Author Topic: Military Ill-prepared for Peacekeeping - G&M  (Read 20631 times)

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Offline daftandbarmy

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Re: Military Ill-prepared for Peacekeeping - G&M
« Reply #25 on: February 03, 2016, 20:54:00 »
Is it just me or does this report seem like a slap in the face to the OMLT, POMLT, etc folks who worked with, and trained, Afghan authorities during OPs ATHENA and ATTENTION?  I'm pretty sure we did some negotiation, conflict management and resolution there as well.

http://www.theglobeandmail.com//news/national/military-ill-prepared-for-peacekeeping-report/article28505963/?cmpid=rss1&click=sf_globefb

I would argue that this article is yet more proof that the G&M, like most Canadian media, is ill prepared to comment on anything related to Canada's military.
"The most important qualification of a soldier is fortitude under fatigue and privation. Courage is only second; hardship, poverty and want are the best school for a soldier." Napoleon

Online Colin P

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Re: Military Ill-prepared for Peacekeeping - G&M
« Reply #26 on: February 05, 2016, 13:58:30 »
I will agree that the current generation might be ill-prepared to dealing with just how useless the UN bureaucracy is.

Offline Chris Pook

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Re: Military Ill-prepared for Peacekeeping - G&M
« Reply #27 on: January 31, 2018, 19:40:23 »
Bump

An old take on what "modern" peace-keeping might look like - written ca 1968.  It's a long read.


Quote
No one was sure at first the concept would work--not in the summer of 1966. The village of Binh Nghia, in Quang Ngai province, was a battleground. The district chief at Binh Son was responsible to the province chief for the state of affairs at Binh Nghia and several other villages. He estimated that, during the past several years, 750 young men from that village had joined main-force VC units. Two independent VC companies and one full battalion were roaming the district. Of the 4,575 persons in the villages, 600 were known VC sympathizers. So the decision by the 7th Marines to establish a Combined Action Company in Binh Nghia was not made without an acknowledgement of the hazards involved.

Something had to be done. The morale of the local Popular Forces platoon was low and ebbing fast. They had been hit by the VC so often that their confidence was shattered. The enemy held the offensive and controlled the daily lives of the civilians. The guerrillas worked and lived at home, banding together at night for military excursions and political activities. Full-time regulars of the Viet Cong main force units entered Binh Nghia at will to seek supplies or hold meetings. Marine patrols and ambushes, operating from remote combat bases, made contact often, killing many soldiers and disrupting movements of large forces. But that alone was not enough. The villager scurried about with averted eyes, and the PFs clung to the shallow safety of their fort. It was obvious who controlled Binh Nghia.

During the first week in June, 12 Marines from Charlie Company were selected to go to the fort and work with the PFs. They were picked on the basis of a mature understanding of the Vietnamese problems as well as for sound tactical sense. The primary mission was to raise the fighting spirit and ability of the 28 PFs of Binh Nghia. The Marines were commanded by a corporal who took things slowly at first, allowing his men and the PFs time to become accustomed to shared watches and joint patrols. The individual friendships between the tall Americans and the Vietnamese militiamen were struck naturally. The language barrier was breached, not by formal language training, but by the basic desire to communicate. These Marines displayed a natural knack for making themselves understood because they wanted to communicate, even though they did not speak Vietnamese

By late June the presence of the Marines had been generally accepted ....

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/fast-rifles-0
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Offline pbi

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Re: Military Ill-prepared for Peacekeeping - G&M
« Reply #28 on: January 31, 2018, 21:20:40 »
Having worked at CFC when Walter was one of a very small crew of academics there, I can say that despite his endless UN cheerleading he is in the long run fairly harmless. The students there are at the rank of Maj/LCdr at least (higher in the senior courses) and one would hope capable of judging Dr, Dorn on his merits (or lack thereof). IMHO much of what he says is rubbish, but that is just me.

