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The Parade Square => The Canadian Military => Topic started by: PPCLI Guy on October 17, 2004, 13:30:44

Title: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: PPCLI Guy on October 17, 2004, 13:30:44
Heretic time...

I think that this is actually exactly the right question to be asking - along with a host of other like-minded questions.  We need a Defence Policy that is based on a National Security Policy and a Foreign Affairs policy, precisely so that we can ask and answer those kinds of questions.  Right now, we as an instituion are dysfunctionally inarticulate when it comes to defending our requirements - and mostly because we haven't put the necessary thought into the problem - in essence our arguments lack any kind of  intellectual rigour.  More importantly, whenever an "outsider" questions us, we turtle up right away, or mutter things like "you wouldn't understand you liberal pinko", and blame it all on Trudeau and the CBC etc etc etc.

I read a great opinion piece this morning (note that the Gazette piece was also an opinion piece - the journalistic standards are slightly different than for "straight" reporting) by Rick Anderson, a former Reform strategist:

http://www.thestar.com/NASApp/cs/ContentServer?pagename=thestar/Layout/Article_Type1&c=Article&cid=1097878210906&call_pageid=968256290204&col=968350116795

Some highlights...

Quote
Canadians need a more frank discussion on the topic of military spending. Put the rhetoric aside â ” people's lives are involved. So is a great deal of money, and our bona fides with other nations.

The tragedy of HMCS Chicoutimi highlights the need to knock off the lip service and align our military expectations with our military commitments. We acknowledge Canada's need to support its own defence and that of others to support international stability and peacekeeping, the rule of international law, the fight against those who violate it through terror or other means. But we leave most of this to others.

We are past due for a serious debate about this. And to start funding properly that which we deem a priority and stop pretending otherwise about the rest. We advertise ourselves as a "middle power," ready to accept important roles within NATO, NORAD and the United Nations, on peacekeeping missions and elsewhere. But our record suggests otherwise:

I think that we all agree that we need a review of our policy.  The key point here is that we need to pick the priorities, fund those appropriately, and discard the rest.

Quote
The idea is to define our expectations, and bring those expectations and resources into sync, to match military expenditures with military commitments.

Doing this must be anchored in practical assessments of our foreign policy and defence interests, essential precursors to defining the missions and resources assigned to our military.

With luck, the reviews of foreign and defence policy underway within the Liberal government will avoid all-things-to-everyone platitudes and get down to specifics, informing an honest discussion that culminates in concrete decisions.

Although I have high hopes fr the policy review, I fear that we will get exactly that - a something-for-everyone approach, that threatens no rice bowls.

Quote
The defence debate is more than just about money. Earlier this year, NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer challenged nations to "confront some rather traditional mindsets in their military establishments. There are still too many out there who are comfortable with old ways of doing business, and who prefer to run on the structures of the past rather than making the radical changes that real transformation means. The time has clearly come for us to challenge these traditionalist views."

For instance, offers Scheffer, let's "examine alternative options like, for example, common funding of essential capabilities, such as airlift or medical facilities ... is it outrageous to suggest that a group of nations come together to provide a NATO transport fleet of helicopters and aircraft ... could the same not be done for medical facilities as well? Or, could nations outsource to provide these specialized capabilities?"

Two key nuggets here - one is the "old think" that runs rampant in the military- a knee-jerk response to protect what we have, and always try to get newer and shinier versions of what we already have - all without putting much effort into re-thinking why we need those capabilities.  A first principles review sure would be nice...

The second point refers to alternative vcollective security arrangements.  Very intersting.

Quote
Updating thinking about Canada's modern military requirements and priorities involves forcing ourselves to confront two broad choices.

We can re-equip our military for an updated set of missions encompassing continental defence, search and rescue, peacekeeping, and other multilateral commitments. This means ramping up military spending pretty substantially â ” just reaching NATO's average involves an extra $13 billion a year.

Or, we can choose the alternate path, continuing to withdraw from military commitments.

But we cannot do both

Yep.  You can't have your cake and eat it too.

So I say "bring on the hard questions" - and lets to some hard thinking to come up with truly defensible answers.

Dave
The Heretic
Title: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Ex-Dragoon on October 17, 2004, 13:36:34
Hey Heretic ;)

Just for my own clarification you are not an advocate for niche roles for the CF are you?
Title: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: PPCLI Guy on October 17, 2004, 13:41:04
Hey Heretic ;)
Just for my own clarification you are not an advocate for niche roles for the CF are you?

Niche if necessary, not necessarily niche...

I am an advocate of defensible, logical, effective and efficient Roles, Missions and Tasks for the CF.
Title: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Ex-Dragoon on October 17, 2004, 13:53:05
Quote
Niche if necessary, not necessarily niche...

Can you clarify that please?
Title: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: PPCLI Guy on October 17, 2004, 14:06:12
Can you clarify that please?

Sorry about that - sometimes I can be a little obtuse. ::)

What I mean is that I am not for or against any specific solution - I am against the problem, which is that we do not have a defensible Defence Policy.  I refuse to situate the estimate.  We need to do a First Priciples review that recognises no shibboleths, no rice bowls, no political considerations, no Granatsteins or Bercussons.  Do an estimate, select a course of action, develop a plan, and execute it.
Title: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Ex-Dragoon on October 17, 2004, 14:08:24
Gotcha...Thanks :)
Title: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: CheersShag on October 17, 2004, 14:16:02
Quote
Do an estimate, select a course of action, develop a plan, and execute it.

You're coming dangerously close to being logical...now you know logic has no place in the modern military.
Title: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: PPCLI Guy on October 17, 2004, 14:20:12
You're coming dangerously close to being logical...now you know logic has no place in the modern military.

<shakes head> I don't know what I was thinking.  Sorry about that.
Title: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Cdn Blackshirt on October 17, 2004, 18:15:17
Kudos to the Heretic.   I completely concur....



Matthew. (https://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.huskerpowerhour.com%2Fubbthreads%2Fimages%2Fgraemlins%2F229031_clap.gif&hash=2a0f7720d91ffafb3357e61fb422f444)
Title: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Infanteer on October 18, 2004, 22:40:37
Since we are on the subject of a higher National Foreign/Defence Policy, I'll split it off to give it its own thread, separate from the Submarines.

What should define our Foreign Policy?

I liked a basic framework proposed by Joseph S Nye.  Although he has geared it towards America, I think we are faced with many of the same geopolitical realities as they are and thus the basic framework can be tailored to a Canadian perspective.  Nye has gotten a bad wrap for his idea of "Soft Power" - this is due to the fact that starry-eyed idealists like Lloyd Axworthy have taken it and mangled it (much to our dismay).  "Soft Power" is really summed up by Theodore Roosevelt's oft quoted dictum "Walk Softly but Carry a Big Stick".  In essence, coercive Hard Power, although the most decisive and definitive form of power, should be used sparingly as Soft Power carries much more "bang for the buck".  It's cooperative nature allows for efforts to be amplified through acceptance within the International Community.

Anyways, our Defence Policy, as a subset of our Foreign Policy, should be geared to come into play when Soft-Power fails (something Axworthy deemed unlikely, much to his dismay in Kosovo).  History has shown that humans and societies are often not rational, pursuing their own goals for a variety of reasons.  As such, any Policy formulation should recognize that the ability to shift rapidly from a cooperative Soft Power stance to a coercive Hard Power one is essential.  As such, whatever our Policy decides we must have should get full attention from Ottawa; their is simply no excuse for half measures when the military is seen as one half of the essential Soft Power/Hard Power principle of Foreign Policy.

What should define our Foreign Policy?  There can be only one thing, the National Interest.  Defining Foreign Policy on ideological or idealistic grounds represents a discord with reality and can prove dangerous.  I firmly believe that a realistic outlook on our National Interest, which should constantly be re-evaluated against the back drop of the international arena, is the best way to go about things.  Ideologues can argue counterpoints, but our National Security demands that we leave that to the Political Science lecture hall.

Nye presents a good framework for the defining features of a framework for our National Interest.  These are the six principles that Canada must mold its Foreign Policy (and as an extention, its Defence Policy) around; the first three are pretty consistent to a liberal democracy (Britain formed policies around the same ideas in the 19th century), while the latter three are more relevent to the modern, Information Age democracy living in an increasingly globalized world (it's always been globalizing, the pace now is much faster though). As with any venture, the formulation of the National Interest utilizing these principles must define what is important and what is not.  We cannot afford to implement policies willy-nilly, as this will only exhaust our resources rapidly.  :

1. Maintain the Balance of Power in Important Regions:  Generally, War is accepted as a bad thing for a trading nation like Canada.  Wars mean that our military, which is expeditionary by nature, has to be sent (at no cheap cost) around the world to protect our national interest.  As such, Canada must remain dedicated to maintaining the Balance of Power in regions important to our National Interest.  By promoting a stable balance of power in our Foreign and Defence policies, we seek to maintain the local geopolitical equilibrium and to dampen the incentive by local societies to use force to change boundaries and relative power levels.

Example:  Preserving the liberal democratic regimes of South Korea and Japan is essential to Canada's vitality as a Pacific Rim country.  Things in Asia which may throw this balance wildly askew (Chinese aggression, North Korean nuclear missiles, a resurgence of Japanese nationalism) are counterproductive to our National Interest.

2.  Promote an Open International Economy:  Canada is a trading nation.  According to the DFAIT, more then 40% of our Gross Domestic Product is stems from this fact.  Therefore, a threat to our economic lifeline of trade is a threat to our National Interest.  As well, an open, international economy can help to mitigate physical threats to us and can help to develop downtrodden areas around the globe, reducing other forms of threats to our National Interest (rampant refugee populations).  As such, our Soft and Hard Power should be directed towards maintain the current world Economic Order that has allowed us as Canadians to prosper from an unprecedented standard of living.

Example: Soft Power-wise, we must promote institutions that breakdown trade barriers and thus reduce economic activity for Canadians.  Hard Power-wise, we must defend the internation economic order.  If a despot attempts to usurp the Middle East in order to gain control of OPEC and hold the West for ransom, then this represents a clear threat to our National Interest and demands that we take action (as such, our failure to do so in GWI is a sign of failure of the government to execute policy to support this principle).

3.  Preserve the International Commons:  International commons must be preserved for the use of humanity at large.  The easiest example is freedom to use the seas.  Nations or groups (Pirates) that inhibit access to the international commons must be dealt with through the application of Hard Power/Soft Power.  Other forms of international commons include the global climate, endangered ecosystems, outer space, and the Internet.

4.  Maintain International Rules and Institutions:   International cooperation remains the best way to protect the liberal democratic order that sustains us.  As such, our Soft Power/Hard Power needs to be put to use to promote the institutions to which we belong; allowing us to amplify our National Interests with regards to trade, the environment, weapons proliferation, human rights, terrorism, etc, etc.

5.  Assist Economic Development:  Much of the world lives in squalor and destitution.  These conditions are the breeding ground for hate, radicalism, and desperation - all factors that lead to conflict.  Although we can never rid ourselves of the specter of war, helping others to stand on our feet serves a variety of our national interests; it improves relations, it opens new economic opportunities, it reduces suspicion, and it appeals to the moral sense the Canadian public feels in that it must better the lot of mankind.

6.  Act as a Convener of Coalitions and Mediator of Disputes: Canada has built a reputation for being a successful actor on the world stage (most of the times).  Sometimes, our intervention into the affairs of others may help to resolve the situation, reducing threats to our National Interest.  As well, taking an international approach as opposed to an isolationist stance helps to build an international standing among the community of nations.

This is what Nye presents and I find as a well-rounded approach to forming our Foreign and Defence policies.  With the principles in place we must now look to prioritizing.  We can formulate the desired ends from this; the next step is to look at our resources to develop the appropriate ways and means to support the above framework.  In developing ways (policies and strategy) and means (executors of policy - like the Military), we build our inventory of Soft Power/Hard Power "tools" around our ends (as defined by the National Interest).

Hopefully, my idea has some merit.  Feel free to pick apart the ideas and contribute.  If we are largely satisfied, the next step is to prioritize ends and build our ways and means to reach these goals.

Cheers,
Infanteer.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: PPCLI Guy on October 18, 2004, 23:58:16
As you probably know, we have a "new" National Security Policy, here:

http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/docs/Publications/NatSecurnat/natsecurnat_e.pdf

Quote
Securing An Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy is a strategic framework and action plan designed to ensure the Government of Canada can prepare for and respond to current and future threats. The policy adopts an integrated approach to security issues across Government, employs a model that can adapt to changing circumstances, and reflects Canadian values of openness, diversity and respect for fundamental rights and freedoms.

The National Security Policy focusses on addressing three core national security interests:
Protecting Canada and Canadians at home and abroad;
Ensuring Canada is not a base for threats to our allies
Contributing to international security. ;

It has eight sections, the last of which is International Security, highlights of which are:

Quote
International Security
"¢ The Government will make Canada's national security one of the top priorities in its International Policy Review.
"¢ The Government is committed to ensuring that the Canadian
Forces are flexible, responsive and combat-capable for a wide
range of operations, and are able to work with our allies.
"¢ Beginning with the establishment of a dedicated capacity-building
fund, Canada will leverage its experience in building peace, order
and good government to help developing, failed and failing states.
"¢ Canada will continue to play an important role in countering
international terrorism, preventing the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, and defusing key intra- and interstate conflicts.

The Defnce Policy is subordinate to the International Poicy, which is subordinate to the National Security Policy, so we are half way there...

OK - enough library services - now I will re-read your post and ruminate....

Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: pbi on October 19, 2004, 00:10:24
Infanteer: I think these provide a good set of basic premises. A few guiding principles should be:

-recognizing the vital importance of our multi-faceted relationship with the US, we will never willingly pose a threat to the security of our neighbour, whether by act or by neglect. We will ensure that our Canadian coastline, airspace and landmass will never become conduits for threats to the security of North America in general and the US in particular. This implies that we will dedicate resources to controlling access, not merely monitoring and reporting;

-we will be first or among the first to act to stop gross violations of human security wherever they may occur, following an assessment of risk and of the need for a coalition. We will seek to be first responders to such incidents, rather than remaining in a location for decades and thus tying down our always-limited capabilities.This implies that we will maintain a joint expeditionary force with a rapid reaction capability; and

-we will remain ready to assist with disaster response in our own country, but clearly as a force of last resort. We will encourage local and provincial authorities to continue to develop aequate plans and response capabilities such that automatic default to the military in an emergency is avoided. This implies that we will retain the C2 (plans, liaisons, etc) necessary to provide such response, but will not make it a focus of our existence.

Just some thoughts. Cheers.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Glorified Ape on October 19, 2004, 02:36:04
Regarding Infanteer's comments, I think that taking cues from Nye and other hardcore IR realists poses quite a risk, not only to Canada but to the world at large. Of course, there's a reason why international realism, as a shool of thought, carries the substantial weight that it does in political science (incidentally, the frameworks and paradigm that Nye subscribes to were all developed in the "political science lecture hall" that's dismissed so lightly in the post.. tsk tsk) and that reason is that it does have excellent explanatory value. As for societies not being rational - it's quite the opposite. The overwhelming tendency for societies to act in the own interests is, as rational choice scholars and realists would both agree, the very epitome of rational human behaviour. 

Using international realism as a way of identifying what's wrong with the international system and what the risks are is one thing, using their mantra of national interest and the resulting ends-justify-means thinking that it breeds is what has limited international development thus far - one only has to look at the US' attitudes and behaviour towards international institutions such as the UN and ICC to see this manifested. The Kissinger-esque attitude of national interest justifying the most far-flung interventionist policies is what has put the world in the state it's in. Interventionism has its place - namely the counteraction of aggressive war and genocide. I think it would be a serious mistake to base a national defence policy on intervention-heavy national interest thinking when the illegitimate interventions it inevitably produces only exacerbate threats to national security. The employment of force for economic security has already been established as self-defeating since the mobilization and employment of the tools it requires inevitably leads to more expenditure than gain, most especially in the long term.

I agree, though, with the suggestion of support for international institutions as a means of ensuring security and stability. Multilateral international institutions breed legitimacy of action and thus reduce the costs of intervention by allowing a far greater number of states to take part (most especially democratic states wherein legitimacy of cause often dictates "actionability"). As for an "open" economy being in Canada's interests, the tendency of unhindered competition from developing countries to increase social welfare costs in Canada would suggest that there are serious flaws with a fully laissez-faire approach to our economic security. Unless one subscribes to a society absent of social welfare programs in which case such a threat is irrelevant.

My main concern is that Canada's policies reflect the reality that what may appear to be advantageous to national interests may very well be detrimental to national security. For example, securing access to Middle Eastern markets and resources through intervention may sound like a good idea but the damage it does to national security by increasing terrorism likely isn't worth it, especially when you factor in the damage it does to market stability and foreign investment.

That was a bit long winded.. sorry. :D I guess the real question is how different policy options will affect the composition of our forces. What are your thoughts specifically on composition, assuming a policy similar to Nye's?
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Infanteer on October 19, 2004, 05:40:07
Quote
As for societies not being rational - it's quite the opposite. The overwhelming tendency for societies to act in the own interests is, as rational choice scholars and realists would both agree, the very epitome of rational human behaviour.

The divide between "interests" and "reality" is often wide; hence irrational decisions stem from seemingly rational actors.   As well, interests are often affected by notions of ideology, religion, greed, prejudice, etc -  infact, I'd argue that diversity of human societies makes "rationality" a rather relative concept (eg: Sept. 11).

Quote
Using international realism as a way of identifying what's wrong with the international system and what the risks are is one thing, using their mantra of national interest and the resulting ends-justify-means thinking that it breeds is what has limited international development thus far - one only has to look at the US' attitudes and behaviour towards international institutions such as the UN and ICC to see this manifested. The Kissinger-esque attitude of national interest justifying the most far-flung interventionist policies is what has put the world in the state it's in. Interventionism has its place - namely the counteraction of aggressive war and genocide. I think it would be a serious mistake to base a national defence policy on intervention-heavy national interest thinking when the illegitimate interventions it inevitably produces only exacerbate threats to national security. The employment of force for economic security has already been established as self-defeating since the mobilization and employment of the tools it requires inevitably leads to more expenditure than gain, most especially in the long term.

Did you just copy that from your textbook?

Please, if you are going to criticize my proposals, address them directly instead of trying to outwit us with big words and fancy concepts.

Quote
My main concern is that Canada's policies reflect the reality that what may appear to be advantageous to national interests may very well be detrimental to national security. For example, securing access to Middle Eastern markets and resources through intervention may sound like a good idea but the damage it does to national security by increasing terrorism likely isn't worth it, especially when you factor in the damage it does to market stability and foreign investment.

Dealing with terrorism is better then having a petroleum-based economy (and thus our standard of living) grind to a halt.

Quote
That was a bit long winded.. sorry.   I guess the real question is how different policy options will affect the composition of our forces.

I presented the above as a framework to approach defining our Defence Policy, one that is based upon the National interest.   You are right to criticize specific aspects (or the whole thing) if you feel they are not good concepts for defining a foreign policy; just focus in on what I've proposed with specific counter proposals of your own so we can make some progress rather then showing us that you've taken some introductory IR courses.

Quote
What are your thoughts specifically on composition, assuming a policy similar to Nye's?

A basic conception coming from the framework I outlined above is best described by PBI:

-recognizing the vital importance of our multi-faceted relationship with the US, we will never willingly pose a threat to the security of our neighbour, whether by act or by neglect. We will ensure that our Canadian coastline, airspace and landmass will never become conduits for threats to the security of North America in general and the US in particular. This implies that we will dedicate resources to controlling access, not merely monitoring and reporting;

-we will be first or among the first to act to stop gross violations of human security wherever they may occur, following an assessment of risk and of the need for a coalition. We will seek to be first responders to such incidents, rather than remaining in a location for decades and thus tying down our always-limited capabilities.This implies that we will maintain a joint expeditionary force with a rapid reaction capability; and

-we will remain ready to assist with disaster response in our own country, but clearly as a force of last resort. We will encourage local and provincial authorities to continue to develop adequate plans and response capabilities such that automatic default to the military in an emergency is avoided. This implies that we will retain the C2 (plans, liaisons, etc) necessary to provide such response, but will not make it a focus of our existence.


Three pretty solid concepts, here are my corresponding ideas on them:

1)   In assuming our fair burden of the continental responsibility, we will ensure that threats to our National Interests will be dealt with away from our shores.   The security and stability of the North American continent is best secured through projecting this security and stability to other areas.   Isolationism and half-measures are not an option.

2)   Going on #1, by nature our military must be an expeditionary force composed of ground, naval, and air assets.   The notion of an expeditionary force must permeate our thinking - from doctrine to equipment rationalization to readiness and deployment.   As well,   aspects of an expeditionary force will force us to "move" to a certain direction, namely light, rapidly deployable, and flexible while at the same time maintaining the traditional aspects of firepower and survivability.   I believe that the USMC offers us many excellent ideas on how to do this.

3)   The prime function of this expeditionary military shall be to project combat power around the world in support of our National Interests.   Although capable of operating across the spectrum of conflict, this demand shall maintain that the ability to fight and win wars in the prime focus of projecting combat power.   As such, other roles should be considered ancillary and place minimal burdens upon the Military as it prepares for and executes the prime function - these ancillary responsibilities can be given to domestic organizations (Coast Guard, RCMP, etc) and to a certain extent, the Reserves, which will have Homeland Defence as one of its missions.

Anyways, to make a more serious attempt at deriving Defence Policy we must hammer out the details of a proper Foreign Policy (I've advocated one based upon furthering National Interest through Soft Power/Hard Power) or else we are putting the cart before the horse.   That is why I created this thread.

Cheers,
Infanteer
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Lance Wiebe on October 19, 2004, 06:45:07
You have a supporter, Infanteer!

Quote
By CONSERVATIVE MP
GORDON O'CONNOR
In 1994, the last time our government took a serious look at defence policy, they did not anticipate the threat focus shifting so much so rapidly. Neglect of this reality led to an improperly structured and inadequately funded Canadian military to meet the evolving challenges.

The end of the Cold War ushered in a new and more volatile security environment. Today failed states, ethnic cleansing and terrorism present enormous challenges to international stability and human security.

If Canada's broad policy requirements to protect our national sovereignty, support allied common security, and contribute to global peace are to be credibly fulfilled, significant political will for new prioritization and funding must be found.

The government has knowingly underfunded the military for over a decade. The Canadian Forces currently need a multibillion dollar defence budget base increase just to do what they are being asked to do under the current defence policy.

The first priority of defence policy should be the protection of our territory, yet the Canadian Forces cannot adequately protect our sovereignty in the North and they are ill-prepared to respond to terrorist attacks and large-scale natural disasters.They also lack the capabilities to adequately contribute to shared continental security or independent Canadian leadership on the world stage.

The Canadian military simply does not have adequate equipment, regular and reserve troop strength, or the ability to transport them quickly within Canada or abroad. In some cases, they do not have the appropriate training.

The Canadian Forces have an authorized strength of 60,000 but because of difficulties in recruiting and training they have an effective strength of about 52,000. The reserves are about 20,000.

This is far too small a force to meet current defence policy let alone today's challenges. Regular force strength needs to be in the 75,000 to 80,000 range while the reserves over time have to be significantly increased.

Incredibly, the Canadian military does have the organization and infrastructure spread across the country to support a force two or three times its size. For example, National Defence Headquarters employs between 11,000 and 12,000 military and civilian personnel, which is equivalent in size to 14 infantry battalions in a military that cannot afford the personnel to have 14
infantry battalions.

National Defence Headquarters is a dual amalgam of civilian departmental administration and military command and control. This has caused many military officers to act and think like public servants. One of the consequences is
that the government rarely gets unblended military advice.

There are far too many generals and senior public servants for our current size military. Beyond the operational units, jobs tend to be getting smaller in scope yet rank is rising. It has become a means of pay compensation rather than a reflection of responsibility. Serious rank creep is now running counter to the priority for military efficiency.

The increased tempo of operations in the new security environment and lack of funding has resulted in a significant decrease in collective training. While individual training requirements, in the main, are being met, group or collective training has suffered. The ability to act as a collective in organizations like naval task groups, air squadrons and army battalions/brigades is essential to conduct meaningful military operations.

Equipment needs are not being met. With roughly 12 per cent of departmental funding committed to equipment upgrading and replacement, the long-term needs of the department cannot be fulfilled. Over time, more and more equipment will have to be abandoned resulting in a â Å“dumbed downâ ?military.

Much of the equipment in service is nearing the end of its useful life or beyond. This means that extraordinary maintenance and servicing has to be carried out to keep it operating. This everincreasing diversion of funds, contributes to a downward spiral of capability.

As with equipment, military infrastructure is in a serious deteriorating state. To keep infrastructure in overall serviceable condition, it needs to be funded at two per cent replacement value per year. This standard has not been met for a very long time and as a result the Department is facing a bow wave of infrastructure replacement and servicing demands.

The recruiting and training system is not operating effectively. Recruits are desperately
needed, yet the system is having great difficulty getting them from the street to units. This problem coupled with the effects of a decade of downsizing has created a rank imbalance. The skill levels and numbers of senior officers and noncommissioned
officers soon to be retiring cannot be addressed in time. An overall loss of talent is imminent.

Improving the state of Canada's
national defence is not insurmountable. The problems faced by the Forces with outdated policy, under funding, structural
imbalance and excessive bureaucracy can be solved. However, as time goes on the situation will become more difficult
to reverse. The dithering of the government must end. New political will must be found to stop the decay of the Canadian
Forces so that they can contribute effectively to the security of Canadians and stability in the world.

Conservative MP Gordon O'Connor Is his party's national defence critic and represents the riding of Carleton-Mississippi Mills, Ont. The Hill Times
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: E.R. Campbell on October 19, 2004, 07:16:46
...   our Defence Policy, as a subset of our Foreign Policy,

I want to take issue with this; it is a common misperception â “ even taught in our staff colleges.   Parts of our defence policy are, indeed, dependent upon foreign policy objectives but others are independent.

The most common defence policy issue which is separate and distinct from foreign policy is: internal security by which I mean the most fundamental defence of our sovereignty against insurrections.   At root Canada is all about free people who have chosen to be here and to be part of a democracy within which government is allowed through the active consent of the governed.   Our government is, by our choice: civil and it secured day-by-day by laws which are enforced by civil police and courts; that is the country we want.   A civil government is, by design â “ by the people's design, 'weak' because we depend upon 99.9% of our fellow citizens to obey the laws we have, collectively, allowed to be made; the government does not need to be 'powerful' to deal with the 0.01% ... not normally.

Now and again disaffected groups may decide that our laws and our political processes are denying them fundamental rights; they might take up arms to protect their rights.   When they do so they threaten the very core of the sovereignty of the nation â “ our right to govern ourselves.   What good is Canada if it is not a democracy of free men and women, governed, by their own consent, through the rule of law?   What good is Canada if any armed band can overthrow the elected government?   The modern liberal-democratic nation-state has one overarching responsibility: to secure its own political sovereignty â “ the freedom for its people to choose their own government.

When that political sovereignty is threatened the nation-state must have adequate 'force' â “ almost certainly armed forces â “ to overcome that threat.   This is the first and primary responsibility of the armed forces in the modern nation-state â “ as it was in ancient nation-state, too.

The first element of our defence policy must be to provide for our own domestic security.


What should define our Foreign Policy?   There can be only one thing, the National Interest.   Defining Foreign Policy on ideological or idealistic grounds represents a discord with reality and can prove dangerous.   I firmly believe that a realistic outlook on our National Interest, which should constantly be re-evaluated against the back drop of the international arena, is the best way to go about things.   Ideologues can argue counterpoints, but our National Security demands that we leave that to the Political Science lecture hall.

No major argument but you might wish to consider that our interest might be best served, perhaps can only be served when some of our ideological values are satisfied.   Are our interests 'served' if we, and perhaps a very few others, are the only liberal-democracies in the world?   My own observations would suggest that peace and prosperity (a pretty fair, albeit grossly oversimplified, abbreviated version of our national interest) is enhanced when more and more nations are also liberal democracies, more interested in commercial competition than in militaristic expansion.

I will join you in discussing your points when time is more readily available.

Three cheers for Lord Palmerston ...
 
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Glorified Ape on October 19, 2004, 10:48:15


The divide between "interests" and "reality" is often wide; hence irrational decisions stem from seemingly rational actors.   As well, interests are often affected by notions of ideology, religion, greed, prejudice, etc -  infact, I'd argue that diversity of human societies makes "rationality" a rather relative concept (eg: Sept. 11).

I think the relativity problem more pertains to the issue of how one goes about realising one's interests. We may think it irrational for Al Qaeda to do something like 9/11 and provoke a major attack on their very existence but one could also argue that such a counter-attack only contributed to their interests further by creating further opposition to the West in the Muslim world.

Quote
Did you just copy that from your textbook?

Please, if you are going to criticize my proposals, address them directly instead of trying to outwit us with big words and fancy concepts.

Er... I criticized the very foundation that your proposal was based on and made reference to the points therein. I would assume that qualifies as a direct addressal of the proposal but maybe I'm crazy. As for the textbook, no - I'm mercifully beyond the point where I need to plagiarize textbooks to state the obvious. If you find my words too big or my concepts too fancy (I used pretty much the same concepts you did, as per addressing your post), my apologies.

Quote
Dealing with terrorism is better then having a petroleum-based economy (and thus our standard of living) grind to a halt.

I'm not sure it's really that much of an "either/or" scenario. I don't think terrorism has really threatened our oil supply and my point was that the current method of dealing with terrorism stands a greater likelihood of endangering our economic security than the terrorism itself.

Quote
I presented the above as a framework to approach defining our Defence Policy, one that is based upon the National interest.   You are right to criticize specific aspects (or the whole thing) if you feel they are not good concepts for defining a foreign policy; just focus in on what I've proposed with specific counter proposals of your own so we can make some progress rather then showing us that you've taken some introductory IR courses.

Here you say I'm right to address the proposal that, before, you claimed I hadn't addressed. Regardless, I believe I addressed specific aspects insofar as I criticized the approach's emphasis on interventionism as a means of interest realization. Our defence policies, in relation to non-domestic issues, should be guided by the demands of the institutions of which we are members. In this aspect I'm in some agreement with point #4, as I'd stated. The problem is whether our NATO commitments should override our UN commitments when the two conflict - as they did in Kosovo. The proposal you outlined seems to demand a far more ambitious approach to defence policy than may be inferred from a purely institutional focus. Maybe Martin had something similar to your proposal in mind when he asserted that Canada must be more involved in international affairs.


Quote
Three pretty solid concepts, here are my corresponding ideas on them:

1)   In assuming our fair burden of the continental responsibility, we will ensure that threats to our National Interests will be dealt with away from our shores.   The security and stability of the North American continent is best secured through projecting this security and stability to other areas.   Isolationism and half-measures are not an option.

How far should we be willing to go with the projection of security and stability elsewhere? If popular revolt in Saudi Arabia threatens North American economic security through the instability it creates, should we intervene in a purely domestic issue?

Quote
2)   Going on #1, by nature our military must be an expeditionary force composed of ground, naval, and air assets.   The notion of an expeditionary force must permeate our thinking - from doctrine to equipment rationalization to readiness and deployment.   As well,   aspects of an expeditionary force will force us to "move" to a certain direction, namely light, rapidly deployable, and flexible while at the same time maintaining the traditional aspects of firepower and survivability.   I believe that the USMC offers us many excellent ideas on how to do this.

Would this require substantial expansion of the forces or more a restructuring of them, or both? I realise our forces aren't exactly "rapidly deployable", but how do they measure up insofar as flexibility and being light are concerned?

Quote
3)   The prime function of this expeditionary military shall be to project combat power around the world in support of our National Interests.   Although capable of operating across the spectrum of conflict, this demand shall maintain that the ability to fight and win wars in the prime focus of projecting combat power.   As such, other roles should be considered ancillary and place minimal burdens upon the Military as it prepares for and executes the prime function - these ancillary responsibilities can be given to domestic organizations (Coast Guard, RCMP, etc) and to a certain extent, the Reserves, which will have Homeland Defence as one of its missions.

By ancillary roles, do you mean crowd control, disaster relief, etc.? If so, have demands on the forces in these areas really been that extensive? (I'm asking because I don't know, not as a rhetorical device)
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: pbi on October 19, 2004, 13:23:46


How far should we be willing to go with the projection of security and stability elsewhere? If popular revolt in Saudi Arabia threatens North American economic security through the instability it creates, should we intervene in a purely domestic issue?

Would this require substantial expansion of the forces or more a restructuring of them, or both? I realise our forces aren't exactly "rapidly deployable", but how do they measure up insofar as flexibility and being light are concerned?

By ancillary roles, do you mean crowd control, disaster relief, etc.? If so, have demands on the forces in these areas really been that extensive? (I'm asking because I don't know, not as a rhetorical device)

1) When I stated my original "principle", I had in mind no specific limit. Rather, I believe each case must be judged on its merits, but with an eye to pre-emption rather than dealing with terrorism on our own streets or uncovering mass graves after the fact. The issue of what is or is not any loner considered to be a "domestic" issue is, IMHO, no longer clear. I think that the UN has taken a position (IIRC) that it is conceivable that the sovereignty of a nation might be violated to, say, stop genocide. The decisive factor would probably be the consequences: invading China being somewhat riskier than, say Yemen or Iraq.

2) The forces we have today are neither fish nor fowl, being at the beginning of a period of transformation but with a large amount of legacy structure and equipment. We are, IMHO, not very "joint": I do not believe that we are capable of projecting/sustain/protecting/recovering a joint force of any size without extensive lash-ups and foreign help. We have systems (MBT, SPG, AVLB, etc) that we cannot rapidly deploy, and naval and air forces that are only marginally or not at all capable of joint force projection/sustainment. We need to work more in these fields. Expansion may not be strictly necessary, but some form of restructure and refocus almost certainly is.

3) While there have been only two major assistance to law enforcement agency operations in the last decade   or so (Oka and Gustafson Lake), there has been considerable burden placed on the Army (and to a lesser extent the Air Force, and lesser still the Navy) to respond to major humanitarian emergencies. I have participated in several of these operations since 1997, and I can state unequivocally that one of the major reasons we are required to get involved is due to the inadequacy of civil preparedness and resources. While this has steadily improved over the last decade, the BC Fire Emergency proved that further work is required. These operations are hugely burdensome on the military, altough we accept the need to help fellow citizens in time of disaster, but more must be done to keep response and mitigation where it belongs: in the hands of municipal and provincial authorities, assisted by Federal funds and coordination.

Cheers.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Spartan on October 19, 2004, 17:40:14
Excuse my ignorance but, how can the Forces be evolving into something when it doesn't have clearly defined policies to follow, more seems like the whipping boy of the government in power? Don't we need a clear policy(es) to define the military and then work towards those capabilities and training? Or is it a chicken/egg arguement that we can't define our policies until we know what our capabilities are?
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: pbi on October 20, 2004, 01:14:28
The Army, under the guidance of the last CLS and through its Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts (Future Army) shop in Kingston (have I got that right??), some time ago decided (rightly or wrongly) that it could not wait for a Def/ForPol review before coming to grips with the changing nature of modern conflict (I do not say "war" because you can get into combat under a lot of names other than "war"). The Army has tried to assess the way the world and our strategic partners are going, and what changes we need to make to stay relevant within the resources we are likely to receive-a challenging task. IMHO this is vital because we cannot remain static: we must stay current with what is going on in the world, since we are so often called upon to be a part of it. So, IMHO, when the Def/ForPol review is finally finished, it may find itself confronted with an Army already well down the transformation road because, money or not, we could not wait. Cheers.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: PPCLI Guy on October 20, 2004, 10:05:34
Quote
So, IMHO, when the Def/ForPol review is finally finished, it may find itself confronted with an Army already well down the transformation road because, money or not, we could not wait.


Very true.  Whne Mr MacCallum was MND, he was very taken with the work that the Army had done on Transformation, and had asked the other services whren they were going to get on with their plans.  This lead to the unbalanced distribution of the extra cash that came in 2 years ago - to the chagrin of many (remeber that conversation in the smoking area that I alluded to?).

Having said that, DGSP (Dir Gen Strat Planning - no accident that it is MGen Dempster, former ACLS) has done some work on Force Planning Scenarios (that was then further developed by DGLCD (Dir Gen Land Cbt Development)).  Can't find the whole text, but here is a summary:

http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/rep-pub/dda/scen_e.asp

More background coming...

Dave
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: NMPeters on October 21, 2004, 10:51:29
This link might help to show where the Army plans to be for Tomorrow and the Future:

http://armyapp.dnd.ca/dlsc-dcsot/doc.asp
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Thucydides on October 25, 2004, 00:03:57
One thing which has not been touched upon is the need to "go it alone". There will be times when our national interest is not in accordance with our allies or potential allies. Under the current state of affairs, we would simply have to stay home.

This is not an idle threat, we have "stayed home" when it became clear the proposed intervention in Zaire would not be supported by any allies and would be actively opposed by Hutu militias (among others, many of the things I have read are contradictory), and despite the Prime Minister's brave words at the UN about the ongoing genocide in the Sudan, we have no ability to get there either. I can only say "thank God" it wasn't a major or direct threat to our national interest.

Alliances and multinational coalitions should also be treated with caution; what are their national interests? It is interesting that the investigation of the Oil for Food program is turning up evidence of massive corruption in the UN, the body that was supposed to provide "legitimacy" to any actions against Iraq. France and Russia were totally opposed to any actions against Iraq, and were threatening to veto any enforcement actions of US resolutions.  It should be no surprise that France and Russia were recipients of a great deal of Saddam Hussein's favors (in terms of oil allocations and contracts to their State oil companies). In that case, do we follow the UN, preserving a corrupt regime and taking the risk that Saddam Hussein might go back to his expansionist ways backed with a WMD program, or follow the Americans, who perceived their national interest would be threatened should the potential turn into reality?

Whatever you think of these examples, there should be a lot of thought put into the idea that we should always be limited to being a force provider in a larger coalition. Circumstances change, and it would be foolish to discount the notion that we must sometimes go it alone.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Cloud Cover on October 25, 2004, 01:22:16
Very true.   WWhenMr MacCallum was MND, he was very taken with the work that the Army had done on Transformation, and had asked the other services whren they were going to get on with their plans.  

I thought Leadmark pre-dated the army plan, before Mr. McGoo was even MND. The problem was getting the government to cough up the cash. Almost all of the capabilities currently sought by the other services from the Navy for the purposes of joint operations were part of the Navy vision through the ALSC and it's escorting vessels. [currently referred to as the JSS]. What wasn't envisioned in Leadmark was the idea of tailoring the Navy to meet the needs of a niche armed forces, since such tailoring would almost certainly force the Navy to abandon it's CP- EEZ and SLOC roles.     

I agree with your comments about the minister being taken with the work of the army, since in all likelihood the Navy once again failed to adequately cast it's plans as transformational [which they were/are] and of enhanced, perhaps even critical relevance to the defence of Canada.[The priority of domestic security as noted by all posters in this thread.]

With McCallum ousted, it looks like a more balanced approach to capability planning might return. There is a significant optimism to suggest, not withstanding the submarine problems, that Leadmark will be 90 percent implemented by 2020. If this turns out to be the case, the Navy will also have managed to accomplish and implement a de facto Maritime defence policy that will support whatever direction the higher order defence and foreign policy reviews might logically go. What the Navy probably hasn't planned on is being shoved off by those who erroneously view the Navy's sole purpose as being reduced to hauling a few army trucks and Griffons around and labelling that role as "jointness."

It remains to be seen whether the Navy can regain it's balance after the past month and then exercise some initiative to state it's case to those who might be willing to actually commit to a sound defence policy, backed up a decent set of plans.   Cheers.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: pbi on October 25, 2004, 01:45:16
Quote
What the Navy probably hasn't planned on is being shoved off by those who erroneously view the Navy's sole purpose as being reduced to hauling a few army trucks and Griffons around and labelling that role as "jointness."

Whoever thinks this is "jointness" is a nitwit. To me (and to respond to a point raised by a majoor,) our goal should be a Joint Expeditionary Force Package that can project/protect/employ/sustain/recover itself using all Canadian resources. This is not a pipedream. IMHO, this means a Navy that is more than just a barge service for the other two services. It means surface combatants that can escort the JEF, protecting it against likely threats, then contribute to Theatre Air Defense on arrival in the AOO. It means submarines that contribute to the "protect" piece but can operate independently as well, as part of the Maritime Component of a Combined Joint Task Force. It means capable landing support and replenishment vessels. It means the abiltity to C2 all of this while providing the Land Component Commander with an HQ afloat until the ground situation is established. In other words, a balanced, capable and modern Navy. I believe that such a force is within the grasp of our Navy, given adequate resources. Cheers.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: dglad on October 25, 2004, 10:32:37
I think I stated once before, on some other thread, that we probably need something like a US Marine Expeditionary Brigade, integrating land, sea and air in a true joint capability package.  No, it doesn't have to replicate a MEB one for one, but that would be the idea.  Such an organization would give Canada the opportunity to project varying types and amounts of force, depending on the need--whether a non-combatant overseas evacuation op, a humanitarian assistance op, or a war-fighting op.  This requires ships and aircraft that can haul and fight, a balanced ground force that has a reasonable degree of capability in any security environment, and doctrine and C2 infrastructure for the whole thing that is complete in itself, yet truly interoperable with our likely allies.

More fundamentally, however, is the need to back up and get this thing right in the first place, based on what Canada wants its military capability to be able to do.  This does require debate.  Right now, the military, and especially the army, are carrying the can for Canada on the global stage.  International aid is way down, and doesn't achieve much in terms of domestic visibility anyway.  We lack the economic oomph to be big players in the global market-place.  And our diplomatic corps has withered even more than our military.  So our military is doing too much--and not just militarily!
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: PPCLI Guy on October 26, 2004, 13:47:26
This link might help to show where the Army plans to be for Tomorrow and the Future:

http://armyapp.dnd.ca/dlsc-dcsot/doc.asp

Great link - thanks.  I encourage others to have a boo at this one.

Dave
Title: The argument for policy review/overhaul
Post by: bossi on October 30, 2004, 11:25:46
Seems to me this is a good overview of why we need to review Canadian Foreign Affairs policy first, before Defence.   Having said that, it's ridiculous how the bureaucrats will drag it out as long as they can (as an aside, I find it amusing when a liberal-leaning newspaper refers to "Martins Liberals", implicitly insuating they're not "real" Liberals ... like "Papa Doc Crouton's" ... but, I digress).

This editorial offers it in point form, and for the sake of argument ... it's not too shabby:

http://www.thestar.com/NASApp/cs/ContentServer?pagename=thestar/Layout/Article_PrintFriendly&c=Article&cid=1099000209076&call_pageid=null

(oh, Good Grief!  There's an equally compelling editorial in the National Post, too)
http://www.canada.com/national/nationalpost/news/comment/story.html?id=288802ab-4cdd-4334-8f75-5529dff8536f

Defining Canada's role in the world

Canadians aspire to a "very ambitious role in the world," Prime Minister Paul Martin declared during the election campaign. And so we should.

Our $1.3 trillion economy puts us in the elite Group of Seven club of wealthy democracies. We are a principal power, if not a major one, with wide interests. No country is closer to the United States, with its huge impact globally. Americans buy more than 80 per cent of our exports, and we buy 25 per cent of theirs. As friends, neighbours and allies, we understand Americans as few others do, and share values and interests.

And their perils. Osama bin Laden has named us as a target.

Canadians have similar ties of affection, too, with many other parts of the world, including Britain, China, Southeast Asia, Italy, Portugal, the Caribbean, Poland, the Philippines and Latin America. We can use them to make the world freer, safer, healthier.

To do that, Martin favours a "three-D" approach and an "integrated national agenda" combining diplomacy, defence and development. He promises better Canada/U.S./Mexico relations. A more coherent war on terror. A stronger effort to fight AIDS. And more.

But while Canada's interests are broad, our resources are finite. We spend more than $18 billion on diplomacy, defence and aid. That's $1.7 billion on our diplomatic corps in 2004/05, $13.6 billion on the military and some $3.3 billion on aid. Yet we could double our spending in these areas and still lag behind our allies, in relative terms. Had we done so by now, Canada's submarine fleet might not be in drydock today. And Martin might not have to suffer through lectures from allies, as well as critics at home, that we should spend more on aid.

Redefining Canada's sense of global purpose, as Martin proposes to do, will involve costly, wrenching change. And tough choices. After tightly managed consultations with bureaucrats, politicians and academics, Martin promises an International Policy Statement, the first since 1995, by late fall. A defence policy statement, the first since 1994, is to follow.

The timing of these reviews is ideal. Given the Liberals' minority status, this is a chance to define a role for Canada that embodies a broad national consensus, and that will far outlive the current government.

Typically, policy reviews produce checklists of priorities. In 1970, Pierre Trudeau put economic growth and social justice ahead of peace and security. By 1985 Brian Mulroney made national unity and sovereignty his main themes. In 1995, Jean Chrétien put prosperity first, then security.

This process of ranking matters to a government. It led Trudeau to screen foreign investment and redistribute oil wealth. Mulroney squandered energy on go-nowhere constitutional reform. And Chrétien favoured Team Canada trade missions over human rights.

What should Martin focus on?

First, coherency is key. Canada/U.S. relations are run out of the Prime Minister's Office, while the foreign affairs and trade department has been split in two. The potential for policy confusion, drift, and sending mixed signals to allies is evident. That would scupper Martin's ambitions.

Second, a focus on the North American hemisphere, with our American and Mexican partners, makes political and economic sense.

Third, we must stand by the United Nations and our other allies as required, and go our own way when necessary, as we did by not joining the Iraq war. Polls suggest Canadians are confident enough to disagree with allies and expect the government to speak boldly when need be.

How to define Canada's core interests? Here is a proposed list:

Promoting prosperity, and economic growth.

Affirming our sovereignty and independence.

Assuring our security in a world shaken by instability and terror.

Projecting our values: Democracy, peace, justice, compassion.

This ranking differs markedly from those of our our allies. The Americans put military supremacy first. So do the British. The French highlight independence. The Germans freedom, peace and prosperity. The Italians promote Euro-Atlantic relations. The Australians focus on Asian ties. New Zealanders focus on Australian ties. Each nation spends accordingly.

This ranking gives Canada/U.S. relations pride of place, but within a regional framework, and in the context of a sturdy nationalism. It also puts a higher priority on thwarting threats to this continent than on humanitarian concerns elsewhere. It reflects a 9/11 world dominated by the U.S., bound by a globalized economy and shaken by instability and terror.

In such a climate, Ottawa will have to be sovereignty-conscious, proactive and assertive to promote our interests even with friends.

Since 9/11 "the principal aim of American foreign policy is to integrate other countries and organizations into arrangements that will sustain a world consistent with U.S. interests and values," said Richard Haass, former head of policy planning for the State Department. "We are doing this by persuading more and more governments ... to sign on to certain key ideas as to how the world should operate for our mutual benefit."

Canada will continue to feel this pressure whether President George Bush or Sen. John Kerry is elected on Tuesday.

Also, Canadians must juggle other priorities: Arctic sovereignty, foreign overfishing, the softwood lumber spat and beef exports. Africa's economic crisis and pandemics. United Nations reform. Martin's push for a broader Group of 20 club of nations to address pressing issues. Building stability in places like Afghanistan, Iraq and Haiti. The Mideast conflict. Saving lives in Darfur and other regions. Peacekeeping. Arms control.

However the Martin Liberals define our priorities, after due Parliamentary and public consultation, Canada's spending must be upgraded to match our ambitions. Otherwise the reviews will be sham exercises. Parliamentary committees and experts have called, credibly, for a defence budget of $20 billion or more, and for $8 billion in aid, within a few years.

Why spend so much, so fast? Because we must reverse a generation of decline. Martin's ambition to "build Canada's influence in the world" and to "take the lead" cannot be realized on the cheap.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Chris Pook on October 30, 2004, 17:53:39
And in line with this thread, and reading from PPCLI Guy's own preferred, leftist pinko liberal rag, (I just love stereotypical labels) ;D

We have this from the Toronto Star - an editorial calling for an upgrade in the defence and diplomacy budgets from 18 BCAD to at least 28 BCAD with DND's budget going from 13 BCAD to 20 BCAD in short order.

     
 
 
Oct. 30, 2004. 01:00 AM
 
Defining Canada's role in the world



Canadians aspire to a "very ambitious role in the world," Prime Minister Paul Martin declared during the election campaign. And so we should.

Our $1.3 trillion economy puts us in the elite Group of Seven club of wealthy democracies. We are a principal power, if not a major one, with wide interests. No country is closer to the United States, with its huge impact globally. Americans buy more than 80 per cent of our exports, and we buy 25 per cent of theirs. As friends, neighbours and allies, we understand Americans as few others do, and share values and interests.

And their perils. Osama bin Laden has named us as a target.

Canadians have similar ties of affection, too, with many other parts of the world, including Britain, China, Southeast Asia, Italy, Portugal, the Caribbean, Poland, the Philippines and Latin America. We can use them to make the world freer, safer, healthier.

To do that, Martin favours a "three-D" approach and an "integrated national agenda" combining diplomacy, defence and development. He promises better Canada/U.S./Mexico relations. A more coherent war on terror. A stronger effort to fight AIDS. And more.

But while Canada's interests are broad, our resources are finite. We spend more than $18 billion on diplomacy, defence and aid. That's $1.7 billion on our diplomatic corps in 2004/05, $13.6 billion on the military and some $3.3 billion on aid. Yet we could double our spending in these areas and still lag behind our allies, in relative terms. Had we done so by now, Canada's submarine fleet might not be in drydock today. And Martin might not have to suffer through lectures from allies, as well as critics at home, that we should spend more on aid.

Redefining Canada's sense of global purpose, as Martin proposes to do, will involve costly, wrenching change. And tough choices. After tightly managed consultations with bureaucrats, politicians and academics, Martin promises an International Policy Statement, the first since 1995, by late fall. A defence policy statement, the first since 1994, is to follow.

The timing of these reviews is ideal. Given the Liberals' minority status, this is a chance to define a role for Canada that embodies a broad national consensus, and that will far outlive the current government.

Typically, policy reviews produce checklists of priorities. In 1970, Pierre Trudeau put economic growth and social justice ahead of peace and security. By 1985 Brian Mulroney made national unity and sovereignty his main themes. In 1995, Jean Chrétien put prosperity first, then security.

This process of ranking matters to a government. It led Trudeau to screen foreign investment and redistribute oil wealth. Mulroney squandered energy on go-nowhere constitutional reform. And Chrétien favoured Team Canada trade missions over human rights.

What should Martin focus on?

First, coherency is key. Canada/U.S. relations are run out of the Prime Minister's Office, while the foreign affairs and trade department has been split in two. The potential for policy confusion, drift, and sending mixed signals to allies is evident. That would scupper Martin's ambitions.

Second, a focus on the North American hemisphere, with our American and Mexican partners, makes political and economic sense.

Third, we must stand by the United Nations and our other allies as required, and go our own way when necessary, as we did by not joining the Iraq war. Polls suggest Canadians are confident enough to disagree with allies and expect the government to speak boldly when need be.

How to define Canada's core interests? Here is a proposed list:

Promoting prosperity, and economic growth.

Affirming our sovereignty and independence.

Assuring our security in a world shaken by instability and terror.

Projecting our values: Democracy, peace, justice, compassion.

This ranking differs markedly from those of our our allies. The Americans put military supremacy first. So do the British. The French highlight independence. The Germans freedom, peace and prosperity. The Italians promote Euro-Atlantic relations. The Australians focus on Asian ties. New Zealanders focus on Australian ties. Each nation spends accordingly.

This ranking gives Canada/U.S. relations pride of place, but within a regional framework, and in the context of a sturdy nationalism. It also puts a higher priority on thwarting threats to this continent than on humanitarian concerns elsewhere. It reflects a 9/11 world dominated by the U.S., bound by a globalized economy and shaken by instability and terror.

In such a climate, Ottawa will have to be sovereignty-conscious, proactive and assertive to promote our interests even with friends.

Since 9/11 "the principal aim of American foreign policy is to integrate other countries and organizations into arrangements that will sustain a world consistent with U.S. interests and values," said Richard Haass, former head of policy planning for the State Department. "We are doing this by persuading more and more governments ... to sign on to certain key ideas as to how the world should operate for our mutual benefit."

Canada will continue to feel this pressure whether President George Bush or Sen. John Kerry is elected on Tuesday.

Also, Canadians must juggle other priorities: Arctic sovereignty, foreign overfishing, the softwood lumber spat and beef exports. Africa's economic crisis and pandemics. United Nations reform. Martin's push for a broader Group of 20 club of nations to address pressing issues. Building stability in places like Afghanistan, Iraq and Haiti. The Mideast conflict. Saving lives in Darfur and other regions. Peacekeeping. Arms control.

However the Martin Liberals define our priorities, after due Parliamentary and public consultation, Canada's spending must be upgraded to match our ambitions. Otherwise the reviews will be sham exercises. Parliamentary committees and experts have called, credibly, for a defence budget of $20 billion or more, and for $8 billion in aid, within a few years.

Why spend so much, so fast? Because we must reverse a generation of decline. Martin's ambition to "build Canada's influence in the world" and to "take the lead" cannot be realized on the cheap.




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Keep wishing guys.  Sometimes Santa Claus does show up.   

Cheers.

Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: PPCLI Guy on October 30, 2004, 19:17:31
And tomorrow's piece wll be specifically about the Defence Policy.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Thucydides on October 30, 2004, 19:24:58
That's right, Santa put $100 million in the bank accounts of certain "Liberal friendly" ad agencies for little or no work. Since Santa was the Minister of Finance and president of the Quebec Caucus at the time, his protestations that he didn't know anything about this indicates he is totally clueless or a shameless lier.

Since all these fine words never lead to action, we should continue to hope the United States feels it is worth their time and effort to take on the bulk of Canada's defense. We can continue to fill the niche roles (bitter rant ends)
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Chris Pook on October 31, 2004, 12:50:12
And here's part 2, just like PPCLI guy promised.  (If this keeps up I may have to consider revising some of the labels I apply to this paper ;D)

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Oct. 31, 2004. 01:00 AM
 
Canada's military lacks focus, funds



Canadians were shocked to see the submarine HMCS Chicoutimi rolling helpless this month in the stormy North Atlantic, crippled by a fatal fire.

They shouldn't have been.

Just last year, an antique Sea King helicopter crashed on the deck of the vintage destroyer HMCS Iroquois. During Canada's peacekeeping airlift to East Timor in 1999, a defective Hercules transport was forced back to base by mechanical failures â ” three times. In 2000, the skipper of an American cargo ship held $223 million worth of Canadian military equipment at sea for six weeks, in a contract dispute. Lacking transport, Ottawa had hired the ship to bring the materiel home from a peacekeeping mission. Our navy had to board the ship.

These fiascos are reminders that the sadly rundown Canadian Forces lack the personnel, funding and equipment to defend our interests in a post-9/11 world where American "pre-emptive" wars, Rwanda type massacres, regional instability and terror are ugly realities.

In recent years, the forces have been busier than at any time in the past half-century. Today, more than 1,600 Canadian troops are serving abroad in Afghanistan and the Arabian Gulf, in the Balkans, in the Middle East and in Africa. The pressure isn't likely to abate any time soon.

Prime Minister Paul Martin promised in the throne speech earlier this month to invest more in the military. He has ordered Defence Minister Bill Graham to develop a new defence policy statement early next year, soon after Ottawa unveils a fresh foreign policy. Regrettably, the defence review will take place largely behind closed doors, to satisfy secrecy-loving bureaucrats who fear public "meddling" in this area. Taxpayers would be better served by a full public consultation and debate. Instead, Parliament will be called on to give Ottawa's plans close scrutiny.

For his part, Martin seems to understand that the Canadian Forces' chief duties are the defence of Canada, the defence of North America in co-operation with the United States, and contributing to global security.

Canada has earmarked $8 billion to bolster continental security after 9/11, and rightly so. Osama bin Laden has named this country as a target.

At the same time, the Canadian Forces must be sufficiently "robust" to comfort our American allies that we are doing what we can to prevent attacks on them from here. That can only enhance our sovereignty. We must maintain sufficient modern warplanes, warships and surveillance aircraft to help secure approaches to this continent. We must be able to project credible force over large distances.

Ottawa is also looking, rightly, to expand Canada/U.S. air defence co-operation to include the navy and cross-border assistance. And to join the U.S. missile defence system.

Further afield, the Canadian Forces must be equipped to mobilize rapidly deployable battle groups with lethal firepower to trouble spots overseas. While our forces need not be huge, they must be high-value.

The "Canadian difference" that Martin intends to make means helping the United Nations support democracy, keep the peace, shore up weak states, thwart genocide, promote development and battle disease. These roles contribute to global stability. Characteristically, they involve the army, airlift and generous aid. Most Canadians strongly support them.

While Canada has one of the world's 20 strongest military forces, it is nowhere as strong as it should be, given our national interests, the endless calls on Canadian troops to serve in places like Afghanistan, the Balkans, Haiti, Somalia and East Timor, and the size of our economy.

We must spend more than the $13.3 billion we do now, refit warships, aircraft and armour, and boost our military beyond the 60,000 mark, and our effective army strength past 15,000. Since 2000, Ottawa has added $2 billion to the base budget. And Martin plans to spend $7 billion on major equipment like the Sikorsky H-92 helicopters, naval supply ships and search-and-rescue aircraft. He has also pledged 5,000 more regulars and 3,000 reservists. It's a welcome start, but not more than that.

Parliamentary committees have urged a base budget in the $18 billion-plus range, just to offset past cuts and to support current missions. We could easily spend $24 billion a year and field 80,000 personnel, and still lag far behind most of our North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies in relative spending terms. When inflation is taken into account, we spend less today than a decade ago.

Can Ottawa spend smarter? Yes, definitely. We can replace Cold War-era destroyers and tanks, close some military bases and thin out the military bureaucracy, while making better use of the cost-efficient reserves.

But we must also spend more. So far, Martin has shrunk from doing that. Yet Canada's relations with the U.S., the U.N. and key allies hang in the balance. Ultimately, so does our sovereignty

I continue to believe in Santa Claus a_majoor.  I believe there is a once in a generation confluence of events happening just now. 

Security interests, economic interests, sovereignty - all register high on the governments lists of concerns.   

The opposition parties, all of them, have either a pro-defence or at least not anti-defence position and are interested in maintaining Canada's ability to be perceived as not-American (much as I personally dislike that position - I prefer pro-Canadian rather than anti-anything). 

The Minority Government gives all parties power and all parties cover - consensus politics on this issue is possible.  If they can't get this one right then there ain't much hope for anything else.

Finally one of the side effects of all of these longterm "deals for a generation", regardless of how effective the deals are, is that the Canadian Public is becoming used to hearing about not hundreds of million dollar projects, nor even billion dollar projects but tens of billion dollar projects.  As well the projects are funded over long periods, at least a decade.

This last observation is the most critical for the CF and DND.  For Canada to do what Australia did, define a 60 Billion Dollar programme over 10-15 years, Canadians have to be brought to believe two things: 

1 - that these types of numbers are commonplace and affordable

2 - that these types of numbers, or better, higher numbers, have been applied to their priorities (health, equalization, daycare, aboriginals) before they have been applied to sending Canadian troops overseas with the right kit.

As to the "number" that might eventually be applied to the CF, that will depend on political will and election spin I think.  For instance an aggressive position could be to add up all of the funds supplied to the "priority" programmes,  likely to be in the 100 billion dollar, or greater, range over a 10-15 year period and then use the combined value as the bench march for justifying an Australian type 60 billion dollar project.   An alternate position could be to look at one project, for example the 41 billion for health, as an upper limit.  In between there are multiple variations allowing the government to choose a marketable benchmark and adjust the period of the programme.

I really believe, (OK maybe I just want to believe) that the ground work is in place to get the job done right for the CF.  Now whether it does get done right........................................
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: PPCLI Guy on October 31, 2004, 23:41:21
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I really believe, (OK maybe I just want to believe) that the ground work is in place to get the job done right for the CF.  Now whether it does get done right

I too believe that the stars and planets may be lining up.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Thucydides on November 01, 2004, 00:56:32
Hope springs eternal, and I want to believe just as much as the other readers here, but considering I trained and deployed to Bosnia on ROTO 13 without sufficient TCCCS, NVGs or even support weapons (we had to raid war stocks to get 1XC-9 per section, and never received the SF kit for the GPMG), my belief is wearing thin.

Many of the events like the helicopter crashes and inability to get to Zaire, East Timor or Afghanistan on our own have been widely publicised, with little result. Now that Osama bin Laden has resurfaced, we might get a little more attention, but only a real demonstration of enemy power like a 767 crashing into the CN tower will lift people out of their lethargy, and then of course is too late. If John Kerry is elected, the sudden pullback of American power might make the anti-American crowd happy, but who is considering the fact that someone will fill the vacuum left by the Americans, and they well might be a hostile power or power block.

I once wrote in the ADTB that the real choice isn't wether to have missile defense or unconventional forces, but rather how much of each we will need. The one thing I cannot find the answer to is how to "sell" that to the Canadian public....
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Infanteer on November 01, 2004, 05:28:45
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The one thing I cannot find the answer to is how to "sell" that to the Canadian public....

Osmosis.

Get more Canadian youth to willingly commit to a basic engagement.   There, they will learn that the military is an active and essential part to the vitality of the state.

One of my favorite ideas for doing so is a much advertised, easy to use eduaction program akin to the Montgomery GI Bill.  A program like this would have to be universally recognized as a suitable way of earning a good portion of continually increasing post-secondary education costs.  This isn't conscription; three years good service will be expected and the GI Bill will be simply one of the options that a soldier has on completion of the BE - but if it is "sold" right at highschools, it should be one that will draw more people into the Forces.  Since Canada spends so much money on subsidization of education, I'm sure there would be no problem with getting the funds and essentially killing two birds with one stone (filling up the ranks of the Forces and offering alternative forms of education subsidization).

When you got a sizable chunk of people going into university, trade schools, and the public service with three years voluntary service and perhaps (more then likely) some operational experience, I honestly believe their will be a shift in perception.   I think the benefits of a shift like this would far outweigh any disadvantages conferred from having a good percentage of Privates being "short-timers" - from recent studies a something that is already a reality (ie: I'm in for three and then college for free - I just made that up too... 8)).
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Acorn on November 01, 2004, 21:17:33
One of my favorite ideas for doing so is a much advertised, easy to use eduaction program akin to the Montgomery GI Bill.

I don't know if that was intentional, but it's good.

Acorn
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Thucydides on November 01, 2004, 22:30:19
While I support the idea of a "GI bill", this will start to run into a problem outlined in a few other threads: the narrow training base we now have. An infusion of funds and fresh recruits would have a negative effect if it isn't backed by sufficient resources to train these people.

Case in point, the influx of recruits who were taken on a few years ago to halt the "death spiral" (effective strength dropping below the 48000 mark) ended up being stranded in a "holding battalion" in Borden. There were no courses, no instructors, no kit...and so many of them sat for almost the entire initial engagement. Think of what sort of impression they got of military virtues and values.

Since we have a minority government, there is a "left flanking" option available; convince the Opposition party to sponsor a private members bill supporting the writing of a new White Paper which recognizes the new security environment and ensures the proper resources are devoted to the job. With some careful planning, there should be enough votes to pass the bill. Stephen Harper, are you a guest on this board?
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Infanteer on November 02, 2004, 04:10:47
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I don't know if that was intentional, but it's good.

Touche; 60-70 wpm (and failure to use the spell check) has its drawbacks.... :)

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While I support the idea of a "GI bill", this will start to run into a problem outlined in a few other threads: the narrow training base we now have. An infusion of funds and fresh recruits would have a negative effect if it isn't backed by sufficient resources to train these people.

Agree; that's why I find the notion that we'll mobilize the reserves when we need them about as absurd as the Government saying "we'll get 5,000 more soldiers!" (Try getting 5,000 bodies through CFRC quickly....)  Any buildup of numbers needs to be gradual and needs to take into account increased infrastructure requirements - my idea is a long-term proposal to encourage a broader understanding of the professional military in Canadian society while at the same time meeting the requirements for more filled boots.  Obviously, to work, it needs short-term solutions (like the one you presented).
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: E.R. Campbell on November 02, 2004, 11:43:16
Can we still talk about foreign policy?

I think we, Canadians, need to take a good, medium term look at the world around us as part of the process of reviewing, revising and enunciating our foreign policy.

The transitional era of one, lonely hyper-puissance will come to an end ... we will return to a bipolar world in which superpower status will be shared by America and China.   It will take China several decades to grow into a full fledged global superpower with global military, economic, political and even social powers, but it is, now, a major power - and not just a regional power.

The two superpowers will be 'attended' by other major powers: the European Union might overcome some difficult demographic, economic, social and political problems and emerge as a cohesive global power; Japan and, especially, India will be major regional powers - sometimes with global reach in some areas.   Brazil, too, will, eventually, get its act together and will be an important 'power.'

What about Canada?

We must accommodate the reality that we will, likely, 'decline' from being - as we are now by almost every sensible measure - one of the world's top ten[/b] to being one of the top twenty ... probably 'behind' America, China, Britain, Brazil, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan and, perhaps, Spain but still 'ahead' of Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, etc.

What shall we do?

The answer is simple and must be made clear by Canadians to politicians: we must pursue, promote and protect our interests; we must do so efficiently and effectively.

We can sum up (and grossly oversimplify) our interests in two words: Peace and Prosperity.   Neither is a as simple as one word might appear and we have known, since Roman times, that the two are interdependent.   Peace is more, much more than the absence of war and prosperity is only valuable when we can use it to improve the commonwealth of our families, communities, nations and communities of nations.

It may be easier to say what we need to avoid rather than to try to specify desired foreign policy outcomes.   What we want to avoid, above all, is a global war between an American led West and a Chinese led East.   We must use our 'good offices' to convince our American friends - and they are our friends, our best friends whether some Canadian s like it or not - and our Chinese trading partners that they can have a competitive, even antagonistic relationship without slipping through adversary and into enemy status.

The first requirement is that we actually have some 'good offices' to use for that worthy purpose.   These 'good offices' are earned and must be maintained through a combination of political actions, economic measures - including foreign aid and investment and defence 'muscle' - muscle which is used.   This should be the first of series of explicit requirements for defence capabilities which need to fall out of our foreign policy.

We must, also, strive to maintain close, non-adversarial contacts in the emerging bi-polar world.   We have several unique advantages which we must be willing and able to exploit:

"¢   First, and I repeat: we are America's closest friend and they are ours - all the breast beating by a substantial minority of Canadians will not change that and must not be allowed to tarnish the relationship;

"¢   Second: we have good, historically friendly ties with China.   We can and should disagree with China on various issues without prejudicing our overall 'friendly' relationship - the Chinese, like all major powers, including America, have neither use nor respect for lapdogs;

"¢   Third: we have good, historically, friendly ties with India and the European Union - two of the key 'second tier' players.   Further, we have good relations with two important subsets -

o   Globally: with the so called Anglosphere which consists of America, Australia, Britain, Canada, New Zealand and Singapore, and

o   Regionally: with the smaller Northern Europeans - Denmark, Iceland, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden.

This is an impressive base from which to pursue, promote and protect our interests - but it is a base which needs a bit of shoring up ... especially regarding its military foundation.   We may wish to revise some alliances - like NATO - to emphasize our strengths and interests and pay more attention to smaller, more exclusive bodies like the Anglosphere where our voice is a bit louder - where we are a bit more 'equal' than in other, larger, fora.   We should consider that our Atlantic and Pacific interests are, at least, equal albeit secondary to our North American ones.   Our military resources should   be applied, in order, to:

"¢   Continental issues;

"¢   Atlantic, Caribbean and Pacific (including Indian Ocean) issues, equally; and

"¢   Other areas - including Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia

We should, explicitly, announce our willingness to join coalitions of the willing which, serve our interests and preferably, serve and include (but, at least, do not offend) our traditional partners, allies and friends.   We should pronounce ourselves willing to be a regional actor - able and prepared to help in, especially, the Caribbean and Central America and, to a lesser extent, throughout the Commonwealth and la fracophonie.   Such help will, of necessity, have a military component and our foreign policy must require that we have the defence capacity to give military weight to our foreign policy initiatives.

Canadians like Lloyd Axworthy's human security agenda: it seems reasonable that middle powers like Canada - and Australia, Ireland, Norway and Sweden should be able to intervene when people are being starved and slaughtered.   Canadians seem less able (or willing) to understand that such interventions require military muscle - expensive military muscle which we, as a nation, must be willing and able to use, in accordance with international law, when the situations requires.   Our foreign policy must remind us, and our elected leaders, that we have ambitions in the world and that policy must remind us that our ambitions come with a price tage.

