Author Topic: Canadian Special Operations Force Command (CANSOFCOM)  (Read 44797 times)

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Offline daftandbarmy

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Re: Canadian Special Operations Force Command (CANSOFCOM)
« Reply #25 on: July 04, 2017, 13:23:43 »
And for today's necro post, here is a CP story reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act in which the Deputy Commander claims that the members of CANSOFCOM face possible burn out.

Special forces operating on ‘borrowed time,’ need more troops: general
By The Canadian Press — Jul 4 2017

OTTAWA — The deputy commander of Canada's special forces says his troops risk being run ragged after three years in Iraq, as well as several other lesser-known missions in other parts of the world.

Brig.-Gen. Peter Dawe says that's why the Liberal government's plan to add more than 600 additional soldiers to the elite force is not only welcome, but necessary.

Canada currently has about 2,000 special forces soldiers, many of whom Dawe says have done multiple tours through Iraq since first being sent to help fight the Islamic State group in August 2014.

But Canadian special forces have also been called upon to help train local forces facing extremist threats in different parts of Africa, Southeast Asia and Central America.

The demand doesn't appear to be letting up, as the government announced last week that Canadian soldiers will stay in Iraq for at least another two years.

Dawe says his troops continue to get the job done, but  have been operating "on borrowed time" and need the help to ensure they — and their families — don't suffer burnout.

We're likely to see the CAF, the Army part anyways, be skewed towards the SOF role as a result of circumstances we have no control over, much.

It will be important, to be successful, to make sure that the rest of the force is also beefed up and aligns to support them or else we could see a 'stress fracture' of some kind appear. Sneaky peekies need pay, boots and PERs too :)
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Offline CEDE NULLIS

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Re: Canadian Special Operations Force Command (CANSOFCOM)
« Reply #26 on: July 04, 2017, 13:53:52 »
I guess it also begs the question - do CANSOFCOM units really need to be the lead on all of the "train, advise, assist" jobs?

I know capacity is more of an issue with 9 infantry battalions, but surely some of the regular battalions could be involved in some way?

I'm sure this has been discussed elsewhere but the British Army has started moving towards this model. The first cadre is underway now.

This from General Carter, CGS from a June 2016 conference at RUSI (https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/160628-lwc16-cgs-opening_address.pdf):

"But we have learned, I think, over the last three years that we need bespoke structures to do some of this overseas capacity building and hence the announcement in the SDSR of five Specialised Infantry Battalions. That title is a place-holder that may become something different in due course, but for the moment it is recognition that our conventional infantry achieved significantly more than might have been expect during Afghanistan and that we need to give them the opportunity to continue to deliver something well above the conventional task.

These battalions will be smaller, some 300 strong, and they will be designed to Train Advise Assist, and where appropriate to accompany indigenous forces, thus taking perhaps greater risk than conventional infantry might have to take and, of course, they will major on language and cultural expertise. They will be rolled out from next year through a series of pilots and the goal is that they should be able to deliver capacity building at a higher end than conventional infantry."

Food for thought anyways!

Offline Lightguns

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Re: Canadian Special Operations Force Command (CANSOFCOM)
« Reply #27 on: July 04, 2017, 14:26:08 »
Pretty soon everyone will be special forces (SF) at this rate.  Mission creep; you do not need to be SF to advise indigenous population soldiers in conventional warfare.  You need to be SF when you advise in ops designed for SF operational environments.  Teaching Iraqi army recruits to shoot straight, throw a grenade or drive a hummer does not require an operator.   Teaching irregular forces in a complex operational environment requires SF, teaching SF requires SF.
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Offline Eye In The Sky

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Re: Canadian Special Operations Force Command (CANSOFCOM)
« Reply #28 on: July 04, 2017, 14:58:46 »
I guess it also begs the question - do CANSOFCOM units really need to be the lead on all of the "train, advise, assist" jobs?

I know capacity is more of an issue with 9 infantry battalions, but surely some of the regular battalions could be involved in some way?