Since those days, the academics have overrun CFC and it can no longer even pretend to be a school for joint warfighters as opposed to NDHQ hall monitors. If you ever wonder  about military leadership in this  country, look at the place that produces them.

I was always glad that I was a graduate of Quantico and not Toronto. Ar least the Marines are not ashamed of being warfighters.
« Last Edit: January 31, 2018, 21:23:32 by pbi »
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Re: Military Ill-prepared for Peacekeeping - G&M
« Reply #29 on: February 01, 2018, 07:38:46 »
Since those days, the academics have overrun CFC and it can no longer even pretend to be a school for joint warfighters as opposed to NDHQ hall monitors.
Ah, but the academics were 'necessary' in order to create their pretend Master's degree -- the Master of Defence Studies -- (even though the fine print mentions that "this is not an accredited graduate degree;  it is a 'professional' degree.")
Sadly amazed at people cheering on the spread of kakistocracy.   :not-again:

Offline Piece of Cake

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Re: Military Ill-prepared for Peacekeeping - G&M
« Reply #30 on: February 01, 2018, 08:02:57 »
Ah, but the academics were 'necessary' in order to create their pretend Master's degree -- the Master of Defence Studies -- (even though the fine print mentions that "this is not an accredited graduate degree;  it is a 'professional' degree.")

Could you please show me this fine print.

In Canada, the Senate of an University has legal authority to grant degrees.  In the case of CFC / RMC it is federal authority from the Royal Military College of Canada Degrees Act, 1959. The Master of Defense Studies is an accredited degree, however it may be viewed as a professional degree - ie MBA, MPA, MD, LLB, JD ect - as opposed to an academic degree - ie BA, BSc, MA, MSc, PHD, ect -.


**** correction **** In the case of CFC / RMC it is provincial authority - the province of Ontario - from the Royal Military College of Canada Degrees Act, 1959
« Last Edit: February 01, 2018, 08:09:16 by Piece of Cake »
Policy is more than black and white.  We need to not only understand the spirit of why a policy was written, but also how the policy affects people.

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Re: Military Ill-prepared for Peacekeeping - G&M
« Reply #31 on: February 01, 2018, 08:30:35 »
Could you please show me this fine print.

I see that it has been amended to read: "Defence Studies (DS) credits may  be acceptable toward other graduate programmes."  (Date modified: 2017-07-24)

Obviously there has been some academic stick-handling since the program was initiated.  I do know of two people who wanted to go on to earn a PhD (one applying at Carleton; one at Queen's), and neither was acceptable based on having only an MDS -- both having applied before this apparent July 2017 change.

I stand corrected.....

[edit] maybe.  Re-reading, it appears that they are only referring to the potential  acceptability of MDS credits to other RMC/CFC programs, and do not speak for civilian universities.

    :salute:

« Last Edit: February 01, 2018, 08:42:55 by Journeyman »
Sadly amazed at people cheering on the spread of kakistocracy.   :not-again:

Offline Piece of Cake

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Re: Military Ill-prepared for Peacekeeping - G&M
« Reply #32 on: February 02, 2018, 01:16:41 »
I see that it has been amended to read: "Defence Studies (DS) credits may  be acceptable toward other graduate programmes."  (Date modified: 2017-07-24)

Obviously there has been some academic stick-handling since the program was initiated.  I do know of two people who wanted to go on to earn a PhD (one applying at Carleton; one at Queen's), and neither was acceptable based on having only an MDS -- both having applied before this apparent July 2017 change.

I stand corrected.....

[edit] maybe.  Re-reading, it appears that they are only referring to the potential  acceptability of MDS credits to other RMC/CFC programs, and do not speak for civilian universities.

    :salute:

It is difficult to get into a PhD program at any university with a professional Master degree.  This is partly due to most professional Master are course based and not thesis based.  While there is a directed research option with the MDS, most universities would not consider this option as meeting 'independent thinking' that comes from a thesis based Master. With this being said, it is possible if one's undergrad GPA was high and in the same course of study of the PhD one was looking to pursue. 
« Last Edit: February 02, 2018, 01:40:16 by Piece of Cake »
Policy is more than black and white.  We need to not only understand the spirit of why a policy was written, but also how the policy affects people.