Above all: we must be free and fair traders.   We must be proponents of globalization because it is abundantly clear that globalization works.   The evidence, the hard data, is clear: there are fewer, many, many fewer really poor people than there were 30 years ago ... most of humanity is measurable better off because of freer, fairer trade and globalization ... the WTO does more for suffering humanity than the United Nations.   We should argue, on the world stage, for global free trade, using a rules based system with a dispute resolution mechanism and we might even wish to argue that the WTO should, gradually, usurp the UN's roles in many areas - for example: some UN members agencies like the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Labour Organization and the International Telecommunications Union would be 'better' under the WTO's jurisdiction.

More to follow, later ...

 
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: E.R. Campbell on November 05, 2004, 12:51:44
You will find another, expert view at: http://www.cdhowe.org/pdf/benefactors_lecture_2004.pdf

This is Allan Gotlieb's very, very recent (3 Nov 04) address to the C.D. Howe institute.

Gotlieb and I disagree on several areas but, very broadly, if you want to doable, affordable, politically possible foreign policy then his views are better than mine.

Gotlieb does want more military spending - but not as much as most, many in the defence community believe is necessary.   Gotlieb suspects, almost certainly correctly, that, given the current state of affairs, Canadians will support some, small, steady increases in defence spending but the idea that we might jump to 2% of GDP in, say, five years is, in his mind, a pipe dream and will remain so unless or until one or more of our ships is sunk or one of units is savaged in operations.

It is a good read, I highly recommend it.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Chris Pook on November 06, 2004, 16:50:05
Good read ROJ.

If we are to be taken seriously by our peers as Gottlieb suggests and we want a realist foreign policy then we will have to invest more money.   Stipulated.

But perhaps we can still flatter ourselves by appealing to our "compassionate" "non-American" "do-gooder" nature by adopting different balance between Defence and Aid than the US adopts while still improving the Defence side of the house, not a difficult proposition

These two charts show what Canada would be spending on Defense and Aid if it spent like the listed countries. Data is take from CIA World Fact Book.

These are our peers.  

They do not aspire to superpower status but the do aspire to a more stable world.

To achieve that stability they are spending money and going out into the world.

You will note that everybody outspends us on their combined Defence and Development budget, including Luxembourg, and outspends us by a wide margin.

I don't happen to like Luxembourg's balance and it looks like they are still not pulling their weight despite the fact they may be the richest bunch of people on the planet.

Belgium isn't bad but the Netherlands is where we could and should be.   That's 1.6% of GDP on Defense and Pearson's 0.7% on Aid.

If we had that kind of budget then how about this for a plan.   Set up two permanent garrisons, smaller in scale but similar in concept to 4 CMBG in Germany.   One in Haiti and one in Afghanistan â “ assuming the locals want us.   They would contribute stability to the countries, be a source of foreign investment and jobs and be sally ports for Canadian operations in the regions.

We don't want to be like Americans.   We want to be different.   We want to act independently.

OK then, so prepare to act independently.   If we think we have a better way to stabilize regions then let us go to it and try.   I don't think the Americans will stop us.   They apparently like what we have done elsewhere.

The Americans do what they do because they want to sleep secure in their beds at night and want to be able to travel widely and make lots of money.   They need a peaceful, secure world.   They see threats coming from areas where the borders aren't secure and governments don't control their populations.   They might prefer democratic governments but order and security are more important than good government.

If we think that we can do a better job, if we think that we can supply security, peace, order AND good government then shouldn't we be doing it rather than just carping on at the Yanks about how they are doing it all wrong?

I am sure the Yanks would be ecstatic if they woke up one morning and Ottawa called to say that they could send their troops home from Afghanistan, that Canada will guarantee the stability of the country and it will be brought under the rule of law and a democratic government â “ with public health care for all.

By the way one of the borders they would like to see more secure would be our borders.  

We make them happy, they will keep the back door open.   We don't make them happy they are quite within their rights, and it is their responsibility to themselves and their kids, to close the door, lock it, and only invite in those people they know.   If we secure our borders and they come to trust our judgment on guaranteeing the character of the types of people we invite in then they will be more inclined to keep that door open.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: E.R. Campbell on November 07, 2004, 10:27:00
I think we need to keep in mind that our foreign policy describes what we do about or to or, sometimes, even for the world around us, in pursuit of our own self interest.   A policy which does not, always, item-by-item, page-by-page and line-by-line keep our self interest as its highest priority is a failure.

We must understand what our self interest is: I have offered peace and prosperity as a shorthand description.   Allan Gotlieb says that, traditionally, our realist foreign policy "has three broad goals over time: control over territory and resources, national unity, and more secure economic access to foreign markets, in particular the United States ...â ?

I would argue that Gotlieb is enunciating a national policy which, I agree, exists and needs to be enunciated because it should 'drive' foreign, defence, economic and sundry domestic policies.

I believe that what Gotlieb describes as the romantic tendency in Canadian foreign policy has secured pride of place for two main reasons:

"¢   Pearson and, specially, Trudeau gave it intellectual respectability - mainly in the Trudeau/Head 1969 foreign policy white paper (a series of little booklets, actually, designed (with great care) to be 'easy' for grammar school children to understand and accept); and

"¢   Chrétien adopted and 'sold' it out of a combination of economic necessity and respect for Pink Lloyd Axworthy's hard left idealism.

The romantics are not interested in defence spending comparisons - "less is more,â ? they say; less defence spending means that more resources can be applied to the human security agenda - allocated to NGOs who, unlike the military, routinely and without fanfare, serve (and bravely and effectively, too, I hasten to add) where human security is most at risk.  

Realists should, also, be wary of spending charts and tables.   One of the main 'outputs' from a successful foreign policy ought to be the capability to reduce defence forces and defence expenditure because our policies - and our military muscle - should have created a safer, more peaceful and prosperous world - one in which we can trade our goods and services without the aid of frigates, battalions and bombers.

Both realists and romantics should[/b] be able to agree on a common strategic survey or overview.   Both 'wings' should be able to 'see' the world through a common, Canadian lens - they should, in other words, agree the factors which bear on our aims and interests and objectives even if they cannot agree on what those aims and objectives might be.   It stands to reason that, despite a common, Canadian world view, the deductions which the realists and romantics draw from their analysis of the commonly agreed factors will be quite different and the courses open and plan will be wildly divergent.

An acceptable Canadian foreign policy must, as Gotlieb suggests, be based upon a number if requirements.   He suggest that they are:

"¢    transcendent U.S. power is the dominant feature of the contemporary international order;

"¢   Canada's role as a middle power can never be regained;

"¢   Canadians
[must] liberate themselves from the belief that the UN is the sacred foundation of our foreign policy;

"¢   we must also abandon our fixation with international rule-making;

"¢   Utopianism, millenarianism and visionary crusades should have no place in Canadian foreign policy;

"¢   
[we must have a] willingness to commit significant resources to achieving Canada's goals; and, most important for Gotlieb

"¢   recognition that our destiny as a sovereign nation is inescapably tied to our geography.



I disagree with his second requirement (expanded on pps 32/33).   I do not think the concept of middle powers is passé ... I think, in fact, that a Western middle power based alliance may be vital to securing Canada's interests (and America's and Australia's and Britain's and ... too) in the re-emerging bipolar world.   The functionalism to which Gotlieb bids us return rests, firmly, on the idea of middle powers.   Our 'top ten' status does not obviate the fact that we are not a great power ... I said, elsewhere, that we are not in the major leagues we need to be a middle power with Triple A political, economic, foreign and military prowess.

With regard to the United Nations and rules based world government, I would go farther than Gotlieb.   I believe that Martin should pursue his G-20 idea - but with strict membership limits: members are invited to join because they are important or reasonably important and because they are responsible, respectable actors on the world stage.   There must be room in the G-20 for countries like Australia, Brazil, Chile, China, Denmark, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Russia Singapore, South Korea and Thailand but not for the likes of Armenia, Burkina Faso, Chad or Djibouti and so on.   This should be a league of great, large, middle and even small powers and Canada should aim to lead the middle powers.

Canada should start, soon, to distance itself from the United Nations because it is highly unlikely that the institutional reforms which are essential can be made under the current Charter.   Canada should insist - and it will achieve much support - that many, many UN agencies - like the International Civil Aviation Organization, International Maritime Organization, International Telecommunications Union, and World Intellectual Property Rights Organization should be transferred to the World Trade Organization.   The WTO should be reinforced with a .security council' based on the OECD or, perhaps better, the G-20 which should be able to enforce the WTO's dispute settlements.   The WTO is a 'rules based' organization and Canadians can indulge their fixation with international rule-making through it, if it is reformed and rebuilt.

I believe we must have a realist foreign policy, rooted in a national policy, supported by economic and defence policies which promotes and protects our vital interests around the world; I also believe this realist policy must be well camouflaged in romantic words.




Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: E.R. Campbell on November 07, 2004, 11:50:41
I would like to address Gotlieb's two most important requirements for a return to a principled, realist foreign policy for Canada:

"¢   transcendent U.S. power is the dominant feature of the contemporary international order; and

"¢   recognition that our destiny as a sovereign nation is inescapably tied to our geography.

The question which our foreign policy must answer is: how to we exploit these two factors to protect and promote our vital interests?

How, in other words, do we help to focus the US' use of its own transcendent power so that it, preferably, supports our interests or, at least, does them no serious harm?   How do we ensure that the US' use of its power does not sideswipe us and our interests?   How do we exploit our geographic proximity to the US?

The latter is easier than the former.   We must, without fail, do a full and fair share in continental defence - including the defence of the US strategic forces.   This is more than NORAD - this involves more than just the defence department.   All of our 'security' services - including, especially, customs and immigration - must be on side[/i] with the Americans; the operative word for all of our security services in continental.

Our merchants - large and small - are, already, exploiting our geographic advantage by broadening and deepening the integration of North America.   This is not a matter of government policy - no one cares what Canadians, broadly, or Canadian political 'leaders' think; this is business and it has been going on - in earnest - for a century and will continue to go on.   It is not a policy, it is a fact; those who cannot see the fact cannot understand Canadian policy - not economic policy, not social policy, not environmental policy, not defence policy, not security policy and not foreign policy; all Canadian policies are tied, inescapably, to our geography.   (Parenthetically: Even our national unity is tied to geography - French speaking Canadians are an insignificant, minor league minority in North America; Spanish is North America's second language - black and brown are its second skin colours.)

There are a few answers:

First and foremost we are, we must remain and we must work at always being America's best friend and most trusted ally.   That does not mean we are or should ever be America's toady - we can, we do, we will disagree with our friends - we must do so as good, best friends do: respectfully.   The Anti-Americanism which, as Gotlieb notes, the Chrétien government made part and parcel of our policy base was an error which must be eradicated - quickly and thoroughly.   For a start, Prime Minister Martin must - as a matter of important national policy - expel Carolyn Parrish from the Liberal caucus and he must firmly and forcefully disavow her views and those of her followers.   This is politically difficult, especially in a minority government but there are many, many things which are far, far more important than the future of Paul Martin and his government - proper, useful, advantageous relations with the US is one of them.

Second, we must cooperate, effectively, in securing our shared continent - sealing the borders and access points to the outside world so that we can unseal our internal borders.

Third, we must work to strengthen the so called Anglosphere - that group of traditional allies and democracies consisting of: America, Australia, Britain, Canada, New Zealand and Singapore.   The Anglosphere allows us to deal with our neighbour and friend with the support of others - multilateralism has a long and honourable history in Canadian foreign policy because it works.   It has, since 1945, worked especially well with the United States - President Bush may say that he is content to act unilaterally but his government wants (and probably needs) allies and partners and friends.   We can, and should, exploit our existing bonds with our traditional allies, including the United States, to pursue our own vital interests.

Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Chris Pook on November 07, 2004, 18:15:20
Gottlieb promotes â Å“Realismâ ? vs â Å“Romanticismâ ?.

Which of these two Principles of War should we consign to the scrap-heap?

Selection and Maintenance of the Aim, or Maintenance of Morale?

While it seems that some of our defence bureaucrats, and I hope it is only the civilian side and not the uniformed side, are willing to neglect morale as an issue it doesn't seem from the comments on this board to be an issue that the uniformed members of the CF are unconcerned with.

Morale is implicity and explicitly a â Å“Romanticâ ? notion.  It is about how people feel about themselves and about how other people feel about them. It is reinforced by everything from Caubeens, Balmorals, and Busbys, CoveraBusbiesilts and trousers, to tanks and frigates.

Most of the details of uniform that are so cherished by the CF, especially in the Reserves, find their origins in the Napoleonic period.  This period is the transitional period of the Rationalists of the Enlightenment to the rise of the Romantics like Lord Byron, the Brontes and Sir Walter Scott, author of the novel Ivanhoe.  Sir Walter Scott actually has a direct connection to my beloved kilt because it was he that convinced King George IV, a great ladies man and lover of fancy dress balls, to wear a philabeg (small kilt) complete with ribbons, feathers and flash buttons on the occasion of his visit to Scotland in 1824.  That  cemented the modern image of what a Scotsman is supposed to look like.  The image endures because of romantic sentiment.  There is very little of practical rationality in a feather bonnet.  These romantic images, like the 3 white stripes on RN collars for Nelson's three great victories, these symbols are the things that bind units to themselves and to their pasts.

However morale is not bought only with flash and high sounding mottos.  It also has practical needs.  â Å“Let the deed shawâ ? or â Å“Show me the moneyâ ? are also critical factors in building morale.  Those in uniform need to feel that they are doing the right thing, that their leaders and their nation support them and trust them and that their actions will benefit others.  Jean Chretien disparagingly referred to the need to feel like â Å“Boy Scoutsâ ?.  As much as he himself found this laughable he wasn't wrong.  Every serving member on this board, past and present feels that his or her service is service in a good cause, even if it service that benefits him or her personally.

One way that they want the support of their nation to be demonstrated is in being supplied with, and trusted to use correctly, the tools that they feel are necessary to do the job.  There are many examples but I will just cite Tanks.  The Tanks debate is as much about Maintenance of Morale as it is about Selection and Maintenance of the Aim.  Soldiers feel they need Tanks to support them.  Without them they feel insecure in the field.  There may be some point in the future where Tanks are demonstrated to have no tactical value (in my mind that day has not yet come).  Until that day comes it behoves the Government, representing the nation, to give the troops the tools necessary not just to perform the tasks in the manner  they see fit, but also the tools necessary to demonstrate support, trust in judgment and to make them feel more secure.  There may come a day when the military voluntarily wishes to give up Tanks but that will only happen when one of two things occurs. When a rich country that has Tanks chooses not to use them and wins without casualties regardless, or a poor country without Tanks defeats a force with Tanks.  That day happened for horses and elephants, for longbows and pikes.

Morale is a critical factor in the maintenance of an effective military force.

Likewise it is a critical factor in the life of a Nation.

Hitler's Germans did not support him just out of a mindless hate of the rest of the World.  They were setting right the injustice of Versailles.  They were saving the Germans of the Alsace and the Saar, the Rhineland and the Sudetenland, of Prussia and Russia from the yoke of oppression.  They were, hideously and wrongly, saving the world from the economic tyranny of the Jews (and before anyone gets self righteous on me here remember Liberal Prime Minister William Lyon MacKenzie King turning away a cruise liner full of Jewish refugees with the comments in his administration â Å“None is too manyâ ?).    Hitler's Germans supported him in abominable acts for all the right reasons.  For the good of humanity and the German race and themselves individually.

The appeal was not an appeal to reason. It was an appeal to emotion. It was a romantic appeal.  Rational arguments were used to buttress that emotional appeal.  It was rationalized.

Pierre Elliot Trudeau successfully appealed to Canadian romanticism and still has a hold on a large chunk of Canadians today.  Pearson appealed more to rationalism and is accorded respect but does not move Canadians like Trudeau.

If we, the CF and its supporters, want to secure the necessary resources for the CF then we can not ignore the â Å“Romanticâ ? needs of the community at large.  We will not suddenly convert Canadians by appealing to jobs or dollars.  We must somehow figure out how achieve our ends while at the same time working within the â Å“Romanticâ ? self image of Canadians.

Like Ralph Klein says, the secret to success is to figure out which way the parade is going and get out in front of it.

We have to build capabilities that not only serve the legitimate war-fighting and security needs of both the CF and the Nation, even if the Nation doesn't share the perception, they also bolster, or at least conform to the National self-image of, in Chretien's derisory but accurate phrase,  â Å“Boy Scoutsâ ?.  Canadians see themselves as Boy Scouts, good kids with good morals helping deserving old ladies across the street.  Rightly or wrongly, realistically or romantically that is the way the see themselves. And until the Nation gets out more into the world and discover that not all old ladies want to cross the street and they certainly don't want any help, especially from nice Christian boys; until they discover that every decision results in making at least on side of the argument unhappy â “ if a compromise is achieved it is likely that both sides will feel aggrieved; until they discover that just as â Å“to govern is to decideâ ? to decide is to make enemies, they will continue to let their Romantic instincts rule over their Realistic appraisals.

We have to work with that situation, not work against it.  We have work through the seams and not try to attack strongpoints.

I had a similar discussion some years ago with a Danish woman on the occasion of Norway voting to join the EU.  She was arguing that the Norwegians would see the light and vote to join because rationally it was in their economic self-interest (markets etc).  I argued that Norway had just achieved its independence from Denmark in 1905 and the people that were voting were the children and grand-children, not to mention some of the self same people that had seen that day after 1000 years or more of dynastic struggles.  I felt that they would feel to attached to their independence, that the emotional ties were too strong, raw and relatively new, that they would vote their emotions over their pocket-books.  Hearts over Minds if you will.  Norway voted not to join.

Scotland has a parliament 300 years after the last one was dissolved and after many attempts to subdue the Scottish character.

In Quebec, they remember, â Å“Ils se souvientsâ ? 245 years after the loss on the Plains of Abraham in 1759 and the Acadians have not forgotten Evangeline.

We need a Rationalist foreign policy but we cannot devise an effective and long lasting one unless it carries the spirit of the Nation, unless it has a Romantic appeal.

In practical terms that means, and here I agree with ROJ and Gottlieb, an emphasis on Sovereignty, Control of the Approaches and Control of the Borders, because these things are seen as serving our self-interests and unfortunately can also be characterized as necessary to distinguish ourselves from the Americans.  On the plus side the Americans would be happy to accept a secure, democratic, independent  Canada on their border as long as it is non-threatening and not a haven for threats.

In terms of international engagement capabilities that allow us to act independently of the US, and occasionally ahead of the US, that allow us to act to bring stability to nations and regions before trouble flares up into a high intensity conflagration those are the types of capabilities we should seek.  The old British colonial maxim was better a battalion in time than a division too late.  If we were able to do act in this fashion, act to stabilize, we would be acting in the best interests of ourselves, the region in question, the international community at large and the interests of the US.

The US acts to reduce threats.  It seeks security and safety.  It desires "Peace, Order and Good Governance" so that its kids can sleep securely at night and so that commerce can proceed and bread can be put on the table. 

It is more concerned about security and order than good governance in foreign lands.  On the other hand it is not against democracy and good governance overseas.  If Canada thinks it can assist in supplying a secure environment while doing a better job at supplying "Good Governance" I am sure that the Americans will not object if we go ahead and try.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: sheikyerbouti on November 07, 2004, 19:25:55
 Just my 2 cents worth, but why  hasn't there been a greater emphasis on supporting the Cadets across Canada as a means of both educating and recruiting a new generation of men and women?

 Tens of thousands of kids have joined Cadets but how many  have continued their commitment to a higher degree. Not once in my years as a cadet did anyone from the corps come in and even explain when or if we could join. It seems that the simplest approach would be to rebuild confidence with the traditional groups that have supported the forces and then explore new ways of educating the public.




 

 
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: E.R. Campbell on November 07, 2004, 19:38:34
Kirkhill's argument is valid if you accept that the romantic tendency in Canadian (and American) foreign policy is, somehow, morally superior to the realist tendency.   I do not.

As a broad generalization (and all broad generalizations are wrong, even this one) I find the romantics to be grounded in greed, envy and timidity â “ the base instincts of too much of our nation.

I believe, as I said, in response to Infanteer â “ up above, 18 Oct 04, â Å“that   our interest might be best served, perhaps can only be served when some of our ideological values are satisfied.   Are our interests 'served' if we, and perhaps a very few others, are the only liberal-democracies in the world?   My own observations would suggest that peace and prosperity (a pretty fair, albeit grossly oversimplified, abbreviated version of our national interest) is enhanced when more and more nations are also liberal democracies, more interested in commercial competition than in militaristic expansion.â ?     Those ideological values mean that while I agree 100% with Gotlieb that â ?Utopianism, millenarianism and visionary crusades should have no place in Canadian foreign policyâ ? we must insist that our basic values: individual liberty, democracy, the rule of law â “ Roosevelt's freedom from fear, or peace, order and good government if you like, should be what we try to export to others â “ that's what I mean when I insist that foreign policy is what we do about foreign countries â “ we try to make them more like us because we believe that countries like Canada and our traditional allies are, really, honestly, peaceful and peace loving and responsible.

We want one and all, friend and foe, to prosper through free trade because we understand that people who are busy improving their lot in life are, except in very, very rare circumstances, unlikely to want to wage aggressive wars, etc.

There is no doubt, for me, that our national policy ought to be grounded in our best moral values - and that should 'drive' our foreign policy.   I do not believe that it is morally acceptable to bleat about Axworthy's human security agenda and then blanche at the prospect of using force â “ not even necessarily Canadian force â “ to implement it.   At its base, however, that is what our Canadian foreign policy does, it does so because extensive and intensive polling tells politicians and senior bureaucrats that Canadians don't want to be moral, they just want to believe they are a moral superpower - without having to spend any money.   Perhaps the first goal of our foreign policy ought to be the reform of our national public education system â “ maybe we should understand 'values.'

I agree with Kirkhill that Trudeau appealed to our romantic nature but he did so with a policy which made no sense, not little sense - none at all, and which, in its implementation, did far more harm to Canada than it did good for anyone.   Trudeau had charisma but no appreciable brains.

Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Chris Pook on November 07, 2004, 20:36:53
I don't take a position that Romanticism is morally superior to Realism, Rusty Old Joint. 

I am referring to what motivates people.  Hitler's Germans were certainly not morally superior to their enemies although they were motivated by romantic notions of doing good.  I don't think that many members on this forum would be motivated to kill for the sake of oil, although oil is critical to the success of ourselves, our allies and our neighbours.  They will do it if ordered but not with the degree of enthusiasm they would have if they were doing to defend their families or to liberate others.

I agree that our policy needs to be a policy that addresses our real needs. In that sense it needs to be a rational policy.  We need to be able to secure our oil, our diamonds, our gold, and silver, our farmlands and ranchlands, our trade routes and our fishing grounds.  But does that sell as well as protecting our families and our home and native land.  One sounds greedy and materialistic.  The other sounds patriotic and worthy of sacrifice.

However, rationally, it also needs to be a policy that is accepted by the Canadian public.  It needs to appeal to their sense of what is important. What is important to them, as well as jobs and trade, as well as security, is the need to feel good about themselves, that their values are not being compromised.

Politicians can't just sell steak.  They have to have sizzle that they can sell as well.  And the CF is reliant on the politicians to sell it and its needs to the Canadian public. 

As to the observations on greed, envy and timidity, that may be the motives that drive some part of the electorate, but you are not going to win much support by telling people that they are a bunch of mean, nasty, vindictive cowards and that they need to become morally upright and develop a spine like us.    In any event the rational man would run away from a fight on the grounds that he is more likely to survive to raise kids and prosper that way.  Not the action of a hero.

I agree with the rest of your comments that romantic visions of utopia can't be allowed to prevent us from acting, Axworthy is a twit and Trudeau did make no sense on foreign policy.  Trudeau  however did motivate people, a whole generation, and unfortunately they haven't all retired yet.  Worse perhaps they have had 30 years to educate our children.  We can't redirect the population's world view over night.  We have to work within the context of the situation on the ground.  And the situation on the ground is that for good or ill many Canadians believe in their bones that Axworthy and Trudeau are right.  As well many of the people most convinced of the correctness of this position are the most activist inclined and most inclined to become politicians, teachers, journalists, United Church ministers and Green Peace members.  We won't win many battles trying to tell these people that they are wrong.  And we can't get through their barrier to communicate to the population at large because they control the message.  What we have to aim to achieve is convincing people that the judicious use of force is compatible with their self-image and part of being a responsible liberal democracy.  No different in fact from accepting that police can act to prevent or stop crime domestically and enlightened parents can act to prevent or stop their children from acting in dangerous or vile fashions at home.

I am simply saying that while the rational objective of selecting and maintaining the aim is paramount to mission success, the mission likewise will not succeed unless morale is maintained by appealing to the non-rational, romantic impulses of the community.

And just to repeat, I am fully in agreement that it is cowardly and unhelpful to both national interest and international interests to fail to act, especially if it is out of fear of the consequences.


Cheers,  :) :salute:
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Thucydides on November 07, 2004, 23:15:55
Here is another case where education is really needed before we can progress as a military or as a nation.

The centre of most Canadians universe seems to be their navels. Unlike us (who have at least seen some of the seamy underside of the planet), most Canadians who I know well enough to comment on are rather oblivious to the world that surrounds them. Think about the sort of mentality which seems to thrive on the idea that our national identity is defined by healthcare. (I suppose exploring and settling a large and climacticly hostile continent really has nothing to do with how we live and work today. Let's not even get into our historical interactions with other peoples). Even a declarative statement like "80% of Canada's trade is with the United States" seems really meaningless to these people. They feel quite free to make judgmental or rude or ignorant remarks about Americans without stopping to think these are people with their own goals and agendas.

We as a notion also forget the nations that make up the United Nations also have goals and agendas of their own, most of which do not coincide with our own.

Most of the posts on this thread have identified or quoted policy experts who have made a case for certain ideas or agendas to drive our foreign policy and thus our military. We need to find every means possible to hammer this home to our fellow Canadians, otherwise we will wither and die on the vine due to lack of support and coherent policy.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Chris Pook on November 08, 2004, 00:25:41
a_majoor:

It sounds like you are describing a notional nation that can be easily swayed but is lacking leadership. 

Any leaders on the horizon?
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Thucydides on November 08, 2004, 10:41:26
In my more P/O'd moments, I start raving about running for Mayor here in London...(not rich enough to aim higher)
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: E.R. Campbell on November 08, 2004, 11:30:49
I don't think we are too far apart, really, Kirkhill, except that:

o   I think too many people put too much emphasis on the military/national security component of foreign policy â “ understandable, to be sure, on army.ca but a bit dangerous all the same;

o   I have difficulty with relating the tendencies[/i] towards 'romanticism' or 'realism' to hard principles â “ especially to the 'master principle.'

Going back to Gotlieb and his concerns that we recognize geopolitical realities: that should cause the authors of the next white paper to call for: Recognition of the fact that our American friends have been attacked and security now dominates their policies (the plural is important) and we should â “ as good neighbours, even if we don't want to talk about our own best (selfish) interests â “ cooperate with them.

Were it my call I would argue for some new, additional (beyond NORAD and the IBETs (Integrated Border Enforcement Teams)) super-national or continental organizations to deal with some customs and immigration matters.   This would require both countries to tighten up some of their procedures (the tourism lobby in the US advocates something akin to a gold card as proof of trustworthiness while the refugee lobby in Canada advocates a dark skin as proof of the same) and it might, even, involve combined (bi-national) 'units' in some places.   That rationale for this is that we need to do, roughly, what the Liberals said Mulroney wanted to do back in 1988: erase the border between Canada and the US and put a common 'fence' around our shares of the continent.

The Americans have a 'right' â “ I believe â “ to expect no less than enhanced cooperation given the facts that they have been attacked and that some enemy elements do (or try to) operate 'through' Canada; we have a selfish interest in easing American fears â “ enhanced flow of goods, services and people within our commonwealth â “ which ought to reinforce our romantic desire to be good neighbours.

Margaret Thatcher used to end arguments with â Å“TINAâ ? -   There Is No Alternative!   Someone else â “ not me, sadly â “ coined the very clever dictum of TINA2 by which he meant that in dealing with the Americans we must remember that:

1.   We are Trapped In North America; and

2.   There Is No Alternative!

Good advice to foreign policy developers, I think.

That being said, our major interests with the Americans are economic, social, cultural and political â “ not military.   Our foreign policy needs to emphasize that we should enhance our continental military/security capabilities as enablers â “ supporting other, more important matters, rather than for their own sake.   This is realism â “ identifying what our vital interests are and then identifying the enablers needed to protect and promote them.   As a general rule military/security capabilities are enablers for more important, valuable and productive economic, social and political capabilities.

I do not like the analogue of: principles of war/policy tendencies.   While I agree that our best (rather than our base) values should animate our national and foreign policies (and the economic and social ones, too) we must strive, always, for clarity â “ realism â “ when we identify and assess all the factors which bear upon our 'aim' (peace and prosperity, in my shorthand).   After we have analyzed the factors and the 'courses open' and made a plan to implement our foreign policy then it may be necessary to camouflage our realism in some romantic verbiage.   But, big BUT realism and romanticism are not competing principles[/b]; they are, rather, more akin to beliefs â “ and one is sense, grounded in a careful appreciation of the situation â “ as it really exists, and the other is nonsense, wishful thinking, at best.
  
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Chris Pook on November 08, 2004, 12:56:19
You're right ROJ, we are not far apart.

All I am saying is that if you ignore morale and you issue an order you may not get the response from your troops you were expecting.  Likewise any policy that doesn't take into account the "morale" of the nation, romantic notions and all, you will not gain the necessary support and resources for the policy.

That being said I think there is a lot of scope available for a determined Government to make a strong case, both rational and romantic, to the nation to justify a rational foreign and defence policy.

Cheers Sir.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: E.R. Campbell on November 08, 2004, 16:52:03
This may be a wee tiny bit off topic but, the article below; from today's Ottawa Citizen sheds some light on the effects of Trudeau's selling of the pacifist sizzle rather than the self interest steak.   The 30-44 age group came of age well after the infamous 1969 white paper became the base for how we were to see ourselves in the world: little, timid, peaceful Canada.

As others have mentioned elsewhere it wasn't just Trudeau and his fellow travellers who detested the military â “ even their own military â “ we had two generations who saw no good in anything military; they wanted, and got, a pacifist foreign policy and emasculated diplomatic services, aid programmes and armed forces.

----------

http://www.canada.com/ottawa/ottawacitizen/news/story.html?id=0c1c4959-063c-4732-b772-48bdeba85234

Canada's leaders of tomorrow more than a little confused about the past

Here's a hint: he was PM for much of the first half of the 20th century, writes Randy Boswell.

Randy Boswell

The Ottawa Citizen

Monday, November 08, 2004


They're the up-and-comers of Canadian society and the leaders of tomorrow, but ask Generation X a fairly simple question about the country's recent history and prepare to laugh -- or weep -- at their Remembrance Day Duh.

A new survey aimed at gauging Canadians' basic knowledge of the Second World War has revealed a startling blind spot among the 30-to-44 age group. By a whopping margin, more of these prime-of-life citizens believed the prime minister during the 1939-45 conflict was Lester B. Pearson instead of Mackenzie King, the country's true wartime leader.

The error seems all the more egregious because even younger Canadians -- those aged 18 to 29 -- knew enough history to pick Mr. King over Mr. Pearson, who was best known for the postwar diplomacy that won him a Nobel Peace Prize in 1957 and his so-so performance as prime minister of two minority governments in the 1960s.

Try to imagine a whole generation of Britons choosing Harold Macmillan over Winston Churchill as their wartime leader, and you get some idea of the significance of the thirtysomethings' view of history.

"That is very surprising," said McGill University historian Jack Jedwab, executive director of the Association for Canadian Studies, who double-checked the numbers just to be sure. "It clearly speaks to a problem in retention of learning."

The survey of 2,100 Canadians, conducted by Environics on behalf of Montreal-based ACS, was part of a study of attitudes toward this country's experience of war. The results are to be discussed this week at a conference in Montreal called Remembering Canada: How We Recall and Represent the Past.

Respondents were asked, "Who was prime minister of Canada during the Second World War?" and given a list of choices: King (who was PM for two terms in the 1920s and then from 1935 to 1948), Pearson (1963-68), Wilfrid Laurier (1896-1911) and Louis St. Laurent (1948-57).

More than half of those over 60 correctly identified Mr. King, with just 16 per cent naming Mr. Pearson. Respondents aged 45 to 59 were twice as likely to choose Mr. King over Mr. Pearson -- 40 per cent to 20 -- with another 20 per cent admitting they didn't know the answer.

Recent high school graduates, those 18 to 29 years old, also made Mr. King the top response: 30 per cent compared with 23 per cent for Mr. Pearson and 26 per cent who didn't know.

But more than a third of the 30-to-44 demographic -- 35 per cent -- named Mr. Pearson as our wartime PM, while only 25 per cent got it right with Mr. King, and 26 per cent couldn't say.

It's no surprise the two oldest groups -- many of whom were born in the King era or just after -- tended to get the right answer. And Mr. Jedwab suspects the youngest cohort in the survey still remembers enough of their high school history to strongly associate Mr. King with the Second World War, while the 30-to-44 set has simply forgotten what they must have once been taught.

He also figures that Mr. Pearson's sterling reputation as the architect of Canada's role in international peacekeeping was particularly ingrained in the minds of those who grew up in the 1960s and '70s.

"Pearson is remembered very well by history," agrees pollster Derek Leebosh, who conducted the survey.

Some people's memories, he suspects, might be jogged by reference to Mr. King's famously equivocal utterance on the key political issue of the war: "Conscription if necessary, but not necessarily conscription."

But there were "no great speeches" by Mr. King to really rivet him into Canadian consciousness, says Mr. Leebosh, none of Churchill's dramatic pledging of blood, toil, tears and sweat.

"Churchill is an iconic figure associated with World War II all through the world," says Mr. Leebosh. "What did King do? Well, he hosted the Quebec Conference, where he pretty much poured drinks for Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt while they talked about the real stuff."

Mr. Pearson, a veteran of the First World War, was a diplomat during the Second World War. He was posted to the Canadian High Commission in London and also worked in Ottawa before becoming Canada's ambassador to the U.S. in 1945.

Mr. King died in 1950; Mr. Pearson in 1972.

Elsewhere in the survey, which was conducted in May and September this year, there may be some explanation for the surprising Gen-X aberration on the King question. While those aged 18-29 responded that they'd learned "a great deal" about the Second World War during their school days, only 22 per cent of the 30-to-44 group said the same.

But no other cut at the numbers reveals such a strong tendency toward mistaking the identity of our wartime prime minister as that exhibited by those born between 1960 and 1974. A fairly high awareness of Mr. King's role in the Second World War was registered overall in each region of the country, with Atlantic Canadians giving the correct answer most often (41 per cent) and Quebec respondents notching the lowest score, a still relatively respectable 35 per cent.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: E.R. Campbell on November 14, 2004, 13:41:27
Getting back on topic: I notice in the weekend's news that Prime Minister Martin is musing out loud about Canada having a 'role' to play in the Middle East peace process, which we all hope can be restarted after Palestinian elections.

I agree.

A two state solution - two independent states, with secure borders, living up to the provisions of a peace treaty - is the only answer.

There are two huge sticking points:

"¢   Secure borders; and

"¢   Honouring a peace treaty.

No one at the UN ever thought that the 1948 'green line' (the so called pre '67 boundaries) provided Israel with anything like a secure border; that's why Lord Caradon and his colleagues crafted UNSC Res. 242 as they did.   No one thinks that Sharon's new fence is the right answer, either - but the wall is, almost certainly, part of the answer, once there is some agreement, of some sort, re: how much less of the West Bank the Palestinians get,

The Israelis do not believe that the Palestinians can be trusted to keep any treaty they have signed.

There is a third problem area: the United Nations.   It is highly unlikely that Israel will cooperate in any useful way with any United Nations officials or organizations.

From the point of view of helping the peace to take root, then, there would seem to be two broad courses open:

"¢   A major role for the United Nations on the Palestinian side; or

"¢   A non-UN organization supervising the truce.

I would argue for the latter and I would argue for Canada, as a leading middle power, to play a major role in forming and maintaining this new, multilateral Israel/Palestine Truce Supervisory Organization.

Canada, and several other nations can come to the table with reasonable reputations - both in Israel and amongst the Arabs - for fairness and trustworthiness.   That list might include, for example, and in addition to Canada: Australia, Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Fiji, Finland, Hungary, Italy, India, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore and South Korea.   There are some Islamic countries which will, likely be acceptable to Israel: Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan and Turkey would be about it, I think.   There are a few European countries which are considered very pro-Arab but would still be acceptable to Israel, I think: France, Germany and Spain come to mind.   There are also some American nations - Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico, for example - that may also be acceptable.

A list like that - 20 or 25 or so members of another coalition of the willing - might provide a good, fairly compact, reliable team to do a number of tasks:

"¢   'Secure' Palestine - make it relatively safe from Israeli incursions by putting a 'trip wire' between Israel and Palestine - a trip wire Israel will be unwilling to cross;

"¢   'Secure' Israel by, for a period of a few years, replacing any sort of Palestinian army - in the near term;

"¢   'Secure' both Israel and Palestine by creating, training and, initially, leading Palestine's eventual armed forces;

"¢   'Secure' both Israel and Palestine by supervising the Palestinian security forces and by actually managing the Israel/Palestine border crossings;

"¢   'Secure' Palestine for the Palestinians by recreating and supervising the Palestinian public service - especially major institutions like the central bank, the courts and regulatory agencies; and

"¢   'Secure' Palestine by the Palestinians by replacing UNRWA in Palestine.

These tasks require, from the Group of 20+:

"¢   Politicians;

"¢   Senior bureaucrats;

"¢   Military leaders and trainers - senior and junior;

"¢   Police and security managers and officers;

"¢   Officials; and

"¢   Formed military units and formations.

This is a useful foreign policy initiative for the Martin government: worthy but, since the military burden can be shared broadly, not too expensive.

I expect Martin to offer Canada's good offices to the Haitians next week.   He will offer a bit of money and a few people - mostly retired politicians and bureaucrats, but, maybe, some soldiers, too - to help with the negotiations.   That is not enough, however, to placate either the US or many Canadians.   He needs, desperately, to be able to say, when George Bush comes calling - looking for a formal Canadian military contribution to Iraq, that: "We have just taken on new tasks, Mr. President, and the cupboard is bare - but we will, yet again, add our naval forces to the Persian Gulf area of operations.   We have assigned troops to Afghanistan and we have just earmarked others for Haiti and Palestine.   We are fully committed - to the global war on terror, to Middle East peace and to problems in our (shared) region.   We can do no more, at this time.â ?


Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: E.R. Campbell on December 03, 2012, 13:04:33
The CBC's Brian Stewart wants us to go back to peacekeeping in this article which is reproduced udner the Fair Dealing provisons of the Copyright Act from the CBC:

http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/story/2012/11/30/f-vp-stewart-peacekeeping.html
Quote
Time for Canada to get back to peacekeeping

By Brian Stewart, CBC News

Posted: Dec 3, 2012

For years now, the Canadian army has fretted about finding a new role for itself after Afghanistan. Well, that day has arrived and it can no longer dodge the stark post-war questions: What next, and where?

Spare us an eternity of training at home and aiding with floods and ice storms, is a common lament among soldiers who see little that's challenging or career-enhancing ahead.

With little chance of another overseas mission in the foreseeable future, there is little for our 25,500 regular soldiers and 16,000 reservists to do, and it's not hard for them to read the tea leaves. An inactive army is both easily bored and easily cut at budget time.

When Prime Minister Stephen Harper recently called for a leaner military "as ready to bring disaster relief as to deliver lethal force," grim images of snow shovels and sandbags surely flashed through many a military mind.

From a command perspective, this is a critical worry for an army that saw both its political clout and domestic popularity soar to remarkable heights over the past decade, even after Canadians soured on the Afghan war itself.

Now all that remains is a little-noticed, short-term training role in Afghanistan.

In Ottawa, the political masters have learned that sending ships and a few aircraft, as we did in the overthrow of Libya's Moammar Gadhafi, is a far safer security investment than putting infantry boots on foreign ground.

What's more, the country has had its fill of fighting land wars in far off places.

But the irony in all this is that Canada — with our military's eager blessing — has ditched the alternative international role our soldiers were long renowned for: peacekeeping.

A dirty word

For more than a decade, Canada's top military officers along with staunchly pro-military politicians and a dedicated handful of academics and journalists, battered and besmirched UN peacekeeping to the point that it became a dirty word uttered with a sneer within the Canadian Armed Forces.

"The UN itself couldn't run a one-man race to the outhouse," wrote Canada's super-star general Rick Hillier in his memoirs a few years ago. He's not always that polite on this subject.

I know many officers and military writers who share the view that UN peacekeeping doesn't deserve us.

But to me this looks like a case of that old adage "Be careful what you ask for." Or in this case, what you are too proud to ask for.

My guess is that a few big peacekeeping operations in Africa and perhaps even the Middle East won't look so bad to a generation of young soldiers and junior officers who feel Afghanistan prepared them to face the real challenges of the world.

32 soldiers

The irony, however, is that at a time when the UN is making serious strides to reform and expand peacekeeping, Canada, which largely invented the practice in the 1950s, is noticeably absent, and unless Ottawa has a change of heart, will remain so.

Since the late 1990s the pro-military lobby did such a good job bad-mouthing UN operations that both Liberal and Conservative governments have been only too happy to eviscerate our peacekeeping contributions.

The Harper government in particular treats the UN as an irritating irrelevance at best, to the point that we forget a UN operation like peacekeeping is something we used to be pretty good at, and that helped define us as a country.

In fact, more than 100,000 Canadian military personnel have worn the blue armband abroad over the years, usually with great distinction.

In the 1990s, Canada made up 10 per cent of all peacekeeping troops worldwide with as many as 4,000 soldiers serving at any one time in places like Cyprus, Lebanon, the Golan Heights, the Balkans, Africa and parts of South America and Asia.

Today, as peacekeepers from other countries have quadrupled in just a dozen years (from 20,000 to 95,000) we have shrunk to a near invisible 52nd place, alongside Fiji and Paraguay.

While nations like India, Brazil and the still impoverish Ethiopia are now the main peacekeeping forces in the UN arsenal, Canada's entire 100,000-strong land, sea and air components contribute "less than a school bus-load of Canadian soldiers" in the striking image of the Globe and Mail's Paul Koring.

That's right, only 32 soldiers, according to the latest UN figures. And these are doled out in tiny packets: one in Cyprus, three in the Golan Heights, six in Darfur, and so on.

'Warrior nation'

When it comes to peacekeeping, we can't blame our low effort on the strain of Afghanistan, for some of our allies in that struggle continued to maintain respectable numbers, particularly Britain (278 soldiers), France (916) and Germany (207).

What degraded peacekeeping here was the mindset that used Afghanistan as a way to seek a full revival of a "warrior nation" ethos through support-our-troops campaigns and media messaging that seemed determined to crush all that was allegedly squishy about our past internationalism.

"The damming of peacekeepers became, among the coterie of military historians and fellow travellers in the media, something of a blood sport, and the game in their sights was liberal Canada," writes Noah Richler in his recent polemic What We Talk about When We Talk about War.

Yes, the critics of UN peacekeeping often had real grievances. It can be inefficient, poorly led, and will forever be identified with disasters like Somalia, Rwanda, and Srebrenica.

But only emphasizing the negatives distorts the picture and takes no account of the many successes, from Mozambique to Cyprus and East Timor, that saved countless lives and regional peace.

In fact, countries caught up in civil war have a 50 per cent greater chance of finding lasting peace if peacekeepers are deployed, according to the most detailed study to date, Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents' Choices after Civil War, by Virginia Page Fortna of Columbia University.

Canadians, to their credit, never entirely bought the anti-peacekeeping vitriol that was making the rounds.

Two years ago, pollsters at Nanos Research found 52 per cent of respondents considered peacekeeping the most important role for our military; only 21 per cent saw combat as the priority.

Yes, we do need an army that can handle combat in crisis zones when necessary, but we also need one that can also use the sophisticated, patient and humane skills required for robust peacekeeping in a world that badly requires such help.

The UN very much wants Canada to return. But one can only imagine the embarrassing back-flips our military boosters will have to perform before our current government says it is time we volunteered again for more UN duty.


The criticism of UN peacekeeping that Brian Stewart acknowledges - "It can be inefficient, poorly led, and will forever be identified with disasters like Somalia, Rwanda, and Srebrenica." - are not just symptoms of a problem: they are permanent attributes of the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations. It, DPKO, is not capable of planning, mounting, commanding or controlling any useful sort of military operation and posting in 1,000 well trained people would not even begin to address the issue.

We probably can and, in some cases, should "return to peacekeeping" but not, ever, wearing UN baby blue berets.

The UN must be forced to:

1. Use second and third world nations to do the kinds of peacekeeping which the UN can manage - the kinds of operations in which Canada should always decline to participate; and

2. Subcontract "robust" peacekeeping to a coalition, like ABCA+. (I regard NATO as too big, too bureaucratic and too inefficient to conduct operations properly.)

My ABCA+ would include America, Britain, Canada and Australia but also a couple more Europeans (say the Netherlands and a non-NATO member like Finland) and one African country (South Africa) and three more Asians (China, India and Singapore). It would be informal - no treaty status, at all - but it would have small, permanent, diplomatic (about 10 members) and military staffs (of no more than say 50 officers 25 NCMs) based in North America to facilitate close liaison with the UN and with the US military's logistic base.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: E.R. Campbell on December 11, 2013, 13:44:12
If the CF can't get the money to do everything it would like (or even need) to do as a fully self-sufficient, multi-role military perhaps we need to take a closer look at how we can provide the most bang for our buck with our allies.  When do we deploy on our own?  The rest of the world is going through the same cutbacks that we are so will we just end up with a whole bunch of smaller, less capable allied militaries that can each work less effectively alongside the Americans? 

Maybe if we look at the gaps that exist in the effective deployment of our probable coalition partners (our typical deployment scenario) we could identify some capabilities which we could develop/expand in order to magnify the strengths of our partners.  If our partners have forces to deploy but can't get them there then maybe we could expand our air transport fleet.  More air-to-air refueling or AORs to support allied air/naval deployments.  Specialist units like electronic warfare, counter-battery, CRBN, etc.  I'm not saying that these are the specific capabilities we could/should focus on...just giving some possible examples.

There would of course then have to be a trade-off by decreasing, or possibly even eliminating, other existing capabilities (this is fundamentally about the money after all).  For example, what if we dropped out of the armoured business and relied on our more capable allies to provide that support when required (like some of our allies relied on our tank support in Afghanistan when they didn't have the capability in theatre)?  Where could we put that money in other capabilities that would provide an even larger positive impact on coalition military operations than our relatively small armoured force?  Again...I'm not making that recommendation, just using it as a possible example.

A possible side benefit could also be that some of these capabilities might be more politically sellable to the Canadian public than more traditional military capabilities.  Procuring and deploying support units/equipment is much more politically safe than nasty, warlike thinks like tanks, submarines and stealth fighters. 

Such a policy certainly wouldn't be without risks either.  The world is a very uncertain place and what happens if a situation should arise where we really NEED a particular military capability and don't have it available anymore?  Canadian blood and treasure could certainly be on the line.  There is also the political risk that we wouldn't get credit from our allies for the things we do in the same way as putting "boots on the ground" in a more traditional way.  If we're not seen as useful and helpful then we could lose much of our say at a lot of important tables around the world.  I think such a policy would certainly require a VERY close relationship, cooperation, coordination and interoperability with our closest allies.  We'd need to work hand-in-hand with them so that they're intimately aware of how important OUR role is in their successful fulfillment of THEIR roles. 

Regardless of what we do money for the CF will likely be quite tight for a number of years to come.  Any course of action (or inaction) is going to have impacts on the capabilities of the CF.  The military might wither across the board, waiting for a return of money and a chance to renew in the same basic structure, or it might make some very specific and targeted changes which could see the CF with very different capabilities and structures than it has currently.  Either way I think it's important to have these very basic level discussions so that the government and the CF can be proactive in facing the budget constraints rather than just reacting to them.


And this brings us back to a nine year old thread: Defining Foreign and Defence Policies.

We cannot structure a force, not in any sensible way, much less assign resources to our defence (http://forums.army.ca/forums/index.php/topic,82898.0.html), until we know what we want the military to do.

GR66 suggests, for example, that we might want to discard the capability for unilateral, solo deployments. That's an idea, but upon what is it based?

I see a spectrum of problems for which the military is part of the solution:

<== Very Low Intensity == Low Intensity == Low/Mid Intensity == Mid Intensity == Mid/High Intensity == High Intensity ==>

I can, without stretching my imagination too far, conceive of situations (in the Caribbean, for example) where we might have vital interests that are not shared with any of the major powers but which might convince us to intervene, militarily, into a (Very) Low Intensity situation in order to protect or promote our own interests. That doesn't mean that we should, much less must have a capability for unilateral military action; it does mean that we should decide, after due consideration, to give up that capability, not just slough it off.

The government has expert military advisors. But we, ordinary Canadians, as the NDP would call us, have a right and, indeed, in my opinion, a duty to tell our politicians what strategic objectives we want the Government of Canada to pursue.

I would suggest that any Canadian can develop a "little list" (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1NLV24qTnlg) of tasks (s)he insists our military must be ready and able to perform. Mine would include, but, probably, not be limited to:

     1. Provide the Government of Canada with reliable, expert military advice;

     2. participate in gathering and analyzing strategic, operational and tactical intelligence;

     3. Maintain near real time surveillance (and identification) over Canada's land mass, the waters contiguous to it, and the airspace over both;

     4. Be able to intercept any intruder into the territories, waters and airspace we claim as our own and "deal with" such intruders;

     5. Conduct small scale (less than 5,000 people) unilateral, low intensity military operations when our vital interest require; and

     ---------- After appropriate periods of mobilization and with (perhaps considerable) extra resources ----------

     6. Conduct small and medium scale (less than 15,000 people), mid intensity operations as part of a coalition of like minded nations when our interests are served; and

     7. Conduct large scale (anything from 25,000 to 2.5 million people), high intensity military operations with a coalition that includes our traditional allies in order to restore peace and security.

My first five are what I think the CF should be able to do, day after day, year after year, decade after decade, with a modest, fixed budget - in my view, something akin to 2% of GDP.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: milnews.ca on December 11, 2013, 14:53:36
We cannot structure a force, not in any sensible way, much less assign resources to our defence (http://forums.army.ca/forums/index.php/topic,82898.0.html), until we know what we want the military to do.
QFTT
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Chris Pook on December 11, 2013, 15:38:51
Corollary:

We cannot decide what we want our military to do until we know what we can do with the resources available.

Chicken! Meet Egg.  :)

This 2012 discussion in the UK about the Aussie Beersheba plan emphasises that we are not alone.

http://ukarmedforcescommentary.blogspot.ca/2012/05/australian-army-reform-and-british-army.html

Coupled with the Yankee struggles I think it is fair to say that nobody has a grip on what is possible and how much it costs.  Equally everybody is having to revisit all their planning assumptions.

WW1, WW2 and the Cold War are well behind us now.

Edit: There is going to have to be a period of experimentation akin to the 1930s to determine what is workable and what it costs.
The Aussies, with their ACR (Armoured Cav Regiment) experiments, are in the midst of that experiment just now.

They are trying to balance Abrams, LAVs, M113s and Bushmasters in a single 3 Squadron, 600 man construct.  Canada = Leos, LAVs, TLAVs and TAPVs.

Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: E.R. Campbell on December 11, 2013, 15:58:11
We know about:

     1. The global strategic situation. We know who we have for friends ~ say a dozen countries upon which we can rely, come hell or high water. We know who our current enemies are ~ again a dozen, maybe more, countries, all far away and
         unable, in any conventional military way, to threaten us, but enemies, all the same;

     2. We know about our own interests ~ and they are global and some are in areas which our enemies can reach;

     3. We know about our strategic objectives: oversimplified they are peace and prosperity; and

     4. We know about our resources ~ we are one of the dozen or so richest countries in the world.

We ought to know:

     1. What our (broad and general) foreign policy is ~ what we plan to do about, for, with and, sometimes, to other countries, and why we plan to do those things; and

     2. What sorts of military power we need, and, again why we need it.

I will accept that we cannot assign precise costs to each and every capability we need but as each need (operational requirement) becomes achievable then the costs should become more and more clear.

(The broad outlines of both foreign and defence policy ought to be agreeable to Conservatives and Liberals alike. I can accept that fringes of both the CPC and the LPC will detest the other's polcies but the mainstreams ought to be close ~ if they aren't then I would suggest that one or the other's policy is wrong. I'm not suggesting that there is, or should be unanimity ~ on several issues, there will be difference that are grounded in both principle and domestic politics: Israel and the Middle East, for example, but on the core issues ~ America, China, India, Europe, etc ~ there should be broad, general agreement between the two main Canadian centrist political parties.)

If my parenthetical hopes are true then sensible long term planning ought to be both possible and the norm.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MilEME09 on December 11, 2013, 16:01:28
I don't think the CAF can get any where unless we come up with a clear strategic goal/direction for where we want the forces to go. Without that we are trying to do everything and accomplish nothing, maybe we can see some change as I hear revision is being made to the CFDS but i doubt that would give us a direction to go.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Chris Pook on December 11, 2013, 16:11:34
Quote
It is ill that men should kill one another in seditions, tumults and wars; but it is worse to bring nations to such misery, weakness and baseness
as to have neither strength nor courage to contend for anything; to have nothing left worth defending and to give the name of peace to desolation.
Algernon Sidney in Discourses Concerning Government, (1698)

The ultimate problem is about trying to have a focused conversation about when we, as a nation, are willing to kill people. 

We have the riches to buy the world's biggest robot army (we don't have the people for the world's biggest army).  We can easily afford a 5% of GDP defense policy.  But unless we can say when we are willing to kill people then there is no basis for discussion.

As Rick Hillier said, the job is to kill people.  Under what circumstances will Canadians permit others to be killed?

In the absence of that understanding there is no justification for any of the Combat Arms.

Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: milnews.ca on December 11, 2013, 16:28:15
Corollary:

We cannot decide what we want our military to do until we know what we can do with the resources available.

Chicken! Meet Egg.  :)
Yes and no.

I'm guessing there's more back-and-forth involved, but in theory, you have to know where you want to go before you 1)  figure out if the vehicle you have will get you there and, if not, and 2)  decide how to change it to get you there.

The ultimate problem is about trying to have a focused conversation about when we, as a nation, are willing to kill people. 
Bang on - as critical as ERC's point, but one that voters may be squeamish about discussing (or even considering).
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: comfortablynumb on December 11, 2013, 16:28:48
I don't think we are going to get any clear direction. Too many people have competing ideas of what Canada is, and what it should be. To get all the players to agree on a defence strategy would be next to impossible. Expense claims, six figure salaries, and substantial pensions will be earned, but nothing coherent or consistent will materialize.

As a whole, the nation is unwilling to take the defence of Canada seriously, but we are also too proud to admit it openly. Politicians will pay attention to defence when voters demand it. Voters will only demand it after we have been caught with our pants down, so to speak.

EDIT: And I'd much rather see well thought out Foreign/Defence policies than mindless military spending. I am very much of the mind that we could do FAR more with LESS if we set realistic goals for what we need and are willing to spend.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: UnwiseCritic on December 11, 2013, 20:35:10
I don't think we are going to get any clear direction. Too many people have competing ideas of what Canada is, and what it should be. To get all the players to agree on a defence strategy would be next to impossible. Expense claims, six figure salaries, and substantial pensions will be earned, but nothing coherent or consistent will materialize.

As a whole, the nation is unwilling to take the defence of Canada seriously, but we are also too proud to admit it openly. Politicians will pay attention to defence when voters demand it. Voters will only demand it after we have been caught with our pants down, so to speak.

EDIT: And I'd much rather see well thought out Foreign/Defence policies than mindless military spending. I am very much of the mind that we could do FAR more with LESS if we set realistic goals for what we need and are willing to spend.

I agree completely. Unfortunately the people that can should make the noise serve in a uniform that keeps us from publicly criticizing our government. And as Harper already keeps a tight muzzle on his party. I could only imagine what would happen to a higher up who criticized the conservatives. Or worse it could draw attention to our/Canada's problem and we might not like the outcome as a new defence strategy might be made to appease and gain votes rather than make us effective at properly defending Canada. And perhaps the people in power don't want to put a strong willed individual who stands up for our soldiers. As that is a real thing and if you read about W.Churchill you will see he specifically set up his office to have strong opposition against him so that he would have people looking critically at his ideas. As he learned from some mistakes of his past.

However I remember reading back in the day an article about how members of the Australian army were embarrassed to serve in their uniform as they felt they weren't pulling their weight overseas due to politics. And it seemed to work out for them. And quite frankly I am not  entirely proud to serve in a Canadian uniform. Don't get me wrong I am a proud Canadian and I am happy to be a soldier. And I think highly of our men and women in uniform as we can do what our government asks of us. But I feel they don't really care about us as a military as much as a political tool. And thus they will never "ask" (give real direction) to us in uniform. So how can I as a Canadian soldier strive for a defined goal, rather than be a fish out of water? And wouldn't making some noise about this behind closed doors be the right thing to do to properly serve our COUNTRY. Rather than our government who views us as a way into office. (I know the voters put them there, but ethically speaking I find it to be a grey area)
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Thucydides on December 12, 2013, 11:19:16
The ultimate problem is about trying to have a focused conversation about when we, as a nation, are willing to kill people. 

We have the riches to buy the world's biggest robot army (we don't have the people for the world's biggest army).  We can easily afford a 5% of GDP defense policy.  But unless we can say when we are willing to kill people then there is no basis for discussion.

As Rick Hillier said, the job is to kill people.  Under what circumstances will Canadians permit others to be killed?

In the absence of that understanding there is no justification for any of the Combat Arms.

People will be squeamish about discussing when it is appropriate to kill other people for many good reasons (including our collective cultural background: "Thou Shalt Not Kill" is one of the Ten Commandments, after all). Even I, who supposedly is able to do this for a living, will admit to being a bit squeamish about the idea, although recognizing that at some point people will cross the line and need killing after all.

Perhaps reframing the discussion to "What is worth fighting for?"  might be a better starting point. You could argue this is just semantics (yes, it is), but it also frames the argument in a positive ("what is worth") rather than a negative ("when we are willing to kill people"). It also ties more cloesly to Edward's overall theme on what our "Grand Strategy" should be (Peace and Prosperity), so may be a much better means of focusing on what we want to achieve, which then logically leads to how we hope to achieve this, and what resources we are willing to apply to the effort.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Chris Pook on December 12, 2013, 12:28:08
Squeamishness is the problem in the debate.

If we can't look the question square how can we have a rational debate?

We dance around the question with euphemisms and alternatives:

Peace-making
Peace-keeping
Domestic Ops
Humanitarian Assistance
Sovereignty Patrols

None of those require a gun - much less killing.

None of those require an army.

Worth fighting for?  Nobody dies.  Well played old man. Congratulations on your win.  See down at the club
Worth dying for?  Brave lad.  Died well in a noble cause.  Unfortunately we lost. Not his fault.
Worth killing for?  ......  Crickets.

I propose we start at the bottom:

Would we kill to protect ourselves? 

I know many brave, and honest, individuals that would say no to that.

Would we kill to protect our families? 

That becomes harder and easier.  More people that I have talked to would be willing to kill someone who threatened their loved ones than if they themselves were threatened.

After that things become increasingly murky.

Family? Extended Family? In-Laws? Locals? Provincials? Nationals? Corporate entities? Foreigners? Foreign family? Foreign family killing Canadians in Canada?

Under what circumstances do you react and when do you act?  Do you always let the other guy get the first shot in?

A dear friend of mine drank himself into an early grave wondering if he was the hero he believed his father to be.  The seminal point of his concern was not if he had the courage to fight, or to die but rather to kill and, for him, more problematically, to order others to kill.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: pbi on December 20, 2013, 08:50:12
I've always thought that our biggest problem as a military is not really money, or resources (we usually get those in spades when the Govt of the day decides we need them), but rather that this country has so few strategic imperatives that would allow a very focused defence policy as a "must do".

To take extreme examples to illustrate my point, let's take Israel and South Korea. Their strategic imperatives are very clear: failure to have an effective military would not only be politically unacceptable to any Govt, it might also be suicidal.

Where is this imperative for Canada? The defence of the nation? IMHO, it's impossible to imagine any plausible threat to Canadian security that would not be a threat to North American security and thus to the US. The US will never, could never, allow the security of North America to fail (911 aside...). All Canadians and their govts know this. "Canada First" has, in my opinion, really been more of a useful political slogan than a coherent strategic concept with the associated ends, ways and means.

Expeditionary combat operations? Even less of an imperative. History shows quite clearly that, less a global war, we can pick and choose whether or not we participate, with what degree of force, and for how long. Don't forget that if McKenzie King had been able to have his way, Canada's role in WWII might have been limited to the RCAF. Some nations might get PO'd at us for not playing, but that usually blows over.

Peace support operations? Again, totally discretionary, although they have some moral and emotional suasion power. But, if we have a Govt like the CPC who couldn't really care less about the UN and its antics, then even that suasion counts for little.

So, what's left? Civil defense? No need for a military for that: just form something like the TNHW national civil emergency service that Germany has, and you're set. Public order or internal security? Beef up the RCMP so it's really a "gendarmerie" in more than name only.

What you're left with, IMHO, is using military policy as a political tool to please various regions and voting constituencies, economic partners and allies. And how you actually go about doing that is case-by-case, Govt-by-Govt, which can lead to an apparently disjointed "flavour of the month"-driven defence policy.

In the end, there seems to be very little requirement to have any particular type or configuration of CAF: it's just about having "something in the window" to meet political needs. Cynical? Yes, probably, but I'm trying to think like a politician, which in the end are those who make these decisions.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: daftandbarmy on December 20, 2013, 11:22:28
Like many organizations facing the double trouble of an aging boomer population and equipment 'rust out'/ under investment due to the ongoing and dire financial situation, our biggest issue is basic sustainability.

Peacekeeping? Really? Better ask Baby Boomer Joe of he has his teeth in:
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: milnews.ca on December 20, 2013, 11:32:28
Worth fighting for?  Nobody dies.  Well played old man. Congratulations on your win.  See down at the club
Worth dying for?  Brave lad.  Died well in a noble cause.  Unfortunately we lost. Not his fault.
Worth killing for?  ......  Crickets.
Want yet another level of complexity?  What's worth having your/someone else's son/daughter fight/kill/die for?

I've always thought that our biggest problem as a military is not really money, or resources (we usually get those in spades when the Govt of the day decides we need them), but rather that this country has so few strategic imperatives that would allow a very focused defence policy as a "must do".
:nod:
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Hamish Seggie on December 20, 2013, 11:53:31
Want yet another level of complexity?  What's worth having your/someone else's son/daughter fight/kill/die for?
:nod:

Yes, we do regret our son's death, but he believed in what he was doing and he chose to do it.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: GR66 on December 20, 2013, 12:24:33
I've always thought that our biggest problem as a military is not really money, or resources (we usually get those in spades when the Govt of the day decides we need them), but rather that this country has so few strategic imperatives that would allow a very focused defence policy as a "must do".

To take extreme examples to illustrate my point, let's take Israel and South Korea. Their strategic imperatives are very clear: failure to have an effective military would not only be politically unacceptable to any Govt, it might also be suicidal.

Where is this imperative for Canada? The defence of the nation? IMHO, it's impossible to imagine any plausible threat to Canadian security that would not be a threat to North American security and thus to the US. The US will never, could never, allow the security of North America to fail (911 aside...). All Canadians and their govts know this. "Canada First" has, in my opinion, really been more of a useful political slogan than a coherent strategic concept with the associated ends, ways and means.

Expeditionary combat operations? Even less of an imperative. History shows quite clearly that, less a global war, we can pick and choose whether or not we participate, with what degree of force, and for how long. Don't forget that if McKenzie King had been able to have his way, Canada's role in WWII might have been limited to the RCAF. Some nations might get PO'd at us for not playing, but that usually blows over.

Peace support operations? Again, totally discretionary, although they have some moral and emotional suasion power. But, if we have a Govt like the CPC who couldn't really care less about the UN and its antics, then even that suasion counts for little.

So, what's left? Civil defense? No need for a military for that: just form something like the TNHW national civil emergency service that Germany has, and you're set. Public order or internal security? Beef up the RCMP so it's really a "gendarmerie" in more than name only.

What you're left with, IMHO, is using military policy as a political tool to please various regions and voting constituencies, economic partners and allies. And how you actually go about doing that is case-by-case, Govt-by-Govt, which can lead to an apparently disjointed "flavour of the month"-driven defence policy.

In the end, there seems to be very little requirement to have any particular type or configuration of CAF: it's just about having "something in the window" to meet political needs. Cynical? Yes, probably, but I'm trying to think like a politician, which in the end are those who make these decisions.

While I generally agree with what you've said, I wouldn't discount the "political needs" you describe in the last paragraph.  As a trading nation we are very dependant on our involvement in international agreements, general peace among our major trading partners, and the free flow of goods across the globe. 

While it may not be necessary to do much military "heavy lifting" to directly enforce our national interests, it IS necessary to at the very least show we are pulling our weight with our allies in order to win a seat at the table when decisions are being made that WILL have significant impacts on our economy.

Many of our key partners in our own prosperity DO have real security concerns for their national interests both at home and overseas for which they will expect our support in order to "keep in their good books".  If those partners begin to see us as a nation that just reaps the benefits of their own efforts with no sacrifice of our own then we WILL pay a price for that.  The price may not be obvious, but don't doubt that there will be a price paid.

As far as "National Defence" goes, I agree that we don't have to fear enemy armoured divisions rolling across the prairies or paratroops floating in the skies over Ottawa, but there ARE threats to North America (and the US in particular).  911 showed how asymmetrical attacks can have huge economic impacts.  Missiles from rogue states in desperate situations can fly across our territory.  Disruption of our energy flows to the US can be a threat to the US, etc. 

If the US ever thinks that our own weakness and inability to protect their northern flank from these kinds of threats is putting them at significant risk then we will have big problems.  The US as a "partner" isn't always an easy thing to live with...but the US as a distrustful neighbour will put up the kinds of fences that will seriously hurt our national interests (i.e. our pocketbooks).  Our very sovereignty would also face pressures as the US takes matters into its own hands in order to secure its perimeter.  The US is the ONLY country we need to worry about having the capability to invade us.  Much better to make sure they have no national interest in doing so rather than having to try and defend against the possibility.

The CF may indeed be much more of a political tool than the militaries of most other countries throughout history and we may not really "need" much military strength in order to defend ourselves in the traditional sense, however it IS still an important tool.  The problem is that none of our political leaders are willing to explain that to the public so that we can have the military we need to fulfill those political needs.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MCG on January 11, 2016, 19:31:28
Some thoughts on where defence policy needs to go.  I like the idea of something that won't flop around substantially with each government change, but that might be a lot to ask for in Canada.

Quote
Changing the politics around Canadian defence policy
There is a clear desire to step back from the hyper-partisanship of the recent past and find more collegial approaches.
Charles Davies
Embassy News
Published: Friday, 01/08/2016 12:00 am EST
Last Updated: Friday, 01/08/2016 9:44 am EST

And so it goes. Yet another election where half-considered political commitments to change course in Canada’s defence policy, made in the heat of battle, stare a new government in the face.

This time it is the Liberal promise to exit the F-35 program. In 2006, it was the Conservative plan to create new units all over the country, regardless of whether they were needed or could be afforded. In 1993, it was the disastrous cancellation of the New Shipborne Helicopter project. In 1984 it was the Mulroney Conservatives’ wildly ambitious and unaffordable defence expansion that included a nuclear submarine fleet.
 
Sometimes, as with the submarine idea, the government is eventually forced into an embarrassing about-face. In other cases, the more troublesome commitments are stalled and eventually quietly buried. Occasionally, however, the new government sticks to its guns and implements the promise, like the Chrétien Liberals in 1993. Which model the Trudeau Liberals will follow remains to be seen, but no matter what there will be a cost to the nation.
 
Defence policy is not about what missions a government assigns to its military—that is a matter of foreign or national security policy. Defence policy is about what defence capabilities Canada will acquire, maintain or divest, and how they will be resourced. Modern defence capabilities take years or even decades to build, so the military options available to the new Liberal government to respond to domestic and global events were decided by past governments, and future governments will have their options defined by this one.
 
Consequently, governments don’t own defence policy the way they do foreign policy. Rather, they are stewards of it, and Canadian governments of all stripes have not been very good at stewardship, to the nation’s cost.
 
Sometimes the costs are publicly acknowledged, such as the $500 million spent to cancel the New Shipborne Helicopter contract. Normally, however, they remain hidden. The enormous diversion of resources within the government, and even allied nations, to develop implementation plans for the Mulroney Conservatives’ defence ambitions was never catalogued or admitted.
 
Either way, these national flip-flops represented a real waste of resources that further eroded the level of military capabilities the country could afford, and the nation’s capacity to defend its interests and contribute substantively to international security challenges.
 