I'm sure this has been discussed elsewhere but the British Army has started moving towards this model. The first cadre is underway now.

This from General Carter, CGS from a June 2016 conference at RUSI (https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/160628-lwc16-cgs-opening_address.pdf):

"But we have learned, I think, over the last three years that we need bespoke structures to do some of this overseas capacity building and hence the announcement in the SDSR of five Specialised Infantry Battalions. That title is a place-holder that may become something different in due course, but for the moment it is recognition that our conventional infantry achieved significantly more than might have been expect during Afghanistan and that we need to give them the opportunity to continue to deliver something well above the conventional task.

These battalions will be smaller, some 300 strong, and they will be designed to Train Advise Assist, and where appropriate to accompany indigenous forces, thus taking perhaps greater risk than conventional infantry might have to take and, of course, they will major on language and cultural expertise. They will be rolled out from next year through a series of pilots and the goal is that they should be able to deliver capacity building at a higher end than conventional infantry."

Food for thought anyways!

I think the issue with this is more of a political one;  *sending troops to Iraq*...the general population will see that as *doing what Trump wants us to do* and Afghanistan is still resident in some people's memories.  Right now, Joe and Jane Canuck seem ok with the Air Force there doing...*air force-y stuff* and our Special Forces there doing *mentoring*. 

We're not at war* with ISIS, remember?   ^-^
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Offline PuckChaser

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Re: Canadian Special Operations Force Command (CANSOFCOM)
« Reply #29 on: July 04, 2017, 15:22:30 »
Pretty soon everyone will be special forces (SF) at this rate.  Mission creep; you do not need to be SF to advise indigenous population soldiers in conventional warfare.  You need to be SF when you advise in ops designed for SF operational environments.  Teaching Iraqi army recruits to shoot straight, throw a grenade or drive a hummer does not require an operator.   Teaching irregular forces in a complex operational environment requires SF, teaching SF requires SF.

The CAF is way ahead of you: http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/peacekeeping-africa-sajjan-1.3712202

We only get a snippet of what missions are being completed by CANSOF, but based on that article the CDS and MND seem to be very in tune with providing conventional forces as trainers when the mission and specific AOR warrants it. What you're suggesting is that the government automatically just throws SOF at everything first, instead of the CDS doing a mission analysis and providing a force package that meets the government's intent. I strongly doubt that's the case, especially with the DComd stating his troops are being run ragged.

Offline Eye In The Sky

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Re: Canadian Special Operations Force Command (CANSOFCOM)
« Reply #30 on: July 04, 2017, 15:34:02 »
the DComd stating his troops are being run ragged.

It's been almost 3 years sustained now.  You can only rotate in/out what you have, and if what you have isn't enough to rest people, they get burnt.  The longer you sustain the more burnt people get and the harder it is for them to recharge.  This is reality in a small military with inadequate numbers of people and funding.
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Offline PuckChaser

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Re: Canadian Special Operations Force Command (CANSOFCOM)
« Reply #31 on: July 04, 2017, 15:57:17 »
It's been almost 3 years sustained now.  You can only rotate in/out what you have, and if what you have isn't enough to rest people, they get burnt.  The longer you sustain the more burnt people get and the harder it is for them to recharge.  This is reality in a small military with inadequate numbers of people and funding.

Concur. Especially when you're talking about 10% deployed, 10% training and 10% having just returned. 30% of CANSOF if the 2,000 pers is accurate is tagged just for IMPACT.

Offline Chris Pook

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Re: Canadian Special Operations Force Command (CANSOFCOM)
« Reply #32 on: July 04, 2017, 21:35:52 »
Rotate more of the Reg Army through CANSOFCOM positions?

Vandoos, PPCLI and RCDs doing a two year secondment to a CSOR Direct Action Company and then return to their Regiment?
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Offline Pickle Rick

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Re: Canadian Special Operations Force Command (CANSOFCOM)
« Reply #33 on: July 04, 2017, 21:46:54 »
Rotate more of the Reg Army through CANSOFCOM positions?