Offline daftandbarmy

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Re: Military Ill-prepared for Peacekeeping - G&M
« Reply #33 on: February 02, 2018, 09:09:41 »
Bump

An old take on what "modern" peace-keeping might look like - written ca 1968.  It's a long read.


http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/fast-rifles-0

Yeah, and that worked out really well in the end for them, right?

Peacekeeping is an oxymoron these days. In realpolitik world, we'd be better off thinking about how to implement a more effective 'Metternich Peace' process.
"The most important qualification of a soldier is fortitude under fatigue and privation. Courage is only second; hardship, poverty and want are the best school for a soldier." Napoleon

Offline Chris Pook

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Re: Military Ill-prepared for Peacekeeping - G&M
« Reply #34 on: February 02, 2018, 15:32:59 »
Yeah, and that worked out really well in the end for them, right?

Peacekeeping is an oxymoron these days. In realpolitik world, we'd be better off thinking about how to implement a more effective 'Metternich Peace' process.

My read on that article is that the strategy was not widely dissimilar from the strategy adopted in Malaya in the 50s, Borneo, Dhofar and the Radfan in the same era as the article (early 1960's) with 3 out of 4 wins (Aden's Radfan being the loss).

That the situation on the ground was changed by the loss of nerve on the part of American politicians after the Tet Offensive in January 1968 doesn't obviate, in my opinion, the merits of the strategy.

Training locals to defend themselves, while influencing them to play by our rules, is never, again in my opinion, a bad plan.  It worked with the Jordanians, the Indians, Omani and Malaysians - among many others.
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Offline pbi

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Re: Military Ill-prepared for Peacekeeping - G&M
« Reply #35 on: February 02, 2018, 17:29:07 »
I bitterly resist the school of thought that tries to depict peacekeeping as some kind of military black art requiring that the initiates partake of the grail of "Specialist Peacekeeping Training", or something.

IMHO (and after three UN PK Ops in the Good Old Days) this is just rubbish. But, of course, quite useful rubbish if you are touting for a course or a training establishment built around that idea.

Granted there may be a few TMST skills that need to be trained up, but I am firm in believing that well disciplined, combat trained professional soldiers who know their business (and LOOK like they know it...) are your best bet for any PKO.  The experience and common sense that a long-service Army brings to these ops is what, in my opinion, makes all the difference.

And, I think, many of the skills needed for successful COIN translate quite nicely to PKO as well.

What I would invest my training time in (other than good soldier skills) is making sure that all ranks have a solid understanding of the situation in the AO, who the players are, and how things got the way they are. That knowledge is, in my opinion, worth the time spent on it.

Let's avoid "niche-ism" at all costs.

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The true measure of a man is what he would do if he knew he never would be found out...

Offline Hamish Seggie

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Re: Military Ill-prepared for Peacekeeping - G&M
« Reply #36 on: February 02, 2018, 17:35:10 »
pbi I will agree.

The reason we were successful at peacekeeping is that we trained for war. If I remember correctly we ran some drivers courses etc prior to Cyprus then mission specific training which lasted five days.

We didn’t train like a Roto 0 nor did we need to.
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Offline pbi

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Re: Military Ill-prepared for Peacekeeping - G&M
« Reply #37 on: February 02, 2018, 17:48:40 »
pbi I will agree.

The reason we were successful at peacekeeping is that we trained for war. If I remember correctly we ran some drivers courses etc prior to Cyprus then mission specific training which lasted five days.

We didn’t train like a Roto 0 nor did we need to.

Roger all. And when we trained for Croatia in 1994, we went down to USMC Pendleton and Twentynine Palms and trained for combat, live fire, right up to having Marine Air dropping 500lbers in support. Thankfully our mission didn't get us in a fight, but if it had done, our chances of getting through a fight were 100% better than the other UN contingents around us.
The Nation that makes a great distinction between its scholars and its warriors will have its thinking done by cowards and its fighting done by fools. ...