It doesn’t need to be this way. Other countries, including Australia, the United States and most of our European allies, do a much better job ensuring that a change in administration does not mean a costly redirection in defence policy. They do this by reducing political partisanship and recognizing that defence resources need to be efficiently applied, over the long term, to the task of turning bucks into bang.

Mechanisms such as legally-mandated cyclical policy reviews every four or five years, done within a non-partisan (or at least multi-partisan) political framework, establish a political dynamic that provides greater consistency than we see in Canada. This is not to say that politics is completely removed from the process, but they have found ways to do it smarter.
 
The new 42nd Parliament has an opportunity to begin changing the political dynamics around Canadian defence policy. There is a clear desire to step back from the hyper-partisanship of the recent past and find more collegial approaches to conducting the nation’s business. Defence would be a very fruitful place for Parliamentarians to start.
 
A more inclusive political approach would at least provide all parties with better insight into the operational, technical, financial, political and other aspects of defence capability investments being considered. This should help them more carefully think through their future election commitments, or even better, warn them away from the politically risky defence policy area completely. After all, elections in Canada are rarely won or lost on defence issues.
 
The best outcome for Canadians would be a stronger, more stable national political consensus around defence policy: the military capabilities the nation requires to defend its sovereignty and contribute to global peace and security, and the resources it needs to allocate to acquiring and sustaining them. This may be a bridge too far in the short term, but is something we need Parliament to reach for.
   
http://www.embassynews.ca/2016/01/13/changing-the-politics-around-canadian-defence-policy/48061
Title: Re: Cutting the CF/DND HQ bloat - Excess CF Sr Leadership, Public Servants and Contractors
Post by: Remius on January 13, 2016, 12:25:07
This looks promising if it follows through....

http://www.embassynews.ca/news/2016/01/13/defence-minister-military-review-to-be-completed-by-end-of-2016/48092

Title: Re: Re: Cutting the CF/DND HQ bloat - Excess CF Sr Leadership, Public Servants and Contractors
Post by: Journeyman on January 13, 2016, 14:02:22
This looks promising if it follows through....

http://www.embassynews.ca/news/2016/01/13/defence-minister-military-review-to-be-completed-by-end-of-2016/48092
Quote
Defence minister: Military review to be completed by end of 2016

Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan says he plans to complete a thorough defence policy review by the end of 2016—and the public will be asked to participate.
Great, the informed wisdom of the CBC Comment section. :stars:
 

Quote
“And as the economy improves, we can look at adjusting things as well,” he added.
I'm guessing he didn't read this post (http://army.ca/forums/index.php/topic,20359.msg1410958.html#msg1410958) on investment banks' concerns that "the new, Liberal government will press ahead too many unnecessary, unproductive stimulus projects and too few of the kind that might, actually, help."  Oh well.
Title: Re: Re: Cutting the CF/DND HQ bloat - Excess CF Sr Leadership, Public Servants and Contractors
Post by: Eye In The Sky on January 13, 2016, 14:31:49
I think I'd rather have input from Tickle Me Elmo (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2wf9lREtLvU) than the average citizen on anything military related.   :2c:

I have never heard the term 'foreign allies' before.  Must be a new buzzterm in Upper Canada.

Title: Re: Re: Cutting the CF/DND HQ bloat - Excess CF Sr Leadership, Public Servants and Contractors
Post by: Remius on January 13, 2016, 15:09:11
Well there was also teh statement that some areas cannot promote growth.  Hopefully this means cutting those reserve unit that struggle to recruit and maintain adequate numbers and beef up those that can.
Title: Is it time for a new WHITE PAPER on Defence ?
Post by: George Wallace on January 16, 2016, 13:45:18
Legion Magazine has produced an article questioning whether it is time for a new White Paper on Defence, or to implement LGen Leslie's Report on Transformation 2011.  They question what direction the Trudeau Government intends to go.

Reproduced under the Fair Dealings provisions of the Copyright Act.

Quote
Time for a new defence White Paper (http://hhttps://legionmagazine.com/en/2016/01/time-for-a-new-defence-white-paper/)
January 14, 2016 by David J. Bercuson

The defence platform of the newly elected Liberal government was not extensive and in part vague, as other parties’ election promises were. But there were two promises the Liberals made that require a closer look.

The first of these was the promise that the Report on Transformation 2011, written by a team headed by Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie in 2010, would be implemented. The second was a pledge to strengthen Canada’s navy in a number of specific ways with new ships and specific missions. The transformation report was prepared and written just after Leslie had stepped down from command of the army and before he retired from the Canadian Armed Forces. He is now a Liberal MP, elected on Oct. 19.

It is a very thorough document in which Leslie and his team examined military headquarters of all the services, particularly at National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa, and in great detail showed how the military side of the defence bureaucracy had ballooned in the previous 10 years, while at the same time the cutting edge of Canada’s three services had basically remained the same size. (Leslie was prohibited from examining the civilian side of the Department of National Defence.)

One of the main recommendations of this complex document was that the ranks of contractors and other experts hired by the military—almost all of them in Ottawa—had become inexplicably large and ought to be cut back drastically. A second was that the Canadian Armed Forces, and especially the army, cut the ranks of Class B reservists wherever possible and increase the ranks of Class A reservists by about 6,000, and that the savings from cutbacks essentially be shifted to the then drastically under-enrolled navy. (It still is, though not as badly.) Leslie also recommended that the major changes in the command structure introduced under Chief of Defence Staff Rick Hillier be significantly modified and simplified.

Some of Leslie’s recommendations have been implemented in the nearly five years since the report was issued. There are far fewer Class B reservists today than there were then. (Class B reservists are reservists employed on a full-time basis. Class A reservists are true part-time soldiers parading at their armouries possibly two times a week and training for several weeks during the summer). The army tends to see Class A reservists’ major role being to augment the Regular Force, but with from six months to a year of additional training before deployment. They constituted 10 to 20 per cent of the soldiers Canada sent to Afghanistan.

Canada has too much “tail” for too few “teeth.”

These recommendations were controversial when first released in 2011 and much of the report is still controversial today, although there is a hard kernel of truth in the observation that Canada has too much “tail” for too few “teeth.”

The problem with the Liberal government’s commitment to follow through on the full transformation report is that it has also pledged to conduct a review of Canadian defence policy. It will be the first since the Canada First Defence Strategy of 2008, which was more of a procurement strategy than a strategic policy and is now almost completely obsolete. So, Canada most certainly does need a new defence White Paper, but even if such an undertaking was a high government priority for Trudeau’s team, a decent policy review could take at least a year to produce and months more to actually implement. The same problem exists for the naval expansion.

What will no doubt happen, therefore, is that the Tory shipbuilding strategy will move forward, the complete replenishment of the remainder of the Halifax fleet will be completed and the implementation of the transformation report will be caught up in the new defence review process.

In the meantime, the Trudeau team will look about desperately for a United Nations peacekeeping mission suitable for deploying Canadian troops. It will find precious few that the CDS and service chiefs will not resist, due to inherent danger to Canadian troops, lack of effective UN command, and lack of the sophisticated support elements that only the United States can supply (as we learned in Afghanistan).

Election promises are always easy to make, much harder to keep.



More on LINK (https://legionmagazine.com/en/2016/01/time-for-a-new-defence-white-paper/).


- See more at: https://legionmagazine.com/en/2016/01/time-for-a-new-defence-white-paper/#sthash.W52Sm8R9.VwxwV9xQ.dpuf
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Target Up on January 17, 2016, 01:29:12
Oooo, a White Paper, that'll fix everything, just like the last one(s).
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: E.R. Campbell on January 17, 2016, 07:37:23
Oooo, a White Paper, that'll fix everything, just like the last one(s).


:goodpost:

You got it, Kat. Without a clear commitment to doing something for some good, pressing reason, White Papers (and green ones and the "grey literature" that precede them, too) do nothing except make the authors feel good ~ see e.g. Jennifer Welsh, the author of Paul Martin's White Paper, "A Role of Pride and influence in the World."

The government, and in fairness to them they need to have some "national will" behind them, needs to have a problem that needs addressing. For this Liberal government the only defence problem is the same as the one the Conservatives had: "How do we get some new "toys for the boys" (that's how I think Betts and Telford see it) without both breaking the bank and getting a boat load of bad press because defence procurement in all screwed up?" This government doesn't have a strategic vision and there is no existential threat to Canada's security so any White Paper is most likely going to be an exercise in bureaucratic/academic mutual masturbation.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: milnews.ca on January 17, 2016, 08:45:58
This government doesn't have a strategic vision and there is no existential threat to Canada's security so any White Paper is most likely going to be an exercise in bureaucratic/academic mutual masturbation.
Bang on!
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: GR66 on January 17, 2016, 10:48:35


:goodpost:

You got it, Kat. Without a clear commitment to doing something for some good, pressing reason, White Papers (and green ones and the "grey literature" that precede them, too) do nothing except make the authors feel good ~ see e.g. Jennifer Welsh, the author of Paul Martin's White Paper, "A Role of Pride and influence in the World."

The government, and in fairness to them they need to have some "national will" behind them, needs to have a problem that needs addressing. For this Liberal government the only defence problem is the same as the one the Conservatives had: "How do we get some new "toys for the boys" (that's how I think Betts and Telford see it) without both breaking the bank and getting a boat load of bad press because defence procurement in all screwed up?" This government doesn't have a strategic vision and there is no existential threat to Canada's security so any White Paper is most likely going to be an exercise in bureaucratic/academic mutual masturbation.

True, and I'm as skeptical as anyone else here that there will be any true, actionable "vision" in either White Paper.  However, it IS the important first step that many of us here have been asking for in order to become the foundation on which any further discussions on the organization and equipping of the CF must be based.

Maybe we'll be lucky and people with some real input like Mr. Cudmore who have been on these forums will see the real underlying issues facing the CF and also see the real opportunity that  meaningful Foreign Policy and Defence White Papers present in developing long-term and effective change in our military.

...or maybe they'll be the same as every other government in the last half century...

Holding my LottoMax ticket in my crossed fingers.  Neither are likely to work out for me but I can dream can't I?


Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: George Wallace on January 17, 2016, 10:58:17


Holding my LottoMax ticket in my crossed fingers.  Neither are likely to work out for me but I can dream can't I?

Well.  If you don't have a ticket, you can't win.

Does that not apply towards a White Paper or Foreign Policy as well?  We are going nowhere fast with no direction.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Old Sweat on January 17, 2016, 11:21:26
Since we all are opining, which is an academic word for guessing, it's my turn based on having lived through several going all the way back to Hellyer's 1964 attempt to blaze a brave, new trail.

Given that this one will be crafted by the Liberals, look for statements like "There is no obvious level of defence spending" and declarations that security for Canadians comes from social programmes and a wide, inclusive umbrella. The actual body will be wide and mushy enough that it actually commits to nothing in terms of national resolve while making all sorts of noises about bilateralism through the United Nations. And of course climate change will be worth a paragraph or two, as probably will be terrorism along with an "it's not really Islam's fault" and maybe some pictures of JT greeting refugees.

In short, a commitment to the status quo, whatever that is at the time.

Modify to add: Back to the days of demanding a seat at the table and then going to the washroom when the bill arrives. A tip of the hat to John Manley and Edward who also made the point.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: George Wallace on January 17, 2016, 11:25:40
......... And of course climate change will be worth a paragraph or two, .......

Shades of "cleaning up the DEW and Pine Tree Lines.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: George Wallace on January 17, 2016, 13:28:18
Anyone got a copy of this book: "In Retreat: The Canadian Forces in the Trudeau Years" ?

http://www.amazon.ca/In-Retreat-Canadian-Forces-Trudeau/dp/0888790074

by Gerald Porter, 1978.


Publisher: Deneau; First Edition edition (1978)
Language: English
ISBN-10: 0888790074
ISBN-13: 978-0888790071


Just wondering what his synopsis was and if he had any proposals as to where to go?
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Chris Pook on January 17, 2016, 15:45:10
Still got my original edition.  I'll see if I can find it.  I can't remember the conclusions.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MCG on January 18, 2016, 00:42:58
There is lots of idea mining that could be done of this site to get a half decent start on a new defence policy. 

Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: milnews.ca on January 18, 2016, 07:58:03
Anyone got a copy of this book: "In Retreat: The Canadian Forces in the Trudeau Years" ?

http://www.amazon.ca/In-Retreat-Canadian-Forces-Trudeau/dp/0888790074

by Gerald Porter, 1978.


Publisher: Deneau; First Edition edition (1978)
Language: English
ISBN-10: 0888790074
ISBN-13: 978-0888790071


Just wondering what his synopsis was and if he had any proposals as to where to go?
I would be interesting to hear what's there, but let's also remember this isn't 1978 - VERY different environment, both in the CAF and outside threatening the world.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Journeyman on January 18, 2016, 09:12:07
There is lots of idea mining that could be done of this site....
...including going back to page 1 of this thread and reading for continuities, a decade + later.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Old Sweat on January 18, 2016, 09:50:47
I probably need more coffee (it's 0639 here in Arizona) but I see a time-dishonoured Canadian tradition of ignoring threats (the 1950's were an exception) and hoping for the best. Just for fun, consider how dismally we performed against the Fenians. In this case there was plenty of advanced warning that the Fenians were going to invade, but virtually no preparations were made and we suffered humiliating defeats at the (two) Battle(s) of Ridgeway on 2 June 1866.

Did we take heed of the lessons? No!

Frankly we were lucky that we weren't faced with enemies like the Comanches or the Zulus and more than lucky that the Americans chose to seek manifest destiny to the west and south, not north.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Journeyman on January 18, 2016, 09:57:18
....consider how dismally we performed against the Fenians.
Wow, you are  old.    :pop:
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Old Sweat on January 18, 2016, 10:00:38
Wow, you are  old.    :pop:

Indeed!  :cheers:
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Humphrey Bogart on January 18, 2016, 10:02:26
I probably need more coffee (it's 0639 here in Arizona) but I see a time-dishonoured Canadian tradition of ignoring threats (the 1950's were an exception) and hoping for the best. Just for fun, consider how dismally we performed against the Fenians. In this case there was plenty of advanced warning that the Fenians were going to invade, but virtually no preparations were made and we suffered humiliating defeats at the (two) Battle(s) of Ridgeway on 2 June 1866.

Did we take heed of the lessons? No!

Frankly we were lucky that we weren't faced with enemies like the Comanches or the Zulus and more than lucky that the Americans chose to seek manifest destiny to the west and south, not north.

Some things never change, GAFF for national defence being one of them.  I don't imagine this is going to change anytime soon, unless something very serious happens.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jollyjacktar on January 18, 2016, 11:09:35
And even then with the present administration in power.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Chris Pook on January 18, 2016, 14:48:11
Anyone got a copy of this book: "In Retreat: The Canadian Forces in the Trudeau Years" ?

http://www.amazon.ca/In-Retreat-Canadian-Forces-Trudeau/dp/0888790074

by Gerald Porter, 1978.


Publisher: Deneau; First Edition edition (1978)
Language: English
ISBN-10: 0888790074
ISBN-13: 978-0888790071


Just wondering what his synopsis was and if he had any proposals as to where to go?


"The Trudeau decade has been a difficult one for Canada'a military personnel.  After the shock of unification had worn off, they believed service life would return to its orderly peacetime pace.  But Trudeau made life in the forces more confusing and disruptive as reorganization and counter-reorganization became the rule instead of the exception.  Nobody seemed to know what was going on, least of all Trudeau.  The troops were marching in a fog without map or compass,  the commander in the distance shouting orders and counter-orders, changing direction as often as the wind. By the time the rear guard had caught up, they were out of step again or going in the wrong direction.

"Did Trudeau know where he was going?  After several tiresome years of marching in circles his own generals concluded he did not.  Worse, the troops sensed that their own leader did not much care about them, no matter how hard or how long they worked to get the job done.  Morale in the forces has become a serious problem, one which gets worse with each reorganization or policy shift.

"Trudeau's defence policies have been paradoxical, much like the man himself.  He is an avowed pacifist, yet he did not hesitate to call the Army into the streets during the October Crisis of 1970. His famous "just watch me" reply when asked how far he was prepared to go to maintain law and order under the War Measures Act showed he understood - and was prepared to use - military power to preserve the peace, regardless of his personal convictions. In an attempt to understand why Trudeau has run the forces down to their present emaciated state, it is worth examining where the military fits within his political vision and how that vision has manifested itself in defence policies and government priorities.

"Throughout his tenure in the East Block, Trudeau has shown a strange misunderstanding, some say contempt, for Canada's armed forces.  Few people would suggest that war is ever desirable, yet most realize there comes a time when a nation must defend itself against blind aggression or perish.  Trudeau apparently failed to make such a distinction during the Second World War.  He did not "join up" like many other young men of his age, preferring instead to continue his university education.  During the 1968 leadership campaign that, like many other Quebeckers, he had been taught to "keep away from imperialistic wars".

"It is Trudeau's apparent misunderstanding about the true nature of the Second World War and the Allies life and death struggle against Nazi Germany which leaves his own generals puzzled. They believe that he either does not understand the role of the military in a free society or just does not like them.  In any event, they continue to view each other coolly from a distance."

197 pages later

"Today, after a decade of Trudeau's mismanagement of the armed forces, Canada stands on the brink of the 1980s as a defenceless nation increasingly dependent on the goodwill and protection of better-equipped allies.  As a peace loving country Canada does not desire to have a large and powerful military machine, but it does require a realistic one.  It needs armed forces strong enough to defend the nation and to contribute a fair share to collective defence, particularly in these perilous times.  Unfortunately, it no longer has them.  The Canadian Forces, beaten back by successive volleys of crippling defence policies, are clearly in retreat.

"Only Canadians can decide whether their armed forces will be strong enough to meet the challenges of the future, or if they will continue to decline in military capability.  That decision must be made soon because time is running out."

The end.

My comments:

After this book came out Joe Clark was elected Prime Minister for a few months and the Trudeau was returned to power for another four years.

In fairness it has to be said that Trudeau supplied materiel support to the CF.  He bought Hueys, Kiowas, Chinooks, Auroras, Hornets, Grizzlies, Cougars, Huskies, Leopards and Tribals and laid the ground work for the Halifaxes.

The biggest hit against him is on the personnel and policy side.  He didn't understand soldiers or soldiering.  Just like he didn't understand farmers, ranchers, oilmen, Quebeckers or any other myriads of others he managed to aggravate.

He was a seminarian and a university boy who grew up in a bubble from which he never escaped.


Title: Liberals should shrink defence spending, analysts urge
Post by: Sheep Dog AT on January 21, 2016, 11:26:41
http://www.msn.com/en-ca/news/canada/liberals-should-shrink-defence-spending-analysts-urge/ar-BBowsHv?li=AAggv0m
Title: Re: Liberals should shrink defence spending, analysts urge
Post by: FSTO on January 21, 2016, 12:20:24
This part here is an easy fix.

“Generals once entrusted to lead soldiers in Afghan combat now need ministerial approval to offer a visiting counterpart a glass of wine. The deputy minister, accountable for $19-billion a year in spending and well over $100-billion in defence investments, must authorize the juice and muffins if his subordinates hold a conference.”

We pay these folks a lot of money to make decisions and then we saddle them with this penny pinching dung?
Title: Re: Liberals should shrink defence spending, analysts urge
Post by: Remius on January 21, 2016, 12:23:40
http://www.msn.com/en-ca/news/canada/liberals-should-shrink-defence-spending-analysts-urge/ar-BBowsHv?li=AAggv0m

This last paragraph in the article :  “Generals once entrusted to lead soldiers in Afghan combat now need ministerial approval to offer a visiting counterpart a glass of wine. The deputy minister, accountable for $19-billion a year in spending and well over $100-billion in defence investments, must authorize the juice and muffins if his subordinates hold a conference.”
Title: Re: Liberals should shrink defence spending, analysts urge
Post by: Old Sweat on January 21, 2016, 12:32:07
The headline doesn't match the story, which talks about rebalancing the budget by reducing personnel to free up money for the capital budget. Or did I miss so something?
Title: Re: Liberals should shrink defence spending, analysts urge
Post by: George Wallace on January 21, 2016, 12:39:44
I read it much the same way and am wondering why we would have the "guns" but no one qualified to shoot them?
Title: Re: Liberals should shrink defence spending, analysts urge
Post by: Humphrey Bogart on January 21, 2016, 12:42:04
I don't think we should spend any less on Defence then we already do.  What I do think we need to do is cut personnel costs so we can repurpose that money toward equipment and infrastructure. 

I think Rick Hillier was on point when he said in the Fall of 2013 that we just "can't get around cuts to personnel"

http://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/canada-just-can-t-get-around-army-cuts-hillier-says-1.1467584 (http://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/canada-just-can-t-get-around-army-cuts-hillier-says-1.1467584)

I'd like Canada to follow the Australian lead of having a smaller but better equipped military.  The Australian's have a Defence Budget of over A$32 Billion (22 Billion US) but only have around 58,000 all ranks in the Regular Force.  By comparison, Canada spent C$18 Billion (12.5 Billion US) but have a Force of officially 68,000 all ranks in the Regular Force (In reality it's probably around 65,000).

So Australia has nearly 10,000 less personnel then we do but has a Defence Budget that in US Dollars, is almost double what ours is.  Obviously, the Australian Defence and Security situation is a little different than ours so we probably don't need to spend what they spend but we should definitely look at reducing our personnel costs to reflect our equipment and infrastructure situation.
Title: Re: Liberals should shrink defence spending, analysts urge
Post by: jmt18325 on January 21, 2016, 12:48:12
Half of the Australian defence budget goes to killing scary looking spiders anyway, I'd imagine.
Title: Re: Liberals should shrink defence spending, analysts urge
Post by: George Wallace on January 21, 2016, 13:36:43

I'd like Canada to follow the Australian lead of having a smaller but better equipped military.  The Australian's have a Defence Budget of over A$32 Billion (22 Billion US) but only have around 58,000 all ranks in the Regular Force.  By comparison, Canada spent C$18 Billion (12.5 Billion US) but have a Force of officially 68,000 all ranks in the Regular Force (In reality it's probably around 65,000).

So Australia has nearly 10,000 less personnel then we do but has a Defence Budget that in US Dollars, is almost double what ours is.  Obviously, the Australian Defence and Security situation is a little different than ours so we probably don't need to spend what they spend but we should definitely look at reducing our personnel costs to reflect our equipment and infrastructure situation.

So?  Would you propose then that we make some cuts such as to SAR?  That the Government contract out the SAR role to civilian or other Government Departments (NOT DND) to provide SAR to both Atlantic and Pacific Coasts, the Arctic and then the Provinces?  Have the Government apply the same medical and dental services to the CAF as it does to the RCMP and Public Service and do away with the CAF Health Care Services?  Privatize the role played by MSE Ops?  Privatize the Supply System?
Title: Re: Liberals should shrink defence spending, analysts urge
Post by: Humphrey Bogart on January 21, 2016, 13:53:32
So?  Would you propose then that we make some cuts such as to SAR?  That the Government contract out the SAR role to civilian or other Government Departments (NOT DND) to provide SAR to both Atlantic and Pacific Coasts, the Arctic and then the Provinces?  Have the Government apply the same medical and dental services to the CAF as it does to the RCMP and Public Service and do away with the CAF Health Care Services?  Privatize the role played by MSE Ops?  Privatize the Supply System?

Nope, the answer is to cut the number of officers we employ and also cut/amalgamate units and formations,  Our military is too top heavy and we've got paper Divisions, Brigades, Wings, etc...

We most certainly don't need 9 infantry Battalions and we also don't need 3 Armoured Regiments.  Our Regimental/Corps system used to be our biggest strength but it's probably become our biggest weakness.

In reality, we've got a paper military with a whole whack of people that are underemployed and spend far too much time feeding the bureaucracy rather then doing what they've been trained to do.  Of course, we need some level of bureaucracy but our bureaucracy has become more important than the field force it's supposed to support.

Our desire for symmetry in an asymmetrical world also makes zero sense.  To quote General Day in the interview he gave to Embassy News:

Quote
I would argue, as a consequence of the changing threat vector, as a consequence of climate change, as a consequence of the proliferation of IT capabilities, that building more of a force structure that looks remarkably like what we had in the ‘90s and the 2000s will serve us very poorly come 2020, 2030, 2040. My worry is that we’ll look at doing more of the same but making it more modern and more capable—and, I would argue, more irrelevant as a consequence.

http://www.embassynews.ca/news/2016/01/20/A-conversation-with-a-former-commander-of-Canadas-special-forces/48105 (http://www.embassynews.ca/news/2016/01/20/A-conversation-with-a-former-commander-of-Canadas-special-forces/48105)
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MCG on January 21, 2016, 13:57:41
A couple things in the Globe and Mail on this today.  The suggestions don't seem that bad.  Cut fat to reinvest where needed, don't micromanage insignificant details away from commanders who are trusted with the lives of service members, provide enough money, and don't over promise. 

Quote
Deal of the century: Trudeau’s defence review will reverberate for decades
GEORGE PETROLEKAS and DAVE PERRY
Contributed to The Globe and Mail
21 Jan 2016

There has not been a full, cohesive and transparent defence review in Canada since the 1994 Defence White Paper. The Liberal government has promised to deliver one by the end of the year.

Given the decades required to develop and then use military capabilities, no other government review will be as consequential or long-lasting, given the size and breadth of National Defence. If history is any guide, equipment choices alone will affect defence until the turn of the next century. Given how many future governments the review affects, this exercise must become a national effort.

The Trudeau government inherited a military funded at $19.1-billion a year or 1 per cent of GDP – far below NATO’s target of 2 per cent of GDP – for 68,000 regular troops and 27,000 reservists.

The previous government’s defence strategy had many initiatives to commend it, but its proposed investments outstripped the supply of available funding by tens of billions of dollars. At its most basic level, defence strategy must be in alignment with the budget. Reducing the size of the Canadian Forces to liberate funds for capital spending should be on the table, but should also be examined as part of a broader review of the appropriate size of the entire defence apparatus, including civil servants and contractors.

As a starting point, the government must articulate in greater detail Canada’s role in the world and how defence fits into that effort. The world is increasingly shifting toward multipolarity, with less American engagement. Add in Russia’s new assertiveness, China’s rising-power status and Middle East instability, and our traditional thinking on global security is now being challenged. Natural disasters, narco-violence, population displacements from conflict, resource scarcity and economic disparity create international human security and humanitarian issues that are no less demanding or complex.

In truth, there are more threats in the world than we could ever afford to address with our military and diplomatic or aid initiatives. For Canada, defining that which we must do independently and what we can only achieve with allies will, in part, dictate the capabilities we require.

Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan must consult widely outside the department to seek innovative solutions. Visiting our allies also affords an opportunity to see how they build ships, procure equipment, develop strategy and manage crises. Briefings cannot supplant first-hand observations.

In the short term however, the reality is the government will be constrained by legacy decisions. Many procurements are already contracted, or soon will be. Major adjustments to ongoing procurement plans will be difficult without imposing new delays. Any palpable improvement to military capability will only be realized if a sclerotic procurement process is transformed. Ad-hoc secretariats, layers of review boards and byzantine financial gateways provide political cover instead of effective procurement.

The government must also clarify its vision on industrial policy and how it intersects with defence spending. For example, the national shipbuilding strategy is also an industrial development and jobs creation strategy, in addition to a defence procurement. If there are premiums to be paid to fund the former, does that mean we will have less defence, or will the government ensure defence requirements remain top of mind.

Beyond procurement, rampant inefficiencies in administration need review. The deputy minister, who oversees billions of dollars in capital programs, also signs off on budgets authorizing subordinates to serve coffee, juice and muffins at a conference. The optics of accountability have overtaken the efficiency of management.


George Petrolekas served with the military in Bosnia, Afghanistan and NATO and was an adviser to senior NATO commanders and is a fellow with the Canadian Global Affairs Institute. Dave Perry is the senior defence analyst at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute. Together, they published an open letter to the Minister of National Defence
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/deal-of-the-century-trudeaus-defence-review-will-reverberate-for-decades/article28309381/

Quote
Reduce military staffing to help fund acquisitions, analysts urge Liberals
An open letter from two leading defence analysts at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute urges Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan to try to build a national consensus as the Forces plan for new ships and planes that will affect this country’s military capabilities for as long as 70 years into the future
Steven Chase
The Globe and Mail
21 Jan 2016

Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan is being urged to significantly shrink plans for the next generation of military hardware in order to meet budget constraints and to consider cutting the size of the Armed Forces to free up more money for capital acquisitions.

An open letter from two leading defence analysts at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute urges Mr. Sajjan to try to build a national consensus as the Forces plan for new ships and planes that will affect this country’s military capabilities for as long as 70 years into the future.
 
Retired colonel George Petrolekas, a fellow at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, and senior analyst David Perry are offering the defence minister tips to achieve the “leaner, more agile, better-equipped military” the Trudeau government promised in its December Speech from the Throne.

They say the Canada First Defence Strategy mapped out by the former Conservative government is hopelessly underfunded. The annual defence budget now exceeds $20-billion per year and automatic yearly increases already programmed into the fiscal framework will shortly hit 3 per cent. But even this budget track, backed by all three major parties, is not enough.

“Proposed investments dictated by the existing strategy, crafted in 2008, outstrip the supply of available funding by tens of billions of dollars,” they write.

“As you update the strategy to account for new priorities and potential threats, the funding pressures are likely to intensify.”

They warned Mr. Sajjan not to overpromise like the previous government. “Avoid that trap. As a government you will be criticized for being unable to deliver your promises, and your armed forces will feel as if they have been misled.”

The analysts urge the minister to rebuild the public affairs team at the Department of National Defence to the level it reached during the Afghanistan war so that the ministry can properly engage Canadians to help build a national consensus on what the military should look like in an era where American dominance is waning.

“Greater consensus can help make sense of global complexities. … Russia is no longer the partner it recently was, and its new assertiveness gives us reason to reassess how we defend North America. China’s economic and military power continues to grow,” they say.

“In North Africa and the Middle East the recent promise of an Arab Spring has morphed into a patchwork of regional instability led in principle by the Islamic State and its franchises using terrorism locally and abroad from a territorial base in failed states.”

Canada needs to improve its sclerotic military purchasing system, the Canadian Global Affairs Institute authors say – and could learn from its allies as it restructures its defence capability.

“Think outside the box and consult widely and often outside the department. Your government has indicated it welcomes the best advice available, and the greatest innovations will come from without, not within. Many of our allies have used exactly this type of outside perspective on their defence reviews,” they write.

The way forward could include a smaller military. “You also inherited a military funded for 68,000 regular troops and 27,000 reservists. Shrinking the military to liberate funds for capital spending should be investigated, so long as key personnel skills are retained and any capability reductions carefully considered.”

The biggest problem ahead is the massive shipbuilding effort to renew the Royal Canadian Navy.

“The most significant, complex and pressing example you face is with shipbuilding – which is not simply a defence procurement but also a matter of industrial policy, employment and regional benefits,” Mr. Petrolekas and Mr. Perry write.

“Critical decisions must be made in the next year on projects which will recapitalize the navy’s combat fleets. You must specify how many and what type of ships will be built, who will design them and integrate their combat systems.”

The next generation of fighter jets – an issue which bedevilled the former Conservative government – is another huge decision for the Liberals who have promised to keep the controversial F-35 fighter-bomber out of contention.

Some projects are too far along to significantly recast. “Many procurements are already in contract, like the Arctic Offshore Patrol Ship, or soon will be, like the Fixed Wing Search and Rescue Aircraft. Marginal changes are possible, but as you discovered with the interim naval oiler project, whole scale adjustments in the short term are difficult unless you are willing to accept considerable delays.”

And finally, the authors plead for Mr. Sajjan to give senior Defence officials more manoeuvrability, arguing they are constrained by petty rules that need to be changed.

“Generals once entrusted to lead soldiers in Afghan combat now need ministerial approval to offer a visiting counterpart a glass of wine. The deputy minister, accountable for $19-billion a year in spending and well over $100-billion in defence investments, must authorize the juice and muffins if his subordinates hold a conference.”
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/liberals-should-shrink-defence-spending-analysts-urge/article28305861/
Title: Re: Liberals should shrink defence spending, analysts urge
Post by: George Wallace on January 21, 2016, 14:19:43
Nope, the answer is to cut the number of officers we employ and also cut/amalgamate units and formations,  Our military is too top heavy and we've got paper Divisions, Brigades, Wings, etc...

We most certainly don't need 9 infantry Battalions and we also don't need 3 Armoured Regiments.  Our Regimental/Corps system used to be our biggest strength but it's probably become our biggest weakness.

In reality, we've got a paper military with a whole whack of people that are underemployed and spend far too much time feeding the bureaucracy rather then doing what they've been trained to do.  Of course, we need some level of bureaucracy but our bureaucracy has become more important than the field force it's supposed to support.

Our desire for symmetry in an asymmetrical world also makes zero sense.  To quote General Day in the interview he gave to Embassy News:

Quote
I would argue, as a consequence of the changing threat vector, as a consequence of climate change, as a consequence of the proliferation of IT capabilities, that building more of a force structure that looks remarkably like what we had in the ‘90s and the 2000s will serve us very poorly come 2020, 2030, 2040. My worry is that we’ll look at doing more of the same but making it more modern and more capable—and, I would argue, more irrelevant as a consequence.

http://www.embassynews.ca/news/2016/01/20/A-conversation-with-a-former-commander-of-Canadas-special-forces/48105 (http://www.embassynews.ca/news/2016/01/20/A-conversation-with-a-former-commander-of-Canadas-special-forces/48105)

True.  We do have too many filling redundant positions at the top, in numerous redunduant or unnecessary HQs or positions. 

I disagree with the cutting of the sharp end number of Cbt Arms units. 

I also see General Day taking the stance General Hillier had, in the decision to do away with the tank and adopt the MGS instead.  That decision proved to be the wrong one then, and I am positive will be the wrong decision to make on such matters (not just Armour Corps) in the future.  There are better ways to ensure an effective Cbt Arms.  We just have to come up with them.
Title: Re: Liberals should shrink defence spending, analysts urge
Post by: Humphrey Bogart on January 21, 2016, 14:32:35
http://www.embassynews.ca/news/2016/01/20/A-conversation-with-a-former-commander-of-Canadas-special-forces/48105 (http://www.embassynews.ca/news/2016/01/20/A-conversation-with-a-former-commander-of-Canadas-special-forces/48105)


True.  We do have too many filling redundant positions at the top, in numerous redunduant or unnecessary HQs. 

I disagree with the cutting of the sharp end number of Cbt Arms units. 

I also see General Day taking the stance General Hillier had, in the decision to do away with the tank and adopt the MGS instead.  That decision proved to be the wrong one then, and I am positive will be the wrong decision to make on such matters (not just Armour Corps) in the future.  There are better ways to ensure an effective Cbt Arms.  We just have to come up with them.

Was it wrong though?  Or was the sending of tanks to Afghanistan a political move by the Armour Corps to protect Tanks?  My understanding was tanks were never actually asked for by pers in theatre; rather, a decision was made in Ottawa to send them. 

On that note though, I don't think the tank should be done away with; however, all tanks should be moved to 1 unit.  Our current position of having vehicles and weapons systems positioned in penny packets around the country needs to stop.  It's a foolish policy and creates unnecessary maintenance and sustainment issues which should not exist.

Naturally the LdSH will get all the tanks and this would rub all the RCDs and 12RBC folks the wrong way.  My response would be "Want to drive a tank?  Join the Stratchonas!"

If I had my way "Form would follow Function"

Title: Re: Liberals should shrink defence spending, analysts urge
Post by: Lumber on January 21, 2016, 14:33:40
In reality, we've got a paper military with a whole whack of people that are underemployed and spend far too much time feeding the bureaucracy rather then doing what they've been trained to do...

Such as browsing and posting on this site...
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Oldgateboatdriver on January 21, 2016, 14:40:07
I agree that we must not cut any deeper into the infantry.

Anybody here remember that the British had to use 14 infantry battalions to keep the peace in Belfast alone during the troubles? That is a city of about half a million inhabitants. If ever there was an increase in instances of terrorist attacks on Canadian soil, not much but enough for the government to be seen to do something strong (How far would you go? "Just watch me") in multiple cities, how much infantry do you think we would need?
 
Naturally the LdSH will get all the tanks and this would rub all the RCDs and 12RBC folks the wrong way.  My response would be "Want to drive a tank?  Join the Stratchonas!"

Or in other words: If you are French Canadian and want to help defend your country: Screw you.

 And here I was thinking we were past these types of positions.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Humphrey Bogart on January 21, 2016, 15:35:41
I agree that we must not cut any deeper into the infantry.

Anybody here remember that the British had to use 14 infantry battalions to keep the peace in Belfast alone during the troubles? That is a city of about half a million inhabitants. If ever there was an increase in instances of terrorist attacks on Canadian soil, not much but enough for the government to be seen to do something strong (How far would you go? "Just watch me") in multiple cities, how much infantry do you think we would need?
 
Or in other words: If you are French Canadian and want to help defend your country: Screw you.

 And here I was thinking we were past these types of positions.

You're severely under appreciating the capabilities of Modern Canadian Police Forces.  All are far more capable then they were even 15 to 20 years ago.

Your point on Francophones wanting to drive tanks is taken; however, it basically substantiates my point on "form following function".  Dividing 80 tanks between three separate regiments may be politically expedient but it is militarily unsound. 

Possible solutions to this would be:

1.  1x Sqn of Strathconas are Francophone soldiers
2.  Move all Tanks to Gagetown and move a Regiment there with it
3.  Create a composite Regiment that draws from all three Regiments (Sort of like the Airborne Regiment)

Having penny packets of tanks divided up amongst each Regiment is good politics, but it's bad military advice and the Officers who made that decision should leave the military and become politicians.

The same can be said for a bunch of other decisions we've made, like having 3 Independent Jump Companies spread amongst three Mechanized Brigades.  A horrendously flawed concept that has gone on for far too long.

This political self-interest is another reason our military (the Army in particular) needs to be purged, as I said earlier in the thread:

Nope, the answer is to cut the number of officers we employ and also cut/amalgamate units and formations,  Our military is too top heavy and we've got paper Divisions, Brigades, Wings, etc...

We most certainly don't need 9 infantry Battalions and we also don't need 3 Armoured Regiments.  Our Regimental/Corps system used to be our biggest strength but it's probably become our biggest weakness.


Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: E.R. Campbell on January 21, 2016, 16:35:14
I agree with HB. Define the minimum requirement:

     1. A Defence of Canada Force;

     2. Continental Defence Forces ~ treaty obligations (NORAD);

     3. Expeditionary Forces ~ a tough sell for this government, I think;

     4. Reserve forces ~ another tough nut with political traps all over the place; and

     5. Support, sustainment and management.

I have, over the years, advocated for Triple A+ armed forces. AAA+means that we recognize that we aren't in the "big leagues," but we willing to "play" at a respectable, middle power, level.

The Three As are:

     Appropriate - for a G7 nation;

     Available - which implies properly staffed and equipped and having access to transport, etc; and

     Adaptable - flexible, well organized, well designed to cope with situations which none of the last government, this government nor the next one will have foreseen.

The forth A, the A+ is:

     Affordable.

I also agree with HB that the place to start, even before the MND's defence review is done is by rationalizing cutting slashing the C2 superstructure and the hangers on, like the Intelligence Command. I think getting ourselves towards AAA+ will be painful and when we are going to tell soldiers to "grin and bear it" then it is best if the leadership has already set the example.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Humphrey Bogart on January 21, 2016, 17:12:10
I agree with HB. Define the minimum requirement:

     1. A Defence of Canada Force;

     2. Continental Defence Forces ~ treaty obligations (NORAD);

     3. Expeditionary Forces ~ a tough sell for this government, I think;

     4. Reserve forces ~ another tough nut with political traps all over the place; and

     5. Support, sustainment and management.

I have, over the years, advocated for Triple A+ armed forces. AAA+means that we recognize that we aren't in the "big leagues," but we willing to "play" at a respectable, middle power, level.

The Three As are:

     Appropriate - for a G7 nation;

     Available - which implies properly staffed and equipped and having access to transport, etc; and

     Adaptable - flexible, well organized, well designed to cope with situations which none of the last government, this government nor the next one will have foreseen.

The forth A, the A+ is:

     Affordable.

I also agree with HB that the place to start, even before the MND's defence review is done is by rationalizing cutting slashing the C2 superstructure and the hangers on, like the Intelligence Command. I think getting ourselves towards AAA+ will be painful and when we are going to tell soldiers to "grin and bear it" then it is best if the leadership has already set the example.

As always Mr. Campbell, you're a beacon of light in a sea of darkness!

 :goodpost:
Title: Re: Liberals should shrink defence spending, analysts urge
Post by: George Wallace on January 21, 2016, 17:14:13
Was it wrong though?  Or was the sending of tanks to Afghanistan a political move by the Armour Corps to protect Tanks?  My understanding was tanks were never actually asked for by pers in theatre; rather, a decision was made in Ottawa to send them. 

On that note though, I don't think the tank should be done away with; however, all tanks should be moved to 1 unit.  Our current position of having vehicles and weapons systems positioned in penny packets around the country needs to stop.  It's a foolish policy and creates unnecessary maintenance and sustainment issues which should not exist.

Naturally the LdSH will get all the tanks and this would rub all the RCDs and 12RBC folks the wrong way.  My response would be "Want to drive a tank?  Join the Stratchonas!"

If I had my way "Form would follow Function"

I see a flaw in that argument.  All the tanks in one unit may be a great idea on paper, but once you deploy tanks overseas, it will be only that unit that will be capable of rotating pers in and out of theatre to serve on them.  The base of trained pers will be small and that would cause pers to burn out quickly.
Title: Re: Liberals should shrink defence spending, analysts urge
Post by: Humphrey Bogart on January 21, 2016, 17:27:35
I see a flaw in that argument.  All the tanks in one unit may be a great idea on paper, but once you deploy tanks overseas, it will be only that unit that will be capable of rotating pers in and out of theatre to serve on them.  The base of trained pers will be small and that would cause pers to burn out quickly.

This is why you need to rotate people through the unit, either by forming a composite unit or by having people switch cap badges.  The Armour Corps isn't opposed to switching cap badges either.  As an example,  The present CO of the Strathconas is a career 12 RBC guy who only rebadged to command the Strathconas.

This is again, the weakness of our Regimental System, especially when dealing with platforms.  The Air Force has tribes that revolve around fighting platforms which can create friction at higher levels but otherwise doesn't do much damage.  The Army has platforms which create friction between different Corps but then they also have pieces of felt on their berets which create not only inter-Corps friction but also intra-Corps friction.

Solving the manning issues with all tanks in one Regiment is actually quite easy, it involves either a cap badge change or a new composite unit.  Either way, the savings and efficiencies gained by putting the tanks all in one place are well worth the cost.

Edit: 

To add, with the amount of tanks we have, we will only ever be able to deploy, at most, a squadron.  Maintaining a full up Regiment shouldn't be a problem. 

If A unit like CSOR can do it, why can't the Armour Corps?
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Fishbone Jones on January 21, 2016, 17:32:48
Quote
The first of these was the promise that the Report on Transformation 2011, written by a team headed by Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie in 2010, would be implemented.

Quote
Reduce military staffing to help fund acquisitions, analysts urge Liberals

Both recommend a reduction in tail to teeth. The Trudeau Liberals promised to implement Leslie's plan.

This weeks GOFO announcement and the natural increase in Col\LCol\Major, because of the GOFO changes, including new positions to be filled, makes it hard for me to square the Trudeau Liberals promise.



Title: Re: Liberals should shrink defence spending, analysts urge
Post by: Journeyman on January 21, 2016, 17:47:05
I see a flaw in that argument.  All the tanks in one unit may be a great idea on paper, but once you deploy tanks overseas, it will be only that unit that will be capable of rotating pers in and out of theatre to serve on them.  The base of trained pers will be small and that would cause pers to burn out quickly.
Whether the tanks are in one location or spread throughout the country, there is a limit number of vehicles on which to keep people current.  You can't reasonably say, "OK LAV guys, every third week you're going to be Leo guys to maintain skills."

Having them all in one location eases several training, logistics, and maintenance issues... and hence financial issues. Post people in and change buttons & bows as required.
Title: Re: Liberals should shrink defence spending, analysts urge
Post by: Chris Pook on January 21, 2016, 17:50:40
I see a flaw in that argument.  All the tanks in one unit may be a great idea on paper, but once you deploy tanks overseas, it will be only that unit that will be capable of rotating pers in and out of theatre to serve on them.  The base of trained pers will be small and that would cause pers to burn out quickly.

Are you ever going to deploy more than a squadron of tanks though?  I can't see deploying all 80 vehicles in the fleet concurrently.  20 for training, 20 for fleet management, 20 deployed, 20 in reserve.  Isn't that the game plan?

If so, a Regiment of 3 active and 2 reserve sabre squadrons of people, to fall in on the two available squadrons of tanks in the Regiment could keep a deployed force in the field for a very extended period.  No?

Edit: apparently I am slow today.
Title: Re: Liberals should shrink defence spending, analysts urge
Post by: Fishbone Jones on January 21, 2016, 18:04:15
This is why you need to rotate people through the unit, either by forming a composite unit or by having people switch cap badges.  The Armour Corps isn't opposed to switching cap badges either.  As an example,  The present CO of the Strathconas is a career 12 RBC guy who only rebadged to command the Strathconas.

This is again, the weakness of our Regimental System, especially when dealing with platforms.  The Air Force has tribes that revolve around fighting platforms which can create friction at higher levels but otherwise doesn't do much damage.  The Army has platforms which create friction between different Corps but then they also have pieces of felt on their berets which create not only inter-Corps friction but also intra-Corps friction.

Solving the manning issues with all tanks in one Regiment is actually quite easy, it involves either a cap badge change or a new composite unit.  Either way, the savings and efficiencies gained by putting the tanks all in one place are well worth the cost.

Edit: 

To add, with the amount of tanks we have, we will only ever be able to deploy, at most, a squadron.  Maintaining a full up Regiment shouldn't be a problem. 

If A unit like CSOR can do it, why can't the Armour Corps?

Rotating people in and out on a piece of equipment, like the Leopard, causes a huge amount of skill fade for those that go somewhere else. You won't be able to just grab someone that drove a tank 5 years ago and have him crew command now, because he's been promoted, and is no longer in that driver position. Fighting a piece of equipment, like a tank, is not the same as replacing a machine gunner with a rifleman, in a section. If you rotate a bunch of guys into the tanks, even if they've been on them before, you'll likely have to start from scratch. They may call them refresher courses not to hurt anyone's feelings but they will be full blown trades courses. Vehicles get modified or upgraded, doctrine changes, techniques change. These all have to be taken into consideration for the workup prior to deployment. What takes 6-9 months of predeployment, will now become 9-12 months. At least the crews will have a chance to meld and become capable of fighting the tank as one.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: E.R. Campbell on January 21, 2016, 18:05:17
A couple things in the Globe and Mail on this today.  The suggestions don't seem that bad.  Cut fat to reinvest where needed, don't micromanage insignificant details away from commanders who are trusted with the lives of service members, provide enough money, and don't over promise. 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/deal-of-the-century-trudeaus-defence-review-will-reverberate-for-decades/article28309381/
...


Deal of the century? Reverberate for decades?

I don't think Trudeau's defence review will be consequential at all ... wheel spinning is all it will be, in fairness just more wheel spinning, since that's all the Conservatives did after 2012.

There is no pressing threat ... period.

Absent a real, pressing, well understood threat, Canadians are disinterested and, more important, unwilling to see their hard earned dollars spent on the military ... "toys for the boys" is how, I am fairly certain, Butts, Telford and company in the PMO see it, and that's how a solid majority of Canadians see it, too.

Minister Sajjan will take a year to conduct his review .... a few trees will be killed to publish it, several academics and journalists and other assorted experts will fill a few hundred computer screens with critical commentary. Canadians, even the very few tens of thousands who care, at all, will yawn. The cabinet P&P (plans and priorities) Committee will defer consideration to the late fall of 2017 by which time, being less than two years away from the next election, it will punt it to the Liberal campaign team for a few words in the platform.

Of course that all can and would change if (when?) there were to be a real, understood threat.
Title: Re: Liberals should shrink defence spending, analysts urge
Post by: Humphrey Bogart on January 21, 2016, 18:08:23
Rotating people in and out on a piece of equipment, like the Leopard, causes a huge amount of skill fade for those that go somewhere else. You won't be able to just grab someone that drove a tank 5 years ago and have him crew command now, because he's been promoted, and is no longer in that driver position. Fighting a piece of equipment, like a tank, is not the same as replacing a machine gunner with a rifleman, in a section. If you rotate a bunch of guys into the tanks, even if they've been on them before, you'll likely have to start from scratch. They may call them refresher courses not to hurt anyone's feelings but they will be full blown trades courses. Vehicles get modified or upgraded, doctrine changes, techniques change. These all have to be taken into consideration for the workup prior to deployment. What takes 6-9 months of predeployment, will now become 9-12 months. At least the crews will have a chance to meld and become capable of fighting the tank as one.

You will never deploy a whole Regiment though so this is a moot point.  I've already answered this a couple of times but Journeyman hit the nail on the head when he said:

Whether the tanks are in one location or spread throughout the country, there is a limit number of vehicles on which to keep people current.  You can't reasonably say, "OK LAV guys, every third week you're going to be Leo guys to maintain skills."

Having them all in one location eases several training, logistics, and maintenance issues... and hence financial issues. Post people in and change buttons & bows as required.


Deal of the century? Reverberate for decades?

I don't think Trudeau's defence review will be consequential at all ... wheel spinning is all it will be, in fairness just more wheel spinning, since that's all the Conservatives did after 2012.

There is no pressing threat ... period.

Absent a real, pressing, well understood threat, Canadians are disinterested and, more important, unwilling to see their hard earned dollars spent on the military ... "toys for the boys" is how, I am fairly certain, Butts, Telford and company in the PMO see it, and that's how a solid majority of Canadians see it, too.

Minister Sajjan will take a year to conduct his review .... a few trees will be killed to publish it, several academics and journalists and other assorted experts will fill a few hundred computer screens with critical commentary. Canadians, even the very few tens of thousands who care, at all, will yawn. The cabinet P&P (plans and priorities) Committee will defer consideration to the late fall of 2017 by which time, being less than two years away from the next election, it will punt it to the Liberal campaign team for a few words in the platform.

Of course that all can and would change if (when?) there were to be a real, understood threat.

:ditto:
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: ArmyRick on January 21, 2016, 18:19:02
A couple of hard questions....

Time to re-think things maybe.

Do we make the Strats all tankers (new MOSID) and the other 2 regiments all recce? Make two MOSIDs?

As far as burning out people if rotating too often, what about having those 4 x squadrons of tanks manned (1 on rotation in X theater) and then have a 5th squadron which is without tanks for 6 months after deployment (leave, career courses, silly *** parades, reconstitution, etc), then when the squadron that finishes work up trg deploys, that 5th squadron would assume their tanks for the next couple of rotations back in Canada, so it would look like this

LdSH (From Dec 2017-July 2017)
-A Squadron (Trg and Dom Ops ready)
-B Squadron (Road to high readiness trg)
-C Squadron (On deployment in FANTASIA with tanks)
-D Squadron (No tanks, parades, chilling out, career courses)
-E Squadron (low level trg and getting used to tanks again)

Armoured guys, thoughts? Rotten tomatoes to throw at me? Or a HESH round fired at me and this good idea fairy? Not sure there are any Leo 1s left to fire them though...
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MilEME09 on January 21, 2016, 18:46:05
Not sure there are any Leo 1s left to fire them though...

i know of atleast 2 in Borden that could >:D
Title: Re: Liberals should shrink defence spending, analysts urge
Post by: George Wallace on January 21, 2016, 20:00:21
This is why you need to rotate people through the unit, either by forming a composite unit or by having people switch cap badges.  The Armour Corps isn't opposed to switching cap badges either.  As an example,  The present CO of the Strathconas is a career 12 RBC guy who only rebadged to command the Strathconas.

This is again, the weakness of our Regimental System, especially when dealing with platforms.  The Air Force has tribes that revolve around fighting platforms which can create friction at higher levels but otherwise doesn't do much damage.  The Army has platforms which create friction between different Corps but then they also have pieces of felt on their berets which create not only inter-Corps friction but also intra-Corps friction.

Solving the manning issues with all tanks in one Regiment is actually quite easy, it involves either a cap badge change or a new composite unit.  Either way, the savings and efficiencies gained by putting the tanks all in one place are well worth the cost.

Edit: 

To add, with the amount of tanks we have, we will only ever be able to deploy, at most, a squadron.  Maintaining a full up Regiment shouldn't be a problem. 

If A unit like CSOR can do it, why can't the Armour Corps?

First flaw with your logic, in your first paragraph, is that you can rotate people into and out of a unit.  Sure the CO of the LdSH (RC) was a 12eme RBC; but that is not the problem.  All officers are being rotated in and out of positions on a regular basis, within the unit and off to ERE and School positions, usually every two years.  The majority, being the men, are not.  They remain in the unit, sometimes for the duration of their whole careers.  It has been over thirty years since the Canadian Government and DND have decided to cut costs and end the annual rotation of personnel through the units and around the country.  No longer will you see Ptes and Cpls being posted every four to six years between units, Bases and establishments. 

Even having all the tanks in one location does not pose the rosy picture that you seem to think.  An operation such as Afghanistan would have totally burnt out all the troops in that unit.

As for Journeyman's comments; they were (hopefully) in jest as LAV guys would not be going onto tanks every third or forth week.  Those tanks would be manned full-time.  As well, those other units would be running tank courses as well, tripling the number of pers being trained.  Having all the tanks in one location would cut the numbers of pers being trained by a third or more; as the Armour School would also be running tank courses along with all their other courses.

As C Sqn RCD is located in Gagetown, on tanks, they both fill the role or being a RCD tank Sqn and support to the Armour School and CTC for training.  If I were to follow your logic, then the LdSH (RC) would be better re-roled to Recce and all the tanks moved to Gagetown to provide a Regt of tanks there with a large training area to use and as a resource to support the Armour School and CTC to train Tankers and Combat Team Commanders.  That would take a lot of the weight off of C Sqn RCD current tasks to support CTC and the Armour School.
Title: Re: Liberals should shrink defence spending, analysts urge
Post by: Chris Pook on January 21, 2016, 20:05:31
.....
If I were to follow your logic, then the LdSH (RC) would be better re-roled to Recce and all the tanks moved to Gagetown to provide a Regt of tanks there with a large training area to use and as a resource to support the Armour School and CTC to train Tankers and Combat Team Commanders.  That would take a lot of the weight off of C Sqn RCD current tasks to support CTC and the Armour School.

Sounds like a good idea to me.  Back to the future.  Add in a properly resourced GS Regiment of Artillery, and one of Engineers and you have the strong, heavy back bone of an actual Division.  Stand Up the 8CH.

Leave the other little fiefdoms in place across the country.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MCG on January 21, 2016, 20:27:11
I see a flaw in that argument.  All the tanks in one unit may be a great idea on paper, but once you deploy tanks overseas, it will be only that unit that will be capable of rotating pers in and out of theatre to serve on them.  The base of trained pers will be small and that would cause pers to burn out quickly.
Is the FG pool from three squadrons of tanks really any different if those squadrons are in one place or spread around the country?

Do we need a giant CTCC when our allies have all moved equivalent courses to synthetic environments?

Deal of the century? Reverberate for decades?
Yes, it certainly seems over the top.  I wrote it off as the authors trying to cast an appeal to thier intended audience - Liberal insiders.

Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Humphrey Bogart on January 21, 2016, 20:43:43
Is the FG pool from three squadrons of tanks really any different if those squadrons are in one place or spread around the country?

Do we need a giant CTCC when our allies have all moved equivalent courses to synthetic environments?
Yes, it certainly seems over the top.  I wrote it off as the authors trying to cast an appeal to thier intended audience - Liberal insiders.

 :ditto:

First flaw with your logic, in your first paragraph, is that you can rotate people into and out of a unit.  Sure the CO of the LdSH (RC) was a 12eme RBC; but that is not the problem.  All officers are being rotated in and out of positions on a regular basis, within the unit and off to ERE and School positions, usually every two years.  The majority, being the men, are not.  They remain in the unit, sometimes for the duration of their whole careers.  It has been over thirty years since the Canadian Government and DND have decided to cut costs and end the annual rotation of personnel through the units and around the country.  No longer will you see Ptes and Cpls being posted every four to six years between units, Bases and establishments. 

Even having all the tanks in one location does not pose the rosy picture that you seem to think.  An operation such as Afghanistan would have totally burnt out all the troops in that unit.

As for Journeyman's comments; they were (hopefully) in jest as LAV guys would not be going onto tanks every third or forth week.  Those tanks would be manned full-time.  As well, those other units would be running tank courses as well, tripling the number of pers being trained.  Having all the tanks in one location would cut the numbers of pers being trained by a third or more; as the Armour School would also be running tank courses along with all their other courses.

As C Sqn RCD is located in Gagetown, on tanks, they both fill the role or being a RCD tank Sqn and support to the Armour School and CTC for training.  If I were to follow your logic, then the LdSH (RC) would be better re-roled to Recce and all the tanks moved to Gagetown to provide a Regt of tanks there with a large training area to use and as a resource to support the Armour School and CTC to train Tankers and Combat Team Commanders.  That would take a lot of the weight off of C Sqn RCD current tasks to support CTC and the Armour School.

You can rotate people in and out of a unit, we are only going to deploy a squadron.  If a single tank Regiment can't maintain one squadron in a high readiness posture, we have bigger problems. 

How is sprinkling tanks between three different Regiments a better solution than co-locating them?  That makes very little sense from a logistical, financial, training and also readiness perspective.

Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: George Wallace on January 21, 2016, 21:23:33
You can rotate people in and out of a unit, we are only going to deploy a squadron.  If a single tank Regiment can't maintain one squadron in a high readiness posture, we have bigger problems. 

How is sprinkling tanks between three different Regiments a better solution than co-locating them?  That makes very little sense from a logistical, financial, training and also readiness perspective.

I explained that already.  It has been over thirty years since the CAF and DND have stopped posting Ptes and Cpls every four to six years between units.  This cuts back in the numbers of pers being trained on particular types of equipment.

Again I will state that all the tanks in one location is only going to permit one third to one quarter the amount of tank training going on.  The other two Regiments run courses on tanks, just as does the LdSH (RC).  The LdSH (RC) will not run a course per Sqn, but one for the whole Regiment.  The other two Regiments are running courses to rotate pers through their tanks; as does the Armour School.  Moving all the tanks to one location cuts back on numbers of pers being qualified by a third to a quarter. 

What you are suggesting is that we move all the tanks to one location where we will train 30 to 60 pers per year, opposed to having over 120 trained annually.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: quadrapiper on January 22, 2016, 00:39:07
Setting aside the regimental who and where, what would the "ideal" fit for CA's armour be? 80 Leopards, and x other vehicles? Significantly more vehicles - enough to, as far as vehicles go, support deploying a regiment's worth? SP artillery?
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MCG on January 22, 2016, 00:44:22
Setting aside the regimental who and where, what would the "ideal" fit for CA's armour be? 80 Leopards, and x other vehicles? Significantly more vehicles - enough to, as far as vehicles go, support deploying a regiment's worth? SP artillery?
We've gone down a rabbit hole when we are asking this in the thread on defence policy.  Maybe it is time for some discussion to pick-up over here:  http://army.ca/forums/index.php/board,3.0.html
Title: Re: Liberals should shrink defence spending, analysts urge
Post by: Eye In The Sky on January 22, 2016, 01:20:10
Naturally the LdSH will get all the tanks and this would rub all the RCDs and 12RBC folks the wrong way.  My response would be "Want to drive a tank?  Join the Stratchonas!"

I am not sure I agree, but I also don't know your thoughts/reasons for having this; hoping you can go thru the rationale in your mind and the benefits of it.

Disregard, I realized it was already done in the posts that followed!

I've never been in a tank Sqn, but I'd take the points of George and RecceGuy into consideration, who've lived and breathed tank life realities.  A driver who has done only Recce then going to tanks will have a huge learning curve.  A Mcpl who did only tanks, gets promoted and then goes on to a recce troop is going to live a different life.  I was a mud recce type and the only use I would have been in a tank would have been yabbering on a radio.

Good discussion so far  :2c:

Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: GR66 on January 22, 2016, 02:00:19
Taking the cap badge politics out of it I think the real questions is this.  If you assume that the total number of tanks in the CF isn't going to change, is it more efficient to group them together in one location or to split them up into multiple locations.  If the total number of vehicles isn't changing then theoretically the number capable of being deployed and sustained in operations at any one time wouldn't change and the number of personnel posted to tank units and training for service in tanks wouldn't change.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Eye In The Sky on January 22, 2016, 02:13:05
Point to consider;  if I only have tanks in one geo location, say Edmonton [Wainwright] with the Strats, it is harder for the Corps to maintain skill sets as it would be limited to posting people geographically, and that costs money.

Having tanks in Edmonton, Pet and Gagetown, you can post people at will from position to position.  I add Gagetown because the Armour School is there and I assume that even if 'all tanks' went West, there would still be the need for a tank element in Gagetown for Officer/PCF training.

Based on that, I say move all tanks to Gagetown, not West.  Freddy is also closer to Halifax and Saint John ports.  C-17s should be able to go into Freddy airport (question)?

Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MilEME09 on January 22, 2016, 05:12:54
I would poss the option that perhaps we need to reshape our armoured forces entirely, let's put these tanks in the major hubs for training, and one squadron worth somewhere well maintained for deployment. Buy more simulators for the units to use in garrison.

Next I would suggest buy more Leopards, or designate one Regiment a Heavy armour Regiment with the Leopard's, and purchase something like the M8 AGS (BAE is trying to offer a modernized version of it to the US). Turning one or two regiments into light tank regiments operating light tanks combined with TUA LAV's, if only one becomes a light tank unit the other one should be a recce regiment.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: George Wallace on January 22, 2016, 09:44:13
OK.  Let's switch this up a bit.  How about we take all the 'Guns' and put them all in 1 RCHA.  Leave 5 RALC and 2 RCHA with only mortars.  How would that work? 
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Humphrey Bogart on January 22, 2016, 09:52:29
OK.  Let's switch this up a bit.  How about we take all the 'Guns' and put them all in 1 RCHA.  Leave 5 RALC and 2 RCHA with only mortars.  How would that work?

Just give me a bit.  I've got a very long answer for everyone that will take some time to hammer out.  I'll end it by bringing this rabbit hole back on topic.

In the meantime George don't get all bent out of shape with my targeting of the Armour Corps, they are but one of many targets.  We can talk about the Artillery later  :nod:
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: E.R. Campbell on January 22, 2016, 10:23:42
This is all fascinating militarytechno~trivia, about on par with monks debating how many angels can dance on the head of a pin, but the problem, for Canada, is that we now have a government that (not unlike the last government) isn't sure why it even has armed forces.

No one, since Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, is actually contemplating disbanding the military, and even PET didn't hold that notion for very long ...

          (https://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.counterweights.ca%2Fblog%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2012%2F08%2Ftlharpmerk033.jpg&hash=0763460a9385fba2c05afacb3cc2fc48)
          Rumour had it that German Defence Minister and long
          time Trudeau friend Helmust Schmidt was recruited, by
          some of Trudeau's own ministers in a mini-coup of sorts,
          to explain the costs of pacifism to the Canadian PM,
          since he would listen to his own cabinet ministers or officials.

... but it seems fairly clear that the Butts~Telford~Trudeau~Wynne braintrust is very, very weak on a range of issues and foreign and defence policy ~ beyond just being seen in various conference halls ~ is just one of them.

The Laurentian Elites want (actually just hope) to return to this ...

               (https://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fdownloads.unmultimedia.org%2Fphoto%2Fmedium%2F520%2F52030.jpg&hash=d4c5442aba4c56cf23988f05fdc9e466)

... but it's pretty evident that even the most benign peacekeeping missions (http://news.nationalpost.com/full-comment/matthew-fisher-benign-peacekeeping-no-longer-an-option-for-canadian-military) look more like this ...

                    (https://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fi.dailymail.co.uk%2Fi%2Fpix%2F2015%2F04%2F30%2F08%2F063EB44100000514-3061222-image-a-5_1430377597058.jpg&hash=4db7b0efa56a6985485cd110404b4465)

What those Laurentian Elites do not want are things like "US led coalition" or "combat mission," or, even, "peacemaking." We can joke about "sunny ways" and "unicorn farts" but the fact is that Stéphane Dion is the Foreign Global Affairs Minister and the few experienced and (relatively) conservative ministers are in economic portfolios: the Laurentian Elites are steering the foreign and defence policy ship of state and they will, actually, be aided and abetted by the ministers who would like a coherent, interests driven foreign policy but who are, perforce, trying to save money which can always be easily done by squeezing the military.

That's why I think that Minister Sajjan's defence review and anything that might fall out from it will be a return to the decades of darkness type wheel spinning.

     (https://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fa1.files.biography.com%2Fimage%2Fupload%2Fc_fill%2Ccs_srgb%2Cdpr_1.0%2Cg_face%2Ch_300%2Cq_80%2Cw_300%2FMTE4MDAzNDEwNzA5MzQ5OTAy.jpg&hash=2975a6cb2b2b944d9415351d8ba7016d)(https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/b/ba/Mulroney.jpg/220px-Mulroney.jpg)(https://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.nndb.com%2Fpeople%2F777%2F000023708%2Fcanada-chretien.jpg&hash=809471140c243b30546b55b44d7fbebc)
                                                                                        The Decades of Darkness: 1967 to 2006
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: E.R. Campbell on January 22, 2016, 10:44:52

Deal of the century? Reverberate for decades?

I don't think Trudeau's defence review will be consequential at all ... wheel spinning is all it will be, in fairness just more wheel spinning, since that's all the Conservatives did after 2012.

There is no pressing threat ... period.

Absent a real, pressing, well understood threat, Canadians are disinterested and, more important, unwilling to see their hard earned dollars spent on the military ... "toys for the boys" is how, I am fairly certain, Butts, Telford and company in the PMO see it, and that's how a solid majority of Canadians see it, too.

Minister Sajjan will take a year to conduct his review .... a few trees will be killed to publish it, several academics and journalists and other assorted experts will fill a few hundred computer screens with critical commentary. Canadians, even the very few tens of thousands who care, at all, will yawn. The cabinet P&P (plans and priorities) Committee will defer consideration to the late fall of 2017 by which time, being less than two years away from the next election, it will punt it to the Liberal campaign team for a few words in the platform.

Of course that all can and would change if (when?) there were to be a real, understood threat.


And to illustrate that point I offer this:

     (https://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fshawglobalnews.files.wordpress.com%2F2015%2F11%2Fraw_19fn_2015-11-26-climate-change-1.jpg%3Fquality%3D70%26amp%3Bstrip%3Dall%26amp%3Bstrip%3Dall&hash=f08da379d059486eab8a808c16775610)

It was from a Ipsos poll done for Global News done in Nov 15, but I doubt things have changed ... where is defence on that list? How about foreign policy? Security? Canadians don't care and until Canadians do care this government will not care, either.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Oldgateboatdriver on January 22, 2016, 10:54:48
Yes. I see that Defence, Foreign Policy and Security rate right up there with Electoral Reform to get rid of that discussing First-Past-Post system everybody hates.  ;D
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Journeyman on January 22, 2016, 12:04:25
How concerned are
Canadians about
climate change?



13% -- yet it's one of their platform cornerstones.  Not exactly "in touch with the Canadian people."
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: cavalryman on January 22, 2016, 12:07:42
13% -- yet it's one of their platform cornerstones.  Not exactly "in touch with the Canadian people."
It's not about being in touch with the grotty, ill-informed electorate.  Our elites know better what the people need than the people themselves and they're going to give it to us hard.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: PPCLI Guy on January 22, 2016, 12:16:35
It's not about being in touch with the grotty, ill-informed electorate.  Our elites know better what the people need than the people themselves and they're going to give it to us hard.

Right.  Like they are with National Security and Defence, which doesn't even make the list?  Do you hate "the elites" for allowing defence spending to be the single largest discretionary element of government spending (ie not transfers to other governments or individuals, or payment of interest) even though it doesn't register as a concern "with the Canadian people"?
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Colin P on January 22, 2016, 13:00:27
I think Sanjin is going to quickly realize that all he can do is go on the defensive and hasty defenses against his own Cabinet to protect his department. I hope his COIN background does not blind him to the potential of conventional warfare in the near future and what is needed for that. A Liberal government with a charming and fluffy PM and a major financial crisis is not a good mix for DND. I can only hope that they can be persuaded that the NSPS is “infrastructure related” as is portion of the aerospace industry. One can argue that many of the shortages within the supply system can easily be met from within the country and should be a priority, but boots are not terribly sexy from a political point of view.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Chris Pook on January 22, 2016, 13:27:48
Perhaps it is simply a case of there being nothing much that the government, particularly the federal government can do about any of those issues except tinker around the margins.  There are no revolutionary solutions to magic those problems away. 