Vandoos, PPCLI and RCDs doing a two year secondment to a CSOR Direct Action Company and then return to their Regiment?

You can't just rotate NCMs/Officers in to CANSOF Assaulter/Operator roles like a regular posting. There still has to be a selection and Assaulter/Operator course to get members that have the abilities/skill sets/personality that suites SOF and the roles they are employed. Just because someone was a good Infantryman/Officer in a Battalion doesn't mean they would be succcessful as an CSOR Operator, or JTF2 Assaulter.

« Last Edit: July 04, 2017, 22:27:48 by LightFighter »

Offline Humphrey Bogart

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Re: Canadian Special Operations Force Command (CANSOFCOM)
« Reply #34 on: July 04, 2017, 22:41:37 »
Rotate more of the Reg Army through CANSOFCOM positions?

Vandoos, PPCLI and RCDs doing a two year secondment to a CSOR Direct Action Company and then return to their Regiment?

Hmmm sounds like the Airborne Regiment.   >:D

You can't just rotate NCMs/Officers in to CANSOF Assaulter/Operator roles like a regular posting. There still has to be a selection and Assaulter/Operator course to get members that have the abilities/skill sets/personality that suites SOF and the roles they are employed. Just because someone was a good Infantryman/Officer in a Battalion doesn't mean they would be succcessful as an CSOR Operator, or JTF2 Assaulter.

The problem with CSOR is they've gone beyond the initial training scope of the unit.  When CSOR was created, they took the bulk of 3 RCR Para Company, ran them through a crash course and said, you're now CSOR.  So what you're saying is factually incorrect, it's perfectly possible to take a normal Infantry Company, weed out a few laggards and build a Commando unit, how do you think the Paras/Royal Marines have successfully done it for years?

CSOR has become JTF2 lite because we've gone for the 90% solution when the 75% probably would have sufficed and also been cheaper.  I know a number of Operators who have been with CSOR since the beginning, they freely admit that they probably wouldn't crack the unit if they had to try out with today's selection standards.

What the CAF probably needs is a dedicated light infantry Battlegroup that's got a larger emphasis on physical fitness, field craft and individual soldier skills than your standard infantry battalion.  Think Recce Platoon but way bigger.

You could have a short selection focused on physical fitness followed by a short commando course, voila unit created. 

The elite of the French Army do it this way.  The FFL takes their most physically fit/keen legionnaires and generally send them to 2REP.  They then all do BPara followed by a "stage commando" which is dependent on which company they wind up in (2REP Companies all have different specialties - Mountain, Littoral, Desert, Urban, etc).  After a few years, if they're still keen, they can attempt to get in to the elite Groupe Commando Parachutistes (GCP) which is a Tier 2 SOF unit within the French Army (each unit within the parachute brigade has at least one GCP, 2REP has two).

Because Canada only ever really dabbles in anything we do, six pack of fighters here, sprinkling of Int guys there, some CIMIC here, few tanks over there.... we tend to choose the most expensive COA, not necessarily the best one for producing massive amounts of combat power.  Such is life in the Armed Forces of a declining middle power  8)
« Last Edit: July 04, 2017, 23:18:19 by Humphrey Bogart »

Offline daftandbarmy

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Re: Canadian Special Operations Force Command (CANSOFCOM)
« Reply #35 on: July 04, 2017, 22:44:48 »
It's been almost 3 years sustained now.  You can only rotate in/out what you have, and if what you have isn't enough to rest people, they get burnt.  The longer you sustain the more burnt people get and the harder it is for them to recharge.  This is reality in a small military with inadequate numbers of people and funding.

I imagine that's what happens when you have ambitious commanders trying to "Keep up with the SOF Jones'".
"The most important qualification of a soldier is fortitude under fatigue and privation. Courage is only second; hardship, poverty and want are the best school for a soldier." Napoleon

Offline Chris Pook

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Re: Canadian Special Operations Force Command (CANSOFCOM)
« Reply #36 on: July 05, 2017, 01:28:05 »
.... This is reality in a small military with inadequate numbers of people and funding.