The true measure of a man is what he would do if he knew he never would be found out...

Offline daftandbarmy

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Re: Military Ill-prepared for Peacekeeping - G&M
« Reply #38 on: February 02, 2018, 18:01:56 »
My read on that article is that the strategy was not widely dissimilar from the strategy adopted in Malaya in the 50s, Borneo, Dhofar and the Radfan in the same era as the article (early 1960's) with 3 out of 4 wins (Aden's Radfan being the loss).

That the situation on the ground was changed by the loss of nerve on the part of American politicians after the Tet Offensive in January 1968 doesn't obviate, in my opinion, the merits of the strategy.

Training locals to defend themselves, while influencing them to play by our rules, is never, again in my opinion, a bad plan.  It worked with the Jordanians, the Indians, Omani and Malaysians - among many others.

One of my COs had been in the Malayan job with the Royal Marines. His secret of success?

It went along the lines of: "We starved them out then hunted them down."

The US could never separate the guerilla from access to resources in the same way they could in Malaya.
"The most important qualification of a soldier is fortitude under fatigue and privation. Courage is only second; hardship, poverty and want are the best school for a soldier." Napoleon

Offline Chris Pook

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Re: Military Ill-prepared for Peacekeeping - G&M
« Reply #39 on: February 02, 2018, 18:14:29 »
Quote
By October, the action had slackened. The unrelenting pressure on the guerrillas was telling. Consistency is a primary ingredient for a successful pacification, and every single night the Marines and PFs would set out a least three ambushes in Binh Nghia. Their full attack of Fort Page did not bring the enemy the respite they had anticipated. In fact, it had precisely the opposite effect. Not only did the enemy continue to encounter pressure form the CACO unit within the village, but, in addition, his sanctuary to the south across the river became the favorite hunting ground for two Marine rifle companies.

Acceptance

There were few VC-initiated incidents in November in the village of Binh Ngnia. As a result, the combat actions slowed considerably, and, although in December there were several shoot-outs against targets on the river, the CACOs have struck at the enemy on land only rarely since the battles in September. By 1967, Binh Nghia was no longer a battleground. From a variety of sources and reports, the district chief and his sub-sector advisor have estimated that there are less than 12 active guerrillas left in the six hamlets. The village is now secure; but it is not self-protecting. The main basis for stability and security in Binh Nghia is still slung loosely over a Marine's shoulder.

The rapport between the people of Binh Nghia and the CACO Marines has been building slowly and steadily. Each Marine has three of four close friends among the families of the villagers, and many meals are taken within the hamlets at the insistence of the villagers. On many occasions, Marines on night patrols passing by certain houses have received information about VC activities whispered through windows in broken English. The PFs and village leaders provide additional intelligence.

The CACO acts as a clearing-house for all military movements within the village complex. The Marines and Vietnamese plan their patrols and plot their on-call night illumination missions together. No Marine force enters the area without checking with the CACO first. Medical evacuation by helicopter and fire support are available. The Marines are convinced that these are very important factors contributing to the high morale of the PFs. Furthermore, any villager requiring swift aid may also be transported by helicopter. During the fall of 1966, 59-man Revolutionary Development Care (RDC) teams moved into two of the villages six hamlets. Their arrival in no way impeded the work of the CACO. The Cadre leaders took to checking in with the CACO Commander to settle military matters as if it were the most natural procedure to follow. For certain checks and visits, the village Police Chief got into the habit of requesting a combined PF/Marine escort, where before he would only take national police.

The extent to which the CACO at Fort Page in Binh Nghia had become solidly established was graphically demonstrated at the village fair held during the last week in December, 1966. The Village Chief and Police Chief planned the fair in order to draw the villagers together; their attention was held by games and songs, and the hope was to inspire a solidarity of feeling against the Viet Cong. The Village Chief invited the CACO Marines to come, not as guests, but as participants.

