian Forces and members of allied forces working with the Canadian Forces who deploy into a defined theatre of operations to take part in operations in the presence of an armed enemy.

GSM-EXP (http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhr-ddhr/chc-tdh/chart-tableau-eng.asp?ref=GSM_EXP)

The General Service Medal (GSM) is awarded to members of the CF and members of allied forces serving with the CF who deploy outside of Canada - but not necessarily into a theatre of operations - to provide direct support, on a full-time basis, to operations in the presence of an armed enemy.

Seems one group there assumes a little more risk then the other.

As for the AIRCRA aspect, I get $311/month for that when not deployed.  Part of that must be the risk that the plane will crash, or any other normal incident/accident.  The stakes are kind of "upped" somewhat from that happening say, in the North West Territories, to somewhere in and over the Badlands, when your big honkin loud plane goes down in the desert for whatever reason (added fun if there is a big smoke trail pointing down from the sky to tell everyone exactly where you *landed*).   The people coming to look for you aren't SAR, coming with warm milk and cookies to ease your suffering.  Whats the risk of that happening?  Who can say for certain.  No one knew for certain who was going to get hit in a TIC in the last theatre, right? 

Is there a risk of that happening?  There is risk every time you go up that you might come down hard and fast.  The chances of surviving that are loads better in the NWT than they are over the badlands.






Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: medicineman on July 10, 2015, 17:58:25
There's always going to be the "I've got it harder than you" crowd no matter how the things go.  As an example, during my tour in Croatia, some creature in Ottawa decided that they wanted to cut our risk pay to pretty much nada, since the guys in Bosnia were getting shot at more than us.  However, we actually suffered a good deal more casualties, both actually and statistically, than the dudes across the mountains from us because of all the mine strikes we were having.  I call it the CNN effect - since all the news cameras were not on us but on Sarajevo, Gorazde, Srebrenica, etc., we apparently didn't have any risk.  I believe someone pointed that out to said person...our hazard pay didn't change.

MM
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: PuckChaser on July 10, 2015, 18:01:49
Same thing for Op ATTENTION, Roto 1 was told to expect a cut in hardship and risk. Then MCpl Greff was killed and a large scale TB attack occurred in April. The rumors stopped (until they tried it again with Roto 2).
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: jollyjacktar on July 10, 2015, 18:11:59
All which makes Rifleman62's yoga video of yesterday all the more relevant.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on July 10, 2015, 18:33:01
Should we further make it complicated by giving Pilots/Aircrews an extra Risk Level, but only for the time they're actually in the air in the ops box?

I just wanted to come back to this point, and point out how easy it is/would be to do just this which IIRC was how it went for OUP (Libya).

- The RA/HA for OP IMPACT - IRAQ was announced early winter.  Can't remember the numbers exactly, but lets say that the RA for that location (Iraq) is $600/month.
- The RA for OP IMPACT - KUWAIT is announced at, lets say, $300 a month.
- for the example, lets use a aircrew mbr who did a 90 day ROTO and flew 30 missions.

Using a 30 day month to pro-rate a 'per day' amount for the example, that would equal RA $20/day for IRAQ, and RA $10/day for KUWAIT.

So, dude/dudette flies 30 missions.  That's 30 days at the RA IRAQ rate ($600), and 60 days at the RA KUWAIT rate ($600) for $1200 RA total. 

I am not sure what would be so hard about this and, it would be for a minimal # of people.  Its admin work, which is what clerks are paid to do, same as I am paid to smash buttons and drop things out of the plane.  Pro-rating is also how they figure out FSP for a partial month and they can manage that.

Its not hard, its doable and there is no real reason to NOT do it, is there?  FWIW, even if I wasn't one of the 'monkey in the middle' types, I'd still think and support what I'm saying, because I actually believe it would be fair to the mbr's.

Before anyone starts another "well, in Afghanistan.." argument, please allow me to me say this pre-emptively...

(http://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fproductivityjunkies.com%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2011%2F01%2FScreen-shot-2011-01-02-at-2.18.02-PM.png&hash=775e89e58b7d8692087cb7444bd004ee)
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Harrigan on July 10, 2015, 20:28:23
It really depends on the "troop" whether the 56 day deployment is a good or bad thing.  Now being a family man I would love a 56 day deployment to get out, do some work and then come home to see my kids.  I'd rather the break up in the tour than the 6 months + 7 months pre-deployment, even with the extra leave and HLTA and loosing 12 months at home after the deployment.  If you have to go then its easier to sell to the spouse and kids that you'll only be gone for 2 months, no biggie.  Easier for reservists to get the time off work, jump in help out.  It's no different in many ways to lots of types of civi work.  It actually might lead to better retention as the CAF workforce gets older in general.

Also hasn't the airforce been doing these exact types of deployments domestically for years.  Send some guys up to work at the northern airfields for 2 months, rotate them out?

I agree with you, IF it is only once or twice.  56 days is fine, and easier on the family. 

But in the mid-2000's some units constantly rotated people in and out on 56 day rotos for years, and with only a relatively small number of qualified personnel, that meant 6 months out of 12 for multiple years.  Suffice to say the failure rate on marriages at that unit was extreme.

Harrigan
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: milnews.ca on August 14, 2015, 21:27:41
Why you're not hearing quite as much (http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2015/08/14/canadian-cf-18-jets-hit-islamic-state-but-dnd-stays-quiet.html) ....
Quote
Expect to hear a lot about the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant during the federal election, just not from the Canadian military.

National Defence has slipped into silent mode for the duration of the campaign and says it will update its website, but won’t hold public briefings about the combat mission in Iraq and Syria, barring something extraordinary.

Canadian warplanes have conducted 29 airstrikes against Islamic State positions and units, including one in Syria, since the last update on July 9 ....
More on the Caretaker Convention (what government officials can/can't do during the federal election) here (http://bit.ly/1TaiThH).
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: E.R. Campbell on August 28, 2015, 08:26:46
Well, it was bound to happen ... the accusation, I mean ...

This article is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from the Globe and Mail:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/canadian-armed-forces-accused-of-killing-civilians-in-iraq-air-strike/article26138351/
Quote
(http://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fbeta.images.theglobeandmail.com%2Fmedia%2Fwww%2Fimages%2Fflag%2Fgam-masthead.png&hash=19ff3553db0adc5a5af34a8cb80569c3)
Canadian Armed Forces accused of killing civilians in Iraq air strike

STEVEN CHASE
OTTAWA — The Globe and Mail

Published Friday, Aug. 28, 2015

Canadian fighter pilots have been accused of killing civilians during a Jan. 21 air strike in Iraq – an allegation the military has kept under wraps until now.

The Canadian Armed Forces, which revealed this information in response to a question from The Globe and Mail, say they’ve nevertheless found no evidence to back up this accusation.

The military has been asked repeatedly since last fall whether Canadian CF-18 Hornets have inadvertently killed or injured civilians during the United States-led air war against Islamic State terrorists. This is the first time it’s been revealed such an allegation has been made.

The Forces say they are inviting anyone with more information to step forward.

“In January, 2015, information came to the Canadian Armed Forces that there might have been civilian casualties as a result of a strike by our CF-18s,” said Captain Kirk Sullivan of Canadian Joint Operations Command. “The source of this allegation had himself heard of these potential casualties through a second-hand account.”

The military said it’s willing to collect more evidence and investigate if circumstances warrant.

“Any agency with information that would indicate potential civilian casualties, or aid in clarifying existing allegations, is encouraged to provide it to the Canadian Armed Forces so that it may pursue it with the coalition,” Capt. Sullivan said.

Canada’s CF-18s have been bombing targets in Iraq since November, 2014, as part of the United States-led air bombing campaign to help Iraqi ground forces recapture their country from extremists who have seized large swaths of territory. Canada also began air strikes in Syria in April, 2015, after the Conservative-dominated House of Commons voted to expand the bombing campaign.

Divulging the allegation about the January air strike is a change from the Forces’ line on the matter as recently as seven weeks ago.

On July 9, military spokesman Paul Forget, a naval captain, was asked at a media briefing whether the military was aware of any civilian casualties, “or possible civilian casualties,” as a result of the air-strike campaign. He didn’t mention this accusation.

“Canada is quite confident that with all the strikes that we’ve executed, there is absolutely no evidence of civilian casualties associated with our strikes,” the officer told reporters.

Defence Minister Jason Kenney also told reporters in early August that he knew of no cases in which there were civilian casualties caused by Canadian bombs in the war on the Islamic State – also referred to as ISIS or ISIL.

“All I can tell you is we’re not aware of any claims of civilian casualties as a result of the RCAF bombing ISIL targets in Iraq and Syria, and I believe the United States is only aware of one,” Mr. Kenney, currently running for re-election, said Aug. 3.

Yet the Canadian military now says it’s known of this allegation for about seven months.

The military says after it learned of this accusation – which it did not elaborate on – there was further scrutiny of photos and videos of the Jan. 21 air strike but these yielded no proof civilians were killed during the attack on Islamic State forces.

“The coalition headquarters conducted a review of all available, reliable imagery and video. The review uncovered no evidence of civilian casualties,” Capt. Sullivan said.

The review of the Jan. 21 bombing was conducted by the Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve headquarters, the Forces say.

The military says the bombing in question took place northwest of Mosul when CF-18 jets were flying a coalition mission in support of Iraqi security forces on the ground. In January, the Forces said in a news release that the Hornets had struck an Islamic State “fighting position.”

Capt. Sullivan said the military remains confident the targeting was justified.

“It was reconfirmed that the target was a valid military objective from which ISIS was firing a heavy machine gun … at Iraqi Kurdish troops,” the officer said. “The area in question is still within ISIS-held territory.”

The Forces say they didn’t consider it necessary to make public this particular allegation because there was insufficient evident to mount a formal investigation.

They could not sufficiently explain Thursday evening precisely why they have now decided to make the allegation public.

Citing “security reasons,” the military is refusing to identify the source of the allegation – and whether this person is civilian or a soldier – and is referring further questions on the complainant to U.S. Central Command.

Canada’s participation in the United States-led campaign against Islamic State militants is projected to cost more than half a billion dollars by March, 2016 – with the majority of the expenses to come from the air war, which also includes surveillance planes and a refueller.

With a report from Oliver Sachgau



I have only one comment. Note this: "The military has been asked repeatedly since last fall whether Canadian CF-18 Hornets have inadvertently killed or injured civilians ..." Journalism is, now, defined as the business of filing ATI request after ATI request saying, "Have ya done anything wrong yet? Well, have ya? Have ya?"
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: milnews.ca on August 28, 2015, 08:59:49
I have only one comment. Note this: "The military has been asked repeatedly since last fall whether Canadian CF-18 Hornets have inadvertently killed or injured civilians ..." Journalism is, now, defined as the business of filing broad-strokes "shotgun" ATI request after ATI request saying, "Have ya done anything wrong yet? Well, have ya? Have ya?" "what's here that can stand out in a headline?"
FTFY

In all fairness, though, note the wording of the answers ....
This is NOT just a Conservative practice (I'm sure there are loads of examples of such wordsmithing from parties of all colours - what do "we" "officially" "know/hear"), but when things are less-than-clearly expressed, the eye can always be drawn.
(http://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fimg.picturequotes.com%2F2%2F17%2F16917%2Fi-did-not-have-sexual-relations-with-that-woman-quote-1.jpg&hash=e87f9bf274c236ba1499908e78fac837)
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Lumber on August 28, 2015, 10:42:15
From the same article:

"The Canadian Armed Forces, which revealed this information in response to a question from The Globe and Mail..."
.
.
.
"They could not sufficiently explain Thursday evening precisely why they have now decided to make the allegation public."

Because you asked them you numpties! Read your own article!
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: milnews.ca on August 29, 2015, 17:05:37
From the same article:

"The Canadian Armed Forces, which revealed this information in response to a question from The Globe and Mail..."
.
.
.
"They could not sufficiently explain Thursday evening precisely why they have now decided to make the allegation public."
I think the other side of that question in green is "why didn't anyone say so earlier?"

And now, who gets the blame? (http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/SOMNIA/article26155601/) ....
Quote
Defence Minister Jason Kenney says the military never told him Canadian fighter pilots had been accused of killing civilians when they bombed an Islamic State fighting position on Jan. 21.

It’s a startling admission from the Conservative minister because the Harper cabinet member is effectively saying the Forces kept him out of the loop.

Mr. Kenney, who is running for re-election in a Calgary riding, remains minister during the campaign under way now.

His chief spokesman, speaking to The Globe on Friday, said this week’s revelation was news to the Calgary MP. “The minister was not made aware of allegations of civilian casualties connected to RCAF strikes,” Daniel Proussalidis said of briefings provided by the Forces.

The spokesman said Mr. Kenney “was consistently briefed that there is no evidence to indicate that RCAF air strikes have resulted in civilian casualties.”

Late Friday evening the Forces acknowledged they did not tell Mr. Kenney, saying they told his predecessor, Rob Nicholson. A cabinet shuffle in early February brought about a change of ministers and the military said it saw no reason to loop in Mr. Kenney because they'd found no evidence to back up the allegation ....
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: cupper on August 29, 2015, 19:32:54
Sooo…. What you are saying is that there is no there there?

That never happens!  ::)
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Tuan on August 29, 2015, 22:18:43
From the PM's office (http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2014/08/15/statement-prime-minister-canada-announcing-further-canadian-support-people-iraq) ....

Let’s just look at the Canadian approach in responding to ISIS threat in this operation. This summer the Canadian Prime Minister Harper was proposing to the parliament to extend and expand Canada’s military mission one more year particularly targeting Syria. However the opposition parties, both New Democrats and Liberals, are opposing this and suggesting that Canada should involve in humanitarian missions, such as helping to solve the refugee crisis and other aid work in Iraq and Syria.

IMHO, the opposition parties’ idea does have a long term strategic advantage and we could benefit from it down the road. First we have to isolate the insurgents/terrorists from the general populace. Let the refugees come out and settle them in other countries thereby showcasing the soft power of Canada/NATO rather than PM Harper’s hard power strategy which is bombing Iraq and Syria.

By weeding the insurgents out of legitimate refugees, we can eventually apply Mao Tse Tung’s theory that “insurgents are like fish in an ocean of people”. By separating the “ocean” of general populace from the insurgent “fish” we will be able to determine the survival of the enemy insurgents/terrorists.

Since it is Middle Eastern crisis the solution should be confined within Middle Eastern region. Therefore migrants should be resettled in countries such as Turkey, Jordan, Saudi or Egypt not Europe, given the ongoing migrant influx in the region. To deny access for would-be jihadists to infiltrate/exfiltrate other countries disguised as refugees, we can set up buffer zones.

Then there is a question of how should one separate the ocean of population from the insurgent fish?

Well, if we're able to win the hearts and minds of the general populace they will do the job for you, which is the core strategy of COIN doctrine. Yes, we have to win the hearts and minds of the people. That’s where a great nation’s soft power plays its part. Hard power is vital in order to safe guard a nation’s interest, however, when we confront an enemy of different faces we have to explore other options and tools to combat them by the means of non-military strategies.

Remember, according to Sun Tzu, the best way to win a war is without even fighting it. As such, eliminating the will to fight and destroying the spirit of the enemy’s potential to fight is also paramount. An ideology has to be fought with another set of ideologies, rather than by swords and guns; may it be a religious ideology, ethno-nationalist ideology or secessionist ideology.

What I am trying to say here is that: “Don’t use cannon to kill a mosquito….” – Confucius


Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: George Wallace on August 30, 2015, 12:04:59
Let’s just look at the Canadian approach in responding to ISIS threat in this operation. This summer the Canadian Prime Minister Harper was proposing to the parliament to extend and expand Canada’s military mission one more year particularly targeting Syria. However the opposition parties, both New Democrats and Liberals, are opposing this and suggesting that Canada should involve in humanitarian missions, such as helping to solve the refugee crisis and other aid work in Iraq and Syria.

IMHO, the opposition parties’ idea does have a long term strategic advantage and we could benefit from it down the road. First we have to isolate the insurgents/terrorists from the general populace. Let the refugees come out and settle them in other countries thereby showcasing the soft power of Canada/NATO rather than PM Harper’s hard power strategy which is bombing Iraq and Syria.

IMHO, the opposition parties have no idea how to deal with this situation.  They have no concept of how to stop the spread of this radical and despicable form of Islam.  Soft power is exactly what has brought us to this state.  Refugees are already flooding the EU, at a rate that the West is having difficulty in handling.  The financial burden these large numbers of refugees are placing on Western nations has yet to be faced.  The fact that terrorists being covertly inserted into Western nations is a major concern and a serious threat as there are NO actual means to identify who is or who is not a member of IS with 100% certainty. 

By weeding the insurgents out of legitimate refugees, we can eventually apply Mao Tse Tung’s theory that “insurgents are like fish in an ocean of people”. By separating the “ocean” of general populace from the insurgent “fish” we will be able to determine the survival of the enemy insurgents/terrorists.

As I said: no 100% solution to effectively identify insurgents with 100% certainty.

Since it is Middle Eastern crisis the solution should be confined within Middle Eastern region. Therefore migrants should be resettled in countries such as Turkey, Jordan, Saudi or Egypt not Europe, given the ongoing migrant influx in the region. To deny access for would-be jihadists to infiltrate/exfiltrate other countries disguised as refugees, we can set up buffer zones.
 

I would tend to agree, but those fleeing would probably tend not to, preferring to get as far away from the turmoil as possible, into one of the "richer" Western nations.  We don't see any of the refugees fleeing Northern Africa, fleeing South.  Nor do we see many refugees in South West Asia fleeing East into Pakistan, India, and other Asian nations. China has fairly much reinforced its presence on securing its Western borders.

Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Tuan on August 30, 2015, 12:21:01
Quote from: George Wallace
As I said: no 100% solution to effectively identify insurgents with 100% certainty.

What you think about imposing a buffer zone that Turkey is planning to do:

Will a Turkish border deal block IS recruits?
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34060925
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: George Wallace on August 30, 2015, 12:27:58
What you think about imposing a buffer zone that Turkey is planning to do:

Will a Turkish border deal block IS recruits?
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34060925

There are buffer zones in many locations around the world.  All of them are band-aid solutions and have been infiltrated thousands of times. 
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Tuan on August 30, 2015, 12:49:30
There are buffer zones in many locations around the world.  All of them are band-aid solutions and have been infiltrated thousands of times.

Well, in May 2009 there was a similar situation in Northern Sri Lanka, where the LTTE, a terrorist organization was holding more than 300,000 Tamil civilians as mere human shield. When the Sri Lankan security forces tried to move in and cordon off the area the LTTE began to release and let the civilians pour into the cleared areas, including LTTE suicide bombers who blew themselves up and killed 19 soldiers in one single incident. Since then, the Sri Lankan military began setting up buffer zones and temporary displacement camps in the immediate vicinity and also with the civilian's help successfully weeded out the terrorists one by one. It is important to note that after this process, there was not a single incident of terrorist attack in the country as yet. All you got to do is "winning the the hearts and minds" of the general populace.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Good2Golf on August 30, 2015, 14:03:59
...All you got to do is "winning the the hearts and minds" of the general populace.

Cool.  That would make an excellent slide in a PowerPoint briefing.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Teager on August 30, 2015, 14:36:57
All you got to do is "winning the the hearts and minds" of the general populace.

What might win the hearts and minds of one group in the middle east could piss off another group. So many groups that have ongoing battles that go way back in history.

Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Bird_Gunner45 on August 30, 2015, 14:43:36
Cool.  That would make an excellent slide in a PowerPoint briefing.

Lol... it sounds like the intro slide to every briefing in Kandahar
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on August 30, 2015, 16:06:56
Let’s just look at the Canadian approach in responding to ISIS threat in this operation. This summer the Canadian Prime Minister Harper was proposing to the parliament to extend and expand Canada’s military mission one more year particularly targeting Syria.

Yes, the only way to win or hope to win the war against ISIS.

Quote
However the opposition parties, both New Democrats and Liberals, are opposing this and suggesting that Canada should involve in humanitarian missions, such as helping to solve the refugee crisis and other aid work in Iraq and Syria.

Yup, and that shows how little they know about how to do this type of business. 

Quote
IMHO, the opposition parties’ idea does have a long term strategic advantage and we could benefit from it down the road.

Great.  Let's hear how, and don't skip the details.

Quote
First we have to isolate the insurgents/terrorists from the general populace.

******' excellent!  Please detail out your plan on how to do this, how this type of thing works.

Quote
Let the refugees come out and settle them in other countries thereby showcasing the soft power of Canada/NATO rather than PM Harper’s hard power strategy which is bombing Iraq and Syria ISIS.

You're assuming the 'other countries' want these people, and you're assuming all of these people want 'out' as opposed to wanting a long-term solution that doesn't have them abandoning theirs homes and lives.

Quote
By weeding the insurgents out of legitimate refugees

Still really looking forward to your theory on how to do this!!!!

Quote
, we can eventually apply Mao Tse Tung’s theory that “insurgents are like fish in an ocean of people”. By separating the “ocean” of general populace from the insurgent “fish” we will be able to determine the survival of the enemy insurgents/terrorists.

 ??? 

Quote
Since it is Middle Eastern crisis the solution should be confined within Middle Eastern region. Therefore migrants should be resettled in countries such as Turkey, Jordan, Saudi or Egypt not Europe, given the ongoing migrant influx in the region.

Again you are assuming these countries want these people, these people want to go to these countries, etc.  This isn't moving Canadians from Cape Breton to mainland NS you are talking about. 

Quote
To deny access for would-be jihadists to infiltrate/exfiltrate other countries disguised as refugees, we can set up buffer zones.

Great!  Please explain how these will work!!

Quote
Then there is a question of how should one separate the ocean of population from the insurgent fish?

Well, if we're able to win the hearts and minds of the general populace they will do the job for you, which is the core strategy of COIN doctrine. Yes, we have to win the hearts and minds of the people. That’s where a great nation’s soft power plays its part. Hard power is vital in order to safe guard a nation’s interest, however, when we confront an enemy of different faces we have to explore other options and tools to combat them by the means of non-military strategies.

Remember, according to Sun Tzu, the best way to win a war is without even fighting it. As such, eliminating the will to fight and destroying the spirit of the enemy’s potential to fight is also paramount. An ideology has to be fought with another set of ideologies, rather than by swords and guns; may it be a religious ideology, ethno-nationalist ideology or secessionist ideology.

What I am trying to say here is that: “Don’t use cannon to kill a mosquito….” – Confucius

I don't think you really have a 'where the rubber meets the road' understanding of how this whole ISIS thing is going down in Iraq and Syria.  You are throwing ideas out that 'sound good' but are as simple as stopping the Atlantic tide from coming into the Bay of Fundy.  In short, I don't think you have a realistic schmick of the real problems or the real solutions.  Your post reminds me of that scene from Armageddon, when the dude that had WAYYY to much coffee was explaining how these solar wind sails would deploy, and...
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Dolphin_Hunter on August 30, 2015, 16:34:11
Well, in May 2009 there was a similar situation in Northern Sri Lanka, where the LTTE, a terrorist organization was holding more than 300,000 Tamil civilians as mere human shield. When the Sri Lankan security forces tried to move in and cordon off the area the LTTE began to release and let the civilians pour into the cleared areas, including LTTE suicide bombers who blew themselves up and killed 19 soldiers in one single incident. Since then, the Sri Lankan military began setting up buffer zones and temporary displacement camps in the immediate vicinity and also with the civilian's help successfully weeded out the terrorists one by one. It is important to note that after this process, there was not a single incident of terrorist attack in the country as yet. All you got to do is "winning the the hearts and minds" of the general populace.

Completely different situation, you really have no idea what is going on over there, and it scares me because most people are ******* clueless as to what is going on (80% of the people that are participating in Op Impact have no clue either).  Trust me, the only way this ends is through force.  They have no interest in stopping and sitting on a piece of land, they want it all, and they won't stop.   

You want to win the hearts and minds of the general populace, you can start by flushing these pieces of crap down the toilet.

IMHO if the ISF doesn't discover a good set of testicles, this will never end without a significant boost on the ground from the MESF.



Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Humphrey Bogart on August 30, 2015, 17:08:55
Completely different situation, you really have no idea what is going on over there, and it scares me because most people are ******* clueless as to what is going on (80% of the people that are participating in Op Impact have no clue either).  Trust me, the only way this ends is through force.  They have no interest in stopping and sitting on a piece of land, they want it all, and they won't stop.   

You want to win the hearts and minds of the general populace, you can start by flushing these pieces of crap down the toilet.

IMHO if the ISF doesn't discover a good set of testicles, this will never end without a significant boost on the ground from the MESF.

He also negates to mention that the conflict against the LTTE only ended after they were utterly defeated by the Sri Lankan Army. 

In order to end a war you actually need to fight.  The whole Sun Tzu "defeat your enemy without fighting" only works when shots haven't been fired, far past that point unfortunately.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Tuan on August 30, 2015, 22:07:52
Alright, I assume you gentlemen are in fact fighting the war in Iraq and Syria while I am not. So I may be completely wrong because I wrote my mind here after spending some time on assessing open source intelligence (OSINT) in the ongoing counterterrorism operations in Iraq and Syria. Having said that I did play a part in obliterating terrorism in Sri Lanka and thought that I could share with you my experience. I know that some of you have already said that it is completely different situation, but just so you know, LTTE in Sri Lanka and ISIS in Middle East differ ideologically and objectively, however, as far as their modus operandi and tradecraft are concerned, they both have some similarities.

So this is what I had posted on a defense forum last year and I am reposting this again thinking that I don’t violate any forum rules here:

“While monitoring OSINT, I have noticed a pattern, in the Islamic State terrorists’ “modus operandi”, that of a spider. Spiders have eight legs and two body parts - a head region (cephalothorax) and an abdomen. Most spiders have toxic venom, which they use to kill their prey.

So if the international community wants to get rid of ISIS, hypothetically speaking, they have to get rid of the head region of ISIS, the “cephalothorax” of the spider, instead of fighting with its eight legs. What I was trying pinpoint is that, while ISIS's headquarters (cephalothorax) is located in Syria, their survival (abdomen) depends on how much area they control in Iraq. Thus before this ISIS "spider" transform into "multi-headed" and "multi-pronged" the international community has to get rid of them.

Of course, they will replace it with another head, so get rid of the other one too, then the next one and so on. All we need is accurate and effective tactical military intelligence collection. I feel that the international intelligence agencies have a bigger role to play, than just being the eyes and ears of any nation, with feet of clay, when faced with an enemy of many different faces. Recommendations for an appropriate tradecraft to achieve such a role are the need of the day. There is NO truth to search for, there is no absolute truth, and everything is subjective! But the kind of role intelligence play in deterrence is what paramount! And achieving A STATE OF GLOBAL DETERRENCE is what I consider the bottom line.

I shall explain how we could achieve a state of global deterrence in my next post.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Tuan on August 30, 2015, 22:33:25
He also negates to mention that the conflict against the LTTE only ended after they were utterly defeated by the Sri Lankan Army. 

In order to end a war you actually need to fight.  The whole Sun Tzu "defeat your enemy without fighting" only works when shots haven't been fired, far past that point unfortunately.

Yes they were utterly defeated at the end but there was a strategic deception that the Sri Lankan military orchestrated that you fail to understand.

One of the ground breaking achievements the Sri Lankan military intelligence had done was that they engineered a split within the Tamil Tiger organization in 2004 and made one of the Tiger’s top commanders to defect from the terrorist organization with over 6000 Tiger cadres. Since SL military realized the importance of HUMINT in counterterrorism they temporarily enrolled the entire cadres including the Tiger top commander Karuna as a paramilitary group in the country’s army. Then the SL military indoctrinated the defected cadres with soft power and turned them against the rest of the Tiger organization’s main faction. This reverse tactic of turning the very same terrorists/ insurgents/guerrillas/rebels - whatever you may call them – against the main faction paid off since the tactical military intelligence collection was crucial and it was ready on the table obtained via this engineered defection. This was the “game-changer” in the Sri Lankan civil war’s history that could be extrapolated into ISIS and/or al Qaeda.

Also, the Tamil Tigers began as guerrillas in early 80s and by late 2000 they became a semi conventional force with an army, navy and rudimentary air force. However one of their fatal strategic and tactical miscalculations was that, at the last stages of the civil war they tried to resemble and mimic a full conventional force whereas the Sri Lankan military Special Forces fought and resembled that of guerillas. Not to mention the Tigers did survive the world’s fourth largest and powerful Indian army in the late 80s only because they then engaged themselves in a asymmetric warfare, like a typical insurgents-cum-guerillas opposed to later day’s semi-conventional army.
Title: "Canada Pledges Further Support for KRG"
Post by: milnews.ca on August 31, 2015, 06:59:45
From Kurdish media (http://www.basnews.com/en/news/2015/08/31/canada-pledges-further-support-for-krg/), shared under the Fair Dealing provisions (http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/c-42/page-19.html#h-26) of the Copyright Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. C-42) (http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/c-42/index.html) - highlights mine:
Quote
Chancellor of the Kurdistan Region Security Council Masrour Barzani received a Canadian delegation, headed by the National Security Advisor to the Canadian Prime Minister, Richard Fadden, on Sunday August 30th.

