Author Topic: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy  (Read 723967 times)

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Offline Underway

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2175 on: February 10, 2018, 10:51:53 »
I'm not advocating for them, just using them as an example.  And as an example of why we should stop listening to the loudest shouter.

As for screwing up the ATH, I heard a completely different story.  The RCN screwed that up.  Welland did their due diligence and found far more damage to the ATH structure (during ultrasounds etc...) then the RCN was willing to pay for, which of course through everything out of kilter.  The ship was one big wave away from disaster due to structural fatigue.  The towing incident certainly can't be blamed on the yard. 

But it's essentially irrelevant to my argument.  It doesn't necessarily have to be Davie but necessarily has to be a competition.  Odds are Davie would win easy a fair competition.

Offline Oldgateboatdriver

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2176 on: February 10, 2018, 11:02:57 »
I am 100% with you that everything should be by open competition.

As I said above, however, in view of various delays in the NSPS (mostly from the governments, not the yards), and the dire situation of the Coast Guard fleet (at least in the Navy, we got all the frigates mid-lifed), there are now serious gaps in the needs of the fleets in relation to the deliverables of the NSPS and beyond.

This provides an opportunity for immediately expanding industrial benefits of the fleet replacements without depriving the selected shipyards under the NSPS of any benefits they have already acquired under it. With a bit of imagination (and really - not much in terms of brainpower required), this can alleviate the fleets needs while improving for all on the NSPS.

But yes: only by doing it with fair and open competitions.

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2177 on: February 10, 2018, 11:10:43 »
As for screwing up the ATH, I heard a completely different story.  The RCN screwed that up.  Welland did their due diligence and found far more damage to the ATH structure (during ultrasounds etc...) then the RCN was willing to pay for, which of course through everything out of kilter.  The ship was one big wave away from disaster due to structural fatigue.  The towing incident certainly can't be blamed on the yard. 

I came off ATH shortly before she went in to Welland and kept in touch with the guys who were there doing QA.  Don't kid yourself,  there was plenty wrong with the refit that wasn't on our side.  And the timing of the tow was because of the yard.

Offline Navy_Pete

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2178 on: February 10, 2018, 13:08:07 »
I came off ATH shortly before she went in to Welland and kept in touch with the guys who were there doing QA.  Don't kid yourself,  there was plenty wrong with the refit that wasn't on our side.  And the timing of the tow was because of the yard.

Can confirm; there was re-re-re-work on multiple tanks due to major QC fails on the paint (subcontractor work).  On the plus side, they did excellent steel, pipe and electrical work and their own paint department was good (just too small to do all the tank work).  That delayed the undocking (can't paint tanks in the water) so we couldn't do any of the set to work and sail her back before the canals closed for the season, hence the tow.

Port Weller was not part of Heddle Marine when ATH was there; they were a separate company that was a subsidiary of Upper Lakes group.  They shut down shortly after ATH, and understand it's now basically just a facility available for rent of the drydocks.  It's too bad; all the guys that worked there were giving it that last shot, but were going to move on as the work in the area was all drying up (Welland industrial base has basically collapsed), but there were some really good people there.

Agree with the need to review it and compete some of the new work; the CCG has had a bunch of new requirements come up since the NSS started 10 years ago so it's a good time to look at it.  There are a few other yards that could build some of the medium ships and a couple options for the large ships but someone like Davie should be well positioned to make a competitive bid.

Offline Cdn Blackshirt

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2179 on: February 10, 2018, 13:59:12 »
The problem with trying to do "open bidding" but only allowing 2-3 domestic competitors is you're very likely to get bid rigging and inflated profiteering. 

On some of these national security type contracts where we are politically saying "we must source from domestic sources" I would argue it makes sense to treat such procurement as a regulated utility and cap a maximum (cost +) agreement with the profit margin falling as they miss on quality or time specifications.
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Offline Oldgateboatdriver

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2180 on: February 10, 2018, 14:02:48 »
Concur, Navy_Pete: Heddle basically scooped up everything as they closed in the Great Lakes system.

Port Weller did, however, belong to Upper Lakes Shipyard Group at the time it acquired Davie - so as to be in position to get the NSPS contract - at which time, Davie would have been lead with subcontract work to Port Weller. At least that was the hope.

Davie / Upper Lake didn't get the contract. You know what happened then to Port Weller, and Upper Lake found a new buyer for Davie, and sold it oversea to Inocea. Everybody knows the rest.