They need headlines.  So they knock down straw men.

On the Security and National Defence front, well that is imposed by external circumstances and our local politicians should be eternally grateful that the Japanese didn't land, Indonesia doesn't sit off shore and that a generous / usefully self-interested neighbour shares the island.  Consequently it remains off the radar of the locals and thus of the ward-healers.

And, frankly, that isn't so bad given some of the alternatives. 

One thing that was said up thread though caught my attention: about the relative safety of times past versus modern times.

I accept that the instance of state on state violence is down.  I also accept that, pending the rise of Multiple Resistant Strains of all bugs, that our health is significantly better.

But.

The combination of nuclear weapons and the overwhelming strength of the US, militarily and economically, has caused people to look for alternative methods of achieving power and control.  No news there.

My sense of things though is that the efforts are driving us back in time to the situation prior to the Treaty of Westphalia.  The State was an artifact created to justify zones of control because prior to that existed Hobbes's state of war of all against all.  Ordnung muss sein and l'etat c'est moi were the outcomes.

But, again.

The enemies of the West (meaning the US and its acolytes, us) are tackling our supremacy exactly the same way that the Protestants took on the Catholics when the Catholics meant the Hapsburgs of Spain and France was little more than Paris.

The Pope divided the world between Portugal and Spain in 1494. This locked out sea going merchants from everywhere else and launched a couple of centuries of anti-establishment warfare.  This piled on top of pre-existing conditions like local authorities that refused to recognize central control and folks like the reivers and cossacks contributed to Hobbes's world.  The net effect, from 1494 to 1648 was a period of interests fomenting unrest to create chaos that could be exploited for local, short term gain.  Starting from 1648 the wars took on a different character as did society.  Central authority was imposed - and used to create armies to impose order. Usually the debate was whose order.  But some sort of order eventually was imposed.

That situation has broadly held from 1815 to the modern day.  And I don't know if 9/11 or the non-invasion of Ukraine will be seen as the point of inflection in the future.

But the future I see is one of privatised warfare - letters of marque being issued to biker gangs and to private security consultants, corporate security forces raised to protect own assets on land and at sea, borders being erased, the distinction between policing and soldiering disappearing - and a recreation of the environment that saw the raising of Dragoon Regiments.    Dragoons were raised as constabulary forces to maintain order at home amongst people that were similarly armed and equipped.  It was only after the domestic subjugation had been successful that Dragoons could be reformed as part of the army and used to confront opposing armies.

All this to say that, in my view, it is going to be a while before the Dragoons need to close ranks and form a mailed fist.  They are going to be needed in their original dispersed role and having to adapt to the operational environment in which they find themselves.

Because of our system of checks and balances and our history the Green Dragoons and the Red Dragoons* are separate and the Green Dragoons are not welcome to operate domestically - unless they are unarmed or unless the Red Dragoons ever found themselves ever overwhelmed at home.   That means that the Green Dragoons must find employment elsewhere and find themselves a willing paymaster.

Currently the Green Dragoons are paid by Her Majesty's Canadian Government - but HMCG seems to have little appetite to employ them in any role other than as Palace Guards.  Much like these guys.

http://media-2.web.britannica.com/eb-media/33/94133-004-7C39F857.jpg

So the question for you guys, the Green Dragoons in the army, is how do you maintain the skills you feel that soldiering requires, while being paid by a parsimonious and unappreciative paymaster, until events prove that you were right all along and are needed?


* The RCMP is officially a regiment of Dragoons.  Arguably amongst the largest in the world.

Edit to offer a solution:

Buccleuch's Regiment.  - Paid for by London to serve the Dutch
Stargate's, MacKay's and Hepburns Regiments of the Green Brigade. - Paid for by Stockholm to serve Vasa
Le Garde Eccosais. - Paid for by Paris to serve the Valois

And more currently:

The Sultan of Oman's forces with British advisors
The Sultan of Brunei with British trained Gurkhas.

You would prevent skill fade but you would not necessarily be loved at home.  Unless you died wearing a Canadian flag.

Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: daftandbarmy on January 23, 2016, 09:54:25
Unfortunately, like Captain Willard in the hotel room, we're all just 'waiting for a mission'. Re-orging everything before that happens would not be a good idea.

No doubt confusion shall reign until then.

And afterwards? A different kind of confusion, as per SOP. :)
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: ArmyRick on January 23, 2016, 12:36:33
If I were king of the whole wide world (as my five year old says it), I would ask Canada a simple question
"Do you wish to participate in operations abroad or simply defend your land" and build the defence force from there.

Yes, I probably simplified it but thats me. I do not like the Half participating in operations overseas (No fighter jets but sure send in spec ops to help fight...er I mean train). Too me, its playing in the middle of the road and could result in p*ssing off our alllies and ensuring our enemies keep us on their hit list.

If we choose to say, be strictly a defence force, then we could look at that. If we choose to participate in missions around the globe (We do not have the ability or resources to act unilaterally, so we will always be in some sort of coalition). We can not always choose the mission, many times the mission for global stability will choose us (is fighting needed? Is it security presence? Maybe its just aircraft for observation?). Predeterming that we will only do UN peacekeeping missions is kind of like deciding you are only going to shovel your driveway today (even if it happens to be July, what I am getting at, is situation decides what is needed).

How do we get this through to vote chasing politicians?
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: milnews.ca on January 23, 2016, 13:14:09
One question, ArmyRick:  if you're going "all or nothing" one way or another, who defends Canada if we go with "all away team" option?  Or am I misunderstanding?
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Brad Sallows on January 23, 2016, 13:20:31
At a certain point, the quantity of people and equipment we have left to provide capability "X" descends below the point at which we can serve the political imperative of dividing everything 3 ways to keep regional noses in joint.  The sensible policy is to consolidate capability "X" in one location.

Stephane Dion got rolled, big time, by Jack Layton.  He is not an obvious choice for a position which is essentially submerged in the Biggest Game of negotiations.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: ArmyRick on January 24, 2016, 11:52:20
Its not an all or nothing options. Uou have misunderstood.

Its a case of Yes we will help with global stability or we will simply defend our own land. Thats the options.

Never did I say we committ all our forces abroad.

For example, NATO is going to conduct X mission in Y country. Lets say they ask Canada (knowing our capabilities) to commit a battle group, a helicopter squadron and a NSE, they are to provide security in a dangerous region with high likely of combat with small pockets of insurgents. Now, if we have those resources and we have decided to help with global stability, then we should not turn around to this example request and say something like "we will provide a company, a helicopter flight and our troops will not actively engage the insurgents, etc, etc."

The yes or no option is whether or not we participate overseas in global stability and we do not cherry pick the who/what/how based on political nonsense or vote chasing. Thats why I asked the big question of my fellow Canadians, do we participate overseas, YES or NO? The way we do it, can not always be pretermined. If we say no, then fair enough. Lets concentrate our ARmed Forces on protecting our land and conducting Dom ops/home security.

The cherry picking our missions for political reasons is what I have a problem with. If we are asked to send  3 frigates for a mission and we say no, it looks too aggressive, then not accetable. If we say no, we do not have 3 frigates available because of our own security, maintenance overhaul, etc, etc. That is different. We can not bake a cake without the ingredients.

This thought is coming from a few things
-The decision to pull fighter jets from Middle east but keep spec ops there to help train (both are efforts so to speak against ISIL)
-This mantra from some in our society who still insist "Canada returns to its traditional role of UN peacekeeping". That one really bothers me. If there is a suitable mission available and we have the resources then YAY for us. But if such a mission is simply not out there, then folks, come on, why bake a cake nobody is going to eat?
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Oldgateboatdriver on January 24, 2016, 12:39:32
I don't think it's a simple matter of saying yes or no, ArmyRick.

Other than actual warfare under the NATO mutual defence clause (i.e. one of the members is attacked on its territory), I don't think that NATO external missions are carried out by having headquarters "assigning" responsibilities to member and then asking "are you in or out" on that  basis.

It is more like NATO develops an overall plan for the mission, identifies the equipment, resources and personnel required then turns to the members and asks them one by one what they would be willing to provide. In the course of these negotiations (and that is what they are), NATO headquarters may "suggest" they expected more from one member or the other and try to put pressure on the government of a given member to do more, but in the end it is a political  decision by each member as to what it will or will not provide - at which point NATO HQ has to make a call whether they want a specific member in or out of the mission on the basis of what that member is willing to provide.

But by experience (AFG), it is very difficult for NATO to refuse any contribution a member may wish to make to the mission, however much NATO HQ would have liked to see more provided by said member. For external operations, NATO is a political organization after all.

As for availability of "blue-helmet" operations, isn't there a mission still open in Cyprus we could help with?  ;D
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: milnews.ca on January 24, 2016, 13:21:38
Its a case of Yes we will help with global stability or we will simply defend our own land. Thats the options.
Seen - thanks for the clarification.

The yes or no option is whether or not we participate overseas in global stability and we do not cherry pick the who/what/how based on political nonsense or vote chasing.
As long as we have democratically-elected civilian oversight of the military, I'm afraid we're never going to reduce that element down to zero.

Thats why I asked the big question of my fellow Canadians, do we participate overseas, YES or NO?
I'd like it to be that simple, too, but sometimes events don't keep it that simple.  A month ago, if I said, "Canada should be fighting the anti-terror fight in Mali because, hey, you never know what'll happen in the neighbourhood," people would have ignored me.  Now, due to "events" (https://ca.news.yahoo.com/four-family-members-among-canadians-killed-burkina-faso-132722282.html), it may not be such a dopey idea.  It'll always come down to the specific event when it comes to "should we go?"
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MCG on January 27, 2016, 19:33:23
Two recent opinion pieces suggest that the the pending withdrawl of CF-18 fighters is a sub-set problem of Canada's lack of defence policy.
Quote
We need a re-think - National defence
The Chronicle-Herald
26 Jan 2016

The angst among some concerning Canada's non-invitation to participate in discussions among allies about the next stage of fighting the Islamic State will soon pass.
 
The Liberal government's campaign promise to bring CF-18 aircraft home was, by definition, a campaign promise.
 
That is, it was taken without the sort of briefings and understanding that a government should have before making a decision like that.
 
This sort of promise, without a better understanding of its consequences, should not have been made.
 
But, over the course of time, this decision should matter little.

The more substantive question this government should seek to answer is what kind of defence policy do we need - now and for the foreseeable future.
 
Clearly, "sunny ways" are not going to do it.

A recent open letter to the defence minister from two defence policy experts - David Perry and retired general George Petrolekas, two Fellows of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute - makes clear the world is not less dangerous nor less complex. (The letter is posted at http://www.cgai.ca/inthemediajanuary212016 (http://www.cgai.ca/inthemediajanuary212016).)
 
Russia is increasingly aggressive.

China, notwithstanding its growing economic challenges, is increasingly provocative.
 
The Middle East and North Africa, after the teasing of the Arab Spring, are again being swallowed up by centuries-old antagonisms.
 
Our domestic defence needs are changing with the opening up of Arctic waters and the growing trade across the Pacific.
 
Then there's North Korea and international terrorism.

Meanwhile, our most recent thorough defence policy review was completed more than 20 years ago. Clearly the world has changed.
 
Canada needs a rational discussion on how to best protect our own interests and how to best contribute to global peace and security.
 
What kind of military do we need in this new environment?

What should our equipment look like and what sort of people do we need to operate this equipment?
 
How can we best assure our internal security? And what can we afford?

The open letter from Fellows Perry and Petrolekas is a helpful piece of advice for government, even if the paper suggests the shipbuilding contract awarded to Halifax's Irving Shipyard was motivated, in part, by notions of "regional benefit."
 
Where would they have the ships built, in Oakville?

A defence policy review is overdue. We should get on with it.   

Quote
Libs need coherent defence policy
David Akin
Winnipeg Sun
26 Jan 2016

Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan says any talk that Canada's reputation has diminished among our military allies is backward. "On the contrary, they are not thinking less of us. I know for a fact our opinion is valued," Sajjan told me in an interview Monday night.
 
The opposition and many experts aren't buying it. They say the Trudeau government's intention to withdraw our fighter jets from the battlefield against ISIL in Syria and Iraq, combined with almost no details about what will replace them, is hurting our name.
 
"The Liberals' incoherent and indecisive messaging has diminished Canada's reputation on the world stage," Conservative MP James Bezan thundered at Sajjan in question period in the House of Commons Monday.
 
Sajjan, when I interviewed him later, said he's been spending his time since his appointment as defence minister on Nov. 4 "understanding the entire mission."
 
He should be a quick study. Saj jan is a decorated veteran of campaigns in Afghanistan and Bosnia and Herzegovina. He rose to the rank of lieutenant colonel and is the first Sikh to command a Canadian Army reserve regiment. He has been at the sharp end of the stick when Canadians were fighting the Taliban.
 
And yet, his boss wants him to pull Canadian Armed Forces off the battlefield against another terrorist group, ISIL.
 
"When you look at the entire picture, we need to look at what capability do we need to bring in based on the entire situation," Sajjan said.

But why do we need to take a 'capability' like the fighter jets out in order to bring a capability in? Can't we do both?
 
Sajjan answers: "There's many options you can look it if you want to get into what-if scenarios."
 
That answer, though, seems unsatisfactory and it's the kind of answer that has even some Liberals in Ottawa a little concerned these days. It's too vague.
 
But that's not Canada's only reputational problem when it comes to defence.

Our NATO allies think we're cheap.

The treaty that binds NATO countries together includes a commitment from each that every government will spend the equivalent of 2% of a country's gross domestic product on national defence and that one-fifth of that will be spent on equipment.
 
Canada is spending close to 1% of GDP and only 16% of that on defence.

In other words, we're not honouring our commitments to our NATO partners.

The Conservatives were as bad as the Liberals before them and the Liberals now seem set to copy the lousy Conservative track record.
 
Sajjan, like his Conservative predecessors, will argue it's not really about the quantity, it's about the quality of defence spending.
 
"Certain countries (spend) up to the 2% but they don't have the right capabilities to bring to bear. What use is that?" Sajjan said.
 
"We always have to be mindful to use the right metric. We're also going to make sure we are fighting in a smart way."
 
Our navy is rusting from the inside out. The "Buffalo" aircraft we use for search-andrescue in western mountain ranges went into service in 1967. I could go on.
 
No amount of smarts gets around equipment deficiencies like that.

We need a serious discussion in Parliament and realistic long-term plan to substantially boost funding for our own national defence.
 

I wonder if the first author is suggesting that the CFDS was not a defence policy review or if the suggestion is that CFDS was not thorough?
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Journeyman on January 27, 2016, 23:57:13
I wonder if the first author is suggesting that the CFDS was not a defence policy review or if the suggestion is that CFDS was not thorough?
Canada First Defence Strategy  was neither a defence policy nor thorough.

It was nothing more than a shopping wish-list filled with mindless platitudes, which was embarrassingly shelved, quite rightfully, before the ink was dry.

I believe that the author was correctly pointing out that Canada has been without a comprehensive Defence White Paper in well over two decades.  Not mentioned is that most governments in the interim have been happy with that because, avoiding spelling out the realities of defence, security, and economy makes it more difficult for critics to hold their feet to the fire over failing to address such issues.



Yes, by "those governments," I include both Liberal and Conservative.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Old Sweat on January 28, 2016, 00:08:49
It seems to me that we rarely have a coherent defence strategy or programme because (a) we have no real control over or even meaningful input into the international situation; and (b) the majority of our giant minds, movers and shakers and rest of us don't care. I am not sure the militia myth excuse is still valid, but its illegitimate children still are hard at work.

In the meantime we either excuse our selves to go to the washroom when the bill arrives or conveniently forget to bring our plastic to the table because "you guys make more money, so you should pay our share of the bill."
 
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: E.R. Campbell on January 28, 2016, 08:43:39
It seems to me that we rarely have a coherent defence strategy or programme because (a) we have no real control over or even meaningful input into the international situation; and (b) the majority of our giant minds, movers and shakers and rest of us don't care. I am not sure the militia myth excuse is still valid, but its illegitimate children still are hard at work.

In the meantime we either excuse our selves to go to the washroom when the bill arrives or conveniently forget to bring our plastic to the table because "you guys make more money, so you should pay our share of the bill."


We did, once ~ only once ~ have a coherent, achievable foreign (and consequential defence) policy. Louis St Laurent set it out, in outline, in his Duncan & John Gray Memorial Lecture (https://coloneltedcampbell.wordpress.com/2016/01/15/more-on-grand-strategy-the-foundation/) at the University of Toronto in 1947. External Affairs Minister (later prime minister (1948-57)) St Laurent then set about giving real, measurable effect to his ideas and Prime Ministers Diefenbaker and Pearson did not waver, either, so, from 1947 to 1967 we had a workable national "grand strategy" that was tailored to its time and space (and we did have some advantages then that we don't have now, but our current socio-economic and geo-strategic situations are not too different from, say, Australia or the Netherlands or even the UK).

Louis St Laurent lived in, actually, a much more complex geo-strategic environment: we (they, I was only a small boy) didn't really understand, in 1945-48, the real and full extent of the Soviet-communist menace (George Kennan had only written his famous "containment" telegram in 1946) but we would soon be embroiled in both a long Cold War, with frightening implications, and a real Hot War (Korea) and in the politics and policies of nuclear deterrence and in trying to re-establish trade in a shattered global economy, and, and, and ...

(https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/52/Bert2.png)(https://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.slate.com%2Fcontent%2Fdam%2Fslate%2Farchive%2F2003%2F02%2F25_030220_duckandcover_kids.jpg.CROP.thumbnail-small.jpg&hash=8b397b0d862edd2f317c6b671dd3b8fd)(https://manspropaganda.files.wordpress.com/2009/11/23card.jpg)

... in comparison everyone, absolutely everyone, since St Laurent-Truman-Eisenhower has had an ever increasingly clear and more simple strategic problem. Nothing in the Arab uprising and the rise of China and all that compares with the fear and unknowns of the late 1940s and the dawn of both the nuclear age and the East-West split. There is no existential threat to our, Western, liberal, "way of life," and that is, primarily, why there is no compelling need for our, 21st century politicians ~ Barack Obama, David Cameron, Angela Merkel or Justin Trudeau ~ to do the kind of deep, long range, strategic thinking that was required of Truman, Eisenhower, Atlee, Churchill and St Laurent. Putin is a threat, but he's no Stalin and he lacks the means to be one, Xi Jinping's only real tie to Mao Zedong is in the jacket he wears a couple of times a year ...

                         (https://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fichef.bbci.co.uk%2Fwwfeatures%2F624_351%2Fimages%2Flive%2Fp0%2F34%2Flg%2Fp034lg7c.jpg&hash=d432afaab4f049553e7d24ee20eed448)

... and the Arabs and al Qaeda and Da'esh and whatever are, historically, familiar, twisting the lion's tail and so on ...

(https://en.wiki2.org/wikipedia/en/thumb/6/61/Twist-British-Tail.jpg/im374-640px-Twist-British-Tail.jpg) (https://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fdigicoll.manoa.hawaii.edu%2Ftreasures%2FLibraries%2Fimagelibrary%2F142-545low.gif&hash=fd55252e22e45035fdbadedf298d9921)

... of course there are threats, threats that we (that includes Canada) should address, but they are anything but existential.

I'm sorry that we, Canadians, cannot have anything even remotely like a useful grand strategy, but every prime minister since Pierre Trudeau has, more or less, mostly more, signed on to Pierre Trudeau's "poor little Canada, beset by its own, domestic, national unity problems, cannot take part in the grownups' work of making the world safe for free peoples and free trade" dogma ~ see the 1970 White Paper, A Foreign Policy for Canadians. But that's not, really, the politicians' fault ... they ask us what we want, we tell 'em, and then they parade fools and charlatans to lead us to where we want to go ...

(https://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fv1.theglobeandmail.com%2Fseries%2Ftrudeau%2Ftrudeau-images%2Fcarnation.jpg&hash=e78a433c5f81618ea7a3e1e9912192d7)(https://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fmetaviews.ca%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2Fimages%2Fmulroney.jpg&hash=6a9491ad41a3ce6bc0a9d6a730bb6ba9)(https://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.notablebiographies.com%2Fimages%2Fuewb_03_img0184.jpg&hash=96485b501ff616fb3381c8d8aa7f53af)(https://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Ffactscan.ca%2Ftest%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2015%2F04%2FHarperStephen_CPC.jpg&hash=2b47bafa2c7b37b98fa3bc6925483705)(https://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.cbc.ca%2Fstrombo%2Fcontent%2Fimages%2FJustin-Trudeau-220x220.jpg&hash=3c9c084d8a24e2cb6b5c875faedf06ac)

... and we vote for 'em. But, absent a real, clear, well understood threat to our "fat, dumb and happy" lives ... why not?



Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Chris Pook on January 28, 2016, 12:35:34
I choose to put this one here because it returns to a repeated refrain of mine:

" "Syrian safe heavens, protected both by air power and ground troops, have to be reconsidered": Dan Hodges.

Which is why another – contentious – proposal has to be brought back to the table. Syrian safe heavens, protected both by air power and ground troops, have to be reconsidered. There would be a price – both in terms of resources and inevitable casualties. But not as high as the price we will inevitably pay if the refugee crisis continues unchecked. And it is also easier to begin the work of constructing the necessary facilities to support Syria’s refugee population in areas where there is already some basic existing infrastructure. "

If you want a role, a justification, for the CAF, for an expeditionary capability, for a robust Combat Air Patrol capability with Air to Ground assets then this is where to look.

Building umbrellas.


PS - this article is about Britain, but as the article itself demonstrates it applies across the EU and the arguments echo here in Canada and the US.



Quote
Let's not delude ourselves: Britain just doesn't care about refugees anymore

Those of us who think Britain's response to the migrant crisis has been woeful must accept that public opinion has hardened – and change tactics

By Dan Hodges 1:01PM GMT 28 Jan 2016


We can carry on fighting. And perhaps we should. Those of us who pride ourselves on our progressive values can look at the government’s announcement that it is rejecting calls for Britain to offer sanctuary to 3,000 refugee children within the EU, and condemn them. We can align ourselves with Labour’s principled stance that no distinction should be drawn between refugees on the European mainland, and those who have sought asylum in the countries bordering Syria. We can look at David Cameron’s commitment to house 20,000 additional Syrian refugees over the next five years, and state – with justification – “that’s not enough”.

Or we can accept the truth: that we have lost, again.

"They met up with a bunch of migrants and said they could all come to Britain."
David Cameron

There is no longer an argument to be had about whether or not significant numbers of refugees should be admitted to the UK. The pendulum of empathy – which swung briefly following the publication of photos of little Alan Kurdi lying motionless on that Turkish beach – has swung back. The clashes at the Hungarian-Serbian border. The Paris attacks. Cologne. They are shaping public opinion now. And it will not be reshaped.

If the Prime Minister could reset the clock to 12:00 noon yesterday, I suspect he would find a different – and better – form of words to throw at his political opponents than “they met with a bunch of migrants in Calais, they said they could all come to Britain!”. But his phrasing was revealing. Not because it exposes some deep inner prejudice – that’s not part of Cameron’s make-up. But because it reveals what constitutes the centre ground of the ongoing debate over the refugee crisis. David Cameron’s political radar wasn’t switched off when he made those toxic remarks. It just didn’t detect any incoming political danger.

Which leaves those of us who are struggling to establish some sort of red line on immigration in general, and asylum in particular, back where we always find ourselves. Routed, and frantically looking around for somewhere new to dig in.

Let us start here. There is no longer any point in expending energy on morally comforting tokenism. The argument about whether to accept 3,000 refugee children from Europe, or whether to accept them from camps within region, is as relevant to the crisis we – or more importantly, they – are facing as debating whether to accept 3,000 refugee children from Mars. According to the latest figures from the UNHCR, there are 4,597,436 registered Syrian refugees. 39 per cent of them are under the age of 11. A further 13 per cent are between the ages of 12 and 17. To continue to use the children of Syria in a proxy argument over our willingness to “do our bit” is not an exercise in compassion but an exercise in grotesque self-indulgence.

There is also no longer any point attempting to delude ourselves the solution to the Syrian refugee crisis can be found in Europe. Yes, we have the resources to provide sanctuary. But we do not have the political will to provide sanctuary. Actually, blaming the politicians on this one is a cop out. We do not have the public will to provide sanctuary.

Sweden is preparing to expel failed 80,000 asylum seekers, and has introduced border controls with Demark. Denmark itself has just passed a series of new laws that include slashing benefits for refugees and seizing their personal assets. A plan to physically remove refugees from Danish urban centres to specially designated camps has also been mooted. Germany has begun deporting refugees to Austria as the backlash against Angela Merkel’s progressive stance on asylum grows. Austria has begun erecting a new border fence with Slovenia.

Poland rejected outright a proposal it accept a “quota” of 4,500 additional refugees. Bulgarian Prime Minister Boyko Borissov has said it is time for the EU's external borders to be shut against new migrants and asylum seekers. This has brought him into line with Hungarian PM Viktor Orban, who has equated refugees with an invading “army”. In France a formal state of emergency is currently in force, reinforcing a warning from Human Rights Watch that fears of terror attacks and of the potential impact of refugee influx [have] led to a visible scaling back of rights in Europe and other regions”.

I personally find all this horrific. But there’s no point me – or anyone who shares my horror – pretending we are in the majority. You want “people power”? This is what it looks like.

The issue is no longer whether we shut the door on those seeking sanctuary. It’s now only about whether we choose to shut the door, or shut the door and throw away the key.

The consensus about meeting our obligations to those fleeing persecution – on our doorstep – has collapsed. So we have to try to construct a new consensus around meeting our obligations to them on their own doorstep.

Britain is currently providing over a billion pounds in in-region support for the Syrian refugees. The progressive argument now has to centre on significantly increasing that level of assistance. And the point needs to be rammed home that this is not about providing charity or handouts. It’s about directly investing in the security and stability of our nation and our continent.

A second focus has to be on how that investment is being targeted. We cannot solve the greatest refugee crisis of a generation with tents and desalination tablets. Our entire understanding of the scale of the challenge needs to change. We have to stop talking of refugee camps and start thinking in terms of refugee city states. The requirement is for proper housing, schools, hospitals, factories, recreational facilities. The number of displaced people currently equates to the populations of Greater Manchester and the West Midlands combined. Our response has to be commensurate with that.

"Syrian safe heavens, protected both by air power and ground troops, have to be reconsidered"

Which is why another – contentious – proposal has to be brought back to the table. Syrian safe heavens, protected both by air power and ground troops, have to be reconsidered. There would be a price – both in terms of resources and inevitable casualties. But not as high as the price we will inevitably pay if the refugee crisis continues unchecked. And it is also easier to begin the work of constructing the necessary facilities to support Syria’s refugee population in areas where there is already some basic existing infrastructure.

Or, we could forget all that, and simply carry on as we are. Banging our heads against wall, and convincing ourselves the progressive fightback on asylum is only another news cycle away.

It isn’t. We have lost another battle. The only question now is whether we want to lose another war as well.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/immigration/12127515/Lets-not-delude-ourselves-Britain-just-doesnt-care-about-refugees-anymore.html
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Colin P on January 28, 2016, 12:57:34
Any grand strategy at this point is going to smash unto the rocks of political  expediency of the moment. We really don’t know where we are going to fight next or how or with whom.

The sovereignty task is the baseline. Most of this falls on the RCAF and RCN shoulders. The Army should be tasked to have an arctic capable unit that can be moved quickly up north. Although the land threat is minimal, as part of the sovereignty “triangle” demands this ability, the purpose being to exercise that right and demonstrate to others that it is important to us. The skill sets maintained will pay dividends elsewhere. Naval Reserves units need to be formed up North, these can be manned by locals with shortfalls for the summer season filled by southerners and some RCN types. They operate light patrol vessel in the summer season and support Ranger, CCG, RCN exercises and SAR, other government departments (RCMP, CBSA, EC, Parks, etc) (Politically Canada needs to invest in significantly more Arctic and Northern infrastructure, but that’s another issue)

Having a expeditionary ready force is the next requirement. Pretty much the majority  of Canada’s army history is expeditionary. How to design this force is the question. Since we will not know who, where and what we will fight next, leads me to believe that a army that contains a “heavy brigade” and “light brigade” is required (we may be able to tag the light brigade with the Arctic tasking as well). The light can be designed around and train for COIN and UN type ops, the heavy brigade trains for mixed and near peer warfare. People will rightly point out that with our small army the requirements to cycle units through rotations regardless of their training and that is a reality. However with both brigades having a strong cadre trained in their respective skillsets, they can quickly adapt the training of each unit to fit the role required. Having the 2 skillsets maintained means that the army can deploy a useful force almost immediately and then set itself to the task of training the net roto.

The reserve units are another issue. Afghanistan clearly showed the importance of the reserves as a reservoir of personal, talent and skills to support long term deployments. I think the concept of “Ops tasking” units should happen again, those units should be selected by proximity to the above mentioned brigades and the ability to tap into a large population. Their role is to provide reasonable trained people to support the brigade and a high likelihood of being deployed. These units get a higher level of funding and equipment. The other Reserve units get selected to train to one or the other role and they stay in that role for a long period and get to submit troops for training and deployments to that brigade. This way everyone knows what their role is and what they training to, which helps with recruiting, training plans and retention.   

Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: E.R. Campbell on January 28, 2016, 17:22:43
It seems to me that from a political/diplomatic standpoint you need to have a "Defence of Canada" force that is rather like 18th and 19th century "fencible" units: raised, trained and equipped for operations here, in Canada, and retained here, in Canada, even when the other, expeditionary, brigades are tasked with overseas operations. That's how you demonstrate a commitment to home or even continental defence.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: GR66 on January 28, 2016, 17:40:09
It seems to me that from a political/diplomatic standpoint you need to have a "Defence of Canada" force that is rather like 18th and 19th century "fencible" units: raised, trained and equipped for operations here, in Canada, and retained here, in Canada, even when the other, expeditionary, brigades are tasked with overseas operations. That's how you demonstrate a commitment to home or even continental defence.

But what does a home defense unit look like in absence of any realistic threat of invasion?  Do conventional infantry/armoured units based on our current Reg/Reserve force models make sense?  Do units organized and equipped (and trained) to perform functions such as aid to civil powers, disaster relief, vital infrastructure protection, etc. make more sense?  Or can air and naval forces meet the political/diplomatic requirement you suggestt with support from a more traditional, expeditionary army when required?
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MCG on January 28, 2016, 17:49:26
But what does a home defense unit look like in absence of any realistic threat of invasion? 
Gendarmier?
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: E.R. Campbell on January 28, 2016, 18:13:23
Gendarmier?


Maybe light infantry able to deploy to anywhere in Canada, on relatively short notice and conduct low intensity operations ...

     1. Airborne, almost certainly

     2. Since the "enemy" would likely be minimal ... maybe a Russian repeat of the (1943) German Weather Station Kurt ...

          (https://encrypted-tbn1.gstatic.com/images?q=tbn:ANd9GcTBq5552oDzazunK0B260XnCQQCV5Wq_cllONuMYWF4dqnOs68)

          ... then no need for tanks, artillery, mortars, HAWs or attack helicopters; but

     3. Need, probably, airborne infantry, engineers, signals (including air support signals), medical and logistics; and

     4. Need, e.g.

          (https://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fi.telegraph.co.uk%2Fmultimedia%2Farchive%2F01854%2Fparachutes_1854357i.jpg&hash=2ed2ec2cd2f5b52c15c1b2f34f0eaf83)(https://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.helis.com%2Fdatabase%2Fpics%2Fnews%2F2015%2Fch-147f_devices.jpg&hash=59f4521f616dd3fb627deffb4bdfb656)
                                                                                                     (https://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.army-technology.com%2Fprojects%2Fwarthog-all-terrain%2Fimages%2F1-all-terrain-vehicle.jpg&hash=6778d06f9e216bdca23c0cb0f766dc37)

     5. Since short notice is required, then at least five, say six "teams" based around one company of infantry and one troop of engineers with airfield building equipment ~ two infantry battalions plus support in a light brigade?

                    (https://media.giphy.com/media/lELRD773cY7Sg/giphy.gif)
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Old Sweat on January 28, 2016, 18:26:40
The 1946 Canada-United States Defence of North America plan committed us to provide an airborne brigade. Can anyone confirm if it is still on the books? I think it probably is, but that's a guess.

This led to the MSF 1948-1955 of three parachute battalions, artillery, engineers, etc, etc followed by the DCF of three airportable battalions each with an airborne company plus that was in turn replaced circa 1968 by the Canadian Airborne Regiment. We are sort of back to the 1956 model.

A senior intelligence officer once confided to me that he had to jump through all sorts of hoops to keep justifying a threat assessment large enough to keep the airborne community in both countries active. Be that as it may, I think while Edward's solution is probably the minimum force structure, it is not robust enough to satisfy the airborne world and the three infantry regimental mafias.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Humphrey Bogart on January 28, 2016, 18:28:58

Maybe light infantry able to deploy to anywhere in Canada, on relatively short notice and conduct low intensity operations ...

     1. Airborne, almost certainly

     2. Since the "enemy" would likely be minimal ... maybe a Russian repeat of the (1943) German Weather Station Kurt ...

          (https://encrypted-tbn1.gstatic.com/images?q=tbn:ANd9GcTBq5552oDzazunK0B260XnCQQCV5Wq_cllONuMYWF4dqnOs68)

          ... then no need for tanks, artillery, mortars, HAWs or attack helicopters; but

     3. Need, probably, airborne infantry, engineers, signals (including air support signals), medical and logistics; and

     4. Need, e.g.

          (https://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fi.telegraph.co.uk%2Fmultimedia%2Farchive%2F01854%2Fparachutes_1854357i.jpg&hash=2ed2ec2cd2f5b52c15c1b2f34f0eaf83)(https://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.helis.com%2Fdatabase%2Fpics%2Fnews%2F2015%2Fch-147f_devices.jpg&hash=59f4521f616dd3fb627deffb4bdfb656)
                                                                                                     (https://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.army-technology.com%2Fprojects%2Fwarthog-all-terrain%2Fimages%2F1-all-terrain-vehicle.jpg&hash=6778d06f9e216bdca23c0cb0f766dc37)

     5. Since short notice is required, then at least five, say six "teams" based around one company of infantry and one troop of engineers with airfield building equipment ~ two infantry battalions plus support in a light brigade?

                    (https://media.giphy.com/media/lELRD773cY7Sg/giphy.gif)

We already have this, it's called JTF2. 

(https://scontent.cdninstagram.com/t51.2885-15/e15/1389098_547891648625276_1737290299_n.jpg)
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: E.R. Campbell on January 28, 2016, 19:38:20
The 1946 Canada-United States Defence of North America plan committed us to provide an airborne brigade. Can anyone confirm if it is still on the books? I think it probably is, but that's a guess.

This led to the MSF 1948-1955 of three parachute battalions, artillery, engineers, etc, etc followed by the DCF of three airportable battalions each with an airborne company plus that was in turn replaced circa 1968 by the Canadian Airborne Regiment. We are sort of back to the 1956 model.

A senior intelligence officer once confided to me that he had to jump through all sorts of hoops to keep justifying a threat assessment large enough to keep the airborne community in both countries active. Be that as it may, I think while Edward's solution is probably the minimum force structure, it is not robust enough to satisfy the airborne world and the three infantry regimental mafias.


That was, indeed, the "model" for my guesstimate.

With regard to JTF-2:

     1. It doesn't meet my requirement of being sort of "fencible," always available for the DoC role; and

     2. It isn't public enough ~ one aspect of a good DoC force should be its constant presence in the media. Secret squirrels are not really very good for "showing the flag" operations.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Chris Pook on January 28, 2016, 20:04:45
I'll continue to punt for 3 small, light (heliborne - with para capability) brigades, a heavy brigade group (tanks and rockets and such) and a Militia force with varying degrees of readiness.

The critical function of the Militia is to supply trainable, disciplined odd-job men and women that the Government can throw into the breach, come what may.  Not a lot of specialization.  Just General Service soldiers.

The light capability would be to supply deployable company combat teams both domestically and overseas when based off the RCN's ships. 

The Heavy Brigade Group could deploy independently or be beefed up with a Light Brigade, or could supply a Battle Group to beef up a Light Brigade, of a Combat Tm to a Light Battle Group.






Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: quadrapiper on January 28, 2016, 20:14:19

That was, indeed, the "model" for my guesstimate.

With regard to JTF-2:

     1. It doesn't meet my requirement of being sort of "fencible," always available for the DoC role; and

     2. It isn't public enough ~ one aspect of a good DoC force should be its constant presence in the media. Secret squirrels are not really very good for "showing the flag" operations.
And there's not enough of them.

I expect a Defence of Canada force built around un- or lightly-armoured trucks, tracks, and ATVs and airmobile/airborne delivery in Canada would reinvigorate the local militia concept, while providing the GS augmentee base that Chris mentioned. Could see a fork: "Fencibles" and Reserves, with the latter being focused on retaining part-time already-trained personnel. I understand the USMC does something similar.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Brad Sallows on January 28, 2016, 21:45:20
Defence promises are only going to shrink.

At approximately $22B, the defence budget is roughly comparable in size to recent projections for the size of the FY16-17 deficit.

The Liberals have a lot programs they want to restore, initiate, and increase before they get around to buying trucks and ships and combat aircraft.  Virtually all of their recently announced repeals and changes come with price tags - they are basically undoing many of the cuts the previous government chose to make so that it could balance the budget without cutting into transfers.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Humphrey Bogart on January 28, 2016, 21:59:00

That was, indeed, the "model" for my guesstimate.

With regard to JTF-2:

     1. It doesn't meet my requirement of being sort of "fencible," always available for the DoC role; and

     2. It isn't public enough ~ one aspect of a good DoC force should be its constant presence in the media. Secret squirrels are not really very good for "showing the flag" operations.

This is where we are in disagreement E.R.

I personally don't see a need for a Defence of Canada force.  What is the strategic imperative for such a force? 

We need a smaller, more agile Army that is optimized for expeditionary operations, unless of course you want your Defence of Canada force to also be capable of overseas operations.  Interestingly, given the geography of our country, a Defence of Canada force would also probably work very well in a brushfire war  :D

I see where you're going with this   ;D
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: ArmyRick on January 28, 2016, 22:07:11
For a defence of Canada type of force (and looking at the current government most likely to support concepts), a few points my crystal ball is telling me
-Correct enough, JTF2 and the rest of CANSOFCOM have a specific job to do (not DoC)
-Heavy (expensive) armoured forces, do not count it. Trust me, not likely going to be supported (gut feeling)
-An airborne force would be essential (best way to cover vast distances), in this case, it would best to have all airborne capable forces located at bases with/near airfields (Pet trucking down to Ottawa not too bad or is Pembroke airfield still operational?)
-I am thinking less Brigade structure and something more light infantry with some mobility assetts (think like Royal Marines Commando or a beefed up Rhodesian Light Infantry) that can fight remotely very well from platoon to battalion size
-Aerial re-supply and helicopters would be my ideal choice to supply them
-Training as well in some amphibious operations (nothing too high speed) and maybe get something similar to Royal Marines ORC (gunned up, armoured RHIBs) and Viking (modified BsV210).
-We do not need seperate airborne and amphibious forces (they can do the same job) as well make them capable of mountain ops (you only need a few Advance Mountain Operators formerly known as MOIs)
-For DoC and look at possible threat scenarios, we may find ourselves doing COIN in our country in the next twenty-thirty years (ya I know, stop licking aluminum)

 
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: PuckChaser on January 28, 2016, 22:20:33
-An airborne force would be essential (best way to cover vast distances), in this case, it would best to have all airborne capable forces located at bases with/near airfields (Pet trucking down to Ottawa not too bad or is Pembroke airfield still operational?)

Pembroke Airfield is still operational, Hercs have been landing all week supporting a BPara course. I believe a CC-177 was supporting as well, but that's going off the A/C identification skills of my wife, she's usually not wrong though.

If we do push for more light infantry and airborne forces, we need that last C-17 whitetail purchased now. 6x A/C plus the J-model hercs lets us move about the country very quickly with light infantry/airborne forces.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: ArmyRick on January 28, 2016, 22:37:13
Bring me up to speed, what is a C17 "whitetail"?

I know what a C17 is.

Specifically, whats a whitetail?

They have been doing Bpara in Pet? I know Edmonton had started running serials a few years ago. Interesting. Or is it just the J phase?

Agreed, the right aircraft are needed if we want to move reasonably quick from point A to point B in our nation.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: PuckChaser on January 28, 2016, 22:56:22
3RCR ran a whole course here starting 2 weeks ago, J Phase is this week.

A whitetail is an aircraft built without a buyer, basically ready to go, just needs a country's paint scheme (hence the whitetail). Tories announced intention to buy one in Dec 2014, and it touched down in Trenton in March 2015. Very quick turn around.

The last one rolled off the line on November 29, 2015, and is waiting a buyer. http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/defense/2015-11-30/last-c-17-produced-california-departs-boeings-plant (http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/defense/2015-11-30/last-c-17-produced-california-departs-boeings-plant)
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: daftandbarmy on January 29, 2016, 00:17:42
For a defence of Canada type of force (and looking at the current government most likely to support concepts), a few points my crystal ball is telling me
-Correct enough, JTF2 and the rest of CANSOFCOM have a specific job to do (not DoC)
-Heavy (expensive) armoured forces, do not count it. Trust me, not likely going to be supported (gut feeling)
-An airborne force would be essential (best way to cover vast distances), in this case, it would best to have all airborne capable forces located at bases with/near airfields (Pet trucking down to Ottawa not too bad or is Pembroke airfield still operational?)
-I am thinking less Brigade structure and something more light infantry with some mobility assetts (think like Royal Marines Commando or a beefed up Rhodesian Light Infantry) that can fight remotely very well from platoon to battalion size
-Aerial re-supply and helicopters would be my ideal choice to supply them
-Training as well in some amphibious operations (nothing too high speed) and maybe get something similar to Royal Marines ORC (gunned up, armoured RHIBs) and Viking (modified BsV210).
-We do not need seperate airborne and amphibious forces (they can do the same job) as well make them capable of mountain ops (you only need a few Advance Mountain Operators formerly known as MOIs)
-For DoC and look at possible threat scenarios, we may find ourselves doing COIN in our country in the next twenty-thirty years (ya I know, stop licking aluminum)

We've got 9 Infantry battalions and base loads of Arty, Engrs, Armd & CSS sitting around 'doing nothing much operational - wise' out of Canada. In Canada.

Why do we need another special home defence force of some kind too?
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MilEME09 on January 29, 2016, 05:55:27
if the establishment is to be believed 90% of dom ops is to be PRes, and 90% of expeditionary ops are reg force. The reality is 90% is all reg force, the PRes lacks the support(both economic and political), training,and equipment to be useful in most dom ops situations, and with the Res force seemingly starting to get less training for some trades, less and less of a possible role for over seas operations. The result is an over stretched Reg force, and a Pres that isn't useful for any real task.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: E.R. Campbell on January 29, 2016, 08:29:57
We've got 9 Infantry battalions and base loads of Arty, Engrs, Armd & CSS sitting around 'doing nothing much operational - wise' out of Canada. In Canada.

Why do we need another special home defence force of some kind too?


I think it's a wee bit of sauve qui peut. My guess is that this Liberal government will be even less inclined to spend on the military than was the last (Conservative) one. Stephen Harper was focused on balancing the budget in 2015, to appease (part of) his base, and Justin Trudeau will be, even more, focused on infrastructure with social value to appease (part of) his base.

I suspect the MND can try to leverage this sort of thing (http://army.ca/forums/index.php/topic,79865.msg1414605.html#msg1414605) into something like a DCF. I doubt he's going to get anything for expeditionary forces ... not until someone actually attacks us, at home ... with something worse than this:

                         (https://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.frugal-cafe.com%2Fpublic_html%2Ffrugal-blog%2Ffrugal-cafe-blogzone%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2014%2F10%2Fmultiple-shootings-canadian-parliament-oct-2014.jpg&hash=568566389e973f3329bfe7e8d8a42850)
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: E.R. Campbell on January 29, 2016, 08:42:12
We've got 9 Infantry battalions and base loads of Arty, Engrs, Armd & CSS sitting around 'doing nothing much operational - wise' out of Canada. In Canada.

Why do we need another special home defence force of some kind too?


And, maybe, the answer is that the MND re-roles about ⅓ of all that into a formally constituted DCF ... based in, let's just say, Valcartier (with, if necessary, some DND funded upgrades to Jean Lesage International Airport).

Then, maybe, we can manage to organize a light (expeditionary) brigade in Petawawa, with a reasonable mix of some armour, light infantry, artillery, engineers, etc, etc, etc, and a heavy (also expeditionary) brigade (mech brigade) out West with a lot of real armour, mech infantry, artillery and engineers and, and, and ...

It has to make some political sense, and, in my opinion, absent an existential threat to our security, wishing for big, robust expeditionary forces is just silly.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: ArmyRick on January 29, 2016, 10:36:46
ERC,

Thanks. You hit the point. I was assuming when I talked about a genuine mobile, light infantry based DoC force, it was implied we would be taking existing units and re-rolling them.

Go back to the concept of the third battalion LIBs, maybe have an engineer, signals, medics and other required attachments POSTED to the LIBs. They would simply rotate through states of readiness. This is very achievable and can be done, needs political will from both the Army brass and our political leaders (lets face it, our MND is very in touch with our capabilities and potential missions). Training for such operations is not terribly expensive, takes will and some resources to commit to it.

The will is the biggest thing, I find there are many an old army creature (like my generation) that are still way too focused on the cold war combat team operations. I highly doubt we will be doing that type of operation, here or abroad. I am NOT saying get rid of LAVs and Tanks (we should hold onto what we have). How exactly to organize and deploy? I am not too sure. I do know that manning LAVs takes up huge loads of ammo, fuel and time to stay effective. Maybe a time has finally come to split infantry? Or make one regiment of armoured Tanks and the other two regiments Mounted with LAVs? I probably just royally p*ssed off people with that line of thinking.

Recently a few of my sergeants were discussing the very useless and outdated training we had done on an exercise, they put forth valuable suggestions, the OC yelled jokingly from his office down the hall "Get back in the box!". Now how much truth is there to that statement?

In August 2014, the reserve summer stalwart whatever ex for 4 div was held down in Welland Canal area. It consisted of operating in a semi-rural, to light built up environment with realistic task and operations (as opposed to modern day repeat of WWI defensive ops). Many people I spoke to, felt that is was excellent training value. If your going to bark off about why the ex did not work, please ensure you attended said ex, otherwise not interested.

I will speak for reserve infantry (Thats me), we ARE very capable of doing most tasks at section, platoon and with some shake out, company tasks. We do very well on ARCG tasks. The biggest hinderance I have seen in the last few years is the hand cuffing on our recruiting (like last year we were allowed to take on 14 recruits for a whole regiment for the year. that allows almost no succession at all). Recruiting and training reserve infantry is less costly and fairly efficient. I know some other reserve trades are very much managable as a part time skill sets. I do realize that other reserve trades may not work on a class A lifestyle. I speak for the infantry, 25+ years of doing it (REg and Res)
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: GR66 on January 29, 2016, 13:58:09
If you accept the premise that Canada is probably not able (or likely) to deploy any force larger than a Brigade Group and be able to maintain it in action with the same types of equipment it begins with, maybe you could shuffle the existing forces in such a way as to have better defined roles and possibly less overhead.

One Expeditionary Mechanized Brigade Group of 2 x Infantry Battalions, 1 x Armoured Regiment, 1 x Artillery Regiment, 1 x Combat Engineer Regiment, etc.  The personnel to field this Brigade Group would be generated by two Reg Force Infantry Regiments (with readiness levels rotating between the three battalions) and three each Armoured, Artillery and Engineer Regiments.

Each regiment could also have a fourth battalion/squadron made up of affiliated Reserve regiments (each "regiment" contributing a company/troop to the unit) to promote joint training opportunities, easier integration of augmentees, etc.

Ideally you could use ERC's "big base" idea to have two large bases each with one regiment of each type co-located and a 3rd base (combat training centre?) with the 3rd non-infantry regiments co-located.

The third infantry regiment could be a re-roled as a light infantry regiment suited for the "defence of Canada" role but also suitable for less intense (or more rapid) expeditionary deployments.  Each battalion could have a jump company, two light infantry companies using vehicles like the Bv206 or BvS10, a support company and 2-4 Reserve companies (again each represented by a Reserve "Regiment") which could use vehicles in the G-Wagon class.

This integration of Reg & Reserve units in the DoC role would accept the reality that higher readiness Reg forces may need to be available for quick deployment even for domestic operations but also more closely integrate those units with the Reserve units which would follow on.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: quadrapiper on January 29, 2016, 16:33:21
This integration of Reg & Reserve units in the DoC role would accept the reality that higher readiness Reg forces may need to be available for quick deployment even for domestic operations but also more closely integrate those units with the Reserve units which would follow on.
Assuming with attention paid to planning for possible "just out the front gate" local operations by PRes units, especially on the western side of the Rockies.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MarkOttawa on January 29, 2016, 16:49:55
At CDAI's blog The Forum:

Quote
"Canada is Back” – Part 2: Trudeau and the Use of Force

If the CF-​18s are withdrawn, and if there is no new combat role to replace them, Canada’s contribution will then be entirely non-​lethal, in the sense that Canadians will no longer be taking the fight directly to the enemy. That heavy lifting—the defeat of the enemy by actually seeking to kill them, disperse them, and expel them from their territory—will be left to others: either local forces on the ground or Canada’s other military allies in the Global Coalition.

In short, Trudeau’s ISIL policy suggests that Canada may be “back” in a less laudable way: “back” to being a country reluctant to use its armed forces. Trudeau’s reluctance to use force is certainly reminiscent of the Liberal government of Jean Chrétien, which had such an antipathy to the use of force that it would often refuse to even acknowledge when the CAF used force: for example, by purposely hiding a lethal engagement between Canadian and Croat forces in the Medak Pocket in 1993;…and not even acknowledging the record-​breaking performance of CAF snipers in Afghanistan in 2001–2002.

If antipathy to the use of force is indeed a prime driver under Trudeau fils, this certainly would be very much in keeping with the dominant self-​perception that Canada is a “peaceable kingdom,” a peacekeeper rather than a war fighter. In a revealing 2008 poll commissioned by the Department of National Defence, an overwhelming number of Canadians expressed the view that the proper purpose of the Canadian Armed Forces was not to use force in world politics, but to engage in humanitarian operations such as disaster relief. Indeed, when a focus group in the same poll was asked about its image of the CAF, one participant responded: “I do not picture a Canadian soldier carrying guns.”

The prime minister has given every indication that he too does not picture a Canadian soldier carrying guns. If that is so, then Canada may indeed be “back.”

Kim Richard Nossal is a professor in the Department of Political Studies and the Centre for International and Defence Policy, Queen’s University. His latest book, co-​authored with Stéphane Roussel and Stéphane Paquin, is The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy, 4th edition, published by McGill-Queen’s University Press in November 2015
https://www.cdainstitute.ca/en/blog/entry/canada-is-back-part-2-trudeau-and-the-use-of-force

Mark
Ottawa
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Eye In The Sky on February 08, 2016, 02:43:52
Article Link (http://www.nationalpost.com/m/wp/blog.html?b=news.nationalpost.com%2Ffull-comment%2Fconrad-black-canadas-planned-defence-review-is-an-opportunity-for-our-nation-to-take-a-giant-stride)

Conrad Black: Canada’s planned defence review is an opportunity for our nation to take a giant stride

The defence review that the federal government has promised by the end of 2016 will be the first in more than 20 years. Given the amounts of money and numbers of people and strategic and industrial questions involved, and the infrequency of such searching examinations, it will be a very important initiative and is to the new regime’s credit that it is doing this. The previous government talked a good game and always spoke as an upholder of Canada’s military, but it was so inflexibly attached to the twin (and virtuous) constraints of a balanced budget and an HST incapable of being raised, that it fell far short in commitment of resources. The (Justin) Trudeau government inherits an annual defence budget of $19.1 billion, or about one per cent of GDP, which is half the NATO target and informal commitment level, albeit a target only the United States and Poland meet. Though the history of the Canadian military in action is a distinguished one, the history of military policy and strategic thinking by Canada’s federal government has been sluggish since Louis St. Laurent’s time, except, up to a point, for Brian Mulroney.

In 2010 we celebrated the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Royal Canadian Navy, but in fact, it did not really begin for some time. Sir Wilfrid Laurier’s Liberals adopted the idea of a Canadian navy, with a Canadian system for training officers and seamen and a domestic shipbuilding industry, as a compromise. Robert Borden’s Conservatives considered a Canadian navy imperial heresy and preferred instead simply to make a financial contribution to the Royal Navy, which would commission the construction of new battleships in British yards by British shipbuilders and man them with British sailors. The first such battleship was named HMS Canada, but was eventually sold to Chile, and the British did not remit the proceeds.

On the other hand, Henri Bourassa’s Quebec Nationalists, who had worked with Borden’s Conservatives to defeat Laurier in 1911 (their shared opposition to Liberals being almost the only thing they could agree on), opposed any contribution to any navy as likely to increase the chances of Canada becoming entangled in a European war that was no earthly concern of Canada’s. French Canada has never had any significant maternal attachments to France in the way English-speaking Canada has had to Britain. Although French-Canadians have always been militant about defending this country, and largely saved it from joining the American Revolution and from being annexed in the War of 1812, they have generally been rather isolationist and are more resistant to this day than English-speaking Canadians to supporting alliance initiatives overseas. The one exception to this was the Korean War. The Union Nationale government of Maurice Duplessis and the Roman Catholic Church leadership whipped the population up to such paroxysms of anti-Communism, Quebec was eager to send a larger contingent than Canada did to Korea. The archbishop of Quebec, the subsequent Cardinal Maurice Roy,had served in the chaplains’ corps in the Second World War, attaining the rank of colonel and receiving the Order of the British Empire for bravery in combat. He eventually became the chaplain general of the Canadian army.

Despite its deemphasis, defence remains a large budgetary item, and as I have written here and elsewhere ad nauseam, this is the most effective form of stimulative public spending, if it is done with that objective in mind, as the new government has pledged to do. Most procurement is in high-tech, high-growth economic areas, encouraging the most sophisticated segment of the work force. Construction is mainly of ships, aircraft and land vehicles, all relatively complicated manufacturing which ramifies throughout heavy industry: steel, aluminum, rubber, glass, and into top-end manufacturing of smaller items — controls and instruments, radar, optics, and engineered products of all kinds. The traditional multiplier effects on economic growth are very gratifying. Like the United States but on a smaller scale, the Canadian armed forces are incomparable engines of adult education and virtually all those who enlist in them get an incentive and ability to raise their academic qualifications as well as their technical skills that they would not enjoy anywhere else.

Without lapsing into the cant of the pretended veteran, there is also little doubt that service in the armed forces often promotes traits invaluable to almost all who have served in them, whether in or near combat or not. This was the secret of the so-called Greatest Generation of the United States: Franklin D. Roosevelt saved the youth of America from unemployment with his infrastructure and conservation workfare programs, then had brilliant commanding officers, Generals Marshall, Eisenhower, MacArthur, and Arnold, and Admiral Nimitz, lead them to victory in the most just of all wars, and then posthumously propelled them into lifetimes of achievement with the GI Bill of Rights that educated and financed the launch of the civilian careers of the 15 million returning veterans (in a population of 135 million people). There is no prospect now of a general war, but increased recruitment in the armed forces is a much better and prouder visa to a better life than the welfare system, and not greatly more expensive.

The most important aspect of the military strength of a country is the influence such strength confers on it in the alliances and councils of the world. The fact that Canada was not invited to the recent meeting of the United States and its principal allies in the action against the Islamic State (ISIL) was not disconcerting to me because, in the interest of giving a new government the benefit of any doubt, I assume that the Trudeau government’s reduction of Canada’s contribution on that front is due to its doubts that the current alliance is altogether coherent [ :facepalm:]. The West, led by the United States, is making common cause with Iran and Russia, a dubious proposition on its face, in Sunni Iraq, around Baghdad, but in Syria is attacking the Iranian and Russian-sponsored Assad regime, while joining Iran and Russia in attacking ISIL, and even as those countries assault the Western entry in the Syrian civil war, the so-called moderate faction. The Kurds appear to be doing most of the heavy lifting and ISIL seems gradually to be losing ground, and probably has not more than 50,000 fighters in its demented crusade for a Caliphate for Sunni Muslims from Turkey to Iraq and through the Arabian Peninsula and across North Africa. It is possibly the most insane political endeavour that has attracted Great Power attention since the Cargo Cult of the Melanesian Pacific Islands wanted to buy President Lyndon Johnson in the mid-sixties and mystically replicate the American consumer society and economy. (Though just as other-worldly as the Islamic State, this was naturally a good deal less troublesome.)

The anti-ISIL cause is a good one, but the diplomatic effort is a farce. The answer isn’t the Liberal addiction to dropping blankets on refugees when they were in opposition, and the withdrawal of our six aging CF-18’s and three non-combat airplanes [CP-140s are combat aircraft dumbass  ::)] since their election is militarily irrelevant. But in addition to the economic benefits, Canada could move militarily, as it has economically, to a G7 status. Canada has one of the world’s 10 greatest National Products, among 198 countries (including Palestine, Taiwan, and the Vatican), but its military strength is much less formidable. The failure to meet more than half the official target as a percentage of GDP of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the most successful alliance in history, of which Canada was a co-founder, is on a par with the perennial failure of any country to pay any attention to its undertakings to reduce carbon emissions. But in the case of the military, we are failing in our ability to have a force that would enable us to have any weight in revitalizing the Western Alliance. NATO degenerated from “An attack upon one is an attack upon all” to “a coalition of the willing” to an incoherent talking shop and Tower of Babel. Apart from the United States, which has the muscle, but has elevated as commander in chief first a trigger-happy cowboy and then a pacifist and appeaser, nobody has any weight in NATO, except, in extremities, Britain and France because of their nuclear deterrents.

If Canada raised the HST marginally on elective spending, it could double its military strength, raise its position in the aerospace industry, be taken seriously by, and help to revive, NATO, and render immensely more assistance than its generous nature has been able to give in natural catastrophes such as tsunamis and earthquakes that strike unpredictably but inevitably. We should start with an aircraft or at least helicopter carrier; this is how a country shows its flag in the world. Thailand, Spain, and Brazil have one, and India and Italy have two, as Canada once did, and plenty are on offer. Pierre Trudeau scrapped our last aircraft carrier, the Bonaventure, in almost as serious an error as John Diefenbaker’s cancellation of the Arrow interceptor. It would also give us a powerful shot in the arm economically. While we’re at it, we can spruce up our military uniforms, which haven’t entirely recovered from the amiable champion of intergalactic life, Pearson Defense minister Paul Hellyer’s, stab at monochromatic unification of the armed forces 50 years ago.  :ignore: I am usually deluged with messages mocking me as a couturier wannabe when I write this, but I urge readers inclined to that response to put “Chinese women’s military parade” into their search engines and see what pride and ambition can be engendered in well-trained and crisply uniformed forces.

The defence review is an opportunity for Canada to take another giant stride, the greatest since the defeat of the Quebec separatists and the successful Mulroney-Chrétien-Martin assault on the federal budget deficit, to gain Canada the status it has otherwise earned as one of the world’s important powers.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

 :dunno:  Why when I read that do I think of it as 'incoherent rambling'?
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MCG on March 08, 2016, 20:03:42
DND recommended to the Conservatives that each infantry battalion be reduced by a company? It seems to me that a more helpful suggestion would have been to reduce each brigade by an infantry battalion, but strengthen the two remaining battalions and the various CS and CSS units.

In any case, John Ivison believes the Liberals have already made-up thier minds and that publich consultations for the defence policy review will not result in much actual considerations.

I do hope to see the spirit of Leslie's transformation report (though, not necessarily the exact recomendations).  There is a lot of efficiency to be had in higher HQs, and this could be translated into resources at operational units.
Quote
Liberals’ vision for Canadian Forces unlikely to be swayed by public consultations
John Ivison
National Post
07 Mar 2016

OTTAWA — Within days, Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan will launch public consultations on the new review that will mandate the future size of the Canadian Forces, what kind of equipment they will use and the theatres in which they will operate.
 
The goal is to have the feedback process wrapped up by June 30 and the whole defence review signed, sealed and delivered by the end of the year, just in time for the 2017 budget.
 
The degree of haste suggests there won’t be much weight placed in those consultations because the Liberals already have a pretty good idea what they want – as the election platform detailed, a “leaner, more agile” military that can defend Canada and North America; can provide support during natural disasters; can offer humanitarian support missions and peacekeeping operations; and (last and, apparently, least) has a degree of combat capability.
 
In tandem with the defence review, Sajjan’s department will issue a new statement of requirement for the CF-18 fighter jet replacement. Insiders suggest the campaign commitment not to buy Lockheed Martin’s F-35 remains written in stone, even if it’s not clear how you conduct an open and transparent tender process while barring one competitor.

There are two or three European fighter jet options available to the air force but government officials concede it will be problematic to buy a plane not operated by Canada’s NORAD ally, the U.S. So, it looks as if we will have a lengthy, expensive competition that will end up choosing Boeing’s Super Hornet.

In their campaign platform, the Liberals said they would buy a cheaper option than the F-35 and re-direct the savings to the navy, since there is not enough money left in the capital spending pot to fund all the ships on order under the Canadian Surface Combatant program.
 
But the only way significant savings are likely to manifest themselves is if the Forces buy a far smaller fleet than the 65 jets planned in the original F-35 contract.
 
That might be exactly what the Liberals envisage.
 
The party’s election platform suggested Canada will no longer participate in the kind of air-to-ground campaigns we witnessed in Iraq. If we are no longer in the business of sending our jets overseas, and their sole focus is on continental defence, we can afford a far smaller fleet.
 
The platform also committed to implement the recommendations of the 2011 Report on Transformation, a controversial effort led by none other than the current Liberal whip, and former lieutenant-general, Andrew Leslie.
 
While the platform is explicit in endorsing Leslie’s roadmap to a more “modern, efficient and effective military” – less tail, more teeth – mention of the report was conspicuous by its absence in Sajjan’s mandate letter.

Leslie appears to have known that his recommendations to reduce headquarters overheads, including the $2.7 billion spent annually on consultants and contractors, would face resistance. “Very few of the recommendations to get where we think we have to go will be easy, popular or risk free,” he wrote.
 
He concluded with a quote from Machiavelli: “The innovators have for enemies all those who have done well under the old conditions.”
 
But he did not perhaps anticipate the virulence with which the advocates for the status quo would fight back against his call to fundamentally restructure the Canadian Forces. 
 
It seems the uniforms, whose livelihoods may have been impacted by the recommendation the Forces adopt a single, streamlined command structure, are still fighting.
 
People familiar with the current review say that many of Leslie’s suggestions for addressing the bloating bureaucracy (the tail grew by 40 per cent from 2004 to 2010; operational or deployable jobs by 10 per cent) are not likely to see the light of day.
 
Yet “leaner and more agile” – even smaller – may not necessarily be a bad thing. Rick Hillier, the former chief of the defence staff, has advocated reducing the size of the military as the only way to ensure it remains strong and stable. He has said the number of full-time members could fall to about 50,000 from the current 66,000.
 
An internal Department of National Defence review conducted by the Conservative government also recommended cutting one infantry company from each of Canada’s nine battalions.
 
The Conservatives failed to act on that recommendation, having criticized the Liberals for ushering in a military “decade of darkness” under Jean Chrétien.

For the same reason, the Trudeau government is likely to be nervous about reducing head count.
 
But the crucial metric is budget. As David Perry at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute points out, the Liberals promised to find $3 billion in savings in an expenditure review during the election.
 
If the defence review is geared to finding savings that are re-invested in new capability areas such as space and cyberspace, a reduction in numbers may be politically marketable.
 
But if it turns out to be a cash grab, designed to free up funds to flow back into general revenues and fluff the deficit, the Liberals will deserve all the opprobrium that comes their way.
 
Whatever the granular detail, it seems certain Canada will emerge with a military more geared to fighting famine than war.
     
http://news.nationalpost.com/full-comment/john-ivison-liberals-vision-for-canadian-forces-unlikely-to-be-swayed-by-public-consoltations
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Rifleman62 on March 08, 2016, 22:45:22
MCG:
Quote
DND recommended to the Conservatives that each infantry battalion be reduced by a company? It seems to me that a more helpful suggestion would have been to reduce each brigade by an infantry battalion, but strengthen the two remaining battalions and the various CS and CSS units.

I fear that if you reduce each Bde by one Inf Bn, you will soon end up with the same thing as now; two under strength Inf Bns. Better to maintain the three Bns and the structure.

Could be some fancy, pie in the sky plan, sounds great to the unknowlegable public, to reduce the Inf Bns to 2 Coys with a third Coy made up of regional PRes. 10/90 anyone.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Old Sweat on March 14, 2016, 11:38:47
David Akin reports in this column reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act that the MND was less than specific in his recent testimony to the Commons Defence and Committee.

Trudeau’s point man on national defence has few answers

David Akin - March 9th, 2016

Four months into his tenure as defence minister, Harjit Sajjan, (above) the former colonel who battled the Taliban in Afghanistan, still has little to say about what defence policy on his watch will look like.

During a 90-minute grilling Tuesday morning by MPs, including Liberals, on the House of Commons defence committee,  Sajjan was asked several questions about Canada’s defence policy. He hemmed, hawwed, and stumbled through his testimony, declining to provide any details on the CF-18 replacement process; the use of armed drones, Canada’s cyberwarfare abilities; how Canada can help defend North America against Russian aggression or any other topics he was asked about.

Sajjan’s excuse? Canada’s defence policy is under review, a review that will not be complete until the end of the year.

“I think it would be very premature and irresponsible of us to make snap decisions so early on,” Sajjan explained to reporters after the meeting.

And yet Sajjan’s cabinet colleagues have not been shy at all about making “snap decisions” in their portfolios. Environment Minister Catherine McKenna, for example, did not hesitate to figure out how to implement nation-wide carbon-pricing. Finance Minister Bill Morneau is blazing ahead with huge deficits. And Immigration Minister John McCallum got right to it upon his swearing-in to speed up the flow of Syrian refugees.

But as Sajjan made abundantly clear to MPs Tuesday, even those from his own party, he will take the go-slow approach.

He even refused to affirm key campaign commitments.

Asked by Conservative MP James Bezan if Sajjan will follow through on the black-and-white campaign commitment not to purchase the Lockheed-Martin F-35 as the replacement for Canada’s aging CF-18 fighters, Sajjan simply spoke about the need for an open procurement process which was still in development.

One of Sajjan’s caucus colleagues, Mark Gerretsen, a Liberal MP from Kingston, Ont. asked Sajjan to describe how Canada will defend its Arctic sovereignty but Sajjan, like he did for just about every question put to him by MPs on the defence committee, provided no details. [Watch the video clip above]

“I don’t want to get ahead of myself on answering some of those questions,” Sajjan told Gerretsen.

Sajjan even declined, when asked, to provide a clear sense of Canada’s current threat assessments.

“You would think there would be a clear idea of what they’re doing,” Bezan said in an interview after the committee meeting. “And I never got the sense of that.”
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Rifleman62 on March 14, 2016, 12:42:22
As ERC stated 4 Nov 15:

Quote
Notwithstanding his personal qualities, which, since I do not know him, I am happy to agree are many and exemplary, I fail to see how he is qualified, as a reserve LCol or as a police detective, to direct and manage one of the largest, most complex and biggest spending departments in government and one which has a regular, sad but noteworthy habit of tripping over its own dick.

Either that statement or there is a dire future of the military under the current government (or a combination of the two), and the worse news is coming.

Example:

Re: Canada to takeover Haiti peacekeeping mission.
« Reply #10 on: March 10, 2016, 14:05:17 »

Quote
Keep the military occupied/committed to a large UN msn = Canada is fully committed to peace and does not have the resources to assist in any combat role, anywhere.

Don't need expensive equipment to be a Peacekeeper in Haiti.

Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Chris Pook on March 14, 2016, 12:42:57
David Akin also posted a link to this:

http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/HOC/Committee/421/FINA/Reports/RP8137950/421_FINA_Rpt02_PDF/421_FINA_Rpt02-e.pdf

Quote
FINAL REPORT OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS STANDING COMMITTEE ON FINANCE REGARDING ITS CONSULTATIONS IN ADVANCE OF THE 2016 BUDGET

Report of the Standing Committee on Finance

Hon. Wayne Easter Chair

MARCH 2016

42nd PARLIAMENT, 1st SESSION

I may have missed it but it seemed to cover every department BUT defence.

Also, I noticed very few submissions from Industry.  A lot of social submissions by interested third parties and intervenors.

But that could just be me and my filters.

Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Rifleman62 on March 14, 2016, 12:49:43
Also there has not been any movement on the VAC file re election promises. Staying out of combat roles, reducing the military = less claims = less money required for VAC = more money for vote buying social programs.
Title: Sunny Ways
Post by: Sheep Dog AT on March 30, 2016, 20:06:24
http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2016/03/30/ex-general-delivers-sunny-ways-reality-check-ahead-of-liberal-defence-review_n_9576012.html
Title: Re: Sunny Ways
Post by: FSTO on March 30, 2016, 21:25:27
I really doubt that the current government (or any Canadian government) has the knowledge to confront our defence issues in a mature clear eyed manner. We seem to have no capacity to clearly see the world as it is and not as the PMO wishes it was. Unless something drastic happens at the centres of our political class as well at the senior mandarin level, Canada will continue to lurch about without a coherent and realistic defence and foreign policy.
I have no hope at all that things will change much after the upcoming white paper is released.
Title: Re: Sunny Ways
Post by: jollyjacktar on March 30, 2016, 21:32:32
Unless and until we face the same sort of threat they did between 39-45.
That seemed to have had the effect of sharpening their focus.
Title: Re: Sunny Ways
Post by: PuckChaser on March 30, 2016, 21:33:17
Until we have an all-party consensus on defense spending, which we'll never get with the Ostrich-NDP, the CAF will continue to be political fodder: Current government blames the last government for underspending, does nothing to help, Opposition hammers them for it, gets elected, rinse, repeat.

Considering the defense review has yet to be started, and its April, we're going to get something half-assed by the end of the year that either addresses only the surface of the issues, or is a purely partisan fluff-piece with no basis in the current global socio-economic reality.
Title: Re: Sunny Ways
Post by: Bucky on March 30, 2016, 23:48:12
...as well at the senior mandarin level...

Wait, what?

Title: Re: Sunny Ways
Post by: milnews.ca on April 05, 2016, 06:29:15
... Considering the defense review has yet to be started, and it's April ...
The latest on that (http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/vance-isis-sight-end-1.3520404) ...
Quote
... Addressing the government's coming defence review, a sort of white paper on the future of the Canadian military, Vance said the review was done and in the hands of Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan.

The general said he is expecting "a good solid look at the future security environment, what are we facing in the world, and what does Canada want to be able to do in that very same world."

That road map would mean considering what kinds of equipment the Canadian Forces need in the future, what can be refurbished and what equipment was ready for the junkyard.

"There are decisions that we make to extend the life of equipment and that's entirely acceptable. Where I am able to offer advice in confidence to government about where there are limitations, in terms of what we can achieve, and that's also part of the process," he said.
If I'm reading this correctly (I haven't listened to the interview yet), it sounds like there's at least a plan for conducting the review in the Minister's hands ...

:pop:
Title: Re: Sunny Ways
Post by: Baz on April 05, 2016, 08:30:35
Unless and until we face the same sort of threat they did between 39-45.
That seemed to have had the effect of sharpening their focus.

In 1939-45 we had the Ministry of Munitions and Supply, under C.D. Howe, "The Minister Of Everything," arguably the most influential minister other than MacKenzie King himself.  Who was the Minister Of Defence?  (It was Ralston and MacNaugton, but nobody remembers that; C.D. Howe is a legend).

A big part of that was to ensure that as much money that could be spent in Canada, was; and that Canada came out of it with a bigger industrial base that was sustainable.  So yes, their focus was sharpened, but it was still on the money.  Rightfully so.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Colin P on April 05, 2016, 11:05:27
and even that was a major struggle, the Tribals were seen as the way to move the shipbuilding to a new level, meanwhile the Corvettes we built for the UK were almost bare as there was either no source of fittings or money to buy them.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: FSTO on April 05, 2016, 12:06:57
and even that was a major struggle, the Tribals were seen as the way to move the shipbuilding to a new level, meanwhile the Corvettes we built for the UK were almost bare as there was either no source of fittings or money to buy them.

Non of the Tribals built in Canada saw action in WWII. I think Canada tried to leap one rung too high in its shipbuilding capability. Maybe the Loch Class frigates were more in our capability vice the more complex Tribals.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loch-class_frigate
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Colin P on April 05, 2016, 13:57:34
true but it set us up for the next series of ships that served us well, the Barbels if bought were intended to be built here as well as I recall. Canada has and can design and build decent ships if it wants to.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: milnews.ca on April 05, 2016, 16:38:21
Coming up tomorrow afternoon - details on "open and transparent public consultations on Canada’s defence policy" (http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=1046639&tp=3).
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Journeyman on April 06, 2016, 09:09:50
.... "open and transparent public consultations on Canada’s defence policy"
I'm sure the kumbaya "think" tanks will be at the head of the line....and be the loudest.... and carry the most weight if arguing for a return to mythical peacekeeping and giving ISIS parkas.   :nod:
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: PuckChaser on April 06, 2016, 11:19:06
Since it's open and public, are serving members allowed to participate? Or will they pull the "don't lobby the government QR&O"?
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: milnews.ca on April 06, 2016, 11:43:03
Since it's open and public, are serving members allowed to participate? Or will they pull the "don't lobby the government QR&O"?
This one? (http://bit.ly/1UVYRrQ)
Quote
19.36 - DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION OR OPINION

(1) For the purposes of this article, the adjective "military" shall be construed as relating not only to the Canadian Forces but also to the armed forces of any country.

(2) Subject to article 19.375 (Communications to News Agencies), no officer or non-commissioned member shall without permission obtained under article 19.37 (Permission to Communicate Information):

    publish in any form whatever or communicate directly or indirectly or otherwise disclose to an unauthorized person official information or the contents of an unpublished or classified official document or the contents thereof;
    use that information or document for a private purpose;
    publish in any form whatever any military information or the member's views on any military subject to unauthorized persons;
    deliver publicly, or record for public delivery, either directly or through the medium of radio or television, a lecture, discourse or answers to questions relating to a military subject;
    prepare a paper or write a script on any military subject for delivery or transmission to the public;
    publish the member's opinions on any military question that is under consideration by superior authorities;
    take part in public in a discussion relating to orders, regulations or instructions issued by the member's superiors;
    disclose to an unauthorized person, without the authority of the department, agency or other body concerned, any information acquired in an official capacity while seconded, attached or loaned to that department, agency or other body;
    furnish to any person, not otherwise authorized to receive them, official reports, correspondence or other documents, or copies thereof; or
    publish in writing or deliver any lecture, address or broadcast in any dealing with a subject of a controversial nature affecting other departments of the public service or pertaining to public policy.

(3) This article does not apply to a writing, lecture, address or broadcast confined exclusively to members of the Canadian Forces.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MCG on April 06, 2016, 11:49:01
Maybe those Ruxted guys will come out of their sabbatical and submitt something that is also shared here?  That could be a good read.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: PuckChaser on April 06, 2016, 14:08:40
This one? (http://bit.ly/1UVYRrQ)

That one is specific to news agencies, although QR&O19.37 allows the CDS to grant permission.

Was thinking more that they'll try to use QR&O19.38:

Quote
19.38 - COMMUNICATIONS WITH OTHER GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS

No officer or non-commissioned member shall enter into direct communication with any government department other than the Department of National Defence on subjects connected with the Canadian Forces or with the member's particular duties or future employment, unless the member is authorized to do so by or under

   a. a statute of Canada;
   b. QR&O; or
   c. instructions from National Defence Headquarters.

Considering this "open and transparent" defense review is an academic and (should be) non-partisan, we should be allowed to provide input in a respectful manner as long as you do not identify as a member of the CAF. Otherwise there's going to be 1 voice (the CDS) speaking on our behalf, and he'll be drowned out by the thousands of NDP-esque isolationists that will skew the results.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MarkOttawa on April 06, 2016, 15:01:42
"Defence Policy Review" website, with lots of links:
http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/defence-policy-review/index.asp

Twitter:

#defenceconsults
https://twitter.com/hashtag/DefenceConsults

Mark
Ottawa
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: PuckChaser on April 06, 2016, 15:24:27
For quick reference, here are the key questions from their public consulation document:
Quote
  • Are there any threats to Canada’s security that are not being addressed adequately?
    2.    What roles should the Canadian Armed Forces play domestically, including in support of civilian authorities?
    3.    How should Canada-United States cooperation on defence of North America evolve in the coming years?
    4.    What form should the CAF contribution to peace support operations take?  Is there a role for the CAF in helping to prevent conflict before it occurs?
    5.    Should the size, structure, and composition for the Canadian Armed Forces change from what they are today?
    6.    How can DND and the CAF improve the way they support the health and wellness of military members? In what areas should more be done?
    7.    Should Canada strive to maintain military capability across the full spectrum of operations? Are there specific niche areas of capability in which Canada should specialize?
    8.    What type of investments should Canada make in space, cyber, and unmanned systems? To what extent should Canada strive to keep pace and be interoperable with key allies in these domains?
    9.    What additional measures could the DND undertake, along with partner departments, to improve defence procurement?
    10.  What resources will the CAF require to meet Canada’s defence needs?
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: milnews.ca on April 06, 2016, 15:38:54
"Defence Policy Review" website, with lots of links:
http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/defence-policy-review/index.asp

Twitter:

#defenceconsults
https://twitter.com/hashtag/DefenceConsults

Mark
Ottawa
And here's who's on the advisory panel (http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=1047029&tp=930) ...
Quote
... Ministerial Advisory Panel Members

- The Honourable Louise Arbour, former Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada and a member of the Advisory Board of The Coalition for the International Criminal Court
- The Honourable Bill Graham, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, and former Minister of National Defence
- General (Ret’d) Raymond R. Henault, former Chief of the Defence Staff, and past Chairman of the NATO Military Committee (CMC)
- Margaret Purdy, former Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet (Security and Intelligence) in the Privy Council Office, and former Associate Deputy Minister of National Defence


The Honourable Louise Arbour is a jurist in residence at Borden Ladner Gervais LLP. In this capacity, she provides strategic advice to lawyers of the International Trade and Arbitration Group, in particular on issues pertaining to international disputes.

Madam Arbour sat as a justice of the Supreme Court of Canada from 1999 to 2004 after serving on the Court of Appeal for Ontario and the Supreme Court of Ontario.

She has held senior positions at the United Nations, including that of High Commissioner for Human Rights, and is a member of the Global Commission on Drug Policy and of the International Commission Against the Death Penalty. Madam Arbour is also a member of the Advisory Board of The Coalition for the International Criminal Court. She chaired an inquiry commission that investigated certain events at the Prison for Women in Kingston, Ontario, and has also served as a member of the Global Commission on Elections, Democracy and Security.

Madam Arbour graduated from Collège Régina Assumpta (Bachelor of Arts), with distinction from the Faculté de droit de l’Université de Montréal (Bachelor of Laws, LL.L) after which she was admitted to the Barreau du Québec and subsequently to the Ontario bar. Madam Arbour has received 44 Honourary Doctorates, been a Companion of the Order of Canada since 2007 and a Grand Officer of the Ordre national du Québec since 2009, as well as a Commander of the Légion d'honneur, and has been decorated by Spain, Colombia and Belgium.

The Honourable Bill Graham is currently Chancellor of Trinity College at the University of Toronto, as well as Chair of the Canadian International Council, and Honorary Colonel of the Governor General's Horse Guards. He has taught at the University of Toronto Faculty of Law and practiced general litigation and international commercial transactions as a Partner with the firm of Fasken and Calvin. In 1993 he was elected Member of Parliament for Toronto-Centre-Rosedale, and from 1995-2002 served as Chairman of the Standing Committee of the House of Commons on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. He was Minister of Foreign Affairs from 2002-2004, and Minister of National Defence from 2004-2006. From February to December 2006, he was Leader of the Official Opposition and Interim Leader of the Liberal Party of Canada.

The Hon. Bill Graham was educated at the University of Toronto (Bachelor of Arts, Honours; Bachelor of Laws LL.B ) and the Université de Paris (Doctorat en Sciences Juridiques). Among other awards and decorations, he is a Chevalier de la Légion d'Honneur of  France, has received the Golden Jubilee Medal and been appointed into the Order of Canada.

General (Ret’d) Raymond R. Henault, who retired from the Canadian Forces in August 2008, is the longest-serving 4-star General in Canadian history. He is now the Strategic Executive Advisor and Chairman of the Strategic Advisory Board for the ADGA Group of Companies in Ottawa, ON. General Henault’s military career began in 1968 as a fighter pilot, and has included a wide variety of command and staff positions including Commander of 444 Tac Hel Squadron in Germany, Base Commander CFB Portage la Prairie, Commander of 10 Tactical Air Group, Chief of Staff Operations at Air Command Headquarters in Winnipeg, and Deputy Chief of the Air Staff and Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff in Ottawa, ON. In June 2001, he was appointed Chief of the Defence Staff and was in command of the Canadian Forces on 9/11.

In 2004, General Henault was elected by his peers as Chairman of the NATO Military Committee (CMC) at NATO HQ in Brussels, Belgium, a position he assumed in June 2005. Representing all NATO Chiefs of Defence, he acted as the Senior Military Advisor to the North Atlantic Council and held the highest military position in the North Atlantic Alliance.

General Henault is a graduate of the University of Manitoba (Bachelor of Arts), Canada’s National Defence College and the École supérieure de guerre aérienne in Paris, France. He holds an Honorary Doctorate of Laws from the University of Manitoba, an Honorary Doctorate from the Royal Military College (Military Science) and holds the position of Honorary Professor of the University of Pecs, Hungary.

Margaret Purdy is President of Margaret Purdy Consulting Inc., a Nova Scotia-based firm providing strategic advice to public sector clients on national security, public safety and emergency management.  Her entire 28-year federal government career was spent in the areas of policing, security, intelligence and defence and included assignments as Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet (Security and Intelligence) in the Privy Council Office and as Associate Deputy Minister of National Defence. In recent years, Ms. Purdy has served as interim Chair of the Board of Directors of the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority and as the Chair of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Audit Committee. She is currently a member of the Communications Security Establishment and National Defence Audit Committees.

Margaret Purdy has published and lectured on the root causes of terrorism, cyber security, critical infrastructure protection, the security of trade and transportation gateways, and Canada’s counter-terrorism policy. At the Liu Institute for Global Issues at the University of British Columbia, she led a major research project focusing on the national security, public safety and international security implications of climate change for Canada.  Ms. Purdy is a graduate of Carleton University (Bachelor of Journalism Honours), Dalhousie University (Bachelor of Education) and the National Defence College of Canada.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: PuckChaser on April 06, 2016, 15:43:15
Glad it's non partisan...:facepalm:
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Oldgateboatdriver on April 06, 2016, 15:59:07
Yep! Just like the key questions asked are not loaded at all towards becoming a constabulary.

 :sarcasm:
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: FSTO on April 06, 2016, 16:21:24
Yep! Just like the key questions asked are not loaded at all towards becoming a constabulary.

 :sarcasm:

So can we as serving members participate in the discussion forum? I filled out the form and checked "Defence Stakeholder", couldn't they just put "CAF Member"?
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: PuckChaser on April 06, 2016, 16:30:14
So can we as serving members participate in the discussion forum? I filled out the form and checked "Defence Stakeholder", couldn't they just put "CAF Member"?

Technically no, but unless we self-identify as a CAF member, how would they know? The Minister needs to show some leadership here, and issue a directive that CAF members can participate. I even got a nice email on DWAN inviting me to help.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: FSTO on April 06, 2016, 16:33:50
Technically no, but unless we self-identify as a CAF member, how would they know? The Minister needs to show some leadership here, and issue a directive that CAF members can participate. I even got a nice email on DWAN inviting me to help.

True, and I assume (a dangerous thing I know) that if the centre has sent this invite to all us unwashed then they are implying that we are free to participate. Correct?
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Journeyman on April 06, 2016, 16:35:45
I filled out the form and checked "Defence Stakeholder".....
That would be a default setting for all Canadians.  Ahh, the blissful ignorance of sheeple.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: PuckChaser on April 06, 2016, 16:37:19
True, and I assume (a dangerous thing I know) that if the centre has sent this invite to all us unwashed then they are implying that we are free to participate. Correct?

Reasonable doubt if they charge you, I guess?  ;D
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Chris Pook on April 06, 2016, 16:45:55
That would be a default setting for all Canadians.  Ahh, the blissful ignorance of sheeple.

I wuz thinking the same thing.

I need a bottle to settle my stomach after reading that stramash.  If feels like a Marvin day.

(https://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fcr4.globalspec.com%2FPostImages%2F201109%2FMarvin_the_robot_97A141EE-90A8-4A3A-D08A7695C320C8DF.png&hash=4f2a9294e8f901431c7c0a7c23fb9091)
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: FSTO on April 06, 2016, 16:46:44
Reasonable doubt if they charge you, I guess?  ;D
Ignorance of the law is no defence.  ;D
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: milnews.ca on April 06, 2016, 16:54:51
This part's VERY interesting:
I even got a nice email on DWAN inviting me to help.
True, and I assume (a dangerous thing I know) that if the centre has sent this invite to all us unwashed then they are implying that we are free to participate. Correct?
If there's been an all-points-bulletin email clearly saying, "hey, there's a review going on", that's one thing.  If the e-mail doesn't clearly say something like, "you can send your concerns directly outside of the chain of command to xxxx@youllremainanonymous.ca", though ...

So can we as serving members participate in the discussion forum? I filled out the form and checked "Defence Stakeholder", couldn't they just put "CAF Member"?
While CF members are, indeed, defence stakeholders, there's no QR&O's saying stakeholders can't, without permission, "publish in writing or deliver any lecture, address or broadcast in any dealing with a subject of a controversial nature affecting other departments of the public service or pertaining to public policy".  I'd love to hear from someone with more legal chops about this sort of distinction.

It may be a fine line between "providing input as a citizen" and "commenting on government policy as a service member."  Also, would it be dealt with differently with the Minister hearing "x" from front-line bureaucrat and "y" from that bureaucrat's DM?

Let's see if anything comes out of the Twitter-sphere from this question (https://twitter.com/milnews_ca/status/717803055660593156) to the Minister from a fat, old, former Mo' guy  ;D
Quote
Question: how do members of the CF share their ideas?

If only there was a collective group that could share the collective concerns of the front-line folks (https://army.ca/forums/index.php/topic,1294.0.html) ...  >:D
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: PuckChaser on April 06, 2016, 17:08:58
Let's see if anything comes out of the Twitter-sphere from this question (https://twitter.com/milnews_ca/status/717803055660593156) to the Minister from a fat, old, former Mo' guy  ;D

I liked it. Hopefully I'm not in cells tomorrow. Probably would be if I was in Bagotville though....  >:D
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jollyjacktar on April 06, 2016, 17:09:55
I wuz thinking the same thing.

I need a bottle to settle my stomach after reading that stramash.  If feels like a Marvin day.

(https://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fcr4.globalspec.com%2FPostImages%2F201109%2FMarvin_the_robot_97A141EE-90A8-4A3A-D08A7695C320C8DF.png&hash=4f2a9294e8f901431c7c0a7c23fb9091)

That is the avatar for how I feel about the trade amalgamation, etc.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: milnews.ca on April 06, 2016, 17:20:23
Hopefully I'm not in cells tomorrow.
At worst, the "discussion" without coffee & Timbits, right?   ;D  Well, at one level, it IS a fair question, especially if you got an email (mind you, I know how government emails are written, so I don't know how many of the big three - accuracy, brevity, clarity - are in it).  Sometimes, us civvies can ask "that guy" questions more easily.

Mind you, I'm also guessing people calling for CF members to comment in this process may have had their noses out of joint if some serving members wanted to comment to, say, the Manley Commission on where AFG should have gone at that point.

Watch & shoot ...
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MilEME09 on April 06, 2016, 18:19:40
I am agreeing with some of the critics on this defense review, many are saying "what is the point?" given that in the throne speach and the budget we very clearly saw the direction the liberals want to take the CAF, and unless something massively different comes out from the public consultations and the review as a whole, I believe it will just be twisted to suit their own political agenda.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Bird_Gunner45 on April 06, 2016, 19:14:27
I am agreeing with some of the critics on this defense review, many are saying "what is the point?" given that in the throne speach and the budget we very clearly saw the direction the liberals want to take the CAF, and unless something massively different comes out from the public consultations and the review as a whole, I believe it will just be twisted to suit their own political agenda.

I'm looking forward to what John from Toronto's views are on the requirement for an expeditionary GBAD capability to shield roto 0 troops from UAS/provide C-ISR, Glenda from Cape Breton's views on the acquisition of the F35 as a means of providing interoperability within NATO, or Joe's thoughts on the requirement for submarines to patrol sea lines of communications.

The average Canadian is that up on defence policy right?

This has all the fixings of a meeting made up of like-minded people controlling a "public" forum to make it seem that liberal views are representative of all Canadians. While there is something of an argument that +/- 60% of the Canadian population is left-wing oriented, the defence views of typical liberal and NDP supporters have traditionally been quite different, so I'm not sure that this applies as much as it might to social issues.

Also, what happens if magically the people agree we need the F35? Is the PM going to reverse this (random) decision?
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jollyjacktar on April 06, 2016, 19:21:02
As you put it that way, it does almost seem as if the "fix" is in.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MilEME09 on April 06, 2016, 19:21:57
To many what if's I think for now, notice too the public consultations are in more liberal leaning areas, and also away from major defense establishments, the NDP Defense critic was annoyed in an interview on CTV that the consultation was being held in Vancouver and not Victoria. So he plans to hold his own public consultations outside the liberal sphere.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: PuckChaser on April 06, 2016, 19:56:02
To many what if's I think for now, notice too the public consultations are in more liberal leaning areas, and also away from major defense establishments, the NDP Defense critic was annoyed in an interview on CTV that the consultation was being held in Vancouver and not Victoria. So he plans to hold his own public consultations outside the liberal sphere.

The website did say if there were community events being held, to submit them and they would be posted on the site. I'd like to think they wouldn't have the balls to not list a submitted one from the NDP defense critic....
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Cloud Cover on April 06, 2016, 20:00:47
'Stay alive, till 2025". Because thats how long this government is going to last.  This review and the result from it will be absolutely meaningless to those who don't give two frigs about defence, so thats about 90 percent of the general population and 100 percent of the Liberal party.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: milnews.ca on April 06, 2016, 20:17:48
This review and the result from it will be absolutely meaningless to those who don't give two frigs about defence, so thats about 90 percent of the general population ...
Sadly, how's that different from any defence review in Canada?  :(

Still, like buying a lottery ticket, speaking your piece raises the odds of being heard from impossible to improbable ...
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MarkOttawa on April 06, 2016, 20:23:53
Carleton Prof. Steve Saideman has some doubts about the places where consultation round-tables will be held:

"Canadian Defence Review: Substance or Paper"
http://saideman.blogspot.ca/2016/04/canadian-defence-review-substance-or.html

Mark
Ottawa
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: LunchMeat on April 06, 2016, 20:58:21
Another excellent piece by Colonel Ted Campbell on the Defence Review.


https://coloneltedcampbell.wordpress.com/2016/04/05/the-defence-review-2/ (https://coloneltedcampbell.wordpress.com/2016/04/05/the-defence-review-2/)
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jollyjacktar on April 06, 2016, 21:19:46
Col. Hammond is spot on.  Excellent read.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: LunchMeat on April 07, 2016, 05:51:19
Col. Hammond is spot on.  Excellent read.

Now, the government says they'd like input from everyone (and anyone?) on the Defence Review, I'm hoping Col. Hammond, Prof. Alexander Moens, and other brilliant minds alike actually submit their suggestions to the MND and he listens.

I'm banking on the MND's long and honourable career as a Reservist to hopefully play a role in actually listening and taking a vested interest in the people that this affects the most: the working/fighting troops, and the Canadians we are there to defend.

I'm sick of the constant pandering to politicos. Give us proper compensation, proper equipment, and give us a purpose to stick around for the long haul.

I hope I'm making sense here... It's been a long night shift
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: E.R. Campbell on April 07, 2016, 08:50:13
Now, the government says they'd like input from everyone (and anyone?) on the Defence Review, I'm hoping Col. Hammond, Prof. Alexander Moens, and other brilliant minds alike actually submit their suggestions to the MND and he listens. My suspicion (reasonably well founded, I think) is that the MND will not have much to do with the review, proper. It will be done by (hopefully) senior officials, maybe (worst case) by political hacks and flacks in Toronto and Montreal; my fear is that those political hacks and flacks have already done the first draft of the review and the second draft will just involve adding references to "friendly" submissions and a few paragraphs of rebuttal to unfriendly ones ~ "unfriendly" advice being the sort already offered by Col Hammond and Prof Moens.

I'm banking on the MND's long and honourable career as a Reservist to hopefully play a role in actually listening and taking a vested interest in the people that this affects the most: the working/fighting troops, and the Canadians we are there to defend.  See my comments, just above, about who really sets defence policy. If Prime Minister Trudeau was interested in a really informed, expert, military opinion then Andrew Leslie would be the MND ~ he's not, so you may rest assured that the PMO is not interested in informed, expert advice. It needs a "review" that will support its big spending, social agenda ... it will get one.

I'm sick of the constant pandering to politicos. Give us proper compensation, proper equipment, and give us a purpose to stick around for the long haul.

I hope I'm making sense here... It's been a long night shift
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: George Wallace on April 07, 2016, 09:03:24
Personally, in line with ERC's post, I am having just a few quandaries with what we will see come out of this:

From CBC: http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-defence-review-sajjan-1.3523414
Quote
The ministerial advisory panel members are:

Louise Arbour, a former Supreme Court justice, member of the advisory board of the Coalition for the International Criminal Court and former UN high commissioner for human rights.

Bill Graham, former Liberal minister of foreign affairs and national defence.

Ray Henault, former chief of the defence staff and past chair of the NATO military committee.

Margaret Purdy, former associate deputy minister of national defence.


Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: milnews.ca on April 07, 2016, 10:56:42
Personally, in line with ERC's post, I am having just a few quandaries with what we will see come out of this:

From CBC: http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-defence-review-sajjan-1.3523414
Quote
The ministerial advisory panel members are:

Louise Arbour, a former Supreme Court justice, member of the advisory board of the Coalition for the International Criminal Court and former UN high commissioner for human rights.

Bill Graham, former Liberal minister of foreign affairs and national defence.

Ray Henault, former chief of the defence staff and past chair of the NATO military committee.

Margaret Purdy, former associate deputy minister of national defence.
More in the microbios here (https://army.ca/forums/index.php/topic,22099.msg1428499.html#msg1428499).
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Thucydides on April 07, 2016, 11:29:05
Quote
If Prime Minister Trudeau was interested in a really informed, expert, military opinion then Andrew Leslie would be the MND ~ he's not, so you may rest assured that the PMO is not interested in informed, expert advice. It needs a "review" that will support its big spending, social agenda ... it will get one.

One "Decade of darkness" per career should be enough for anyone...
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: E.R. Campbell on April 07, 2016, 13:28:37
One "Decade of darkness" per career should be enough for anyone...


Oh, I had three of them:

   1. Trudeau père (1968-84) really wanted to disband the CF. When his own cabinet rebelled he settled for just starving us to death;

   2. Mulroney (1984-1992) who might have wanted to strengthen the CF but who was constrained by Pierre Trudeau's fiscal legacy; and

   3. Chrétien (1993 until well after I retired) who simply didn't like (or trust) the military and was very, very well attuned to Canadians' broad and general distaste for defence spending.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: George Wallace on April 07, 2016, 13:46:48

Oh, I had three of them:

   1. Trudeau père (1968-84) really wanted to disband the CF. When his own cabinet rebelled he settled for just starving us to death;

   2. Mulroney (1984-1992) who might have wanted to strengthen the CF but who was constrained by Pierre Trudeau's fiscal legacy; and

   3. Chrétien (1993 until well after I retired) who simply didn't like (or trust) the military and was very, very well attuned to Canadians' broad and general distaste for defence spending.

GOD!  Now I feel depressed......Having served during all of those 'reigns'.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jollyjacktar on April 07, 2016, 13:58:53
Yes, and still going today as I started in 80 with a short break between 85-89.  The years between Chretien and today were not necessarily much better at times for that matter.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Eye In The Sky on April 07, 2016, 14:07:52
But...we have new ranks!   ;D
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Retired AF Guy on April 07, 2016, 14:17:04

Oh, I had three of them:

   1. Trudeau père (1968-84) really wanted to disband the CF. When his own cabinet rebelled he settled for just starving us to death;

   2. Mulroney (1984-1992) who might have wanted to strengthen the CF but who was constrained by Pierre Trudeau's fiscal legacy; and

   3. Chrétien (1993 until well after I retired) who simply didn't like (or trust) the military and was very, very well attuned to Canadians' broad and general distaste for defence spending.

The same here.. should have gotten a medal for it.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: George Wallace on April 07, 2016, 14:45:06
But...we have new ranks!   ;D

And we are on V 2.0  [:D
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jollyjacktar on April 07, 2016, 15:29:54
But...we have new ranks!   ;D

I didn't know I had a new smell.   Hope it's pleasant like Gain detergent or Axe...
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Eye In The Sky on April 07, 2016, 16:27:00
And we are on V 2.0  [:D

Hey I guess that is right.  So, does that mean we have "new" new ranks?  Or is it *new* "new" new ranks now?  They are changing so fast I can't keep up!
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: milnews.ca on April 08, 2016, 07:49:13
Technically no, but unless we self-identify as a CAF member, how would they know? The Minister needs to show some leadership here, and issue a directive that CAF members can participate. I even got a nice email on DWAN inviting me to help.
Another option:  one could host a "consultation event" (http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/defence-policy-review/consultation-events.asp) ...
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MilEME09 on April 14, 2016, 16:14:54
"This has all happened before, and it will happen again"

Quote
http://news.nationalpost.com/full-comment/douglas-bland-get-ready-for-the-defence-cuts

Douglas Bland: Get ready for the defence cuts

Prime Minster Justin Trudeau promised Canadians that he would “invest in our Armed Forces,” but to date he has not explained how he will do so. Rather, on April 6, the National Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan announced not a review to develop a new defence policy, but a “defence consultation” meant to “help set future direction and priorities” for the Canadian Forces.

Why has the government launched this complicated public consultation, instead of a focused defence policy review? Previous policy reviews always provided opportunities for citizens, scholars, and defence-related organizations and institutes to contribute directly to such policy reviews. Why could a wide survey of Canadian’s opinions on defence policy not be incorporated into a comprehensive review?

It appears that Trudeau’s consultations are merely intended to cloak until next year or beyond the government’s intention to make deep cuts to the Canadian Forces and the defence budget. This isn’t a new approach. Prime minister Jean Chrétien used the same tactics in 1994

On Feb. 23, 1994, with Chrétien’s support, the Senate and the House of Commons created a Special Joint Committee (SJC) on Canada’s Defence Policy to undertake “a review of Canadian defence policy.” Later that year, the SJC presented its recommendations as to “the principles, purposes, and objectives (that) should guide our government in setting out Canada’s defence policy.” The committee’s final report was widely praised by citizens, scholars, senators, and members of parliament. Chrétien, however, was not pleased.

Almost immediately after the eport was made public, then-defence minister David Collenette, tabled the government’s Defence White Paper, a policy developed in great secrecy while the SJC was in session. In his introduction to the white paper — and to the outrage of some members of the SJC — Collenette simply declared: “The SJC played an integral role in shaping Canada’s new defence policy. … (However) the committee’s recommendations concerning the size of the Regular Force were judged to be inconsistent with the financial parameters within which the DND must operate. Cuts deeper than those envisioned by the SJC will be required to meet the Government’s deficit reduction target.”

No more was heard of the SJC report during Chrétien’s time in government.

The reality was that Chrétien had decided, as he makes clear in his memoir, to reduce significantly defence spending and that objective became Canada’s national defence policy.

Prime Minister Trudeau is following Chrétien’s lead, but he needs a credible rational to support his defence budget cuts and time to construct an “in the national interest” rationale for them. Thus, his scheme to let Canadians “inform the development of a new defence policy for Canada” may simply be — as was the 1994 SJC for Chrétien — a shield meant to protect the government in the short term should anyone ask, “What’s Canada’s national defence policy?”

If the advisory panel concludes that Canadians support the need for an increase, and not cuts, in defence spending, we should expect Sajjan one day to announce — Collenette-like —  “The public consultations recommendations concerning defence policy were judged to be inconsistent with the financial parameters within which the DND must operate.”

Afterward, perhaps close to the next election, Trudeau’s real defence policy will be unveiled.

National Post

Douglas Bland is a retired Canadian Army officer and professor emeritus at Queen’s University.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Oldgateboatdriver on April 14, 2016, 16:44:41
 :bravo:

I believe our friends in Armour would say to this: Target! .... traversing left.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Chris Pook on April 14, 2016, 17:22:21
:bravo:

I believe our friends in Armour would say to this: Target! .... traversing left.

Agreed.

Trudeau's Modus Operandi is looking more and more like the old Liberal game plan.  Have lots of meetings.  Say lots of stuff.  Do whatever they please.

For the Press, well they get lots of stuff to cover.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Canuck_Jock on April 14, 2016, 17:35:30
How long before we hear that old chestnut of "smaller but more capable force.." It is pretty well scripted for politicians, but the logical end state is that the smallest force is the most capable?
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: RCPalmer on April 14, 2016, 19:08:47
How long before we hear that old chestnut of "smaller but more capable force.." It is pretty well scripted for politicians, but the logical end state is that the smallest force is the most capable?

Now, I would obviously love to see both funding and personnel growth within the CAF, but sometimes I wonder what we would do with additional resources if we got them.  There are some macro comparisons that are a bit troubling.  Now, I think that it can be fairly reasonably argued the ADF maintains all of the capability sets that the CAF does (with the possible exception of some arctic capabilities), and quite a few that we don't such as attack helicopters and amphibious assault ships.  Geographical considerations such as distances between bases and units impact the operations and maintenance of our forces in similar ways.  Benefits are comparable, and the size and structure of the reserve force of both nations is quite similar.  However:

Canada spends 14 Billion (U.S.) annually to maintain a full time force of 68,000.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canadian_Armed_Forces

Australia spends 22 Billion (U.S.) annually to maintain a full time force of 57,000.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Australian_Defence_Force

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_military_expenditures

In short, they do more with more money and fewer personnel.  So, it begs the question, "what are the differences"?  I hope it isn't just building winterization and heating.  At first blush, it looks like the Aussies spend more of their money on capital projects, while Canada spends a greater portion of its budget on keeping people in uniform full time.  I'm not necessarily saying that the Aussies it right and we have it wrong, but we must not immediately decry any call for re-alignment or reform, and at some point we may have to trade capabilities for personnel to operate within a finite funding envelope.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Dimsum on April 14, 2016, 19:22:28
In short, they do more with more money and fewer personnel.  So, it begs the question, "what are the differences"?  I hope it isn't just building winterization and heating.  At first blush, it looks like the Aussies spend more of their money on capital projects, while Canada spends a greater portion of its budget on keeping people in uniform full time.  I'm not necessarily saying that the Aussies it right and we have it wrong, but we must not immediately decry any call for re-alignment or reform, and at some point we may have to trade capabilities for personnel to operate within a finite funding envelope.

I wonder how much $ would be saved by bundling all of the squadrons of a type in one place, like the Aussies do with all their assets besides fighters.  For example, the two line squadrons and training squadron of their AP-3Cs (Aurora equivalents) are all in Adelaide, so people posted there can expect to stay there for a while instead of getting posted every 3 or so years to the opposite coast like what happens in the RCAF. 

It's not to say that no one ever gets posted in the RAAF, but unless it's for a staff posting in Canberra or similar, they seem to get moved less.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MilEME09 on April 14, 2016, 19:55:52
I think you have to look at the personal break down as well, we are very top heavy as a military, where I suspect the ADF isn't. If the CAF expanded we don't need more officers, we have enough already, they just need to get moved around. I would be interested to see what the average procurement time is for the ADF as well, and compare our two systems.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: RCPalmer on April 14, 2016, 19:58:59
I wonder how much $ would be saved by bundling all of the squadrons of a type in one place, like the Aussies do with all their assets besides fighters.  For example, the two line squadrons and training squadron of their AP-3Cs (Aurora equivalents) are all in Adelaide, so people posted there can expect to stay there for a while instead of getting posted every 3 or so years to the opposite coast like what happens in the RCAF. 

It's not to say that no one ever gets posted in the RAAF, but unless it's for a staff posting in Canberra or similar, they seem to get moved less.

I'm sure the cost of postings is a factor, and I have heard anecdotally that members move around less in the ADF.  With regards to the cost savings of consolidating aircraft by type, I would imagine that an operational imperative in the CAF driving up a cost (in this case two widely separated coasts requiring surveillance capabilities) would have some ADF equivalent to balance things out. Maybe they have to fly further in hotter climates driving up fuel costs?...I don't know.  My point here is that it is not unfair for the government to ask us to become more efficient. I am sure there is a lot we could do.  That said, my worry is that when cuts have come in the past, we have been inclined to cut meat, not fat.


Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: dapaterson on April 14, 2016, 20:00:11
I think you have to look at the personal break down as well, we are very top heavy as a military, where I suspect the ADF isn't. If the CAF expanded we don't need more officers, we have enough already, they just need to get moved around. I would be interested to see what the average procurement time is for the ADF as well, and compare our two systems.

Except when we expanded the Reg F we grew the number of officers.  And continue to do so.  We have more LCols in a Reg F of 68K today than we did in a Reg F of 87K in 1990.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MilEME09 on April 14, 2016, 20:10:35
Except when we expanded the Reg F we grew the number of officers.  And continue to do so.  We have more LCols in a Reg F of 68K today than we did in a Reg F of 87K in 1990.

thus our problem, I remember one of my Mcpls did the math and it's like 1 officer for every 3 NCM's. That is a ridiculously high ratio for a military of our size, I think we need a reduction in our officer intake, and the elimination of some positions via attrition.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Flavus101 on April 15, 2016, 00:17:08
There was an interesting conversation had in my unit about officers intruding into what was traditionally NCO territory for day to day operations. I am not sure if this is a localized thing (keep in mind we are talking reserve force) or if this is CAF wide?

Perhaps this train of thought deserves a whole other topic.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: PuckChaser on April 15, 2016, 00:50:38
There was an interesting conversation had in my unit about officers intruding into what was traditionally NCO territory for day to day operations. I am not sure if this is a localized thing (keep in mind we are talking reserve force) or if this is CAF wide?

Perhaps this train of thought deserves a whole other topic.

When you have too many officers, they run out of tasks and get into my world. Some take the correction, and others use the entitled attitude given to them at RMC to annoy the living daylights out of us.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: RCPalmer on April 15, 2016, 12:07:22
thus our problem, I remember one of my Mcpls did the math and it's like 1 officer for every 3 NCM's. That is a ridiculously high ratio for a military of our size, I think we need a reduction in our officer intake, and the elimination of some positions via attrition.


I would assert that this issue is more TOS driven.  The CAF needs a lot more officers at the bottom of the pyramid than at the top, but we let pretty much everyone stay to CRA.  Most other armies employ "up or out" (in the case of the Americans), or fixed career lengths (in the case of the Brits).  Prior to unification there was a different retirement age for every rank.  We must of course respect the charter, which means that anything age based is likely out the window, (and I bet CRA won't stand up to a charter challenge in the long run) it doesn't mean that we need to keep every member until retirement.

 I would also note that there are some areas where we are still short officers. The reserve force for example is as a whole desperately short of trained junior officers (Lts and Capts), and that has significant CT and IT implications for us.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Brasidas on April 15, 2016, 14:28:00

I would assert that this issue is more TOS driven.  The CAF needs a lot more officers at the bottom of the pyramid than at the top, but we let pretty much everyone stay to CRA.  Most other armies employ "up or out" (in the case of the Americans), or fixed career lengths (in the case of the Brits).  Prior to unification there was a different retirement age for every rank.  We must of course respect the charter, which means that anything age based is likely out the window, (and I bet CRA won't stand up to a charter challenge in the long run) it doesn't mean that we need to keep every member until retirement.

 I would also note that there are some areas where we are still short officers. The reserve force for example is as a whole desperately short of trained junior officers (Lts and Capts), and that has significant CT and IT implications for us.

What about just not promoting Capts?
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: RCPalmer on April 15, 2016, 14:46:14
What about just not promoting Capts?

Very true.  In the reserve world, we have an annoying habit of tolerating no gaps at the top of the hierarchy but enormous gaps at the bottom, so we are constantly promoting our best people which takes them away from the activities that matter (ie training soldiers).  At the LCol and CWO level, we often promote them out of a job entirely.  If we are ever going to stabilize the PRes personnel state, we are going to have to stop doing that.

However, this concept has limitations.  Just as the Corporal with 20 years of service isn't likely to be in a rifle section, the 20 year Capt isn't likely to be suitable for employment in a core role either.  Now, I'm not saying that there is never a place for long term Capts or Cpls (and I realize that tech trades are a somewhat different animal), but because we keep everyone, we have a glut of pers who are only suitable for the non-core roles.  This contributes to the institutional bloat, and apart from being very expensive, leads to our current situation of ever growing staffs chasing, (micro)managing and tasking increasingly hollow organizations.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: E.R. Campbell on April 22, 2016, 07:33:40
This, BGen (ret'd) Jim Cox, in the Vimy Report (http://thevimyreport.com/2016/04/defence-lite/), ought to be required reading.

Brooke Claxton was, in my mind, the "very model of a modern defence minister," he had a fine, legal mind and he was in no awe, at all, of the admirals and generals in the CF ... he had, himself, only limited military experience (as a battery Sergeant Major in the First World War) but that didn't matter: he (and St Laurent) had a clear eyed view of the world, of Canada's place in it and of the resources available. The world was infinitely more complex and dangerous than anything any Canadian government, especially this one, has faced since: there were emerging real, existential threats to Canada and a national grand strategy was required (which St Laurent provided) so that a clear, comprehensive and flexible defence policy could be crafted. It was:

     “to defend Canada against aggression, to assist the civil power in maintaining law and order within the country, and to carry out any undertaking which by our own voluntary act, we may assume in cooperation with
     friendly nations or under any effective plan of collective action under the United Nations.


That was it. If Prime Minister Trudeau had set that forth as a start point then I would have some hope for the Defence Review, as it is ...  :dunno:

Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Old Sweat on April 28, 2016, 15:55:31
The Canadian Press reports in this story reproduced under the Fair Dealing provision of the Copyright Act that a retired admiral has testified that politicians and bureaucrats paralyze the defence decision making process.

DND paralyzed as politicians and bureaucrats pass the buck, says retired admiral

By The Canadian Press — Apr 28 2016

OTTAWA — A retired admiral is telling the Trudeau government's defence review that National Defence is often paralyzed by timid bureaucrats and politicians who pass the buck on decisions.

Retired vice-admiral Bruce Donaldson, who until a few years ago was second-in-command of the military, says in a written brief that the system is set up to avoid risk and accountability.

That, he says, leads to costly delays and failure to deliver necessary equipment and support.

Donaldson, who retired in 2013, also says the public has little understanding of government finances and has been encouraged to see spending on the military as wasteful.

He suggests government has done a poor job of educating citizens on the necessary cost of doing business as a country.

The Liberals held the first in a series of six public consultations this week in Vancouver as Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan attempts to craft an updated vision for the military.

 



Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Underway on April 28, 2016, 16:34:22
Now, I would obviously love to see both funding and personnel growth within the CAF, but sometimes I wonder what we would do with additional resources if we got them.  There are some macro comparisons that are a bit troubling.  Now, I think that it can be fairly reasonably argued the ADF maintains all of the capability sets that the CAF does (with the possible exception of some arctic capabilities), and quite a few that we don't such as attack helicopters and amphibious assault ships.  Geographical considerations such as distances between bases and units impact the operations and maintenance of our forces in similar ways.  Benefits are comparable, and the size and structure of the reserve force of both nations is quite similar.  However:

Canada spends 14 Billion (U.S.) annually to maintain a full time force of 68,000.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canadian_Armed_Forces

Australia spends 22 Billion (U.S.) annually to maintain a full time force of 57,000.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Australian_Defence_Force

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_military_expenditures

In short, they do more with more money and fewer personnel.  So, it begs the question, "what are the differences"?  I hope it isn't just building winterization and heating.  At first blush, it looks like the Aussies spend more of their money on capital projects, while Canada spends a greater portion of its budget on keeping people in uniform full time.  I'm not necessarily saying that the Aussies it right and we have it wrong, but we must not immediately decry any call for re-alignment or reform, and at some point we may have to trade capabilities for personnel to operate within a finite funding envelope.

You'll probably find on further research that the element balance is different.  The CAF is very army heavy.  The Aussies have a much larger Navy (pers wise) than we do.  They also operate more aircraft.  Also you'll find that the Aussies are the highest paid military in the world.  Canada is second (though I can't find the ref where I read that).  Cost differences are found there.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: FSTO on April 28, 2016, 17:13:01
You'll probably find on further research that the element balance is different.  The CAF is very army heavy.  The Aussies have a much larger Navy (pers wise) than we do.  They also operate more aircraft.  Also you'll find that the Aussies are the highest paid military in the world.  Canada is second (though I can't find the ref where I read that).  Cost differences are found there.

This might get me banned here, but why is the army so large in relation to the Navy and Air Force? We depend more on sea lanes and air lanes for trade and communications, and a larger standing army vice a well equipped Navy and Air Force doesn't seem to be the proper way to spend limited funds.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: kratz on April 28, 2016, 17:31:43
This might get me banned here, but why is the army so large in relation to the Navy and Air Force? <snip>

The over-simplified answer is optics. "The army is cheaper and more versatile" to sell to the public compared to the RCN or RCAF. The cost of a few hundred or thousand [**fill in item here**] is far cheaper sounding than 12 ships for $55 billion over 40 years. The cost comparison to the average taxpayer just doesn't sell as easily, even when the accounting process is the same. Over those 40 years, what the army eats up in funding equals or surpasses the navy or air force, but nobody notices because the incremental costs are so much lower for specified items (boots, uniforms, trucks ect...)
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MilEME09 on April 28, 2016, 17:54:29
This might get me banned here, but why is the army so large in relation to the Navy and Air Force? We depend more on sea lanes and air lanes for trade and communications, and a larger standing army vice a well equipped Navy and Air Force doesn't seem to be the proper way to spend limited funds.

I have thought similarly, but I don't think our army is large, by comparison to the other branches it is, but not being able to sustain a battle group long term in A-stan shows the army isn't what it needs to be. That said I believe our navy should be double it's current size, ditto for the airforce. Problem is that costs money. The way I see it, if we had the budget to do so I would do the following,

Army

- Increase the regular force to 27,000, add a new Coy to existing units, or stand up new reg force units that were put to null strength in the 90's
- New units could be based out of existing facilities after some upgrades
- Increase the PRes to 18,000, both by expanding current units, and reactivating units on the supplementary order of battle
- Invest in a well rounded army including robust GBAD, and Anti-armour capabilities

Navy

-Increase personal to 13,000 Regular, and 10,000 NAVRES
-increase the number of surface vessels by 1.5, and triple our submarine force
-Build a fully capable facility in Manitoba to act as a midway point for arctic operations

Airfoce

-Increase Reg force personal to 18,000, and AirRes up to 8,000
-invest in using smaller existing airports for airRes to train, or have property at larger airports that could be joint reg/res facilities
- increase our rotor wing capabilities, double our SAR capabilities to increase response times coast to coast
- double our combat aircraft from out current ~70 CF-18's to 140 aircraft of what ever we decide to buy
- double our super herc fleet to give us a larger transport capability


Now I am no expert, but these are just my thoughts
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: dapaterson on April 28, 2016, 17:59:34
Army Res is already around 18K, so you are proposing no change.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Journeyman on April 28, 2016, 18:06:07
The over-simplified answer is optics.
You're probably right.  Canadians have this peacekeeper mythology, and they tend not to picture sailors or air.. force-persons standing in dusty, dirty, impoverished, garbage-strewn dumps wearing light blue berets.  They think army.  It's not personal; it's just optics.

"The army is cheaper and more versatile" to sell to the public ....
I suspect that you'll be hard pressed to find 1 Canadian in 20 who is really tracking defence spending -- whether media-driven or actually informed, so I doubt that's remotely a factor in the size of the three services.

If you want a more useful metric, maybe look at the size of the operational army, navy, air force, and contrast those  with the amount of HQ and 'other' elements (Base support, staff colleges, ceremonial/show dog&pony); that may give you a more valued argument than simplistic army vs navy vs air force.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Chris Pook on April 28, 2016, 18:17:38
Related thought:

How many of us are aware of the cost of policing Canada?  Providing fire response?  Ambulances and Emergency Rooms?  CSIS? CSE?  Private security?  Coast Guard?

The CAF falls within that group of services.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: RCPalmer on April 28, 2016, 18:59:56
You'll probably find on further research that the element balance is different.  The CAF is very army heavy.  The Aussies have a much larger Navy (pers wise) than we do.  They also operate more aircraft.  Also you'll find that the Aussies are the highest paid military in the world.  Canada is second (though I can't find the ref where I read that).  Cost differences are found there.

I would still assert that they maintain a more robust capability set with significantly fewer people which merits some thought for our own posture.  That said, let's do a quick comparison of the full time component: 

Canadian Army:22,800
RCN:8,500
RCAF:14,500
Other Commands: 22,200
Total: 68,000

Australian Army: 28,568
RAN:14,215
RAAF:14,120
Total: 56,903

The Army is by far the largest element in both forces (proportionately larger in the Australian Army), but as you say the Australians have clearly emphasized their Navy relative to what Canada has done. That said, the comparison is a bit skewed due to the organic aviation capabilities found within the RAN and Australian Army, and the fact that there is no easy way break out the purple component of the CAF by the environments they support.

To compare the structures of the Armies as an example, there are a lot of similarities:

Canadian Army: 3 Maneuver Brigade HQs, 9 Inf Battalions (6 mech, 3 light), 1 Armored Regiment, 2 Armored Recce Regiments, 3 Arty Regiments, 3 Combat Engineer Regiments, 1 Engineer Support Regiment, and 1 Air Defence Regiment (with no AD equipment).

Australian Army: 3 Maneuver Brigade HQs, 6 Inf Bn (all light), 3 Armoured Cavalry Regiments (each consisting of 1 tank squadron, 1 recce squadron, and an APC squadron providing appx 1 Battalion of lift), 3 Arty Regiments, 3 Combat Engineer Regiments, 1 Engineer Support Regiment, 1 Air Defence Regiment (with equipment), and 1 Aviation Brigade (with dedicated recce, utility, heavy lift and attack platforms).

In this way, they are quite similar to us with the exception of the fact that they maintain 6 infantry battalions compared to our 9. However, with fewer units and perhaps fewer personnel in those units, they generate an equivalent or better capability. 

Through the Army Managed Readiness Plan, the Canadian Army force generates a Brigade Headquarters and a single mechanized infantry battle group for sustained expeditionary operations and a much lighter infantry battalion with enablers for a single rotation, risk managed deployment. 
http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/assets/ARMY_Internet/docs/en/waypoint-2018.pdf

Through plan Bersheeba, the Aussies rotate each of their three brigades through their high readiness cycle (superficially similar to us), and in each cycle they generate a high readiness capability of a brigade consisting of the equivalent capability of one mechanized battle group, one light infantry battalion, and a surprisingly robust reserve battle group.   
http://www.army.gov.au/Our-future/Projects/Plan-BEERSHEBA
http://www.army.gov.au/Our-work/Speeches-and-transcripts/Defence-Reserves-Association-Annual-Conference

Further, they have done that while maintaining anti-armor, infantry mortar, air defence, and attack helicopter capabilities within their Army.  Most significantly, their Air Force and Navy have all the capabilities we do, and lots we don't with amphibious lift and airborne EW being two examples that come to mind. 

Now the Aussies  obviously have a bigger budget than we do, but in terms of how they allocate funds, they are clearly prioritizing capabilities (which implies personnel and equipment in the right combination) over pure personnel strength. The inevitable conclusion here is that we could maintain a broader capability set with the same funding envelope and fewer full time personnel.  As I have said, I would love to see some growth in the defence budget, but if we made some hard choices on personnel and procurement (and I appreciate that there is a huge political consideration with that), we could do a lot more with the resources we have.

Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Bird_Gunner45 on April 28, 2016, 19:04:42
This might get me banned here, but why is the army so large in relation to the Navy and Air Force? We depend more on sea lanes and air lanes for trade and communications, and a larger standing army vice a well equipped Navy and Air Force doesn't seem to be the proper way to spend limited funds.

This was the US defence policy up until the 1890s, where there was an extremely small regular force used primarily for constabulary duties in the west and a large coastal defence cadre to deter invasion. The USN, in those days, was seen as an offensive arm that, in defence, was only expected to sortie out and engage an invading force from Europe.

For Canada, the threat of invasion is miniscule with virtually no existential threats to us (and I dont believe for a second that ISIS/terrorism is existential). Canada could, in theory, invest in anti-shipping missiles such as China does to 'secure the coast' at a low cost and invest in a few more capable ships to do naval tasks that require more of a presence (fisheries, anti-piracy, etc).

The only real external threat, aside from terrorism, to Canada is from ballistic missiles so we could invest in counter-BM capabilities to secure key cities with the air force focusing on DCA/the odd bear bomber through NORAD and expeditionary ops.

The army, then, has two real roles- expeditionary and domestic. For expeditionary, we are  basically now set up to support a coalition operation with a brigade group or battle group. We also have a reserve that is unable to do anything outside of one-for-one augmentation of the regular force due to the legal limitations. We would be better to rationalize the reserve system and perhaps go to a system more like what the US has... some key capabilities kept in the reserve that can be called up COMPLETE if the Div/brigade go to war. The capabilities moved to armour could be logistical (such as in the US with transport) or even combat arms units that are less likely to deploy (armour, artillery have been suggested before). For domestic, there needs to be a standing unit(s) tasked with "homeland" tasks as a primary duty, preferably at the reserve level. Finally, I would see us closing austere bases such as Shilo and Petawawa (close as in close the garrison and keep the training area) and moving garrisons to larger centres such as Edmonton, Quebec City, and Borden (Toronto). Second line support requirements would be smaller, and most base side services could be contracted, reducing logistical manning requirements. This would also make the provision of mental health, food, and other services cheaper due to proximity and minimize money used for postings. Just some thoughts.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: dapaterson on April 28, 2016, 19:09:35
One needs to be a bit cautious when comparing; we've centralized certain functions and thus account for them differently.  For example, the ~7000 untrained in the Reg F are part of the "Other Commands" count; that group also includes a number of support units and formations (medical, for example), training institutions, and others which are buried in the Aus Army, Navy & Air Force.

How you count and what you count are important questions to consider when making comparisons.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: RCPalmer on April 28, 2016, 19:39:52
One needs to be a bit cautious when comparing; we've centralized certain functions and thus account for them differently.  For example, the ~7000 untrained in the Reg F are part of the "Other Commands" count; that group also includes a number of support units and formations (medical, for example), training institutions, and others which are buried in the Aus Army, Navy & Air Force.

How you count and what you count are important questions to consider when making comparisons.

Absolutely.  I am less concerned about the ratios than the capabilities they deliver relative to their total personnel resources which is why I dived fairly deep into a comparison of the Army managed readiness plans in both forces.  That said, the large number untrained RegF personnel is significant and expensive. When I worked in recruiting, it was reported as closer to 10k, and the consensus was that number could be cut in half by hiring based on the start date of occupational training and including a window to complete basic instead of the hiring against basic training serials and hoping for the best like we do now for most occupations. 
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MilEME09 on April 28, 2016, 19:46:09
Absolutely.  I am less concerned about the ratios than the capabilities they deliver relative to their total personnel resources which is why I dived fairly deep into a comparison of the Army managed readiness plans in both armies.  That said, the large number untrained RegF personnel is significant and expensive. When I worked in recruiting, it was reported as closer to 10k, and the consensus was that number could be cut in half by hiring based on the start date of occupational training and including a window to complete basic instead of the hiring against basic training serials and hoping for the best like we do now for most occupations.

sounds like this would get a lot of people out of PAT platoons more quickly, heck at one point the PAT platoon in Borden was more like PAT Battalion
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: dapaterson on April 28, 2016, 20:00:01
Absolutely.  I am less concerned about the ratios than the capabilities they deliver relative to their total personnel resources which is why I dived fairly deep into a comparison of the Army managed readiness plans in both armies.  That said, the large number untrained RegF personnel is significant and expensive. When I worked in recruiting, it was reported as closer to 10k, and the consensus was that number could be cut in half by hiring based on the start date of occupational training and including a window to complete basic instead of the hiring against basic training serials and hoping for the best like we do now for most occupations.

I suspect that was in the years when the Reg F was growing to 68K.  In a period of growth, BTL requirement grows until a more or less steady state is achieved.  The number of untrained positions required for the steady state can be estimated based on the attrition rate, and time to train to OFP.

Since we average 7% attrition, and our target strength is 68000, we therefore need to recruit 68000 x 7% or 4760 Reg F members every year.  While it varies between trades, a rule of thumb is that it takes 1 year to get an NCM to OFP (the more technical trades take longer), and about 3.5 years to get an officer to OFP (ROTP students skew that number higher, due to 4 years in university plus whatever occupational training is not completed during summers).

If we assume a 75% / 25% NCM / Officer split, then the requirement is 4760 x 75% x 1 = 3570 NCM BTL positions, and 4760 x 25% x 3.5 = 4165 Officer BTL positions, for a steady-state total of 7735 for the BTL (and, for the pedants out there, the SUTL as well).
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: RCPalmer on April 28, 2016, 20:17:38
I suspect that was in the years when the Reg F was growing to 68K.  In a period of growth, BTL requirement grows until a more or less steady state is achieved.  The number of untrained positions required for the steady state can be estimated based on the attrition rate, and time to train to OFP.

Since we average 7% attrition, and our target strength is 68000, we therefore need to recruit 68000 x 7% or 4760 Reg F members every year.  While it varies between trades, a rule of thumb is that it takes 1 year to get an NCM to OFP (the more technical trades take longer), and about 3.5 years to get an officer to OFP (ROTP students skew that number higher, due to 4 years in university plus whatever occupational training is not completed during summers).

If we assume a 75% / 25% NCM / Officer split, then the requirement is 4760 x 75% x 1 = 3570 NCM BTL positions, and 4760 x 25% x 3.5 = 4165 Officer BTL positions, for a steady-state total of 7735 for the BTL (and, for the pedants out there, the SUTL as well).

Those ratios are very interesting (particularly the officer ones) but I would assert that the rough calculations still hide a lot of waste.  There are a lot of NCM MOSIDs where members can be taken to OFP in 6 months if they complete their courses back to back. Also, that officer BTL bill is huge, and ties into some of the earlier discussions about officer to NCM ratios and TOS. Of course, the BTL is far from the only place where personnel bloat exists.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: dapaterson on April 28, 2016, 20:22:18
The challenge is that there are other NCM MOSIDS that take years to qualify to the OFP.  One year is an average across them all.  Better alignment of training is fine in theory and is actively pursued, but in practice Bloggins breaks a leg in week one of her DP1 while doing Tae Kwan Do, and is stalled until the next serial begins after she's healed.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: RCPalmer on April 28, 2016, 20:27:57
The challenge is that there are other NCM MOSIDS that take years to qualify to the OFP.  One year is an average across them all.  Better alignment of training is fine in theory and is actively pursued, but in practice Bloggins breaks a leg in week one of her DP1 while doing Tae Kwan Do, and is stalled until the next serial begins after she's healed.

Fair enough, but we have to look somewhere.  How else can we account for the fact that the Aussies are maintaining an equivalent (arguably significantly more capable) Army, crew more ships, and fly more planes than us with 10,000 fewer people in uniform?
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: dapaterson on April 28, 2016, 20:52:09
No disagreement there.  I am hopeful that the pending Defence Review may identify ways to economize and optimize.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MilEME09 on April 28, 2016, 20:56:20
Fair enough, but we have to look somewhere.  How else can we account for the fact that the Aussies are maintaining an equivalent (arguably significantly more capable) Army, crew more ships, and fly more planes than us with 10,000 fewer people in uniform?

maybe the fact they don't have meaningless HQs? They have two division HQ, we have five for about the same amount of forces. Comparing structure below

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/9/9e/Australia_Land_Forces_2016.png/1920px-Australia_Land_Forces_2016.png

vs the Canadian Army

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/2/2a/Canada_Land_Forces.png/1920px-Canada_Land_Forces.png

I see ALOT more HQ on the Canadian side of things

Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MarkOttawa on June 23, 2016, 17:41:41
Defence Policy Review is supposed to look at CAF and cyber--Dick Fadden weighs in on the military (the post also has lots on what some allies' militaries are doing and what the Canadian gov't as a whole mostly is not):

Quote
Offensive Cyber Capability for Canadian Forces? Is the New Government Cyber Serious?
https://cgai3ds.wordpress.com/2016/06/23/mark-collins-offensive-cyber-capability-for-canadian-forces-is-the-new-government-cyber-serious/

Mark
Ottawa
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MarkOttawa on June 28, 2016, 22:07:28
The conclusion of a submission to the Defence Policy Review by Prof. Steve Saideman:
http://www.cgai.ca/fellows#Stephen%20Saidman

Quote
...
I do think that the best decision would be for Canada to spend more on its military, but I recognize that this is probably a non-starter. Whatever increases will probably not catch up to inflation. I also recognize that Canada will continue to spend more and get less due to the insistence on buying Canadian built equipment even when better/less expensive kit is available. Given these trends, the CAF is in for hard times ahead (although calling a new decade of darkness is a bit much)–expected to keep up the pace of operations while avoiding hard decisions about priorities. Perhaps the Defence Review will lead to some difficult decisions actually being confronted.
http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/defence-policy-review/docs/montreal/saideman-montreal-submission.pdf

One suspects that final sentence may be a tad optimistic. Still…All the submissions here:
http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/defence-policy-review/perspectives.asp

Mark
Ottawa
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Bird_Gunner45 on June 28, 2016, 23:02:45
Romeo Dallaire suggested that the army work with the Romeo Dallaire foundation.... shocking.

Good suggestions by some, even if some of the names on the list are a touch partisan. I hope that, one way or the other, we get a white paper and some direction. Most times it feels like the different tribes in the army are all moving in separate directions with more concern on making sure their empires remain in tact than on advancing the overall cause.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Journeyman on July 06, 2016, 12:28:26
The Canadian Global Affairs Institute has released their submissions to the Defence Policy Review here (http://www.cgai.ca/policy_review).

Some pretty high-priced help weighing in..... for whatever it's worth.
/cynicism
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Journeyman on July 06, 2016, 21:00:37
And to follow up, Col (ret'd) Chris Killford has an interesting opinion piece in the Ottawa Citizen.  "So much for public consultation on Canada's defence policy." (http://ottawacitizen.com/opinion/columnists/kilford-so-much-for-public-consultation-on-canadas-defence-policy)   Essentially, he's suggesting that the consultations are little more than smoke and mirrors. 

a)  The 2016 NATO Summit is about to occur and we've already made a "substantial and perhaps permanent troop contribution in Eastern Europe." 

b)  Well before the results of the public consultations are published, it’s also "highly likely Canada will make a major commitment to support one or more peacekeeping missions," linked to the September UN Session and the PM's desire to "return" to peacekeeping (and get a seat on the UNSC).

c)  Finally, there's still CF-18 replacement saga. "Few believe that acquiring the F-18 Super Hornet over the F-35 is a terribly good idea but there’s likely to be an announcement that this will be the case well before the findings of the defence policy review are released in early 2017."  We'll then buy all-in for the SH because of the cost of a mixed fleet.


Effectively, by the time the public consultation phase and follow-on deliberations are over, our defence posture will already be set in stone.   ::)
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MarkOttawa on July 06, 2016, 22:35:13
What with Latvia anything now for UN peacekeeping beyond a small, real blue beret, force in Colombia?
https://cgai3ds.wordpress.com/2016/06/29/mark-collins-us-new-government-and-canadian-forces-un-peacekeeping-colombia-africa-nato-in-e-europe-both/

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/canada-commits-57-million-to-support-peace-process-in-colombia/article30748766/

Anything substantial left for Africa?
https://cgai3ds.wordpress.com/2016/04/18/mark-collins-netherlands-and-un-peacekeeping-sort-of-in-mali-canada/

Mark
Ottawa
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Journeyman on July 07, 2016, 10:23:03
What with Latvia anything now for UN peacekeeping beyond a small, real blue beret, force in Colombia?
Haiti is our "employ VanDoos" default setting.  Colombia could be a combination of maritime patrol (most of their drug shipments are by sea, with the San Andrés/ Providencia/ Santa Catalina archipelago being a popular trans-shipment hub), and police training.

For any UN mission, competent (as opposed to sycophant) leadership tends to be in dire need.  While I periodically, and subtly,  ***** about our fondness for growing HQs, we may as well put them to work.  This would provide the added benefit of having the HQ staff being OUTCAN, therefore make-work projects for subordinate units could only decline. :nod:   Missions in isolated regions (ie - most African ops) need transport aircraft. We can provide that capability.


Now, the downside to all of these options is that they are not manpower-intensive.  The PM is going to want to deploy ground troops to get the numbers up.  As noted in Killford's OpEd piece, Norway and Ireland (our competitors for the two UNSC seats) combined, have deployed about 500 pers on UN ops; Canada currently has 79.

Can we deploy the equivalent of two battalions concurrently?  Certainly.  As a start state only, Mech Inf focus on Latvian cultural awareness briefings; Light Inf start thinking PKO.  Other arms, dust off your Cyprus-vintage "re-roling to peacekeeper" lessons-learned.

Will there be a cost?  Absolutely.  The knock-on effects for developing our forces will be great as we attempt to force generate, deploy, shoe-horn in career courses (students and staff), meet all the marginal tasks that are critical to....someone  in the food chain... 


Oh, and there's that tertiary effect on the group we often pay mere lip service to, the families; they'll take a big hit.  But if it allows the PM to campaign for re-election on having 'earned' us a seat at the UNSC for two years, I'm sure they'll cheerfully bite the bullet.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MCG on July 07, 2016, 12:40:18
Trudeau's father was able to do big UN peacekeeping while meeting those unfortunate NATO obligations.  Of course, he had a Reg F that averaged over 89,000 in strength.

Maybe there is an investment that has to be made if we want to sit at all the big boy tables.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Chris Pook on July 07, 2016, 13:17:12
....

...; Light Inf start thinking PKO.  Other arms, dust off your Cyprus-vintage "re-roling to peacekeeper" lessons-learned.

...

Re PKO - UN:

MacKenzie or Dallaire ROE?
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Journeyman on July 07, 2016, 17:12:08
Re PKO - UN:

MacKenzie or Dallaire ROE?
My preference would be to avoid anything to do with the UN;  League of Nations 2.0 needs to be bulldozed and re-attempted.

However, that's not in the PM's "vision" (or hallucination).  As such, I fear the troops will be sent into MacKenzie situations with Dallaire ROEs..... with DFAIT Global Affairs Canada (and those dingbats at the whatever-its-called "institute") second-guessing every move the troops make.


Now imagine my response if I were the slightest bit cynical.   ;D
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: milnews.ca on July 07, 2016, 17:35:28
Now imagine my response if I were the slightest bit cynical.   ;D
Not you ...
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MCG on July 10, 2016, 14:14:24
Time is almost gone.  Has everyone provided their thoughts to the government:

http://www.defenceconsultations.ca
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: daftandbarmy on July 10, 2016, 16:02:25
Time is almost gone.  Has everyone provided their thoughts to the government:

http://www.defenceconsultations.ca

Can't they read my thoughts through the tinfoil hat?
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: GAP on July 10, 2016, 16:03:57
Can't they read my thoughts through the tinfoil hat?