The pair discussed the latest developments in the fight against Islamic State (IS), and the progression of the political process in the region.

Barzani underlined the role of international community in fighting terrorism, saying that military, financial and diplomatic support is crucial for the Kurdistan Region to defeat IS.

He stressed that Islamic countries should step in and fight radical ideology.

Fadden praised the Peshmerga forces that have made huge sacrifices to protect millions of civilians against IS.

He pledged that the Canadian government will continue supporting the Peshmerga and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) as they are the most effective force on the ground against the terrorist group.


Regarding negotiations over presidential issues in the Kurdistan Region, Barzani expressed hope that the dialogue will continue and the best solution to the matter will be found.

He said that the current political situation is the outcome of a successful democratic process in the region in which the parties feel free to express their views.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Tuan on August 31, 2015, 11:52:44
Quote
Quote
By weeding the insurgents out of legitimate refugees

Still really looking forward to your theory on how to do this!!!!

Quote
, we can eventually apply Mao Tse Tung’s theory that “insurgents are like fish in an ocean of people”. By separating the “ocean” of general populace from the insurgent “fish” we will be able to determine the survival of the enemy insurgents/terrorists.

 ??? 

Okay, you can use a method call “Spotter Force Multiplier Theory” (SFMT), which was a successful tradecraft in intelligence led warfare in Sri Lanka.

So what is it?

In any enemy organization, may it be police, intelligence and military or even among the non-state actors, such as gangs, mafia or terrorist groups; you can only identify the members of the particular organization using its own members. When we confront/combat these organizations we would definitely come across and identify at least one single genuine member of such organization, whom I would call as “Joe”. Using Joe as a “spotter” we’ll be able to identify few other Joes. And then keep using every Joe as a “spotter force multiplier” till we get the big fish. Please note that the each Joe we arrest/capture should undergo a brief rehabilitation process; instill them with compassion and indoctrinate them with soft power, contrary to the usual aggressive interrogation techniques. The advantage of using SFMT is that we would have a complete picture and understanding of insider information regarding any enemy organization, which is known as the tactical intelligence in the field. 
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: George Wallace on August 31, 2015, 11:54:51
Another name for Link Analysis. 
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Tuan on August 31, 2015, 12:04:58
Another name for Link Analysis.

Thank you for the corroboration!
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on August 31, 2015, 22:39:01
I don't know crap about Sri Lanka.  No comments there.  But for thought, what worked for the Nazi's on one front might not have worked so well on a different front.  Not all nails need the same size hammer.  Follow me?

I don't think you get how this deal is going down in the big dirt farm either.  I won't talk about TTPs and that stuff but let me suggest that your open source stuff isn't quite up to snuff.  You do understand the GOI is the driver of the big happy bus, right?  I say that because I don't think very many people understand the power structure in that region very well.  And the issues that arise from it that help/hinder the fight. 

 :2c:
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Technoviking on September 01, 2015, 07:20:33
Did someone mention Cylons?

(http://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fstatic.giantbomb.com%2Fuploads%2Fscale_small%2F0%2F1230%2F891293-cent_005.jpg&hash=3cb0a45cf3921922371d818056fb7bf8)
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Tuan on September 01, 2015, 10:56:50
I don't know crap about Sri Lanka.  No comments there.  But for thought, what worked for the Nazi's on one front might not have worked so well on a different front.  Not all nails need the same size hammer.  Follow me?

I don't think you get how this deal is going down in the big dirt farm either.  I won't talk about TTPs and that stuff but let me suggest that your open source stuff isn't quite up to snuff.  You do understand the GOI is the driver of the big happy bus, right?  I say that because I don't think very many people understand the power structure in that region very well.  And the issues that arise from it that help/hinder the fight. 

 :2c:

How Sri Lanka won the war
http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/how-sri-lanka-won-the-war/
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: MCG on September 01, 2015, 11:15:27
Sounds like the Conservatives may push this mission into an election topic.
Quote
Harper to discuss next steps on militants
Stephanie Levitz, The Canadian Press
Toronto Star
01 Sep 2015

Canadian pilots fighting in the skies over Iraq and Syria may soon find out how much longer the federal Conservatives think they'll need to be there, the party's leader said Monday.
 
At an election rally, Stephen Harper said he intends in the coming days to discuss Canada's contribution to the international coalition fighting Islamic militants in those countries, but suggested the fight is far from over.
 
"The intervention has had the effect of largely stopping the advance of ISIS (Islamic State), particularly in the north of Iraq and to some degree in other parts of Iraq and Syria - not maybe as much we'd like," he said.
 
It's been a year since the plight of thousands of Yazidis trapped on a mountaintop by Islamic State of Iraq and Levant fighters moved the U.S. to pull together countries for an air war designed to stop Islamic State from taking over more land in Iraq.
 
Canada joined the fight in October 2014 for an initial six-month mission, which was expanded in March for up to a year. Canadian fighters are now also bombing Islamic State positions in Syria. Things have improved, Harper told the rally.
 
"A year ago, they were literally on the verge of sweeping over the entire region, so at least that has been halted."
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Tuan on September 02, 2015, 00:48:38
Quote from: Tuan
...All you got to do is "winning the hearts and minds" of the general populace.

Quote
Cool.  That would make an excellent slide in a PowerPoint briefing.

Quote
Lol... it sounds like the intro slide to every briefing in Kandahar

I know that you guys are being sarcastic but I am appalled by the fact that  you fail to grasp the significance of “soft power” in conflict resolution. I think it would help to define “soft power” and how it emerges from a society. It is, at a basic level "mind control without active coercion”.  Soft power does work and that’s why terrorist or fascist organizations block soft power avenues from influencing people so that they can sustain their propaganda.

It doesn’t mean we can win the war on terror with soft power only. I believe the international community could utilize and balance its soft power and hard power when combating terrorism. Each and every nation has a unique popular culture that is so rich and deep that it can be greatly utilized against hardcore individuals and enemy organizations. Some leading western scholars suggest that success in world politics could be best achieved through the use of “smart power” – a combination of both hard power and soft power.

An American Congresswoman, Jane Harman, had pointed out in her blog that "while the 'hard power' represented by drone strikes and aircraft carriers is essential to our security, living and portraying our values is as - if not more - important in the long run". She went on to say that "we have a responsibility to craft a winning narrative. When we fail to step up and define ourselves, the extremists will be happy to do it for us..."

Fighting terrorism softly
By Jane Harman
http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/07/10/fighting-terrorism-softly-opinion/
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Dolphin_Hunter on September 02, 2015, 08:49:59
I understand your point.  There is a time and place for soft power.   This is not one of them.

Could you imagine if we applied that theory to past conflicts?  We would still be waiting for Europe to fall.

These guys are barbarians, they are brutal, too brutal for western society to comprehend.   This is where I have a problem, because people like yourself come up with these great ideas, and they gain traction.  Not because it’s a great idea, but because the general population can’t fathom how another human being could be so violent.

ISIS/ISIL/Da’ish or whatever you want to call them, is a very brutal organization, they fear nothing.   The longer they stick around, the stronger they get, the longer the international community quibbles on how to deal with them, the stronger they get.

What we need is the world to come together and put this to bed, we all agree that they need to be stopped.  Russia, China, Iran, Turkey, U.S., and many others all agree this needs to stop, heck even the Taliban think they are too extreme.  If for a moment it would be nice if we could all work together to end this non-sense with ISIL, then we can focus on other issues (Turks vs Kurds, Syria, Ukraine).  We can’t solve all the problems at once, but if ISIL were to be relegated to a 4th line terrorist organization, it would make things easier over there.

To sit back and try to win this particular battle with soft power is a bad idea, of course this is my simple opinion.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Tuan on September 02, 2015, 10:56:01
I understand your point.  There is a time and place for soft power.   This is not one of them.

Could you imagine if we applied that theory to past conflicts?  We would still be waiting for Europe to fall.

These guys are barbarians, they are brutal, too brutal for western society to comprehend.   This is where I have a problem, because people like yourself come up with these great ideas, and they gain traction.  Not because it’s a great idea, but because the general population can’t fathom how another human being could be so violent.

ISIS/ISIL/Da’ish or whatever you want to call them, is a very brutal organization, they fear nothing.   The longer they stick around, the stronger they get, the longer the international community quibbles on how to deal with them, the stronger they get.

What we need is the world to come together and put this to bed, we all agree that they need to be stopped.  Russia, China, Iran, Turkey, U.S., and many others all agree this needs to stop, heck even the Taliban think they are too extreme.  If for a moment it would be nice if we could all work together to end this non-sense with ISIL, then we can focus on other issues (Turks vs Kurds, Syria, Ukraine).  We can’t solve all the problems at once, but if ISIL were to be relegated to a 4th line terrorist organization, it would make things easier over there.

To sit back and try to win this particular battle with soft power is a bad idea, of course this is my simple opinion.

I do agree with you that they are barbarians, but how many of them are voluntary ideologues and how many of them are coercively conscripted children? Do you think these kids have any idea what ISIS really wants? Or what even barbarian means? Did they have a choice? What did they do wrong when the option is do or die?

OTOH, according to a recent study on radicalization, Muslims in western countries struggle with identity issues and the majority white culture is hostile to the Islamic culture in those countries so they try to search for their belonging and join the extremists like ISIS

Contrary to the Muslims in western countries joining the ISIS, the non Muslim westerners themselves join ISIS, particularly because of broken home background who tend to be detached from the society, and make matters worse the report claims, the western popular culture such as youngsters who listen to rap music are increasingly becoming violent and join extremists.

Experts also warn that governments' anti-terror legislation could even play into hands of jihadists.

Therefore, we have to first and foremost fix our careless society from bottom up!

The Children of ISIS                                                   
http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/features/teenage-jihad-inside-the-world-of-american-kids-seduced-by-isis-20150325?page=5
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Tuan on September 02, 2015, 14:04:21
Quote
Let the refugees come out and settle them in other countries thereby showcasing the soft power of Canada/NATO rather than PM Harper’s hard power strategy which is bombing Iraq and Syria.

Quote from: Eye In The Sky
You're assuming the 'other countries' want these people, and you're assuming all of these people want 'out' as opposed to wanting a long-term solution that doesn't have them abandoning theirs homes and lives.

"you have to understand,
that no one puts their children in a boat
unless the water is safer than the land"


From a beautiful poem by Warsan Shire
http://zeyeon.tumblr.com/post/58052223804/home-warsan-shire
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Beadwindow 7 on September 02, 2015, 14:11:05
I know that you guys are being sarcastic but I am appalled by the fact that  you fail to grasp the significance of “soft power” in conflict resolution.

I'm a little surprised by your "appalment". And I would hold off on assuming that we fail to grasp the significance.

Soft power, if you want to call it that, has it's place. But it comes from a place of diplomacy, culture and history. Which is valid in certain circumstances, or as a part of an overall approach to conflict.

WE, however, are by the very nature of our mentality, training and employment PART of Hard power. We are not choosing which power to use, it has been chosen by the political masters.

The fact is the immediate threat requires the application of force. Soft Power wouldn't even be a speed bump to the aggressive and violent spread of "The Caliphate". you can use it to try to isolate the power base and the source of people and support, but that is very much a long-term, future problem.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Tuan on September 02, 2015, 15:00:29
Quote from:  Beadwindow 7
Soft power, if you want to call it that, has it's place. But it comes from a place of diplomacy, culture and history. Which is valid in certain circumstances, or as a part of an overall approach to conflict.

WE, however, are by the very nature of our mentality, training and employment PART of Hard power. We are not choosing which power to use, it has been chosen by the political masters.

If your political masters could successfully use the soft power to undermine the idea of communism, rather than hard power, why can’t they use the same soft power to undermine the idea of terrorism? I wonder if terrorists are more brutal than communists?
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: E.R. Campbell on September 02, 2015, 15:01:23
"you have to understand,
that no one puts their children in a boat
unless the water is safer than the land"


From a beautiful poem by Warsan Shire
http://zeyeon.tumblr.com/post/58052223804/home-warsan-shire


Refugees are, by definition, people who are:

     1. Fleeing their home in fear of life or limb; and

     2. Want, and fully intend to return to their homes as soon as the danger is removed.

People who are fleeing their homes, for whatever reason, and who want to settle somewhere new are migrants, not refugees.

It is wrong to settle refugees in far off, foreign lands, where they have little ability or, often, inclination to adapt. Refugees should be:

     First: Made safe ~ provided with shelter, food, medical care, schools and security, as close to their homes as is practical. This will put a HUGE strain on a few countries which are unfortunate enough to border conflict zones.

     Second: Able to see the international community deal with the threats/dangers which have made them into refugees. This is the real nature of R2P: the civilized, able, mature countries must ACT to change governments which abuse their
     own people: invade; overthrow the cruel, repressive, unrepresentative government; hang the leaders and their henchmen (and women); and, briefly, support new, better leaders.

     Third: Assisted in returning to their homes.

Bringing e.g. Syrian refugees to Canada or Denmark or Germany is unproductive, possibly even counter-productive. Some people in refugee camps will decide that home is no longer attractive; they will want to change their own status from refugee to migrant. Those who want to immigrate to Australia or Britain or Canada should fill out the forms just like all other potential immigrants and hope that they have the "points" they need, based on skill and knowledge and so on.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: George Wallace on September 02, 2015, 15:06:55

Refugees are, by definition, people who are:

     1. Fleeing their home in fear of life or limb; and

     2. Want, and fully intend to return to their homes as soon as the danger is removed.

People who are fleeing their homes, for whatever reason, and who want to settle somewhere new are migrants, not refugees.

It is wrong to settle refugees in far off, foreign lands, where they have little ability or, often, inclination to adapt. Refugees should be:

     First: Made safe ~ provided with shelter, food, medical care, schools and security, as close to their homes as is practical. This will put a HUGE strain on a few countries which are unfortunate enough to border conflict zones.

     Second: Able to see the international community deal with the threats/dangers which have made them into refugees. This is the real nature of R2P: the civilized, able, mature countries must ACT to change governments which abuse their
     own people: invade; overthrow the cruel, repressive, unrepresentative government; hang the leaders and their henchmen (and women); and, briefly, support new, better leaders.

     Third: Assisted in returning to their homes.

Bringing e.g. Syrian refugees to Canada or Denmark or Germany is unproductive, possibly even counter-productive. Some people in refugee camps will decide that home is no longer attractive; they will want to change their own status from refugee to migrant. Those who want to immigrate to Australia or Britain or Canada should fill out the forms just like all other potential immigrants and hope that they have the "points" they need, based on skill and knowledge and so on.

 :goodpost:

Very good points that seem to have been overlooked by the MSM.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: George Wallace on September 02, 2015, 15:09:35
If you could successfully use the soft power to undermine the idea of communism, rather than hard power, why can’t you use the same soft power to undermine the idea of terrorism? I wonder if terrorists are more brutal than communists?

I am now beginning to really question your thought processes. 
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: dapaterson on September 02, 2015, 15:19:37
Except it's never that simple.  If there's a lack of international will you end up with refugee camps serving as long-term means of housing people who wish to return but are unable to.  Is it practical to keep people in camps for generations, in the hope that someday they may be able to return?

Even post-war, the facts on the ground may prevent restoration of the status quo ante bellum; Israel was settled by many who legally could return to their pre-war homes, but who risked injury or death to assert those rights.

Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Tuan on September 02, 2015, 15:33:02
I am now beginning to really question your thought processes.

Did I say something wrong, Sir?
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Colin P on September 02, 2015, 16:08:22
If your political masters could successfully use the soft power to undermine the idea of communism, rather than hard power, why can’t they use the same soft power to undermine the idea of terrorism? I wonder if terrorists are more brutal than communists?

soft power? No we used proxy wars, physical confrontations, occasional killings and the outright threat of nuclear war and we had significant forces on land, sea and air on standby to fight their significant forces. It was a stare down with a very real possibility of a no-win gunfight at any time. The big factor on the other side is that the USSR had suffered heavily in people losses in WWII and there was a rational desire not to commit suicide, just as we had no desire to commit suicide. For the hardcore centre of ISIS, death is liberation to a better life. 
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: E.R. Campbell on September 02, 2015, 16:13:17
Except it's never that simple.  If there's a lack of international will you end up with refugee camps serving as long-term means of housing people who wish to return but are unable to.  Is it practical to keep people in camps for generations, in the hope that someday they may be able to return?

Even post-war, the facts on the ground may prevent restoration of the status quo ante bellum; Israel was settled by many who legally could return to their pre-war homes, but who risked injury or death to assert those rights.


The Arab/Israeli conflict and the plight of the Palestinian regugees is a classic example of that lack of will.

The Arabs, considering, as they do, that Israel illegally expelled the Palestinian-Arabs,* should have attacked Israel, again and again ~ which they did, to their credit, and they should have won ... failing that, as they have done, again and again and again, they should have done something, almost anything for the Palestinian refugees: almost anything other than use them as pawns in a propaganda war.

     (An old mentor of mine, a Brit with looooooong service in the Middle East told me, over a few points, that "the Palestinians are the Jews of Arabia." he was complementing the Palestinians because, as he explained,
      they are the best educated, most entrepreneurial, most family oriented, most sophisticated of ALL the Arabs. They are also, he explained, despised by the Saudis and Syrians, Iraqis and Gulf Arabs, and so on as "town Arabs" by people who worship
      a nomadic lifestyle that none of them live anymore. The Palestinians are the doctors and engineers and accountants and small business owners and plant managers and lawyers, bankers and teachers throughout the region and across North Africa
      ~ needed and hated in equal measure.)

The Palestinians deserve better, but they put their faith in the wrong people: their brother Arabs. The Palestinians need to rise up and overthrow one or two governments ~ Syria might be ripe for the taking ~ and start a new Palestinian state. They, themselves, cannot bring Israel down and the Arabs are too frightened, too disorganized, too corrupt and too divided amongst themselves to help.

_____
* There is no doubt that some Arabs were expelled, improperly, at least, if not downright illegally. How many is open for debate. Equally there is no doubt that the Absentee Property Laws effectively expropriated Arab property without payment.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: E.R. Campbell on September 02, 2015, 16:24:28
soft power? No we used proxy wars, physical confrontations, occasional killings and the outright threat of nuclear war and we had significant forces on land, sea and air on standby to fight their significant forces. It was a stare down with a very real possibility of a no-win gunfight at any time. The big factor on the other side is that the USSR had suffered heavily in people losses in WWII and there was a rational desire not to commit suicide, just as we had no desire to commit suicide. For the hardcore centre of ISIS, death is liberation to a better life.


Actually, there was a significant, organized, conscious soft power campaign against the USSR and China, specifically, and against communism in general, that was started, in the late 1940s, by US President Truman and which continued, strongly, under President Eisenhower and, less strongly, certainly far less coherently, under Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter and Reagan. It involved not only government agencies like VOA and AID but, far more significantly (and requiring delicate management) American business and the arts, e.g: GE, GM and Coca Cola; Pan Am, Diners Club and Holiday Inn; and, esecially Disney, MGM, Ella Fitzgerald and Louis Armstrong. It was damned effective, too ~ arguably worth more than NATO.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Tuan on September 02, 2015, 16:36:44

Actually, there was a significant, organized, conscious soft power campaign against the USSR and China, specifically, and against communism in general, that was started, in the late 1940s, by US President Truman and which continued, strongly, under President Eisenhower and, less strongly, certainly far less coherently, under Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter and Reagan. It involved not only government agencies like VOA and AID but, far more significantly (and requiring delicate management) American business and the arts, e.g: GE, GM and Coca Cola; Pan Am, Diners Club and Holiday Inn; and, esecially Disney, MGM, Ella Fitzgerald and Louis Armstrong. It was damned effective, too ~ arguably worth more than NATO.

Thank you for the corroboration! How about rock and roll?

For young Soviets, the Beatles were a first, mutinous rip in the iron curtain
http://www.theguardian.com/music/2013/apr/20/beatles-soviet-union-first-rip-iron-curtain
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Good2Golf on September 02, 2015, 16:43:44
Thanks for the lecture, Tuan. 

My sarcasm is based on nearly a third of a century of service including a year-long tour embedded in a developing country's government exercising 'soft power' to help build their government's capacity.  I'm pretty sure that they appreciated my and my Canadian comrades' 'soft power', but thanks, I'll consider your advice the next time I'm deployed in a manner that supports Canada's use of soft power.

Regards
G2G
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on September 02, 2015, 17:36:10
Tuan,

The MESF is not an occupying force, they are assisting the GOI in their efforts against ISIS (to the best of my knowledge, unless I really missed something important...) and therefore, IMO, the 'winning the hearts and minds' part is a battle between the GOI and ISIS.

The MESF has to ensure they, because they are linked to the GOI, do not do anything to make that battle harder for the GOI.

My quick summary from the oar-puller perspective.


WRT the application of soft power.  What makes you think that this is not happening?? 
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Acorn on September 02, 2015, 17:44:37

The Arab/Israeli conflict and the plight of the Palestinian regugees is a classic example of that lack of will.

Probably the leading example, as you say. Palestinian refugee "camps" in Lebanon and (those not destroyed) in Syria are very permanent villages.

Other refugees that never returned include the Vietnamese Boat People though, which we welcomed, and integrated, knowing full well even if they could eventually go back it was going to be generations. One could argue there was a certain amount of Western responsibility to them, but large numbers were accepted into Britain and Canada, neither of which ranked among supporters of the US-led war.

Or the Lebanese, many of whom did go back after Taif, though they keep their Canadian passports (since we did offer them citizenship), knowing how volatile the region is. Of course we now just despise them as "Canadians of convenience."

All too often these days refugees become migrants.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: E.R. Campbell on September 02, 2015, 18:29:19
Probably the leading example, as you say. Palestinian refugee "camps" in Lebanon and (those not destroyed) in Syria are very permanent villages.

Other refugees that never returned include the Vietnamese Boat People though, which we welcomed, and integrated, knowing full well even if they could eventually go back it was going to be generations. One could argue there was a certain amount of Western responsibility to them, but large numbers were accepted into Britain and Canada, neither of which ranked among supporters of the US-led war.

Or the Lebanese, many of whom did go back after Taif, though they keep their Canadian passports (since we did offer them citizenship), knowing how volatile the region is. Of course we now just despise them as "Canadians of convenience."

All too often these days refugees become migrants.


A great example of doing the (mostly) right thing ~ accepting (mostly) sophisticated, hard working, adaptable people as immigrants ~ for the wrong reason: as refugees.

I agree they were refugees, many had been in Hong Kong camps, in poor conditions, but better than the Arabs and the UN provide for the Palestinians (yes, I've been in some of those camps), and others were, literally snatched from the ocean by ships. But we, and other Western nations, should have had (should have right now) well targeted immigration programmes that would have seen East Asians as "right," and many other socio-cultural (ethnic) groups as "wrong" for immigration. I could, even, make a weak argument that, given the geography (including the human geography) of East Asia, settling Vietnamese refugees in Australia and North America makes some sense.

But, essentially, we were lucky: the Vietnamese refugees were, concomitantly, excellent immigrants, too; ditto the South Asians from  Uganda in 1972 and the Czechs in 1968; we were not so lucky with other refugees. It's NOT the refugees' fault that they are unprepared to make their ways in Canada ... they're glad to be here, but (culturally) unprepared to prosper here.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Haggis on September 02, 2015, 19:27:39
I'm sure this article (http://www.macleans.ca/news/world/the-foggy-war-where-is-canada-in-the-fight-against-islamic-state/) from MacLean's, shared with the usual disclaimers, will cause some political leaders to question our future there.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: crowbag on September 02, 2015, 19:42:23
"In central Iraq, that targeting has been spotty: The only viable local forces are Shia militias aligned with Iran, and co-operating with them is a geopolitical minefield."

"As much as Canadians want to be part of the action against Islamic State, the reality is that Canada is wading into a complex, fractured and unpredictable landscape. There is no satisfying endgame in sight."

Great piece - unfortunately Harper et al prefer to paint the situation as pretty straightforward - I guess in an election year ya gotta do what ya gotta do right?
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Sheep Dog AT on September 02, 2015, 19:53:53
Kurds have better kit then us. Maybe we should sit this one out.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: E.R. Campbell on September 02, 2015, 20:27:11

Refugees are, by definition, people who are:

     1. Fleeing their home in fear of life or limb; and

     2. Want, and fully intend to return to their homes as soon as the danger is removed.

People who are fleeing their homes, for whatever reason, and who want to settle somewhere new are migrants, not refugees.

It is wrong to settle refugees in far off, foreign lands, where they have little ability or, often, inclination to adapt. Refugees should be:

     First: Made safe ~ provided with shelter, food, medical care, schools and security, as close to their homes as is practical. This will put a HUGE strain on a few countries which are unfortunate enough to border conflict zones.

     Second: Able to see the international community deal with the threats/dangers which have made them into refugees. This is the real nature of R2P: the civilized, able, mature countries must ACT to change governments which abuse their
     own people: invade; overthrow the cruel, repressive, unrepresentative government; hang the leaders and their henchmen (and women); and, briefly, support new, better leaders.

     Third: Assisted in returning to their homes.

Bringing e.g. Syrian refugees to Canada or Denmark or Germany is unproductive, possibly even counter-productive. Some people in refugee camps will decide that home is no longer attractive; they will want to change their own status from refugee to migrant. Those who want to immigrate to Australia or Britain or Canada should fill out the forms just like all other potential immigrants and hope that they have the "points" they need, based on skill and knowledge and so on.


Here is the problem for Syrian refugees:

               (https://image-store.slidesharecdn.com/e4157636-ea4c-4641-abbd-e7344fdb9214-original.jpeg)

This image is circulating on social media, now ...

              (https://image-store.slidesharecdn.com/cc8ce86d-ddc5-49fa-aac7-6682efed305d-original.jpeg)

You know, I almost hope IS** does well ... well enough to invade Saudi Arabia and string up every f'ing member of the House of Saud and all their friends and relatives in the region from every f'ing lamp-post in the f'ing country.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Tuan on September 02, 2015, 20:37:55


You know, I almost hope IS** does well ... well enough to invade Saudi Arabia and string up every f'ing member of the House of Saud and all their friends and relatives in the region from every f'ing lamp-post in the f'ing country.

LOL  :D
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Tuan on September 02, 2015, 20:41:16
Quote from: crowbag
Alright lads, good cam and concealment, but the ******* Brigadier is coming to visit so take the ganja off your helmets NOW!

 :o
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on September 02, 2015, 23:13:08
I'm sure this article (http://www.macleans.ca/news/world/the-foggy-war-where-is-canada-in-the-fight-against-islamic-state/) from MacLean's, shared with the usual disclaimers, will cause some political leaders to question our future there.

Here is a more accurate account of Canadian airstrikes since the op launched last fall.  Maybe that article author should spend some time reading.

http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad-current/op-impact-airstrikes.page
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Tuan on September 03, 2015, 10:51:28
Thank you Rosemary Barton for keeping Chris Alexander in check....
http://www.cbc.ca/player/News/Politics/ID/2674869415/
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Acorn on September 03, 2015, 15:55:16
You know, I almost hope IS** does well ... well enough to invade Saudi Arabia and string up every f'ing member of the House of Saud and all their friends and relatives in the region from every f'ing lamp-post in the f'ing country.

Frankly I'd rather see our own governments face down the house of Saud and tell them what they can do with their oil. I'd rather see IS as a red mist and the Saudis treated like South Africa was in the '80s (at least).

Even if the Saudis (and inclue the other Gulf States) were inclined to accept regional refugees for anything other than cheap labour it's not exactly a popular destination. Limited livable space, limited opportunities for work and a hostile population are one reason Iraqi and Syrian refugees are heading in other directions. Jordan doesn't have much capacity anymore, and Turkey already has over 2 million living in appalling conditions. Plus the dead boy was a Kurd - is it any wonder his family risked all to get elsewhere.

I think I see a subtext in your earlier post that the people of the Middle East are somehow less desirable as immigrants than the 250,000 Southeast Asians we took in in the '80s. I doubt we can count education as a problem area - Levantine Arabs number amongst the best educated. I suppose we could return to the Christians Only policy that saw our Lebanese community grow prior to WWII - that's what Hungary is demanding should the EU finally get their collective thumbs out and figure out how to deal with a very unbalanced influx.

Yes, maybe the Arabs of the region should pick up more of the load. But perhaps "humanity" has no place in decision making of this sort?

Or maybe I spent far too much time in the ME, and went native, so it's colouring my view of the situation?

 
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: crowbag on September 03, 2015, 16:07:05

Here is a more accurate account of Canadian airstrikes since the op launched last fall.  Maybe that article author should spend some time reading.

http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad-current/op-impact-airstrikes.page

Fair enough - the main point still holds strong though:

"...the reality is that Canada is wading into a complex, fractured and unpredictable landscape. There is no satisfying endgame in sight."

Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: E.R. Campbell on September 03, 2015, 16:18:34
Frankly I'd rather see our own governments face down the house of Saud and tell them what they can do with their oil. I'd rather see IS as a red mist and the Saudis treated like South Africa was in the '80s (at least).

Even if the Saudis (and inclue the other Gulf States) were inclined to accept regional refugees for anything other than cheap labour it's not exactly a popular destination. Limited livable space, limited opportunities for work and a hostile population are one reason Iraqi and Syrian refugees are heading in other directions. Jordan doesn't have much capacity anymore, and Turkey already has over 2 million living in appalling conditions. Plus the dead boy was a Kurd - is it any wonder his family risked all to get elsewhere.

I think I see a subtext in your earlier post that the people of the Middle East are somehow less desirable as immigrants than the 250,000 Southeast Asians we took in in the '80s. I doubt we can count education as a problem area - Levantine Arabs number amongst the best educated. I suppose we could return to the Christians Only policy that saw our Lebanese community grow prior to WWII - that's what Hungary is demanding should the EU finally get their collective thumbs out and figure out how to deal with a very unbalanced influx.

Yes, maybe the Arabs of the region should pick up more of the load. But perhaps "humanity" has no place in decision making of this sort?

Or maybe I spent far too much time in the ME, and went native, so it's colouring my view of the situation?


I suppose you do. My own, personal (and very limited) experience is that my (few) Arab (Egyptian, Iraqi, Syrian and Lebanese (Christian and Muslim) colleagues (mostly in the radio/telecomm engineering world) were excellent people, great immigrants and a real asset to Canada ~ very well educated, in many cases, and (universally, I think) eager to leave the Middle East for socio-economic and political reasons. On a slightly lower scale, ditto for my neighbour the Arab convenience store owner who is doing a great job raising two sons to be good, hard working, well educated, productive (and, it appears to me, happy Canadians ~ happy to be Canadian). Not the same, evidently, for many Arabs (just a minority, I suppose) who have come to Canada and cannot manage to adapt to a modern, sophisticated, Western/multi-cultural lifestyle and have become drains on both our social welfare and criminal justice systems.

Are there no Chinese and Vietnamese criminals? You bet your life there are: and they're a cruel and vicious lot, too. :nod:

But, my personal experience is that my East and South Asian colleagues and friends seemed to have fewer community problems than my Arab/Middle Eastern colleagues; one of my Arab-Canadian friends told us that he had withdrawn almost completely from any Islamic community organizations, cutting himself off from some of his own famiuly: he has three daughters and he explained that they could not grow to their full human potential if they were exposed to the influences of mosques and community organizations. I don't recall any of our Chinese or Indian colleagues saying anything similar, ever, not even about Hindu-Sikh problems.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Baden Guy on September 03, 2015, 16:48:44
The Last Neocon

"Canada's Prime Minister Stephen Harper has been a hawk since the days of W. His looming defeat could finally mean an end to one of the most controversial foreign-policy eras in recent history."

Interesting take on PM Harper:

http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/02/the-last-neocon-canadas-stephen-harper/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=New%20Campaign&utm_term=%2AEditors%20Picks
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Tuan on September 03, 2015, 18:20:32

I suppose you do. My own, personal (and very limited) experience is that my (few) Arab (Egyptian, Iraqi, Syrian and Lebanese (Christian and Muslim) colleagues (mostly in the radio/telecomm engineering world) were excellent people, great immigrants and a real asset to Canada ~ very well educated, in many cases, and (universally, I think) eager to leave the Middle East for socio-economic and political reasons. On a slightly lower scale, ditto for my neighbour the Arab convenience store owner who is doing a great job raising two sons to be good, hard working, well educated, productive (and, it appears to me, happy Canadians ~ happy to be Canadian). Not the same, evidently, for many Arabs (just a minority, I suppose) who have come to Canada and cannot manage to adapt to a modern, sophisticated, Western/multi-cultural lifestyle and have become drains on both our social welfare and criminal justice systems.

Are there no Chinese and Vietnamese criminals? You bet your life there are: and they're a cruel and vicious lot, too. :nod:

But, my personal experience is that my East and South Asian colleagues and friends seemed to have fewer community problems than my Arab/Middle Eastern colleagues; one of my Arab-Canadian friends told us that he had withdrawn almost completely from any Islamic community organizations, cutting himself off from some of his own famiuly: he has three daughters and he explained that they could not grow to their full human potential if they were exposed to the influences of mosques and community organizations. I don't recall any of our Chinese or Indian colleagues saying anything similar, ever, not even about Hindu-Sikh problems.

In light of the recent, and ever-present, refugee debate in Canada, I would like Campbell's take on the Sri Lankan Tamil boat people:

Has Canada seen the last of the boat people?
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/has-canada-seen-the-last-of-the-boat-people/article21153005/
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Tuan on September 03, 2015, 18:34:48
Fair enough - the main point still holds strong though:

"...the reality is that Canada is wading into a complex, fractured and unpredictable landscape. There is no satisfying endgame in sight."

AFAIC, Canada's end game in Op IMPACT would be rethinking strategy once the Liberals win the election on Oct19.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Chris Pook on September 03, 2015, 18:40:01
Re: Refugees and Immigrants.

As an immigrant myself I do not want people coming here out of fear and desperation.  I want willing volunteers to help this country grow and sustain the lifestyle we enjoy.   Fear and despair breed resentment.

Immigrants should be welcomed. 

Refugees are a necessary evil. 

The suitable response when someone is driven out of their home is to get them back into their home as quickly as possible. 
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Retired AF Guy on September 03, 2015, 20:47:59
From Thursday copy of the National Post. Re-printed under the usual provisions of the Copyright Act:

Quote
Canada is watching Syria die

Terry Glavin | September 2, 2015 | Last Updated: Sep 3 8:36 AM ET

“The worst part of it is the feeling that we don’t have any allies,” Montreal’s Faisal Alazem, the tireless 32-year-old campaigner for the Syrian-Canadian Council, told me the other day. “That is what people in the Syrian community are feeling.”

There are feelings of deep gratitude for having been welcomed into Canada, Alazem said. But with their homeland being reduced to an apocalyptic nightmare — the barrel-bombing of Aleppo and Homs, the beheadings of university professors, the demolition of Palmyra’s ancient temples — among Syrian-Canadians, there is also an unquenchable sorrow.

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s genocidal regime clings to power in Damascus and the jihadist psychopaths of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) are ascendant almost everywhere else. The one thing the democratic opposition wanted from the world was a no-fly zone and air-patrolled humanitarian corridors. Even that was too much to ask. There is no going home now.

But among Syrian-Canadians, the worst thing of all, Alazem said, is a suffocating feeling of solitude and betrayal. “In the Western countries, the civil society groups — it’s not just their inaction, they fight you as well,” he said. “They are crying crocodile tears about refugees now, but they have played the biggest role in throwing lifelines to the regime. And so I have to say to them, this is the reality, this is the result of all your anti-war activism, and now the people are drowning in the sea.”

Drowning in the sea: a little boy, no more than five-years-old, in a red T-shirt and shorts, found face-down in the surf. The toddler was among 11 corpses that washed up on a Turkish beach Tuesday. Last Friday, as many as 200 refugees drowned when the fishing boat they were being smuggled in capsized off the Libyan coast. At least 2,500 people, most of them Syrians, have drowned in this way in the Mediterranean already this year.

A year ago this week, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry emerged from a gathering on the sidelines of the NATO summit in Wales with commitments from nine NATO countries, including Canada, to join in a military effort to “degrade and ultimately destroy” ISIL. A few days after that Sept. 4, 2014, huddle, a half-dozen Arab states signed up. At least a dozen other countries are now also contributing in one way or another.

To say the American-led coalition effort has failed to stop the war in Syria would be true enough. It would also be disingenuous, for two reasons. The first is that to have allowed ISIL to expand the scope of its rampages would have meant war without precedent in 1,000 years of the Middle East’s bloody history. The second and most important is that the Obama administration never had any intention of stopping the war in the first place.

Assad, the Iranian ayatollahs’ Syrian proxy, has been allowed to persist in his relentless bombing of Syria’s cities and his dispatching of Shabiha and Hezbollah death squads. Assad has been allowed to violate Obama’s allegedly genius chemical-weapons pact as well, dozens of times. It is the toll from Assad’s war, not ISIL’s atrocities, that is the thing to notice: perhaps seven of every eight Syrian deaths (at least a quarter of a million people so far), almost all of Syria’s seven million “internally displaced” innocents and the overwhelming majority of the four million Syrian refugees who have fled the country.

The enormity of the Syrian catastrophe is at least partly what makes the tragedy so difficult to comprehend, but in Canada there is an added encumbrance. It is the delicate sensibilities of established opinion that require diplomacy to be privileged as an unimpeachable virtue and further require the United Nations to be understood as the sole means by which disasters of the Syrian kind are prevented, or at least resolved.

It makes no difference that no less an authority than António Guterres, the UN high commissioner for refugees, attributes Syria’s agonies primarily to a failure of diplomacy, or that the UN’s governing Security Council is a hostage of Russia’s Vladimir Putin and China’s Xi Jinping, or that the UN’s refugee budget is running well below the half-way mark — $5.6 billion — for Syrian refugees. Funding is already two-thirds shy of anticipated refugee costs for 2015. The World Food Program has been rolling back its refugee food allowances year after year and in the coming weeks, more than 200,000 of the most desperate Syrian refugees are having their aid cut off entirely.

With their homeland being reduced to an apocalyptic nightmare, among Syrian-Canadians, there is also an unquenchable sorrow
In Geneva, the International Organization for Migration reckons that about 237,000 people have set out across the Mediterranean in rickety ships headed for Europe this year, a number already exceeding last year’s total figure of 219,000. The main cohort consists of Syrian refugees, the largest refugee population on Earth. Europe is now facing a refugee crisis unlike anything since the Second World War.

In the Canadian context, the only comparable event is Black September, 1847, the darkest hour of the Irish famine, when roughly 100,000 mostly Irish refugees arrived in the Saint Lawrence River in dozens of coffin ships. Roughly 17,500 Irish drowned that year, or died on board ship, or in the fever sheds on the quarantine island of Gross Isle. The Syrians are the famine Irish of 21st century.

There’s another illustrative comparison worth making. Canada has settled roughly 20,000 Iraqi refugees since 2009 and last January, the Conservative government committed to taking in 10,000 Syrian refugees, on top of 1,300 welcomed in 2014. Last month, Prime Minister Stephen Harper promised that another 10,000 Syrians and Iraqis would be added to the mix. Here’s the contrast: the kinder, gentler Obama administration has allowed only about 1,500 Syrian refugees to settle in the United States over the past four years.

Harper is right when he says the New Democratic Party’s approach to the Syrian catastrophe amounts to little more than “dropping aid on dead people.” The NDP is right when it points out the inordinately obtuse and incoherent accounting of just how many Syrian refugees have actually arrived in Canada. The Liberals are right, too, in their call to expedite family reunification visas, show more generosity and cooperation in private-sponsorship efforts, reduce processing times and allow Syrians on temporary visas to extend their stays in Canada and acquire citizenship.

But what we are all doing — Conservatives, Liberals and New Democrats, Americans, Canadians, and all the dominant elites of the United Nations and the NATO countries that cleave to that sophisticated indifference known in polite company as anti-interventionism — is a very straightforward thing. We are watching Syria die. We are allowing it to happen. And if you can comprehend that, you will know something of the sorrow that afflicts Faisal Alazem and all those other Syrian-Canadians these days.

National Post

 Article Link (http://news.nationalpost.com/full-comment/terry-glavin-the-tears-of-syria)
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on September 03, 2015, 22:40:35
Fair enough - the main point still holds strong though:

"...the reality is that Canada is wading into a complex, fractured and unpredictable landscape. There is no satisfying endgame in sight."

So, if it's hard or difficult, leave it for someone else?  Imagine if the world continued to do that in say, 1939ish...would have been a great ending no?

If we pull out of the MESF now, how long will it be before the Liberals and NDP are yacking that the Conservatives are 'doing nothing and letting innocent people die"? 

Point - no matter what the PM and government do, the Liberals and NDP will say it is wrong and not enough.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on September 03, 2015, 22:45:01
AFAIC, Canada's end game in Op IMPACT would be rethinking strategy once the Liberals win the election on Oct19.

You aren't seeming to get it.  Canada can have all the 'strategy' revamped by the Liberals IF they win an election.  It will only (maybe) change a few things, Canada is NOT...NOT driving the big happy MESF bus.  We have a seat on the bus, if we don't like the way they bus is going we have the choice to get off, or stay.  The Coach Master is the GOI.

PS - this is an OP Impact thread, not a Sri Lanka thread.   :2c:
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: jollyjacktar on September 04, 2015, 06:29:17
So, if it's hard or difficult, leave it for someone else?  Imagine if the world continued to do that in say, 1939ish...would have been a great ending no?

If we pull out of the MESF now, how long will it be before the Liberals and NDP are yacking that the Conservatives are 'doing nothing and letting innocent people die"? 

Point - no matter what the PM and government do, the Liberals and NDP will say it is wrong and not enough.

I'm just waiting for the day JT starts claiming that we should have been and he would be dropping life jackets in addition to parkas.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Good2Golf on September 04, 2015, 08:51:19
The image of 3-year old Kurdi is heart-wrenching.

If a building were on fire you could either focus your attention on having the fire-fighters hold out rescue nets for people to jump into to escape the flames, or the fire-fighters could focus their efforts at putting out the flames at their source.

Helping immigrants cross the Mediterrainean is the former.  Canada, wrongly in the eyes of many, has currently chosen the latter.  I agree with the latter, but do consider that elements of the former could be done better.

The problem with not fighting the fire at its source is that the fire will tend to increase in size and endanger other buildings and risk more people's lives. 

In the end, we as a Nation deserve whichever government we chose to elect in six weeks' time.

I have little confidence the the Liberal or NDP plan to withdraw from direct action at the source of The Da'esh's flames will decrease the human suffering of Syrian and Iraqi refugees...

G2G
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Tuan on September 04, 2015, 10:49:31
You aren't seeming to get it.  Canada can have all the 'strategy' revamped by the Liberals IF they win an election.  It will only (maybe) change a few things, Canada is NOT...NOT driving the big happy MESF bus.  We have a seat on the bus, if we don't like the way they bus is going we have the choice to get off, or stay.  The Coach Master is the GOI.

Again, the current strategy isn’t working so we need to revamp it. As I've already mentioned here, we should be keep removing the ideologues/leaders of the ISIS, the (cephalothorax) of the spider, but it seems like MESF is committed to fighting with its legs. Wonder how many ISIS leaders have you removed so far? And I don’t buy your crap that GOI is the so-called “coach master”. Why don’t you tell them that beggars can't be choosers?

Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: George Wallace on September 04, 2015, 11:03:18
........ Wonder how many ISIS leaders have you removed so far? ............

Several.  It takes time to track and identify the leadership of IS, but with dedication and hard work, it is being done.  If you for some reason think it is a simple matter, then you are truly naive.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Humphrey Bogart on September 04, 2015, 11:25:08
Again, the current strategy isn’t working so we need to revamp it. As I've already mentioned here, we should be keep removing the ideologues/leaders of the ISIS, the (cephalothorax) of the spider, but it seems like MESF is committed to fighting with its legs. Wonder how many ISIS leaders have you removed so far? And I don’t buy your crap that GOI is the so-called “coach master”. Why don’t you tell them that beggars can't be choosers?

Official: local ISIS leader killed in western Mosul
http://rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/030920151 (http://rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/030920151)

No. 2 ISIS leader killed by air strike in Iraq, White House says
http://www.ctvnews.ca/world/no-2-isis-leader-killed-by-air-strike-in-iraq-white-house-says-1.2527880 (http://www.ctvnews.ca/world/no-2-isis-leader-killed-by-air-strike-in-iraq-white-house-says-1.2527880)

http://www.scmagazine.com/isis-hacking-leader-killed-by-drone-strike/article/435372/
http://www.scmagazine.com/isis-hacking-leader-killed-by-drone-strike/article/435372/ (http://www.scmagazine.com/isis-hacking-leader-killed-by-drone-strike/article/435372/)

Afghan agency: ISIS leader killed in drone strike
http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/11/asia/isis-leader-killed-afghanistan/ (http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/11/asia/isis-leader-killed-afghanistan/)

SAS go into Syria to kill ISIS chief: UK 'boots on the ground' for ferocious joint US gunbattle that killed terror financier Abu Sayaff
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3190731/SAS-Syria-kill-chief-UK-boots-ground-ferocious-joint-gunbattle-killed-terror-financier-Abu-Sayaff.html (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3190731/SAS-Syria-kill-chief-UK-boots-ground-ferocious-joint-gunbattle-killed-terror-financier-Abu-Sayaff.html)

This is just in the past few weeks.  You sound like the typical 24 year old, political science student who probably still lives in his Mom's basement, but has all the answers  ::).  You come on here and argue with a bunch of career soldiers, many of whom have extensive experience operating in many of the worlds worst places conducting all sorts of different missions (disaster response, peacekeeping and warfighting). 

Why do you think the current strategy isn't working?  What sort of actual evidence do you have to back that sort of statement up or is this just your opinion?  Do you even know what the current strategy is?


The image of 3-year old Kurdi is heart-wrenching.

If a building were on fire you could either focus your attention on having the fire-fighters hold out rescue nets for people to jump into to escape the flames, or the fire-fighters could focus their efforts at putting out the flames at their source.

Helping immigrants cross the Mediterrainean is the former.  Canada, wrongly in the eyes of many, has currently chosen the latter.  I agree with the latter, but do consider that elements of the former could be done better.

The problem with not fighting the fire at its source is that the fire will tend to increase in size and endanger other buildings and risk more people's lives. 

In the end, we as a Nation deserve whichever government we chose to elect in six weeks' time.

I have little confidence the the Liberal or NDP plan to withdraw from direct action at the source of The Da'esh's flames will decrease the human suffering of Syrian and Iraqi refugees...

G2G

You know the worst part about this G2G?  The kid that drowned is Kurdish, aka the one group of people the Canadian government is actually trying to support!  Probably the only group over there that deserves any sort of support. 
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Dolphin_Hunter on September 04, 2015, 11:34:10
And I don’t buy your crap that GOI is the so-called “coach master”. Why don’t you tell them that beggars can't be choosers?

You are kidding right?  Look, the Government of Iraq is playing a huge part in running the show, you'd be surprised how much control they have (after all it is their country), MESF is responding to a request from them (Iraq).  This is unlike the war a few years ago where the US just showed up and started kicking ***.

This is not going to happen overnight, I will also point out that our current strategy has worked as the advance was halted.  I can't sit here and magically give every ISF soldier in Iraq Abu Azrael  sized balls, but in all honesty that's what they need, they are fighting an enemy who has no fear.   Which is why they are capable of over running towns with 12 guys, one side has fear, one does not (my opinion).



Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Humphrey Bogart on September 04, 2015, 11:41:36
You are kidding right?  Look, the Government of Iraq is playing a huge part in running the show, you'd be surprised how much control they have (after all it is their country), MESF is responding to a request from them (Iraq).  This is unlike the war a few years ago where the US just showed up and started kicking ***.

This is not going to happen overnight, I will also point out that our current strategy has worked as the advance was halted.  I can't sit here and magically give every ISF soldier in Iraq Abu Azrael  sized balls, but in all honesty that's what they need, they are fighting an enemy who has no fear.   Which is why they are capable of over running towns with 12 guys, one side has fear, one does not (my opinion).

Something tells me DH that Tuan only believes what he wants to hear.  Trying to explain to him how a multi-national military operation actually works is probably a waste of effort.

http://www.france24.com/en/20150828-video-reporter-embedded-with-french-troops-sahel-desert?ns_campaign=reseaux_sociaux&ns_source=twitter&ns_mchannel=social&ns_linkname=editorial&aef_campaign_ref=partage_aef&aef_campaign_date=2015-08-27&dlvrit=66745 (http://www.france24.com/en/20150828-video-reporter-embedded-with-french-troops-sahel-desert?ns_campaign=reseaux_sociaux&ns_source=twitter&ns_mchannel=social&ns_linkname=editorial&aef_campaign_ref=partage_aef&aef_campaign_date=2015-08-27&dlvrit=66745)

Linked is a video of French soldiers working with Nigerien soldiers in the Sahel.  Watch in Tuan, maybe you'll learn something?
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Tuan on September 04, 2015, 11:57:03
According to reports, so far Abu Hussain the hacker of ISIS, Haji Mutazz the deputy of ISIS and Junaid Hussain the recruiter of the ISIS have been removed, which is significance.

I know it is NOT an easy task; it needs meticulous planning, painstaking preparation and accurate and effective execution. That’s why I said, “intelligence is the capital” in counterterrorism operations. In order to acquire complete picture of the ISIS we have to engineer a defection within ISIS. A few renegades, so “ponder the improbable” instead of attacking me, will ya?

Moreover, this is an open forum thus, for OPSEC/PERSEC reasons I won’t discuss further details here, follow me? I don’t know the ROE, TOE, TTP and so on because I am an average Canadian who is projecting ideas from OSINT. However if you take me in I will tell y’all what to do. Period.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Remius on September 04, 2015, 12:06:17
Moreover, this is an open forum thus, for OPSEC/PERSEC reasons I won’t discuss further details here, follow me? I don’t know the ROE, TOE, TTP and so on because I am an average Canadian who is projecting ideas from OSINT. However if you take me in I will tell y’all what to do. Period.

 ???
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Humphrey Bogart on September 04, 2015, 12:15:56
???

This guy is borderline troll material
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Good2Golf on September 04, 2015, 13:52:39
...However if you take me in I will tell y’all what to do. Period.

As with all of us, you're passing on your opinion on the internet...then again, you seem to know so much, that maybe the PM should have you replace Mr. Fadden, as the National Security Advisor.

Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Scott on September 04, 2015, 14:04:37
According to reports, so far Abu Hussain the hacker of ISIS, Haji Mutazz the deputy of ISIS and Junaid Hussain the recruiter of the ISIS have been removed, which is significance.

I know it is NOT an easy task; it needs meticulous planning, painstaking preparation and accurate and effective execution. That’s why I said, “intelligence is the capital” in counterterrorism operations. In order to acquire complete picture of the ISIS we have to engineer a defection within ISIS. A few renegades, so “ponder the improbable” instead of attacking me, will ya?

Moreover, this is an open forum thus, for OPSEC/PERSEC reasons I won’t discuss further details here, follow me? I don’t know the ROE, TOE, TTP and so on because I am an average Canadian who is projecting ideas from OSINT. However if you take me in I will tell y’all what to do. Period.

Your credibility is in a nosedive now, buds.

Go and read a little bit on here about this sort of approach and how it's fared in the past.

Scott
Staff
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Tuan on September 04, 2015, 16:11:32
Just the other day, I watched the movie “Thirteen Days” and pondered and wondered how far the United States came from the Cuban missile crisis to the fall of Soviet Union.

The point is the world is between conformist and non-conformists. Liberals and Realists. Realists believe might is right, but intelligence says knowledge is power, another word for might, so there is always a chance for a small man to make a big difference, after all it took a small child to inform the mighty King that he was naked  ;)
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Good2Golf on September 04, 2015, 16:21:57
Oh, I get it...you're going for the Internet Troll of the Year Award. 
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Acorn on September 04, 2015, 17:13:52
But, my personal experience is that my East and South Asian colleagues and friends seemed to have fewer community problems than my Arab/Middle Eastern colleagues; one of my Arab-Canadian friends told us that he had withdrawn almost completely from any Islamic community organizations, cutting himself off from some of his own famiuly: he has three daughters and he explained that they could not grow to their full human potential if they were exposed to the influences of mosques and community organizations. I don't recall any of our Chinese or Indian colleagues saying anything similar, ever, not even about Hindu-Sikh problems.

What you describe is a troubling aspect of how some Islamic organizations have evolved. Islam is due for a Reformation, but I don't know if it'll get worse before better. An Iranian gentleman of my aquaintance (a settled refugee from the Ayatollahs' regime) made similar comments about certain areas of Ottawa "look like Saudi Arabia."

There are similar community tensions in the South Asian and Asian communities. A different sort of extreme, perhaps, but it's there. You may remember the tea kettle bomb in BC some time ago.

I'll have to ask my wife when it was dropped, but there used to be a section of an immigration file called "adaptability." It was an entirely subjective entry made by the immigration officer, which may be why it was dropped, but it helped screen out immigrants who held views or participated in practices that are against what are generally held as our Canadian values. In at least one case that she described to me (without specifics) she explained how she was able to "mark down" a Syrian gent who demanded to "see the man in charge of my file" when my wife insisted he stop answering questions for his wife who was in the interview booth with him. She gently explained that she was the man in charge of his file, and that he would have a great deal of difficulty living in Canada where he could find himself subordinate to a woman.

I think the current issue with refugees is one of approach. We have, in the past, taken refugees without the promise of citizenship. In fact, not all want it (the man who lost is family is returning to Kobani - Canada was a place of safety for his wife and kids, not home). Many Lebanese returned as soon as the Taif Accord was inked. I don't know how it would hold up legally, but perhaps we need to create some sort of status that provides for equality, but is forfeit when the refugee returns home. Anyone wanting to stay has to go through the regular immigration application process.

The other analogy posted above, about firefighters holding nets for people to jump from the buring building or fighting the fire is a false dichotomy. Ask a firefighter - they do both. So can we. We don't have to take them all (that would be absurd), just as we don't need to be the only "firefighters" trying to put out the flames.

Merkel has said Germany could absorb 800,000 of the refugees  :o. That's nearly 1% of their population. By that metric we should be able to absorb 300,000, though I would suggest we could absorb 50k without even noticing. Yes, refugees are harder to integrate than those who want to come here, but it's not impossible.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Tuan on September 04, 2015, 17:52:27
"Mulcair dismissed military action, specifically Canada’s current bombing campaign in Syria and Iraq, as a solution to the flood of refugees that is overwhelming Europe and galvanizing worldwide public attention...."

Thomas Mulcair dismisses Canada’s military involvement in Syria and Iraq as a solution to the refugee crisis
 (http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/canadian-politics/thomas-mulcair-dismisses-canadas-military-involvement-in-syria-and-iraq-as-a-solution-to-the-refugee-crisis)
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Humphrey Bogart on September 04, 2015, 18:35:58
"Mulcair dismissed military action, specifically Canada’s current bombing campaign in Syria and Iraq, as a solution to the flood of refugees that is overwhelming Europe and galvanizing worldwide public attention...."

Thomas Mulcair dismisses Canada’s military involvement in Syria and Iraq as a solution to the refugee crisis
 (http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/canadian-politics/thomas-mulcair-dismisses-canadas-military-involvement-in-syria-and-iraq-as-a-solution-to-the-refugee-crisis)

You can read!  Amazing!

Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: George Wallace on September 04, 2015, 18:47:59
"Mulcair dismissed military action, specifically Canada’s current bombing campaign in Syria and Iraq, as a solution to the flood of refugees that is overwhelming Europe and galvanizing worldwide public attention...."

Thomas Mulcair dismisses Canada’s military involvement in Syria and Iraq as a solution to the refugee crisis


That tells me one thing.  Thomas Mulcair is not part of the solution; but part of the problem.

Permitting IS to spread and force more people to flee the area, does not decrease the problem of refugees and migrants.  It has the opposite affect.  An even greater refugee and migrant problem is the result.

I hope that I am not too optimistic to hope that most Canadians can see this.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: MCG on September 04, 2015, 18:48:23
Gents,
We don't have to agree with each other, but let’s put the personal insults away.


Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on September 04, 2015, 18:51:23
Again, the current strategy isn’t working so we need to revamp it. As I've already mentioned here, we should be keep removing the ideologues/leaders of the ISIS, the (cephalothorax) of the spider, but it seems like MESF is committed to fighting with its legs. Wonder how many ISIS leaders have you removed so far?

Who the frig is 'we' and why are you including yourself in this equation?  I don't think I saw you flying over the badlands.  Maybe you were tucked away in the pannier?  Musta been cold on those 3rd block trips!! (I know you don't have a clue what I'm talking about, so it just reinforces my very valid point that you really don't know SFA about what you're talking about). 

You don't have a sweet ******' clue WHAT MESF is really doing; you rely on 'open source int' and news reports.   ::)   But, in short, the MESF is doing what the GOI is asking it to do.  Again IT IS NOT AN OCCUPATION FORCE. 

Quote
And I don’t buy your crap that GOI is the so-called “coach master”. Why don’t you tell them that beggars can't be choosers?