Or is it reality in a military an army that is spending resources on anything other than that element that is regularly engaged?  20,000 candidates in 3 Brigades to keep 3 companies in CSOR supplied?  And you can't find enough physically fit, switched on specimens?




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Offline devil39

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Re: Canadian Special Operations Force Command (CANSOFCOM)
« Reply #37 on: July 05, 2017, 01:32:13 »
Pretty soon everyone will be special forces (SF) at this rate.  Mission creep; you do not need to be SF to advise indigenous population soldiers in conventional warfare.  You need to be SF when you advise in ops designed for SF operational environments.  Teaching Iraqi army recruits to shoot straight, throw a grenade or drive a hummer does not require an operator.   Teaching irregular forces in a complex operational environment requires SF, teaching SF requires SF.

The Canadian Army, with their pedantic and ridiculous (Micro) Managed (Un) Readiness Plan, have priced themselves out of business.  CANSOF makes a point of excelling in, and embracing ambiguity and filling empty space.  Is there any doubt why CANSOF continues to grow at the expense of the Canadian Army?
« Last Edit: July 05, 2017, 08:24:17 by devil39 »

Offline Humphrey Bogart

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Re: Canadian Special Operations Force Command (CANSOFCOM)
« Reply #38 on: July 05, 2017, 06:44:05 »
Or is it reality in a military an army that is spending resources on anything other than that element that is regularly engaged?  20,000 candidates in 3 Brigades to keep 3 companies in CSOR supplied?  And you can't find enough physically fit, switched on specimens?

We dabble Chris, it's all about dabbling in this Armed Force  ;D

The Canadian Army, with their pedantic and ridiculous (Micro) Managed (Un) Readiness Program, have priced themselves out of business.  CANSOF makes a point of excelling in, and embracing ambiguity and filling empty space.  Is there any doubt why CANSOF continues to grow at the expense of the Canadian Army?

So if we were to compare the CAF to a potluck?

Is CANSOFCOM the dude that brings pulled pork but only enough for like two people to have

Is the Army the jackass that shows up with 10 rotten veggie plates from the roadside truck stop

 ;D
« Last Edit: July 05, 2017, 06:47:32 by Humphrey Bogart »

Offline Lightguns

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Re: Canadian Special Operations Force Command (CANSOFCOM)
« Reply #39 on: July 05, 2017, 07:52:00 »
My concern would be repeating the mistake that the Israelis made. They decided in the 50s that all infantry should be paratroopers, those that couldn't or wouldn't were sent to the mechanized infantry which was under funded to fund the paratroopers.  The result was that their infantry corps valued paratroopers travelling light to mechanized infantry and thus the mechanized infantry became a ******* that was transferred to the Armoured Corps who underfunded it and let it's training go because of the lessons of 67 when infantry rarely dismounted.  In 73 when the Arabs got ATGMs the armoured paid the price of not having a trained mechanized infantry.  The quick fix was to give the paratroopers half tracks from reserve infantry units whose troops were turned into labour for the engineers.   Thus wasting the vertical insertion capacity of a majority of the paratroopers.
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Offline Humphrey Bogart

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Re: Canadian Special Operations Force Command (CANSOFCOM)
« Reply #40 on: July 05, 2017, 08:14:22 »
My concern would be repeating the mistake that the Israelis made. They decided in the 50s that all infantry should be paratroopers, those that couldn't or wouldn't were sent to the mechanized infantry which was under funded to fund the paratroopers.  The result was that their infantry corps valued paratroopers travelling light to mechanized infantry and thus the mechanized infantry became a ******* that was transferred to the Armoured Corps who underfunded it and let it's training go because of the lessons of 67 when infantry rarely dismounted.  In 73 when the Arabs got ATGMs the armoured paid the price of not having a trained mechanized infantry.  The quick fix was to give the paratroopers half tracks from reserve infantry units whose troops were turned into labour for the engineers.   Thus wasting the vertical insertion capacity of a majority of the paratroopers.

