Author Topic: The End of the MCDVs  (Read 217721 times)

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Offline Chris Pook

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Re: The End of the MCDVs
« Reply #50 on: August 28, 2013, 14:39:30 »
More on the "Black Swan":

Mark
Ottawa

I like the concept.  It looks like it was written with the Holland in mind.  And the AOPS isn't far off the standard either (allowing for its northern peculiarities).
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Offline Navy_Pete

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Re: The End of the MCDVs
« Reply #51 on: August 28, 2013, 18:33:53 »
Sheer speed is a bit overrated; the difference between a ship going 15 knots of 50 knots doesn't matter much next to the sub sonic to supersonic speeds of missiles.  Also, the prevalence of radar, UAVs, helos etc has generally increased the surveillance footprint of a ship significantly.

MCDVs, AOPs and other similar ships are more of a presence then a threat; if you wanted some real teeth in the Artic or otherwise close to shore some medium range missile batteries may be more effective. 


Offline E.R. Campbell

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Re: The End of the MCDVs
« Reply #52 on: August 29, 2013, 09:49:27 »
Because the subject is germane (and it drags us back on topic):

NOTE:  Torn between putting this here (because of the airframe) or in a navy forum (because of the launch/maintenance platform) - flipped a coin and here it is.

Wanted:  someone to build, maintain small UAVs to (apparently) work off Kingston Class ships - this from MERX:Closing date:  2013/11/04 14:00 EST

Quote
.... This bid solicitation is being issued to satisfy the requirement of the Department of National Defence of Canada for the Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (SUAS). It is intended to result in the award of two (2) contracts to one successful Bidder: the SUAS Acquisition Contract (SUAS-A) and the SUAS In Service Support Contract (SUAS-S) ....

More details (370+ page PDF) in bid docs here

And

I didn't read all of it, but ScanEagle would work.

The ScanEagle on a ship:


Source: Defence Industry Daily (2 Jul 13)
It is ill that men should kill one another in seditions, tumults and wars; but it is worse to bring nations to such misery, weakness and baseness
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Offline Chris Pook

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Re: The End of the MCDVs
« Reply #53 on: August 29, 2013, 10:48:22 »
Swarms of Scan Eagles

Equals a MCDV with its own Maritime Recce Squadron (or at least Flight).
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Offline E.R. Campbell

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Re: The End of the MCDVs
« Reply #54 on: August 29, 2013, 12:08:32 »
Reading back through this thread I am understanding that:

     1. These little ships are capable and, although 15+ years old, are being upgaded to give them a longer service life, maybe even with new capabilities (UAVs); Question: what is a reasonable service life for these vessels?

     2. There are useful roles - "presence" type operations, FishPats, etc - for a small (1,000 - 1,500 ton) warship "flying" a UAV which are likely to auger for retention and eventual replacement of the KINGSTON class;  Question: is there room (need?) for a "sloop" type vessel in the RCN, betweenthe "heavies" and the MCDVs/corvettes?                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
   
     3. There is still a long term requirement for some "major combatants" - 5,000+ ton "blue water" ships carrying manned and unmanned aircraft; and                                                                                                         

     4. There might be a role for an "intermediate" class of combatants - like the UK Black Swan idea.

Obviously there are also needs for support ships, submarines, training vessels, tenders and so on, including AOPVs.

The NAVRES have proven that they can put competent crews on warships. A problem is that the NAVRES, as currently established, cannot produce 400+ of the right people (12 X 35) on a full time basis. Another problem is that it is not clear that any Reserve force should be providing full time units. But, the fact is that NAVRES can do a job, within appropriate means. Question: leaving aside any questions about the propriety of using reservists to staff what are, clearly, full time units, can the NAVRES experience be applied to other Army or RCAF units? Or does the MCDV tell us that greater and greater co-manning, with opportunities for e.g. NAVRES officers to rise command even major combatants, the right lesson to be drawn?