I exist in a dark little place called the 'tactical level'.  My job is to do my job where I go, provide advice and guidance where I can on the areas I am (supposed) to be a SME in, to the people who expect it from me, and to keep my crap wired tight, so I can continue to do my job.  I subscribe to the 'beggars can't be choosers' stuff sometimes, like when I am trying to give away some good used clothing to a needy person, but not so much when the situation isn't about clothes, its about killing and torturing innocent people and helping that kind of nasty crap be stopped.  That's just me. 

See, now you're just becoming petty because (1) you don't have a clue what is really going on (2) you think some stuff from Sri Lanka applies that no one really gives 2 flying ****s about and (3) you can't accept that fact that your pretty plan of neatly separating spider legs and heads doesn't ACTUALLY work all neat and tidy like it does in your "how to beat ISIS for Dummies" plan. 

I don't care if you 'buy' that the GOI is the driver of the bus.  You can believe that it's really Mork from Ork who is in command for all I care.  You can try all the Na-nu Na-nu tricks you want; the fact remains and will remain that the GOI is overall in charge of the business taking place in their own country.  Sure there are influences and all that jazz but at the end of the day...the GOI is responsible, the same as the GOC is here in good ol Canada-land.

(http://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fstatic.guim.co.uk%2Fsys-images%2FGuardian%2FPix%2Fpictures%2F2014%2F8%2F14%2F1408019234489%2FMORK-AND-MINDY---1970s----010.jpg&hash=51ed7d491092e1366750cf3e8173be90)

People have been trying to get you to see and understand things aren't all neat and tidy in the real world like they are in your head WRT this theatre.  You keep ignoring them.  It's really okay to just accept the fact there are people on here who know what they're talking about from experience.  Those on here who have experience specifically in this theatre aren't, can't and won't talk about it on here -you'll just have to accept their credibility or continue to piss people off by insisting this spider head-and-leg thing really is magical stuff, you are smart, have it all figured out while the rest of us just haven't seen the light yet.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Quirky on September 05, 2015, 19:15:47
Fair enough - the main point still holds strong though:

"...the reality is that Canada is wading into a complex, fractured and unpredictable landscape. There is no satisfying endgame in sight."

This. Dropping bombs from 20,000ft onto people in the desert hasn't worked too well thus far. We did the same thing to Libya and look how much of a cluster frig that country is right now. This operation will be nothing more than a gigantic waste of money. 
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Chris Pook on September 05, 2015, 22:09:10
This. Dropping bombs from 20,000ft onto people in the desert hasn't worked too well thus far. We did the same thing to Libya and look how much of a cluster frig that country is right now. This operation will be nothing more than a gigantic waste of money.

On the other hand we had an opportunity to secure Benghazi or Tobruk and establish secure havens there.  It wasn't, and isn't necessary to secure the whole of Libya to manage the refugee problem, or to influence events in Libya to our advantage.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: MarkOttawa on September 06, 2015, 13:32:17
Hmm:

Quote
A Canadian Warplane Mistakenly Broadcast Its Location Over Islamic State Controlled Territory [Iraq]

For what appears to be an entire sortie, a Canadian warplane broadcast its flight location while flying over so-called Islamic State (IS) controlled territory.

The revelation regarding a refueling plane flying as part of Operation IMPACT in Iraq, comes from civilian website Flightradar24.com — a collective of thousands of volunteer antenna networks all over the world streamlining location data of planes using something called automatic dependent surveillance-broadcasts (ADS-B).

ADS-B capability is an air traffic control technology which, in a sense, replaces ground control radars. Instead of relying on ground radars to locate and identify aircraft, planes with ADS-B transmit information about their identity, location, and velocity. Both civilian and military aircraft all over the world now use ADS-B. And, occasionally, military planes will forget to turn off their ADS-B transponders, exposing both their GPS-location to the public and giving potential threat actors the chance to identify them.

That was the case for the plane nicknamed "HOSER 15" by aviation enthusiasts monitoring Flightradar24 online that identified a Royal Canadian Air  Force (RCAF) A310-CC-150 in the skies of Iraq as it flew overtop of parts of IS controlled territory.

(https://lh4.googleusercontent.com/vKQ8LpYcMBDxt6gNq7bKQSsk0DoK3nYYDYhdUlb0wg9OY6HmVcd2xZCAt7vlOywiVNmPHKUqJlPfEQZuotlsIrc5NWimmNgCMuUr4xt73XkXcI-pNQjZ_Ihh7WUKjvaJWWwuHhg)
...
The Canadian Department of National Defense confirmed to VICE News the incident was indeed a mistake by pilots — which, theoretically, could've allowed IS forces to identify them in the sky and fire on the warplane...

Mark
Ottawa
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: SupersonicMax on September 06, 2015, 14:44:08
Not the first time it happens...  Happened in 2011 as well.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: milnews.ca on September 06, 2015, 15:13:49
Lovin' the callsign, though ....  ;D
(http://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fbarfblog.com%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2010%2F02%2Fbob_doug_hosers.jpg&hash=fd7f5ed491ac29d3c1272940a132dff7)
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on September 06, 2015, 15:49:10
I notice they said "fire on..." not 'effectively engage'.  But a detail like that doesn't make a difference in the news or to politicians... ;D
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: milnews.ca on September 06, 2015, 17:58:47
.... a detail like that doesn't make a difference in the news or to politicians... ;D
Or most media consumers, either.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: milnews.ca on September 06, 2015, 20:10:42
For the record, this from the CAF Info-machine (http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=1016179&tp=980) ....
Quote
The following statement is issued in response to recent coverage regarding possible civilian casualties resulting from a Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) airstrike in ISIS-held territory in Iraq on January 21, 2015.

Shortly after the air strike, information came to the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) through the Coalition headquarters that there might have been civilian casualties as a result of coalition action that included a Canadian airstrike. The source of this allegation had himself heard of these potential casualties through a second-hand account and, as far as we understand, there remains no eyewitness or credible information relating to any civilian casualties due to Canadian action on Jan. 21.

The target was an ISIS-occupied compound that was identified as a legitimate military target and struck on January 21, 2015. Analysis indicated that no civilians were present in the area for a number of days and so the target was cleared for engagement.

That area was under observation because it is located at the front lines where constant fighting between ISIS and Iraqi-Kurdish security forces has been occurring over a prolonged period. ISIS was using this compound as a fighting position to fire upon Iraqi-Kurdish security forces. On Jan. 21, a sniper was firing on Iraqi-Kurdish troops and our aircraft were guided to the target by coalition observers. The target was cleared as a valid military target with no civilians present before striking.

The Coalition headquarters conducted a review of all available imagery, video and intelligence. Concurrent to this, a CAF review, including a full history of the site since Jan. 2, also found there were no grounds to believe that civilians had been killed or even present. Furthermore, subsequent to the allegations, there has been no information from the Iraqi-Kurdish Security Forces suggesting there may have been civilian casualties.

Because the initial reviews eliminated Canadian action as a possible contributor to the unconfirmed civilian casualties, there were no grounds for an investigation and thus no reason to report anything other than our routine strike updates to Canadians.

The CAF remains confident there were no civilian casualties associated with the January 21 airstrike. Should there ever be a credible allegation of civilian casualties resulting from any CF-18 airstrikes during Operation IMPACT, the CAF will investigate thoroughly with coalition partners and provide as much information as possible to Canadians without compromising the safety and security of our operations and personnel.

To be clear, any agency with information that would indicate potential civilian casualties, or aid in clarifying existing allegations, is encouraged to provide it to the CAF so that it may pursue it with the coalition.

-30-
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on September 08, 2015, 13:27:48
This. Dropping bombs from 20,000ft onto people in the desert hasn't worked too well thus far. We did the same thing to Libya and look how much of a cluster frig that country is right now. This operation will be nothing more than a gigantic waste of money.

 ::)
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: crowbag on September 10, 2015, 16:01:08
So, if it's hard or difficult, leave it for someone else?  Imagine if the world continued to do that in say, 1939ish...would have been a great ending no?

If we pull out of the MESF now, how long will it be before the Liberals and NDP are yacking that the Conservatives are 'doing nothing and letting innocent people die"? 

Point - no matter what the PM and government do, the Liberals and NDP will say it is wrong and not enough.

I'm not sure conflating current events and 1939 is in any way effective beyond trying to stifle debate. Leave it for someone else? Maybe that isn't such a bad idea, regional stakeholders as opposed to MESF? Lets see how they make out in Yemen though...another sub-plot in this terrible saga...

I completely agree with the points on the political squabbling, though. Will be interesting to see what happens on this post-election, especially if the NDP end up winning (appears increasingly possible  :-\).


...But, in short, the MESF is doing what the GOI is asking it to do.  Again IT IS NOT AN OCCUPATION FORCE. 


Interesting take on the current relationship with the GOI:

http://warontherocks.com/2015/09/dont-bother-working-through-baghdad/

Not sure I agree entirely with the author, but it is food for thought, and brings up some important points.

While clamoring to "do something" about ISIS, I fear we are being shortsighted on a strategic/geo-political level. Winning tactical victories does not necessarily translate into strategic success, as we all know from Iraq and Afghan. "Degrading and destroying ISIS," or whatever the official line is now, is not a long-term strategy.

Maybe there is just a bad taste in my mouth from being shot at by Iranian funded/supported militias in Iraq, the same Iranian proxies we are now supporting in the fight against ISIS...Iran's influence in Iraq is there to stay, while ours is fleeting at best. I don't feel that this is recognized by our current government.

Don't get me wrong, the situation is a quagmire, and if anyone claims they know the right answer they are deluded. It is important that the prudence of the mission is debated by Canadians though.

In any case - God speed to you and all the others involved over there on the tactical side of life. Lets hope the political masters are working equally hard on the rest of the picture, and adequately understand the nuances of the situation in the region as a whole. The rhetoric of the current government sure doesn't make me optimistic though...
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Baz on September 10, 2015, 16:47:45
::)

You may role your eyes but there is a lot of evidence, including at NATO within 18 months, that Libya was a tactical success, operational learning process, and strategic failure.

What if all we do against ISIS is teach them how to operate in the presence of air power, like the Talisman also learned?  Then what's the plan?  Bomb them back into the dark ages?
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Infanteer on September 11, 2015, 14:19:39
Then what's the plan?  Bomb them back into the dark ages?

ISIS internet streams suggest they are already there.

Douhet still remains attractive, even though we learn every decade or so (Vietnam, Iraq, Libya) that airpower has limits as a coercive tool.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on September 13, 2015, 07:05:33
I'm not sure conflating current events and 1939 is in any way effective beyond trying to stifle debate. Leave it for someone else? Maybe that isn't such a bad idea, regional stakeholders as opposed to MESF? Lets see how they make out in Yemen though...another sub-plot in this terrible saga...

Not trying to stifle debate, but trying to show 'the head in the sand/ignore the problem' technique usually doesn't fair out well.  I believe the overall 'intent' is that the solution come from the middle east area.  I think there are many question on if that is realistically possible in the current...climate.  One thing is clear, there is no easy solution.  IMO it is plausible there will never be one, in my lifetime at least. 

Quote
Not sure I agree entirely with the author, but it is food for thought, and brings up some important points.

While clamoring to "do something" about ISIS, I fear we are being shortsighted on a strategic/geo-political level. Winning tactical victories does not necessarily translate into strategic success, as we all know from Iraq and Afghan. "Degrading and destroying ISIS," or whatever the official line is now, is not a long-term strategy.


I wonder about the strategic/political level as well; but I try to keep it tucked away.  I may have an opinion on it but I don't pretend to understand or even be able to consider the factors in that quagmire.  Lacking an educated/informed opinion, I try not to embarrass myself too much. 

Quote
Maybe there is just a bad taste in my mouth from being shot at by Iranian funded/supported militias in Iraq, the same Iranian proxies we are now supporting in the fight against ISIS...Iran's influence in Iraq is there to stay, while ours is fleeting at best. I don't feel that this is recognized by our current government.

Glad you made it out of the Badlands. 

Maybe our total force commitment is an indication of something?

Quote
Don't get me wrong, the situation is a quagmire, and if anyone claims they know the right answer they are deluded. It is important that the prudence of the mission is debated by Canadians though.

If someone does know the answer, they are being real pricks by keeping it to themselves all these years.  And agree on the debated by Canadians part, my beef is that they are not necessarily deciding on factual information, rather on bits and blurbs and political sound-bites centered more on an upcoming election than the actual mission and the people they've sent over into the litterbox who are risking the orange pajama dance.

Quote
In any case - God speed to you and all the others involved over there on the tactical side of life. Lets hope the political masters are working equally hard on the rest of the picture, and adequately understand the nuances of the situation in the region as a whole. The rhetoric of the current government sure doesn't make me optimistic though...

I'll second that.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on September 13, 2015, 07:15:50
You may role your eyes but there is a lot of evidence, including at NATO within 18 months, that Libya was a tactical success, operational learning process, and strategic failure.

History might not repeat itself? 

Quote
What if all we do against ISIS is teach them how to operate in the presence of air power, like the Talisman also learned?  Then what's the plan?  Bomb them back into the dark ages?

That's a question for a few floors up from where I work.  I'm just a self-loading button monkey.   8) 

Having said that, I felt pretty swept-up on the tactical and (less so) the operational level.  I don't pretend to know or have valuable input at the strategic level.  I was trained to think '2 up' and that is way above 2 for me. 
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Baz on September 13, 2015, 09:15:54
Having said that, I felt pretty swept-up on the tactical and (less so) the operational level.  I don't pretend to know or have valuable input at the strategic level.  I was trained to think '2 up' and that is way above 2 for me.

Then you are prepared to consider that simply dismissively rolling your eyes to someone asking these very questions is just a way to stifle the conversation?

Some of us believe that promises are being made on the current capability of airport ti deliver strategic effect, which are causing politicians to make poorly informed decisions.  Directly related to your community is your designation as ISR; what is the long term cost of that?

The previous Come RCAF was completely focused on this; when your only obvious concern about the state of MH is how it can support ISR, especially the overland air effort, we have a problem.

I have worked at the strategic level on these questions.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on September 16, 2015, 12:54:00
What I am prepared to say (at the risk of offending some) is that ground crew aren't sitting in the DMSC getting eyes on the same info on the tactical/operational stuff, so I don't feel they have any real reason to be waving the 'this is a waste of time' flag. 

If you don't have any real, accurate info (and anyone who does won't be putting it out on this forum, naturally) then you have an 'opinion'.  That's a fair difference from having an 'informed' opinion.

The ATF task is not to 'win the war on it's very own'.  People need to keep site of that.  However, my opinion, is the ATF is doing it's mandated job and doing it as well as it is able to.

My community is, has, and will continue to do ISR and do it quite well.  I guess the only way anyone can really judge that is to see if for themselves, which won't happen for 99.9% of the CAF.  I personally know of 1 GOFO who was pretty impressed with the job after witnessing it with his/her eyes and it was over the normal op area.

I am hoping the long term cost of that is that we get a little more noticed, a little better supported/funded, more access to some beneficial training opportunites and 'gainfully employed'.   I'll also note that while IMPACT is ongoing, the community is still doing all the other things we normally do.  I am away from my postal code now but not at a sandy location. 

With limited resources, I suspect any Comdr these days are looking to wring every drop he/she can out of any resource.  My  :2c: is either the new or old MH platform would be better employed elsewhere.  However, I think the broad left and right of arcs on the term/buzzword "ISR" need to be explored and put into more...detail?  Definition?

Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Good2Golf on September 16, 2015, 16:55:50
EITS, rest assured folks are tracking you guys -- and your last point is a valid concern, but is becoming better understood of late, both inside and outside the Department.

Fly safe!

Cheers,
G2G
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on September 16, 2015, 17:32:19
Tks.  In all honesty, I think ISR is a very generalized term that is used today.  ISR can be done by 1 pers, 1 CPF, heck a guy in a bug-smasher with a friend along for the ride with bino's can do "ISR".

Because of that, I don't think anyone can realistically expect to understand the nuances of that come with each and every platform that is capable, in whatever degree, of doing "ISR". 

Is ISR an appropriate term to use WRT what the CP-140 is doing in theatre?  Yes.  IMO.

Are the CF-18s doing the job they are supposed to be doing?  Again I say yes.

There's no need to take just my word for it though see the info below...and for the record, there's more to it than just the strike %s carried out by our Hornet folks.  Comparatively, if you are an infanteer on a defensive position, how much does the mere threat of an active sniper 'in the treeline' somewhere make you change the way you do your business, without ever having a fired a shot at you.  There are more effects a weapon system can have on a battle space than just kinetic.   :2c:

Attention: Latest News - Air operations

As of 14 September 2015, Air Task Force-Iraq conducted 1481 sorties:
•CF-188 Hornet fighters conducted 951 sorties;
•CC-150T Polaris aerial refueller conducted 255 sorties, delivering some 15,359,000 pounds of fuel to coalition aircraft; and
•CP-140 Aurora aircraft conducted 275 reconnaissance missions.

Definition - sortie: In air operations, a sortie refers to an operational flight by one aircraft. A sortie starts when one aircraft takes off and ends upon landing

http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad-current/op-impact.page

http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad-current/op-impact-airstrikes.page
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Good2Golf on September 16, 2015, 17:37:15
In all honesty, I think ISR is a very inappropriately over-generalized term that is used today. 

   :nod:

Better granularity on ISR-elements and their context within the larger ISR framework is being dist'd extradepartmentally...small but positive steps.
Title: Re: Pan-Islamic civil war merged mega thread (Sunni vs Shia, and the expansion of IS(IS/IL))
Post by: eharps on October 07, 2015, 10:40:40
http://winnipeg.ctvnews.ca/former-chief-of-defence-staff-says-military-intervention-is-needed-in-iraq-syria-1.2598880

The Canadian Press
Published Wednesday, October 7, 2015 5:23AM CST
Last Updated Wednesday, October 7, 2015 5:24AM CST


WINNIPEG - Retired general Rick Hillier says military intervention in Iraq and Syria is needed.
 
The former chief of defence staff says the humanitarian crisis won't end unless Islamic State leaders are dealt with first.
 
Canada's role in the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant has become an election issue.
 
NDP leader Tom Mulcair has said he would end bombing campaigns and other military action, and put more resources into humanitarian and refugee efforts.
 
Hillier says that's wrong, and what's needed is continued air strikes and the ongoing presence of special forces in the region.
 
Hillier was in charge of Canada's military between 2005 and 2008.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on October 07, 2015, 23:26:46
 ???

What does he think MESF, ATF-I et al are doing?
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: PuckChaser on October 07, 2015, 23:47:27
He might be implying boots on the ground without actually saying it. You can only project so much power into an area, to secure it you need ground forces.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on October 08, 2015, 00:32:06
I get the boots on the ground stuff;  I wasn't always a zoomie.  I wish he'd just use plain language, there's enough fluff in the air with the election coming up. 

Personally, I agree with him about 'boots on the ground', I just don't know I believe those boots should come from Canada; the solution should be more local to the problem.  The "west" gets into this one at C7-range, the whole region could 'bond together' against that common enemy (aka "us") and then the fireworks will be on.

Oh - Mulclair...please stop.  Would you take the firefighters away from the fire so they could hand out blankets and knit mittens?   :facepalm:
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: PuckChaser on October 08, 2015, 00:36:46
Absolutely agree. I think he's diving further into politics and poli-speak and anyway from the straight shooter talk that endeared him to his troops.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: YZT580 on October 09, 2015, 19:33:01
You are delving too deeply.  My first read had him simply stating that the intervention that we are doing now is the intervention that is needed; at least from Canada's position.   He even stated that the F18s and special forces were the way to go.  I don't see any poli-speak there
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Ghazwan on October 14, 2015, 05:24:33
It is 6 more than we have there now.  Plus the other assets going.  Comparably, what % of the Army (F Ech types) were deployed to the sandbox at any one time?  Certainly not all, but our contribution there wasn't seen as "embarrassing" right? What % of the Army does the current SOF contribution equal?    While this op will go, there is still the other "stuff" these units do day to day that still must be done.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: PuckChaser on October 14, 2015, 08:56:34
SOF doesn't work for the Army, so the percentage is 0.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on October 14, 2015, 19:40:41
It is 6 more than we have there now.  Plus the other assets going.  Comparably, what % of the Army (F Ech types) were deployed to the sandbox at any one time?  Certainly not all, but our contribution there wasn't seen as "embarrassing" right? What % of the Army does the current SOF contribution equal?    While this op will go, there is still the other "stuff" these units do day to day that still must be done.

Honestly, I read your post and it doesn't make sense.  SAY AGAIN ALL AFTER MUMBLE MUMBLE, OVER. 

'This op' will go?  It's BEEN going for just short of a calendar year. 
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Dimsum on October 19, 2015, 16:40:49
Considering it's election night, I got to thinking that both Trudeau and Mulcair want to stop the bombing campaign in Iraq/Syria, while either keeping or sending back the folks on the ground.  However, they don't mention (or I may have missed) anything about the CP-140s or the tankers - maybe since by keeping those assets in theatre, they can still tell the coalition that Canada is doing something? 
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Baz on October 19, 2015, 16:59:08
Maybe they don't even realize that they are there???
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Dimsum on October 19, 2015, 17:01:36
Maybe they don't even realize that they are there???

The sad part is I'm not sure whether you're joking or not, and that you may be completely right.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: eharps on October 19, 2015, 17:07:51
Maybe they don't even realize that they are there???

you may be completely right.

I think this is likely the case. Tonight will be very interesting, but not as interesting as the next 6 months after we decide who is taking the reigns.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Baz on October 19, 2015, 17:11:29
The sad part is I'm not sure whether you're joking or not, and that you may be completely right.

Joking, no; sarcastic, maybe...

To be somewhat fair, they have a lot of files they have to think about; this file, at the surface, is "we're over there bombing them..."  The details may not have sunk in.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on October 20, 2015, 16:14:05
Trust me, there are CAF members who are working in the location the LRP and Tankers dets are at, working for OP Impact who don't know what the frig the ATF-I is doing.  I am dead serious.  I guess Air Task Force - Iraq as a name and all the news articles did not make it as obvious as we thought it did.  The self licking lollipop JTFSC doesn't seem to realize it exits to support something called "the mission end".  Dobbers.   :facepalm:
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: milnews.ca on October 20, 2015, 16:41:51
this file, at the surface, is "we're over there bombing them..."  The details may not have sunk in.
Good point - from the platform (http://www.liberal.ca/realchange/combat-mission-in-iraq/):
Quote
We will end Canada’s combat mission in Iraq.

We will refocus Canada’s military contribution in the region on the training of local forces, while providing more humanitarian support and immediately welcoming 25,000 more refugees from Syria.
Not tooooooooooooooo much detail or nuance there - watch and (no longer) shoot, indeed.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on October 20, 2015, 16:51:31
If they are going to end the ATF-I part (therefore not needing the JFT-I IMO), the way to do it and save face is to just not extend beyond the current end date.

As a Canadian, taxpayer and directly affected CAF member, if the decision is going to be ""end the mission", I hope that is how it is chosen to be done. 
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: milnews.ca on October 20, 2015, 17:36:24
If they are going to end the ATF-I part (therefore not needing the JFT-I IMO), the way to do it and save face is to just not extend beyond the current end date.

As a Canadian, taxpayer and directly affected CAF member, if the decision is going to be ""end the mission", I hope that is how it is chosen to be done.
Here's hoping (https://skypeblogs.files.wordpress.com/2011/07/fingerscrossed_80.png) someone in the administration makes as much sense as you do.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on October 20, 2015, 18:26:01
I wonder what the new MND will think and advise on the issue.  Needless to say I pray it doesn't involve blue berets and/or helmets.  If that is the case, please bring everyone back.   :2c:
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: PPCLI Guy on October 20, 2015, 23:49:18
We'll be UNing it for sure within 12 months....in Africa.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: SeaKingTacco on October 21, 2015, 00:03:30
Yippee.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: FSTO on October 21, 2015, 00:22:07
Yea! Africa!

 :facepalm:
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on October 21, 2015, 07:58:57
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-34589250

So the message I see is "we don't like ISIS but we aren't willing to actually do anything about it".
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: milnews.ca on October 21, 2015, 08:06:29
We'll be UNing it for sure within 12 months....in Africa.
:nod:
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Tuan on October 21, 2015, 21:37:22
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-34589250

So the message I see is "we don't like ISIS but we aren't willing to actually do anything about it".

here is a quote from your BBC link:

Quote
However, he said he would keep Canadian military trainers in northern Iraq, the AFP news agency reports.

With all due respect for your service, I want to ask you a question. You have always said that the GoI is the driver of the bus in this operation. If so, why don't you train, arm and fund them and get the hell out of there? Why do you want to die for someone else battle?
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on October 21, 2015, 22:08:07
here is quote from your BBC link:

With all due respect for your service, I want to ask you a question. You have always said the GoI is the driver of the bus in this operation. If so, why don't you train, arm and fund them and get the hell out of there? Why do you want to die for someone else battle?

Ref the quote from BBC;  the tan beret folks are there and doing their business, but myself and many others (some, at least) hold the opinion that success in Iraq against ISIS is dependent on (1) establishing and defending the border in Anbar (2) eliminating ISIS between Bagdad and the border and (3) maintaining the deep fight on the Syrian side of the boarder, denying FOM throughout.  There is much more detail but that's the coles notes version and would be more complicated than this simple versionr.   Our SOF folks are...part of that larger geopraphical battlespace.   

BUT the real trigger pulling in this one, targets being engaged, enemy losing freedom of movement are our CF18s.  The SOF guys are doing their thing, and well but they have a different mission and ROE.  18 drivers are engaging ISIS across the battlespace.

As for why would I put myself in a position to die?  Horrible crap is happening to innocent people who only want to live their lives.  People are being tortured, executed, thrown off buildings.   There is also the idea of fighting this there where it is contained ( in a global sense ) and the farther it is from my wife, and my retired parents and in laws,  and the kids I see getting onto buses to go to school, the better.  I much prefer to fight the enemy in his backyard than mine.   I can focus then and not wonder if my door locks are good enough, kind of thing.

Germany was not a direct threat to Canadian soil, nor Korea, or Afghanistan yet we fought those fights.   For ideals, freedom, human suffering to be minimized, and many other reasons,  not only for us but for those being denied what we enjoy everyday.

I am also not a coward or a war monger, I simply accept the fact it is part of our world and some people deserve an early exit from life.   People pay me to crew an airplane that was designed to kill or help kill targets.   Firefighters run into burning buildings, right?  Same concept.  It's the job and I do it to help keep the sheep safe from the wolves.

Canada can hand out blankets and parkas all it wants; does it make sense to do that if you haven't stopped the people who took the ones people had away in the first place?
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Dolphin_Hunter on October 21, 2015, 22:11:53
here is a quote from your BBC link:

With all due respect for your service, I want to ask you a question. You have always said that the GoI is the driver of the bus in this operation. If so, why don't you train, arm and fund them and get the hell out of there? Why do you want to die for someone else battle?

Why do I want to fight and die for someone else's battle?

I believe in defending those who can't defend themselves.  So if that means fighting someone else's battle then that's what I will do.  I know it was a long time ago, but World War II was someone else's battle.  frig even bleeding heart peacekeeping missions are someone else's battle.

Now back to your comment about the GOI.  They are driving the bus.  That's a fact.  Now to your training comment, did the GOI ask Canada to help them train?  That is a question you need answered.  We don't just show up uninvited and setup a training school.  It doesn't work like that.

After I posted I see ETIS pretty much said the same thing.  Tuan I don't think you will ever understand how guys like ETIS and many others on here operate.  We all pretty much feel the same way.  We sacrifice our time to help others, we miss births, holidays, anniversaries, and much much more. Sure we go because we were ordered to go, but no one ordered us into the recruiting center.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Tuan on October 21, 2015, 22:35:09
I hear y’all and understand that you are all noble soldiers. However, I guess, our new government wants to do the job differently. IMO, we have come a long way since WWII, the Korean War and even the war on terror in Afghanistan began 14 years ago, whereas the contemporary “Hybrid Warfare” that we are fighting today contains many different facets and thus, I believe, the Canadian Armed Forces could engage itself in many different roles other than just bombing missions.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Dimsum on October 21, 2015, 22:43:52
I hear y’all and understand that you are all noble soldiers. However, I guess, our new government wants to do the job differently. IMO, we have come a long way since WWII, the Korean War and even the war on terror in Afghanistan began 14 years ago, whereas the contemporary “Hybrid Warfare” that we are fighting today contains many different facets and thus, I believe, the Canadian Armed Forces could engage itself in many different roles other than just bombing missions.