Offline Colin P

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2181 on: February 12, 2018, 10:33:06 »
Keep in mind that there is only going to a certain amount of work to maintain these shipyards in the future, the NSPS is an attempt to ensure that there is just enough yards to keep that work going. The idea is great, just 20 years late. I respect the effort Davies put in, but honestly will there be enough work to keep 3 large yards going for the next 30 years? Another thing going against Davie, is it is not geographically well located for naval ship repair. As a country it is critical that we have a capable yard on both coasts to maintain the fleets properly. Halifax has always been the centre of east coast naval operations for a good reason, frankly I wish I could replace Irving management with Davies. From a purely logistical point of view for long term ship repair, Davie is poorly located.

Offline Uzlu

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2182 on: February 12, 2018, 13:48:07 »
I respect the effort Davies put in, but honestly will there be enough work to keep 3 large yards going for the next 30 years?
I think it might be possible.  But does it have to be thirty-year programmes?  How about twenty-five-year or twenty-year programmes?  There would be less long-and-expensive refits.  How about the following for very-long-term planning purposes?  Irving builds only destroyers and frigates, Seaspan builds only icebreakers, and the third shipbuilding company builds all other large ships for the navy and coast guard. 

Perhaps something like three destroyers, twelve frigates, twenty icebreakers, four replenishment ships,  one fleet diving-support ship, two naval-research ships, three offshore fisheries-science vessels, one offshore oceanographic-science vessel, nine ice-strengthened navaids tenders, one offshore search-and-rescue cutter, four ice-strengthened offshore search-and-rescue cutters,  and four fishery-patrol vessels or their equivalents.

Offline Colin P

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2183 on: February 12, 2018, 17:08:11 »
Canadian ship replacement thinking-20 years, hmm we should think about replacing this? 25 years or dear this thing is really getting bad, we should double up on the paint. 30 years- what do mean it's broken, how much to fix it? Oh my........ 35 years, PANIC, PANIC, oh my god how did this crisis happen???? Senior management says, no worries we will study the problem, meanwhile "modernize" your service delivery to delete the need for that ship...

Offline MarkOttawa

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2184 on: February 15, 2018, 15:48:56 »
Conclusion of lengthy CGAI paper:

Quote
A Basic Primer on Naval Shipbuilding
...
by Ian Mack
...
One should not be surprised by the propensity for delays in execution. Canada enjoys living next door to the U.S. and having strong ties with our southern neighbour. Rightly or wrongly, Canadians see the U.S. as the guarantor of Canada’s defence. The corollary is that Canadians view the Department of National Defence as a government entity worthy of less interest than the business of most other departments of government. If one accepts this hypothesis, three corollaries follow. First, Canada still needs to be able to contribute to collective defence to maintain these strong ties – and especially with the Trump administration, where burden sharing by allies who enjoy the U.S. security guarantee remains an objective under the recently released National Defense Strategy. Second, Canadian politicians are unlikely to invest significant capital in finding ways to accelerate defence procurement, which represents political liability due to its expense and significant risk profile for what is essentially overhead of the undervalued defence program. And third, because it is expensive, they want industrial and technical benefits for Canadian companies from every contract, especially noting that these are high-paying jobs with the potential to fuel national prosperity. In implementation, the delivery of shipbuilding projects under NSS can be assessed as hugely expensive, well north of $50 billion. All this is to say, successive governments want to do military procurement, but with a minimum of risk. Continuous attempts to de-risk inherently complex and thus risk-laden initiatives such as shipbuilding consume a lot of effort and time.

Delays are therefore common, putting timely procurement execution in jeopardy across the board. But one should manage their expectations for more timely execution. Unless the world goes into a major war, Canada’s strategic position changes in the world order, the U.S. applies uncommon pressure, or military procurement gets so broken that the politicians cannot take the political heat – delays will continue. There are things that could be done more expediently within the military procurement system but there must be motivation to identify those opportunities and implement the related changes. Other nations empower external czars to do comprehensive end-to-end reviews of programs and projects to identify options employed elsewhere. Then ministers specifically default to accepting proposed recommendations unless there is a compelling reason not to. Without such an approach or similar, attempts to reduce delays are likely to be more akin to tinkering at the edges. Noting these comments relating to schedule for Canadian weapon systems platform acquisitions, it follows that significant changes of procurement strategy mid-course run a very high probability of creating even longer delays than staying the course we are now on.

So What

In the end, this is all about the future of the National Shipbuilding Strategy, an enterprise-wide change initiative of national proportions. It is truly a complex initiative that can be expected to take decades to mature, as was typically required when national naval shipyards went into place in other nations in the previous century. And as stated in the opening paragraphs of this paper, challenges will continue to emerge – challenges that will need continual and candid explanation.