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« Last Edit: August 30, 2013, 00:07:11 by Infanteer »
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Offline Monsoon

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Re: The End of the MCDVs
« Reply #55 on: August 29, 2013, 13:39:41 »
Reading back through this thread I am understanding that:

     1. These little ships are capable and, although 15+ years old, are being upgaded to give them a longer service life, maybe even with new capabilities (UAVs); Question: what is a reasonable service life for these vessels?
According to the Admiral in an open forum brief quite recently, the MCDVs are on the books (the fleet plan reviewed by the Minister regularly) for another 15 years or so. Doesn't mean life won't intervene to take them offline sooner, but with the recent radar upgrades and other tweaks, they'd probably run until then without major overhaul.

Quote
     2. There are useful roles - "presence" type operations, FishPats, etc - for a small (1,000 - 1,500 ton) warship "flying" a UAV which are likely to auger for retention and eventual replacement of the KINGSTON class;  Question: is there room (need?) for a "sloop" type vessel in the RCN, between the "heavies" and the MCDVs/corvettes?
Just a minor bicker about nautical terminology - 'sloop' is a term I've not heard applied navally recently, so I assume you're reaching for the right word. In sailing days, sloops-of-war were vessels smaller even than corvettes, so while we're coining terms this one may not be the right one. If what you want is a ship about the same size as a Kingston-class with more line-of-sight weapons, a bit more speed and a slightly larger crew to support continuous operations, 'corvette' is probably the right word.

Quote
The NAVRES have proven that they can put competent crews on warships. A problem is that the NAVRES, as currently established, cannot produce 400+ of the right people (12 X 35) on a full time basis. Another problem is that it is not clear that any Reserve force should be providing full time units. But, the fact is that NAVRES can do a job, within appropriate means. Question: leaving aside any questions about the propriety of using reservists to staff what are, clearly, full time units, can the NAVRES experience be applied to other Army or RCAF units? Or does the MCDV tell us that greater and greater co-manning, with opportunities for e.g. NAVRES officers to rise command even major combatants, the right lesson to be drawn?
The direction being taken by the RCN (again, the Admiral will tell this to anyone who asks) is that the new NAVRES mission is identical to the RCN's mission, and no longer includes a separate "man the MCDVs" line in it. The RCN will man all ships; most of the crews of all ships will be Reg F, but they will be augmented individually by reservists trained to the same standard at various different ranks (basically, the number of people on the Kingston class now, spread throughout the fleet). There's a lot that needs to happen between here and there (the RCN as a whole will be moving away from platform-specificity in training, and PRes/Reg F training will need to be aligned for all trades, etc), so reservists will be predominant on the Kingston-class for quite some time, but this is the 10-year plan.

All that to say that no new platforms will be designated "reserve" or otherwise.

Offline E.R. Campbell

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Re: The End of the MCDVs
« Reply #56 on: August 29, 2013, 13:54:17 »
...
Just a minor bicker about nautical terminology - 'sloop' is a term I've not heard applied navally recently, so I assume you're reaching for the right word. In sailing days, sloops-of-war were vessels smaller even than corvettes, so while we're coining terms this one may not be the right one. If what you want is a ship about the same size as a Kingston-class with more line-of-sight weapons, a bit more speed and a slightly larger crew to support continuous operations, 'corvette' is probably the right word.
...


I got that from:

More on the "Black Swan":

Quote
What Type of Ships Does the RN Need?
http://www.cdfai.org/the3dsblog/?p=1609

Mark
Ottawa


The linked paper eventually gets you here where the 3,500 ton warship ship, pictured on page 3-8, is described as a sloop of war.

But I'm an old soldier, so I'll defer to matelots on all these matters.

And thanks for the answers to the other questions.
It is ill that men should kill one another in seditions, tumults and wars; but it is worse to bring nations to such misery, weakness and baseness
as to have neither strength nor courage to contend for anything; to have nothing left worth defending and to give the name of peace to desolation.
Algernon Sidney in Discourses Concerning Government, (1698)
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Online AlexanderM

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Re: The End of the MCDVs
« Reply #57 on: August 29, 2013, 14:23:30 »
This is close to what I expect we'll end up with, but too slow.

http://www.casr.ca/id-danish-naval-projects-rasmussen.htm
Rasmussen is classed as a Cutter.  A Corvette is a bit bigger.