Lightguns,

I think this is exactly what the Army is scared of.  It's part of the reason (not the only one) the Airborne was killed off.

I've said this before:

The Canadian Army's entire history is "mechanized warfare in Europe" we're comfortable with it.  The Army as an institutional is uncomfortable with commando forces because they take away from what the institution believes is its core raison d'être. 

A commando regiment would require giving it primacy as far as funding and picks of the litter go.  The Regiments and other Corps would never stand for it.

Any Commander that pushed for this would end up spending his entire command fighting institutional and regimental inertia. 

The Americans suffer the same problem.  I worked with a US Green Beret on exchange here, he noted that they have the exact same things happen down South, "want to attempt 75th Ranger or Special Forces?  Better hope you pass because the knives will be out if you don't".  He also noted that the Regimental component of our Army adds an additional complication that they don't suffer from.

There's a reason they've been slowly clawing back responsibility for everything SOF career related.  They've had to in order to advance the yard stick.

« Last Edit: July 05, 2017, 08:19:51 by Humphrey Bogart »

Offline Pickle Rick

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Re: Canadian Special Operations Force Command (CANSOFCOM)
« Reply #41 on: July 05, 2017, 10:24:12 »
The problem with CSOR is they've gone beyond the initial training scope of the unit.  When CSOR was created, they took the bulk of 3 RCR Para Company, ran them through a crash course and said, you're now CSOR.  So what you're saying is factually incorrect, it's perfectly possible to take a normal Infantry Company, weed out a few laggards and build a Commando unit

I understand how CSOR was created initially, however my above post was more in reference to the CSOR(including their selection and SFC) of today, not 2006.


You could have a short selection focused on physical fitness followed by a short commando course, voila unit created.

I don't disagree with this, however CSOR as it stands right now is more than this.


What the CAF probably needs is a dedicated light infantry Battlegroup that's got a larger emphasis on physical fitness, field craft and individual soldier skills than your standard infantry battalion.  Think Recce Platoon but way bigger.

So essentially, something in line with what the CAR/SSF were?
« Last Edit: July 05, 2017, 10:36:00 by LightFighter »

Offline Humphrey Bogart

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Re: Canadian Special Operations Force Command (CANSOFCOM)
« Reply #42 on: July 05, 2017, 10:52:56 »
I understand how CSOR was created initially, however my above post was more in reference to the CSOR(including their selection and SFC) of today, not 2006.


I don't disagree with this, however CSOR as it stands right now is more than this.


So essentially, something in line with what the CAR/SSF were?

Pretty much, sorry for coming across as condescending, I just don't like the political narrative the institution has created with respect to SOF/Army Missions and Tasks. 




Offline Chris Pook

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Re: Canadian Special Operations Force Command (CANSOFCOM)
« Reply #43 on: July 05, 2017, 11:33:21 »
....I just don't like the political narrative the institution has created ....

And thus it is with any institution.  It becomes institutionalised and exists to serve its members.  And if those members can separate themselves from the herd, ensuring jobs for life in the Corps of Tree Climbers*, so much the better.

* pace Field Marshall Slim.



I continue to believe that the problem should be addressed by separating the infantry from their vehicles at the battalion level.  That the vehicles be held by battalion, either in a separate company and/or as platoons attached to companies and that the training of the crews and the training of the infantry be handled separately.

Then you have 27 rifle coys available to work in a variety of environments and you have a basis for attaching signallers, FOOs, engineers and log types when the vehicles are not available - and there seems to be more occasions when the vehicles are not available than when they are.

You could also have 52 to 127 rifle coys available from the reserve force (assumes that all of the militia units are trained first and foremost in local defence skills).