For many years, our government has stated they would pursue a list of solutions to the current ills: enhanced oversight, greater shipbuilding expertise and capacity within the government, improved budgeting based on better cost estimates, and four key measures of outcome performance (timeliness of project execution, delivery of vessels within approved budgets, shipyard productivity and economic benefits).

These are not easily achieved. Internationally, nations are struggling to recruit shipbuilding expertise in sufficient quantities to manage more than one or two major naval procurements continuously over a decade and the knowledgeable people to provide mature governance. International associations engaged in complex project management research have said that in truly complex endeavours, the iron triangle of matched requirements and schedule with cost are nigh on impossible to predict with much confidence until actual deliveries occur in a sorted fashion, so an enhanced record on cost estimation is inherently unlikely.

Then there is the issue of shipyard productivity. Interestingly, when various international benchmarking experts were asked to define when the NSS shipyards could be measured to show strong productivity, they were unanimous in saying that, noting the order book for each shipyard (and especially for Vancouver Shipyard), “not for a very long time”. The shipyards are committed to reach something termed “target state” once they have effectively built a ship and thus demonstrated all the key construction activities. Target state is a set of best practices in shipbuilding, essentially the fundamentals to good productivity. But achieving target state will not necessarily deliver good productivity. Using an analogy, this is similar to being able to master the various skills of driving a car: parallel parking, changing lanes, navigating and the like. But once the driver’s licence is obtained as proof of such competencies, one is not yet necessarily ready to tackle downtown New York traffic in rush hour or the 401 in Toronto during a white-out snow squall. Having the basic skills does not make you a good driver. Under NSS, target state is confirmation that all of the basic skills are present to a reasonable level of competence, but their integration in the face of greater complexity and adversity may not yet be present. Achieving target state does not confirm that the shipyards are meeting some international productivity standard such as “tons of steel per person-year” over multiple ships – and in shipbuilding, such standards themselves are controversial. For all of these measures, the race is on to deliver in every one of them – but schedule is king. In hindsight and noting the priority of defence for Canadians (or rather, the lack of priority), it could be argued that NSPS was the right thing to do in principle but perhaps too ambitious for Canada. But there is a counter argument if the “Build in Canada” shipbuilding policy prevails. As was apparent from the first JSS procurement activity that was terminated, the alternative in this century is likely to be best described as lurching from one crisis to another, shipbuilding project by shipbuilding project and Canadian shipyard by Canadian shipyard.

NSS is not on the rocks but it is in shoal waters. NSS can offer great benefits if Canada can stay the course. There have been and are challenges today. And because the processes shaping procurements are largely set by the client, the ball is in the government’s court. Therefore, the government of Canada is encouraged to (1) commission an independent end-to-end review of NSS with the express intent of expeditiously implementing the resulting recommendations, and (2) implement frequent, regular and honest communications with the public, no matter the issues at hand. These two additional actions alone will go a long ways to keeping NSS off the rocks...

Ian Mack (Rear-Admiral Ret.) was the director-general in the Department of National Defence responsible for a decade (2007-2017) for the conception, shaping and support to the launch and subsequent implementation of the National Shipbuilding Strategy, and for guiding the DND project managers for the Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships, the Joint Support Ships and the Canadian Surface Combatants. Since leaving the government, he has offered his shipbuilding and project management perspectives internationally. Ian is a longstanding Fellow of the International Centre for Complex Project Management.
http://www.cgai.ca/a_basic_primer_on_naval_shipbuilding

Mark
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Offline MarkOttawa

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2185 on: February 15, 2018, 19:43:49 »
Knowledgeable friend comments:

Quote
I couldn't generate any optimism at all. I doubt we have the managerial skills in this country, certainly not in government, to make this a success. And not enough money.

Mark
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Offline NavyShooter

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2186 on: February 15, 2018, 19:49:38 »
From the 'boots on the deck level' I have very little confidence that the work-force at ISI is capable of producing the product.

Insert disclaimer statement here....

:panzer:

Offline Oldgateboatdriver

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2187 on: February 16, 2018, 20:19:32 »
This is the part (admission?) from Admiral Mack's article that gets my blood boiling:

and four key measures of outcome performance (timeliness of project execution, delivery of vessels within approved budgets, shipyard productivity and economic benefits).

Anybody sees any indication in there that the warships are supposed to be fit for fighting at a level commensurate with their expected duties?

Offline MarkOttawa

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2188 on: February 17, 2018, 13:31:50 »
Meanwhile US Navy's new frigate program warp-speeding past CSC:

Quote
Navy awards design contracts for future frigate

The Navy has awarded $15 million contracts to five companies for conceptual designs for the FFG(X) program.