Online AlexanderM

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Re: The End of the MCDVs
« Reply #58 on: August 29, 2013, 14:48:24 »


21 knots, 54 Crew and a deck big enough for a Sea King / Cormorant / Cyclone (with hangar).  5000 nm @ 15 kts.

Big, rangy boat with a small crew.  And cheap.

Link
This guy would be a Corvette, based on size (over 300'), but no missiles or mission modules.  Kirkhill, what was the price tag?

Offline Ex-Dragoon

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Re: The End of the MCDVs
« Reply #59 on: August 29, 2013, 15:14:52 »
Rasmussen is classed as a Cutter.  A Corvette is a bit bigger.

Cutter is a term left over from the days when the USCG was the US Revenue Cutter service as well as used for smaller sailing vessels. Cutters used in naval/coast guard ops from my experience can be up to frigate size (check out the National Security Cutters)
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Offline Chris Pook

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Re: The End of the MCDVs
« Reply #60 on: August 29, 2013, 15:29:44 »
Quote
Construction is being carried out in parallel, with the first two at Damen Schelde Naval Shipbuilding in Vlissingen, the Netherlands, and the remaining at Damen's sister shipyard in Galatz, Romania. The project is estimated to cost €467.8m ($687.9m). These ships were built between 2008 and 2012.

About 172 MUSD a piece.

Link

In terms of terminology, as Mr. Campbell asserts, the "sloop" cognomen came from the Black Swan info.

A bit of reading revealed that the Flowers were also called sloops before they were called corvettes with large corvettes being called frigates.

The "Black Swan" Concept is a bit shorter (90m vs 108 m) but about the same displacement (3150 for the sloop vs 3750 for the OPV) and with the same emphasis on being a cheap and cheerful platform for anything you can put in sea can or haul aboard on  10 tonne crane or skyhook.

Interesting crewing concept for the sloop (8 man core crew plus up to 32 mission specialists with an additional 40 Pax short term).

Some comments have been it needs more power for faster transit.  The counter argument is less power = less cost = more hulls = more presence = fewer transits (ie more likely to have a vessel where and when you need it).



Black Swan Sloop.

Interesting that her dimensions are broadly equivalent to the AOPS, Svalbard and Barentshav (which the author cites as an antecedent).

But back to ERC's question on the MCDVs.  We have them.  And if hull speed is becoming less of an issue and unmanned vehicles more of an issue what can you cram into an MCDV?

Scan Eagles apparently.  How about UUV towed sonar arrays?  Long Range 10 tonne UUVs?  VTOL UAVs?  Better sea boats (Danish LCPs?)
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Offline Chris Pook

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Re: The End of the MCDVs
« Reply #61 on: August 29, 2013, 15:32:08 »




Additional Swan Concept images
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Re: The End of the MCDVs
« Reply #62 on: August 29, 2013, 22:45:32 »
Quote
322. Cost. A preliminary estimate21 for the unit production cost of the
sloop-of-war, built in a UK shipyard, using commercial norms, is £65M at
2010 financial conditions. Further work would be required to calculate these
savings and the through-life costs of the platform. However, with a small core
crew, reduced fuel burn, easy access to fewer onboard sensors and a
markedly reduced maintenance burden, not only will the ship’s availability
increase but its overall cost will be far less than current warships. This figure
does not take into account the cost of capability packages.

From the Black Swan JCN Chapter 3.

Anticipated Unit Cost Budget (2010) 65 MUKP or 100 MUSD. 

This is about 60% of the Holland class OPV but the Holland spends a fair bit of cash on its Integrated Mission Mast and has larger fixed weapons array than envisioned for the Black Swan.
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Offline Underway

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Re: The End of the MCDVs
« Reply #63 on: August 30, 2013, 20:23:50 »
According to the Admiral in an open forum brief quite recently, the MCDVs are on the books (the fleet plan reviewed by the Minister regularly) for another 15 years or so. Doesn't mean life won't intervene to take them offline sooner, but with the recent radar upgrades and other tweaks, they'd probably run until then without major overhaul.
The direction being taken by the RCN (again, the Admiral will tell this to anyone who asks) is that the new NAVRES mission is identical to the RCN's mission, and no longer includes a separate "man the MCDVs" line in it. The RCN will man all ships; most of the crews of all ships will be Reg F, but they will be augmented individually by reservists trained to the same standard at various different ranks (basically, the number of people on the Kingston class now, spread throughout the fleet). There's a lot that needs to happen between here and there (the RCN as a whole will be moving away from platform-specificity in training, and PRes/Reg F training will need to be aligned for all trades, etc), so reservists will be predominant on the Kingston-class for quite some time, but this is the 10-year plan.