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Offline Lightguns

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Re: Canadian Special Operations Force Command (CANSOFCOM)
« Reply #44 on: July 05, 2017, 11:36:56 »
And thus it is with any institution.  It becomes institutionalised and exists to serve its members.  And if those members can separate themselves from the herd, ensuring jobs for life in the Corps of Tree Climbers*, so much the better.

* pace Field Marshall Slim.



I continue to believe that the problem should be addressed by separating the infantry from their vehicles at the battalion level.  That the vehicles be held by battalion, either in a separate company and/or as platoons attached to companies and that the training of the crews and the training of the infantry be handled separately.

Then you have 27 rifle coys available to work in a variety of environments and you have a basis for attaching signallers, FOOs, engineers and log types when the vehicles are not available - and there seems to be more occasions when the vehicles are not available than when they are.

You could also have 52 to 127 rifle coys available from the reserve force (assumes that all of the militia units are trained first and foremost in local defence skills).

Damn good manageable idea.  The only worry is a govt that says "you only need vehicles to train 3 coys at a time, we will buy the rest when we go to war......."
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Offline Chris Pook

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Re: Canadian Special Operations Force Command (CANSOFCOM)
« Reply #45 on: July 05, 2017, 11:47:45 »
Damn good manageable idea.  The only worry is a govt that says "you only need vehicles to train 3 coys at a time, we will buy the rest when we go to war......."

I agree that that is a possibility.

I also agree that the armoured corps could screw up by not adequately training the groundpounders assigned to it, as in Israel.

Or that the infantry corps could screw up by not adequately managing their vehicles and simultaneously neglecting both physical fitness and how to manage dismounted combat loads.

Or that the whole army could screw up by failing to adequately enforce existing rules and regulations and employ "elite" forces as dumping grounds for expendables.

All of those things are possible.

But all of those things are command failures that result from a lack of focus on the priority task - creating a force that can engage any and all foes, at any time and place, by day or by night, regardless of season and terrain, and regardless of political environment, and kill them - in accordance with Her Majesty's wishes.

Not just on a German plain that even the Germans won't defend any more.
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Offline Ostrozac

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Re: Canadian Special Operations Force Command (CANSOFCOM)
« Reply #46 on: July 05, 2017, 12:17:01 »
The Canadian Army's entire history is "mechanized warfare in Europe" we're comfortable with it.

I would argue that we are actually schizophrenic as an institution -- in addition to the heavy metal, force-on-force advocates that clearly designed my training at the Tactics School and write our doctrine,  there are also advocates of a constabulary Canadian Army that is not intended to fight large groups of uniformed modern enemies. This second group seems to heavily influence our equipment choice -- the TAPV, the choice of M777 with a soft skinned tractor instead of self propelled artillery, the divestment/cancellation of CCV and TUA, large battle group and brigade headquarters with no ability to manoeuvre.

That our doctrine and equipment don't match makes the Canadian Army an inherently nonsensical organization. It doesn't actually do what it says on the label, so whatever we do is inherently improvised. We're pretty good at improvisation, but it's still improvisation. Our Army isn't fit for purpose, because we can't actually articulate a purpose.

Offline Chris Pook

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Re: Canadian Special Operations Force Command (CANSOFCOM)
« Reply #47 on: July 05, 2017, 13:36:07 »
Quote
More seriously, the big attacks that have taken place around Raqqa, one in particular, a surprise landing by helicopter, I was told by the top US commanders, would not have taken place if it hadn’t been for President Trump’s decision to delegate military authorities down to the level of command. I mean, under Obama that would have taken a couple weeks of White House meetings and then they still wouldn’t have made up their mind.

In this case there was not one meeting. They just said, General Townsend, the commander in Baghdad, you decide. And three days later, these Kurds who’d never seen an airplane or helicopter had been helicoptered across a lake for a surprise attack that is probably the most daring and decisive of the war.

https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2017/07/03/wps_david_ignatius_returns_from_syria_kurdish_fighters_cheer_at_mention_of_president_trumps_name.html

Quote
"In the battalion Command Post the radio remained on, but silent.  Suddenly HMS Intrepid, the LPD that carried the landing-craft that would take the men ashore, called and her operations officer asked to speak to the CO.  He was summoned from his cabin.