Nah....the tinfoil blocks good karma....
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Dimsum on July 10, 2016, 18:27:50
Time is almost gone.  Has everyone provided their thoughts to the government:

http://www.defenceconsultations.ca

Full colour patches, unit t-shirts and hats?   >:D
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: cavalryman on July 10, 2016, 18:29:48
Full colour patches, unit t-shirts and hats?   >:D
You mean every unit gets to wear their own funny hat?  I have dibs on a tricorne for my old regiment
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Dimsum on July 10, 2016, 18:32:27
You mean every unit gets to wear their own funny hat?  I have dibs on a tricorne for my old regiment

I vote for this one.  Those Italians are always so fashionable.   :nod:

(https://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.stripes.com%2Fpolopoly_fs%2F1.65550.1273635612%21%2Fimage%2F477596645.jpg_gen%2Fderivatives%2Flandscape_804%2F477596645.jpg&hash=887f8775d548ee1f46e650329686ea72)
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: cavalryman on July 10, 2016, 18:45:09
Is he staring at the photographer or at the bird on his shoulder?  ;D
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: FSTO on July 10, 2016, 19:47:35
Is he staring at the photographer or at the bird on his shoulder?  ;D

The way some folks on here moan and drip about buttons and bows they would only be happy with this:

(https://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fcdn.styleblazer.com%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2016%2F02%2FRalphLauren-mens-flightsuit.jpg%3F5933d2&hash=f3670a5c6ef9a93934ff4fcc621db673)
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: cavalryman on July 10, 2016, 20:21:48
The way some folks on here moan and drip about buttons and bows they would only be happy with this:

(https://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fcdn.styleblazer.com%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2016%2F02%2FRalphLauren-mens-flightsuit.jpg%3F5933d2&hash=f3670a5c6ef9a93934ff4fcc621db673)
Ah the memories.  Loved my crewsuit.  I used to wear it in the days when we had 21 Iltis in the compound, 17 or 18 of the runners at any given time, and the ability to do 1st line maintenance in-house, a CP box on a CUCV whose batteries didn't catch fire, a pair of MLVWs and 5/4ts.  No mounts for the MGs of course, but we had radios in every C/S, with spares, and they not only worked most of the time but you didn't need a 3 day course to learn how to set a frequency.  So yeah.  We didn't look gorgeous 20 years ago, but we had f*cking kit to train with, so screw the buttons and bows. 
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: George Wallace on July 10, 2016, 20:35:27
Ah the memories.  Loved my crewsuit.  I used to wear it in the days when we had 21 Iltis in the compound, 17 or 18 of the runners at any given time, and the ability to do 1st line maintenance in-house, a CP box on a CUCV whose batteries didn't catch fire, a pair of MLVWs and 5/4ts.  No mounts for the MGs of course, but we had radios in every C/S, with spares, and they not only worked most of the time but you didn't need a 3 day course to learn how to set a frequency.  So yeah.  We didn't look gorgeous 20 years ago, but we had f*cking kit to train with, so screw the buttons and bows.

Ah!....See, now there is the difference.  We loved our crewsuits as well, but they were always kept clean and nicely folded in our bugout kit to be pulled out only when we stood down for weekends on Fall Ex and could go into the local German disco and tell the girls we were Pilots in a Leopard Sqn. 

You ever go more than two days in one and then have to take a dump?
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Fishbone Jones on July 10, 2016, 21:51:43
Time is almost gone.  Has everyone provided their thoughts to the government:

http://www.defenceconsultations.ca

This is an acedemic  excercise. The grits have already decided. They're just letting you think you have a say. No doubt the new White Paper is mostly written already.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: cavalryman on July 10, 2016, 22:05:21


You ever go more than two days in one and then have to take a dump?
Nope.  Always saved it to wear after the post-Endex shower.  Very comfy to sleep in on the bus or the troop train. [:D
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MCG on July 10, 2016, 22:14:32
This is an acedemic  excercise. The grits have already decided. They're just letting you think you have a say. No doubt the new White Paper is mostly written already.
Maybe or maybe not, but ...

If you choose not to submit your opinions and ideas, then you can only blame yourself if the government does not consider what you never shared.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: milnews.ca on July 10, 2016, 23:30:19
I vote for this one.  Those Italians are always so fashionable.   :nod:

(https://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.stripes.com%2Fpolopoly_fs%2F1.65550.1273635612%21%2Fimage%2F477596645.jpg_gen%2Fderivatives%2Flandscape_804%2F477596645.jpg&hash=887f8775d548ee1f46e650329686ea72)
Better fashionable than metrosexual/borderline Village People  ;D ...
(https://mattsko.files.wordpress.com/2014/05/spanish-legion-04.jpg)
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: comfortablynumb on July 11, 2016, 00:04:19
Uniforms aside - at least they appear healthy/fit.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Journeyman on July 12, 2016, 11:44:58
The way some folks on here moan and drip about buttons and bows they would only be happy with this:

Perhaps some of us believe a higher priority should be placed on funding and developing competent troops, effectively trained on serviceable equipment -- with bonus points if they're supported by informed strategic guidance.

If the "moaning and dripping" is sufficiently widespread and consistent, then maybe even the dullards not trusted with troops who tend to gravitate towards things like buttons and bows committees will get the message.  Although to be fair, I seriously doubt that they  would get the message, but perhaps someone in a superior position of authority will say "enough is ******* enough."

Personally, for the Army, I have great faith that the incoming Commander will refocus on what's important, once the current CCA goes off to burden NATO HQ (where I'm sure he can collect all sorts of meaningless Pirates of Penzance badges).


Your priorities may vary.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: daftandbarmy on July 12, 2016, 11:52:04
I thought that was what the election was about? You complete your survey (ballot) and the winners govern according to the results.

I assume there's someone in the Liberal camp that assumes the military will always be better received if they appear to be managed within the context of an appeasing Ochlocracy. Sadly, that didn't seem to turn out too well for the Romans:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ochlocracy
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: FSTO on July 12, 2016, 12:25:31
Perhaps some of us believe a higher priority should be placed on funding and developing competent troops, effectively trained on serviceable equipment -- with bonus points if they're supported by informed strategic guidance.

If the "moaning and dripping" is sufficiently widespread and consistent, then maybe even the dullards not trusted with troops who tend to gravitate towards things like buttons and bows committees will get the message.  Although to be fair, I seriously doubt that they  would get the message, but perhaps someone in a superior position of authority will say "enough is ******* enough."

Personally, for the Army, I have great faith that the incoming Commander will refocus on what's important, once the current CCA goes off to burden NATO HQ (where I'm sure he can collect all sorts of meaningless Pirates of Penzance badges).


Your priorities may vary.

My priorities are in line with yours. In my world it is enough trained sailors that we don't have to pier-head jump half the coast to send a high-readiness ship on an operation. As for the strategic guidance part? I am not holding my breath on any coherence coming from our political masters any time soon.

That being said, the ceremonial aspect of our job is still an important part of the overall image we present to the general public. Looking sharp and professional weather on the parade ground, at a COMREL event or just walking downtown sends a message to joe/jill public that their military is something to be proud of and willing to spend money on to recruit, train and equip them to do their job.



Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Eye In The Sky on July 12, 2016, 13:33:42
If I actually believed that Joe/Jill Public actually gave 2 shits about their military, I might care how the think I look in uniform.  As I don't think they do actually care, I'll confine what I care about my uniform to its utility;  pockets for the stuff I need and giving me a chance of staying alive in a fire.

Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Tango2Bravo on July 12, 2016, 14:12:25
I vote for this one.  Those Italians are always so fashionable.   :nod:

(https://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.stripes.com%2Fpolopoly_fs%2F1.65550.1273635612%21%2Fimage%2F477596645.jpg_gen%2Fderivatives%2Flandscape_804%2F477596645.jpg&hash=887f8775d548ee1f46e650329686ea72)

The Bersaglieri are elite infantry in the Italian Army. They earned an enviable combat record in the Western Desert in WW2. I recently served alongside Bersaglieri in Lebanon: they are outstanding soldiers and I was always happy to see those black feathers on the helmet of the soldier in the MG hatch. Those feathers on their helmets are a part of their esprit de corps. I am not saying that we need those, but I can imagine the outcry if somebody took away the black beret from the RCAC. I wouldn't call myself a uniform guy, but I do feel that they play a part in morale and identity.

Speaking of Lebanon and trying to get back on topic, I recently spent a year there wearing a blue beret. I was an unarmed observer and I served first as a patroller and then as Chief of Operations for an observer group. Working in a UN mission is certainly different than in US or NATO mission, but its not all doom and gloom. I felt that I was in a professional organization with excellent military and civilian leadership. Now, while Lebanon was not "safe" and had its own complexities it was certainly not Mali either. I would, however, gladly work in a UN mission again.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: milnews.ca on July 12, 2016, 15:38:16
The Bersaglieri are elite infantry in the Italian Army. They earned an enviable combat record in the Western Desert in WW2. I recently served alongside Bersaglieri in Lebanon: they are outstanding soldiers and I was always happy to see those black feathers on the helmet of the soldier in the MG hatch. Those feathers on their helmets are a part of their esprit de corps ...
That, and the trademark extra-double-quick march (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c0kBETseDmQ) ...

Speaking of Lebanon and trying to get back on topic, I recently spent a year there wearing a blue beret. I was an unarmed observer and I served first as a patroller and then as Chief of Operations for an observer group. Working in a UN mission is certainly different than in US or NATO mission, but its not all doom and gloom. I felt that I was in a professional organization with excellent military and civilian leadership. Now, while Lebanon was not "safe" and had its own complexities it was certainly not Mali either. I would, however, gladly work in a UN mission again.
Thanks for sharing the recent experience.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: daftandbarmy on July 12, 2016, 16:52:35
Whatever we do, we had better get ourselves sorted out before Putin finds a bunch of senior Officers willing to push things as hard as he wants:

http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/688775/Vladimir-Putin-purges-entire-Baltic-fleet-officer-class-coverup-claims-submarine-collision
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MCG on July 20, 2016, 18:59:03
The Royal United Services Institute of Vancouver Island has thrown its ideas into the defence policy review, and followed with an opinion piece in the Times Colonist.  If you have your own ideas, there are only a few more days to submit your ideas (http://www.defenceconsultations.ca).

Quote
Comment: We need capable, trained armed forces
Roger Love
Times Colonist
20 July 2016

The seventh defence review in 52 years, now underway, reflects four important issues that Canadians need to address: sovereignty and security, prosperity, global stability, and protection and promotion of Canadian values.

What are the priority roles for Canada's military? Defend the sovereignty and security of Canada, North America and treaty allies (NATO) - in that order. Support continued prosperity through the trade that is vital to our economy, by maintenance of an open land border (remember the disruption in the aftermath of 9/11) and protection of the maritime approaches and - working with allies - of the high seas.

How should Canada's military be structured to meet these priority roles? Canada's military cannot be expected to maintain sovereignty and security over our vast land mass, coastline and maritime approaches unaided.

However, with a credible military force that meets realistic capability expectations, including seamless interoperability with NATO allies, we can expect assistance from those allies.

Assistance is, of course, primarily from the U.S.; NATO wants our troops in Eastern Europe to counter developing Russian threats.

We cannot expect U.S. assistance to defend our homeland if we do not have a sound defence capability to aid it in defending its homeland. Major approaches to the U.S. cross our territorial land mass, maritime zone and air space, so we must maximize our security relationships with the U.S. and ensure seamless interoperability with its air, naval and land forces.

Our defence contributions must be sufficient to overcome any American concerns about the adequacy of our capabilities, including against cyber or terrorist attack - homegrown or other. Without this, we risk a U.S. defence that might take the battle to or over our major populated areas.

We cannot expect help if we don't come to the table with the means to defend ourselves and our allies against both traditional military and terrorism threats and developing threats, such as cyber and space. The global nature of, particularly, increasing terrorist, cyber and space threats requires a global response with all of our allies to maintain prosperity and global stability.

Only a broad-based capability to work seamlessly with allies against such threats, and traditional threats, enables us to work with the U.S. to defend North America.

Without such capability and seamless interoperability of forces, we will almost certainly be left out in the cold in the event of any military or non-military attack.

How should Canada's military be structured to meet other roles? Canada's historical role for 60 years has been, in major part, to pursue global stability through NATO and coalition interventions with allies.

"Peacekeeping" in its original conception is increasingly limited. It is now, as anyone can see from the past 25 years, "peace-enforcing" between warring sides with interest only in military victory (e.g., Balkans, Rwanda, Sudan, Somalia), together with roles as trainers and advisers to one side or the other in sectarian conflicts (e.g., currently in Iraq). For these, and UN Chapter 7 deployments (e.g., Mali and Congo), we need larger numbers than for simplistic "peacekeeping" - including the ability to defend ourselves and other UN forces.

Contributions are needed from non-military government departments through efforts related to nation-building work and to pre-empt warfare in troubled zones through early economic, political and bureaucratic aid. Both these approaches can promote Canadian values.

The underlying roles for the military have not changed in the 52 years since the 1964 review: Protect Canadian sovereignty and security first, contribute to global security, be a force to promote Canadian values in the world. The strategies and practices change as the threats evolve. We now have more terrorist and cyber attacks - both organized and independent - and much more serious technological threats.

We cannot know what type of threats we will face in coming years, or decades over the operational life of equipment that we are now buying. So we need to cover, to the best of our ability, the full spectrum of threats that we see now and can reasonably foresee.

Only well-equipped, well-trained and flexible Canadian Armed Forces will protect our country from what is becoming a more hostile world, while we contribute to maintaining an uneasy global peace.


Roger Love is treasurer of the Royal United Services Institute of Vancouver Island and writes on behalf of the institute. The institute's Defence Policy Review submission can be found on the organization's website at rusiviccda.org (http://rusiviccda.org/?p=1316).
http://www.timescolonist.com/opinion/columnists/comment-we-need-capable-trained-armed-forces-1.2305516
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Chris Pook on July 21, 2016, 11:43:09
(https://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.telegraph.co.uk%2Fcontent%2Fdam%2Fnews%2F2016%2F07%2F21%2FNATO_spending_resized-large_trans%2B%2BAz3ogyoD1YDpdxYGZ0Xf4vG3OKYTeFSo_ZoY0DpvP4I.JPG&hash=7565cbe63a22d7ff3f05e59488e16c7f)

NATO Spending

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/07/21/trumps-isolationism-shows-why-britain-is-right-to-renew-trident/
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Journeyman on July 21, 2016, 12:25:24
NATO Spending
Pffft..... freeloading Luxembourg bastards.  >:(
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jmt18325 on July 21, 2016, 12:27:45
It's pretty misleading in that we spend the 6th highest total.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Thucydides on July 21, 2016, 12:37:58
Way may spend more in dollar terms, but how "effective" is our spending when sending and sustaining a single battlegroup exhausts all of our resources? When Infantry battalions are so undermanned they go to national level training exercises with an unmanned rifle company? When we still don't have trucks, boots, refuelling ships, a replacement fighter, an actual cyberwar unit et. etc.

While the raw spending figures and percentage of GDP is important as the first step, we still need to translate that into actual combat power, which we do incredibly poorly (using our resources to build headquarters and bureaucratic structures instead.)
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Journeyman on July 21, 2016, 12:39:31
It's pretty misleading in that we spend the 6th highest total.
          :not-again:

1.  The title of the graph states quite clearly "....as a share of Gross Domestic Product."

2.  GDP is a common NATO accounting guideline agreed to by Canada.


Given these two obvious attributes, how can this possibly be misleading?    ::)
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Chris Pook on July 21, 2016, 13:14:00
It's pretty misleading in that we spend the 6th highest total.

And yet, when the community has decided there is a greater need, we appear to be derelict for contributing less than we can.  The US can't assume the burden indefinitely (Trump and Clinton are just making explicit what the voters already know).

In progressive terms Canada is the 1% that benefits but doesn't pay.

PS - Although my sympathies lie with the Army, I would suggest that our best "bang for buck" comes from a large, deployable Air Force and Navy.  They can transition rapidly from war to peace and back to war in a generally peacetime environment with reduced risk of unsightly spectacles along the Highways of Heroes.

Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: QV on July 21, 2016, 13:54:45
Given our lengthy coastline and huge airspace with no hostile land border, than absolutely Canada should invest heavily in air and sea power with land forces a distant third.


Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MilEME09 on July 21, 2016, 14:32:19
Given our lengthy coastline and huge airspace with no hostile land border, than absolutely Canada should invest heavily in air and sea power with land forces a distant third.

I agree, our navy and airforce should be doubled, if not tripled given our size
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Chris Pook on July 21, 2016, 14:39:04
The Army, with its current manpower, would make a usefully sized force for an enlarged Navy and Air Force to project.  And all that necessary extra logistics capability can come in handy both at home and abroad.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Oldgateboatdriver on July 21, 2016, 14:44:29
And yet, when the community has decided there is a greater need, we appear to be derelict for contributing less than we can.  The US can't assume the burden indefinitely (Trump and Clinton are just making explicit what the voters already know).

In progressive terms Canada is the 1% that benefits but doesn't pay.

PS - Although my sympathies lie with the Army, I would suggest that our best "bang for buck" comes from a large, deployable Air Force and Navy.  They can transition rapidly from war to peace and back to war in a generally peacetime environment with reduced risk of unsightly spectacles along the Highways of Heroes.

The Stark incident: 37 dead, 21 injured;
The Roberts incident: no dead, 10 injured;
The Cole incident: 17 dead, 39 injured.

We had Canadian warships deployed in all those theatres at the time.

We've escaped any such incident so far. Is it luck? And if so, how long will it hold?

Single engagements are less frequent in naval warfare - even of the "terrorism" type - but they tend to cause more casualties per event than the Army ones when they occur. I am talking in general terms here (and about single engagements) - I realize you have some bad land engagements, like the 710 casualties at Beaumont Hamel of the Royal Newfoundland Regiment, but you can also compare them with the 1415 casualties in only a few minutes  of the Hood in the battle of Denmark Straight.

If you remember what took place in Canada in the wake of the day of our greatest single day loss (four soldiers if I recall correctly, with about a dozen injured at the same time), can you imagine what would occur the day you tell Canadians you just lost 30 sailors and injured another 60?
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Chris Pook on July 21, 2016, 15:27:17
OGBD

I don't say the eliminated risk, I just say the reduced risk.

In my view the reality is that while sailors and aviators are always at risk, the level of risk, on average is low.

For the Army, again in my view, the reality is something other.  In truth the level of risk for a soldier in a peacetime army is generally considerably less than that experienced by sailors and aviators.

However that changes dramatically when the Army is deployed - and how much that changes depends on how far forward it is deployed and the nature of the defences it faces.  That degree of confrontation can be managed, calibrated, by the government of the day.  Ultimately the government will decide how many hearses it is prepared to see on the 401.  When the Army is committed by the government it is likely that most of those hearses will be carrying soldiers.

Personally, I would prefer to put as few bodies at risk as possible and pay our bills in technology, not blood.  In fact that is the reason that I continue to argue for a large number of vessels with a small number of sailors.  And equally, a large number of aircraft with a small number of aviators.

I would say the same about the Army if I could, but unfortunately it is difficult to divide a pair of muddy boots and still have them be effective.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jmt18325 on July 21, 2016, 15:49:53
          :not-again:

1.  The title of the graph states quite clearly "....as a share of Gross Domestic Product."

2.  GDP is a common NATO accounting guideline agreed to by Canada.


Given these two obvious attributes, how can this possibly be misleading?    ::)

Because it doesn't have any context whatsoever.  Canada is the 6th largest spender in NATO, and the 16th largest in the world.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Chris Pook on July 21, 2016, 16:07:21
Because it doesn't have any context whatsoever.  Canada is the 6th largest spender in NATO, and the 16th largest in the world.

And we are reneging on our commitments to the tune of 18 Billion US Dollars and are responsible for 20% of the 90 BUSD shortfall in NATO defence funds.  Second only to Germany which is short by 30 BUSD.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: dapaterson on July 21, 2016, 16:19:40
How is NATO short?  What, specifically,  does NATO lack?  Or is this merely an arbitrary number based on a crude metric, and not driven by any capability based assessment?
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jmt18325 on July 21, 2016, 16:21:44
And we are reneging on our commitments to the tune of 18 Billion US Dollars and are responsible for 20% of the 90 BUSD shortfall in NATO defence funds.  Second only to Germany which is short by 30 BUSD.

What pressing threat is there to Canada that could possibly justify doubling our military budget?  I can see putting back the money that the Conservatives cut, if we're going to stick with their plan (we're not) and adding a few billing for capabilities we may be lacking, but $18B? 

It's an arbitrary number that is completely meaningless.  If NATO wants to throw out their 6th highest contributor, let them.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MCG on July 21, 2016, 16:50:45
Quote
In Warsaw, Trudeau to stress Canada's NATO support beyond numbers
Prime Minister to also call for Brexit calm, CETA progress

Amanda Connolly
iPolitics
06 July 2016

As NATO meets in Warsaw this week in a capital heavy with post-Cold War symbolism, Justin Trudeau will be armed with a response to U.S. President Barack Obama’s vehement plea to Canada’s Parliament that “NATO needs more Canada.”

In a technical briefing Wednesday, senior government officials told reporters that Trudeau will stress that measuring defence spending as a percentage of GDP is not the only metric NATO allies should be using to assess military contributions and support for the alliance.

Officials outlined several of the key areas of focus for the prime minister during the crucial summit, which will unfold in the Polish capital Friday and Saturday after a period of Russian expansionism and amid political and economic turmoil in Europe.

They said Canada does not feel defensive about its military spending, currently at .98 per cent of GDP, despite the call from Obama during his address to Parliament last week to do more.

The alliance has a goal of getting members to commit to spending 2 per cent of GDP on defence but few have met that target.

...

The discussions on Afghanistan will unfold in the wake of Obama’s announcement today that he is backing away from an earlier pledge to drawback the American presence in the country because of the “precarious” situation there.

He will leave 8,400 troops in Afghanistan until the end of his term this November, still significantly less than the roughly 40,000 that were there when he first took office in 2012.

His goal had been to reduce the number to 5,500 by the time he left office but noted Wednesday that “we have to deal with the realities of the world as they exist.”

Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan will accompany Trudeau for the summit but his schedule is not yet confirmed.

...
https://ipolitics.ca/2016/07/06/in-warsaw-trudeau-to-stress-canadas-nato-support-beyond-numbers/


Quote
Darkening world a challenge for Liberals’ sunny ways 
John Ibbitson
The Globe and Mail
09 July 2016

The students in Stéfanie von Hlatky’s classes have no idea of what it’s like to live in a world of great nations in conflict, balance-of-power diplomacy and war that could kill thousands or millions as a constant threat.

“They’re all people who were children when 9/11 happened, and that’s their frame of reference,” Prof. von Hlatky, a political scientist at Queen’s University, observes in an interview.
 
That’s all changing. As Justin Trudeau and the other NATO heads of government conclude their summit in Warsaw Saturday, they face an old-new reality of Russia and China challenging the West’s supremacy, a challenge not seen since the days of the Prime Minister’s father. Meeting that challenge will test Mr. Trudeau’s sunny assumptions about Canada as a helpful fixer in the world, as the Liberal government struggles to shape a new and coherent policy for the country’s defence.

“History is back,” asserts Andrew Rasiulis, rebutting the 1992 claim by Francis Fukuyama that the end of the Cold War marked, ideologically, the end of history. “But it’s back in a more complex way.”

Mr. Rasiulis is a retired military analyst and fellow at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute. (All of those interviewed for this story are fellows at the institute.) For almost 30 years, he observes, the United States, NATO and other countries of the West have dominated the globe geopolitically, bothered by terrorist threats and sundry insurgencies, but never fundamentally challenged.

But the rising influence and belligerence of China and Russia are confronting Western hegemony in ways not seen since the days of the Soviet Union and Mao Zedong.

“It’s patently the case that we’re back in a situation of great powers competing,” says Julian Lindley-French, a British strategic analyst and vice president of the Atlantic Treaty Association, which studies NATO-related issues. “And it’s interfering with every conflict in the world.”

Russian President Vladimir Putin stunned Western politicians with his annexations in Georgia and Ukraine. To deter further aggression, NATO is bolstering its borders, with the Canadian government detailing at the Warsaw summit it plans to lead a battalion-sized land force in Latvia, part of a new brigade-sized commitment by NATO to Poland and the three Baltic states.

Analysts agree that these reinforcements would be quickly overwhelmed by Russian forces in an invasion. The real purpose of the brigade is to serve as a “tripwire” – a warning to Russia that any moves against the Baltic States or Poland would mean war with the United States, Canada and the rest of NATO.

Strangely enough, the greatest threat to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania might be found in the Western Pacific. There, China is expanding its navy and turning atolls into airstrips to bolster its claim that the South China Sea is actually a Chinese lake.

Marius Grinius, a retired Canadian diplomat who was ambassador to Vietnam and South and North Korea, points out that Chinese power, wealth and influence have been growing for decades, to the point where “there is now a sense that the Middle Kingdom has to take its place in the world.” Whether it does so peacefully or in conflict with its neighbours and the United States is the most important geopolitical question of our time, what Mr. Grinius calls “the new Great Game.”

The nightmare scenario for Mr. Lindley-French involves rising tensions between China and an overstretched United States in the Pacific, a Middle East in ferment and Europe weak and divided, convincing Mr. Putin that he can get away with snatching territory in the Baltics or somewhere else. And in the background lurks the deadly knowledge that the great powers still have large stockpiles of nuclear weapons.

Add in the continuing threats of terrorism, insurgency, regional instability and the increasing challenge to collective security of global warming, and the world starts to look geopolitically like a collection of dangerous neighbourhoods.

These challenges – both new and old fashioned – confront a Canadian government determined to replace Conservative belligerence with Liberal engagement, peace-making with peacekeeping.

“Trudeau and the Liberals wish that Defence would just go away,” Mr. Rasiulis believes. “Defence is not sunny.” Though Mr. Rasiulis does believe the new government deserves praise for doing a better job than the Conservatives of mixing defence with diplomacy.

The Liberals have already signalled that they have no intention of keeping a commitment by NATO members, made at the last summit in 2014, to gradually raise their defence spending to 2 per cent of GDP, if they are not at that level already. Canadian defence spending is .98 per cent of GDP, one of the lowest levels in NATO.

“The world needs more Canada. NATO needs more Canada,” U.S. President Barack Obama declared during his speech to Parliament in June – a subtle jab at Canada’s tendency, as the saying goes, to give all aid short of help.

The Liberals argue that Canada spends its defence dollars so wisely that big increases aren’t necessary. “We do not feel defensive about our spend[ing],” a senior government official speaking on background told reporters earlier this week at a NATO summit briefing. “The spend[ing] is not the only metric we should be using.”


Prof. von Hlatky believes the government has a point. The Canadian Forces have evolved over the past decade or so into a flexible, superbly trained and reasonably well-equipped force, she says. “Since the U.S. and NATO allies are faced with very diverse threats all over the world, Canada can play a role in all of those conflicts because of their training and their high level of professionalism.”

Nonetheless, the new commitment to send troops to Latvia while seeking as well to expand engagement in the United Nations and other multilateral forums, especially though new peacekeeping commitments, will stretch the Canadian military to the limit. “We’re going to do deterrence, we’re going to do counterterrorism, we’re going to do peacekeeping,” Prof. von Hlatky observes. “That’s a lot.”

Ultimately, the new government may have no choice but to increase spending on defence. Take the vexed question of replacing the aging fleet of CF-18 fighters. The Liberals promised during the election campaign to scrap the Conservative commitment to the Lockheed Martin F-35, find something cheaper and spend the savings on the navy, which is desperately in need of new ships.

But while a last-generation fighter might be sufficient for bombing and strafing militants in Middle Eastern hills, it won’t do the job in contested airspace over Europe against the best Russian planes.

“They have a choice to make,” says Mr. Lindley-French of the new government. “Either they’re serious or they’re not. My sense of Mr. Trudeau thus far is that he’s not, that he wants to be a free rider.” Of course, sheltering beneath the American security umbrella, squeezing the defence budget and spending the money on domestic social programs is as Canadian as tinkering with the national anthem.

Still, Canada’s new NATO commitment is bold and real. And the Liberals are once again reviewing the criteria for the next-generation jet fighter, suggesting the F-35 might be back on the table. The government has also launched a defence policy review. (Defence and foreign policy reviews appear to be irresistible temptations for new governments.) That review might conclude that Canada should focus on hard policy in Europe, by bolstering its NATO commitment, and soft policy in China, by cultivating improved relations with Beijing, while looking for opportunities to make meaningful contributions to peacekeeping duties, if and when they arise.

“For Canada, the question has to be, how can we be the most reliable alliance partner with the limited means that we have,” says Prof. von Hlatky. “We do that by having a highly competent, professional armed forces that can be nimble and that can assist in various types of situations.”

That would be one way for Canada to meaningfully contribute to peace and security in a new but dangerously old-fashioned world order.

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/darkening-world-a-challenge-for-liberals-sunny-ways/article30843212/
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MCG on July 21, 2016, 16:50:55
Earlier this month (as well as late last month), there was a lot of media discussion on the NATO nations' commitment to spend 2% of GDP and about the appropriateness of that metric as compared to other less tangible ideas such as the quality of our force and our "operational outputs."  I question if the argument that Canada has "always stepped up well above many other NATO partners" is an argument that is perceived to be true outside of this country.  Yes, we did take an incredibly difficult AO with Kandahar and it cost us a significant price in blood ... but I seem to recall that we received that AO because we were late deciding to come to the plate after other NATO nations had already agreed to step-up and take their own AOs within the original ISAF boundaries.  We also made a big show of concluding our mission well ahead of those other nations who were/are still shouldering their own AOs, and we were all but absent from NATO's other big mission through this time period.  KFOR remained a significant focus of NATO efforts for years after we dropped to token Canadian representation (and it would seem the alliance still has 5,500 pers deployed of which only 5 are Canadian (http://jfcnaples.nato.int/kfor/about-us/history)).

There can be no doubt that those elements that Canada contributes to international operations are highly capable organizations which perform outstandingly.  But stepping back from the battle groups, ships and task forces - are we really "punching above our weight" as a nation?  Is that how our allies see it?  Certainly, Obama's comments to the Canadian Parliament suggest the US sees Canada as a nation punching below our weight (to put a new spin on a worn-out phrase).  We are not living to our potential.

As for being satisfied with spending below 1% GDP, if our spending levels are adequate then why do we constantly short-change our requirements when we go to procurements?  Why do we buy fleets of fighting vehicles but skimp on the necessary support vehicles for lack of money?  Why was discussion framed as a cost choice between the F-35 or a lesser fighter with a more capable Navy fleet?  Why have we been gutting PYs out of the Army field force (the organization which most heavily paid Canada's self-held belief of punching above our weight) instead of authorizing and funding new PYs to grow the new capabilities such as Cyber?  Why did we allow the Air Defence capability to atrophy out of the Army?  Why did we sacrifice pioneers, anti-armour and mortars in the infantry?  Why are combat engineers operating heavy equipment so old that replacement parts are no longer available to buy?  Why are we selling B Fleet and TLAV vehicles without replacement?  Does a shortage of funding over successive governments have anything to do with this?

Is 1% of GDP really enough to get the military we need if we want to claim that we are shouldering our share of responsibility?  Is 1% of GDP enough to meet NATO and NORAD obligations while expanding (and properly resourcing) our commitment to UN peace support operations?

The government is right.  Percentage of GDP is not the only metric of what we bring to NATO; it is more a metric of actual capability against potential capability.  Digging below the surface, < 1% of GDP is not getting the military capability that we pretend to have.

Quote
Trudeau repurposes Tory lines about military spending after criticism from NATO
Lee Berthiaume, The Canadian Press
National Post
06 July 2016

OTTAWA — Prime Minister Justin Trudeau defended Canada’s record on military spending Tuesday, saying the country has consistently shouldered a heavier burden than many of its allies when it counts the most.

NATO reported this week that Canadian defence spending in 2015 hit levels not seen in decades, falling to 0.98 per cent of gross domestic product. That is less than half the two per cent of GDP target that all NATO members, including Canada, agreed to in 2014.

But documents obtained by the Canadian Press show the previous Conservative government never actually committed to meet that NATO target, which would equate to about $40 billion a year.

Instead, the Conservatives quietly pushed the alliance to recognize other “outputs” from Canada such as the contributions it has made to both NATO and non-NATO missions around the world.

Trudeau appeared to be picking up on that theme during a news conference after an unrelated announcement in Montreal.

He was asked whether he would commit to the two per cent target when he meets with other NATO leaders in Poland later this week.

Trudeau didn’t respond directly. Instead, he pointed to the government’s announcement last week that Canada will take a leadership role in a new multinational force in Eastern Europe as the latest example of the country pulling its weight.

“We have always stepped up well above many other NATO partners to engage, and that’s actually highlighted by our engagement around Operation Reassurance,” Trudeau said.

Canadian troops are expected to be deployed to Latvia, where they will make up the majority of a 1,000-strong battalion that serve as a deterrent against Russian aggression. Germany, the U.K. and the U.S. will lead similar units in Lithuania, Estonia and Poland.

“We continue to be a valued and valuable partner in NATO,” Trudeau added, “and I look forward to productive discussions in Warsaw with our NATO partners about how Canada can continue to contribute to peace and security in the world.”

All NATO countries, including Canada, agreed in 2014 to stop cutting military budgets and work towards spending two per cent of GDP on defence. The goal was intended to ensure all alliance members were doing their fair share, which includes investing enough to field a modern military.

The target has taken on added importance following Russia’s own military buildup, and criticisms from some U.S. senators and Republic presidential hopeful Donald Trump about NATO members not pulling their weight. Obama also raised the issue in his address to Parliament last week.

NATO estimates Canadian defence spending will increase slightly this year, to 0.99 per cent of GDP. However, that will still leave Canada 23rd out of 28 NATO members.

The previous Conservative government also tried to defend against criticism of Canada’s defence spending by pointing to its contributions to operations overseas, according to a briefing note prepared for Trudeau last November and obtained through access to information law.

Canada wanted a “qualitative assessment of defence contributions based on ‘outputs’ and did not commit to achieving a fixed target of two per cent of GDP,” the note reads.

“Instead, Canada expressed a commitment to continue to develop its national capabilities and to contribute as full partners in NATO missions as well as non-NATO missions with our NATO allies.”

Defence analyst David Perry of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute said it’s nearly impossible to imagine any Canadian prime minister actually committing to the two per cent target, which would mean doubling defence spending.

However, he also didn’t believe it’s possible to maintain an effective, state-of-the-art Canadian Armed Forces at the current spending levels.
 
http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/canadian-politics/trudeau-repurposes-tory-lines-about-military-spending-after-criticism-from-nato

Quote
Trudeau defends Canada’s military spending record, points to NATO contribution
'We continue to be a valued and valuable partner in NATO,' Justin Trudeau said, as he referred to the most recent mission in Eastern Europe.

By Lee Berthiaume, The Canadian Press
The Star
05 July 2016

OTTAWA — Prime Minister Justin Trudeau defended Canada’s record on military spending Tuesday by pointing out that the country has consistently done more than many allies in other ways — most recently in Eastern Europe.

NATO reported this week that Canadian defence spending hit record lows last year, falling to 0.98 per cent of gross domestic product. That is less than half the two per cent target that all NATO members, including Canada, agreed to in 2014.

Asked during a press conference in Montreal on Tuesday whether he would commit to the two per cent target when he travels to Poland later this week, Trudeau instead referenced the Liberal government’s decision to have Canada lead a 1,000-strong NATO force in Eastern Europe.

“We have always stepped up well above many other NATO partners to engage, and that’s actually highlighted by our engagement around Operation Reassurance,” Trudeau said.

“We continue to be a valued and valuable partner in NATO,” he added, “and I look forward to productive discussions in Warsaw with our NATO partners about how Canada can continue to contribute to peace and security in the world.”

Trudeau will travel to the Polish capital later this week for meetings with the 27 other NATO leaders. Allied defence spending is expected to be one of the major topics of discussion, alongside the threat posed by Russia and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.

All NATO countries, including Canada, agreed in 2014 to stop cutting military budgets and work towards spending two per cent of GDP on defence. The goal was intended to ensure all alliance members were doing their fair share, which includes investing enough to field a modern military.

The target has taken on added importance thanks to Russia’s own military buildup, as well as criticisms in the U.S. from senators and Republican presidential hopeful Donald Trump about some members not pulling their weight.

Obama was also seen to have gently rebuked Canada on the issue in his address to Parliament last week, saying: “As your ally and as your friend, let me say that we’ll be more secure when every NATO member, including Canada, contributes its full share to our common security.”

The alliance does estimate that Canadian defence spending will increase slightly this year, to 0.99 per cent of GDP. However, that will still leave Canada 23rd out of 28 NATO members.
https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2016/07/05/trudeau-defends-canadas-military-spending-record-points-to-nato-contribution.html
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Bird_Gunner45 on July 21, 2016, 17:12:20
What pressing threat is there to Canada that could possibly justify doubling our military budget?  I can see putting back the money that the Conservatives cut, if we're going to stick with their plan (we're not) and adding a few billing for capabilities we may be lacking, but $18B? 

It's an arbitrary number that is completely meaningless.  If NATO wants to throw out their 6th highest contributor, let them.

That said, I would be interested to see a graphic that shows how our military spending rates once adjusted for personnel costs, which are significantly higher than other NATO partners (just O&M). Do we spend more on actual army stuff rather than salaries/pension relative to other nations or less? For the 6th largest spender in NATO we sure don't seem to get as much out of it as a lot of those other nations considering we have a Navy that is basically broken, fly a small number of old fighters, have a small number of transport aircraft, have a significant number of vacancies in key units (particularly when numbers reflect trained strength not on PCAT/TCAT) and no AH/AT/GBAD whatsoever.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Old Sweat on July 21, 2016, 17:25:07
That said, I would be interested to see a graphic that shows how our military spending rates once adjusted for personnel costs, which are significantly higher than other NATO partners (just O&M). Do we spend more on actual army stuff rather than salaries/pension relative to other nations or less? For the 6th largest spender in NATO we sure don't seem to get as much out of it as a lot of those other nations considering we have a Navy that is basically broken, fly a small number of old fighters, have a small number of transport aircraft, have a significant number of vacancies in key units (particularly when numbers reflect trained strength not on PCAT/TCAT) and no AH/AT/GBAD whatsoever.

Concur. Because of geography, low population density and other factors such as two official languages, our fixed costs for administration are high. Now toss in a propensity to create a labyrinth of headquarters that seem to do little other than pass paper, electronically or not and, at least in the opinion of one who served in a regime when our command and control was much leaner, we - okay, you - run an extremely costly and inefficient organization.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jmt18325 on July 21, 2016, 17:28:29
That said, I would be interested to see a graphic that shows how our military spending rates once adjusted for personnel costs, which are significantly higher than other NATO partners (just O&M). Do we spend more on actual army stuff rather than salaries/pension relative to other nations or less? For the 6th largest spender in NATO we sure don't seem to get as much out of it as a lot of those other nations considering we have a Navy that is basically broken, fly a small number of old fighters, have a small number of transport aircraft, have a significant number of vacancies in key units (particularly when numbers reflect trained strength not on PCAT/TCAT) and no AH/AT/GBAD whatsoever.

Do we really compare that badly?  Yes, we have an old fighter fleet, but it's completely modern, going through yet another set of upgrades that are equal to what the US Marines are using, and better than what many are flying.  Many NATO countries have a much smaller fleet yet.

Do we really have a broken navy by NATO standards overall?  True, we're currently lacking AORs, but how many other forces in NATO have 12 surface combatants that can compare with the Halifax class, and spend less than us (maybe Spain - but not 12).

Do we really have few transport aircraft?  We have 17 C-130j, 5 C-17s (only two other NATO countries with that kind of lift), plus the Buffalo and the Twotter.  We now have Chinooks and a large number of light helicopters.

Yes, we're missing key capabilities - AORs, air defense, amphibious lift capability, etc, and we need new trucks, but, despite some old equipment, we actually compare not as bad as some people make it out.  We actually have 2 Navy ships under construction (one is a lease, yes), soon to be 3, and 2 large CCG ships (soon to be 3) under construction.  We actually have modern tanks with modern armored vehicles and trucks being delivered or on the way.  There's not as many as we once had, but did we really need that many?  Again, is there a pressing treat that requires all of that?

I'd argue that we should keep our navy combatant fleet and defense fighter fleet strong enough, and most anything else we spend is a gift to Europe and the rest of NATO.

I'm interested to see what the defense review comes out with, as we'll then be able to gauge the Liberal plan, and what level of spending is needed to suspend it.  We know the Conservative plan.  It was fine, but they undercut it by under funding their own plan.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jmt18325 on July 21, 2016, 17:29:59
Concur. Because of geography, low population density and other factors such as two official languages, our fixed costs for administration are high. Now toss in a propensity to create a labyrinth of headquarters that seem to do little other than pass paper, electronically or not and, at least in the opinion of one who served in a regime when our command and control was much leaner, we - okay, you - run an extremely costly and inefficient organization.

And I agree with all of that.  That said, until this year (and we'll see what happens this year) DND has been returning money it couldn't spend because of a lack of procurement people and know how.  Not only that, but money has now been pushed forward 3 times for the same reason.  Before spending any more money, that all has to be fixed.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Bird_Gunner45 on July 21, 2016, 17:45:44
Do we really compare that badly?  Yes, we have an old fighter fleet, but it's completely modern, going through yet another set of upgrades that are equal to what the US Marines are using, and better than what many are flying.  Many NATO countries have a much smaller fleet yet.

Do we really have a broken navy by NATO standards overall?  True, we're currently lacking AORs, but how many other forces in NATO have 12 surface combatants that can compare with the Halifax class, and spend less than us (maybe Spain - but not 12).

Do we really have few transport aircraft?  We have 17 C-130j, 5 C-17s (only two other NATO countries with that kind of lift), plus the Buffalo and the Twotter.  We now have Chinooks and a large number of light helicopters.

Yes, we're missing key capabilities - AORs, air defense, amphibious lift capability, etc, and we need new trucks, but, despite some old equipment, we actually compare not as bad as some people make it out.  We actually have 2 Navy ships under construction (one is a lease, yes), soon to be 3, and 2 large CCG ships (soon to be 3) under construction.  We actually have modern tanks with modern armored vehicles and trucks being delivered or on the way.  There's not as many as we once had, but did we really need that many?  Again, is there a pressing treat that requires all of that?

I'd argue that we should keep our navy combatant fleet and defense fighter fleet strong enough, and most anything else we spend is a gift to Europe and the rest of NATO.

I'm interested to see what the defense review comes out with, as we'll then be able to gauge the Liberal plan, and what level of spending is needed to suspend it.  We know the Conservative plan.  It was fine, but they undercut it by under funding their own plan.

Who said anything about Liberals or Conservatives? Stick to the topic and stop trying to make everything about politics. I could get a %&^$ less about who is in charge so long as they fix the massive amount of overhead we seem to maintain for ourselves that limits our actual O&M funds.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Chris Pook on July 21, 2016, 17:50:14
And I agree with all of that.  That said, until this year (and we'll see what happens this year) DND has been returning money it couldn't spend because of a lack of procurement people and know how.  Not only that, but money has now been pushed forward 3 times for the same reason.  Before spending any more money, that all has to be fixed.


With respect, JMT - we have been waiting a century for that to be fixed and it is a work in progress for our allies.  The replacement and enhancement of our defences has to continue regardless while realistically accepting the inefficiencies in place.

As to the cost of our contribution vice the threat to Canada.  As a trading nation (assuming we are a trading nation and not a nation of park wardens), as a trading nation it is important that the Commons are orderly and are safe places to travel.  Consider our contribution as that necessary to police the Commons.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jmt18325 on July 21, 2016, 17:57:17
Who said anything about Liberals or Conservatives? Stick to the topic and stop trying to make everything about politics. I could get a %&^$ less about who is in charge so long as they fix the massive amount of overhead we seem to maintain for ourselves that limits our actual O&M funds.

If that's all you got out of what I said, I'm sorry.

I wasn't actually making a political commentary.  Right now, we have the Canada First Defence Strategy.  It is currently underfunded as planned.  We have to wait and see what the Liberals come up with as a plan and these if they find it properly.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jmt18325 on July 21, 2016, 18:05:48

With respect, JMT - we have been waiting a century for that to be fixed and it is a work in progress for our allies.  The replacement and enhancement of our defences has to continue regardless while realistically accepting the inefficiencies in place.

I refuse to accept that DND can't at least figure out how to spend the money that they do get in a timely manner.

Quote
As to the cost of our contribution vice the threat to Canada.  As a trading nation (assuming we are a trading nation and not a nation of park wardens), as a trading nation it is important that the Commons are orderly and are safe places to travel.  Consider our contribution as that necessary to police the Commons.

I'm not sure it's worth the cost in many cases.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Blackadder1916 on July 21, 2016, 19:53:58
That said, I would be interested to see a graphic that shows how our military spending rates once adjusted for personnel costs, which are significantly higher than other NATO partners (just O&M). Do we spend more on actual army stuff rather than salaries/pension relative to other nations or less? For the 6th largest spender in NATO we sure don't seem to get as much out of it as a lot of those other nations considering we have a Navy that is basically broken, fly a small number of old fighters, have a small number of transport aircraft, have a significant number of vacancies in key units (particularly when numbers reflect trained strength not on PCAT/TCAT) and no AH/AT/GBAD whatsoever.

While it probably is not as simplified a graphic as you hope for, you will find some tables here (http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_07/20160704_160704-pr2016-116.pdf) that show a breakdown by category as a percentage of each NATO country's defence spending.

The categories are:

1.  Personnel - Personnel expenditures include military and civilian expenditures and pensions.
2.  Equipment - Equipment expenditures include major equipment expenditures and R&D devoted to major equipment.
3.  Infrastructure
4.  Other - Other expenditures include operations and maintenance expenditures, other R&D expenditures and expenditures not allocated among above-mentioned categories.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jmt18325 on July 21, 2016, 20:29:30
There's no question we need to devote more money to equipment renewal.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: QV on July 21, 2016, 22:16:50
What pressing threat is there to Canada that could possibly justify doubling our military budget?  I can see putting back the money that the Conservatives cut, if we're going to stick with their plan (we're not) and adding a few billing for capabilities we may be lacking, but $18B? 

It's an arbitrary number that is completely meaningless.  If NATO wants to throw out their 6th highest contributor, let them.

Let's use the deterrence force to Latvia as an example.  If the Russians roll over that token force, what is our response?  What will Canada's contribution to NATOs response be?  We won't have any meaningful contribution.  As a G7 nation we should be able to wield more force than we currently can.  We should have far more strike/fighter aircraft and far more ships and subs than we do.  That's the problem. 
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jmt18325 on July 21, 2016, 22:28:30
Let's use the deterrence force to Latvia as an example.  If the Russians roll over that token force, what is our response?  What will Canada's contribution to NATOs response be?  We won't have any meaningful contribution.  As a G7 nation we should be able to wield more force than we currently can.  We should have far more strike/fighter aircraft and far more ships and subs than we do.  That's the problem.

We'd have some kind of response, in the form of ships and a few fighters aircraft, for sure, and probably whatever was left of our army at that point.  Still, I don't see that as a realistic outcome to what's currently going on, and I don't see it as a big concern.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Bird_Gunner45 on July 21, 2016, 23:30:20
While it probably is not as simplified a graphic as you hope for, you will find some tables here (http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_07/20160704_160704-pr2016-116.pdf) that show a breakdown by category as a percentage of each NATO country's defence spending.

The categories are:

1.  Personnel - Personnel expenditures include military and civilian expenditures and pensions.
2.  Equipment - Equipment expenditures include major equipment expenditures and R&D devoted to major equipment.
3.  Infrastructure
4.  Other - Other expenditures include operations and maintenance expenditures, other R&D expenditures and expenditures not allocated among above-mentioned categories.

Great graphics. It was legitimately eye opening to see what some of those other NATO nations spend for personnel... up to 70%! Makes their militaries more of a welfare society and makes you wonder if the 2% threshold is applicable
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Colin P on July 22, 2016, 12:30:39
The thing is that you need some sort of standard that can be easily measured and that's what the GDP figure does. If Canada wisely spent 2% of GDP on defense, we would have one of the top military's in the world, with proper fleets of ships, fully equipped infantry battalions, well rounded Air force, decently equipped reserves and a proper system to sustain and support the above.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jmt18325 on July 22, 2016, 12:55:08
The thing is that you need some sort of standard that can be easily measured and that's what the GDP figure does.

That standard really tells you nothing.  It says nothing about where the money is going, or what you're contributing.  Our defence budget should be able to fund what we have planned as of right now, based on our defence needs.  As of right now, we aren't properly funding our own plans. 
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: George Wallace on July 22, 2016, 13:14:08
That standard really tells you nothing.  It says nothing about where the money is going, or what you're contributing.  Our defence budget should be able to fund what we have planned as of right now, based on our defence needs.  As of right now, we aren't properly funding our own plans.

First you have to have a plan.  It has been decades since the Canadian Government has seriously put any thought into what it expects of the Canadian Armed Forces.  Spur of the moment jumping on a UN or NATO bandwagon to send "Peacekeepers" or "Peacemakers" is not a desirable position to be in, nor is it a credible plan.  The last White Paper on Defence has been so long ago, most of us who knew what it was have forgotten, and those who never knew what it was......well, they never knew and never will know.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Journeyman on July 22, 2016, 13:27:52
I refuse to accept that DND can't at least figure out how to spend the money that they do get in a timely manner.
I'm not sure how many different people you need here pointing out that you don't know what you're talking about, but the least -- the absolute very least -- you could do (for this thread at any rate), is to read up on how defence procurement works.

DND is not remotely  a stand-alone entity when it comes to spending; there are several other Departments, direct government intervention, a labyrinth of regulations (few of which were enacted specifically for the military, but which we're obligated to address regardless).....


Opinions vs. informed  opinions......
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: E.R. Campbell on July 22, 2016, 13:38:06
All you measure with a % of GDP is national will or commitment. It is possible, just, to spend 1.5% of GDP wisely and effectively (which is not, as Old Sweat points out, at superfluous staff officers in bloated HQs) and make a high quality contribution to the common defence tasks; it is, equally, possible to spend 3% of GDP and still have a second rate, poorly lead, semi-skilled military ~ it may be large and well equipped but neither equals "good." But the country that commits 2% or 3% of GDP is serious about doing something, even if it is not doing it very well, while the smart, efficient and effective military from the 1.25% or 1.5% country still says that it is lacking in the will to share the burden of the common defence of the West, even when Putin is telling us that we need to be concerned.

In my opinion Canada is spending far too little, given the strategic situation, and it is spending it poorly ... we are, in other words, as a nation, neither smart nor committed.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Chris Pook on July 22, 2016, 13:57:36
All you measure with a % of GDP is national will or commitment. It is possible, just, to spend 1.5% of GDP wisely and effectively (which is not, as Old Sweat points out, at superfluous staff officers in bloated HQs) and make a high quality contribution to the common defence tasks; it is, equally, possible to spend 3% of GDP and still have a second rate, poorly lead, semi-skilled military ~ it may be large and well equipped but neither equals "good." But the country that commits 2% or 3% of GDP is serious about doing something, even if it is not doing it very well, while the smart, efficient and effective military from the 1.25% or 1.5% country still says that it is lacking in the will to share the burden of the common defence of the West, even when Putin is telling us that we need to be concerned.

In my opinion Canada is spending far too little, given the strategic situation, and it is spending it poorly ... we are, in other words, as a nation, neither smart nor committed.

Thumbs up on that one.

I was asked what capabilities NATO is missing that our money might pay for.  Well, how about Carrier Groups.  The US used to fund 13 Carrier Groups, with escorts.  The Brits used to fund 30 or 40 escorts.  Those ships "policed the commons" of the high seas and created crisis response capabilities.   They are reduced and diminished now.  Does that make the commons safer?  I don't believe so.  That is but one example of an area where our missing 18 BUSD could be used to our, and NATO's and the international community's at large, benefit.   We don't have to fund carriers and air wings but we can fund escorts and subs and AORs and transports that would allow the Americans to spend more on other stuff.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: George Wallace on July 22, 2016, 14:17:59
All you measure with a % of GDP is national will or commitment. It is possible, just, to spend 1.5% of GDP wisely and effectively (which is not, as Old Sweat points out, at superfluous staff officers in bloated HQs) and make a high quality contribution to the common defence tasks; it is, equally, possible to spend 3% of GDP and still have a second rate, poorly lead, semi-skilled military ~ it may be large and well equipped but neither equals "good." But the country that commits 2% or 3% of GDP is serious about doing something, even if it is not doing it very well, while the smart, efficient and effective military from the 1.25% or 1.5% country still says that it is lacking in the will to share the burden of the common defence of the West, even when Putin is telling us that we need to be concerned.

In my opinion Canada is spending far too little, given the strategic situation, and it is spending it poorly ... we are, in other words, as a nation, neither smart nor committed.

It will be interesting to see where we go if Trump is elected President.  He has stated in his acceptance speech that he will be demanding that other nations pick up their socks and tow their line and that the US is no longer going to be funding the majority of NATO and other security operations, while other nations skimp out on their obligations.  Will he "lay down the law" on Trudeau and force him to commit more to NATO, NORAD, and other joint security ventures?  That would be a form of 'deja vu' from Trudeau version 1.0.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: milnews.ca on July 22, 2016, 14:37:07
It will be interesting to see where we go if Trump is elected President.  He has stated in his acceptance speech that he will be demanding that other nations pick up their socks and tow their line and that the US is no longer going to be funding the majority of NATO and other security operations, while other nations skimp out on their obligations.  Will he "lay down the law" on Trudeau and force him to commit more to NATO, NORAD, and other joint security ventures?  That would be a form of 'deja vu' from Trudeau version 1.0.
If that's the case, will Trudeau counter with, for example, "sure, as long as Canadian wood can be sold in the U.S. without any tariffs" - yeah, I know, dare to dream ...
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jmt18325 on July 22, 2016, 16:16:09
First you have to have a plan.  It has been decades since the Canadian Government has seriously put any thought into what it expects of the Canadian Armed Forces.  Spur of the moment jumping on a UN or NATO bandwagon to send "Peacekeepers" or "Peacemakers" is not a desirable position to be in, nor is it a credible plan.  The last White Paper on Defence has been so long ago, most of us who knew what it was have forgotten, and those who never knew what it was......well, they never knew and never will know.

That's why I await the defence review.  It will give us the plan and vision that Canadians have created through their government.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jmt18325 on July 22, 2016, 16:17:10
I'm not sure how many different people you need here pointing out that you don't know what you're talking about, but the least -- the absolute very least -- you could do (for this thread at any rate), is to read up on how defence procurement works.

DND is not remotely  a stand-alone entity when it comes to spending; there are several other Departments, direct government intervention, a labyrinth of regulations (few of which were enacted specifically for the military, but which we're obligated to address regardless).....


Opinions vs. informed  opinions......

I don't really care why the problem exists - it exists.  That's the problem.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jmt18325 on July 22, 2016, 16:21:24
All you measure with a % of GDP is national will or commitment. It is possible, just, to spend 1.5% of GDP wisely and effectively (which is not, as Old Sweat points out, at superfluous staff officers in bloated HQs) and make a high quality contribution to the common defence tasks; it is, equally, possible to spend 3% of GDP and still have a second rate, poorly lead, semi-skilled military ~ it may be large and well equipped but neither equals "good." But the country that commits 2% or 3% of GDP is serious about doing something, even if it is not doing it very well, while the smart, efficient and effective military from the 1.25% or 1.5% country still says that it is lacking in the will to share the burden of the common defence of the West, even when Putin is telling us that we need to be concerned.

In my opinion Canada is spending far too little, given the strategic situation, and it is spending it poorly ... we are, in other words, as a nation, neither smart nor committed.

In reality, there isn't much threat to Canada.  I would agree some expansion could be justified for the common defence, but not $18B
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: George Wallace on July 22, 2016, 17:23:26
In reality, there isn't much threat to Canada.  I would agree some expansion could be justified for the common defence, but not $18B

I'm actually curious as to how you come to that conclusion.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jmt18325 on July 23, 2016, 15:54:46
I'm actually curious as to how you come to that conclusion.

With a slightly strong air force on our end, and the logistics required to project force to Canada from our end (this applies to anyone that isn't the US) there really isn't much of a conventional military threat that we couldn't take on.  I would say some money could be spent on under ice capable subs as well, and at least as many ships as we have now.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: George Wallace on July 23, 2016, 16:19:33
With a slightly strong air force on our end, and the logistics required to project force to Canada from our end (this applies to anyone that isn't the US) there really isn't much of a conventional military threat that we couldn't take on.  I would say some money could be spent on under ice capable subs as well, and at least as many ships as we have now.

HUH?  ???
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: QV on July 23, 2016, 16:22:41
With a slightly strong air force on our end, and the logistics required to project force to Canada from our end (this applies to anyone that isn't the US) there really isn't much of a conventional military threat that we couldn't take on.  I would say some money could be spent on under ice capable subs as well, and at least as many ships as we have now.

 :facepalm:
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: SeaKingTacco on July 23, 2016, 17:12:18
That's why I await the defence review.  It will give us the plan and vision that Canadians have created through their government.

Are you actually serious? Have you actually been to any of the Defence Policy Consultations? I have.

I can assure you that the "fix is in". The Consultative process is about 98% smoke and mirrors. Whatever Defence Policy we do get has probably already been largely decided and will have little or nothing to do with what has been said/heard while "consulting with Canadians"- which is probably a good thing, given that the comments on Defence matters that I have heard from the average Canadian are generally uneducated and naive at best (which sounds elitist, but many of us have been immersed in Defence Policy for years, if not decades. It is like expecting the average lay Canadian to have an intelligent and well informed opinion on quantum mechanics).
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jmt18325 on July 23, 2016, 17:27:18
HUH?  ???

Given geography, Canada is a difficult country to invade.  If we want to focus on our defence needs, the navy and air force are where we need to concentrate our resources.  You could lob missiles at it from afar with relative ease though, but the chances of that are pretty small.

Most investments that we make are more to contribute to the common defence needs of NATO, and not so much the self defence needs of Canada.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jmt18325 on July 23, 2016, 17:28:23
Are you actually serious? Have you actually been to any of the Defence Policy Consultations? I have.

I don't mean through the public input so much as through the overall vision that the government has in mind.  The government that Canadians selected.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: PuckChaser on July 23, 2016, 18:01:23
I don't mean through the public input so much as through the overall vision that the government has in mind.  The government that Canadians selected.

Maybe if we delinked politics, from defense, we wouldn't be screwed every 4-8 years. You're apparently unable to do that, and were quite content to see your favourite Liberals renege on planned increases to DND's budget, and actually "defer" (cut) capital procurement budgets so we wouldn't be $32 or $33B in the red.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Retired AF Guy on July 23, 2016, 18:42:53
Given geography, Canada is a difficult country to invade.  If we want to focus on our defence needs, the navy and air force are where we need to concentrate our resources.  You could lob missiles at it from afar with relative ease though, but the chances of that are pretty small.

Most investments that we make are more to contribute to the common defence needs of NATO, and not so much the self defence needs of Canada.

What about an internal threat?
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jmt18325 on July 23, 2016, 19:16:18
Maybe if we delinked politics, from defense, we wouldn't be screwed every 4-8 years. You're apparently unable to do that, and were quite content to see your favourite Liberals renege on planned increases to DND's budget, and actually "defer" (cut) capital procurement budgets so we wouldn't be $32 or $33B in the red.

I don't fault the Liberals for that move, just as I don't fault the Conservatives for the same move in 2012 and 2014.  They all did it for the same reasons relating to the same projects - the Canadian Surface Combatant, the JSS, and the fighter replacement.  We were supposed to be buying those things at this point, but we're not ready to because of failure after failure by government after government.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jmt18325 on July 23, 2016, 19:17:53
What about an internal threat?

There aren't really many internal threats that can be foreseen that will require a large combat force.  Not larger than we have right now anyway.  I'd propose cutting the size of the army somewhat, and equipping the smaller force better, with all the aspects that they are currently missing, such as air defense and self propelled artillery.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: PuckChaser on July 23, 2016, 19:31:46
There aren't really many internal threats that can be foreseen that will require a large combat force.  Not larger than we have right now anyway.  I'd propose cutting the size of the army somewhat, and equipping the smaller force better, with all the aspects that they are currently missing, such as air defense and self propelled artillery.

How about we equip the Army we have properly, without making any further cuts? Of course that would cost money. Money that was just "deferred".

You can't say we have a huge landmass that needs to be protected, and then in the next sentence want to cut a large portion of it. We absolutely need a larger RCAF and RCN to cover all that area, and in that same sense, having anything less in terms of troop counts for the Army makes giant holes in the defense of the nation.

You can't hold ground with ships and airplanes. That's what boots on the ground are for.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Jarnhamar on July 23, 2016, 19:34:46
There aren't really many internal threats that can be foreseen that will require a large combat force.  Not larger than we have right now anyway.  I'd propose cutting the size of the army somewhat, and equipping the smaller force better, with all the aspects that they are currently missing, such as air defense and self propelled artillery.

I don't think you're familiar with how hurting our army is for deployable people. Unless you mean cutting HQ types, then I agree.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jmt18325 on July 23, 2016, 19:36:03
How about we equip the Army we have properly, without making any further cuts? Of course that would cost money. Money that was just "deferred".

That's not the same money.  The deferred money is already allocated to ships and planes.

Quote
You can't say we have a huge landmass that needs to be protected, and then in the next sentence want to cut a large portion of it. We absolutely need a larger RCAF and RCN to cover all that area, and in that same sense, having anything less in terms of troop counts for the Army makes giant holes in the defense of the nation.

For the vast majority of foreseeable circumstances, protecting Canada will need to involve stopping any enemy before they get here.

Quote
You can't hold ground with ships and airplanes. That's what boots on the ground are for.

And we both agree we need better boots - we just don't agree on the number.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jmt18325 on July 23, 2016, 19:37:15
I don't think you're familiar with how hurting our army is for deployable people. Unless you mean cutting HQ types, then I agree.

I'm aware that we can deploy about 3000 people abroad, as we're about to do apparently and have done recently.  I'm not sure we need to do that.  I believe our major contribution to NATO should be air and sea power.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: PuckChaser on July 23, 2016, 19:44:11
That's not the same money.  The deferred money is already allocated to ships and planes.

Its absolutely the same money. Capital procurement for ships is the same money for tanks, for SPGs, for GBAD. One giant pot, subdivided down for projects. When that pot is cut, projects get cut completely, or you get less things in each project.

For the vast majority of foreseeable circumstances, protecting Canada will need to involve stopping any enemy before they get here.

What happens after they get through the RCN and RCAF? Bend over and kiss your *** goodbye? What about a catastrophic earthquake or flood? Gonna get all those pilots out to fill sandbags? The Army is a work pool for all those tasks that gets us good press. You also can't peacekeep without an Army.

And we both agree we need better boots - we just don't agree on the number.

Right now we have no boots. Literally no boots to issue out. I'm sure they could get a project going again, but that capital spending is deferred.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jmt18325 on July 23, 2016, 20:03:41
Its absolutely the same money. Capital procurement for ships is the same money for tanks, for SPGs, for GBAD. One giant pot, subdivided down for projects. When that pot is cut, projects get cut completely, or you get less things in each project.

The money that was moved forward is the same money that was moved two times before.  It's already allocated.

Quote
Right now we have no boots. Literally no boots to issue out. I'm sure they could get a project going again, but that capital spending is deferred.

Actually, that kind of capital spending gets increased by almost $1.5B this year, as per the NATO charts.  As per the budget documents, large project spending (ships and such) actually increases to more than $1B this year, from less than $1B last year.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Cloud Cover on July 23, 2016, 21:37:06
In my opinion Canada is spending far too little, given the strategic situation, and it is spending it poorly ... we are, in other words, as a nation, neither smart nor committed.

Well said. And I can't really see that changing, ever.

and this, right here, from 2004, is what needed to occur, did not occur and will not ever occur:


What I mean is that I am not for or against any specific solution - I am against the problem, which is that we do not have a defensible Defence Policy.  I refuse to situate the estimate.  We need to do a First Priciples review that recognises no shibboleths, no rice bowls, no political considerations, no Granatsteins or Bercussons.  Do an estimate, select a course of action, develop a plan, and execute it.

- mod edit to fix formatting/coding -
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: YZT580 on July 23, 2016, 22:19:12
and we need to get all party agreement to place politics on the backburner in the same manner as the Aussies have done so that there is no change in procurement every 4 years.  How we utilize those resources would remain in the political spectrum but the actual nuts and bolts procurement requirements need to be set in stone.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Good2Golf on July 23, 2016, 23:06:39
I don't mean through the public input so much as through the overall vision that the government has in mind.  The government that Canadians selected.


ummmm....that's not a consultation, then...
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jmt18325 on July 24, 2016, 00:08:51

ummmm....that's not a consultation, then...

I know - that's why I didn't use the word.  I'm sure the consultation will play some small part, but, not much of one. 
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Dimsum on July 24, 2016, 01:26:47
and we need to get all party agreement to place politics on the backburner in the same manner as the Aussies have done so that there is no change in procurement every 4 years. 

The reason why the Aus Defence Force enjoys political support from all sides is due to history and geography.  Until we stop becoming neighbours with the US and/or have an actual attack on our soil that slips through NORAD, etc. the same won't happen in Canada.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Old Sweat on July 24, 2016, 09:12:20
The reason why the Aus Defence Force enjoys political support from all sides is due to history and geography.  Until we stop becoming neighbours with the US and/or have an actual attack on our soil that slips through NORAD, etc. the same won't happen in Canada.

Indeed. They found the hard way in the early months of the Pacific War that the world views from 10 Downing Street and Canberra are very, very different.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Brad Sallows on July 24, 2016, 13:27:27
"Defence of Canada" is a misleading way to express the domestic role.  The country is too large and the population too small relative to either of our most significant neighbours.  A more useful way to phrase the domestic role is "Exercise/Demonstration of Sovereignty".  Canada's real military interest in a "Defence of Canada" capability lies with NATO.

If you accepted those two premises, you'd probably design, create, and sustain a much different force than the one federal governments have slowly been creeping toward.

A defence review is an estimate, situated to spend as little as the government believes it can politically endure.  To move expenditures from 1% to 2% of GDP implies a doubling; the current budget is somewhere in the low $20 billions; even if the government were willing to deficit finance that amount it has already done so to support other programs which indicates clearly where priorities lie.

To redress the spending problem, you'd first have to undo all the spending which created the new deficit and then find about the same amount in cuts elsewhere if you wanted to achieve a doubling and balance the budget.  Essentially, the magnitude of the NATO financing target problem has doubled with the change of government.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jmt18325 on July 24, 2016, 18:43:07
It's almost as if the last government didn't run a deficit.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: SeaKingTacco on July 24, 2016, 21:31:01
It certainly did- at the threat of non-confidence in 2008 (remember that?).

It took until 2014 to dig out from that. For one year.

You are welcome.

To drag this back onto Defence- owe you a bit of an apology, JMT. It seems that I misread an earlier post of yours and misconstrued that you thought that Defence policy should be set by the masses. You said nothing of the sort.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jmt18325 on July 24, 2016, 22:03:55
It certainly did- at the threat of non-confidence in 2008 (remember that?).

Of course I remember, but it still happened.  The digging out is actually why we're at ~1% of GDP and not ~1.2% of GDP right now.  I think we need either a new plan that conforms with current spending levels, or more spending to conform with the current plan.  I don't hold out much hope for the latter, outside of intense international pressure.

Just think of it - to reach our defence and foreign aid targets (the ones we promised to meet), we'd have to spend somewhere in the range of $27B more a year.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jmt18325 on July 24, 2016, 22:08:06
I'm only aware of one country that meets both of those targets.  That's the UK.  We could meet the targets.  We may have to tax a bit more though, just as they do.  We could also run larger deficits in the short term. 

There was a CIBC graph this year that showed what would happen if Canada were to run even $100B deficits every year forever.  At the end of it, our federal debt to GDP would still be better than almost any other country.  I don't advocate that - I'm just saying we have room to do things in the short to medium term if we wish, without a lot of risk.  Our deficit will (almost certainly) fall every year anyway, even under this government.

I would be in favour of spending more money if we could first sort out our procurement mess (again, I don't care of the cause, only the reality that it exists) and then decide what we actually need the money for. 

Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MilEME09 on July 25, 2016, 12:39:13
I would be in favour of spending more money if we could first sort out our procurement mess (again, I don't care of the cause, only the reality that it exists) and then decide what we actually need the money for.

I'd agree, the DND as a whole needs a reorganization, and restructuring, before we can push more money into the armed forces in large amounts. You can't tell me that it's normal our tail keeps getting fatter while our teeth are rotting out.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Lightguns on July 25, 2016, 14:14:17
I'd agree, the DND as a whole needs a reorganization, and restructuring, before we can push more money into the armed forces in large amounts. You can't tell me that it's normal our tail keeps getting fatter while our teeth are rotting out.

Yes, it is almost time for a common uniform and rank system  :evil:
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: milnews.ca on July 25, 2016, 14:39:04
You can't tell me that it's normal our tail keeps getting fatter while our teeth are rotting out.
Good word picture there.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MCG on July 30, 2016, 21:48:02
One more day to provide your thoughts on:
... among other things.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MCG on August 04, 2016, 00:51:28
The consultation is closed.  If you had an opinion, I hope you use at least one of the venues to communicate your thoughts. 

Quote
National Defence concludes public consultations as part of Defence Policy Review
August 2, 2016 – Ottawa – National Defence / Canadian Armed Forces

Defence Minister Harjit S. Sajjan today announced the conclusion of public consultations on the future of Canada’s defence policy, the largest such efforts in over 20 years.

The Department of National Defence (DND) launched these public consultations on April 6, 2016 to seek feedback from interested Canadians, international allies, and key stakeholders on the type of military Canada needs in order to represent Canada’s interests at home and abroad. Discussions focused on:

the main challenges to Canada’s security
the role of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) in addressing current threats and challenges
the resources and capabilities needed to carry out the CAF mandate
DND has received approximately 20,200 submissions to the Defence Policy Review online consultation portal and over 4,700 participants have contributed comments and votes using the online discussion forum.