All that to say that no new platforms will be designated "reserve" or otherwise.

So that's where my original info came from.  NAVRES is going to move to augmenting Reg F instead, looking more at blended crewing.  Makes sense as NAVRES can barely keep up with the MCDV staffing requirements.  It will also allow more flexibility in staffing for the Reg F.  With the amalgamation of the pension plan and the stated goal of moving to "full time" and "part time" sailors vs Class A, B, C and Reg F positions you can see the long term pers management coming to the fore.

For comparison currently the PRes force employment structure for the Army, Navy and Airforce are completely different.  Airforce is 90% previous Reg F service, Army is almost all Class A and Navy is half to two thirds Class C/B.  As the Commodore remarked "If they asked me to mobilize the Navy reserve I would say - mobilize who?  We are already mobilized!"

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Re: The End of the MCDVs
« Reply #64 on: August 30, 2013, 21:26:50 »
So that's where my original info came from.  NAVRES is going to move to augmenting Reg F instead, looking more at blended crewing.  Makes sense as NAVRES can barely keep up with the MCDV staffing requirements.  It will also allow more flexibility in staffing for the Reg F.  With the amalgamation of the pension plan and the stated goal of moving to "full time" and "part time" sailors vs Class A, B, C and Reg F positions you can see the long term pers management coming to the fore.

For comparison currently the PRes force employment structure for the Army, Navy and Airforce are completely different.  Airforce is 90% previous Reg F service, Army is almost all Class A and Navy is half to two thirds Class C/B.  As the Commodore remarked "If they asked me to mobilize the Navy reserve I would say - mobilize who?  We are already mobilized!"


Do members think one of the two (army or Navy) is a more "correct" model or reserve forces?
It is ill that men should kill one another in seditions, tumults and wars; but it is worse to bring nations to such misery, weakness and baseness
as to have neither strength nor courage to contend for anything; to have nothing left worth defending and to give the name of peace to desolation.
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Re: The End of the MCDVs
« Reply #65 on: August 30, 2013, 21:32:13 »
We are already mobilized!"

Welcome to waking up to reality.

Sadly, the demobilization will put NASCAR to shame,
shedding the built up core skills due to the budget cuts.
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Re: The End of the MCDVs
« Reply #66 on: September 01, 2013, 04:18:43 »
Just to add my two cents.... Though they may have depreciated due to market volatility...

In regards to placing the scan eagles on MCDV's, there is more than deck space to factor in with the UAV. The amount of pitch an roll matters a great deal in aviation ops, and the smaller we try to go with ships the more vulnerable we become to the whims of the sea. A UAV det on a small boat may be great in calm seas, but in 20KT with 1-2m seas it may very quickly become useless. 

Size matters in many ways, not the least of which is sea handling capabilities. A large boat takes light seas easily with no impact on crew, a small boat reacts to light seas very poorly, resulting in increased crew fatigue.

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Re: The End of the MCDVs
« Reply #67 on: September 01, 2013, 11:29:50 »
There are very good stabilization systems available.

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Re: The End of the MCDVs
« Reply #68 on: September 01, 2013, 12:09:16 »
Fresh off the SHAD hotline... NAVRES has been directed to come up with a pers management plan to adjust to having no MCDVs within a 5 year timeframe.

This should not be a huge surprise to anyone who can read between the lines.  No midlife refit planned.  Kingston will be 26 years old by 2020.  New AOPS to do the coastal patrol duties.  The mine hunting packages are just as easily placed on any ship with the space to tie down two seacans.  Only a few working route survey packages left.