In the market place of the hamlet of Binh Yen Noi, a wooden stage had been erected for the fair. There were two benches set in front of the stage. Behind them sat thousands of villagers, packed in tight to watch the entertainment. After a number of villagers had sung songs or acted out skits before a most appreciative audience, two Marines and a PF mounted the stage to moan and mimic some of the latest rock-and-roll records, to the accompaniment of much hooting and laughter. When the fair quieted down toward midnight, those Marines in attendance gathered some PFs and RDC militia and faded into the darkness to relieve others on watch or patrol. One patrol checked the fishing hamlet of My Hue. There were six men--three Marines and three PFS--in the patrol. There was no contact that night, which was Christmas Day in the United States.

The Future

There is no real concussion to this story, not yet anyway. The Marines and the PFs and the RDT militia will be going on patrol in Binh Nghia village tonight, and tomorrow night, and the night after that. The task is not finished, but it is well started and gaining momentum.

The article I quoted seems to address the need for, and the means to achieving, separation of the community from the guerillas.  It also addresses the notion of a quick-fix.  There isn't one.  It requires a long term commitment by all participants - and it requires soldiers, not social workers.  But the soldiers need to be extraordinary in their abilities - self-disciplined, motivated, capable and willing to work with the locals.

By the way - re concussion - I assume that that infers no Marine had yet been hit over the head with a two by four.
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Offline Hamish Seggie

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Re: Military Ill-prepared for Peacekeeping - G&M
« Reply #40 on: February 02, 2018, 18:30:39 »
Roger all. And when we trained for Croatia in 1994, we went down to USMC Pendleton and Twentynine Palms and trained for combat, live fire, right up to having Marine Air dropping 500lbers in support. Thankfully our mission didn't get us in a fight, but if it had done, our chances of getting through a fight were 100% better than the other UN contingents around us.

For FRY we went to Fort Ord. It was needed and necessary. A few of the troops used that training in Sep 1993.
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Online Colin P

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Re: Military Ill-prepared for Peacekeeping - G&M
« Reply #41 on: February 06, 2018, 16:25:53 »
What I took away from reading several books on the Malay Emergency is that early on, key senior people were given a clear mandate to deal with the issue, very good choices were made in the key personal and it was recognized early on this was not to be a military led fight, but a Police/Civil led fight with close support of the military. Key weaknesses in the CT were identified and continuously exploited. A honest look at the grievances of the host population and high level support for a resolution to them. Prior the Chinese were landless squatters, the new villages with the Sultans blessings gave them a place to put down roots and the security to do so. Maintenance of aim and that key people were brought in at different times to deal the evolving situation with adaptive techniques. Also the senior administrators were strong enough to resist to much input and demands from London.   

Offline daftandbarmy

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Re: Military Ill-prepared for Peacekeeping - G&M
« Reply #42 on: February 06, 2018, 23:32:59 »
What I took away from reading several books on the Malay Emergency is that early on, key senior people were given a clear mandate to deal with the issue, very good choices were made in the key personal and it was recognized early on this was not to be a military led fight, but a Police/Civil led fight with close support of the military. Key weaknesses in the CT were identified and continuously exploited. A honest look at the grievances of the host population and high level support for a resolution to them. Prior the Chinese were landless squatters, the new villages with the Sultans blessings gave them a place to put down roots and the security to do so. Maintenance of aim and that key people were brought in at different times to deal the evolving situation with adaptive techniques. Also the senior administrators were strong enough to resist to much input and demands from London.   

And it took 20 years, and was one of the reasons that Britain delayed giving up 'National Service' post WW2.

And it's still not 'over', over. Seriously.

Regardless, this is a good read by Rand:

https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2005/R957.pdf
« Last Edit: February 06, 2018, 23:38:56 by daftandbarmy »
"The most important qualification of a soldier is fortitude under fatigue and privation. Courage is only second; hardship, poverty and want are the best school for a soldier." Napoleon

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Re: Military Ill-prepared for Peacekeeping - G&M
« Reply #43 on: February 07, 2018, 08:24:47 »
My favourite book on the topic is Brig Richard Clutterbuck's "The Long, Long War; Counterinsurgency in Malaya and Vietnam" published back in 1966.