We are not just doing bombing missions - and this is something I'm interested to see when the new PM finally sets a date for the "combat mission" withdrawal.  What about the air-to-air refuellers, since those assets aren't limited to fuelling planes from their own country?  What about the CP-140s conducting Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance for the entire coalition?  Are those considered "combat" or not?
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on October 21, 2015, 22:54:34
I hear y’all and understand that you are all noble soldiers. However, I guess, our new government wants to do the job differently. IMO, we have come a long way since WWII, the Korean War and even the war on terror in Afghanistan began 14 years ago, whereas the contemporary “Hybrid Warfare” that we are fighting today contains many different facets and thus, I believe, the Canadian Armed Forces could engage itself in many different roles other than just bombing missions.

we are airmen, not soldiers.   8) 

You can't conduct humanitarian aide in an area you do not control.  You need to eliminate the wolves from the area first.  There is no peace to be had there and there won't be if people start leaving the coalition.  Take the gloves off and fight bare knuckles if you truly want to win.  Mr Trudeau is sending what global message with this act?

I am not comparing the conflicts of WWII, Korea or Afghanistan I am saying to fight this one for similar reasons summed up as "it is the right thing to do against the current bunch of crap heads".

Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Tuan on October 21, 2015, 23:34:36
we are airmen, not soldiers.   8) 

You can't conduct humanitarian aide in an area you do not control.  You need to eliminate the wolves from the area first.  There is no peace to be had there and there won't be if people start leaving the coalition.  Take the gloves off and fight bare knuckles if you truly want to win.  Mr Trudeau is sending what global message with this act?

I read otherwise though! According to military analysts, as hybrid war combines elements of an insurgency, nation-building, sectarian strife, and domestic terrorism;  it is more likely to pose the Alliance a strategic dilemma because our presence is likely to exacerbate rather than improve the situation.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on October 22, 2015, 00:33:49
Groovy.  Now give me an example where this worked as well as these analysts suggest it does.  Iraq?  Afghanistan perhaps?  Walk away without the enemy eliminated and hope?

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/21/world/asia/afghanistan-taliban-police-ghormach.html
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on October 22, 2015, 00:39:54
However, I guess, our new government wants to do the job differently  someone else to do the hard part of the job.

There, FTFY.   ^-^
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Tuan on October 22, 2015, 00:53:21
Groovy.  Now give me an example where this worked as well as these analysts suggest it does.  Iraq?  Afghanistan perhaps?  Walk away without the enemy eliminated and hope?

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/21/world/asia/afghanistan-taliban-police-ghormach.html

Please check out this presentation  (https://www.google.ca/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CBwQFjAAahUKEwiu-ry8ltXIAhVMLB4KHeaQCQQ&url=http%3A%2F%2Fismor.cds.cranfield.ac.uk%2F26th-symposium-2009%2Fwhats-in-a-name-...-that-which-we-call-a-rose-by-any-other-name-would-smell-as-sweet.-or-why-half-of-winning-an-irregular-war-is-agreeing-what-it-is..%2F%40%40download%2Fpresentation%2FPurton.ppt&usg=AFQjCNEaQHlf5iwiDmyMxQ1YHk2Duhpvxw&sig2=UZyZNlTRJsSaEee90_LEqA&bvm=bv.105814755,d.dmo)
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on October 22, 2015, 01:26:41
Okay I did.  Now, do you have a single example of anywhere this theory has actually worked?

Here are 2 examples of stuff that actually worked. 

(https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/e/e5/Shigemitsu-signs-surrender.jpg/300px-Shigemitsu-signs-surrender.jpg)

(http://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fi.huffpost.com%2Fgen%2F1124861%2Fimages%2Fo-GERMANY-SURRENDERS-ALLIES-WWII-ENDS-facebook.jpg&hash=487147d1bf0f3bc1691a0b6e83393c0e)
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Baz on October 22, 2015, 06:51:59
Comparing World War II to what we are doing now is disingenuous at best.

Like it or not, Air Power is presented to governments as a way of doing something with very little risk; it does not have a good history being used by itself.  Air power alone did not win World War II.   Until the Russians entered it didn't look to be winning against ISIS.  What the Russians have done looks very much like supporting ground forces.

The National question is are we in this fight to do something, or to look to be doing something.  Other countries, especially the US, are having that discussion.  Why can't we?
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: milnews.ca on October 22, 2015, 07:03:42
What about the air-to-air refuellers, since those assets aren't limited to fuelling planes from their own country?  What about the CP-140s conducting Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance for the entire coalition?  Are those considered "combat" or not?
Very good questions, still unanswered.  I guess the reporters haven't asked yet - maybe because they don't remember/know about the rest of Canada's complement in theatre?

Meanwhile, on the ground (http://rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/211020151) ....
Quote
Iraq’s autonomous Kurdistan region said Wednesday that Canada has played an important role in the war against the Islamic State group (ISIS), and that its announced withdrawal from combat roles is “bad news.”

“It is a bad news for us. Canada was a major partner in the coalition and it was a great help to Kurdistan,” Jabar Yawar, chief of staff and spokesman for the Kurdish Peshmerga ministry, told Rudaw Wednesday.

(....)

According to the Peshmerga ministry, Canada has a “very active embassy in Iraq that its ambassadors have visited the Kurdistan Region and have continued cooperation with local officials.”

“Canada helped us with military equipment. They have also support us with training Peshmerga forces,” Yawar explained ....
On the other hand (http://www.edmontonsun.com/2015/10/21/retired-general-says-isis-wouldnt-miss-the-canadian-forces) ....
Quote
A retired military general says pulling back Canadian fighter jets in Iraq and Syria will not be missed by ISIS fighters.

(....)

Retired Canadian Major-General Lewis MacKenzie describes the move as "politically wise" but adds Canada's role in fighting ISIS was so small that the contributions militarily will go largely unnoticed by terrorists.

"ISIS wouldn't miss us that much...I don't think it will be much of a blip," said Mackenzie.

"We're providing a very, very small percentage of the actual missions that are engaging ISIS on the ground, somewhere over just two per cent. But we have nothing to be ashamed of -- we've been making contributions above our weight for the last 20 to 30 years." ....
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: YZT580 on October 22, 2015, 09:30:23
Article in Flight Global suggests that all aviation assets are to be withdrawn.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Tuan on October 22, 2015, 10:32:23
Okay I did.  Now, do you have a single example of anywhere this theory has actually worked?

Yes, there is one such case in point: the complete annihilation of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), simply known as the Tamil Tigers.
 
During early 1980s at the height of cold war, India had to break the US-Sri Lanka nexus. Sri Lanka was aligned with the US and Pakistan. India was at that time aligned with USSR (and it is rumoured that USSR's KGB had a high level of control over Indian bureaucracy: ('KGB moles infiltrated the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s PMO'). The LTTE proved to be an ideal folly for India. Thus India’s foreign intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) armed, trained and funded the LTTE and engaged them as proxies against the Sri Lankan armed forces just like the CIA engaged Afghan Mujahedeen against the USSR.

At late 1980s, India and Sri Lanka signed a mutual agreement to cooperate and Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi (Indira Gandhi’s son) made an inexplicable move to cozy up with the Lankans through the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord. Under the terms of that accord, India was to deploy 100,000 troops to Sri Lanka to disarm the very same LTTE terrorists they had created. That’s when things got out of hand and the Indian troops ended up fighting with the LTTE and not only India lost more than 1200 soldiers, but also the LTTE assassinated both Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lankan  President Ranasingha Premadasa.

Eventually, India was forced to withdraw its troops from Sri Lanka and made a u-turn and armed, trained and funded the Sri Lankan military to fight against LTTE. The Sri Lankan government also got support from the USA, the UK, Canada, Russia and China in order to arm and train its military and obliterated the LTTE in May 2009. 

As such, the Sri Lankan civil war had a complex dynamics and resembled modern hybrid warfare in recent times that was fought and won by the local forces who were aided by the international alliances.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on October 22, 2015, 14:10:38
Comparing World War II to what we are doing now is disingenuous at best.

I am not comparing the 2, I am comparing the reasons we were in WWII to the reasons we should stay in this one and every other conflict we've sent forces to between them.  I am not trying to compare apples and oranges, I am trying to compare old apples and their similarities to new apples. 

Fortunately, I am not the only person who holds the view we should be part of the mission, as shown in the article below (emphasis mine).  It's old but has value to this thread, IMO.  Have a read with an open mind is all I ask.

Article Link (http://Article Link)

National Post View: Canada’s fight against ISIS is a mission worth extending

March 24, 2015

When Canada went to war against the Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham (ISIS) six months ago, the limited commitment of Canadian jets and a small number of special forces advisers to Iraq was more than justified. ISIS, which emerged from the power vacuum created by Syria’s long-running civil war, had poured over the border in northern Iraq. After easily overcoming ineffective Iraqi military units, ISIS established a so-called caliphate in Iraq, with a population of millions.

The list of crimes ISIS’s barbaric thugs then embarked on is well known, but bears repeating: Ethnic cleansing of minority groups, mass murder, rape on a horrifying scale, public execution of homosexuals and “adulterers,” and the enslavement of women and girls into forced marriages with ISIS fighters (or anyone with enough cash to buy one on the open market).

If anything, ISIS has become even more barbaric and threatening since. But preventing a humanitarian catastrophe was only part of the case for military action. Left unchecked, there can be little doubt it would have spread over much of the Middle East, destabilizing those parts it did not control, using the oil revenues thus acquired to purchase weapons, hire manpower and rally to its side disaffected Muslim youth from around the globe.

The international community had to act, and as a member of that community, Canada was right to do its part. The mission proposed last fall was reasonable in scale and scope: Six CF-18 jets, two surveillance aircraft and an airborne refueler, with associated ground support personnel, joined the 69 commandos providing (mostly) non-combat assistance to Iraqi units and Kurdish militias. Moreover, it was limited to six months, allowing for some stock-taking before we decided whether the mission was worth continuing.


Six months on, the mission can be judged a success, on its own modest terms. It has stopped the advance of ISIS, giving the beleaguered Iraqi army time to regroup, without significant loss of life, either to our forces or civilians. But the battle is not yet won. Hence Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s address to the House of Commons on Tuesday, proposing to extend the mission for 12 months. There would, however, be one important change: Canada’s combat aircraft would no longer be confined to Iraqi territory. Our planes would now be authorized to seek out ISIS targets across the border in Syria, in areas outside the control of Bashar Al-Assad’s murderous regime.

This strikes us as entirely reasonable. While the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition has contained ISIS in Iraq, it has been frustrated by the group’s ability to seek refuge in Syria. There is no reason why Canada should seek to destroy ISIS targets in Iraq while politely abstaining from hitting them in Syria. Nor are we “aiding” the Assad regime by mounting limited strikes in parts of his country that he has effectively abandoned to ISIS rule. The risk to Canada’s pilots is real, but given the stakes, acceptable. This is what they joined the Air Force to do, and what they have spent their lives preparing for.

In the House on Tuesday, NDP leader Thomas Mulcair and Liberal leader Justin Trudeau vowed to oppose the proposed extension and expansion of the mission. They seemed to agree that ISIS is awful and that the threat is real, but would prefer that Canada limit its role to humanitarian aid. As before, the only difference seemed to be that, while the NDP oppose any military action against ISIS, the Liberals agree ISIS must be fought. Just not by us.


Leaving the fighting to others is not what we do; it is not who we are

What nonsense. Humanitarian aid is certainly needed; Canada has been contributing much, and should continue to do so. But the best way to help the threatened civilians of Iraq is to stop the barbarians who would kill, rape and enslave them. Security is the basic building block of any society. Until Iraqis are safe, they cannot be effectively helped.

It is true that other nations, such as Ireland or Poland, have contributed to the mission in non-military ways. But, well, Canada is not Ireland. Leaving the fighting to others is not what we do; it is not who we are. When the cause is just, this country answers the call — as we will and must in the current conflict. There is hard work to be done in Iraq and Syria, but it is work worth doing.

National Post
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on October 22, 2015, 14:24:13
Like it or not, Air Power is presented to governments as a way of doing something with very little risk; it does not have a good history being used by itself.  Air power alone did not win World War II.   Until the Russians entered it didn't look to be winning against ISIS.  What the Russians have done looks very much like supporting ground forces.

Agree, but will add that there are ground forces involved that the air assets are supporting; they just aren't 'our' ground forces.  Perhaps this point needs to emphasized more often.

Quote
The National question is are we in this fight to do something, or to look to be doing something.  Other countries, especially the US, are having that discussion.  Why can't we?

A very important question.  Are we 'asking that question' though?  Or is Mr Trudeau taking action 'on his own' and against even the majority of Liberal supporters? 

A second article on this point for consideration.  Again, read with an open mind and ask yourself some honest questions...emphasis mine again.

Article Link (http://m.calgarysun.com/2015/10/21/trudeaus-first-move-doesnt-bode-well)

Trudeau’s first move doesn’t bode well

Justin Trudeau’s first move as prime minister is to take Canada out of the fight against the Islamic State.

We will no longer be fighting the terrorist group that burns people alive in cages, is partially responsible for the refugee crisis, and has identified Canada as a target for attacks.

While the incoming prime minister has the authority to pull Canada out of the mission right away, it’s poor optics to do so for a number of reasons.

Late Tuesday afternoon we learned Trudeau told U.S. President Barack Obama over the phone that sooner rather than later our CF-18 fighter jets will no longer be engaged in sorties over Iraq and Syria.

We will still “engage in a responsible way” -- presumably meaning we’d continue some version of advising and assistance -- but, Trudeau said, Obama “understands the commitments I’ve made around ending the combat mission.”

This is a very big decision for Trudeau to have already announced as a fait accompli before he has even moved into 24 Sussex Dr.

It’s no surprise that Trudeau wanted to do this. It’s on the record. But it’s important to note it wasn’t one of the key parts of his platform.

It wasn’t something he repeated on every occasion as he did with his infrastructure spending plan.

Did voters give him a majority predominantly because of this position? No. Polls have consistently shown that a majority of Canadians support Canada’s role against the Islamic State.

An Ipsos Reid poll earlier this year showed 67% of identified Liberal supporters were in favour of extending Canada’s mission in Iraq and Syria.

Trudeau is offside from his own party.

But perhaps more important is the question of teamwork. One of the ways in which we were told Trudeau would be different than Harper is that he would be less of a one-man show. Less dictatorial, more of a team player and consensus builder.

In fact, whenever someone criticized Trudeau’s credentials -- as I frequently did in election columns -- the main response was that what matters more in a leader is that they listen to those around him.

Yet this first move of Trudeau’s was made without listening to the team that was elected to join him in Ottawa. It was made from the top down.

There hasn’t been a caucus meeting yet. No defence minister has been announced. There is no cabinet.

This first move by Trudeau is as equally single-minded as decisions made by Harper that prompted the outgoing PM’s detractors to label him a “dictator”.

The Sun’s Tarek Fatah wrote a column just before the news broke about Obama’s call to Trudeau, hoping that the incoming PM would listen to those around him:

“Men such as former Toronto Police chief Bill Blair, Toronto Centre MP Bill Morneau and Canada’s first-ever Somali-Canadian MP, Ahmad Hussen from York-South Weston, are just three who give me hope some Liberals MPs will resist moves to pull Canada out of the war against ISIS.”

It looks like that didn’t happen. This should be cause for concern for those who thought Trudeau would “do politics differently.”

Before the mechanisms of government were even in place, before the Governor General has even sworn him in, he spoke to the leader of the free world and withdrew Canada from a coalition committed to tackling the world’s worst human rights abusers. All by himself.

A sign of things to come?

Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Baz on October 22, 2015, 14:33:27
The international community had to act: but what happened to the 3 block war?

I am not convinced that how we are fighting this (which is in large part, as I said, becuase Air Forces keep promising they can solve problems with little risk), is going to make it any better.

Doing something is not always better than doing nothing; witness Libya.  My worry, is that at the end of the day all we'll do is teach the bad guys how to operate in the presence of Air Power.

I welcome the discussion, and I never actively campaigned to stop doing what we are doing.  I just think we need to consider all the issues, and be careful about presenting a simple solution to the politicians, when in fact a complex one is needed.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Altair on October 22, 2015, 14:38:36
Agree, but will add that there are ground forces involved that the air assets are supporting; they just aren't 'our' ground forces.  Perhaps this point needs to emphasized more often.

A very important question.  Are we 'asking that question' though?  Or is Mr Trudeau taking action 'on his own' and against even the majority of Liberal supporters? 

A second article on this point for consideration.  Again, read with an opinion mind and ask yourself some honest questions...emphasis mine again.

Article Link (http://m.calgarysun.com/2015/10/21/trudeaus-first-move-doesnt-bode-well)

Trudeau’s first move doesn’t bode well

Justin Trudeau’s first move as prime minister is to take Canada out of the fight against the Islamic State.

We will no longer be fighting the terrorist group that burns people alive in cages, is partially responsible for the refugee crisis, and has identified Canada as a target for attacks.

While the incoming prime minister has the authority to pull Canada out of the mission right away, it’s poor optics to do so for a number of reasons.

Late Tuesday afternoon we learned Trudeau told U.S. President Barack Obama over the phone that sooner rather than later our CF-18 fighter jets will no longer be engaged in sorties over Iraq and Syria.

We will still “engage in a responsible way” -- presumably meaning we’d continue some version of advising and assistance -- but, Trudeau said, Obama “understands the commitments I’ve made around ending the combat mission.”

This is a very big decision for Trudeau to have already announced as a fait accompli before he has even moved into 24 Sussex Dr.

It’s no surprise that Trudeau wanted to do this. It’s on the record. But it’s important to note it wasn’t one of the key parts of his platform.

It wasn’t something he repeated on every occasion as he did with his infrastructure spending plan.

Did voters give him a majority predominantly because of this position? No. Polls have consistently shown that a majority of Canadians support Canada’s role against the Islamic State.

An Ipsos Reid poll earlier this year showed 67% of identified Liberal supporters were in favour of extending Canada’s mission in Iraq and Syria.

Trudeau is offside from his own party.

But perhaps more important is the question of teamwork. One of the ways in which we were told Trudeau would be different than Harper is that he would be less of a one-man show. Less dictatorial, more of a team player and consensus builder.

In fact, whenever someone criticized Trudeau’s credentials -- as I frequently did in election columns -- the main response was that what matters more in a leader is that they listen to those around him.

Yet this first move of Trudeau’s was made without listening to the team that was elected to join him in Ottawa. It was made from the top down.

There hasn’t been a caucus meeting yet. No defence minister has been announced. There is no cabinet.

This first move by Trudeau is as equally single-minded as decisions made by Harper that prompted the outgoing PM’s detractors to label him a “dictator”.

The Sun’s Tarek Fatah wrote a column just before the news broke about Obama’s call to Trudeau, hoping that the incoming PM would listen to those around him:

“Men such as former Toronto Police chief Bill Blair, Toronto Centre MP Bill Morneau and Canada’s first-ever Somali-Canadian MP, Ahmad Hussen from York-South Weston, are just three who give me hope some Liberals MPs will resist moves to pull Canada out of the war against ISIS.”

It looks like that didn’t happen. This should be cause for concern for those who thought Trudeau would “do politics differently.”

Before the mechanisms of government were even in place, before the Governor General has even sworn him in, he spoke to the leader of the free world and withdrew Canada from a coalition committed to tackling the world’s worst human rights abusers. All by himself.

A sign of things to come?

I respectfully disagree.

Justin Trudeau has said since the very first vote in parliament that he didn't support Canadian jets bombing syria.

He also said it during the debates. Whenever asked, he stated that was his position.

To do a complete 180 the day after he gets elected would be another case of a politician lying. Like it or not, he campaigned on pulling the Jets from Iraq and Syria, it was public record, and anyone who voted for a liberal knew this was the plan. It would be lacking bottom to say "vote for me,and when I'm prime minister I'll ask everyone around me what I should do and come to some sort of concensus "

It was a campaign promise he made and he's following through on it, like it or not.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Baz on October 22, 2015, 14:39:51
A second article on this point for consideration.  Again, read with an opinion mind and ask yourself some honest questions...emphasis mine again.

I ask you do the same thing, and consider opinions from all sides, not just the ones that support you.

I have asked myself these questions, in rooms where the strategic implications were being decided, and I wasn't the only one asking...

Editted to add: I'm not agree with what JT is doing here, I just think there should be a discussion over what we are trying to accomplish.  In the HoC debates it was either "bomb" or "drop clothing."  Not good enough, in my opinion.

Modern wars (of any type) cannot be fought without Air Power.  I am just dubious that Air Power alone can accomplish anything.

So back to my point, if the only reason the US is in the ISIS fight is so that the Obama administration can be SEEN to be doing something, and we were dragged in to support that, then we are again in danger of making a dog's breakfast of this.  If we actually have a plan, other than just bombing stuff, then we should stick to it.

Based on my experience, I'm thinking it's more of the first and less of the second...
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Jed on October 22, 2015, 14:46:13
I respectfully disagree.

Justin Trudeau has said since the very first vote in parliament that he didn't support Canadian jets bombing syria.

He also said it during the debates. Whenever asked, he stated that was his position.

To do a complete 180 the day after he gets elected would be another case of a politician lying. Like it or not, he campaigned on pulling the Jets from Iraq and Syria, it was public record, and anyone who voted for a liberal knew this was the plan. It would be lacking bottom to say "vote for me,and when I'm prime minister I'll ask everyone around me what I should do and come to some sort of concensus "

It was a campaign promise he made and he's following through on it, like it or not.

Oh come on, Altair. That is ingenuous of you. PM elect Trudeau is acting very dictatorial and certainly did not stop and seek sage advice on this issue. His actions are purely political in this case. After all, it is not like he had't flip flopped on other issues during this campaign.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Altair on October 22, 2015, 14:55:39
Oh come on, Altair. That is ingenuous of you. PM elect Trudeau is acting very dictatorial and certainly did not stop and seek sage advice on this issue. His actions are purely political in this case. After all, it is not like he had't flip flopped on other issues during this campaign.
The man campaigned on this. So did mulair actually, would he have been dictatorial for following through on his campaign promise as well?

He made a commitment to this and he's following through. Lord knows if a cf 18 crashed somewhere in Syria and a CF pilot was burned to death in a cage the media and opposition would never let him hear the end of it.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: milnews.ca on October 22, 2015, 14:56:47
.... In the HoC debates it was either "bomb" or "drop clothing."  Not good enough, in my opinion ....
:nod:
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on October 22, 2015, 15:06:44
The international community had to act: but what happened to the 3 block war?

I am not an expert in 3 block war, but again we don't have all the assets in place to conduct it;  we have some tools that can be used to effect it, but the ground piece is not ours to decide on how it is conducted. 

Quote
I am not convinced that how we are fighting this (which is in large part, as I said, becuase Air Forces keep promising they can solve problems with little risk), is going to make it any better.

But the 'we' part, the RCAF assets, are doing the part they were sent to do;  halt and degrade ISIS where possible, deny them their FOM.  That was accomplished.  We (the greater Canada 'we') never said we would destroy ISIS/win the war/solve all the problems.  We said "here is what we will send as part of the air power assets to assist the GOI and MESF".  My experience and knowledge is we have done and are doing that.  I wish I was able to elaborate more, but anyone in uniform knows why that can't happen.  I can only hope my words and opinion on that can be considered credible because of the work I do.

Quote
Doing something is not always better than doing nothing; witness Libya.  My worry, is that at the end of the day all we'll do is teach the bad guys how to operate in the presence of Air Power.

A valid concern and one to take into consideration.  I believe that kind of TRA was done.

Quote
I welcome the discussion, and I never actively campaigned to stop doing what we are doing.  I just think we need to consider all the issues, and be careful about presenting a simple solution to the politicians, when in fact a complex one is needed.

I welcome discussion, debate...even heated debate.   ^-^

I also think we need to ask, and re-ask all the important 'so what?' questions.  I don't think Mr Trudeau has done that on this issue.  I think this was an easy campaign promise to 'keep' very quickly and publicly without consideration of several key "so what" questions.  IMO, the estimate was not complete and therefore the chosen COA was picked on incomplete information.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Baz on October 22, 2015, 15:15:59
But the 'we' part, the RCAF assets, are doing the part they were sent to do;  halt and degrade ISIS where possible, deny them their FOM.  That was accomplished.  We (the greater Canada 'we') never said we would destroy ISIS/win the war/solve all the problems.  We said "here is what we will send as part of the air power assets to assist the GOI and MESF".  My experience and knowledge is we have done and are doing that.  I wish I was able to elaborate more, but anyone in uniform knows why that can't happen.  I can only hope my words and opinion on that can be considered credible because of the work I do.

I also think we need to ask, and re-ask all the important 'so what?' questions.  I don't think Mr Trudeau has done that on this issue.  I think this was an easy campaign promise to 'keep' very quickly and publicly without consideration of several key "so what" questions.  IMO, the estimate was not complete and therefore the chosen COA was picked on incomplete information.

Absolutely the deployed forces are doing what they are good at: as I said, tactical success, operational wash, historical strategic failures.  But should we be putting them at risk without a plan?

I agree he should have studied more once he got on the inside and was privy to all the information.  However, I'm not sure Harper got good advice, or took it, either.  And I'm not sure Obama has a plan, or good advice, or did it for the right reasons.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on October 22, 2015, 15:21:21
I ask you do the same thing, and consider opinions from all sides, not just the ones that support you.

I try and knowing where I stand on the issue, try to rise above my own stance and look at it from the perspective of others.  Isn't that the only way we can achieve a greater awareness of a situation?  Spirited discourse  8) can be very productive.

Quote
I have asked myself these questions, in rooms where the strategic implications were being decided, and I wasn't the only one asking...

Editted to add: I'm not agree with what JT is doing here, I just think there should be a discussion over what we are trying to accomplish.  In the HoC debates it was either "bomb" or "drop clothing."  Not good enough, in my opinion.

Modern wars (of any type) cannot be fought without Air Power.  I am just dubious that Air Power alone can accomplish anything.

So back to my point, if the only reason the US is in the ISIS fight is so that the Obama administration can be SEEN to be doing something, and we were dragged in to support that, then we are again in danger of making a dog's breakfast of this.  If we actually have a plan, other than just bombing stuff, then we should stick to it.

Based on my experience, I'm thinking it's more of the first and less of the second...

That bit in yellow is the hard question, and also way above my level of knowledge. 

I can see we are along parallel lines of thinking, at least in some regards.  I don't believe some key 'so whats?' have been asked, let alone answered and we (the Canada 'we') should stop, define the questions at this point in the game that need answered and base the answers on relevant points of consideration.  I do not see where this has happened yet and this is a cause of concern for me; not only for this specific subject but as an indicator on the mentality of those who will govern our great country for the next 4 years.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: BurnDoctor on October 22, 2015, 21:06:03
Okay I did.  Now, do you have a single example of anywhere this theory has actually worked?

Here are 2 examples of stuff that actually worked. 

(https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/e/e5/Shigemitsu-signs-surrender.jpg/300px-Shigemitsu-signs-surrender.jpg)

(http://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fi.huffpost.com%2Fgen%2F1124861%2Fimages%2Fo-GERMANY-SURRENDERS-ALLIES-WWII-ENDS-facebook.jpg&hash=487147d1bf0f3bc1691a0b6e83393c0e)

I'm totally with Eye In The Sky: A war worth fighting is a war worth fighting to win. In War Two, winning was defined as unconditional surrender. This is really only practical with state actors. Non-state actors such as ISIS demand a paradigm shift to a different end-state. Denying them territorial gain, revenue, and assets (coupled with making joining their ranks unattractive through psy-ops,etc. ) is fine, but, by gosh, I'm sure the end-state most of us would like to see for these ungodly ISIS scum would be complete and utter annihilation.  To make that omelette, some eggs will have to be broken, and neither Pierre's little boy nor the west in general currently seem to have the stomach for it, fatigued by 14 years of war. I genuinely believe that is too our detriment: by not tackling this now, we're deferring dealing with the threat until later, and quite possibly closer to "home"...ours, or that of our European friends.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Cloud Cover on October 22, 2015, 23:44:45
> I genuinely believe that is too our detriment: by not tackling this now, we're deferring dealing with the threat until later, and quite possibly closer to "home"...ours

The forces are here, currently writing mid-terms.  They don't add to much, but their striking power is the broadcast of fear when they take the next act.

On JT's first day he is going to get one hell of a briefing from the security services.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: YZT580 on October 23, 2015, 00:26:00
just pray that he actually listens
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Baz on October 23, 2015, 09:40:21
I'm totally with Eye In The Sky: A war worth fighting is a war worth fighting to win.

OK, we are all in agreement over that we have to win.  Now the question is how.

Firstly, my opinion is that the nation is not at war: small parts of the CAF are.  This has been the case right from Sept 11.  A little story, Jan 2002, right after I had come home from the Gulf (I was with HMCS Halifax) I was on a cruise.  Some grey hairs at breakfast from the US started to go on about how they were at war.  Notice the irony: the are talking about how they were at war while sitting at breakfast on a cruise ship.

So, if we want to fight to win, using what they taught me about targeting, what is the first step: identification of adversaries and own center of gravity.  I have my ideas, but I'll toss that out for discussion...

This should be a national discussion, and it should have been part of the election.  I know I'm seriously considering a call to my MP to discuss where we should be going...
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: BurnDoctor on October 23, 2015, 15:41:55
> I genuinely believe that is too our detriment: by not tackling this now, we're deferring dealing with the threat until later, and quite possibly closer to "home"...ours

The forces are here, currently writing mid-terms.  They don't add to much, but their striking power is the broadcast of fear when they take the next act.