Moving forward, important choices will be made to ensure that DND and the CAF have what they need to confront new threats and challenges in the years ahead. Over the coming months, DND will be compiling and reviewing the information received from online submissions, stakeholder roundtables and discussions with Parliamentarians and key international Allies and partners. This will help inform the development of Canada’s new defence policy to be launched in early 2017.
http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?mthd=index&crtr.page=1&nid=1106699
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: PuckChaser on August 04, 2016, 09:37:44
Seems they've pushed off the report date, it was supposed to be this fall.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Chris Pook on August 04, 2016, 12:37:26
Seems they've pushed off the report date, it was supposed to be this fall.

Quote
This will help inform the development of Canada’s new defence policy to be launched in early 2017

Wiggle #1:  help
Wiggle #2:  inform
Wiggle #3:  the development
Wiggle #4 ?:  Is the development to be launched in early 2017 or is the policy to be launched in early 2017?

Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jmt18325 on August 04, 2016, 13:39:54
Seems they've pushed off the report date, it was supposed to be this fall.

I don't recall that ever being the date.  Do you have a cite?
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: milnews.ca on August 04, 2016, 13:51:52
Wiggle #1:  help
Wiggle #2:  inform
Wiggle #3:  the development
Wiggle #4 ?:  Is the development to be launched in early 2017 or is the policy to be launched in early 2017?
You've read government docs before, haven't you?   ;D
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Chris Pook on August 04, 2016, 14:29:08
You've read government docs before, haven't you?   ;D

Upside down and backwards from across a desk.   ;D
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: PuckChaser on August 04, 2016, 21:04:26
I don't recall that ever being the date.  Do you have a cite?

https://ipolitics.ca/2016/01/29/defence-policy-review-to-be-complete-by-end-of-2016-sajjan/ (https://ipolitics.ca/2016/01/29/defence-policy-review-to-be-complete-by-end-of-2016-sajjan/)

Quote
Defence policy review to be complete by end of 2016: Sajjan
Written by Amanda Connolly

Friday, January 29th, 2016

Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan says he wants to see his review of Canada’s defence policy finished by the end of the year.

Speaking at the closing of Canada 2020’s foreign policy conference, Sajjan told the audience he’s aiming to have the review done before 2017 so the government can have the background it needs to make decisions that will lead to better “ripple effects.”

“If we want to understand the ripples we are creating, we have to understand the environment we are creating them in,” Sajjan said.

Among the issues Sajjan said the review will consider are: Canada’s contribution to NATO, NORAD and other international coalitions; how the military looks after its people, and; what needs to be done to better prepare Canada to fight cyberattacks and conduct surveillance.

They started to creep the timeline to the right in the Spring, but original campaign promise and statements were for Fall/Winter 2016. Simply very poor time appreciation for an obviously complex task.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: E.R. Campbell on August 05, 2016, 09:25:58
https://ipolitics.ca/2016/01/29/defence-policy-review-to-be-complete-by-end-of-2016-sajjan/ (https://ipolitics.ca/2016/01/29/defence-policy-review-to-be-complete-by-end-of-2016-sajjan/)

They started to creep the timeline to the right in the Spring, but original campaign promise and statements were for Fall/Winter 2016. Simply very poor time appreciation for an obviously complex task.


Actually, I think the task was fairly simple and has been, largely, done very, very well ...

The real task was to take defence (and the defence budget and big ticket procurement items) "off the table" for a year or so while the government focused on its social agenda. I think Minister Sajjan, a neophyte and a lightweight, has done remarkably well, aided by the defence community's own version of the "chattering classes" who lined up to make (always contradictory) submissions that will, in the end, by sufficient to convince the government that both "experts" and Canadians at large want us to return to traditional, baby-blue beret type UN peacekeeping ~ preferably employing female, French speaking police officers ~ in Africa. There will be seen to be lesser (than the evil, war mongering Conservatives suggested) needs for warships, new jet fighters and tanks.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: milnews.ca on August 05, 2016, 09:48:03
... both "experts" and Canadians at large want us to return to traditional, baby-blue beret type UN peacekeeping ~ preferably employing female, French speaking police officers ~ in Africa. There will be seen to be lesser (than the evil, war mongering Conservatives suggested) needs for warships, new jet fighters and tanks.
You should bill the Crown for writing the executive summary  :nod:
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MCG on August 17, 2016, 11:52:41
This site is not the only place were concerns have been voiced that the consultation outcome may have been predetermined.  Hopefully, the third party processing of online responses will mitigate against such concerns.  It could be interesting if the Ipsos report is also made available to the public.

Quote
Ipsos to analyze 20,200-plus responses to defence policy review
Participants offer mixed reviews of recently concluded public consultations, with some praising the openness, while others framed the proceedings as 'muddled.'

MARCO VIGLIOTTI
Hill Times
17 Aug 2016

The government has contracted an outside research firm to study and summarize the more than 20,000 submissions it received this spring and summer for its defence policy review.

Participants are offering mixed reviews for the government’s recently concluded public consultations on defence policy, with some praising the discussions for their openness and transparency, while others framed the proceedings as “muddled” and confusing.

National Defence wrapped up public consultations on the future of Canadian defence policy earlier this month, drawing some 20,200 submissions through its online portal and attracting more than 4,700 participants to submit comments and votes via an online discussion forum, according to ministry figures.

The department also hosted several roundtable meetings with invitees, including groups representing defence manufacturers and the aerospace industry.

MPs were also encouraged to host their own town halls to discuss defence policy with their constituents and submit the responses to the ministry.

A defence department spokesperson says the government has retained an outside research and polling firm to study the results and summarize the findings.

Evan Koronewski said Ipsos, a contractor on the government’s standing-offer list for stakeholder and citizen engagement and consultations activities, received the contract to conduct the roundtable meetings, and manage the online submission portal.

The company is responsible for analyzing all data received through the roundtables and portal, and preparing summary reports for department policy experts for further study, he said in an emailed statement.

For the roundtables, Ipsos will prepare a report summarizing the events into key themes by Ipsos personnel present at each event, drawing on a combination of notes and recordings where available and validated by session facilitators.

In terms of the online consultations, Ipsos will prepare a report again summarizing discussion and submissions into key thematic areas, with the assistance of text-analytics software as well as manual coding by experienced analysts, Mr. Koronewski said.

The company will then prepare an initial report for ministry staff summarizing its findings from the roundtables and online consultations, while department policy experts will incorporate these findings into the formal defence policy paper in early 2017, he explained.

The ministry’s internal analysis, he noted, is expected to be completed by the end of the year.

The department rather than Ipsos is handling and processing the information collected through the MP town halls.

In addition to department staff, Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan (Vancouver South, B.C.) has established an advisory panel to support him during the policy review process.

The panel members are: Louise Arbour, a former Supreme Court justice and former UN high commissioner for human rights; ex-Liberal foreign affairs and defence minister Bill Graham; Ray Henault, former chief of the defence staff and past chair of the NATO military committee; and Margaret Purdy, who previously served as an associate deputy minister of national defence.

Mr. Koronewski said the department had examined “lessons learned and best practices from our closest allies” in determining an appropriate length of the review process. Australia and New Zealand, for instance, have recently worked on their own reviews.

When asked about how much the department is paying Ipsos for its work, Mr. Koronewski said it was too early to reveal because work is ongoing. “National Defence will make the final cost known once the final report is made available to the public,” he said.

The overall cost of the defence policy review also won’t be available for the “next little while,” he said, because the process is ongoing, though all expenses will be pulled from the department’s existing budget.

Opposition wary of predetermined results

Opposition critics have repeatedly expressed skepticism about how informative these consultations will prove to be.

Conservative defence critic James Bezan (Selkirk-Interlake-Eastman, Man.) said constituents he has spoken with are concerned the Liberals have already plotted out their plans for defence policy.

“What I’m hearing is people are concerned that this is predetermined, that the government is going to go ahead and make decisions regardless of what may come through the policy review, or [that] the defence policy review…will support the things that they’re already doing,” he said in an interview earlier this summer.

NDP defence critic Randall Garrison (Esquimalt-Saanich-Sooke, B.C.) raised similar concerns about the consultations, questioning whether what he saw as a nebulous and disorganized structure would allow the government to effectively dismiss views that run counter to its own preference.

“They know what they already want to do and [with the consultations] you can pick selectively from what you’ve heard across the country if there isn’t any way to systemize the information,” he told The Hill Times last month.

While the political response is predictably divided along partisan lines, non-aligned participants also appear to be divided on the merits of the consultations.

Tony Battista, CEO of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute, a security-focused think-tank, argued that while public consultations can prove very useful, the process introduced by the government is “muddled” and confusing.

For example, he slammed the process the Liberals used to recruit speakers for the roundtable meetings as “opaque,” saying certain participants and groups were brought in because of their expertise but others seemingly called upon to create the “appearance of a multitude of viewpoints irrespective of their…submissions.”

A spokesperson for Irving Shipbuilding, a major defence contractor, however, congratulated the government for embarking on the sweeping review “in an open and transparent way,” Sean Lewis said in an emailed statement.

Jim Quick, president of CEO of the Aerospace Industries Association of Canada, a sector lobby group, also praised the government for engaging with stakeholders about the future of the country’s defence policy, hailing the consultations as informative and helpful.

“I felt it went very well,” he said in an interview, noting that the review focused on the entirety of defence policy rather than simply procurement as some may have thought.

“They’re not interested in just the industry’s view, they’re interested in the views of all Canadians.”

AIAC participated in a formal roundtable discussion headed by Minister Sajjan, whom Mr. Quick described as “extremely engaging,” attentive, and “very informed.”

“We felt we were listened to and that we were given the opportunity to help the government find solutions,” he said of the consultations.

Magellan Aerospace, a Canadian manufacturer that serves both civilian and military customers, submitted a document as part of the consultation process that mostly focused on defence procurement issues, according to Scott McCrady, the company’s corporate program director for the F-35 program.

Of the 10 questions in the consultation questionnaire circulated by the government, he said only one hit the “sweet spot” in terms of Magellan’s main focus, while some others were also relevant, though the remainder went beyond what the company wanted to discuss.

Despite the broad focus, Mr. McCrady congratulated the government for seeking feedback from industry.

“The fact that the dialogue is even happening…is a good thing,” he said.
 
https://www.hilltimes.com/2016/08/17/ipsos-to-analyze-responses-to-defence-policy-review/77172
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Chris Pook on August 17, 2016, 13:05:56
And now, as on so many other issues, we await a decision..... any decision.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Journeyman on August 17, 2016, 17:13:52
The department rather than Ipsos is handling and processing the information collected through the MP town halls.
I wonder why that may be? 


Tinfoil hat time:
It may  allow for a difficult-to-trace slush-fund of opinion.

For example, Ipsos may report '80% of respondents want X';  if the government is predisposed towards Y, they can simply say "yes, but our town halls, DIRECTLY with our MPs (not some anonymous online wankers), clearly  recommend Y."   :Tin-Foil-Hat:


Elizabeth May's constituents may actually get an opinion in on a Defence Review.  :stars:


But seriously, I wonder why.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Chris Pook on August 17, 2016, 17:45:44
I wonder why that may be? 


Tinfoil hat time:
It may  allow for a difficult-to-trace slush-fund of opinion.

For example, Ipsos may report '80% of respondents want X';  if the government is predisposed towards Y, they can simply say "yes, but our town halls, DIRECTLY with our MPs (not some anonymous online wankers), clearly  recommend Y."   :Tin-Foil-Hat:


Elizabeth May's constituents may actually get an opinion in on a Defence Review.  :stars:


But seriously, I wonder why.

4700 participants.

57,584 Army.ca members

I wonder what our representation was like?
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Journeyman on August 17, 2016, 18:01:28
4700 participants.
I read that as  20,200 online portal submissions,  4,700 online discussion participants,  plus x -number who contributed via MP roundtables.

Mind you, some of the online responses read like CBC commenters, but even more off their meds, so.....  :dunno:
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Chris Pook on August 17, 2016, 18:29:14
Clarity, clarity.

A world where Left is right, socialist is fascist, conservative is liberal.  Alice and I are confused much of the time.

Edit:  And I suppose I should add - peace is war.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Oldgateboatdriver on August 17, 2016, 19:18:11
You have double plus words there, Chris.

You have to use the latest Newspeak dictionary.

For instance it's peace is non peace, or if in Africa: double plus non peace.

So says Minitruth.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Chris Pook on August 17, 2016, 19:20:06
You have double plus words there, Chris.

You have to use the latest Newspeak dictionary.

For instance it's peace is non peace, or if in Africa: double plus non peace.

So says Minitruth.

 [:D
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MarkOttawa on September 29, 2016, 17:48:48
Good piece by Prof. Steve Saideman of Carleton U. on defence policy review:

Reviewing the summer of the defence review
https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/cdfai/pages/97/attachments/original/1475163657/Dispatch_-_Fall_2016.pdf?1475163657#page=20

Mark
Ottawa
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: milnews.ca on January 11, 2017, 07:52:15
Bumped with the latest - a pretty detailed listing from the CF Ombudsman on what needs to be done as part of his submission to the Defence Policy Review sausage machine (http://bit.ly/2j5D9nJ).  Here's his conclusion (highlights mine):
Quote
The Ombudsman Office is a resource for those who find themselves frustrated by failures in the system. When we point out those shortcomings, and they are addressed, the Department of National Defence and/or the Canadian Armed Forces become better and more effective employers for it. However, as I have noted throughout this submission, the systemic failures are too often not corrected.

With that in mind I want to emphasize that everything in this submission is based on calls, complaints and expressions of frustration and anger that pour into our office on a regular basis.

I am not suggesting there are malicious, uncaring people in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces – the contrary is true. I am stating there is an absolute need for modern innovative thinking that flips the paradigm from the rules and regulations controlling the people to the people controlling the rules and regulations. It is always easy to find a rule or regulation that allows for inaction. It is always easier to review or study than take action and right a wrong.

In this submission, I have deliberately avoided recommending studies or reviews and the myriad of others words and phrases that have become euphemisms for lets-announce-a-study-and-hope-it-goes-away when the heat is on from the public, politicians and journalists who have glommed on to some injustice.

Yes, the media, politicians and public will inevitably move on to other matters and the lack of public scrutiny might bring temporary comfort to a few people; but under the rug the problems live on and continue to gather dust.

    Mentally ill members unable to get help will continue to take drastic steps and bring a lifetime of sorrow to their families.
    Indigenous Youth in need of role models will continue to miss the opportunity.
    Our Reservists will continue to wait for parity with Regular Force members and the compensation, care and respect parity represents.
    Those attempting to negotiate the bureaucratic end-of-career maze will not be helped by another study when they know that the phrase “seamless transition” is in stark contrast to reality.
    Many military spouses and children will not be placated by claims of ‘caring for our families’ when they know from experience that whether meaningless or well meaning, it’s an empty slogan.


None of the issues addressed in this submission need another prolonged study or review and none require the expenditure of vast amounts of money.  What we need now is leadership with the will to right the wrongs before the credibility and image of this treasured institution is further eroded. No matter what position or stance we take at home or abroad, a well-supported military force will be the factor in determining success.

So let me end as I began: This is about the future. It is about our national security and our ability to attract future generations of great army, navy and air force members. It is about getting back to a place where the Canadian military regularly had pools of highly motivated, talented people knocking on the recruiting office door. Today, far too many of those talented Canadians are walking past that door with neither a second thought nor a backward glance.
Well put, Mr. Walbourne!
(https://media.giphy.com/media/5hHOBKJ8lw9OM/giphy.gif)
More from the CF 'Budman here (http://bit.ly/2iFc6Nb).
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: milnews.ca on February 07, 2017, 07:21:13
Two takes of Monday's (6 Feb 2017) meeting between DefMin Sajjan & SecDef Mattis:  the U.S. Info-machine's (https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-Release-View/Article/1073097/readout-of-secretary-mattis-meetings-with-canadian-minister-of-national-defence) ...
Quote
Pentagon Spokesman Capt. Jeff Davis provided the following readout:

Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis hosted the Canadian Minister of National Defence Harjit Sajjan at the Pentagon today, his first time hosting a defense counterpart as secretary of defense.

Secretary Mattis and Minister Sajjan reaffirmed the U.S.-Canada defense relationship, emphasizing their commitments to NORAD and continental defense, and agreeing to deepen cooperation to protect North America, noting that 2018 will be the 60th anniversary of NORAD. Secretary Mattis addressed enhancing North American defense relations and the North American Defense Ministerial, which he offered to host this spring in Washington, D.C.

The secretary and minister discussed international priorities and operations, as well as the upcoming NATO Defense Ministerial. The secretary and minister discussed U.S. and Canadian leadership as Framework Nations for Enhanced Forward Presence, members of the international counter-ISIL coalition, and support for United Nations peacekeeping. Secretary Mattis thanked Canada for its commitments to NATO and the counter-ISIL campaign, and agreed to continued discussions with Canada and other coalition members on the progress of the U.S. counter-ISIL strategy review.

The secretary and minister also discussed the importance of defense investments and modernization to ensure continued cooperation.

The secretary commended the minister for his consistent leadership, noting the need for both the U.S. and Canada to continue to represent our shared values and advance security, prosperity, and freedom. The two leaders noted the long relationship between the U.S. military and Canadian armed forces and stated they looked forward to deepening the U.S.-Canada relationship and continuing to work closely together.
...vs. the Canadian info-machine (http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=1186019&tp=980):
Quote
Defence Minister Harjit S. Sajjan today issued the following readout after his first meeting with new U.S. Secretary of Defense, James Mattis:

    "Today I had the pleasure of meeting with U.S. Secretary of Defence James Mattis. The warm, cordial tone of the discussion reflects the long-standing, close partnership between Canada and the United States, particularly when it comes to defence and security. "The close defence relationship between our two nations provides both countries with greater security in North America and contributes to peace and stability in the world in increasingly complex and uncertain times.

    "With 2018 marking the 60th anniversary of NORAD, I was pleased to highlight the importance of this unique partnership and its success in protecting North America, and we looked forward to working together on its modernization. Secretary Mattis and I also discussed multilateral issues, including our pledges to lead battle groups in support of NATO's enhanced forward presence in Eastern Europe, our commitments to the United Nations and the Summit of Defence Ministers that Canada will host later this year. We discussed our training missions in both Ukraine and Iraq and the work being done by the Global Coalition to degrade and defeat Daesh. I also took the opportunity to discuss Canada's Defence Policy Review.

    "We discussed Canada’s decision to launch an open and transparent competition to replace our legacy fleet of CF-18 fighter aircraft, and to explore the immediate acquisition of 18 new Super Hornet fighter aircraft as an interim capability. I expressed my appreciation to the secretary for the support and cooperation of the US Government in these processes.

    "Secretary Mattis and I pledged to work closely together and look forward to our next meeting at the upcoming NATO defence ministerial later this month. "I want to thank Secretary Mattis and Pentagon officials for the warm welcome in Washington and look forward to hosting Secretary Mattis in Canada."
More from the Pentagon here (https://goo.gl/4PV7Cj).
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MarkOttawa on February 07, 2017, 16:08:26
Telling what the Canadian statement does not mention:

Quote
The secretary and minister also discussed the importance of defense investments and modernization to ensure continued cooperation [emphasis added--rather a message, eh?].

Hmm.

Mark
Ottawa
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jmt18325 on February 07, 2017, 16:11:06
What that seems to say to me - the Trump administration feels the 2% target is less meaningful than then 20% equipment investment.  Canada could get to that number with an extra $1-2B per year.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Chris Pook on February 07, 2017, 17:29:07
Nudder possible play....

Finance Operations out of the 0.7% of GDP pledged to Foreign Aid (nominally).
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: suffolkowner on February 07, 2017, 20:54:48
What that seems to say to me - the Trump administration feels the 2% target is less meaningful than then 20% equipment investment.  Canada could get to that number with an extra $1-2B per year.

So just buy a couple extra Super Hornets and park them,eh!? [lol:
Title: Re: The Defence Budget
Post by: milnews.ca on May 03, 2017, 17:37:23
Aaaaaaand, the short & sweet version after the speech (https://goo.gl/ZU7zsf) ...
Quote
Defence Minister Harjit S. Sajjan issued the following statement today after addressing the Conference of Defence Associations Institute on the state of Canada’s defence:

“Over the last year and a half, the Government of Canada has worked hard to address the complex challenges facing the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). Our comprehensive review of Canada’s defence policy has shown that successive governments have not delivered the stability of predictable, sustainable, long-term funding for Defence.

“Years of inadequate funding have left the CAF lacking the resources they need. From the Army to the Navy to the Air Force – our women and men have not received the equipment and support they need. A prime example is our Cormorant search and rescue helicopters.  These helicopters provide a vital service that Canadians rely on.  Yet the previous Government did not make any provisions for the needed upcoming mid-life upgrades.

“But the resourcing problems that I have found the most troubling are the ones that have directly affected our members. Canada’s governments have failed to properly equip our Reserve Force. Not only is there not enough equipment, but the training to use what equipment they have is lacking. Like our Regular Force, our Reserve Force are tremendously resourceful, and they perform extremely well, despite having been under-funded for so long.

“Governments have a responsibility to care for their militaries, resource them properly, and fund them in a responsible way that meets their needs. Canada’s new defence policy will be a plan to build an even stronger military. Most of all, it will be a plan to care for the women and men who put on the uniform. It will be a plan to care for their families. I look forward to doing right – now and for the long term – by those who defend Canada, our people, and our way of life.”
Title: Re: The Defence Budget
Post by: jollyjacktar on May 03, 2017, 17:53:37
Ah, so the cheque, so to speak, is in the mail.  We're all good then, phew.  :sarcasm:   I've heard this same song and dance by many more before him.

Why does this come to mind... truth in advertising commercial (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r8hP9-qnAxk)
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: dapaterson on May 14, 2017, 23:39:14
Defence policy review to be announced after the NATO summit, according to CBC news.

http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/defence-policy-review-brussels-1.4113720?cmp=rss

Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: comfortablynumb on May 15, 2017, 00:15:54
Announcement after NATO summit = no good news for defence $$$.

 :2c:
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MilEME09 on May 15, 2017, 13:49:40
Announcement after NATO summit = no good news for defence $$$.

 :2c:

I'd pay good money to see the Head of NATO or any of our allies steel the governments thunder and come out criticizing our plan, because likely we will inform our allies about it at the summit.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Rifleman62 on May 15, 2017, 17:26:33
Read somewhere (can't find it now) that the PM will attend meeting and leave before the announcement/"Foreign Affairs Minister Chrystia Freeland will deliver a major speech ...." and " That will be followed closely by Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan's policy review...."

Fearless leader if true.

Interestingly the policy was shown to US officials, so there is hope.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: milnews.ca on May 15, 2017, 17:42:41
Read somewhere (can't find it now) that the PM will attend meeting and leave before the announcement/"Foreign Affairs Minister Chrystia Freeland will deliver a major speech ...." and " That will be followed closely by Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan's policy review...." ...
Here's the Cosmic Butterfly Corporation's take (http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/defence-policy-review-brussels-1.4113720) ...
Quote
Canada's long-awaited defence policy review will not be made public before Prime Minister Justin Trudeau faces allies at the NATO Summit in Brussels later this month, CBC News has learned.

It's a significant decision that could make the gathering of alliance leaders uncomfortable for the prime minister, especially in light of the demands and expectations of U.S. President Donald Trump, who has insisted allies boost spending on their militaries.

A senior government official tells CBC News the plan had been to release the policy before the meeting, but officials believe it is important that Canada's defence policy align with a broader set of foreign policy goals.

Foreign Affairs Minister Chrystia Freeland will deliver a major speech shortly after the gathering of NATO leaders that will more clearly define the Liberal government's vision, said an official with direct knowledge of the plan.

That will be followed closely by Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan's policy review, which has been more than a year in the making and will set the future direction for the military, in terms of expectations, spending and equipment.

(...)

The Americans were given a sneak peek at the new policy and were pleased, said a pair of defence sources, who were not authorized to speak to the media ...*
... as well as The Canadian Press, via Toronto Star's (https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2017/05/15/release-of-canadian-defence-policy-update-delayed-until-after-nato-summit.html) ...
Quote
... Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan’s spokeswoman, Jordan Owens, confirmed Monday that the policy won’t be released until after the NATO summit.

The government wants to “nestle” the defence policy within a broader foreign policy context, Owens said, which will give Canadians more context on how the different pieces fit together ...
We'll have to see how our "allies" take it - not that they've likely ever shared their defence plans with Canada before they release them to the public.
Announcement after NATO summit = no good news for defence $$$.

 :2c:
Hey, let's just count like the U.K. does (http://www.defenceonline.co.uk/2017/05/11/open-letter-raises-security-concerns-uk/) -- easy, peasy, lemon squeezy ...

* - We'll find out quickly enough via POTUS45's Twitter feed, right?  ;)
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: dapaterson on May 15, 2017, 18:14:00
Canada's long-awaited new defence policy will be delivered on June 7, almost two weeks after Prime Minister Justin Trudeau meets with allies at the NATO Summit in Brussels, the country's defence minister has acknowledged.

Harjit Sajjan announced the date in response to a friendly question posed by a fellow Liberal MP during Monday's question period.

http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/defence-policy-review-brussels-1.4113720
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Chris Pook on May 15, 2017, 18:56:15
Canada's long-awaited new defence policy will be delivered on June 7, almost two weeks after Prime Minister Justin Trudeau meets with allies at the NATO Summit in Brussels, the country's defence minister has acknowledged.

Harjit Sajjan announced the date in response to a friendly question posed by a fellow Liberal MP during Monday's question period.

http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/defence-policy-review-brussels-1.4113720

I need an Italian interpreter.  Why do I keep hearing "Domani, Domani"  running through my head?  ;D
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: milnews.ca on June 06, 2017, 07:44:30
A prelude to the defence policy (https://goo.gl/0Ja06J), coming this morning (6 Jun 2017):
Quote
The Honourable Chrystia Freeland, Minister of Foreign Affairs, will deliver a major address in the House of Commons and outline the country’s foreign policy priorities.

Event: Speech
Date: Tuesday, June 6, 2017
Time: 10 a.m. ET
Location: House of Commons, Centre Block, 111 Wellington Street, Ottawa, Ontario ...
:pop:
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Rifleman62 on June 06, 2017, 10:23:50
The G & M summary of the speech:

Quote
Foreign Affairs Minister Chrystia Freeland is the one to keep an eye on today. Ms. Freeland was appointed to her current job in January as the Trump administration took office, but it is today that she is set to lay out her foreign policy vision in a speech in the House of Commons this morning. The speech is set to be heavy on support for multilateralism, light on “responsible conviction,” and will be followed by a motion asking MPs to commit to a foreign policy based on championing human rights and gender equality, and fighting climate change and income inequality.

"Responsible conviction" - http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/canadian-politics/stephane-dion-gives-liberal-foreign-policy-a-brand-name-responsible-conviction

To me, more, kumbaya from a government out of touch. Unfortunately they need a very rude awakening close to home that affects them personally.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Lightguns on June 06, 2017, 10:37:31
The G & M summary of the speech:

Quote
Foreign Affairs Minister Chrystia Freeland is the one to keep an eye on today. Ms. Freeland was appointed to her current job in January as the Trump administration took office, but it is today that she is set to lay out her foreign policy vision in a speech in the House of Commons this morning. The speech is set to be heavy on support for multilateralism, light on “responsible conviction,” and will be followed by a motion asking MPs to commit to a foreign policy based on championing human rights and gender equality, and fighting climate change and income inequality.

"Responsible conviction" - http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/canadian-politics/stephane-dion-gives-liberal-foreign-policy-a-brand-name-responsible-conviction

To me, more, kumbaya from a government out of touch. Unfortunately they need a very rude awakening close to home that affects them personally.

Not going to happen they are all well insulated from the world around them. 
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MilEME09 on June 06, 2017, 13:07:55
I feel like I must still be alseep.

Quote
Canada can no longer rely on U.S. for global leadership, Freeland says

Foreign Affairs Minister Chrystia Freeland said the Liberal government will make a “substantial investment” in the military, saying Canada can no longer rely on Washington for global leadership in the face of threats of Russian adventurism and the need to combat the “monstrous extremism” of Islamic State.

In a major speech setting the table for Wednesday’s release of a new blueprint for Canada’s military, Ms. Freeland did not mention U.S. President Donald Trump’s America First foreign policy, but she said many Americans cast their votes to “shrug off the burden of world leadership.”

“The fact that our friend and ally has come to question the very worth of its mantle of global leadership, puts in sharp focus for the rest of us to set our own clear and sovereign course,” she told the House of Commons Tuesday. “To say this is not controversial: it is a fact.”

Ms. Freeland said Canada has been able to count on the powerful U.S. military to provide a protective shield since 1945 as she argued this country needs to significantly build up the Canadian military with “a substantial investment” to help confront strategic threats to liberal democracies.

“To rely solely on the U.S. security umbrella would make us a client state,” she said. “To put it plainly: Canadian diplomacy and development sometimes requires the backing of hard power.”

Ms. Freeland listed North Korea, the civil war in Syria, Islamic State, Russian aggression in the Ukraine and Baltic states and climate change as major threats to the global order.

“We will make the necessary investments in our military, to not only address years of neglect and underfunding, but also to place the Canadian Armed Forces on a new footing – with new equipment, training, resources and consistent and predictable funding,” she said.

Wednesday’s defence policy review is expected to lay out the military’s priorities for future overseas deployments, and outline Ottawa’s 20-year plan for spending billions of dollars to upgrade warships and fighter jets, among other things.

Ms. Freeland expressed the Liberal government’s deep disappointment in President Trump’s decision to pull out of the Paris climate treaty, calling on the world to show “renewed, uncommon resolve” to combat global warming.

“Turning aside from our responsibilities is not an option. Instead we must think carefully and deeply about what is happening, and find a way forward,” she told MPs.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel has made the same criticism, saying last week that Europe could no longer rely on the United States for world leadership and that the continent must take on a larger diplomatic role on the world stage.

Ms. Freeland also championed the benefits of free trade, now under challenge by the rise of protectionism in the U.S., led by the Trump White House. Free trade hasn’t been the cause of the gap between the rich and the poor in more developed nations of the word, she said.

“It’s true that the system is flawed. But international trade is the wrong target,” she said. “The real culprit is domestic policy that fails to appreciate that continued growth, and political stability, depend on domestic measures that share the wealth.”

The minister described how and why Canada’s role in the Second World War allowed the country to help shape the post-1945 multilateral order.

Canada has continued to play a large role in promoting multculturalism and diversity and providing a home to the downtrodden – refugees fleeing persecution, famine or wars, she said. It has taken a strong stand on the world stage, promoting gender equality and a rule-based international order.

“Canadian liberalism is a precious idea,” Ms. Freeland said. “We are safer and more prosperous, Mr. Speaker, when more of the world shares Canadian values.”


Okay so again either I'm still asleep or due to the Trump administration's posturing a Canadian government now believes we can't rely on the American umbrella.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: milnews.ca on June 06, 2017, 13:17:55
Part 1 of 2, (almost) straight from the horse's mouth, via the Global Affairs Canada info-machine (https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2017/06/address_by_ministerfreelandoncanadasforeignpolicypriorities.html) - also attached in case link doesn't work for you:
Quote
Address by Minister Freeland on Canada’s foreign policy priorities
From Global Affairs Canada
June 6, 2017 – Ottawa, Canada

Check against delivery. This speech has been translated in accordance with the Government of Canada’s official languages policy and edited for posting and distribution in accordance with its communications policy.


Mr. Speaker,

Here is a question: Is Canada an essential country, at this time in the life of our planet?

Most of us here would agree that it is. But if we assert this, we are called to explain why. And we are called to consider the specifics of what we must do as a consequence.

International relationships that had seemed immutable for 70 years are being called into question. From Europe, to Asia, to our own North American home, long-standing pacts that have formed the bedrock of our security and prosperity for generations are being tested.

And new shared human imperatives—the fight against climate change first among them—call for renewed, uncommon resolve.

Turning aside from our responsibilities is not an option. Instead we must think carefully and deeply about what is happening, and find a way forward.

By definition, the path we choose must be one that serves the interests of all Canadians and upholds our broadly held national values; that preserves and nurtures Canadian prosperity and security; and that contributes to our collective goal of a better, safer, more just, more prosperous, and sustainable world. One we can pass onto our children and grandchildren, with a sense of having done the right thing.

This is no small order, Mr. Speaker. It is what I would like to spend few minutes talking about today.

Since before the end of the Second World War, beginning with the international conference at Bretton Woods in 1944, Canada has been deeply engaged in, and greatly enjoyed the benefits of, a global order based on rules.

These were principles and standards that were applied, perhaps not perfectly at all times by all states, but certainly by the vast majority of democratic states, most of the time.

The system had at its heart the core notions of territorial integrity, human rights, democracy, respect for the rule of law, and an aspiration to free and friendly trade.

The common volition toward this order arose from a fervent determination not to repeat the immediate past.

Humankind had learned through the direct experience of horror and hardship, Mr. Speaker, that the narrow pursuit of national self-interest, the law of the jungle, led to nothing but carnage and poverty.

Two global conflicts and the Great Depression, all in the span of less than half a century, taught our parents and grandparents that national borders must be inviolate; that international trading relationships created not only prosperity but also peace; and that a true world community, one based on shared aspirations and standards, was not only desirable but essential to our very survival.

That deep yearning toward lasting peace led to the creation of international institutions that endure to this day—with the nations of Western Europe, together with their transatlantic allies, the United States and Canada, at their foundation

In each of these evolutions in how we humans organize ourselves, Canadians played pivotal roles.

There was Bretton Woods itself, where the Canadian delegation was instrumental in drafting provisions of the fledgling International Monetary Fund and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

A few years later in 1947, a Canadian, Dana Wilgress, played a leading role at the meetings in Geneva that led to the development of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, precursor to the WTO.

It is a Canadian, John Humphrey, who is generally credited as the principal author of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, which was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948. That was the first of what became a series of declarations to set international standards in this vital area.

And let us not neglect the great Canadian perhaps best known for advancing the cause of humanitarian internationalism—Lester B. Pearson. He was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his leadership during the Suez crisis in 1956, for the creation of modern peacekeeping.

These institutions may seem commonplace now, Mr. Speaker. We may take them for granted. We should not. Seventy years ago they were revolutionary. And they set the stage for the longest period of peace and prosperity in our history.

It was the same appreciation of the common interests of the human family, in caring for our common home, that led us to the acid rain treaty of the Mulroney era. It is what led us to the Montreal Protocol of 1987 to phase out CFCs and preserve the ozone layer. It is what led us to Paris, Mr. Speaker, with 194 signatories at our side. That is global co-operation.

And it is important to note that when sacrifice was required to support and strengthen the global order—military power, in defence of our principles and our alliances—Canada was there. In the Suez, in Korea, in the Congo, in Cyprus, in the First Gulf War, in the Balkans, in Afghanistan, up to and including today in Iraq, among many other places, Canada has been there.

As the Prime Minister has often said, that is what Canadians do. We step up.

Today it is worth reminding ourselves why we step up—why we devote time and resources to foreign policy, defence and development, why we have sent Canadian soldiers, sailors, aviators, diplomats, aid workers, intelligence officers, doctors, nurses, medics and engineers into situations of danger, disaster, and chaos overseas, even at times when Canadian territory was not directly at risk.

Why do we spend billions on defence, if we are not immediately threatened?

For some countries—Israel, Latvia come to mind—the answer is self-evident. Countries that face a clear and immediate existential challenge know they need to spend on military and foreign policy. And they know why.

For a few lucky countries—like Canada and the United States—that feel protected by geography and are good neighbours, the answer is less obvious. Indeed, you could easily imagine a Canadian view that says, we are safe on our continent, and we have things to do at home, so let's turn inward. Let’s say Canada first.

Here’s why that would be wrong.

First, though no foreign adversary is poised to invade us, we do face clear challenges. Climate change is by definition a shared menace, affecting every single person on this planet. Civil war, poverty, drought and natural disasters anywhere in the world threaten us as well—not least because these catastrophes spawn globally destabilizing mass migrations. The dictatorship in North Korea, crimes against humanity in Syria, the monstrous extremists of Daesh, and Russian military adventurism and expansionism also all pose clear strategic threats to the liberal democratic world, including Canada.

Our ability to act against such threats alone is limited. It requires cooperation with like-minded countries.

On the military front, Canada’s geography has meant that we have always been able to count on American self-interest to provide a protective umbrella beneath which we have found indirect shelter.

Some think, some even say, we should therefore free ride on U.S. military power. Why invest billions to maintain a capable, professional, well-funded and well-equipped Canadian military?

The answer is obvious: To rely solely on the U.S. security umbrella would make us a client state. And although we have an incredibly good relationship with our American friends and neighbours, such a dependence would not be in Canada’s interest.

That is why doing our fair share is clearly necessary. It is why our commitment to NORAD, and to our strategic relationship with the United States, is so critical. It is by pulling our weight in this partnership, and in all our international partnerships, that we, in fact, have weight.

To put it plainly: Canadian diplomacy and development sometimes require the backing of hard power. Force is of course always a last resort. But the principled use of force, together with our allies and governed by international law, is part of our history and must be part of our future.

To have that capacity requires a substantial investment, which this government is committed to making. The Minister of Defence will elaborate fully on that tomorrow. I know he will make Canadians justly proud.

Whatever their politics, Canadians understand that, as a middle power living next to the world’s only super power, Canada has a huge interest in an international order based on rules. One in which might is not always right. One in which more powerful countries are constrained in their treatment of smaller ones by standards that are internationally respected, enforced and upheld.

The single most important pillar of this, which emerged following the carnage of the First and Second World Wars, is the sanctity of borders. And that principle, today, is under siege.

This is why the democratic world has united behind Ukraine. The illegal seizure of Ukrainian territory by Russia is the first time since the end of the Second World War that a European power has annexed by force the territory of another European country. This is not something we can accept or ignore.

The atrocities of Daesh directly challenge both the sanctity of borders and the liberal international order itself. They create chaos, not only because of the carnage they perpetrate on their innocent victims, but because of the humanitarian crises and migratory explosions that follow. This is why the world has united against this scourge; violent extremism challenges our way of life. We will always oppose it.

Another key benefit for Canada from an international system based on rules, is of course free trade. In this sphere as well, beggar-thy-neighbour policies hit middle powers soonest and hardest. That is the implacable lesson of the 1930s, and the Great Depression. Rising trade barriers hurt the people they are intended to help. They curb growth, stifle innovation and kill employment. This is a lesson we should learn from history. We should not need to teach it to ourselves again through painful experience.

The international order an earlier generation built faces two big challenges, both unprecedented.

The first is the rapid emergence of the global South and Asia—most prominently, China—and the need to integrate these countries into the world’s economic and political system in a way that is additive, that preserves the best of the old order that preceded their rise, and that addresses the existential threat of climate change. This is a problem that simply cannot be solved by nations working alone. We must work together.

I have focused these remarks on the development of the postwar international order—a process that was led primarily by the Atlantic powers of North America and Western Europe.

But we recognize that the global balance of power has changed greatly since then—and will continue to evolve as more nations prosper.

The G20, in whose creation Canada was instrumental, was an early acknowledgement of this emerging reality. The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa and Asia are on the ascendant, delivering ever-increasing living standards to fast-growing populations bursting with innovation, creativity and enterprise.

This is not a trend anyone should fear: it is one we should embrace. Let us recognize that the peace and prosperity we in the West have enjoyed these past 70 years are desired by all, and increasingly within reach of all. And, as Canadians, let us be agents of that change.

Let us seize the great opportunity we now have to help the people of the world’s fastest-growing countries join the global middle class and the multilateral system that supports it. Peace and prosperity are every person’s birthright. The second great challenge is an exhaustion in the West of the belief among working people, the middle class, that the globalized system can help them better their lives. This is an enormous crisis of confidence. It has the potential, if we let it, to undermine global prosperity itself.

At the root of this anxiety around the world is a pervasive sense that too many people have been left behind, betrayed by a system they were promised would make them better off, but hasn’t.

Here’s the key: it’s true that the system is flawed. But international trade is the wrong target, Mr. Speaker. The real culprit is domestic policy that fails to appreciate that continued growth, and political stability, depend on domestic measures that share the wealth.

Admittedly, this is a complicated problem. If there were easy solutions everybody would be applying them ...
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: milnews.ca on June 06, 2017, 13:19:16
Part 2 of 2 of Freeland's 6 June 2017 speech:
Quote
... But let’s be clear on this point: it is wrong to view the woes of our middle class as the result of fiendish behaviour by foreigners.

The truth is that the nature of work has changed because of profound, and generally benign, global economic innovation. This transformation, driven primarily by automation and the digital revolution, is broadly positive.

Managed fairly, it has the potential to increase prosperity for all—not just the global one percent. That means supporting families, supporting pensioners, and supporting education and retraining—as the Minister of Finance did in his recent budget.

By better supporting the middle class, and those working hard to join it, Canada is defining an approach to globalization that can be a model. At the same time, we strongly support the global 2030 Goals for Sustainable Development, Mr. Speaker. The world abroad and the world at home are not two solitudes. They are connected.

Likewise, by embracing multiculturalism and diversity, Canadians are embodying a way of life that works. We can say this in all humility, but also without any false self-effacement: Canadians know about living side-by side with people of diverse origins and beliefs, whose ancestors hail from the far corners of the globe, in harmony and peace. We’re good at it. Watch how we do it.

We say this in the full knowledge that we also have problems of our own to overcome—most egregiously the injustices suffered by Indigenous people in Canada. We must never flinch from acknowledging this great failure, even as we do the hard work of seeking restoration and reconciliation.

Now, it is clearly not our role to impose our values around the world, Mr. Speaker. No one appointed us the world's policeman. But it is our role to clearly stand for these rights both in Canada and abroad.

It is our role to provide refuge to the persecuted and downtrodden, to the extent we are able, as we are so proud to have done for more than 40,000 Syrian refugees.

It is our role to set a standard for how states should treat women, gays and lesbians, transgendered people, racial, ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious minorities, and Indigenous people.

We can and must play an active role in the preservation and strengthening of the global order from which we have benefited so greatly. Doing so is in our interest, because our own open society is most secure in a world of open societies‎. And it is under threat in a world where open societies are under threat.

In short, Canadian liberalism is a precious idea. It would not long survive in a world dominated by the clash of great powers and their vassals, struggling for supremacy or, at best, an uneasy détente.

Canada can work for better, Mr. Speaker. We must work for better.

Let me pause here and address the United States, directly. As the Prime Minister said last week: Canada is deeply disappointed by the decision by the U.S. federal government to withdraw from the Paris Agreement on climate.

That said, we will continue to seek opportunities for constructive progress on the environment, wherever we can find them, with our counterparts in Washington and across the great United States, at all levels of government and with partners in business, labour and civil society.

As I have said, we Canadians can rightly be proud of the role we played in building the postwar order, and the unprecedented peace and prosperity that followed.

Yet even as we celebrate our own part in that project, it’s only fair for us to acknowledge the larger contribution of the United States. For in blood, in treasure, in strategic vision, in leadership, America has paid the lion's share.

The United States has truly been the indispensable nation, Mr. Speaker. For their unique, seven-decades-long contribution to our shared peace ‎and prosperity, and on behalf of all Canadians, I would like to profoundly thank our American friends.

As I have argued, Canada believes strongly that this stable, predictable international order has been deeply in our national interest. And we believe it has helped foster peace and prosperity for our ‎southern neighbours, too.

Yet it would be naive or hypocritical to claim before this House that all Americans today agree. Indeed, many of the voters in last year's presidential election cast their ballots, animated in part by a desire to shrug off the burden of world leadership. To say this is not controversial: it is simply a fact.

Canada is grateful, and will always be grateful, to our neighbour for the outsized role it has played in the world. And we seek and will continue to seek to persuade our friends that their continued international leadership is very much in their national interest—as well as that of the rest of the free world.

Yet we also recognize that this is ultimately not our decision to make. It is a choice Americans must make for themselves.

The fact that our friend and ally has come to question the very worth of its mantle of global leadership, puts into sharper focus the need for the rest of us to set our own clear and sovereign course. For Canada that course must be the renewal, indeed the strengthening, of the postwar multilateral order.

We will follow this path, with open hands and open hearts extended to our American friends, seeking to make common cause as we have so often in the past. And indeed, as we continue to do now on multiple fronts—from border security, to the defence of North America through NORAD, to the fight against Daesh, to our efforts within NATO, to nurturing and improving our trading relationship, which is the strongest in the world.

And, at the same time, we will work with other like-minded people and countries who share our aims.

Mr. Speaker, to put this in sharper focus, those aims are as follows:

First, we will robustly support the rules-based international order, and all its institutions, and seek ways to strengthen and improve them.

We will strongly support the multilateral forums where such discussions are held—including the G7, the G20, the OAS, APEC, the WTO, the Commonwealth and La Francophonie, the Arctic Council, and of course NATO and the UN.

A cornerstone of our multilateral agenda is our steadfast commitment to the Transatlantic Alliance. Our bond is manifest in CETA, our historic trade agreement with the European Union—which we believe in and warmly support—and in our military deployment this summer to Latvia.

There can be no clearer sign that NATO and Article 5 are at the heart of Canada’s national security policy.

We will strive for leadership in all these multilateral forums. We are honoured to be hosting the G7 next year, and we are energetically pursuing a two-year term on the UN Security Council. We seek this UN seat because we wish to be heard. For we are safer and more prosperous, Mr. Speaker, when more of the world shares Canadian values.

Those values include feminism, and the promotion of the rights of women and girls.

It is important, and historic, that we have a prime minister and a government proud to proclaim ourselves feminists. Women’s rights are human rights. That includes sexual reproductive rights and the right to safe and accessible abortions. These rights are at the core of our foreign policy.

To that end, in the coming days, my colleague the Minister of International Development and La Francophonie will unveil Canada’s first feminist international assistance policy, which will target women’s rights and gender equality. We will put Canada at the forefront of this global effort.

This is a matter of basic justice and also basic economics. We know that empowering women, overseas and here at home, makes families and countries more prosperous. Canada’s values are informed by our historical duality of French and English; by our cooperative brand of federalism; by our multi-cultural, multi-ethnic and multi-linguistic citizenry; and by our geography—bridging Atlantic, Pacific and Arctic. Our values are informed by the traditions and aspirations of the Indigenous people in Canada. And our values include an unshakeable commitment to pluralism, human rights and the rule of law.

Second: We will make the necessary investments in our military, to not only redress years of neglect and underfunding, but also to place the Canadian Armed Forces on a new footing—with the equipment, training, resources and consistent, predictable financing they need to do their difficult, dangerous and important work.

We owe this to our women and men in uniform. We will not let them down, Mr. Speaker.

Canada’s broader interest in investing in a capable, professional and robust military is very clear: If middle powers do not implicate themselves in the furtherance of peace and stability around the world, that will be left to the Great Powers to settle among themselves. This would not be in Canada’s interest.

Third, we are a trading nation. Far from seeing trade as a zero-sum game, we believe in trading relationships that benefit all parties. We look forward to working with our continental partners to modernize the North American Free Trade Agreement, and to making a great trading partnership even better. We will also intensify our efforts to diversify Canadian trade worldwide. We will actively seek new trade agreements that further Canadian economic interests and that reflect our values—with the Canada-EU Trade Agreement as our template.

We are proud of the role Canada has played in creating a rules-based international trading order. We believe in the WTO and will continue our work to make it stronger, and more responsive to the needs of ordinary people in Canada and around the world.

We believe in progressive trade that works for working people. That is why we are very proud that this month, Canada will ratify the last of the fundamental conventions of the International Labour Organization.

In summary, we will be tireless in pursing our national interest, tireless in upholding progressive Canadian values, tireless in working to create a rules-based international order for the 21st century. Seventy years ago Canada played a pivotal role in forming the postwar international order. We are now called—by virtue of our unique experience, expertise, geography, diversity and values—to do this again, for a new century.

Mr. Speaker, these are ambitious objectives. There is no guarantee of success.

We set them, not in the assumption that success will come easily, but in the certain knowledge that it will not. We will venture, in noble and good causes. We will risk. We will enjoy victories—and we will suffer defeats. But we will keep working toward a better world, Mr. Speaker, because that is what Canadians do.

Let me conclude on a personal note.

A popular criticism today of the argument I am making here, is that all such ideas are abstract, perhaps of interest to the so-called Laurentian elite, or the media, or the Ottawa bubble, but not at all relevant to “real” Canadians.

That line of reasoning is the ultimate, elite condescension; it is nonsense. And in reply, I offer the example of my grandfather, John Wilbur Freeland.

He was born in Peace River, Alberta—the son of a pioneer family. Wilbur was 24 in 1940, and making a bit of a living as a cowboy and boxer. His nickname was “Pretty Boy” Freeland.

My grandpa was the opposite of an Upper Canada elite. But in the darkest days of the Second World War, Wilbur enlisted to serve. Two of his brothers, Carleton and Warren, joined up too. Wilbur and Carleton came home. Warren did not.

My grandfather told me‎ they signed up partly for the excitement—Europe, even at war, was an exotic destination for the youths of the Peace Country.

But there was more to it than a young man’s thirst for adventure. My grandfather was one of a generation of Canadians who intuitively understood the connection between their lives, and those of people they’d never met, whose speech they couldn’t comprehend, who lived on a continent so far away as to constitute, back then, another world.

That generation of Canadians—the Greatest Generation, we call them, with good reason—had survived the Great Depression. They were born in the aftermath of the First World War. They appreciated viscerally that a world without fixed borders or rules for the global economy, was a world of strife and poverty. They sought to prevent that from ever happening again.

That is why they risked and gave their lives to fight in a European war. That is why, when they came home, they cheerfully contributed to the great project of rebuilding Europe and creating a postwar world order. That is why they counted themselves lucky to be able to do so.

They were our parents, and grandparents, and great-grandparents. The challenge we face today is significant, to be sure. But it pales next to the task they faced, and met.

Our job today is to preserve their achievement, and to build on it; to use the multilateral structures they created as the foundation for planetary accords and institutions fit for the new realities of this century.

They rose to their generation’s great challenge. And so can we.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: GAP on June 06, 2017, 13:22:32
She's talking out of her *** at the same time as telling Trump the government will increase spending to the 2% he demanded.....as did Germany.

As for the rest of it, it's all hooey..... :(
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Journeyman on June 06, 2017, 13:51:20
Well, if Min. Freeland is going to simply add "Canada rocked in 1946" to Merkel's cribbed speech, then maybe Min. Sajjan whoever  is speaking for Defence tomorrow will merely put a new cover on Canada First Defence Strategy  and say that's the way ahead.  After all, it didn't get much usage first time around.

Of course, if one hand is saying "investment will be more focused upon people than equipment," while the other says the government will "place the Canadian Armed Forces on a new footing – with new equipment, training, resources and consistent and predictable funding," then I'm guessing they really don't know that they're saying.

Hence, words may lie but actions will tell the truth;  they may promise a "new footing," but the boots will still be crap.  :not-again:


/today's cynicism


Edit:
ps - next time Trump mentions "Canada agreed to 2% GDP defence spending," the response is "yes, and the US agreed to the Paris Climate Agreement; go **** yourself."
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: GK .Dundas on June 06, 2017, 16:39:57
Who are we kidding here ?
In order to to do that we'd have to spend a lot more on defence a lot more . Far more the the amount we are spending now and probably more than the 2 % we promised to NATO and have never delivered on.
Canadian are quite happy to be the US's ***** but will never admit to it.
It relieves us from doing any heavy lifting and taking any responsibility and spending money we use for other areas.
In short we resemble that 35 year still living in his mom's basement
We have one of the finest Medical care systems in the world indirectly subsidised by the US Taxpayer . Our EI system our education system all indirectly subsidised by guess who ?
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Chris Pook on June 06, 2017, 17:09:44
Question:

With all this discussion about living in a rules based society - where is the opportunity for me to live by my rules?
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: GAP on June 06, 2017, 17:12:54
Go start your own country.......others have done it....or find a weak one
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Colin P on June 06, 2017, 17:14:55
smallish forts out on the water are great starter kits
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Chris Pook on June 06, 2017, 17:17:49
Go start your own country.......others have done it....or find a weak one

Pretty unsatisfactory. 

Bear in the wild.  Bear in a park.  Bear in a compound.  Bear in a cage. Bear in chains.   At some point in time the bear becomes an unhappy bear.  I used to feel I lived in a park and was quite comfortable there.  Now I'm not so comfortable and the prospects don't look so good.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jmt18325 on June 06, 2017, 19:20:43
Pretty unsatisfactory. 

Bear in the wild.  Bear in a park.  Bear in a compound.  Bear in a cage. Bear in chains.   At some point in time the bear becomes an unhappy bear.  I used to feel I lived in a park and was quite comfortable there.  Now I'm not so comfortable and the prospects don't look so good.

Well, too bad for you, quite frankly.  A country is a shared situation. 
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: PuckChaser on June 06, 2017, 20:50:49
Garbage political speech. Proof of any real foreign policy change will be the Defense Review tomorrow, and real dollars put behind solving DNDs issues.

Colour me cynical that the Liberal party that hid behind the US defense machine in the 1990s to early 2000s, is suddenly ready to open the coffers and realize that the world needs more than hollow words.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jmt18325 on June 06, 2017, 21:40:32
It'd probably be best to wait until tomorrow to find out.  Somehow, I doubt many of you would be satisfied no matter what.  Because, Trudeau, right?
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: PuckChaser on June 06, 2017, 22:35:24
It'd probably be best to wait until tomorrow to find out.  Somehow, I doubt many of you would be satisfied no matter what.  Because, Trudeau, right?

I'll be stoked if we get more money, ASAP. Unfortunately the last budget basically told us to pound salt for a few years. Any "new" equipment is going to take 10-15 years to get, because we need to destroy the current procurement process and rebuild away from PSPC. We'll also have to wait until next year's budget to get any infusion of cash, unless they magically pull money out of thin air and create a special bill. Then the question is, where do we get it? Raise GST? Tax the already harshly taxed "1%ers"? You're not making $20B by cancelling a few boutique tax credits.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jmt18325 on June 06, 2017, 22:57:00
Well, the deficit is about $10B smaller than projected last year.  There's easily room for another ~$5B per year in spending starting in a year's time.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jollyjacktar on June 06, 2017, 23:25:00
It'd probably be best to wait until tomorrow to find out.  Somehow, I doubt many of you would be satisfied no matter what.  Because, Trudeau, right?

Ah, but much the same could be said about your Justin one man band floor show... because,Trudeau, right?
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jmt18325 on June 06, 2017, 23:37:05
Ah, but much the same could be said about your Justin one man band floor show... because,Trudeau, right?

Yes, I like Justin Trudeau.  That's why I defend him from baseless attacks.  I liked Harper as well (though far less) and defended him from baseless attacks as well. 

BTW, I meant to add - money could be added (this isn't a prediction) as soon as the fall, with the economic and fiscal update. 
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: daftandbarmy on June 07, 2017, 00:00:11
Yes, I like Justin Trudeau.  That's why I defend him from baseless attacks.  I liked Harper as well (though far less) and defended him from baseless attacks as well. 

BTW, I meant to add - money could be added (this isn't a prediction) as soon as the fall, with the economic and fiscal update.

My guess is that half of the things they announce will be stuff they've already rolled out, and the other half will be handouts to the PQ based defense industry.

But hey, that's just me...
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: FSTO on June 07, 2017, 00:43:03
It'd probably be best to wait until tomorrow to find out.  Somehow, I doubt many of you would be satisfied no matter what.  Because, Trudeau, right?

The reason there is so much eye rolling here (and I would guess through out the CAF) is that over many years of experience and studying the history of the CAF that there has been many words spoken and very little capability produced. I would love to see the infusion of more and steady funding but I have to see results to change my opinion of government mandarins.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jmt18325 on June 07, 2017, 00:52:10
The reason there is so much eye rolling here (and I would guess through out the CAF) is that over many years of experience and studying the history of the CAF that there has been many words spoken and very little capability produced. I would love to see the infusion of more and steady funding but I have to see results to change my opinion of government mandarins.

I understand the skepticism.  I get that the last government announced much and ended up funding little.  I just know that many of the conservative persuasion have a special hate for Trudeau.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: FSTO on June 07, 2017, 01:01:26
I understand the skepticism.  I get that the last government announced much and ended up funding little.  I just know that many of the conservative persuasion have a special hate for Trudeau.


I grew up under Trudeau senior and I wasn't a fan.

I am of the opinion that there is no sand in Trudeau junior and nothing he has done has changed my assessment.

I wonder if Goodale, Garneau and other more solid ministers are the senior architects of this more muscular direction.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MilEME09 on June 07, 2017, 01:28:06

I wonder if Goodale, Garneau and other more solid ministers are the senior architects of this more muscular direction.

I'm sure any "transformation" of the CAF will have Andrew Leslie's hands all over it
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jmt18325 on June 07, 2017, 01:28:43


I grew up under Trudeau senior and I wasn't a fan.

I am of the opinion that there is no sand in Trudeau junior and nothing he has done has changed my assessment.

I wonder if Goodale, Garneau and other more solid ministers are the senior architects of this more muscular direction.

If it's happening (if) Trudeau agreed to it.  It's quite clear (to most of us anyway) that's he's firmly in charge of the agenda.  He simply fools a lot of you by taking a lot of pictures and smiling.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jollyjacktar on June 07, 2017, 02:28:32
jmt, something you have to understand and accept.   Many of the old bastards here, and I am one, have heard so may promises made and seen them broken by successive governments over the years that we don't blindly believe anymore.  I will freely admit to not being a JT fan, but I remember his dad.  I truly do hope that the son surprises me, in a good way, but I'm still waiting.   That being said, I really do have a hate in my heart for Jean Chretien, more so than JT.  If that's any comfort.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MilEME09 on June 07, 2017, 02:50:07
jmt, something you have to understand and accept.   Many of the old bastards here, and I am one, have heard so may promises made and seen them broken by successive governments over the years that we don't blindly believe anymore.  I will freely admit to not being a JT fan, but I remember his dad.  I truly do hope that the son surprises me, in a good way, but I'm still waiting.   That being said, I really do have a hate in my heart for Jean Chretien, more so than JT.  If that's any comfort.

maybe this will be like PT, buy a few new tanks and ships, say they are support the armed forces, and call it a day. Unless I hear tomorrow of some five year plan to expand the CAF, begin purchasing new equipment, fast track needed equipment, massive infrastructure investments on bases, and the money to back it up. I'll hold my breath, sip my Crown royal, and call it just another day in Canadian politics.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: CBH99 on June 07, 2017, 06:48:57
Who are we kidding here ?
In order to to do that we'd have to spend a lot more on defence a lot more . Far more the the amount we are spending now and probably more than the 2 % we promised to NATO and have never delivered on.
Canadian are quite happy to be the US's ***** but will never admit to it.
It relieves us from doing any heavy lifting and taking any responsibility and spending money we use for other areas.
In short we resemble that 35 year still living in his mom's basement
We have one of the finest Medical care systems in the world indirectly subsidised by the US Taxpayer . Our EI system our education system all indirectly subsidised by guess who ?

Genuinely curious, but how is our medical care system, EI, and education systems funded indirectly by the US taxpayer?
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Lightguns on June 07, 2017, 07:29:00
Garbage political speech. Proof of any real foreign policy change will be the Defense Review tomorrow, and real dollars put behind solving DNDs issues.

Colour me cynical that the Liberal party that hid behind the US defense machine in the 1990s to early 2000s, is suddenly ready to open the coffers and realize that the world needs more than hollow words.

Concur, just words to show the EU the Liberal government still loves them.  Meaningless tripe followed by a military rebuilding plan that will start the year the Liberals know they can no longer win an election.  Which is followed by a shrug and a "we tried but Canadians said no".
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: milnews.ca on June 07, 2017, 09:09:35
My guess is that half of the things they announce will be stuff they've already rolled out, and the other half will be handouts to the PQ based defense industry.
Or just bring back stuff they said they'd put off - voila, "new" defence spending!
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: E.R. Campbell on June 07, 2017, 10:57:36
There are two pretty good responses to Minister Freeland's speech in the Opinion section of the Globe and Mail:

Freeland’s speech: A lot of nice words, but no practical action (https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/freelands-speech-a-lot-of-nice-words-but-no-practical-action/article35227023/) by Simon Palamar, who is a research associate at the Centre for International Governance Innovation; and

Freeland has woken up to reality. But has Trudeau? (https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/freeland-has-woken-up-to-reality-but-has-trudeau/article35222769/) by David Bercuson, who is director of the Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary and a fellow of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute.


Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Colin P on June 07, 2017, 11:16:00
I can see increase defense infrastructure spending, more money to get more diversity into the forces, they order 10,000 blue berets, likely start a procurement process that will somehow involve Bombardier. Likely "announce" investment in infrastructure overseas to support our forces in Eastern Europe. They will toss some goodies to the troops and will re-annouce the tax exemption.

What I would like to see is an agreement to buy 2 Resolve AOR's (in addition to the Queenston Class) and have Davie organize a contract to build and/or finish 2 Mistral class ships. A purchase of new tactical trucks, leasing of a tracked APC/IFV for the European theatre to equip the units over there, procurement of AD systems and ATGM's. A increase in Combat arms and Combat support trades PY by 5% next year and 2% every year after for 5 years. Announce moving a squadron closer to one of the bigger cities and increase in Aircrew/ground crew for aircraft squadrons. Also a 10 year plan on upgrading the equipment used by the Reserves and 10% increase in personal.   
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jmt18325 on June 07, 2017, 11:23:38
Freeland has woken up to reality. But has Trudeau? (https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/freeland-has-woken-up-to-reality-but-has-trudeau/article35222769/) by David Bercuson, who is director of the Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary and a fellow of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute.

The idea that Trudeau sat in the front bench and listened to (and congratulated) his Foreign Affairs Minister on a speech he didn't agree with/wasn't behind is kind of preposterous.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Lightguns on June 07, 2017, 11:48:27
The idea that Trudeau sat in the front bench and listened to (and congratulated) his Foreign Affairs Minister on a speech he didn't agree with/wasn't behind is kind of preposterous.

You do not understand politics do you?  Optics are more important than substance in politics, especially in a Democracy because by the time you have to do something, the public is voting you out.  It's always the next guy's problem. 
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Old Sweat on June 07, 2017, 11:53:52
Just a suggestion, along with a bit of speculation leads towards the theory that this hard power course is 180 degrees from what the Liberals actually want to do. Ms Freeland has blamed this all on President Trump after all without mentioning him by name, and I think they are betting on Trump being a one term president, or even "hopefully" being impeached in 2018 or 2019. This then should lead to a more conventional chief executive and they can go back to chasing unicorns.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Rifleman62 on June 07, 2017, 12:00:00
Meaning all the new spending will trickle to 2019/20 then be reneged on with the election of a new Democratic POTUS.

Hillary is thinking of running in 2020. She will protect us.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jmt18325 on June 07, 2017, 12:02:13
You do not understand politics do you?  Optics are more important than substance in politics, especially in a Democracy because by the time you have to do something, the public is voting you out.  It's always the next guy's problem.

I understand politics quite well.  The government obviously supports the optics.  We'll find out if they support the substance
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: milnews.ca on June 07, 2017, 12:17:34
You do not understand politics do you?  Optics are more important than substance in politics, especially in a Democracy because by the time you have to do something, the public is voting you out.  It's always the next guy's problem.
Yup -- PMJT wouldn't be the first politician (and won't be the last) to benefit from the, "one person says one thing (http://www.businessinsider.com/trump-nato-speech-article-5-omission-2017-6), another says another (https://www.voanews.com/a/vice-president-pence-commits-to-nato-article-5-in-montenegro-accession-speech/3890112.html), so we can make it mean whatever we like" approach to political messaging.
Just a suggestion, along with a bit of speculation leads towards the theory that this hard power course is 180 degrees from what the Liberals actually want to do. Ms Freeland has blamed this all on President Trump after all without mentioning him by name, and I think they are betting on Trump being a one term president, or even "hopefully" being impeached in 2018 or 2019. This then should lead to a more conventional chief executive and they can go back to chasing unicorns.
Hmmm - never say never ...
We'll find out if they support the substance
Around 12:30pm Eastern, in fact ...
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MilEME09 on June 07, 2017, 13:28:13
Should I already be worried they are using an LSVW as a prop for the announcement?
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Colin P on June 07, 2017, 13:31:35
The idea that Trudeau sat in the front bench and listened to (and congratulated) his Foreign Affairs Minister on a speech he didn't agree with/wasn't behind is kind of preposterous.

I agree with you on this, every word of that speech was looked over by at least 10 sets of eyes if not more. Which is why I hate doing briefing notes and scenario notes for Ministers. Everybody has to pee a bit on a corner of the document to make sure they are noticed.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MilEME09 on June 07, 2017, 13:39:44
Budget increases of 7% over the next 10 years, 88 is the new fighter jet requirement, regular force to increase to 71,000. 15 CSC's confirmed as the minimum. This is just going on and on holy moly, i must be dreaming.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jmt18325 on June 07, 2017, 13:40:53
Is it too early to gloat?
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Target Up on June 07, 2017, 13:44:31
Yes.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Baden Guy on June 07, 2017, 13:46:37
" 88 is the new fighter jet requirement,"
Is one to take this to mean 88 Super Hornets ?  :-\
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MilEME09 on June 07, 2017, 13:48:48
" 88 is the new fighter jet requirement,"
Is one to take this to mean 88 Super Hornets ?  :-\

who knows, they apparently want to reduce their procurement time frame by 50% too,
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Colin P on June 07, 2017, 13:52:49
Space and cyber warfare, I get the sense that money earmarked for defense will get funneled into that instead.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Dimsum on June 07, 2017, 13:56:44
Space and cyber warfare, I get the sense that money earmarked for defense will get funneled into that instead.

As un-sexy as that is, Space and Cyber *are* part of defense.  Try conducting modern coalition operations without satellite and/or secure comms.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Brad Sallows on June 07, 2017, 13:59:36
The key to analyzing intentions is to look at how much of projected new spending occurs within the next 2-3 years.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: trooper142 on June 07, 2017, 14:08:48
The key to analyzing intentions is to look at how much of projected new spending occurs within the next 2-3 years.

http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/canada-defence-policy/docs/canada-defence-policy-report.pdf

I think this answers that question.  Almost 2 Billion investment starting next fiscal year, approximately 1 billion the next fiscal year.

It does slow down in 2019/20 but ramps back up in 2020/21 with an almost 2.5 billion dollar investment that fiscal year.

I think this shows they are serious
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: ballz on June 07, 2017, 14:22:11
I'll believe it in 10 years time and not before... it's all well and good to say we're going to increase spending by 70% over 10 years, but that is a huge amount of treasure and if you don't know where that treasure is coming from, you haven't "fully committed" to anything.

Quote
G&M Reporter: "Minister, where is the 60+ billion dollars of additional funding coming from? Is your government planning on increasing the size of the deficit or cutting spending from other areas?"

MND: "Waffle waffle waffle..." (sorry, it was way too long to actually type out but it really was a long-winded non-answer).

G&M Reporter: "So to be clear am I to interpret from that, that you haven't determined where that money will come from?"

MND: "Our government has fully committed to making sure that the CAF are going to be on a sustainable footing for the next 20 years."

We'll see the holes in this plan in the next budget when for the first time they actually have to throw an additional 2-4 billion into the DND account.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MarkOttawa on June 07, 2017, 14:23:04
Main gov't defence policy page:
http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/canada-defence-policy/index.asp

Backgrounder: Investments to Enhance Capability and Capacity
http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/canada-defence-policy/news/investments-enhance-capability-capacity.asp

Mark
Ottawa
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MilEME09 on June 07, 2017, 14:24:29
nothing a 3% National defense tax can't fix :P
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: PPCLI Guy on June 07, 2017, 14:40:45
http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/canada-defence-policy/docs/canada-defence-policy-report.pdf

I think this answers that question.  Almost 2 Billion investment starting next fiscal year, approximately 1 billion the next fiscal year.

It does slow down in 2019/20 but ramps back up in 2020/21 with an almost 2.5 billion dollar investment that fiscal year.

I think this shows they are serious

Any more than that and we would not be able to spend it.  Given the length of recapitalisation programs, the funds must necessarily be assigned in the out years.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MarkOttawa on June 07, 2017, 14:48:43
Globe story--note CSC, new fighter costs (no new subs planned):

Quote
Ottawa lays out $62-billion in new military spending over 20 years

Ottawa has announced plans for a beefed-up and modernized military that includes tens of billions of dollars in new spending, although the biggest budget increases are years down the road.

The new money in the 20-year plan will be used to add 5,000 regular and reserve personnel, buy a bigger-than-expected fleet of 88 fighter jets, and pay for the ballooning cost of 15 military vessels called surface combatants, among other details announced by National Defence.