As I recall it was a gift from and older, much more senior officer who was, probably, tired of my questions about the nature of counter-insurgency (a subject about which he had more than just a passing familiarity). Many, many of us were fascinated with what was happening in Viet Nam in the mid 1960s but we had too few experienced Canadian officers to guide us.

I am not happy with the notion that Malaya = Viet Nam or even than Malaya ≈ Viet Nam; they were both insurgencies but, there, especially after the French left with their tails between their legs, most similarities ended. That being said, how one "sees" an insurgency (top down or bottom up) matters, and I believe that the Brits, from Templar on down, understood what they really meant by "winning hearts and minds." Clutterbuck, for example, gives special emphasis to the role of the (native) village police constable as the very beating heart of a successful COIN campaign and he explains why the Army's job is to support and protect that constable ~ not the other way 'round. I'm far less convinced that "hearts and minds" was ever anything for than a slogan, to be repeated mindlessly, to e.g. Maxwell Taylor and William Westmorland.

At the very top, at the US president/UK prime minister level, I believe that John F Kennedy was more interested in the use of power than in the fate of Viet Nam or in America's interests in Asia. In London, however, Clement Atlee (1945-51) and Winston Churchill (1951-55) had many other more difficult issues than an insurgency in a far distant colony and they let their career civil servants, e.g. Sir Robert Thompson, and generals, e.g. Briggs and Templar, to sort things out ... the central government contented itself with supporting them, politically and logistically, as best it could. That may have been more good luck than good management but, I believe, it was a the key difference in the two campaigns.

A second fundamental difference, in my opinion, was in the nature of the two proconsuls: I remain convinced that Maxwell Taylor was, at best, a second rate general who just happened to have "good" political connections and a keen sense of self promotion while Gerald Templar was a solid, albeit unspectacular officer who a) inherited the basics of a good plan from Briggs; b) got GREAT strategic and policy guidance from Thompson and c) understood the very nature of that particular insurgency, which is to say that he actually understood and even somewhat sympathized with the legitimate grievances of the Malay-Chinese.

My  :2c:  the 1960s were long, long ago but 'The Long, Long War' is still worth a read.
It is ill that men should kill one another in seditions, tumults and wars; but it is worse to bring nations to such misery, weakness and baseness
as to have neither strength nor courage to contend for anything; to have nothing left worth defending and to give the name of peace to desolation.
Algernon Sidney in Discourses Concerning Government, (1698)
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Re: Military Ill-prepared for Peacekeeping - G&M
« Reply #44 on: February 07, 2018, 16:30:39 »
I read Chin Peng book "My side of history" I call it "A dummies guide to how not to run an insurgency" Apparently his masters in Beijing were none to pleased with their Malay-Chinese upstarts, who started a revolution without the proper conditions for success. Another couple of interesting points he mentioned was the existence of Japanese soldiers operating with the CT's and that Beijing did have a Domino plan in the works.

Offline daftandbarmy

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Re: Military Ill-prepared for Peacekeeping - G&M
« Reply #45 on: February 07, 2018, 16:56:17 »
I read Chin Peng book "My side of history" I call it "A dummies guide to how not to run an insurgency" Apparently his masters in Beijing were none to pleased with their Malay-Chinese upstarts, who started a revolution without the proper conditions for success. Another couple of interesting points he mentioned was the existence of Japanese soldiers operating with the CT's and that Beijing did have a Domino plan in the works.