On JT's first day he is going to get one hell of a briefing from the security services.

I've had that thought daily since Monday, and that I'd dearly love to hear that briefing.  I really hope it's a good old-fashioned " 'splainin' " that JT gets. Currently he has no clue, from the mundane (calling LAVs "Jeeps") to the broad strategic (announcing to our allies on Day 1 that "we're back", despite having been shoulder-to-shoulder with them since...well...since forever; and then promptly bailing on Op Impact. Don't even get me started on how insulting it is to CF members that he implies that Canada was ever "gone" with respect to engagement with allies.)

Rant over. For today. Roughly 1500 to go, unless we get real lucky with some spectacular scandal.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: CMoffs on October 24, 2015, 04:47:18
    In my opinion, we only fly 2.7 percent of all sorties over Iraq and Syria. So us pulling out in that aspect isn't a big deal to me. I agree with us having to win the war but with what it costs to fly those jets and the minimal impact we make as part of the coalition, we could be getting a bigger bang for our buck. I'm not sure what the humanitarian situation is with the coalition is but I'm sure with the money we're spending with the bombing mission could be being spent else where and make a much bigger impact. Cause until we put boots on the ground to fight the war and win it, create a proper plan to address radicalization and build a better tomorrow, then spend the time and money to actually follow through on this plan (cause it will at least a few generations to do so) only then will we have a chance at winning. But nobody wants to do it. I remember reading a British article on the War in Afghanistan. The Brit's said that it would take at least a 50 year mission to actually rid Afghanistan of the Taliban and the threat of radicalization. That's nearly 3 generations of soldiers fighting in the same war.

   
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Good2Golf on October 24, 2015, 09:41:35
So percentages overrule principles?

Canada was one of the major proponents of R2P at the UN.  We're updating this to "R2FUAHTWMIOWTL - Responsibility to follow-up and help those who made it out with their lives?" ???

If percentages were the prime consideration, we should never have sent JTF 2 into Afghanistan after 9/11, nor the PPCLI Battle Group, nor follow-on Tasks Forces, nor anywhere else where Canada contributed but a few percentages, morality and principles be darned.

:2c:

G2G
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: E.R. Campbell on October 24, 2015, 10:12:38
I've made no secret of my views over the years: I oppose any and all US led, Western interventions in the region (North Africa, the Middle East and West Asia), except arms sales, until the people there have found some way ~ massive and monstrous bloodshed will, I suspect, be a major feature ~ to sort themselves out. In my opinion most of the peoples of the regions are in urgent need of a socio-cultural enlightenment such as we, in the liberal, enlightened, secular West underwent in the 17th and 18th centuries. Of course, in our case, the enlightenment had to be preceded by a religious reformation which, in its turn, needed the bloody Thirty Years War. Similar events in Asia (the Chinese enlightenment happened, arguably, 2,500 years ago, after the bloody Spring and Autumn (春秋) and Warring States (戰國 / 战国) periods) followed a similar pattern, albeit with less religious involvement.

Anyway, I proposed, in the past, isolation, which includes, sadly, only very, very limited, non-governmental humanitarian aid.

So I applaud M Trudeau for backing away, but I oppose refugee resettlement and government humanitarian projects. Leave 'em alone for a generation or two, in my prescription ... let Allah sort 'em out.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: GR66 on October 24, 2015, 12:25:16
As usual Mr. Campbell gets to the root of the issue and provides the logical course of action.  Which of course won't be taken by the West.  That's not to say that the West is collectively stupid or incapable of making hard decisions (at least not totally), but there are other factors than sheer logic that come into play. 

There is general human compassion and an abhorrence of violence and suffering which our (voting) public would find it difficult to sit back and simply watch.  There are short term economic and political factors which drive our involvement (which are always easier to see and pursue than the long term factors). 

My personal preference would be to see the Arab coalition members completely take over the bombing campaign from the West.  We could perhaps still provide our Aurora and tanker support to the campaign in order to maximize the effectiveness, but it really is their war to fight.  The problem is that many of these "allies" in the short term really are our enemies (or at the very least NOT our friends) in the long term and are contributing to the base problem of Islamic radicalism in the Middle East. 

That being the case, I'm not opposed to pulling even those elements out too, but I do think that politically it's very important to make it very clear to our Western allies in the coalition our reason for pulling out...not just pulling out because we're unwilling to do our fair share of the heavy lifting when it's required.  This means that we may have to be seen to be picking up the slack in other areas by our allies in order to maintain our credibility with them.

The Kurds may be a different case.  Supporting them may possibly be in both our short and long term interests.  They may have the possibility of being a more moderate, pro-Western, wedge into the Middle East that doesn't carry the negatives that support of the Gulf States carries.  Continued and even increased support for them could be something I'd support but there are certainly political risks in that as well.  NATO member Turkey certainly does not want a strong, independent Kurdish state developing and there is a real risk of Canadian-supported Kurds coming into direct conflict with Russian-supported (or even Russian national) forces in Syria.  Do we have the guts to follow through with our support if the going gets tough?  Is our national interest there strong enough to be worth that support?  I'm not sure I know the answer to that.

I also agree in general with Mr. Campbell's stand on refugees.  I don't think it does any good for us to take in large numbers of refugees from the region.  I'm fine with taking in immigrants who meet our requirements but we have a process in place for that already.  No need for special quotas, etc.  I am however fine with increasing humanitarian assistance to the region to support refugees locally.  Better to give money to Turkey, Jordan and the Kurds to support people displaced by the war rather then moving a handful of them to our country. 
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: recceguy on October 24, 2015, 13:41:14
I oppose refugee resettlement and government humanitarian projects. Leave 'em alone for a generation or two, in my prescription ... let Allah sort 'em out.

^^^^ This :bravo:
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on October 24, 2015, 15:52:27
    In my opinion, we only fly 2.7 percent of all sorties over Iraq and Syria. So us pulling out in that aspect isn't a big deal to me. I agree with us having to win the war but with what it costs to fly those jets and the minimal impact we make as part of the coalition, we could be getting a bigger bang for our buck. I'm not sure what the humanitarian situation is with the coalition is but I'm sure with the money we're spending with the bombing mission could be being spent else where and make a much bigger impact. Cause until we put boots on the ground to fight the war and win it, create a proper plan to address radicalization and build a better tomorrow, then spend the time and money to actually follow through on this plan (cause it will at least a few generations to do so) only then will we have a chance at winning. But nobody wants to do it. I remember reading a British article on the War in Afghanistan. The Brit's said that it would take at least a 50 year mission to actually rid Afghanistan of the Taliban and the threat of radicalization. That's nearly 3 generations of soldiers fighting in the same war.

   

we aren't the boots on the ground in this one, we are HELPING the boots on the ground in this one.

Also need to remember it's 2.7 of ALL sorts,  not just combat ones.  The great thing about a coalition?  Many hands make light work.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Tuan on October 24, 2015, 22:58:06
we aren't the boots on the ground in this one, we are HELPING the boots on the ground in this one.

Also need to remember it's 2.7 of ALL sorts,  not just combat ones.  The great thing about a coalition?  Many hands make light work.

I was just wondering who is doing the tactical military intelligence collection in the region, which is extremely important in counterterrorism operations. If entire coalition is engaged in bombing missions why can’t the Canadian forces train the indigenous groups such as Kurds and Syrian rebels in "good human intelligence gathering” practices against the ISIS?

I completely understand that the tactics/techniques can often be considered classified information in many realms, so it's quite hard to discuss that without revealing/spreading information, which isn’t available in the open forum. Those who knows does not tell, and those who tells does not know, because you don't just kiss and tell, no true professional talks, (except beating around the bush) because after having spoken, he becomes a non-entity.

Having said that, from open source we can extract 95% of strategic intelligence, but for tactical intelligence we need to depend on the human intelligence (HUMINT). It is not news that the NATO forces have been trying to strengthen its HUMINT gathering capacity for a long time and the best way in my opinion is that they train and deploy the ISIS defectors and indigenous groups of the surrounding region.


Let me quote Professor Bruce Hoffman, a veteran American scholar on counterterrorism, whose writings I thought could be an a addition to our discussion in this topic:

Quote
The challenge that security forces and militaries the world over have faced in countering terrorism is how to obtain information about an enigmatic enemy who fights unconventionally and operates in a highly amenable environment where he typically is indistinguishable from the civilian populace. The differences between police officers and soldiers in training and approach, coupled with the fact that most military forces are generally uncomfortable with, and inadequately prepared for, counterterrorist operations, strengthens this challenge. Military forces in such unfamiliar settings must learn to acquire intelligence by methods markedly different from those to which they are accustomed. The most "actionable," and therefore effective, information in this environment is discerned not from orders of battle, visual satellite transmissions of opposing force positions, or intercepted signals but from human intelligence gathered mostly from the indigenous population.
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2002/01/a-nasty-business/302379/

Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on October 25, 2015, 07:44:53
Not going to discuss anything on here other than to say Int comes from many sources and means.

Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Tuan on October 28, 2015, 22:29:46
Canada's new PM is right: Bombs won't beat ISIS
http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/23/opinions/canada-isis-trudeau/index.html

Quote
Justin Trudeau's campaign promise to end the bombing mission, while continuing to train Iraqis away from the front lines, represented a balanced approach to recognizing the complexity of the Syrian conflict and the limited options available to the West.

While counterterrorism is most often linked with the exercise of "hard power" (intelligence, law, policing, and military power), it must increasingly make use of "soft power" (political, social, and economic control, together with broader policy initiatives dealing with the environment, development, critical infrastructure, migration, and humanitarian intervention).

The Syrian conflict has its roots in a volatile mix of discriminatory practices by government, widespread corruption, chronic lack of opportunity for young people, lack of essential services, all combined to convince many that there is no alternative other than violent extremism and terrorism. A strictly military approach to such a complex situation is dangerously reductionist. As the great American psychologist, Abraham Maslow, wrote in 1966: "I suppose it is tempting, if the only tool you have is a hammer, to treat everything as if it were a nail."

The Sunni Arabs of Iraq and Syria support ISIS only because they have no other option in a divided and discriminatory environment where Shia governments favor their own, with support from Iran and Hezbollah, and Kurds enjoy the support of the U.S. and its allies (to Turkey's great chagrin).

Because ISIS is the only Sunni force capable of confronting the Shia forces in both Iraq and Syria, it receives varying degrees of support from neighboring Sunni states, particularly Saudi Arabia. The Syrian conflict is in many ways a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and threatens to become a kind of proxy Cold War between Russia and the U.S.

Political, economic, social, humanitarian, and diplomatic initiatives are urgently needed if a long-lasting solution is to be found. With Russia entering the fray on the side of Bashar al-Assad, and supposedly moderate rebels less and less capable of sustained and effective combat, as well as increasing waves of desperate refugees fleeing rapidly escalating violence, with no end in sight, a comprehensive approach is all the more imperative.

Justin Trudeau's decision to end Canada's participation in the bombing campaign against ISIS is a step in the right direction.[Quote/]
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: PuckChaser on October 28, 2015, 22:33:28
Canada's new PM is right: Bombs won't beat ISIS
http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/23/opinions/canada-isis-trudeau/index.html

Yep, bombs alone won't work. That's why Obama is sending more ground troops to expand the training mission into more OMLT tasks and SOF raids.

Go to Syria and ask to negotiate with ISIS. I'll wait here for the Al-Jazerra video.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: YZT580 on October 28, 2015, 22:57:51
Bombs won't win but they will certainly slow down the advance to give time for other approaches to win.  Terrorists are not poor deprived children, but are often from middle and upper class backgrounds.  They are not underprivileged.  They are supported primarily because voting ISIS is preferable to losing your head or your children or your spouse.  These people are dangerous and handing out lollipops to the folks that are running from the gunfire is a feelgood but accomplish nothing approach.   
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: MCG on October 28, 2015, 23:00:07
Does pulling out fighters also mean pulling out refueling and surveillance capabilities? 

Could "continuing to train Iraqis" include more conventional force training capacity (as we had in Kabul)?

Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Tuan on October 28, 2015, 23:06:59
Quote
While counterterrorism is most often linked with the exercise of "hard power" (intelligence, law, policing, and military power), it must increasingly make use of "soft power" (political, social, and economic control, together with broader policy initiatives dealing with the environment, development, critical infrastructure, migration, and humanitarian intervention).

The Syrian conflict has its roots in a volatile mix of discriminatory practices by government, widespread corruption, chronic lack of opportunity for young people, lack of essential services, all combined to convince many that there is no alternative other than violent extremism and terrorism. A strictly military approach to such a complex situation is dangerously reductionist. As the great American psychologist, Abraham Maslow, wrote in 1966: "I suppose it is tempting, if the only tool you have is a hammer, to treat everything as if it were a nail."

Above is a quote from the CNN article I just posted which reaffirms the same "soft power" concept I had argued in this forum during  Trudeau's campaign , if you'd go back and read. Point is "hard power" alone just won't work! What would work is "smart power", a combination of both soft power and hard power. Seems like somebody's listening.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Harrigan on October 29, 2015, 05:56:54
Does pulling out fighters also mean pulling out refueling and surveillance capabilities? 

Could "continuing to train Iraqis" include more conventional force training capacity (as we had in Kabul)?

I would be absolutely shocked if the refuelling and surveillance capabilities are pulled out.  In fact, I could see the Hornets being replaced by air mobility assets, particularly if their "25,000 refugee" plan by the end of the year involves some RCAF assistance.

Harrigan
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: milnews.ca on October 29, 2015, 07:20:53
I would be absolutely shocked if the refuelling and surveillance capabilities are pulled out.  In fact, I could see the Hornets being replaced by air mobility assets, particularly if their "25,000 refugee" plan by the end of the year involves some RCAF assistance.
That bit in yellow may need more than just RCAF help, if one believes "sources" ....
Quote
A military airlift of the new Liberal government's promised 25,000 Syrian refugees would strain military resources and leave the air force largely unable to sustain operations around the globe, sources tell CBC News, suggesting contracted civilian airliners are a better option.

But the Liberal refugee proposal is also large and the logistics so intense, it's also unlikely the government could meet its obligations without relying heavily on the military and its network of bases and troops across the country.

These two realities are likely guiding planners inside the government and military as they prepare to meet prime minister-designate Justin Trudeau's campaign promise to welcome 25,000 refugees of the Syrian crisis by the end of the year ....
Much of the article covers how Canada dealt with Kosovar refugees in 1999 in OP Parasol (http://bit.ly/1jTy0g6).
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on October 29, 2015, 11:08:51
Above is a quote from the CNN article I just posted which reaffirms the same "soft power" concept I had argued in this forum during  Trudeau's campaign , if you'd go back and read. Point is "hard power" alone just won't work! What would work is "smart power", a combination of both soft power and hard power. Seems like somebody's listening.

The point has always been that hard power/military force ALONE won't work, but that it is a necessary piece of the puzzle.  So this is hardly any sort of an epiphany on anyone's part, right?

No one has ever suggested that the air task force et al was the 'one stop solution' to the conflict in the area.  As I and others have said many times, the job of ATF-I was to stop the advance and 'strike where able IAW ROEs", ISIS forces who were advancing.  That job was done.

The rest of the job, problem, whatever you want to call it, is not the mandate of an ATF.

Simple analogy;  if your house is on fire, the first thing you probably want to happen is for the fire fighters to show up, stop the spread and put out the fire.  The rebuilding of the home, investigation into the cause, etc is 'after the fire is out' actions and not ones the fire fighters themselves do.  They go back to the firehouse, service their gear, continue their training, and wait for the bell to go off again. 

Bombs alone won't stop ISIS, but 'soft power' also won't stop a technical who is engaging a friendly position.  In that instance, you'll want the 'bomb'.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Tuan on October 29, 2015, 13:08:45
The point has always been that hard power/military force ALONE won't work, but that it is a necessary piece of the puzzle.  So this is hardly any sort of an epiphany on anyone's part, right?

No one has ever suggested that the air task force et al was the 'one stop solution' to the conflict in the area.  As I and others have said many times, the job of ATF-I was to stop the advance and 'strike where able IAW ROEs", ISIS forces who were advancing.  That job was done.

The rest of the job, problem, whatever you want to call it, is not the mandate of an ATF.

Simple analogy;  if your house is on fire, the first thing you probably want to happen is for the fire fighters to show up, stop the spread and put out the fire.  The rebuilding of the home, investigation into the cause, etc is 'after the fire is out' actions and not ones the fire fighters themselves do.  They go back to the firehouse, service their gear, continue their training, and wait for the bell to go off again. 

Bombs alone won't stop ISIS, but 'soft power' also won't stop a technical who is engaging a friendly position.  In that instance, you'll want the 'bomb'.

If that’s the case can you list the soft power initiatives parallel to hard power strategy that the Tories put forward since this operation has begun?
 
I seriously think that as a North American solution to the problem, while our giant neighbour to the south trying to respond to the conflict with hard power strategy, Canada on the other hand should approach it with its traditional soft power policy, a discourse that would redress the balance at the end.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on October 29, 2015, 13:30:06
Or, more accurately, did you mean the Government of Iraq and other countries from the region?

You miss the point here, overall.  The Canadian government is not, has not been, nor will be, the nucleus of change in that region.  They can advise, assist, etc BUT the solutions for this will not be ones IMPLEMENTED by the Canadian Government, whether that government is formed by the Conservatives OR Liberals.

Iraq has a government in place (without getting into whether it is effective or not, let's just acknowledge that there is a government in place.  What concerns there may be about that government would be a totally separate thread).  As you've heard me say, the GOI is driving the bus.  There may be interested parties telling that bus driver which way to turn or stop, but the driver has the final decision.  Not his Canadian tourist 6 rows back from the front.

Trying the link the  assumed 'lack of soft power' in the region to PM Harper and the Tories is vacuous in my opinion.   :2c:

While I am not involved in the application of soft power, I ask how you KNOW there are no efforts in its application ongoing now, or before WRT to soft power?  No news stories on it?  No 'open source intelligence'?  I don't like to assume things, so I would like some sort of credible, tangible evidence that no one is applying 'soft power' while the necessary campaign to stop and degrade ISIS is ongoing.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Tuan on October 29, 2015, 13:54:14
I haven’t come across any reports about the application of soft power initiatives vis-à-vis war on ISIS, to date. Have you? But, I read otherwise WRT the US approach that should be.....

Quote
The term "soft power" -- the ability of a country to persuade others to do what it wants without force or coercion -- is now widely invoked in foreign policy debates. This short book reintroduces the idea and argues for its relevance in forming post-September 11 U.S. foreign policy. Nye argues that successful states need both hard and soft power -- the ability to coerce others as well as the ability to shape their long-term attitudes and preferences. The United States can dominate others, but it has also excelled in projecting soft power, with the help of its companies, foundations, universities, churches, and other institutions of civil society; U.S. culture, ideals, and values have been extraordinarily important in helping Washington attract partners and supporters. Nye acknowledges the limits of soft power: it tends to have diffuse effects on the outside world and is not easily wielded to achieve specific outcomes. Indeed, societies often embrace American values and culture but resist U.S. foreign policies. But overall, Nye's message is that U.S. security hinges as much on winning hearts and minds as it does on winning wars.

Joseph Nye, former Assistant Secretary of Defense under the Clinton Administration and author of several books on smart power strategy, suggests that the most effective strategies in foreign policy today require a mix of hard and soft power resources. Employing only hard power or only soft power in a given situation will usually prove inadequate. Nye utilizes the example of terrorism, arguing that combating terrorism demands smart power strategy. He advises that simply utilizing soft power resources to change the hearts and minds of the Taliban government would be ineffective and requires a hard power component. In developing relationships with the mainstream Muslim world, however, soft power resources are necessary and the use of hard power would have damaging effects.

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/2004-05-01/soft-power-means-success-world-politics
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on October 29, 2015, 14:06:10
I haven't, no, but that doesn't mean I do not assume they aren't ongoing.  If they are, are they 'news worthy'?  Are they even in the open source domain?  The answer to the first question, IMO, is "no".  MSM wants juicy things on their sites/printed versions.  The answer to the second question is better left for SMEs in that area, I would just be offering a WAG.

Is there a potential opportunity for Canada to play a bigger role as an 'advisor' to the stakeholders in the region?  I think there could be, yes.  I just don't know how much 'soft power' we have to project as a nation. 

Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Harrigan on October 30, 2015, 00:15:00
I don't think Tuan has 'missed the point', but he (or she) is just looking at it a different way.

From what I can see, much of the commentary in this thread is based on some assumptions:
1.  Our contributions is materially contributing to the overall mission goal
2.  Any change in that contribution would detract from the overall mission goal

I believe the answer to 1. is Yes, but I am not sure that a change in contribution would necessarily detract from the overall mission goal. 

If we pull out our 6 Hornets, it is not as though the entire ATF will collapse into a bubbling heap and ISIL will be in Baghdad tomorrow.  We have a small contributory role in the overall effort.  I would suggest that the relative impacts of the refuelling and particularly the ISR components are greater, though, and that is why I would be very surprised if the Auroras or tankers are sent home.  That is a niche capability that we are providing that is quite valuable.

The bottom line, though,  is that Canada's contribution to OP IMPACT, as with most of our 'coalition of the willing' deployments,  is not valued for the number of bombs it can drop in Syria or Iraq, or the number of planes refuelled, or the number of targets identified and prosecuted, as valuable in a tactical sense as those roles may be.  Our biggest contribution to the fight against ISIS is our flag - that is what the United States wants more than anything else.

I am quite certain that Obama was, as was reported, perhaps disappointed but understanding about Trudeau's position on Canada's combat role vs ISIS.  The removal of the Hornets fulfils a political promise by the incoming government that all Canadians were aware of and voted for.  However, as long as the US is confident that Canada's 'flag' is not being lowered from the fight against ISIS, I am sure they can live with the loss of 6 x Hornets from the ORBAT.  And I personally haven't heard anything from Trudeau suggesting that he intends to end the entire ISIS mission. 

We can argue against that decision, of course, but to do so requires us to ask these rather important questions:

1.  What does winning look like?
2.  Is our current strategy of aerial bombing of pop-up targets and providing training assistance to the GoI and Kurds making material progress towards achieving the answer to Q1?
3.  If the answer to Q2 is no, do we need to change our strategy or do we continue our current strategy indefinitely and hope that the results change?
4.  If the answer to Q1 has no obvious roadmap of 'how to get from here to there', what are the implications?
5.  If the answer to Q1 requires commitment and casualties that western powers are not prepared to take, see Q3.

My sense from this site is that the general consensus answer (mine too) to Q1 is something along the lines of 'ISIS is eradicated'. 

If we are well on our way to doing that, great.  I obviously missed that press conference then. 
If we are NOT well on our way to doing that, then perhaps "continuing the status quo" is not such a great COA.

Harrigan
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on October 30, 2015, 00:59:08
That is a niche capability that we are providing that is quite valuable.


That sounds good but it not based on reality.  Sorry, can't elaborate any more than that.  Also, the ATF is Canadian.  The MESF is the 'coalition'.  6 Hornets make up 66% of the ATF.

Here in lies the problem; it is a small op, involving aircrew only on the teeth end, most people don't know the facts or understand a lot of it and form opinions based on 'whats in the news'.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Harrigan on October 30, 2015, 04:15:22
Apologies about the ATF/MESF mixup.  I meant that the loss of 6 x Hornets is not going to materially affect the operational goals of the coalition air effort.

As for the capabilities of the refuellers and tankers, my understanding is that the Auroras (in particular) are providing an excellent service that WOULD be missed by the coalition were they to be removed.  If that is not based on reality, that would be disappointing. 

Harrigan
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Good2Golf on October 30, 2015, 13:49:20
There is also an incorrect presumption in the discussion that Canada must also be exercising "soft power.' 

What is the answer to the question, "To whom should [Canada's or any other nation's] 'soft power' be focused?"   

GoI?  ISIS?  UN?  GCC?
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Tuan on October 30, 2015, 19:52:48
Supporting my opinion with Nye's notion, what I meant to say was, when combating terrorism, not only Canada but also other nations, would benefit if they apply "smart power" strategy, a combination of both soft and hard power.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Good2Golf on October 31, 2015, 15:35:42
...and again I'll ask, "apply such 'smart power' against whom?"

You are espousing a methodology, and I don't necessarily disagree with the overall premise, but the intended recipient of such engagement is also an important factor. Should ME and/or Western nations attempt to work directly with ISIS? Or with nations directly affected by ISIS? or with regional organizations? (Hence GCC included in my previous list of potential engagees)

G2G
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Tuan on October 31, 2015, 16:25:42
My understanding is that apply the smart power concept directly against ISIS. By doing so, we (the NATO led coalition forces) would eventually be engaged in a PSYOPS project against ISIS. I believe that we can ultimately persuade some factions and/or members of ISIS to defect from the organization and thus turn this war on ISIS into a psychological warfare.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: milnews.ca on October 31, 2015, 16:27:15
My understanding is that apply the smart power concept directly against ISIS. By doing so, we (the NATO led coalition forces) would eventually be engaged in a PSYOPS project against ISIS. I believe that we can ultimately persuade some factions and/or members of ISIS to defeat from the organization and thus turn this war on ISIS into a psychological warfare.
WTF?  Buzzword bingo?
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Humphrey Bogart on October 31, 2015, 16:54:43
WTF?  Buzzword bingo?

Lol someone make this man a General!
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Tuan on October 31, 2015, 17:13:25
My understanding is that apply the smart power concept directly against ISIS. By doing so, we (the NATO led coalition forces) would eventually be engaged in a PSYOPS project against ISIS. I believe that we can ultimately persuade some factions and/or members of ISIS to defect from the organization and thus turn this war on ISIS into a psychological warfare.

My apologies, there was a typo that I've corrected that instead of "defect" I wrote "defeat"
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on October 31, 2015, 17:45:59
My understanding is that apply the smart power concept directly against ISIS. By doing so, we (the NATO led coalition forces) would eventually be engaged in a PSYOPS project against ISIS. I believe that we can ultimately persuade some factions and/or members of ISIS to defect from the organization and thus turn this war on ISIS into a psychological warfare.

What is your definition of psychological warfare?  Why do you assume that isn't part of the current op?
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Tuan on October 31, 2015, 17:58:16
What is your definition of psychological warfare?  Why do you assume that isn't part of the current op?

Simply put, if you're really engaged in psychological warfare, you'd maximize the soft power and minimize the hard power, but what is happening in this operation is the other way around, don't you think?
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: MCG on October 31, 2015, 18:06:13
Simply put, if you're really engaged in psychological warfare, you'd maximize the soft power and minimize the hard power ...
So, you believe "hard" and "soft" techniques are mutually exclusive?
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Tuan on October 31, 2015, 18:19:32
So, you believe "hard" and "soft" techniques are mutually exclusive?
With all due respect, I am not interested in discussing a logical argument from a probability theory, rather I compare two different counterterrorism operations in which one was successful and other is not, and what we did right and wrong, that's all!
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: MCG on October 31, 2015, 18:28:06
I have not presented you a question of probability.  You have seemingly established your argument on the premise that we cannot exercise "hard power" if we are to exercise "soft power."  This false dichotomy may be inconvenient for you to address, but if you want to dialog then you can't just choose to avoid the questions that don't enable the conclusions desired by you.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Tuan on October 31, 2015, 18:51:50
Not at all, I am not trying to avoid questions or trying to win an argument here, that's not my purpose, rather I am interested in sharing my knowledge as a counterterrorism practitioner from Sri Lanka, where my countrymen with the support of rest of the world successfully obliterated one of the world most ruthless terrorist organization. Therefore my only argument is that if we can do that, why can't you and others?
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: MCG on October 31, 2015, 18:57:19
What I see you doing is selling a false dichotomy, tossing around buzz words, and not really defining your alternate solution in detailed plain-speak.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Good2Golf on October 31, 2015, 19:18:35
Tuan, you do know that soft power is about applying political influence on other political (governmental and non-governmental) agencies that work in the same interactive context, right?  If ISIS had ambassadors or envoys to the UN, for example, soft power might be applicable.  They don't, so soft power's application towards them seems dubious, no?

Secondly, you said we apply 'smart power' which earlier you defined as a blend of both hard and soft power. 

How about the premise that Canada and other nations that can apply the hard power to directly intervene against hostile/in humane action by ISIS against others, and countries, such as those f the Middle East, provide the soft power, which arguably, M.E. countries using their significantly closer cultural ties could do with much greater effect.

G2G
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Tuan on October 31, 2015, 19:21:45
I am sorry you see me that way but my intention is clear and concise; however as you would understand, I am reluctant to write everything on an open forum such as this one.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: E.R. Campbell on October 31, 2015, 19:32:38
Soft power, the best soft power, is very, very difficult, usually impossible, for governments to "deploy" because, as Prof Nye pointed out the soft power weapons are, usually, not within a government's span of control.