Also the timeliness of this are interesting.   New budget in 6 months.  New CFDS shortly thereafter.  Navy has been holding onto Horizon 2050 for quite a while as it has been written but not released (prob waiting for the new CFDS to be released so they don't steal any thunder or go in the wrong direction.)


So, three pages on, are we agreed that:

     1. The MCDVs are anything but dead ~ they have useful roles, some of which they perform in an very efficient and effective manner, relative to the "heavies." Maybe they will have new kit and new roles, too;

     2. A wholly "reserve fleet" is on the way out. All ships will be crewed by whoever is available and qualified;

     3. NAVRES will need more and better training to do its full and fair share of co-crewing the fleet;

     4. There is a Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy which currently makes provisions for new AORs and new "heavies;" but

     5. Question: Is there a "master plan" for a complete, mixed fleet of "heavies" with support ships, subamrines, tenders, training vessels and small combatants (1,000± tons) and even an
         "intermediate" class of ships like the UK proposal for the Black Swan class of ships?
It is ill that men should kill one another in seditions, tumults and wars; but it is worse to bring nations to such misery, weakness and baseness
as to have neither strength nor courage to contend for anything; to have nothing left worth defending and to give the name of peace to desolation.
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Offline Chris Pook

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Re: The End of the MCDVs
« Reply #69 on: September 01, 2013, 13:28:13 »


     5. Question: Is there a "master plan" for a complete, mixed fleet of "heavies" with support ships, subamrines, tenders, training vessels and small combatants (1,000± tons) and even an
         "intermediate" class of ships like the UK proposal for the Black Swan class of ships?

Are there serving members that see value in the Black Swan approach? 

To wit:  3000 - 4000 tonne relocatable platforms, lightly manned, built to SOLAS standards, capable of maintaining a presence and being adapted to a variety of roles.

The 3000 - 4000 tonne range seems likely to improve the stability issues and the range of sea states in which operations can be conducted.

The small crew (as small as eight) would seem to reduce personnel issues - and with good Ship to Shore connectors permits the crew to be swapped on station.

Any serving champions for the concept?
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Re: The End of the MCDVs
« Reply #70 on: September 01, 2013, 17:56:10 »
Good thread, and maybe soon worthy of a split.

Are there serving members that see value in the Black Swan approach? 

I'll stick my hand up.  This comes from an Army Officer, so take it for what it's worth.

I like the Black Swan proposal for its general intent; something akin to the U.S. LCS that delivers joint force capability to project power abroad.  The paper correctly identifies the primary problem that we'll face, even when we have the Future Surface Combatant/SSC/whatever it is called this week.

Quote
However, these large combatants will be too few, too costly, too mission essential and most importantly too vulnerable to be risked in a contested littoral – although without an alternative they will have to be risked with the knowledge that they will probably take losses. Defence needs to escape its current predicament of escalating platform and personnel costs causing ever decreasing numbers,
which also lack the quality required to make them fit for task.

Our frigates will never be available in sufficient numbers to conduct the dirty tasks, like counter-mine warfare, that are essential for force projection.  I did some research in amphibious operations and it is apparent, despite big platforms costing so much in terms of manpower and resources, that navies often shed lesser platforms to sustain these capital ships.

To me, a primary problem is that joint force development rests (appropriately) in the hands of the Chief of Force Development is in the VCDS branch but that anything done here is diluted by the fact that the Army, Navy and Air Force all have their own force development organizations that, generally, follow single-service development.  This is, ironically, one of the reasons that spurred Unification in the 1960s.  Although a tank, a frigate or an F-35 produces some form of combat power or capability for Canada, I wonder how much more capability is gained through creating systems capable of joint force synergy.  A tank in Suffield, a Fighter in Bagotville or a Frigate in the middle of the blue ocean may not be as strategically useful as a small "Black Swan" with some UAVs and a company of soldiers on board.
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Offline drunknsubmrnr

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Re: The End of the MCDVs
« Reply #71 on: September 01, 2013, 20:26:27 »
Quote
Just a minor bicker about nautical terminology - 'sloop' is a term I've not heard applied navally recently, so I assume you're reaching for the right word. In sailing days, sloops-of-war were vessels smaller even than corvettes, so while we're coining terms this one may not be the right one. If what you want is a ship about the same size as a Kingston-class with more line-of-sight weapons, a bit more speed and a slightly larger crew to support continuous operations, 'corvette' is probably the right word.