The insurgency 'resurged' in the 1968-89. So much for an effective COIN campaign, eh?  ::)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communist_insurgency_in_Malaysia_(1968%E2%80%9389)

The Chinese still have an interest in the region and, I assume, still have some kind of sleeper network in place.
"The most important qualification of a soldier is fortitude under fatigue and privation. Courage is only second; hardship, poverty and want are the best school for a soldier." Napoleon

Offline Blackadder1916

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Re: Military Ill-prepared for Peacekeeping - G&M
« Reply #46 on: February 07, 2018, 17:58:07 »
An interesting discussion.  A couple of shorter pieces that may be of interest to the topic are:

Extracting Counterinsurgency lessons: The Malayan Emergency and Afghanistan
https://rusi.org/commentary/extracting-counterinsurgency-lessons-malayan-emergency-and-afghanistan

And from DARPA/Rand circa 1972 (some interesting perspectives as the USA was still in Vietnam)

The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2005/R957.pdf

Plus,

Comparison of the Malayan Emergency and Vietnam War and Application of Lessons to Solve El Salvador Problems and Appropriate U.S. Military Assistance    http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a182811.pdf

While not a very in-depth analysis, it does add a perspective of a Malaysian officer (my assumption due to his name) attending a US Army staff course in 1987.  It caught my attention because a few short years later, I had occasion to attended a US Army course where two of my fellow international (read foreign) students were a Malaysian Capt (doctor with Special Forces battalion) and an El Salvadoran Capt (Med Svc Corps but former Inf who transferred after being wounded).  During an in course discussion about COIN, they provided some unique points of view.  With the passing years and involvement in wars focusing mainly in Asia, there may be a tendency to forget that for several years America's focus on COIN tended to look south.

And this which was reviewed favourably in Canadian Military Journal several years ago.
Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, John A. Nagl, University of Chicago Press, 2002


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Offline whiskey601

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Re: Military Ill-prepared for Peacekeeping - G&M
« Reply #47 on: February 07, 2018, 21:47:24 »
The insurgency 'resurged' in the 1968-89. So much for an effective COIN campaign, eh?  ::)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communist_insurgency_in_Malaysia_(1968%E2%80%9389)

The Chinese still have an interest in the region and, I assume, still have some kind of sleeper network in place.

Interesting clicking through all that I learned the Australians keep an infantry training company for jungle warfare in Borneo ( Rifle Company Butterworth).  There are no jungles in Australia?

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Re: Military Ill-prepared for Peacekeeping - G&M
« Reply #48 on: February 07, 2018, 22:22:36 »
Interesting clicking through all that I learned the Australians keep an infantry training company for jungle warfare in Borneo ( Rifle Company Butterworth).  There are no jungles in Australia?

A lot, their jungles just aren't very close to their main enemy, and the primary threat to Australia's sphere of influence in that area: Indonesia.

They have an interesting alliance with Singapore too.

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Re: Military Ill-prepared for Peacekeeping - G&M
« Reply #49 on: February 08, 2018, 10:26:11 »

During an in course discussion about COIN, they provided some unique points of view.  With the passing years and involvement in wars focusing mainly in Asia, there may be a tendency to forget that for several years America's focus on COIN tended to look south.


Last year I was part of a team from CASC which delivered a Campaign Planning Course at several international locations, in support of the Directorate of Military Training and Cooperation. One of the places we did the course was at the Colombian Army's Combined Arms Centre in Bogota. I had the opportunity to work closely with a Col of Artillery of the Colombian Army  who shadowed us on behalf of their CAC.

Apart from being an extremely knowledgeable and professional officer with bags of combat experience (both as a Gunner and "dismounted" in the Inf Role) he was very knowledgeable about COIN, specifically the nasty war against FARC and the FLN. Not only was he fully versed in the tactics of it, but he clearly understood the strategic and political implications in the Western Hemisphere. It was a real honour and professional experience to have met him. (and had a few drinks...!!! [cheers]

I was so impressed by him that I felt he would be an excellent speaker on COIN at CACSC, if only to break the habit of Brit or US speakers. I suggested his name to the Cmdt of CACSC, who received it well but I'm not sure what happened after that. There are many perspectives on COIN and they aren't all from the Anglosphere.
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