If you want to see GREAT soft power, you need to look at:

(http://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fimg0071.popscreencdn.com%2F149272277_amazoncom-josephine-baker-josephine-baker-music.jpg&hash=629a08668d270c685b7c6ccd9567630f) (https://pmcdeadline2.files.wordpress.com/2015/04/mgm-logo-new.jpg?w=446&h=299&crop=1)(http://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fisrabox.com%2Fuploads%2Fposts%2F2007-12%2F1198556467_louis-armstrong-gold-400.jpg&hash=d85732b684b44e8b5bdbd0f3e4d53408)  (http://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.mcwade.com%2FDesignTalk%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2009%2F02%2Fcokeredcircle.jpg&hash=54f4280c4cbb50d4efe114afacbd5d47) (http://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.jgdb.com%2Fjgsdvd7c.jpg&hash=1245f64db507802a7a6d19a611eae889)

Samuel Goldwyn and Louis B Meyer and bunch of other Eastern European Jews created the American Dream and sold it all over the world. They probably did more to create and wield American soft power than did even George C Marshal and Dean Acheson.

Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: PPCLI Guy on October 31, 2015, 19:36:14
Reproduced under the Fair Dealings provisions of the Copyright Act.

Quote

SMALL WARS JOURNAL
smallwarsjournal.com

August 27, 2010
What Sri Lanka Can Teach Us About COIN
by Lionel Beehner

 ...But Sri Lanka‘s successful victory one year ago stands all this conventional wisdom on its head. It was brute military force, not political dialogue or population control, which ended its brutal decades-long war with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), or Tamil Tigers, a
separatist group perhaps most notorious for popularizing the suicide bomb. The final military campaign lasted months, not years or decades. It was a gruesome finale, to be sure. The Sri Lankan government paid little heed to outside calls for preventing collateral damage. While humanitarian workers and journalists were barred from entering the war zone, as many as 20,000 civilians were killed in the crossfire and hundreds of thousands of internally displaced Tamils were corralled into camps after war ended1. It was, as one journalist I spoke to in Colombo put it,―a war without witnesses.‖ Hearts and minds took a backseat to shock and awe.

Still, the lesson from Sri Lanka‘s COIN experiment is that overwhelming force can defeat insurgents, terrorists and other irregular armed groups in relatively short order, but at a steep cost. Its model disproves the notion that counterinsurgencies must be drawn-out, Vietnamlike
campaigns. With U.S. forces bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan, it also provides states fighting small wars with a different  counterinsurgency template. Not without reason did Pakistan and Thailand, which both face insurgencies on their peripheries, seek out Sri Lanka for military training and advice in recent months.

Soft power huh?

Quote
How to Defeat Insurgencies: Sri Lanka's Bad Example
By Bobby Ghosh / Washington    Time Magazine Wednesday, May 20, 2009
 

The conflict in Sri Lanka has long provided lessons for militant groups around the world. The Tamil Tigers taught terrorists everywhere the finer (or more savage) points of suicide bombing, the recruitment of child soldiers, arms trafficking, propaganda and the use of a global diaspora to collect resources. The Tigers "were the pioneers in many of the terrorist tactics we see worldwide today," says Jason Campbell, an Iraq and Afghanistan analyst at the Brookings Institution.

But now that the Tigers have been defeated, governments and security forces around the world may try to learn from the success of the Sri Lanka government. President Mahinda Rajapaksa and his army have turned the conventional wisdom on fighting insurgencies on its head, adopting strategies and tactics long discredited, both in the battlefield and in the military classroom. Since they appear to have worked against the Tigers, other countries wracked by insurgencies — from Pakistan to Sudan to Algeria — may be tempted to follow suit. But Rajapaksa's triumph has come at a high cost in civilian lives and a sharp decline in democratic values — and he is no closer to resolving the ethnic resentments that underpinned the insurgency for decades. Perhaps Sri Lanka's success should come with a warning label for political leaders and military commanders elsewhere: Do not try this at home.

Rajapaksa's campaign has a bit in common with the one General David Petraeus deployed so successfully in Iraq, and is rolling out in Afghanistan. Just as the American general was able to use Sunni insurgents to fight al-Qaeda in Iraq, Sri Lanka's President turned a splinter group of Tigers into allies. Colombo and Washington (and other Western capitals) also cooperated in cutting off funding to the Tigers from a global network of sympathizers. Beyond that, however, the Rajapaksa counterinsurgency doctrine seems ripped from a bygone era. The main principles are:

Brute Force Works
Modern military wisdom says sheer force doesn't quell insurgencies, and that in the long run political and economic power-sharing along with social reconciliation are the only ways to end the fighting. But the Sri Lankan army eventually broke down the Tigers in an unrelenting military campaign, the final phase of which lasted more than two years. That sort of sustained offensive hasn't been tried anywhere, in decades.

Negotiations Don't
After numerous attempts at mediation — most notably by Norway — led to nothing, Rajapaksa basically abandoned the pursuit of a negotiated solution. Once the military had the upper hand, there was little effort to treaty with the Tigers.

Collateral Damage Is Acceptable
In the final months of fighting, the Sri Lankan military offensive hardly differentiated between civilian and Tiger targets. Refugees fleeing the fighting said thousands of innocents were being killed in the army's bombardments. Modern militaries typically halt hostilities when large numbers of civilians are killed. The Sri Lankan army barely paused. Reva Bhalla, director of analysis at Stratfor, a global intelligence firm, says Rajapaksa's "disregard for civilian casualties" was a key to the success of the military operation.

Critics Should Shut Up — Or Else
For a democracy, Sri Lanka's recent record on press freedom is an embarrassment. Journalists who dared question the government (and not just over the military campaign) have been threatened, roughed up, or worse. The Jan. 8 murder of Lasantha Wickrematunge, a crusading editor — and TIME contributor — was an especially low point. In recent months, as the fighting intensified, journalists and international observers were kept well away, ensuring very little reporting on the military's harsh tactics and the civilian casualties.

Lack of accurate reporting from the war front was one reason why the international outcry against the military's heavy-handedness was so muted — especially in the U.S. Rajapaksa also benefited from the post-9/11 global consensus that insurgent groups using terror tactics "can no longer call themselves freedom fighters," according to Daniel Markey, a South Asia expert at the Council on Foreign Relations. "The Tigers didn't understand this, and paid a significant price."

That may be one lesson insurgencies worldwide can learn from the Tigers' downfall.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on October 31, 2015, 19:39:25
Simply put, if you're really engaged in psychological warfare, you'd maximize the soft power and minimize the hard power, but what is happening in this operation is the other way around, don't you think?

Not exactly an answer to the questions...

What is your definition of psychological warfare?  Why do you assume that isn't part of the current op?
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on October 31, 2015, 19:50:02
Not at all, I am not trying to avoid questions or trying to win an argument here, that's not my purpose, rather I am interested in sharing my knowledge as a counterterrorism practitioner from Sri Lanka, where my countrymen with the support of rest of the world successfully obliterated one of the world most ruthless terrorist organization. Therefore my only argument is that if we can do that, why can't you and others?

Would you care to elaborate to what degree you were involved?  An outside observer?  A trigger-puller? 
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Tuan on October 31, 2015, 20:19:38
Off to work right now, and respond to all queries promptly when I get back.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: jollyjacktar on October 31, 2015, 21:31:09


Soft power huh?

The Roman/Mogul methods work just ask Carthage.  The west doesn't have the balls or hasn't been pushed over the tipping point of restraint yet.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Tuan on November 01, 2015, 01:58:54
Tuan, you do know that soft power is about applying political influence on other political (governmental and non-governmental) agencies that work in the same interactive context, right?  If ISIS had ambassadors or envoys to the UN, for example, soft power might be applicable.  They don't, so soft power's application towards them seems dubious, no?

Not necessarily, because Nye, who coined the term “soft power”, doesn’t restrict/classify it to be only for state actors, rather in his book he recommends it to be applied against non state actors such as terrorist organizations.

Secondly, you said we apply 'smart power' which earlier you defined as a blend of both hard and soft power. 

How about the premise that Canada and other nations that can apply the hard power to directly intervene against hostile/in humane action by ISIS against others, and countries, such as those f the Middle East, provide the soft power, which arguably, M.E. countries using their significantly closer cultural ties could do with much greater effect.

Much of the world’s Islamic extremists already view the Western nations as an enemy. As such, if the West continues to engage them in hostile manner, primarily by the use of hard power, while the Middle Eastern Muslim countries embrace the extremists/terrorist softly, the situation will exacerbate as the latter will perceive the Western nations as enemy intruders.  Is this what Nye trying to tell us by the U.S.’s success in world politics is best achieved through the use of smart power?
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Tuan on November 01, 2015, 01:00:20
Soft power, the best soft power, is very, very difficult, usually impossible, for governments to "deploy" because, as Prof Nye pointed out the soft power weapons are, usually, not within a government's span of control.

Completely agree with you Sir!
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Tuan on November 01, 2015, 01:06:23
Reproduced under the Fair Dealings provisions of the Copyright Act.

Soft power huh?

For the record, you won’t find everything in the open source but let me summarize the untold story of the Sri Lankan conflict that led to the total destruction of the terrorist organization.

In 2002, a Sri Lankan statesman known as Ranil Wickremesinghe elected to power and unlike previous governments he chose to negotiate with Tamil Tigers. But while talking peace, the terrorists were rearming and rebuilding themselves with a strong army, navy and a rudimentary air force. In response, Wickremesinghe led UNP government was forced to engage them in a intelligence led psychological warfare. With the help of the U.S and Norway, one of the ground breaking achievements the Sri Lankan military intelligence has gained was that they engineered a split within the Tiger organization in 2004 and made a Tiger leader who was second in command in the ranks to defect from the terrorist organization with over 6000 Tiger cadres out of the organization's total number of10, 000 cadres. Since the DMI realized the importance of HUMINT in counterterrorism they temporarily enlisted the entire cadres including the Tiger top commander Karuna as a paramilitary group in the country’s army. Then they indoctrinated the defected cadres with soft power and turned them against the rest of the Tiger organization’s main faction. This reverse tactic of turning the very same terrorists/ insurgents/guerrillas/rebels - whatever you may call them – against the main faction paid off since the tactical military intelligence collection was crucial and it was ready on the table obtained via this engineered defection. This was the “game-changer” in the Sri Lankan civil war’s history that could be extrapolated into al Qaeda, Taliban and/or ISIS.

Please refer this:
http://jcr.sagepub.com/content/56/1/16.short

I am not done yet; following the defection, the Tamil Tigers forced all the Tamil population to vote against Wickremesinghe's UNP government whereby a far right wing hardliner Mahinda Rajapaksa was elected as President in 2006. He was a dictator who only knew “whom to use for what.”  Subsequently, he took advantage of the intelligence provided by the paramilitary group that the previous government formed and busted the entire terrorist organization including its supreme leader. Now Rajapaksa regime is being prosecuted for war crimes by the new government reelected this year led by the very same statesman, Ranil Wickremesinghe!

Reproduced under the Fair Dealings provisions of the Copyright Act.

Soft power huh?

Oh yeah, soft power it is!
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Tuan on November 01, 2015, 01:11:11
I know many of you define terrorism through your eyes on the al Qaeda in Afghanistan and ISIS in Iraq, and would not be interested in other nations who are/were victims of terrorist organizations equally dangerous as ISIS, if not more. For those who are really interested in Sri Lanka here is an annotated bibliography.

Balasingham, A. (2001). The Will to Freedom: An Inside View of Tamil Resistance.    Mitcham, England:Fairmax.
This book is an insider’s look at the armed conflict by the LTTE, which portrays them as freedom fighters. As a historical account, The Will to Freedom clearly examines important events, episodes, and turning points of the 30-year long conflict. This book will be an important source for this essay because it sheds the light on the unknown characteristics of the LTTE leaders, cadres and their mindset, motivation, strengths, and weaknesses.

Balasuriya, M. (2011) The Rise and Fall of the LTTE. Colombo Sri Lanka: Asian Network on Conflict Research.                               
As an Inspector General of Sri Lankan Police, the author Balasuriya examines three main areas in his book. First, he addresses the crucial element for defeating the LTTE – political leadership and well-trained armed forces, police and intelligence services. Second, the author looks into the government of Sri Lanka’s realistic approach to war and peace. Third, he explores the LTTE’s genesis, growth, decline, infighting, and finally its defeat by Sri Lankan security forces andthe international collaborators, particularly the United States, India and China. As such, this book would be a valuable account for this paper because it focuses on the LTTE’s history and reasons for its defeat. 

Chandraprema, C.A. (2012) Gōta’s War: The Crushing of Tamil Tiger Terrorism in Sri    Lanka. Colombo, Sri Lanka: Ranjan Wijeratne Foundation
This book presents a clear picture of the importance of the political and military leadership for wiping out terrorism in Sri Lanka. The author gives credit to the Sri Lankan president Mahinda Rajapaksa and his brother, also the Secretary of Defense, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, for political and military victories respectively. The book will be an important account for this paper because it point outs how Gota (Gotabaya Rajapaksa) planned, prepared and executed the war against the LTTE successfully in the midst of many obstacles.
 
De Silva, K.M. (2012) Sri Lanka and the Defeat of the LTTE. New Delhi, India: Penguin
   In his book, the veteran Sri Lankan historian De Silva outlines the history of ethnic tension in Sri Lanka since its independence in 1948. Then he examines the origin, development and demise of the LTTE, the triumphant Sri Lankan government and the security forces. Finally, De Silva talks about the necessity of post war reconciliation, rehabilitation, and rebuilding of the country as well. As such, contents of De Silva’s book will support this paper’s arguments about causes of the LTTE defeat.

DeVotta, N. (2009) The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the Lost Quest for    Separatism in Sri Lanka. Asian Survey, 49(6), 1021-1051.
This journal article analyses the root causes of the Sri Lankan conflict, such as discrimination and oppression of its own minorities by the successive Sri Lankan government. This led to the birth of the LTTE, which engaged in terrorism and fascistic rule in the areas they controlled, thereby weakening the Tamil community. DeVotta then went on to say that the Sri Lankan president Mahinda Rajapaksa’s extra constitutional counterterrorism strategies led to the eventual defeat of the LTTE.  As such, this journal article is important because it provides an opinion on the ethnic conflicts in Sri Lanka that contributed to the development and demise of the LTTE.

Gunaratna, R. (2002). Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror. New York, NY: Barkley.
As a leading scholar who wrote more than six books on LTTE and heads a counterterrorism think-tank in Asia-Pacific, Professor Gunaratna now writes about Al Qaeda comparing the organization’s ideologies, structures, tactics, and operations to other terrorist organizations, especially the trendsetter LTTE. Gunaratna writes this book based on the Al Qaeda’s documents and his own interviews with Al Qaeda associates, which led to five years of an extensive research. This book points out the obvious that Al Qaeda copies all their operational tactics from the LTTE, and therefore, this book’s findings will immensely contribute to this paper.

Gunaratna, R. (1997) International and Regional Security Implications of the Sri Lankan    Tamil Insurgency. Colombo, Sri Lanka: Unie Arts.
Basing on surrendered and arrested LTTE cadres’ interviews, the author Gunaratna writes about how LTTE became a threat to regional and global security. This book analyzes the LTTE organization’s structure, strategies, tactics, and profiles. This is one of those books that led Western nations’ to label the LTTE as a terrorist organization rather than a freedom movement. Thus, this book’s contents will be useful for understanding of the reasons that led Western nations to ban and fight against the LTTE.

Hoffman, B. (2009) The first non-state use of a chemical weapon in warfare: the Tamil Tigers’ assault on East Kiran. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 20(3-4), 463-477.
This journal article explores a shocking detailed account of the LTTE as the first non-state actor using chemical weapons in East Kiran, Sri Lanka, against the Sri Lankan security forces in June 1990. The article begins with the general background of the LTTE and goes on to state how innovative and lethal they are as a terrorist organization. The article concludes with the outline of the motivations behind a terrorist group to use chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons, and suggestions on how governments can prevent this from happening in the future. Therefore, this journal article provides a key to understanding the dangerous dimensions of the LTTE and possible consequences for the global security.
 
Mayilvaganan, M. (2008) Is it Endgame for LTTE? Strategic Analysis, 33(1), 25-39.   This journal article examines the LTTE’s struggle during the “Global War on Terrorism” following the post-9/11 scenario.  The author enlists the factors contributing to the defeat of the LTTE, such as internal conflict, international pressure, predominance of the Sri Lankan military, scarcity of arms and new recruits, which are some of the elements. Mayilvaganan further questions the regional and global implications on the anticipated defeat of the LTTE. Therefore this journal article validates this paper’s argument about the impact of the 9/11 attacks on the LTTE.

Narayanswamy, M.R. (2003) Inside an Elusive Mind: Prabhakaran. New Delhi, India: Konark.
As one of India’s leading author on terrorism, Narayanswamy writes about why the LTTE was armed, trained and funded by the Indian government in order to placate India’s geopolitical interests in late 1980s. This book is an interesting portrait of a man who was the only decision maker and the supreme leader of the world’s most ruthless terrorist organization. Narayanswamy also throws light on the hitherto unknown facts of the Indian intelligence interventions in Sri Lanka that led to the eventual assassination of India’s Prime Minister Rajiv Ghandi by the LTTE. Therefore, this book’s contents will be beneficial for this paper because they provide evidence on how a state-sponsored terrorism became a threat to the regional and global security.

P/s: I wrote this bibliography for one my college paper.

Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Tuan on November 01, 2015, 01:14:59
Would you care to elaborate to what degree you were involved?  An outside observer?  A trigger-puller?

Both! Here is an author’s bio from my upcoming book.

Quote
Tuan was born in Jaffna, Sri Lanka and raised in Northern and Southern provinces in that country. Later in 1997, he moved to Canada. He is married and a father of three young children. He has worked over two decades with several international intelligence agencies as an intelligence officer, intelligence analyst and security consultant.

At the age of 17, Tuan was abducted from high school and forcibly recruited by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) under the demand that at least one member from each family must contribute to the civil war. Subsequently, he underwent six months of basic military training and was deployed as a child soldier. After more than four years of nightmares and harrowing experience with one of the world’s most ruthless terrorist organization, he was eventually assigned to infiltrate the government of Sri Lanka as a sleeper agent, where he made a U-turn and became a double agent in order to play a significant role in obliterating the terrorists in May 2009.

The security and intelligence agencies Tuan worked for include India’s foreign intelligence agency the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) of Sri Lanka, the Canadian Security Intelligence Services (CSIS), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) in Singapore.

Tuan has been active in voicing his concerns relating to Tamil grievances in Sri Lanka. One of his contributions was to support the migrants from Sri Lanka that arrived in Canada by boats in 2009 and 2010. Following his testimony justice was administered in court and refugee hearings for many Tamils refugee claimants.

Tuan is currently working on his upcoming memoir that tells an important, personal part of the larger story about his experience as a child soldier in Sri Lanka, LTTE organization and operations, what makes a man a terrorist and the significance of intelligence in counterterrorism under different chapters.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Good2Golf on November 01, 2015, 09:40:35
Much of the world’s Islamic extremists already view the Western nations as an enemy. As such, if the West continues to engage them in hostile manner, primarily by the use of hard power, while the Middle Eastern Muslim countries embrace the extremists/terrorist softly, the situation will exacerbate as the latter will perceive the Western nations as enemy intruders. 

...but not exclusively with soft power, you would agree.

G2G
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Tuan on November 01, 2015, 11:03:13
...but not exclusively with soft power, you would agree.

G2G
Yes, IMO, like the Sri Lankan model, the west should arm and train GCC nations plus the indigenous groups and may be act as an intermediary between the parties rather than fighting the war themselves because the conflict in ME is increasingly becoming complex.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Good2Golf on November 01, 2015, 11:58:02
Yes, IMO, like the Sri Lankan model, the west should arm and train GCC nations plus the indigenous groups and may be act as an intermediary between the parties rather than fighting the war themselves because the conflict in ME is increasingly becoming complex.

Not unreasonable.  I would think, however, that a significant issue regarding ISIS is that prominent members of the GCC do not appear as 'seized of the issue' as the Sri Lankan government of the day, was.

G2G
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Tuan on November 01, 2015, 13:38:07
Not unreasonable.  I would think, however, that a significant issue regarding ISIS is that prominent members of the GCC do not appear as 'seized of the issue' as the Sri Lankan government of the day, was.

G2G

True, that's why the westerners should be cautious about when to push and pull in the region.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Jarnhamar on November 01, 2015, 13:55:31
Both! Here is an author’s bio from my upcoming book.

Ahhhh.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on November 02, 2015, 14:05:48
Quote
SMALL WARS JOURNAL
smallwarsjournal.com

August 27, 2010
What Sri Lanka Can Teach Us About COIN
by Lionel Beehner

 ...But Sri Lanka‘s successful victory one year ago stands all this conventional wisdom on its head. It was brute military force, not political dialogue or population control, which ended its brutal decades-long war with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), or Tamil Tigers, a separatist group perhaps most notorious for popularizing the suicide bomb. The final military campaign lasted months, not years or decades. It was a gruesome finale, to be sure. The Sri Lankan government paid little heed to outside calls for preventing collateral damage. While humanitarian workers and journalists were barred from entering the war zone, as many as 20,000 civilians were killed in the crossfire and hundreds of thousands of internally displaced Tamils were corralled into camps after war ended1. It was, as one journalist I spoke to in Colombo put it,―a war without witnesses.‖ Hearts and minds took a backseat to shock and awe.

Still, the lesson from Sri Lanka‘s COIN experiment is that overwhelming force can defeat insurgents, terrorists and other irregular armed groups in relatively short order, but at a steep cost. Its model disproves the notion that counterinsurgencies must be drawn-out, Vietnamlike campaigns. With U.S. forces bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan, it also provides states fighting small wars with a different  counterinsurgency template. Not without reason did Pakistan and Thailand, which both face insurgencies on their peripheries, seek out Sri Lanka for military training and advice in recent months.

I believe I can assure you the MESF et al will not risk 'killing as many as 20,000 civilians'.  This article excerpt alone makes me discount the 'advice' that may come from this 'successful' operation. 
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: MCG on November 02, 2015, 14:59:22
I believe I can assure you the MESF et al will not risk 'killing as many as 20,000 civilians'. 
I am sure the Russians would not lose sleep over it, nor would many of the regional powers.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: MCG on November 02, 2015, 15:25:22
Does pulling out fighters also mean pulling out refueling and surveillance capabilities? 

Could "continuing to train Iraqis" include more conventional force training capacity (as we had in Kabul)?
It seems that media speculation to my second question is "yes"

Quote
Canada's training mission in Iraq to expand as bombing mission ends
U.S. keen for Canada to remain part of the coalition in Iraq, Syria

Lee Berthiaume
Ottawa Citizen
31 Oct 2015

The new Liberal government is expected to expand Canada's training mission in Iraq, which would take away some of the string of withdrawing Canadian military aircraft from the region and help the U.S. as it starts sending troops into Syria.
 
Canada currently has six fighter jets, two surveillance aircraft and an air-to-air refuelling plane participating in the U.S.-led bombing campaign against ISIL. It also has 69 special forces troops training and operating alongside Kurdish forces fighting the extremist group in northern Iraq.
 
Prime minister-designate Justin Trudeau and the Liberals pledged during the election campaign to end Canada's bombing mission in Iraq and Syria. But while Trudeau reaffirmed the promise after the election, he declined to give specific details until after his government is sworn in on Nov. 4. Experts say there are a number of unanswered questions about Trudeau's plan for Iraq and Syria, including when the jets will return home and whether the new government will withdraw all Canadian warplanes or only the fighter jets. But most believe the special forces mission will get a boost.
 
"There will not solely be 69 people in a training capacity, and that's it," said defence analyst David Perry of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute. "They will be enhancing the training mission."
 
Trudeau himself has signalled an expansion of the special forces mission on numerous occasions. Earlier this year, for example, he said Canada should be "building on" the training already underway. His party's election platform says a Liberal government would "refocus" on training local Iraqi forces.
 
"If there's going to be any noticeable refocusing, that implies you're not just going to keep the same number of people there doing that particular function," Perry said.
 
Expanding the mission would serve several purposes. Canada's pending withdrawal from the bombing mission has already made headlines, and would represent a symbolic blow to the U.S.-led coalition against ISIL. Adding more trainers on the ground would dampen any negative message.
 
"The U.S. wants us in the coalition," said Bessma Momani, a Middle East expert at the Centre for International Governance Innovation. "They want to be able to announce: 'Yes, Canada withdrew six CF-18s. That's OK. But they increased here.'" Meanwhile, on Friday, President Barack Obama for the first time authorized sending U.S. soldiers into Syria to help train and assist rebels fighting the Islamic State (ISIL). About 50 special operations troops will be based in Kurdish territory to work with local forces, the White House said, though more could soon follow.
 
Canada has one of the smallest contingents of trainers of the participating countries in Iraq. According to the Royal United Services Institute, a British think tank, 11 allies had more troops in Iraq than Canada at the beginning of August. And of the 5,954 coalition soldiers in Iraq, more than 3,500 were from the U.S. While most of the experts believed Washington would try to pressure Trudeau into making some new commitment in Iraq, they were split on whether it would ask Canada to send trainers into Syria. But adding troops in Iraq, at least, would free up U.S. trainers for Syria.
 
There is precedent for this as documents obtained by Postmedia showed the Conservative government's decision to deploy 900 trainers to Kabul in 2011 to help train Afghan forces was based in large part on releasing some American soldiers for combat instead of training. Trudeau has also indicated he will modify the special forces mission so Canadian soldiers are no longer operating on the front lines with Kurdish forces, where they have been calling in airstrikes and engaging in defensive firefights with Islamic State fighters.
 
NDP MP Hélène Laverdière said she hopes Trudeau will order a halt to the bombing campaign and changes to the special forces mission as soon as the new government is sworn in. She also urged the Liberals to consult with opposition parties if it plans to add more troops on the ground.
 
One Canadian special forces soldier has been killed in Iraq. Sgt. Andrew Doiron was shot and killed by Kurdish forces during a so-called friendly fire incident in March.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Tuan on November 02, 2015, 15:41:14
I believe I can assure you the MESF et al will not risk 'killing as many as 20,000 civilians'.  This article excerpt alone makes me discount the 'advice' that may come from this 'successful' operation.

I am not going to argue about the civilian casualties and that's why the current government has set up a commission to investigate war crimes and all that but if you study the war you'll learn some lessons from it.

Although I'll definitely NOT justify the final brutal force that killed actually around 40,000 civilians according to a UN report, here is another article's point of view:

Quote
Some have criticized the Sri Lankan victory as only being possible because the government disregarded civilian casualties and used military force bluntly and brutally. This view correctly emphasizes that wars are by their nature cruel and violent and should not be entered into or continued lightly. However, it unhelpfully neglects critical factors and explains little. As this article has discussed, victory came to the side with the most successful strategies – even if it took the government more than 22 years to find them.

In this regard, a comparison with the two other Western-led counterinsurgency wars of the period comparing soldiers and civilians killed is instructive:

Breakdown of Overall Deaths in the Conflict

Category of those Killed   Sri Lanka War (1983-2009)   Iraq War
(2004-09)   Afghanistan War (2001-14)
Friendly Force Personnel   29%   17%   29%
Enemy Force Personnel   37%   22%   46%
Civilians   34%   61%   25%
 

These were three different civil wars that each featured counterinsurgency strategies that progressively evolved. All involved significant civilian casualties with Iraq markedly the worse with 61 percent of those killed being civilians and Afghanistan the best at 25 percent. The Sri Lankan war with 34 percent of those killed overall being civilians, and thus broadly comparable to Afghanistan, then seems somewhat unremarkable except that the Sri Lankan war was decisively won. In Iraq and Afghanistan there was no victory, there remains no peace and people continue to die.

http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/how-sri-lanka-won-the-war/
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: opcougar on November 04, 2015, 12:29:19
Spot on....as someone who survived a couple of IRA bombings in London UK, way before the Taliban, ISIS and ETA (Spain) malarky, my "terrorism" experience goes that far back. Oh, they are still in operation by the way, but most people don't see that or think of Northern Ireland like that.

I know many of you define terrorism through your eyes on the al Qaeda in Afghanistan and ISIS in Iraq, and would not be interested in other nations who are/were victims of terrorist organizations equally dangerous as ISIS, if not more.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Humphrey Bogart on November 04, 2015, 13:25:55
There is a key difference between ISIS and some of the other groups mentioned in this thread though.  LTTE, IRA, ETA, Abu Sayyaf, FARC, pick your freedom fighter movement are merely organizations fighting for some form of national liberation.  They may use terrorist attacks to further their agenda but ultimately they are fighting a war of national liberation.