Huntington Ingalls, Lockheed Martin, Austal USA, General Dynamics Bath Iron Works, and Italian shipbuilder Fincantieri have all been asked to submit mature designs over the next 16 months before the Navy drops down to a single detailed design and construction contract.

All the contracts contain options that could grow the value to between $22 million and $23 million, according to the contract announcement. The work is expected to be complete by June, 2019.

The U.S. Navy intends to award the contract for the first FFG(X) in 2020. It will buy one in 2020 and one in 2021, followed by two each year after that, according to the Navy’s most recent 30-year shipbuilding plan. The U.S. Navy’s requirement is for 52 small-surface combatants, the bulk of which will be LCS.

Both Austal and Lockheed Martin are competing amped up versions of their littoral combat ships. Huntington Ingalls is offering a version of the Coast Guard’s National Security Cutter. Fincantieri is offering its FREMM design. General Dynamics is offering a patrnership with Spanish shipbuilding Navantia, for its F100 frigate.

The Navy is looking for builders to balance value and capabilities, according to a statement, the Naval Sea Systems Command.

“Throughout the accelerated acquisition process for FFG(X), the Navy will incentivize industry to balance cost and capability and achieve the best value solution for the American taxpayer,” the statement reads.
https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2018/02/16/navy-awards-design-contracts-for-for-future-frigate

Much more on USN FFG(X) at USNI News, with lots of weapons systems details:

Quote
Navy Picks Five Contenders for Next Generation Frigate FFG(X) Program
https://news.usni.org/2018/02/16/navy-picks-five-contenders-next-generation-frigate-ffgxprogram

Mark
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« Last Edit: February 17, 2018, 14:22:49 by MarkOttawa »
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Offline Underway

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2189 on: February 17, 2018, 16:19:42 »
Meanwhile US Navy's new frigate program warp-speeding past CSC:

Not past, perhaps catching up.  The CSC program will be awarded soon, this summer I expect.  However I do expect the US to start their build sooner than us, considering they already have multiple shipyards that can do the work or already doing the work for frigate sized ships.  Though technically we do have a yard building frigate sized ships right now.

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2190 on: February 17, 2018, 16:59:57 »
Don't we now have three yards capable of building frigates?  Irving, Davie and Seaspan?  Four if you include Seaspan's Victoria Yard.
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Offline MarkOttawa

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2191 on: February 17, 2018, 17:09:12 »
Ça explique, mais ça n'excuse pas.

Offline Colin P

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2192 on: February 17, 2018, 17:32:57 »
Meanwhile the new opponents


Offline MTShaw

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2193 on: February 17, 2018, 18:51:19 »
Meanwhile the new opponents

No they're America's new opponent. It's they're latest useful tool to rile it's population against the imagined opponent.

Meanwhile everybody, including the Americans, are busy doing business with the Chinese.

BTW the way, the Chinese appear, on the surface, quite capable.

Offline Halifax Tar

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2194 on: February 17, 2018, 18:59:04 »
Meanwhile the new opponents



Is it just me or does that Chinese tanker look allot like a Pro class ?  Perhaps slightly updated.
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Offline Colin P

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2195 on: February 17, 2018, 20:13:12 »
As I understand it, the Pro class were considered successes, so elements of that design would be incorporated. It will be interesting to see if China also goes down the Astreix route for the next generation?

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2196 on: February 18, 2018, 06:46:35 »
Is it just me or does that Chinese tanker look allot like a Pro class ?  Perhaps slightly updated.

More than a passing resemblance to my eyes too.

Offline Oldgateboatdriver

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2197 on: February 18, 2018, 10:44:48 »
And look like US, Spanish, French, Australian and Italian ones. Every AOR of that generation had this typical arrangement.

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2198 on: February 18, 2018, 11:25:23 »
Would the commonality of design make station keeping and RAS procedures more uniform?
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Offline Navy_Pete

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2199 on: February 18, 2018, 12:11:54 »
Would the commonality of design make station keeping and RAS procedures more uniform?

I think the commonality of the design is due to considerations around station keeping (ie the bow pressure wave effect) and other general practical considerations.  You would have to update both the AOR and receiving ships concurrently to do any radical changes, but they've updated the receiver and probes a few times over the years. The RAS procedures themselves are uniform across NATO for interoperability reasons, so whether you RAS off the USN, UK, Spain, Turkey, Greece etc all the signals are identical, and we use the same reference for station #s etc.

I imagine that the Russian and Chineses procedures aren't hugely different, although they may have different signals.