'Are you aware that in three hours time the Brigade is due to go ashore?' he was asked?  'Has the battalion broken out its first-line scales of ammunition yet?'  More importantly, 'Could the battalion make the deadline?'.....

....At 0200 hours on the 21st, the first landing-craft parties assembled in the Continental Lounge, weighed down with bergens, belt order and weapons.  In many respects the scene was like any battalion parachute training exercise....

...In one of the leading craft the men of B Company prepared to disembark, shouldering their bergens with difficulty.  Their boat stopped.  Though in fact C Company was now due ashore first, it took so long to beach their craft that B Company was first in

'Off troops!' called the coxswain.  Silence. No one moved. Again he called. A small figure scurried back along the railings to the stern. - 'There's still two to three feet of water.'

'I don't give a damn! They'll just have to get wet.  Get off!' the coxswain shouted again. Someone more attuned to a Para's mentality simply shouted 'Go!'  They went.

From: 2 Para Falklands: The Battalion at War.  Maj-Gen John Frost. Birk and Enright 1983. Chapter 3 - Preparing for Action.

Local infantry in an expedient helicopter assault.

Paras in an expedient amphibious assault.

And with never more than a sprinkling of Tree Climbers to organize affairs.
« Last Edit: July 05, 2017, 13:39:24 by Chris Pook »
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Offline daftandbarmy

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Re: Canadian Special Operations Force Command (CANSOFCOM)
« Reply #48 on: July 05, 2017, 14:40:29 »
I would argue that we are actually schizophrenic as an institution -- in addition to the heavy metal, force-on-force advocates that clearly designed my training at the Tactics School and write our doctrine,  there are also advocates of a constabulary Canadian Army that is not intended to fight large groups of uniformed modern enemies. This second group seems to heavily influence our equipment choice -- the TAPV, the choice of M777 with a soft skinned tractor instead of self propelled artillery, the divestment/cancellation of CCV and TUA, large battle group and brigade headquarters with no ability to manoeuvre.

That our doctrine and equipment don't match makes the Canadian Army an inherently nonsensical organization. It doesn't actually do what it says on the label, so whatever we do is inherently improvised. We're pretty good at improvisation, but it's still improvisation. Our Army isn't fit for purpose, because we can't actually articulate a purpose.

Our OMLTs in Afghanistan conducted operations that were formerly the province of Special Forces, and did very well.

Good militaries, led by skilled senior leaders and staffs, can do just about anything. To keep these skills alive we should practice re-roling from time to time to keep those 'flexibility' muscles alive. It's as much a mistake to designate 3 of our battalions as 'light battalions forever' as it is to designate the rest as 'mech battalions forever'.

Re-role to SOF battalions? Why not; depending on the task it should be relatively easy. If not, we aren't getting good value for our infantry $ investments.

"The most important qualification of a soldier is fortitude under fatigue and privation. Courage is only second; hardship, poverty and want are the best school for a soldier." Napoleon

Offline Chris Pook

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Re: Canadian Special Operations Force Command (CANSOFCOM)
« Reply #49 on: July 05, 2017, 14:46:07 »
Our OMLTs in Afghanistan conducted operations that were formerly the province of Special Forces, and did very well.

Good militaries, led by skilled senior leaders and staffs, can do just about anything. To keep these skills alive we should practice re-roling from time to time to keep those 'flexibility' muscles alive. It's as much a mistake to designate 3 of our battalions as 'light battalions forever' as it is to designate the rest as 'mech battalions forever'.

Re-role to SOF battalions? Why not; depending on the task it should be relatively easy. If not, we aren't getting good value for our infantry $ investments.

Perhaps the OMLT/Trainer Type SOFs could hone their craft bringing Reserve Companies up to speed.
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