ISIS, on the other hand, is a doomsday cult.  Yes they are Muslim fundamentalists but what differentiates them from other groups is they believe that the world needs to end and that all non-believers needs to be killed in order to be reborn as believers in Allah and Islam.  They are closer to a group like Aum Shinrikyo or the Branch Davidians. 

So while all groups mentioned, LTTE, IRA, ETA, etc... use violence as a means to advance their cause, these groups ultimately have limited strategic objectives.  They are rational organizations and are run by rational people.  ISIS is not a rational organization, it wants to destroy the world.  They are, for all intents and purposes, a bunch of mindless zombies.  The only thing that will stop these people is "two to the chest, one to the head".

Quote
The Islamic State awaits the army of “Rome,” whose defeat at Dabiq, Syria, will initiate the countdown to the apocalypse.

I say we meet them at Dabiq, so we can begin the countdown.  The countdown until their entire doomsday organization is destroyed, one by one. 

 
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: PuckChaser on November 04, 2015, 13:37:22
Absolutely, that's why "soft" power is more effective for those groups with political goals. ISIS could care less about politics, so using political negotiations is never going to work. They'll keep you talking so you're focused on that instead of taking the fight to them.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Humphrey Bogart on November 04, 2015, 13:39:45
Absolutely, that's why "soft" power is more effective for those groups with political goals. ISIS could care less about politics, so using political negotiations is never going to work. They'll keep you talking so you're focused on that instead of taking the fight to them.

This is my point.  I agree partially with Tuan that soft power can be used on the periphery i.e. keeping others from joining ISIS but that ultimately, ISIS needs to be confronted with hard power. 

Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Colin P on November 04, 2015, 14:11:10
Spot on....as someone who survived a couple of IRA bombings in London UK, way before the Taliban, ISIS and ETA (Spain) malarky, my "terrorism" experience goes that far back. Oh, they are still in operation by the way, but most people don't see that or think of Northern Ireland like that.

That is part of the success of the combined military and political approach. The IRA was forced to the table by military action and then made irrelevant to most through political action.

However never mistake there is no line separating politics and fundamental Islam, the two are tightly intertwined.   
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Tuan on November 05, 2015, 02:21:43
There is a key difference between ISIS and some of the other groups mentioned in this thread though.  LTTE, IRA, ETA, Abu Sayyaf, FARC, pick your freedom fighter movement are merely organizations fighting for some form of national liberation.  They may use terrorist attacks to further their agenda but ultimately they are fighting a war of national liberation.

ISIS, on the other hand, is a doomsday cult.  Yes they are Muslim fundamentalists but what differentiates them from other groups is they believe that the world needs to end and that all non-believers needs to be killed in order to be reborn as believers in Allah and Islam.  They are closer to a group like Aum Shinrikyo or the Branch Davidians. 

So while all groups mentioned, LTTE, IRA, ETA, etc... use violence as a means to advance their cause, these groups ultimately have limited strategic objectives.  They are rational organizations and are run by rational people.  ISIS is not a rational organization, it wants to destroy the world.  They are, for all intents and purposes, a bunch of mindless zombies.  The only thing that will stop these people is "two to the chest, one to the head".

This perception exactly emphasizes the statement, “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter,” as it has become not only a cliché, but also one of the most difficult obstacles in coping with terrorism.

As Professor Boaz Ganor pointed out, “the matter of definition and conceptualization of ‘terrorism’ is usually a purely theoretical issue—a mechanism for scholars to work out the appropriate set of parameters for the research they intend to undertake. However, when dealing with terrorism and guerrilla warfare, implications of defining our terms tend to transcend the boundaries of theoretical discussions. In the struggle against terrorism, the problem of definition is a crucial element in the attempt to coordinate international collaboration, based on the currently accepted rules of traditional warfare.”
http://www.ict.org.il/Article.aspx?ID=1123

For instance, once upon a time al Qaeda was freedom fighters in the eyes of America but later they turned out to be terrorists. Similarly, the LTTE was freedom fighters in the eyes of India once upon a time and later turned against them as terrorists. Let’s look at the present day dilemma in Syria, a group that is “terrorists” for Russia may seem to be “freedom fighters” for America and vice versa.

Therefore, the bottom line is that the dubious "distinction of terrorism” is fundamentally flawed. In fact, there’s no clear definition of terrorism in the UN database, to date. However, according to some scholars, politicians and experts, if someone attacks you they’re ‘terrorists’ whose ideology is Islamic extremism/jihadism or as you described ‘doomsday cult’ thus they have to be dealt with hard power, whereas if someone aiding you they’re ‘freedom fighters’ who are fighting for national liberation and thus apply soft power to deal with them, eh?
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Humphrey Bogart on November 05, 2015, 09:11:15
This perception exactly emphasizes the statement, “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter,” as it has become not only a cliché, but also one of the most difficult obstacles in coping with terrorism.

As Professor Boaz Ganor pointed out, “the matter of definition and conceptualization of ‘terrorism’ is usually a purely theoretical issue—a mechanism for scholars to work out the appropriate set of parameters for the research they intend to undertake. However, when dealing with terrorism and guerrilla warfare, implications of defining our terms tend to transcend the boundaries of theoretical discussions. In the struggle against terrorism, the problem of definition is a crucial element in the attempt to coordinate international collaboration, based on the currently accepted rules of traditional warfare.”
http://www.ict.org.il/Article.aspx?ID=1123

For instance, once upon a time al Qaeda was freedom fighters in the eyes of America but later they turned out to be terrorists. Similarly, the LTTE was freedom fighters in the eyes of India once upon a time and later turned against them as terrorists. Let’s look at the present day dilemma in Syria, a group that is “terrorists” for Russia may seem to be “freedom fighters” for America and vice versa.

Therefore, the bottom line is that the dubious "distinction of terrorism” is fundamentally flawed. In fact, there’s no clear definition of terrorism in the UN database to date. However, according to some scholars, politicians and experts, if someone attacks you they’re ‘terrorists’ whose ideology is Islamic extremism/jihadism or as you described ‘doomsday cult’ thus they have to be dealt with hard power, whereas if someone aiding you they’re ‘freedom fighters’ who are fighting for national liberation and thus apply soft power to deal with them, eh?

I never said that we had to deal with any of those groups using only soft power.  I find the IRA, ETA, LTTE to all be equally detestable organizations.

I think all of these groups need to be dealt with using a combination of hard and soft power.  The soft power is used to keep people from joining them while hardpower is used to destroy the followers.

I agree that simply labelling anyone who is against you a terrorist is a poor word choice.  It's far too simplistic.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: E.R. Campbell on November 05, 2015, 10:10:14
Terror and terrorism are "tactics," usually used by the weaker opponent simply because he doesn't have the resources to fight any other way.

When Churchill told SOE (also known as the "Ministry of Ungentlemanly Warfare") to "set Europe ablaze,"he wasn't talking about giving Hitler a birthday party: he meant "be terrorists, use terror to unsettle the Germans wherever you can strike at them." It was the classic tactic of the weaker side ... it's been around for centuries:

          (http://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.armchairgeneral.com%2Fwordpress%2Fwp-content%2Fimage%2F2008%2Fspecialfeatures%2Fothernapoleonicwars%2Fgoya-third-of-may.jpg&hash=00ae50a9ce30019bb0f110b2a5093b46)

Counter-terrorism, assuming there actually is such a thing, is hideously complex ... think, in recent times, Viet Nam from the 1940s through to the 1970s, of Cyprus and Kenya in the 1950s, and so on.

I don't know enough about Sri Lanka except to say that there was much more than enough wrong on both sides to keep all the gods busy for eternity.One can only hope that few other countries descend into such a hell ... but some will.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Tuan on November 05, 2015, 10:52:13
Terror and terrorism are "tactics," usually used by the weaker opponent simply because he doesn't have the resources to fight any other way.


Precisely, you've hit the nail right on the head Sir; and this is exactly why some analysts call it a asymmetric warfare!
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: YZT580 on November 05, 2015, 11:33:40
As most who follow this site are aware, our very word assassin originates in the middle east amongst the ancestors of ISIS.  We are currently confronted with the descendants of the original 'assassins' who have 1. declared themselves an independent country and 2. subsequently declared war on Canada specifically (amongst others) and 3. are currently engaged in butchering or worse all those remaining within their declared sphere of influence who oppose them in any way.  Soft power will only work to help those who having experimented with ISIS, been revolted by its actions, and now want out if we can provide a safe environment for them while at the same time rescuing those from within the caliphate who want out. This haven includes good governance (something Obama and NATO forgot about during the uprisings in Libya et al and when they pulled out of precipitately pulled out of Bagdad).  Both of these elements require the employment of an organized and strong military offensive in the initial stages.  Dropping bombs in the meantime at least stops or slows the advance but until there is an organised army ready to go head to head with |ISIS that is all it will do.  Stopping people from crossing over is only possible when you control the access points and are ready to employ deadly force to sterilize the crossing points.  First thing to do is establish a safe haven so refugees don't have to leave their home territory for very foreign climates. 

That requires force again but then it requires good governance (a place where we are able to advise but it has to be an acceptable government to those who are displaced).  That means it has to be a middle eastern form of government administered by the Syrians themselves.  How you achieve that I don't know but the first step is to initiate plans to stop and eliminate the threat.  Namely destroy every element of ISIS you can find.  Forget name calling or branding and call it like it is: they are the enemy who have declared war on us. 

Does that make sense or am I being too simplistic?
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: PPCLI Guy on November 07, 2015, 10:30:19
First off, ISIL is not a descendant of the assassins - in fact they would have been mortal enemies.  The Assassins were a branch of the Ismaili sect of Shia Islam.  ISIL is rabidly Sunni.

As to the rest of it, governance is indeed the key, in both Iraq and Syria.  Indeed Gen Allen (President’s Special Envoy for the Global
Coalition to Counter Daesh) publicly speaks of five lines of effort:

http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2015/06/01-2015-us-islamic-world-forum/2015-0601-brookings-doha-forum-final.pdf (http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2015/06/01-2015-us-islamic-world-forum/2015-0601-brookings-doha-forum-final.pdf)

* A military component to deny safe haven and provide security assistance
* Disrupting flow of foreign fighters,
* Disrupting access to financial resources,
* Providing humanitarian relief and stabilization support
* Counter-messaging – or defeating Daesh as an idea.

With respect to stabilization, he has this to say:

Quote
As more territory is taken back from Daesh, we must also ensure we’re poised to empower the Iraqi government to act in relief of liberated populations.  We are working closely with the Iraqis, with the support of our Coalition partners, and in particular the Arab states, to help Iraq develop stabilization and recovery plans.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: opcougar on November 07, 2015, 10:55:07
I'll like to see an excerpt of that from the memo that you might be privy to...please

There is a key difference between ISIS and some of the other groups mentioned in this thread though.  LTTE, IRA, ETA, Abu Sayyaf, FARC, pick your freedom fighter movement are merely organizations fighting for some form of national liberation.  They may use terrorist attacks to further their agenda but ultimately they are fighting a war of national liberation.

ISIS, on the other hand, is a doomsday cult.  Yes they are Muslim fundamentalists but what differentiates them from other groups is they believe that the world needs to end and that all non-believers needs to be killed in order to be reborn as believers in Allah and Islam. They are closer to a group like Aum Shinrikyo or the Branch Davidians. 

So while all groups mentioned, LTTE, IRA, ETA, etc... use violence as a means to advance their cause, these groups ultimately have limited strategic objectives.  They are rational organizations and are run by rational people.  ISIS is not a rational organization, it wants to destroy the world.  They are, for all intents and purposes, a bunch of mindless zombies.  The only thing that will stop these people is "two to the chest, one to the head".

I say we meet them at Dabiq, so we can begin the countdown.  The countdown until their entire doomsday organization is destroyed, one by one. 

 
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Humphrey Bogart on November 07, 2015, 11:03:45
I'll like to see an excerpt of that from the memo that you might be privy to...please

http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/03/what-isis-really-wants/384980/ (http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/03/what-isis-really-wants/384980/)

Quote
The Islamic State is no mere collection of psychopaths. It is a religious group with carefully considered beliefs, among them that it is a key agent of the coming apocalypse. Here’s what that means for its strategy—and for how to stop it.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: opcougar on November 07, 2015, 13:24:21
So the New Yorker published comments by a US commander in the Middle East and that makes it kosher? I was expecting something from a site ISIS owns

http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/03/what-isis-really-wants/384980/ (http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/03/what-isis-really-wants/384980/)
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Eye In The Sky on November 07, 2015, 13:29:59
Do you have something to offer that is more credible?
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: milnews.ca on November 07, 2015, 14:30:42
So the New Yorker published comments by a US commander in the Middle East and that makes it kosher? I was expecting something from a site ISIS owns
Will a mere academic studying what ISIS says/does (https://www.lawfareblog.com/isis-cult) do?
Quote
.... Many new religious movements employ a set of practices for enhancing commitment. These include sharing property and/or signing it over to the group upon admission; limiting interactions with the outside world; employing special terms for the outside world; ignoring outside news sources; speaking a special jargon; unusual sexual practices such as requiring free love, polygamy, or celibacy; communal ownership of property; uncompensated labor and communal work efforts; daily meetings; mortification procedures such as confession, mutual surveillance, and denunciation; institutionalization of awe for the group and its leaders through the attribution of magical powers; the legitimization of group demands through appeals to ultimate values (such as religion); and the use of special forms of address.

Most terrorist groups employ at least some of these mechanisms. Violent cults develop a story about imminent danger to an “in-group,” foster group identity, dehumanize the group’s purported enemies, and encourage the creation of a “killer self” capable of murdering large numbers of innocent people.

ISIS members engage in a number of these practices. Many Western recruits burn their passports as a rite of passage. ISIS flaunts its sexual enslavement of “polytheists” as a sign of its strict conformance with Shariah, and of the coming end times. The strict dress code is enforced in part by public shaming of women who don’t comply. Like other apocalyptic groups in history, ISIS’s stated goal is to purify the world and create a new era, in which a more perfect version of Islam is accepted worldwide. This is a typical millenarian project, which always involves transforming the world into something more pure, either politically (as with the communists’ “New Man”) or religiously.

Dr. Robert J. Lifton is a psychiatrist who has studied “totalistic” groups since the 1950s, and he continues to write about them. “Increasingly widespread among ordinary people is the feeling of things going so wrong that only extreme measures can restore virtues and righteousness to society.” None of us is entirely free of such inner struggles; there is much that is confusing about contemporary life, in which many people are no longer tethered to traditional societies. But apocalyptic groups act on these feelings, “destroying a world in order to save it,” in Lifton’s words. Lifton was referring to another violent millenarian cult, Aum Shinrikyo, which in the 1990s had attempted to acquire nuclear weapons and had succeeded in poisoning some five thousand people on the Tokyo subway, twelve of whom died. But his words apply as well to ISIS. “Having studied some of the most destructive events of this era, I found much of what Aum did familiar, echoing the totalistic belief systems and end-of the-world aspirations I had encountered in other versions of the fundamentalist self. I came to see these, in turn, as uneasy reactions to the openness and potential confusions of the ‘protean’ self that history has bequeathed us.”

ISIS is similarly apocalyptic in its views, as similarly unpredictable. It emerged out of an especially barbaric strain of Al Qaeda, which was initiated by Abu Musab al Zarqawi, rather than Osama bin Laden. One of the reasons for both Zarqawi’s and ISIS’s anti-Shi’ite savagery is their apparent belief in end-times prophecies. It is impossible to know whether Baghdadi and other ISIS leaders truly believe that the end times are near, or are using these prophecies instrumentally and cynically to attract a broader array of recruits. Either way, appealing to apocalyptic expectation is an important part of ISIS’s modus operandi. And goading the West into a final battle in Syria is a critical component of the scenario.
Otherwise, as others have said ....
Do you have something to offer that is more credible?
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Tuan on November 07, 2015, 16:10:42
First off, ISIL is not a descendant of the assassins - in fact they would have been mortal enemies.  The Assassins were a branch of the Ismaili sect of Shia Islam.  ISIL is rabidly Sunni.

As to the rest of it, governance is indeed the key, in both Iraq and Syria.  Indeed Gen Allen (President’s Special Envoy for the Global
Coalition to Counter Daesh) publicly speaks of five lines of effort:

http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2015/06/01-2015-us-islamic-world-forum/2015-0601-brookings-doha-forum-final.pdf (http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2015/06/01-2015-us-islamic-world-forum/2015-0601-brookings-doha-forum-final.pdf)

* A military component to deny safe haven and provide security assistance
* Disrupting flow of foreign fighters,
* Disrupting access to financial resources,
* Providing humanitarian relief and stabilization support
* Counter-messaging – or defeating Daesh as an idea.

With respect to stabilization, he has this to say:

As I said here many times, you can eliminate some extremists, some leaders and some groups by military might as for short term goals but you will never destroy an intergenerational idea, such as Qutbism/Salafism/Wahhabism or Jihadism because an ideology has to be countered with another ideology, not by bombs and guns as it would exacerbate the situation. To counter an ideology by another you need to apply soft power!

http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/07spring/eikmeier.pdf
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: PPCLI Guy on November 07, 2015, 17:01:47
To counter an ideology by another you need to apply soft power!

I have no issues with that - in fact that is the thrust of the fifth line of operation.  I will, however, not accept that your Sri Lankan model is in anyway applicable, given its reliance on overt and unrepentant hard power methods.

You keep asking me to look at the lipstick.  I insist on looking at the pig.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Tuan on November 07, 2015, 17:20:25
I have no issues with that - in fact that is the thrust of the fifth line of operation.  I will, however, not accept that your Sri Lankan model is in anyway applicable, given its reliance on overt and unrepentant hard power methods.
You cannot base your entire argument vis-à-vis Sri Lankan conflict from the last few months of the operation that was directed by a dictator. I suggest you study the entire 30 year long war and post here your bibliography as I did, and then continue your discussion.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: E.R. Campbell on November 07, 2015, 17:38:50
As I said here many times, you can eliminate some extremists, some leaders and some groups by military might as for short term goals but you will never destroy an intergenerational idea, such as Qutbism/Salafism/Wahhabism or Jihadism because an ideology has to be countered with another ideology, not by bombs and guns as it would exacerbate the situation. To counter an ideology by another you need to apply soft power!

http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/07spring/eikmeier.pdf


You, and Col Eikmeier, are talking about changing Islam ... which might (I suggest would) be a very good thing, perhaps, some would suggest, it is even an essential thing if Islam, writ large, is to avoid a catastrophic conflict with both the US led West and China. There is a way to change religions ... we, in the West, did it 500ish years ago, it's called:

                              (http://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fecx.images-amazon.com%2Fimages%2FI%2F51A3IaaGXeL._SX324_BO1%2C204%2C203%2C200_.jpg&hash=cf8f5e2d923fd50f3b65fb7e8efe680e)
                                   By the way, I highly recommend the book: it's
                                   informative, insightful, and beautifully written

Of course, the reformation took a while and external "help" (from the Muslims) was both unwelcome and unhelpful and, from a Muslim perspective, unwise.

I cannot see why, either:

     1. An Islamic reformation is unlikely; or

     2. Any Western (or Chinese) "help" with the Islamic Reformation of, say, the late 20th through 23th centuries (I suspect it may have already begun) would be welcome, helpful or wise.

Our reformation did, and I expect the islamic Reformation will need to endure a long, bloody "civil war" ~ the Thirty Years' war (http://www.britannica.com/event/Thirty-Years-War), in our case.

There was some "soft power" ~ rather a lot, actually ~ involved in the European/Christian Reformation but it was all from within the European/Christian community, which is why it worked ... sort of. The Muslims tried to intervene, to exploit Europe's divisions (Selim I had his way with Egypt in some small part because Europe was divided, Suleiman the Magnificent exploited more and deeper divisions to conquer the Balkans and Mehmed III exploited even deeper divisions to defeat the Habsburgs, but his successors had, mostly, to deal with internal corruption, the Mughals and, later still, in the case of Suleiman II, a reuniting Europe that had surrendered about as much as it intended) but, in the end Muslim "help" was, I repeat, unhelpful and unwise. There is no reason to believe that Western "help" during an islamic Reformation will or can be otherwise, regardless of what sorts of power are applied.

In my mind the Islamic Reformation is more complex that the earlier Christian one because it involves not just sects but also Big Ideas about man and society, about revered medieval traditions vs the 21st and 22nd and so on centuries, and about the very role of religion (belief/faith) in life. It's heady stuff and, I believe, the Muslims need to sort it all out ... by themselves, in their own way and in their own ummah.

Our power, soft or hard, is neither wanted nor needed.

(Israel can look after itself.)

Edit: format (paragraphing) and spelling
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Tuan on November 07, 2015, 17:51:30
^^ I will definitely go and get it from my library and read it and then comment on it, Sir!
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: opcougar on November 07, 2015, 18:42:24
I wasn't trying to be paedantic, and am sure most people round the world know that Murica will say anything to justify whatever. WMDs rings a bell, and where is Bin Laden's body????

Will a mere academic studying what ISIS says/does (https://www.lawfareblog.com/isis-cult) do?Otherwise, as others have said ....
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: MCG on November 07, 2015, 19:28:43
 :Tin-Foil-Hat:
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Oldgateboatdriver on November 07, 2015, 19:59:32
^^ I will definitely go and get it from my library and read it and then comment on it, Sir!

It is not a bad book to be familiar with , Tuan, but I also suggest you look up, in a similar vein, Ayaan Hirsi Ali's book "Heretic: Why Islam Needs a Reformation Now".
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: jollyjacktar on November 07, 2015, 23:40:26

You, and Col Eikmeier, are talking about changing Islam ... which might (I suggest would) be a very good thing, perhaps, some would suggest, it is even an essential thing if Islam, writ large, is to avoid a catastrophic conflict with both the US led West and China. There is a way to change religions ... we, in the West, did it 500ish years ago, it's called:

                              (http://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fecx.images-amazon.com%2Fimages%2FI%2F51A3IaaGXeL._SX324_BO1%2C204%2C203%2C200_.jpg&hash=cf8f5e2d923fd50f3b65fb7e8efe680e)
                                   By the way, I highly recommend the book: it's
                                   informative, insightful, and beautifully written

Of course, the reformation took a while and external "help" (from the Muslims) was both unwelcome and unhelpful and, from a Muslim perspective, unwise.

I cannot see why, either:

     1. An Islamic reformation is unlikely; or

     2. Any Western (or Chinese) "help" with the Islamic Reformation of, say, the late 20th through 23th centuries (I suspect it may have already begun) would be welcome, helpful or wise.

Our reformation did, and I expect the islamic Reformation will need to endure a long, bloody "civil war" ~ the Thirty Years' war (http://www.britannica.com/event/Thirty-Years-War), in our case.

There was some "soft power" ~ rather a lot, actually ~ involved in the European/Christian Reformation but it was all from within the European/Christian community, which is why it worked ... sort of. The Muslims tried to intervene, to exploit Europe's divisions (Selim I had his way with Egypt in some small part because Europe was divided, Suleiman the Magnificent exploited more and deeper divisions to conquer the Balkans and Mehmed III exploited even deeper divisions to defeat the Habsburgs, but his successors had, mostly, to deal with internal corruption, the Mughals and, later still, in the case of Suleiman II, a reuniting Europe that had surrendered about as much as it intended) but, in the end Muslim "help" was, I repeat, unhelpful and unwise. There is no reason to believe that Western "help" during an islamic Reformation will or can be otherwise, regardless of what sorts of power are applied.

In my mind the Islamic Reformation is more complex that the earlier Christian one because it involves not just sects but also Big Ideas about man and society, about revered medieval traditions vs the 21st and 22nd and so on centuries, and about the very role of religion (belief/faith) in life. It's heady stuff and, I believe, the Muslims need to sort it all out ... by themselves, in their own way and in their own ummah.

Our power, soft or hard, is neither wanted nor needed.

(Israel can look after itself.)

Edit: format (paragraphing) and spelling

But as with anyone who needs to make major changes in their lives, nothing will change or stick unless or until they're ready to make the  change.

My stopping smoking comes to mind as an example.  Didn't happen successfully until I wanted to quit for real. 

Are the followers of Islam ready, willing or able to accept a re-jig of what my wife tells me is the verbatim dictation from Allah?  I can't see how that would fly.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: daftandbarmy on November 08, 2015, 01:45:17
As I said here many times, you can eliminate some extremists, some leaders and some groups by military might as for short term goals but you will never destroy an intergenerational idea, such as Qutbism/Salafism/Wahhabism or Jihadism because an ideology has to be countered with another ideology, not by bombs and guns as it would exacerbate the situation. To counter an ideology by another you need to apply soft power!

http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/07spring/eikmeier.pdf

The allies did a pretty good job at using hard power to destroy Nazism in Europe, and the equivalent in Japan, 1939-45.

AFAIK the only thing soft about that conflict were the two boiled eggs my old man was issued in his 5 years of service as a gunner in 3 Div.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: SupersonicMax on November 08, 2015, 09:24:06
The allies did a pretty good job at using hard power to destroy Nazism in Europe, and the equivalent in Japan, 1939-45.

AFAIK the only thing soft about that conflict were the two boiled eggs my old man was issued in his 5 years of service as a gunner in 3 Div.
But how we employ power changed greatly since...  Strategic attacks on civilian (essentially terrorizing them so that pressure is put on the Governments to capitulate) doesn't fly anymore.  That and we're fightig an ideology, not nations with regimes using an ideology.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: E.R. Campbell on November 08, 2015, 09:35:48
But how we employ power changed greatly since...  Strategic attacks on civilian (essentially terrorizing them so that pressure is put on the Governments to capitulate) doesn't fly anymore.  That and we're fightig an ideology, not nations with regimes using an ideology.


Both perceptive and correct, Max, and it's why Tuan is marching somewhere near parallel to the right track when he talks about "soft power," but, the ideology at work, in the Middle East, is a religious one (and maybe I should say "are religious ones") and it/they is/are ones that has/have had deep divisions since very near the very beginning of Islam.

At a guess, all of Islam need some (more rather than less) reformation ... but my guess also ought to tell you that I sympathized with Francis Fukuyama a few years ago ... I believe hope guess that some sort of individualistic secular-humanism is the only way in which peoples can manage to coexist without murdering each other on very large scales, and I also guess that something akin to the European Enlightenment (18th century), and the Chinese one 2,000+ years earlier, is needed but I suspect that an Enlightenment must follow (a) religious reformation(s) which, I further suspect, must include some bloody civil wars ~ civil wars in which I suggest we in the US led West have no useful role to play.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: Chris Pook on November 08, 2015, 10:49:07

Both perceptive and correct, Max, and it's why Tuan is marching somewhere near parallel to the right track when he talks about "soft power," but, the ideology at work, in the Middle East, is a religious one (and maybe I should say "are religious ones") and it/they is/are ones that has/have had deep divisions since very near the very beginning of Islam.

At a guess, all of Islam need some (more rather than less) reformation ... but my guess also ought to tell you that I sympathized with Francis Fukuyama a few years ago ... I believe hope guess that some sort of individualistic secular-humanism is the only way in which peoples can manage to coexist without murdering each other on very large scales, and I also guess that something akin to the European Enlightenment (18th century), and the Chinese one 2,000+ years earlier, is needed but I suspect that an Enlightenment must follow (a) religious reformation(s) which, I further suspect, must include some bloody civil wars ~ civil wars in which I suggest we in the US led West have no useful role to play.

Matthew 24:6 - "And ye shall hear of wars and rumours of wars: see that ye be not troubled: for all these things must come to pass, but the end is not yet."

Archaeologists have just found another massacre site in Iran - 3400 years old (http://www.pasthorizonspr.com/index.php/archives/11/2015/archaeologists-uncover-human-tragedy-at-ancient-elamite-site-of-haft-tappeh).

(http://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.pasthorizonspr.com%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2015%2F11%2FHaft4.jpg&hash=66db4224830420f7b386884e0c0e324a)

And others have been found all over the Middle East dating back to 5800 years ago (http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2007/09/070907-syria-graves.html)

These folks' problems date a long way back before Mohammed.  In fact I could argue that Mohammed was a "peace maker", making peace among his own by finding them an external enemy - just like Charlemagne and an multitude of others.

And I'm afraid I don't think a Reformation is going to provide an answer. The Reformation started with the Affair of the Placards in 1534 Luther's Theses in 1517 and lasted until Pope John XXIII.  I didn't see much sign of Christian peace in that interval and I don't see that fundamental attitudes on power and democracy have changed any in Europe.  The elites are still looking for top down mechanisms and for a man to lead them.
Title: Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
Post by: E.R. Campbell on November 08, 2015, 11:12:50
Matthew 24:6 - "And ye shall hear of wars and rumours of wars: see that ye be not troubled: for all these things must come to pass, but the end is not yet."

Archaeologists have just found another massacre site in Iran - 3400 years old (http://www.pasthorizonspr.com/index.php/archives/11/2015/archaeologists-uncover-human-tragedy-at-ancient-elamite-site-of-haft-tappeh).

(http://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A