In WWII a "sloop" was an ocean-going escort with 2 shafts, warship machinery and oriented towards AAW.

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Re: The End of the MCDVs
« Reply #72 on: September 01, 2013, 22:11:00 »

So, three pages on, are we agreed that:

     1. The MCDVs are anything but dead ~ they have useful roles, some of which they perform in an very efficient and effective manner, relative to the "heavies." Maybe they will have new kit and new roles, too;

     2. A wholly "reserve fleet" is on the way out. All ships will be crewed by whoever is available and qualified;

     3. NAVRES will need more and better training to do meet its full and fair share of the new role co-crewing the fleet;

     [snip]

FTFY
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"Tanning Stations on the flight deck"


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Offline Ostrozac

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Re: The End of the MCDVs
« Reply #73 on: September 02, 2013, 10:14:00 »

Do members think one of the two (army or Navy) is a more "correct" model or reserve forces?

An equivalent army structure to the Navy Reserves would be if the battle group on high-readiness were to actually receive its full complement of reserve augmentation, posted, cost-moved and on Class B or Class C service for the two year period of high readiness. The problem in a peacetime army is that being posted to Petawawa or Shilo for two years with the prospect of probably not actually deploying overseas is not too attractive a job to a reservist, and even if we were to develop "career reservists" the way the navy has, we have five force generation bases that we would have to keep moving guys between.

The navy seems to have a good thing going with their naval reservists -- it seems to work for them. But a peacetime navy based out of Halifax and Esquimalt still sails around and does interesting things. A peacetime army is training and waiting for the next mission.

Offline Navy_Pete

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Re: The End of the MCDVs
« Reply #74 on: September 02, 2013, 11:35:12 »
To me, a primary problem is that joint force development rests (appropriately) in the hands of the Chief of Force Development is in the VCDS branch but that anything done here is diluted by the fact that the Army, Navy and Air Force all have their own force development organizations that, generally, follow single-service development.  This is, ironically, one of the reasons that spurred Unification in the 1960s.  Although a tank, a frigate or an F-35 produces some form of combat power or capability for Canada, I wonder how much more capability is gained through creating systems capable of joint force synergy.  A tank in Suffield, a Fighter in Bagotville or a Frigate in the middle of the blue ocean may not be as strategically useful as a small "Black Swan" with some UAVs and a company of soldiers on board.

Personally, I would prefer greater integration with the army for operations.  OP HESTIA in Haiti was a good example; I know ATH and maybe HAL as well picked up a platoon in Jamaica and shuttled them in, then provided some logistic support (like water).  They weren't designed for it though, but something similar to the Black Swan concept would be perfectly suited for that.  Also then we'd be less likely to be toting around a 'Land Forces Support Radio' that uses a frequency range the army abandoned in the 90s.

If they had gone down with a supply ship as well (PRE was in refit), they could have easily deployed a fair bit of manpower and had a good sized mobile supply depot on hand, and a half dozen helos, plus the RIBs/landing crafts would have been available for movement.

Adapting that to a warzone doesn't really involve much more.  You'd want one or two ships capable of air defence to protect the tanker.  If the Black Swan were fitted with a reasonable sized gun, they could also provide fire support.  Of course, if there was a USN Arleigh Burke ship along with you they'd have a ridiculous number of missiles onboard as well.

The one big thing changing in the newer ships is that they are modular.  So aside from your core crew, each different load out would come with it's own operators, so you could have two ships in the same class doing different jobs, but keeping some similar core capabilities.

If nothing else, it'd be nice to be able to better support the army when they are fighting a ground war or otherwise off somewhere miserable.  Joined the mob because I wanted to do something more meaningful then improving someone's widget factory.  While it's been a lot of fun, sailing around with stops in Boston, NY, Edinburgh etc while friends are getting shot at doesn't really fill me with a sense of accomplishment.