Canada’s new defence policy includes $62.3-billion in additional spending over the next 20 years, including a total of just $6.6-billion over the next five years...

Federal officials said the influx of funding will bring defence spending to 1.4 per cent of GDP, still shy of the goal of 2 per cent among NATO allies. As it stands, NATO, a defence alliance of Western countries, estimates that Canada spends 1 per cent of GDP on defence, while Canada estimates it is actually spending 1.2 per cent using a different formula...

The document states that the cost of 15 new surface combatants will be in the $56– to $60-billion range, up from previous estimates of $26-billion. The $30-billion increase in the budget for the vessels shows the extent to which major military spending plans have historically been underestimated and unfunded.

The Royal Canadian Navy is not planning to buy new submarines as part of this plan, but rather to modernize its current Victoria-class vessels.

In terms of fighter jets, the plans state the government is still exploring the purchase of an interim fleet of 18 Super Hornet fighter jets to meet short-term needs. However, Ottawa is now embroiled in a commercial dispute with U.S.-based manufacturer Boeing, which has slowed down the process.

Regarding the complete replacement of Canada’s fleet of CF-18s in the 2020s, the government now estimates that it will need to buy 88 new fighter jets to meet all international commitments. This is a significant increase from the 65 fighter jets that were planned under the previous Conservative government.

Officials refused to lay out the budget for the potential purchase of Super Hornets. They said the acquisition of the full fleet of 88 fighter jets will cost up to $19-billion, up from the previous government’s budget of $9-billion for the now-cancelled purchase of 65 Lockheed-Martin F-35s.

As part of the recruitment of new military personnel, the Canadian Armed Forces are planning to add 605 new personnel to their special operations forces, which are deployed in some of Canada’s most dangerous and lethal missions. Overall, National Defence is planning to add 3,500 members to its regular force (currently at 68,000) and 1,500 to its reserve force (currently at 28,500)...
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/ottawa-lays-out-62-billion-in-new-military-spending-over-20-years/article35231311/

Mark
Ottawa
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jmt18325 on June 07, 2017, 14:51:14
That's lifecycle costs.  The costs at $1.2B per ship are completely reasonable.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Colin P on June 07, 2017, 14:53:22
How much of the increase is just putting back the money they said they were deferring?
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jmt18325 on June 07, 2017, 14:55:17
How much of the increase is just putting back the money they said they were deferring?

This is more than that.

Perhaps the most important piece:

http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/canada-defence-policy/news/modernizing-business-defence.asp
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: milnews.ca on June 07, 2017, 15:01:12
 This table from an appendix (pg 106 here (http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/canada-defence-policy/docs/canada-defence-policy-report.pdf)) caught my eye ...
Quote
... This policy ensures the Canadian Armed Forces will be prepared to simultaneously:

• Defend Canada, including responding concurrently to multiple domestic emergencies in support of civilian authorities;

• Meet its NORAD obligations, with new capacity in some areas;

• Meet commitments to NATO Allies under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty; and

• Contribute to international peace and stability through:

-- Two sustained deployments of ~500-1500 personnel, including one as a lead nation;
-- One time-limited deployment of ~500-1500 personnel (6-9 months duration);
-- Two sustained deployments of ~100-500 personnel and;
-- Two time-limited deployments (6-9 months) of ~100-500 personnel;
-- One Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) deployment, with scaleable additional support;
-- One Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation, with scaleable additional support ...
So, doable?
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Colin P on June 07, 2017, 15:04:36
As un-sexy as that is, Space and Cyber *are* part of defense.  Try conducting modern coalition operations without satellite and/or secure comms.

True, but these are the Liberals who are the masters of waving one hand while sliding money off the table for something else. I see these references as "pipes" to funnel money away from basic defense matters to more squishy and politically attractive (to the Liberals) projects, like funding an R&D building in a Liberal riding to promote "Space oriented research". Yes the Cynic is strong in this one.   
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MilEME09 on June 07, 2017, 15:07:20
Quote
-- Two sustained deployments of ~500-1500 personnel, including one as a lead nation;
-- One time-limited deployment of ~500-1500 personnel (6-9 months duration);
-- Two sustained deployments of ~100-500 personnel and;
-- Two time-limited deployments (6-9 months) of ~100-500 personnel;
-- One Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) deployment, with scaleable additional support;
-- One Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation, with scaleable additional support ...

So basically two afghanistan sized amounts of personal deployed almost all the time, I feel like an extra 3000 reg force ain't going to cover it.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: RomeoJuliet on June 07, 2017, 15:09:19
Is it too early to gloat?
Nope
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: ModlrMike on June 07, 2017, 15:35:33
Is it too early to gloat?

A $62.5Bn plan over 20 years with no definition of how it's going to be funded. Forgive me if I don't hold my breath.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jmt18325 on June 07, 2017, 15:44:50
A $62.5Bn plan over 20 years with no definition of how it's going to be funded. Forgive me if I don't hold my breath.

The defence budget increases by $1.7B next year, and $800M the year after that.  That's before the election.  After the election it increases by $300M, follwoed by a $1.5B increase.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: PPCLI Guy on June 07, 2017, 15:46:26
So basically two afghanistan sized amounts of personal deployed almost all the time, I feel like an extra 3000 reg force ain't going to cover it.

We have close to enough people now - we just employ them incorrectly, in places like ASGs or whatever they are called now, and CDA, and CADTC, and in post-office box HQs etc etc
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jollyjacktar on June 07, 2017, 16:30:26
Is it too early to gloat?

I'll repeat myself to you again.  There are many of us here who have heard these type of honeyed promises before, by both parties, and had the self same promises go unfulfilled as the carpet gets pulled from under the feet.

You're young.  In 10 years, if all this comes to pass, do feel free to make me eat all the crap you like while you crow and gloat nearby.  I'll eat it without complaint as I'll deserve it.  Until the time there's 88 fighters, 15 CSC,  71K personnel and actual money in hand as promised..... YES, it's too early to gloat.  Many talks and BS walks, as the saying goes.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Oldgateboatdriver on June 07, 2017, 16:54:08
To be fair, while we have had "shopping list" type of Defence Policy statements before, this is the first one I know of that actually specifies year by year the intended total defence spending over a period of 20 years, both in current dollars and predicted actual dollars of those years.

As we have a road map, we may not have to wait for 10 or 20 years to know if they are delivering: Every year we will be able to see if they hit that year's target. Moreover, with a "road map" like that, and if they manage to get the opposition to bite and criticize as "too little", it would become that much more difficult for any future government to deliver less in any given year (save "Events, dear boy! events!").

As for the various "sustained" deployments proposed on the international scene, I note that it mentions numbers but not provenance. For instance, the about 500 people every second year for 6-9 months could easily be covered by a Navy task force of two ships. So I agree with PPCLI Guy: It will be a matter of how we organize the people we have and the small increase proffered when it materialize. For instance, how much tail could be saved if the Army got rid of its not really existing five Divisions and went to single headquarter governing actually existing brigade groups only? Don't shoot me, I am just suggesting that there are re-organizations possible that correspond to the actual size of our forces that could free a lot more people for front line duties - in all elements probably - but if we keep organizing ourselves the same way as now, increasing to 71,000 will not provide much in terms of extra teeth.
 
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: GAP on June 07, 2017, 16:59:43
I think they are going to abide by it for the next 3 years while Trump is in office, then they hope they can dump it for some solid social programs..... :(
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MarkOttawa on June 07, 2017, 17:00:49
Gov't graphic via twitter:
https://twitter.com/TimmyC62/status/872516511692279808
Quote
Timothy Choi‏ @TimmyC62

Damn, there's that cursed "5-6" #AOPS #AOPV number again...
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/DBvNE-8VYAQcfxe.jpg)

Mark
Ottawa
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: George Wallace on June 07, 2017, 17:09:13
I think they are going to abide by it for the next 3 years while Trump is in office, then they hope they can dump it for some solid social programs..... :(

.......and that is only if Trump stays in office for those 3 years.....  [:D
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jmt18325 on June 07, 2017, 17:15:43
Gov't graphic via twitter:
https://twitter.com/TimmyC62/status/872516511692279808
Mark
Ottawa

I would imagine, contract being signed and all, that the 5-6 number is set in stone (for now).
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MilEME09 on June 07, 2017, 17:55:57
The national post sums up the mood on this site pretty well,

(https://scontent-sea1-1.xx.fbcdn.net/v/t1.0-0/s526x395/18921708_10155393402534595_117192070454709445_n.jpg?oh=d2a440d79cd9d004d473f6e84267d72d&oe=59DDA570)


everything is talk until contracts are signed and deliveries made
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: milnews.ca on June 07, 2017, 18:02:25
A comment from the U.S. Secretary of Defense (https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-Release-View/Article/1206854/statement-by-secretary-of-defense-jim-mattis-on-canadas-defense-policy/) ...
Quote
We are heartened by today's release of Canada's defense policy.

The United States welcomes Canada's marked increase in investment in their military and their continued commitment to a strong defense relationship with the United States and NATO.

This new defense policy demonstrates Canadian resolve to build additional military capacity and a more capable fighting force. In light of today's security challenges around the world, it's critical for Canada's moral voice to be supported by the hard power of a strong military.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: milnews.ca on June 07, 2017, 18:10:28
And this from POTUS45's info-machine (https://twitter.com/MCShort45/status/872554487650668544) (but not directly from POTUS45) ...
Quote
.@POTUS getting results --> NATO member Canada will increase military spending 70 percent over next decade: http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/C/CN_CANADA_MILITARY?SITE=AP&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT … via @AP
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Chris Pook on June 07, 2017, 18:30:06
As a plan it has much to commend itself.  As with all plans it will be the commitment to the implementation of the intent and not the detail.

Not sure that faster procurement is compatible with stronger controls but that remains to be seen.

On the plus side - commitments to "soldier kit" (boots?) and radios for light forces, emphasis on C4ISR and Log as well as CANSOFCOM and light forces generally, 88 Ftrs, RPAS, LRPAs, SSKs, Sats, 15 CSCs, GBADs - all good stuff.

The stuff that's missing?  Strike capability - Tanks, Arty, Strike Missiles for the Air Force (Sidewinder refurb only), Big Honking Ships, more airlift, more helos (especially Attack helos).

So, Boots and Radios, Good Binoculars and lots of vehicles for peoples with blankets, beans and bandages.  Not indefensible.

About what one might have expected. 

Now if they can actually deliver on tyres and rubber soles you will probably be further ahead than you seem to be now. 

As the man said: If Cash.

Given the limitations of the Surface Fleet as projected I would like to see more of the "Global Corvette" capability with an ability to launch a Lt Coy/ SOF force from at least some, if not all, the CSCs.  But that is just me beating my ancient and empty drum.  :)
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MilEME09 on June 07, 2017, 18:41:53
What gets me is actually most of this stuff is already having project offices and such, GBAD? 2019 is suppose to be RFP, replacing support vehicles I read as replace the LSVW and HL, well thats in the 2019-2021 time frame if funding allows. it's all already in the books, and if they wanted to, they could allocate the funds and get these projects going now, and we'd be signing contracts in time for 2019.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: VinceW on June 07, 2017, 18:45:46
Does the increase to 605 more Special Operations soldiers mean that they're increasing from the 1 Special Forces Company in CSOR to 3?
I've heard for awhile that's what some have wanted.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MilEME09 on June 07, 2017, 19:00:50
Does the increase to 605 more Special Operations soldiers mean that they're increasing from the 1 Special Forces Company in CSOR to 3?
I've heard for awhile that's what some have wanted.

probably, now heres a question, is that 605 for SoF included in the 5000 person increase to our numbers?
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Thucydides on June 07, 2017, 19:08:29
I think they are going to abide by it for the next 3 years while Trump is in office, then they hope they can dump it for some solid social programs..... :(

They may be in for a surprise after the 2020 election then...... ;)

A friend described this to me from some press release, where it was portrayed as "Canada stepping up to replace an increasingly isolationist US" (paraphrase). Nice face saving move if true, the Liberals are discovering that reflexive anti Americanism or anti Trumpism is not a viable COA these days.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: daftandbarmy on June 07, 2017, 19:24:46
A comment from the U.S. Secretary of Defense (https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-Release-View/Article/1206854/statement-by-secretary-of-defense-jim-mattis-on-canadas-defense-policy/) ...

Nice to see 'merica using the 'Royal' we :)
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Journeyman on June 07, 2017, 19:50:23
Well, we've had input from the Manitoba Community College kid telling us what to think.  Just need the POTUS' morning tweets now.
     

[fingers not crossed; breath not held.  We'll see]


Edit: I'm glad that Marc Garneau was there to fill in as Jeff Dunham again.   I guess the Honourable Maryam Monsef (Minister for the Status of Women) was unavailable.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: milnews.ca on June 07, 2017, 22:15:18
... The stuff that's missing?  Strike capability - Tanks, Arty, Strike Missiles for the Air Force (Sidewinder refurb only), Big Honking Ships, more airlift, more helos (especially Attack helos) ...
This caught my eye on pg 73 ...
Quote
... Invest in a range of remotely piloted systems, including an armed aerial system capable of conducting surveillance and precision strikes ...
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: GnyHwy on June 07, 2017, 22:53:03
If we are to conduct coalition and joint operations and the minimum size force to execute this for the army is a brigade (4800), why is the largest force element in the concurrent operations 1500?
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: K-Nato87 on June 07, 2017, 22:58:59
I'm hearing that the training is going to be shortened in this policy. will this effect my BMQ, Land Course and Course Training ??


I hope I am being misinformed on this. I apologize if this question is in the wrong place.

Thanks 
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: GnyHwy on June 07, 2017, 23:00:42
Also didn't see anything about increasing the civilians that it will take to integrate all this stuff, particularly the C2.

Have to read thoroughly tomorrow.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: George Wallace on June 07, 2017, 23:02:18
I'm hearing that the training is going to be shortened in this policy. will this effect my BMQ, Land Course and Course Training ??


I hope I am being misinformed on this. I apologize if this question is in the wrong place.

Thanks

I can not see any reason that this announcement would affect your training in any way. 

Perhaps you should check out the credibility of your source of information.

If it is something like F 6; then totally disregard it.  (F6 is not even on the scale.  [:D )
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Old EO Tech on June 07, 2017, 23:03:55
Gov't graphic via twitter:
https://twitter.com/TimmyC62/status/872516511692279808
Mark
Ottawa

Well like many here, I'll believe the numbers when I see contracts being signed.  As someone already stated, projects already exist for much of this, it would just take money for LVM, ERC, ACSV projects to put out RFP this year and assess bids in 18....

Jon
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jmt18325 on June 07, 2017, 23:14:04
Also didn't see anything about increasing the civilians that it will take to integrate all this stuff, particularly the C2.

Have to read thoroughly tomorrow.

There will be 1150 new civilian positions.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MilEME09 on June 07, 2017, 23:17:17
There will be 1150 new civilian positions.

oh just what we need more civilian contractors, I can see the tail getting fatter already
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jmt18325 on June 07, 2017, 23:19:08
oh just what we need more civilian contractors, I can see the tail getting fatter already

Based on some of the comments, I'm thinking (hoping?) that the positions will relate mostly to procurement.  They hope to shorten procurement time, and they plan to bring all contracts under $5M in house to DND.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Chris Pook on June 07, 2017, 23:26:05
This caught my eye on pg 73 ...

I think you are talking about something like this
(https://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.military-today.com%2Faircraft%2Fmq9_reaper.jpg&hash=fe1a7ca777a62f1177cf0abf7953fca5)

A Reaper with a 50 kg Hellfire/Brimstone with a 10 km or so range as opposed to something like this

(https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/fc/Agm-158_JASSM.jpg)

a 1000 kg JASSM-ER  with a 1000 km range

Or even one of these

(https://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/smart/slamf18.jpg)

700 kg, 200 km Harpoon

Or these

(https://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fmedia.defenceindustrydaily.com%2Fimages%2FORD_GBU-39_SDB_Concept_Color_lg.jpg&hash=43710062936728e28258917d96a6907e)

Small Diameter Bombs - 100 kg / 100 km







Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MCG on June 08, 2017, 00:12:01
oh just what we need more civilian contractors, I can see the tail getting fatter already
No.  Not contractors.  Public Servants.  There is a difference.

We need them to staff the procurement project teams to start buying equipment ... and maybe displace a few military PYs for reinvestment into operational roles.

They also could make a good workforce for cyber if much of that capability becomes static, permanently conducting operations from a hub in Canada.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Brad Sallows on June 08, 2017, 00:30:35
CBC reports "The Liberal government's new defence policy lays out a plan to increase the defence budget by 70 per cent over the next decade to $32.7 billion."

The 2016 Fiscal Reference Tables report National Defence Direct Program Expenses as $28.5 billion.  At a 1.5% inflation rate (https://tradingeconomics.com/canada/inflation-cpi), that would have to hit $33 billion in 10 years just to account for inflation (North of $400 million per year).
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jmt18325 on June 08, 2017, 00:33:51
The 2016 Fiscal Reference Tables report National Defence Direct Program Expenses as $28.5 billion.

I think you should probably check that again.  Canada spends nowhere close to that on defence. 

http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/canada-defence-policy/news/stable-predictable-realistic-funding.asp

This year's budget is just over $20B (I've been forgetting all day what fiscal year we're in).
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Chris Pook on June 08, 2017, 02:06:01
https://www.fin.gc.ca/frt-trf/2016/frt-trf-1603-eng.asp#tbl12

Thanks for suggesting the check JMT

Table 12, Column 4, Last Row - 28,519 "millions of dollars"

Now - the apples and oranges debate might be useful here - but I'm thinking that the government will be dragging every existing dollar that is related to defence but uncounted into the discussion and thus will be doing its best to display more without spending more.

Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: milnews.ca on June 08, 2017, 06:22:21
Some more cynical than me might say if ceasefire.ca/the Rideau Disarmament Institute (the "Disarmament" is silent) is unhappy (http://www.ceasefire.ca/?p=25044), pro-militarites should be happy  >:D
Quote
Canada does Trump’s bidding with massive new defence spending.

Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan released Canada’s new defence policy today and here are the highlights:

-          A 70% increase in defence spending over the next 10 years

-          A staggering 62 billion dollar increase over the next 20 years

-          An increase in the number of fighter jets to be purchased from 65 (under Harper) to 88

-          An increase in personnel in both the regular and reserve forces

The Trudeau Liberals did not campaign on, and have no mandate for, significant increases in the defence budget. There has been no change in the international security environment since their election to justify such astronomical increases. The only change has been the election of Donald Trump.

While there are positive elements of the new policy – particularly Canada’s engagement in support of UN peace operations – the new funding envelope is nothing short of a total capitulation to the American bully, President Trump.

Next, let the road show begin!
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: GnyHwy on June 08, 2017, 06:55:26
No.  Not contractors.  Public Servants.  There is a difference.

We need them to staff the procurement project teams to start buying equipment ... and maybe displace a few military PYs for reinvestment into operational roles.

That is good news. Hopefully we can herd the cats.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: GnyHwy on June 08, 2017, 07:29:58
Some more cynical than me might say if ceasefire.ca/the Rideau Disarmament Institute (the "Disarmament" is silent) is unhappy (http://www.ceasefire.ca/?p=25044), pro-militarites should be happy  >:D
Next, let the road show begin!

That is quite the rag! Read this article too. It's a couple years old, but I doubt they have changed their mind since then. There are a few doozies in there.

"A Canadian Defence and Security Policy for the 21st Century"
http://www.ceasefire.ca/?p=20741 (http://www.ceasefire.ca/?p=20741)
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Half Full on June 08, 2017, 08:09:22
What gets me is actually most of this stuff is already having project offices and such, GBAD? 2019 is suppose to be RFP, replacing support vehicles I read as replace the LSVW and HL, well thats in the 2019-2021 time frame if funding allows. it's all already in the books, and if they wanted to, they could allocate the funds and get these projects going now, and we'd be signing contracts in time for 2019.
The difference now is that all these mentioned programs will now be in our Investment Plan whereas until yesterday they weren't.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Lightguns on June 08, 2017, 08:21:36
Sounds like lots of work for class B staff captains for a the next few years........
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Haggis on June 08, 2017, 09:39:39
Sounds like lots of work for class B staff captains for a the next few years........

Three years, at least.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jmt18325 on June 08, 2017, 10:05:40
https://www.fin.gc.ca/frt-trf/2016/frt-trf-1603-eng.asp#tbl12

Thanks for suggesting the check JMT

Table 12, Column 4, Last Row - 28,519 "millions of dollars"

If we actually spent that much money on defence, no one would be complaining.  I'm not an accountant, so I can't explain it.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: dapaterson on June 08, 2017, 10:23:51
Accrual vs cash based accounting.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Colin P on June 08, 2017, 11:12:47
What gets me is actually most of this stuff is already having project offices and such, GBAD? 2019 is suppose to be RFP, replacing support vehicles I read as replace the LSVW and HL, well thats in the 2019-2021 time frame if funding allows. it's all already in the books, and if they wanted to, they could allocate the funds and get these projects going now, and we'd be signing contracts in time for 2019.

Classic Liberal stuff (well the CPC is guilty to, but the Liberals are experts at it)
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MilEME09 on June 08, 2017, 13:44:17
No.  Not contractors.  Public Servants.  There is a difference.

We need them to staff the procurement project teams to start buying equipment ... and maybe displace a few military PYs for reinvestment into operational roles.

They also could make a good workforce for cyber if much of that capability becomes static, permanently conducting operations from a hub in Canada.

Well considering I've heard on here that the procurement office got effectively gutted in the 90's, more people there makes sense. I'll be impressed though if we can get contracts signed in under 5 years.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Humphrey Bogart on June 08, 2017, 14:15:31
I can't understand why we need a "Cyber Command"? 

We've got CSEC, which is already administered by DND.  Expand its scope and resource envelope. 
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jmt18325 on June 08, 2017, 14:40:52
I can't understand why we need a "Cyber Command"? 

We've got CSEC, which is already administered by DND.  Expand its scope and resource envelope.

Isn't that completely different?
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Target Up on June 08, 2017, 14:44:29
Maybe there are a couple spare generals and colonels who need jobs?
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Lightguns on June 08, 2017, 14:54:21
I can't understand why we need a "Cyber Command"? 

We've got CSEC, which is already administered by DND.  Expand its scope and resource envelope.

Likely so the Yank General can have a golf partner of suitable status......
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: milnews.ca on June 08, 2017, 15:18:31
I can't understand why we need a "Cyber Command"? 

We've got CSEC, which is already administered by DND.  Expand its scope and resource envelope.
My limited understanding is that CSEC is focused on the detection/protection stuff (all open source, that), so to me, it makes sense that if an offensive capability is ramped up, some military know-how would be useful to mix into the technical expertise already there, no?

Sounds a bit like this is part of the larger "do we train SME's to be  troops too (http://taskandpurpose.com/army-wants-recruit-cyber-experts-hiring-civilians-rank-colonel/), or get soldiers to learn enough to guide the SME's?" debate.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: GnyHwy on June 08, 2017, 16:00:38
Sounds a bit like this is part of the larger "do we train SME's to be  troops too (http://taskandpurpose.com/army-wants-recruit-cyber-experts-hiring-civilians-rank-colonel/), or get soldiers to learn enough to guide the SME's?" debate.

I don't think I can be done effectively. This would apply to any capability.  The civs have the knowledge, but have no idea how the military works or what they need. The military folks know how the military works, but won't get the expertise, either because they will move on before getting it or have other/multiple priorities.

It needs to be both, with the military person in charge having enough knowledge of the military and the tech, to direct and guide the civilians. We essentially do this already.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MCG on June 08, 2017, 16:22:36
This table from an appendix (pg 106 here (http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/canada-defence-policy/docs/canada-defence-policy-report.pdf)) caught my eye ...
Quote
... This policy ensures the Canadian Armed Forces will be prepared to simultaneously:

• Defend Canada, including responding concurrently to multiple domestic emergencies in support of civilian authorities;

• Meet its NORAD obligations, with new capacity in some areas;

• Meet commitments to NATO Allies under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty; and

• Contribute to international peace and stability through:

-- Two sustained deployments of ~500-1500 personnel, including one as a lead nation;
-- One time-limited deployment of ~500-1500 personnel (6-9 months duration);
-- Two sustained deployments of ~100-500 personnel and;
-- Two time-limited deployments (6-9 months) of ~100-500 personnel;
-- One Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) deployment, with scaleable additional support;
-- One Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation, with scaleable additional support ...
So, doable?
So basically two afghanistan sized amounts of personal deployed almost all the time, I feel like an extra 3000 reg force ain't going to cover it.
We have close to enough people now - we just employ them incorrectly, in places like ASGs or whatever they are called now, and CDA, and CADTC, and in post-office box HQs etc etc
Keep in mind that these personnel commitments do not tie themselves to a particular environment.  So, it could be two ATHENA type missions in parallel, or maybe it is one ATHENA in parallel to one IMPACT.  Arguably, the sustained and time-limited deployments of 100-500 could reflect a ship or two in some distant sea.  As far as a metric toward which to do force design, some assumptions will have to be made about missions & force packages. (What I see, from four sustained missions and three time-limited missions, is that we probably need the ability to launch four theater activation teams annually with sufficient logistic and engineering capacity to set the conditions for mission success, and also four theater close-out teams annually with the same engineering and logistic capacity built-in).

But even accepting that some of those missions will be primarily not in the land environment, the Army will still need better management of how PYs are employed.  I have already heard comment of how the 3,500 new PY will solve the hollowing of the brigades.  I don't expect as much.  605 PYs are already allocated for CANSOF.  More will be needed to expand the fighter force and grow the cyber and space capabilities.  We also already know that insufficient PYs are allocated to the BTL to sustain the force size we already have, so more of those 3,500 will have to go there.  So, if we want the field force that many here would think we need (and maybe imagine that those two sustained and one time-limited 1500 person missions happen to overlap geographically as a deployed brigade group with RCAF & CANSOF integrated), then the institution needs to set its priorities that way.  ... or, we can have two full & larger military colleges for the glory of the military colleges themselves.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MCG on June 08, 2017, 16:28:14
Some commentary:
Quote
Liberal defence plan puts national interest ahead of its own partisan concerns, for now (http://news.nationalpost.com/full-comment/john-ivison-liberal-defence-plan-puts-national-interest-ahead-of-its-own-partisan-concerns-for-now)
John Ivison
National Post
07 Jun 2017 (Updated: 08 Jun  7:31 AM ET)


OTTAWA — Now we know why Chrystia Freeland went to such lengths to sell the idea of “hard power” in her speech Monday – it was an effort to soften up Liberal voters to the idea of billions being spent on swords, not ploughshares.

The Strong Secure Engaged policy unveiled by Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan is a defence plan you might expect from a Conservative government. Indeed it is difficult to see how the Tories will be able to criticize it, beyond the plan making it even harder for new leader Andrew Scheer to balance the books within two years of taking power. Already bulging deficits are set to distend further still.

It is not a document that will appeal to the herbivore wing of the Liberal party.

But the government appears to have been so spooked at the prospect of becoming, in Freeland’s words, “a client state” of Trump’s America, that a declaration of independence was deemed necessary.

The president will probably consider that mission accomplished.

The plan is to spend an extra $6.6 billion in the next five years and $62.3 billion over the next 20 years. This will pay for increasing the size of the regular force by 3,500 troops, to 71,500.

Spending increases will follow in each year until, by 2027-8, defence expenditure reaches $33.4 billion a year, from $18.9 billion this year.

Capital spending will get a major $47.2 billion boost over the 20 years covered — taking the total for planned projects and new investments to $164 billion, on a cash basis.

Spending increases will follow in each year until, by 2027-8, defence expenditure reaches $33.4 billion a year, from $18.9 billion this year.

Capital spending will get a major $47.2 billion boost over the 20 years covered — taking the total for planned projects and new investments to $164 billion, on a cash basis.

The bulk of that capital spending increase is accounted for by surface combatant ships and fighter jets.

The $26 billion set aside to build 15 warships will be increased to the $60 billion it is estimated it will actually cost to build them.

The Royal Canadian Air Force has been promised 88 advanced fighter aircraft to replace the CF18s. The Conservatives had earmarked $9 billion; the new plan estimates an acquisition cost of up to $19 billion.

The $9-billion “interim” purchase of 18 Boeing SuperHornets barely warranted a mention, suggesting the “capability gap” the minister was so concerned about has mysteriously vanished. “The government continues to explore the potential acquisition of an interim aircraft,” was all the review said.

It was a curious document in many ways, spending much of its time on a new health and wellness plan, family support program and efforts to improve gender balance. It was replete with images of cute, multicultural military families, native drummers and Forces members doing all manner of good works around the globe.

Important as all that is, many in the military would surely prefer to know where they might engage — there was no mention of peacekeeping in Africa or new deployments in the Middle East.

There was ambitious talk of the Forces being able to handle a number of concurrent missions but no sense of strategic priorities — where in the world should we engage? Our ally south of the border is preoccupied by Kim Jong-un and his desire to build an inter-continental ballistic missile. Yet the government made clear it has no intention of signing up for ballistic missile defence.

The focus was on investments in equipment, aimed at providing the Canadian Armed Forces with the capacity to wield “the principled use of force” referred to by Global Affairs Minister Freeland.

Yet, as one veteran of such bureaucratic wars put it, having the commitment in a defence policy review means Sajjan is “only 10 per cent” of the way to delivering it.

The 2005 defence policy statement promised increased defence budgets, which saw a 35 per cent spending uptick by 2011. But the 2008 financial crisis curtailed that growth and cuts followed.

The 1987 White Paper had an even shorter shelf life and was gutted after the fall of the Berlin Wall two years later.

At that time, the Mulroney government had just started becoming concerned about the national debt. The Trudeau government appears to be unburdened by any such concerns – the new spending will simply be piled on the deficit.

But who’s to say the prime minister won’t have a blinding conversion to fiscal conservatism if confronted by imminent unemployment?

There are logistical issues, too.

David Perry, senior analyst at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, said the government has committed to spending serious amounts of new money, “if it all gets delivered as promised.”

But on that point, he expressed himself “very dubious.”

The Defence Department has long had major problems spending the money it has, never mind an extra $47.2 billion.

As one close watcher of the Defence Department put it, “Strong, Secure, Engaged” is a nice, clean, well-articulated document but it has no timelines and no implementation plan.

Sajjan echoed Freeland’s sentiments in his speech. “The Canadian Armed Forces are an indispensable instrument of Canada’s foreign policy. If we’re serious about our role in the world, we must be serious about funding our military. And indeed we are,” he said.

At least, they are for now.

But they weren’t particularly enthused during the 2015 election, when they promised to merely “maintain current National Defence spending.”

This is not an issue on which the Liberals are trusted on motive. It is not a vote-winner for them and their faith will be tested in the future, when other priorities become more pressing.

For now, though, the government should be commended for putting the national interest ahead of its own narrow partisan concerns.

There is no particular political upside for them. They will be judged on results, not intentions — and they won’t be in for another decade.


Quote
Liberals’ feel-good defence plan has some notable omissions (http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/canadian-politics/matthew-fisher-liberals-feel-good-defence-plan-has-notable-omissions)
Matthew Fisher
National Post
07 Jun 2017 (Updated: 08 Jun  7:31 AM ET)


Canada’s back!

Well, it may be one day if some grand spending promises outlined in the Trudeau government’s defence policy review — which would increase defence spending by a whopping 70 per cent — are kept. But the timeline announced by the government Wednesday to get there runs to 2026 and beyond.

“Canada’s Defence Policy” is like other papers published since the end of the Second World War outlining military policy for the next 20 years. It is long on spending promises — $62 billion of them. But most of the money is heavily back-loaded. It will be subject to the budgetary constraints and whims of the winners of the next few federal elections and will not be of much help to Canada or NATO in the near future.

The document — announced to great fanfare before a Greek chorus of several hundred soldiers in Ottawa’s Cartier Square Drill Hall — was as interesting for what it didn’t say as for what it did say.

There was scant mention of peacekeeping, although this was supposed to have been Justin Trudeau’s signature military policy and the best way — or so he and his aides once thought — for Canada to secure a two-year appointment as a member of the United Nations Security Council.

Other than stating for the umpteenth time that at some point Canadian blue helmets will embark for Africa to honour a campaign promise that Trudeau made nearly two years ago, there was barely a whiff in the 112-page document or numerous side papers about where those peacekeepers might end up, in what configuration and to what end. The best its authors could muster was some vague talk about collaborating with the UN, which has made a hash of peacekeeping lately, and, even more dangerously, establishing closers ties with the African Union, whose record on peacekeeping has been a disgrace.

Replying to questions from journalists, Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan hid, as the government has for months, behind the excuse that peacekeeping was dangerous. So there must be “no snap decisions” made about where to commit troops, the minister said.

What Sajjan did not say was that there had been a snap decision on peacekeeping and it was made by Trudeau in the 2015 election because his advisers thought there were votes in such a humanitarian gambit. But clearly neither the prime minister nor those around him had the slightest understanding at the time about how peacekeeping has changed radically since Canadians last did it in large numbers 20 years ago.

The military and the diplomatic corps have been bringing the cabinet up to speed about this ever since. What they have heard has clearly spooked them to the point where they do not have a clue how to honour this promise.

As tricky as peacekeeping has become, the army and the air force have been ready for nearly a year with personnel and assets to fulfill a wide range of mission requirements. Troops were identified and training space was set aside, but the government continues to dither, leaving in limbo the brigade that is always on call for such operations.

There are other significant gaps in what the government claims is a landmark document. Perhaps the biggest one is that there is nothing about whether Canada will finally join the U.S. program for North American ballistic missile defence, which has been a top NORAD priority for some time because of the lethal long-range capabilities that North Korea, Russia and China have been acquiring.

After consulting for months with all kinds of Canadians, all that the paper has to say about BMD is that Canada is committed to modernizing its overall contribution to NORAD.

There is also no clarity on the jet fighter procurement muddle. The paper announced that Canada now needs 88 new fighter jets, rather than 65, as the Tories had it. If this is the number of new jets that the RCAF actually gets, it will be good for Canada, NORAD and NATO. But there is no explanation about what represents a multibillion-dollar shift in policy or about when those new aircraft might actually join the fleet.

There is also nothing about how these new jets will fit in with the Liberals’ ill-considered plan to spend as much as $7 billion on an interim purchase of 18 Boeing Super Hornet jets that almost nobody in the military community in Canada or elsewhere understands the justification for.

What may be happening in slow motion is that the government is laying the groundwork to bail out of the sole-source Super Hornet interim buy in favour of a competition for a much larger number of aircraft. Almost all of Canada’s allies inside and outside NATO have decided on the much newer Lockheed Martin F-35. Germany and Poland are the latest countries to seriously consider buying the F-35, leaving Canada in awkward isolation with a short-term plan to buy the much older, less capable Super Hornet.

Other than the smart, multi-coloured brochure announcing the new policy, the most impressive thing about Wednesday’s announcement was that the numbers being thrown around were bigger than anyone expected. Special Forces is a prime example. This secretive lethal part of the military is to get an additional 605 badly needed troops for critical missions. And there is a guarantee of sorts that Canada will build 15 surface warships, after speculation that the number was going to shrink to as low as six because of ballooning costs.

There is also an acceptance of the realities of modern warfare with talk of more resources for drones, cyber warfare and intelligence, as well as predictable words about the need for greater diversity and gender equality.

The Defence Policy Review was not written only for Canadians, of course. It is designed to answer serious questions that Washington and NATO have about Ottawa’s commitment to collective security.

In this regard there is some fancy — some might say fanciful — bookkeeping so that it can be claimed that Canada will eventually spend 1.4 per cent of GDP on defence, though this is still far short of the pledge that it and every NATO country has made to spend two per cent of GDP on defence. Part of the way the government plans to reach 1.4 per cent is to throw into the calculation some of the money that is spent on the Coast Guard, the RCMP and pensions for soldiers and, if it was understood correctly, for DND civilians.

How much of this new arithmetic will be accepted by NATO, the U.S. and other allies is anyone’s guess. Still, the feel-good factor was high Wednesday. If history is any guide, a lot of the promises made in the Defence Policy Review will never be kept. Canadians should have the answer to that in about 2026.


(https://Army.ca/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fwpmedia.news.nationalpost.com%2F2017%2F06%2Fdefence-spending.png&hash=e877eaebbbebd0521f3f8c5349e19eea)
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Humphrey Bogart on June 08, 2017, 16:35:10
Isn't that completely different?

CSE Mandate, as defined in the National Defence Act:

Quote
CSE’s mandate and authorities are defined in the National Defence Act, which requires CSE to do three things:

a.  to acquire and use information from the global information infrastructure for the purpose of providing foreign intelligence, in accordance with Government of Canada intelligence priorities;

b.  to provide advice, guidance and services to help ensure the protection of electronic information and of information infrastructures of importance to the Government of Canada;

c.  to provide technical and operational assistance to federal law enforcement and security agencies in the performance of their lawful duties.

So, we've got an organization that is administered by National Defence, has National Defence assets (CFS Leitrim/CFS Alert/CFS Masset/CFB Gander) already supporting it, already looks after Cyber Defence for the Govt of Canada and is responsible for all SIGINT collection, yet we deem it necessary to stand up an entirely new command with a very narrow scope? 

A cyber operator is only as good as the computing power they have at their disposal.  CSEC is in possession of one of the most powerful supercomputers in the world in their new billion dollar HQ in Ottawa, want to do actual offensive cyber operations?  You need to use a computer like that, is the CAF going to have a billion dollar computer at its disposal to conduct military operations?  Especially Offensive Ones.

A proper Denial of Service Attack takes a lot of computing power, especially if you want to bring down someone elses system.

In other words, I feel like we throw the word Cyber around a lot in the Defence Review, without having much of a clue as to what it all means.



Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MCG on June 08, 2017, 16:37:13
A proper Denial of Service Attack takes a lot of computing power, especially if you want to bring down someone elses system.
That is why you use zombies.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Humphrey Bogart on June 08, 2017, 16:41:12
That is why you use zombies.

Where do we get the Zombies though?  Also, would the Canadian Government be willing to infect a bunch of random computers with Trojans and use them in a DoS attack?  Sounds kind of illegal to me and probably wouldn't pass the G&M test.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Eye In The Sky on June 08, 2017, 16:59:48
I can't understand why we need a "Cyber Command"? 

For the same reason we *needed* Int Command?  8)
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: milnews.ca on June 08, 2017, 17:01:15
And what's the message o' the day?
Care to guess how different each news release is?  #InfoMachineBoilerplateRulz
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Eye In The Sky on June 08, 2017, 17:25:55
So, out of all the talking and posturing, what deliverables are happening during this current governments term?  Anything other than CANSOF DEUs?
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Colin P on June 08, 2017, 17:37:34
Where do we get the Zombies though?  Also, would the Canadian Government be willing to infect a bunch of random computers with Trojans and use them in a DoS attack?  Sounds kind of illegal to me and probably wouldn't pass the G&M test.

You be able to spot the infection as being Canadian it will say "Please may I take over your computer"
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Blackadder1916 on June 08, 2017, 17:45:22
You be able to spot the infection as being Canadian it will say "Please may I take over your computer, eh"

FTFY
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jmt18325 on June 08, 2017, 17:50:16
So, out of all the talking and posturing, what deliverables are happening during this current governments term?  Anything other than CANSOF DEUs?

Since there is a substantial funding increase (about 10%) this year, it seems that there has to be something.  There is also predicted to be a jump of capital expenditures from 10% of last year's budget (less than $2B) to almost 20% this year (more than $4B).  I'm not sure what they're buying though.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Chris Pook on June 08, 2017, 17:58:10
Quote
The $26 billion set aside to build 15 warships will be increased to the $60 billion it is estimated it will actually cost to build them.

Per John Ivison above.....

60,000,000,000 for 15 ships

Ugly news - 4,000,000,000 per ship 

Looking from the other side for possibilities

Given the nature of Canadian defence budgeting as I under stand it, which means that those ship "projects" include weapons systems, sensors and munitions .....

Could that unseemly price for ships include 6 (+/-) ships of the Aegis or similar type armed with RIM-161 Standard SM3 missiles?

And if 2 Task Forces of a JSS and 2 to 4 CSCs and an SSK (maybe)  how would a fleet of 2x JSS, 4-6 CSC-AAD, 6-9 CSC-GP(ASW), 2-3 CSC-C&S, and 4x SSKs be received?

Especially with 5-6 AOPS covered by Sats, RPAS-MALES, Xx LRPAs and 88x CFXX?

And an Army leaning "Lt" with a GBAD capability and the CF with a useful SOF capability?

All with reasonable C4ISR and Log?

Existing helo and air transport.  No new sea transport.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jmt18325 on June 08, 2017, 18:12:52
$60B is not construction costs.  As someone here (forgive me, I don't remember who) stated, the actual cost of building the ships would be more like $1.2B, which is in line with what many of our allies pay.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Chris Pook on June 08, 2017, 18:14:38
$60B is not construction costs.  As someone here (forgive me, I don't remember who) stated, the actual cost of building the ships would be more like $1.2B, which is in line with what many of our allies pay.

I guess I am not only thick but also unclear.....
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Loachman on June 08, 2017, 18:18:10
For the same reason we *needed* Int Command?  8)

More special commands, more special dress uniforms.

Does Bombardier own Logistik?
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: dapaterson on June 08, 2017, 18:21:44
I guess I am not only thick but also unclear.....

Lifecycle costing: development, acquisition, lifetime operation, overhaul, decommissioning and scrapping.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jmt18325 on June 08, 2017, 18:28:17
I guess I am not only thick but also unclear.....

Me too.  The PBO report is what they used: http://www.pbo-dpb.gc.ca/web/default/files/Documents/Reports/2017/CSC%20Costing/CSC_EN.pdf It sheds some light on this.  I don't know where the 1.2B figure came from.  In here the figure looks to be closer to $1.5B.  As you can see from the report, only about $27B is construction related costs.  The rest is development, maintenance, supply, and probably lifecycle related costs.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Humphrey Bogart on June 08, 2017, 19:04:55
My limited understanding is that CSEC is focused on the detection/protection stuff (all open source, that), so to me, it makes sense that if an offensive capability is ramped up, some military know-how would be useful to mix into the technical expertise already there, no?

Sounds a bit like this is part of the larger "do we train SME's to be  troops too (http://taskandpurpose.com/army-wants-recruit-cyber-experts-hiring-civilians-rank-colonel/), or get soldiers to learn enough to guide the SME's?" debate.

The thing is, those denial and protection systems can also be used to conduct offensive operations as well, a computer is a computer.

CSEC can most definitely do offensive operations, whether they do, nobody here knows for sure. 

The use of botnets (zombies) is really the poor mans answer to super computers. 

Comparing it to an electricity grid, it's the equivalent of using a six meter tall stack of batteries covering an entire football field in lieu of one large baseload powerplant to power an entire city for one night.  This would also cost more than said powerplant. 

Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Oldgateboatdriver on June 08, 2017, 19:42:40
Me too.  The PBO report is what they used: http://www.pbo-dpb.gc.ca/web/default/files/Documents/Reports/2017/CSC%20Costing/CSC_EN.pdf It sheds some light on this.  I don't know where the 1.2B figure came from.  In here the figure looks to be closer to $1.5B.  As you can see from the report, only about $27B is construction related costs.  The rest is development, maintenance, supply, and probably lifecycle related costs.

It was I who developed the 1.2 B$ figure as follows: The PBO does not distinguish versions of the CSC's. Using the cost of  Type 45/Horizon class/Hobbart Air defence destroyers as baseline, which is 4 B$ each, and considering Canada plans to acquire three such versions of the CSC, I took their total price, 12B$, away from the total 27B$ amount. This left me with 15B$ for the remaining 12 GP/ASW versions, therefore 1.2B$ each of those.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Thucydides on June 08, 2017, 23:08:34
The thing is, those denial and protection systems can also be used to conduct offensive operations as well, a computer is a computer.

CSEC can most definitely do offensive operations, whether they do, nobody here knows for sure. 

The use of botnets (zombies) is really the poor mans answer to super computers. 

Comparing it to an electricity grid, it's the equivalent of using a six meter tall stack of batteries covering an entire football field in lieu of one large baseload powerplant to power an entire city for one night.  This would also cost more than said powerplant.

Botnets have a few advantages over a dedicated cloud or supercomputer data centre, however.

1: You don't lose your own capabilities when a botnet is activated, rather you are harvesting the latent power of hundreds to millions of other people's computers

2: You can set up botnets outside of your own geographical boundaries. Want to have real fun? Establish a botnet in every computer in Iran and then unleash it. Where do you think all attention is going to turn?

3: For other do it yourself applications, you could potentially set up botnets in your own organization. The thousands of computers on the desks of every CF office represent insane amounts of computer power that isn't being used (the millions of .ppt presentations could easily be made on 486 machines), so activating them with our own botnets and running them when most people are out of the office represents a viable use of existing resources. There would have to be masking protocols to disguise the offensive use of this botnet, although the same applies if a supercomputer cluster running in some data centre is being used. A defensive botnet is an interesting idea, running tens of thousands of DND computers to sanitize networks may be a defence task at some future date.

4: Like more conventional cloud computing, botnets utilize and release resources as needed. Amazon will rent you hundreds to thousands of "cores" if you need some heavy duty computing on a temporary basis. Internal botnets could be used to run heavy duty programs like the IBM "Watson" if you don't need answers in real time like a game show contestant, which is once again a viable use of the thousands of computers that DND already has on desktops.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: milnews.ca on June 09, 2017, 03:57:58
Like the song says, "on the road again" ...
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MilEME09 on June 09, 2017, 13:11:05
The fact that they are doing the nation wide tour to sell the plan is a positive sign.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Dimsum on June 09, 2017, 16:01:25
The fact that they are doing the nation wide tour to sell the plan is a positive sign.

Or that it's good optics to explain/sell the plan to a bunch of people that are generally cynical about these things (like on this forum, *ahem*).  I think one of their lessons learned is that they will be scruitinized by us, more so than the general public, to a massive extent, so might as well put their best foot forward. 

Town Halls for everyone!  Who gets to be the designated "question-asker"?
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Altair on June 09, 2017, 17:33:33
So if the LPC actually manage to provide the biggest funding increase to the CAF in decades, does that change people's viewpoint on the party or no?
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Colin P on June 09, 2017, 17:47:27
So if the LPC actually manage to provide the biggest funding increase to the CAF in decades, does that change people's viewpoint on the party or no?

When a hooker tells you "I love you long time Johnny" do you believe her as well?
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Loachman on June 09, 2017, 18:28:36
So if the LPC actually manage to provide the biggest funding increase to the CAF in decades, does that change people's viewpoint on the party or no?

No.

I've seen too many hollow promises, especially Liberal hollow promises, over too many decades to believe any of this.

No.

Not even if every single thing that they promise in that defence budget actually comes to pass.

Even the most vile serial-killing rapist can do a good deed once, yet still remains a vile serial-killing rapist.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: George Wallace on June 09, 2017, 19:29:33
No.

I've seen too many hollow promises, especially Liberal hollow promises, over too many decades to believe any of this.

No.

Not even if every single thing that they promise in that defence budget actually comes to pass.

Even the most vile serial-killing rapist can do a good deed once, yet still remains a vile serial-killing rapist.

I think that you will find all who have experienced the last three or four decades of "promises" will have the same opinion, especially when it comes to the Trudeau Dynasty.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Altair on June 09, 2017, 19:31:15
No.

I've seen too many hollow promises, especially Liberal hollow promises, over too many decades to believe any of this.

No.

Not even if every single thing that they promise in that defence budget actually comes to pass.

Even the most vile serial-killing rapist can do a good deed once, yet still remains a vile serial-killing rapist.
Ok then.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jollyjacktar on June 09, 2017, 19:47:07
I think that you will find all who have experienced the last three or four decades of "promises" will have the same opinion, especially when it comes to the Trudeau Dynasty.

 :goodpost:
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Loachman on June 09, 2017, 20:12:21
Ok then.

And I'd only be slightly less sceptical of the same promises if they issued from a Conservative government.

I was stationed in Lahr when MND Perrin Beattie visited a couple of times while formulating the last Conservative white paper. He came to the Mess for Happy Hour and spoke with us, informally and at length. He asked intelligent, well-thought-out questions, listened intently, then responded with further intelligent, well-thought-out questions, and sought our suggestions. He seemed far more open and genuine than any other politician that I have ever met.

Actually, he was the only politician that I have ever met who displayed any shred of openness and genuineness, and I've met a few.

I participated in all of the dog-and-pony shows put on by 4 CMBG for all of the MPs that visited during the development of that white paper, generally flying them from the Airfield (where the operational units were located) to the Kaserne (where the HQs - CFE and 4 CMBG - and the Canex, with its most excellent and cheap Duty Free Shop, were located), or the other way, in my Trusty Kiowa. Those flying from the Kaserne to the Airfield were all clutching several white Canex bags each. That may have been the prime motivation for many of them.

We were quite impressed by the white paper when it appeared, especially by Mr Beattie's note in the foreword about speaking with us. I still have my copy in a box somewhere. We thought many of its promises impractical and too expensive: up to twelve nuclear-powered submarines capable of patrolling under our ice, two or three hundred tanks, and a metric buttload of other fancy equipment. Even a fraction of that kit would have been nice, though.

I was still in Lahr a year or so later, when Mr Beattie was moved to another portfolio and everything was suddenly cancelled.

CFLH - the Kiowa replacement - escaped cancellation for a extra day. Somebody almost missed it.

I might believe this version after the kit and people have been delivered, if the right kit is bought from the right suppliers for the right reasons, and the right people are in the right places (operational and support units rather than more and/or more bloated HQs).

Maybe.

Perhaps.

Until then, empty words are just empty words.

It's better than the expected savaging.

Maybe.

Perhaps.

But that may be on its way in another couple of years.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Target Up on June 09, 2017, 20:25:01
Ah yes, the heady days of white papers and 20% pay hikes all around.  I still get the same giddy feeling every time PM Awesome and MinDef Swell want to magic up zillions of dollars... I wonder where they're going to come from?  Anyone for an enhanced oxygen tax? Joggers beware.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Thucydides on June 09, 2017, 22:21:12
So if the LPC actually manage to provide the biggest funding increase to the CAF in decades, does that change people's viewpoint on the party or no?

Well since the reason for the funding increase was a certain Mr Donald J Trump, I am looking at one party with a much greater amount of respect.  ;)
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Eye In The Sky on June 09, 2017, 23:14:59
The fact that they are doing the nation wide tour to sell the plan is a positive sign.
:rofl:
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: PuckChaser on June 09, 2017, 23:44:06
I really want to sit down with the "policy" document and compare previously announced spending to what's included in here before making full comment. However my first impression is that this is significantly less than a transformational and far-reaching policy that the Canadian public was led to believe. It reads more like CFDS and simply throws money at problems.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Old EO Tech on June 09, 2017, 23:58:00
I really want to sit down with the "policy" document and compare previously announced spending to what's included in here before making full comment. However my first impression is that this is significantly less than a transformational and far-reaching policy that the Canadian public was led to believe. It reads more like CFDS and simply throws money at problems.

For that matter, if you look at the tasks that the CAF has in this policy, they are not that different from the CFDS, or the 1993 White Paper on Defence for that matter...only the proposed cash is different.  And for that I will reserve judgement until FY 18/19 when the first 1.2B is supposed to be allocated.  Time will tell.

Jon
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Chris Pook on June 10, 2017, 02:46:13
https://youtu.be/MA2hk_CIZeo
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Underway on June 10, 2017, 10:58:10
Doing some random spitball maths here.  DND is expecting a 6% pay increase for end of June retroactive back a till April 2014 IIRC.  6% of 18 billion is approx 1 billion.  Half the CAF budget is pay.  So as far as I can tell any increases in the defence budget for this year will go almost entirely to pay for the pay increase both current and retroactive.

So basically there is a pay increase, so we'll sell it like we are helping the CAF.  I might be entirely off base with that, and I understand that next year the pay increase will not have as many retroactive accounts to settle, but for this year not to much new money that is usable.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jollyjacktar on June 10, 2017, 11:09:08
Speak for yourself, I'll find the raise usable.    :nod:
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: George Wallace on June 10, 2017, 11:39:12
Doing some random spitball maths here.  DND is expecting a 6% pay increase for end of June retroactive back a till April 2014 IIRC.  6% of 18 billion is approx 1 billion.  Half the CAF budget is pay.  So as far as I can tell any increases in the defence budget for this year will go almost entirely to pay for the pay increase both current and retroactive.

So basically there is a pay increase, so we'll sell it like we are helping the CAF.  I might be entirely off base with that, and I understand that next year the pay increase will not have as many retroactive accounts to settle, but for this year not to much new money that is usable.

I think you are catching on to the reality of these promises.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Brad Sallows on June 10, 2017, 12:19:58
>So if the LPC actually manage to provide the biggest funding increase to the CAF in decades, does that change people's viewpoint on the party or no?

No.  My opinion already acknowledges all of the acquisitions and improvements that were, in fact, initiated and delivered by past Liberal governments.  Also, consider that "people" are not necessarily single-issue voters.

Regardless of the aspirational statements (which are all budgets really are), I'll need to see it in the accounting facts.  This could all end up on the Corps 86 shelf.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Chris Pook on June 10, 2017, 15:14:26
OK - Disclaimers

I am not an accountant.
I just end up fighting with them for fun and profit.

Pulling up the CFDS paper's numbers, the numbers that Brad pointed to and the new numbers I come up with the attached spreadsheet.

The spreadsheet covers the period from 1987 to 2037
History is available from 1987 to 2016
Harper's plan covers 2008 to 2028
Trudeau's plan covers 2017 to 2037.
Harper's delivery is available in the history from 2008 to 2016 leaving 12 years of his plan at the discretion of future governments
Trudeau's history is only available for one year and I assume that the working plan for comparison was Harper's Plan.

Trudeau has now published his plan.

First, some changes - always fun.  Trudeau has redefined terms.  Instead of Personnel, Readiness, Maintenance, Capital and Infrastructure the emphasis is now on Capital and Operations - operations to include crewing and staffing (ie personnel?).  Also, the scope of the accrual budget has changed. 

For the amateur, (me) this makes it interesting when trying to find apples to compare with my oranges.

Somethings do stick out though.

Harper budgeted 490 BCAD to fund his DND for 20 years (2008 to 2028)
Trudeau is budgeting 497 BCAD to fund his DND for 20 years (2017 to 2037) on an accrual basis or 553 BCAD on a cash basis.  Is this an increase or isn't it?  Allowing for inflation etc?  I leave that to the experts to inform me.

On the Capital front Harper budgeted 60 BCAD as a 20 year accrual for capital gear.
Trudeau, on entering, and in my view maintaining the equipment standard of the Canada First Defence Strategy with the exception of adding 33% more fighters (65 to 88) has determined that:

He needs to increase Harper's capital accrual by 5.9 BCAD.  Given that the Harper accrual was 60 BCAD and the new accrual for existing projects is 74.2 BCAD can only assume that Harper increased his accrual from 60 BCAD to 68.3 BCAD (a 14% overage) to which Trudeau has added his new 5.9 BCAD.  That means that projects costed in the 2006-2008 timeframe are now expected to cost about 25% more than originally anticipated. 

In addition he is accruing an additional 33.8 BCAD over the next 20 years to fund 52 critical new capital projects. 

That brings his Capital Accrual up to 108 BCAD over the 2017  to 2037  period.

However........

Many of those new projects replace existing capabilities.  In my opinion those capabilities would likely be maintained regardless of the government in power.  Therefore any government, confronted with a capital envelope that terminated in 2028 would have find new money to fund those capabilities for the 9 years between 2028 and 2037.

In the same vein, when the government says it will not need cash for capital projects beyond 2028 ..... I have my doubts.

Partisan source.  Mileage may vary.

On the plus side - where the Opposition used to find it appropriate to big up number yugely in order to make the Government look bad the Government now finds it expedient to big up numbers yugely to make the Government look good.  IMHO the numbers are pretty much the same.  But that's just me.

An amateur.   :cheers:




Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: QV on June 10, 2017, 17:39:26
Wait, didn't Canada have about 130 CF18s? And due to life cycling/loss there are only 60 or 70 remaining.... so how is getting 88 planes an increase if our original number was 130+?  Unless we are keeping the old 18s flying also....

In years ahead our fighter inventory will be 12... buts ok because they will be 7th gen!



Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Chris Pook on June 10, 2017, 17:53:12
My idea of the perfect defence system:

Anything that will Zot the miscreant in front of me anytime I want and doesn't cost anything.

I don't know how many fighters that requires.

 :cheers:
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: RomeoJuliet on June 10, 2017, 19:17:22
My idea of the perfect defence system:

Anything that will Zot the miscreant in front of me anytime I want and doesn't cost anything.

I don't know how many fighters that requires.

 :cheers:
This says it all. Good post.


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: milnews.ca on June 10, 2017, 20:28:56
My idea of the perfect defence system:

Anything that will Zot the miscreant in front of me anytime I want and doesn't cost anything.
That certainly makes for an accurate, brief & clear project outline  ;D
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Old Sweat on June 10, 2017, 22:49:48
That certainly makes for an accurate, brief & clear project outline  ;D

Especially if you add "I get the option of shooting first."
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Loachman on June 11, 2017, 08:48:24
Wait, didn't Canada have about 130 CF18s? And due to life cycling/loss there are only 60 or 70 remaining.... so how is getting 88 planes an increase if our original number was 130+?

We had three operational squadrons in Germany, with a total of 54 machines. Those squadrons were deactivated, along with 4CMBG, after we won the Cold War and we cashed in the "peace dividend".
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Eye In The Sky on June 11, 2017, 12:55:43
Wait, didn't Canada have about 130 CF18s? And due to life cycling/loss there are only 60 or 70 remaining.... so how is getting 88 planes an increase if our original number was 130+?  Unless we are keeping the old 18s flying also....

In years ahead our fighter inventory will be 12... buts ok because they will be 7th gen!

We replaced a fleet of 33 Argus MPAs with 18 Aurora MPS...which are now down to 14 total (that's not 14 fliers at any given point).

We replaced the old 77 and 46? set radios with less when they were replaced with the TCCCS stuff.

*Do more with less*  It's the expectation AND reality.  *Well, we only have 70 or 80 CF-18s left now, and we're doing fine.  We don't need more than that.*

The original plan for F35s was 65 airframes wasn't it?
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: suffolkowner on June 11, 2017, 14:11:23
I think the 88 fighters derive from the 65 fighters to provide 36 for NORAD the remaining 23 allow 12 for NATO and other expeditionary engagements
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Oldgateboatdriver on June 11, 2017, 15:33:48
We replaced a fleet of 33 Argus MPAs with 18 Aurora MPS...which are now down to 14 total (that's not 14 fliers at any given point).

We replaced the old 77 and 46? set radios with less when they were replaced with the TCCCS stuff.

*Do more with less*  It's the expectation AND reality.  *Well, we only have 70 or 80 CF-18s left now, and we're doing fine.  We don't need more than that.*

The original plan for F35s was 65 airframes wasn't it?

You are being kind, EITS.

When the Aurora came on line, we still had 20-25 Trackers operating from shore facilities. While nowhere near the capacities of the Aurora, they nevertheless were useful in coastal surveillance, sovereignty and fisheries patrol and to that extent, increased the capacity that the Aurora's alone would have provided.

These duties are now all carried out by the Aurora fleet. Sure, the Trackers were retired as the cold war wrapped up so, their duties were picked up by the Aurora community at the same time as counter-soviet ASW operations scaled right down.

I shudder to think, however, where your community would be tomorrow if the Russians decided to scale up their submarine ops in the Atlantic and Pacific to even half the level of the cold-war ops.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MarkOttawa on June 11, 2017, 17:08:44
The cyber side, major post at Lux et Umbra Blog:

Quote
Canadian Forces to get offensive cyber capability — but questions remain
https://luxexumbra.blogspot.ca/2017/06/canadian-forces-to-get-offensive-cyber.html

Mark
Ottawa
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Blair Gilmore on June 11, 2017, 17:36:15
I got to sit in on MP Scott Brison's recent talk about the Defence Policy at the CFB Halifax MFRC. The Liberals are fanning out across the country and making all the right noises about the new plans. MND will be probably speaking about the new ships when he addresses the sailors on Monday here in Halifax. Mr. Brison had good thoughts about having the backs of the military and admitted that the transition process has let former service members down in the past. The personnel portion of the policy certainly has good things planned to help members and their families. You can read more about what the MP had to say at the following link:

http://www.happydiver.space/?p=452
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Eye In The Sky on June 11, 2017, 19:18:51

I shudder to think, however, where your community would be tomorrow if the Russians decided to scale up their submarine ops in the Atlantic and Pacific to even half the level of the cold-war ops.

My father is a retired Cold War *VP* type.  We've chatted about the caps they had then with the 30+ airframe fleet (that had 24+ hour endurance routinely) compared to the 14 total fleet of today with *less than 18 hour* endurance.  But, hey, ASW is dead don't you know??

http://www.defensenews.com/articles/russia-adds-kazan-to-its-nuclear-attack-submarine-fleet

Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: luttrellfan on June 11, 2017, 20:51:20
Good Evening everyone,

This new Defence Policy proposal that just came out surprised me with what the government has planned for the military. Although nothing is set in stone I would like to touch on the point where the Government wants to increase the amount of personnel in the Reg. and Reserve force. I wondering with all the "In demand"  trades (according to the Forces website) we have, would the standards on the aptitude tests be dropped a bit to help attract more people for those jobs?
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: PuckChaser on June 11, 2017, 21:04:22
God I hope not. I'd rather we have empty spots than people who cannot pass a fairly easy CFAT.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Thucydides on June 11, 2017, 21:37:12
People, please.

There have been a multitude of White papers and policy documents which promised much but delivered nothing. I don't want to hear Liberal talking heads, I want to see the certified cheques going to suppliers and contractors, and see the newly recruited servicemembers filling the empty files. I want to see trucks and AFV's in the hangers and parking lots, boots in the QM shelves (and on soldier's feet), ships at the quay or at sea and aircraft on the aprons.

Anything else is empty words.

And history and past performance is on the side of the second outcome.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MCG on June 11, 2017, 22:00:42
So, as a member of the profession of arms, it is not my place to comment on the ability/willingness/probability of one political party or another to follow through with its promises.  But, I can comment what those promises mean for national defence.  I know that some people will become violently ill if they do not spin a topic into partisan vitriol, but let's give the purely professional examination a try.  Without mention on Liberals or Conservatives (or any derogatory slang in-lieu) can we discuss the defence merits and shortfalls of the policy itself?

Then if (improbably) everyone agrees that the plan is right, the skeptics and practically minded can shift focus to the question of how to keep the government on track to achieve its promises.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Eland2 on June 11, 2017, 22:04:29
My personal thoughts on the new Defence Policy are a mixed bag. On the one hand, more support for soldiers, their families and veterans is a good thing. On the other, I'm scratching my head over why we need reservists functioning as linguists. I mean, wouldn't this be a function better allocated to regular force intelligence units?

As to having reservists take on light urban SAR duties - wouldn't this kind of tasking be better and more cheaply handled by civilians? Maybe stand up a civilian-operated Civil Defence Corps like they have in Ireland to handle this sort of thing, and then augment it with trained reservists if and when conditions dictate?

While there's a lot that's good about the plan, I have substantial reservations. For starters, there seems to be a lot of fluff, puffery, deliberate vagueness and smoke and mirrors going on.

The Canadian Surface Combatant plan for the RCN and fighter jet purchases are already more or less capitalized, so there's really nothing new here, even though the Defence Plan tries to present it as new. The same holds true of the LAV fleet upgrades, which have already been capitalized and have been an ongoing process for some time now.

Armed drones are a good idea. Not only can they be used for offensive purposes if needed, they can also be used as recce/surveillance platforms in peacekeeping/peace-support operations. Restoring the air-defence assets we lost almost two decades ago is a good idea as well.

The other problem I have with the plan is the way it's costed. The official version of the plan seems to indicate that near the end of the plan, spending will rise to approximately 1.4% of GDP. But if you account for the effects of inflation, which erodes the time-value of money, the net result is that we will be barely spending more than 1% of GDP in real dollars and possibly less mid-way through the life of the plan and beyond. In this regard, the document is starting to look a lot like 'how to look like you're spending more money without actually spending it'.

The bottom line is that outside of the fighter jets, the new frigates/destroyers, the armed drones and LAV fleet upgrades, I'm not seeing any major, tangible advancements in the CF's combat capability through the new spending plan. I'm seeing a lot of stand-pat and nibbling around the edges. 

That is, where are the replacements for the CP-140 Auroras? What about replacements for the aging C3 howitzers, the LG1 105mm guns and existing 81mm mortar systems? Where are the anti-tank assets? Will the MCDVs be replaced along with that dog's breakfast fleet of subs we have?

How about a few more tanks so we don't have to cannibalize the 40-odd Leo 2A4 tanks that haven't been upgraded and are relegated to training purposes, if the crap hits the fan somewhere and we have to do a major combat deployment? And how about a competent recce vehicle instead of the TAPV, which really isn't designed to do recce? What about buying one or two Mistral-type LHD ships so we can rapidly deploy special forces and infantry and support them? And what, no attack helicopters?

I think the Senate Committee on Defence had the right idea when it recommended buying 12 new subs in addition to the projected 15 surface combatant ships and buying approximately 24 attack helicopters. 12 subs would go a long way toward making our small navy relatively powerful and a credible deterrent.

I'd go a bit further and suggest adding two nuclear-powered subs to patrol the arctic sea-lanes. With extensive automation and smaller crews characterizing a lot of modern subs, you wouldn't need to recruit a large number of sailors to operate the 12 subs that have been recommended. Although you would need a pretty substantial infrastructure to maintain them, and this would probably entail having to make CFB Esquimalt and CFB Halifax half again as large as they are now if not twice so.

As to defence policy overall, the only thing I support are general purpose, combat-capable forces that can be deployed anywhere in Canada in sufficient and credible numbers, and have the ability to meaningfully support and participate in NATO missions.

Peacekeeping is nice, but it's a luxury in today's threat environment. I've always had the idea that if you have general-purpose combat-capable forces, you can do peacekeeping, but if you have a peacekeeping-only force, you can't take on combat missions and be successful.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: suffolkowner on June 11, 2017, 22:18:15
Eland I see
1. 15 CSC's
2. 2 JSS
3. 5-6 AOPS
4. modernize Victoria class
5. 88 new fighters
6. CP-140 replacement
7. AAR CC-150 replacement
8. Twin Otter replacement
9. purchase of UAV's
10. Light forces modernization
11. LAV upgrade
12. GBAD addition
13. Arctic mobility enhancements
14. replace armoured combat support vehicles
15. modernize logistic and heavy engineering vehicles

I think there were supposed to be 18 so I'm missing some
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jmt18325 on June 11, 2017, 22:52:21
16. Modernized CH-146
17. Modernized CH-149
18. New ground based air defence systems.

To the person you were responding to - it would be a good idea to read the plan before criticizing it, I'd say.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Thucydides on June 11, 2017, 23:06:07
Eland is quite right that some of the proposed "capabilities" are either very strange or could be done quite well (if not better) using civilian resources. This seems to be part of the smoke and mirrors approach to add things of dubious or even non defense purposes to the defense budget to provide the appearance of growing towards the 2% of GDP mark that NATO members are supposed to spend on defense.

There is also not any real rigorous analysis of what, exactly, the Canadian Armed Forces is supposed to do. That of course would require a detailed examination of what Canada's Grand Strategy should be, define our National Interests and then allocate manpower and resources to these tasks. My own handwave of this would suggest that Canada's Navy would be the big winner, followed by sufficient airpower to project meaningful amounts of force across continental or oceanic distances (covering Canada's arctic and projecting power overseas across the Atlantic or Pacific oceans). This also suggests the Army would be inverted, and regiments might only be built around one mechanized battalion and have two "light" battalions appropriately armed and equipped to move rapidly and deploy lethal force wherever they land (along with appropriate light support and enablers as well). Of course since I didn't really do much more than quickly prioritize overseas trade and freedom of passage as being key elements of the Grand Strategy and National Interest, the layout is very vague and sketchy at best.

I doubt this state of affairs won't change until there is a very substantial change in the mentality of our governing, academic and bureaucratic classes (or I become Imperator, which is much the same thing  ;))
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: FSTO on June 12, 2017, 00:13:56
Eland is quite right that some of the proposed "capabilities" are either very strange or could be done quite well (if not better) using civilian resources. This seems to be part of the smoke and mirrors approach to add things of dubious or even non defense purposes to the defense budget to provide the appearance of growing towards the 2% of GDP mark that NATO members are supposed to spend on defense.

There is also not any real rigorous analysis of what, exactly, the Canadian Armed Forces is supposed to do. That of course would require a detailed examination of what Canada's Grand Strategy should be, define our National Interests and then allocate manpower and resources to these tasks. My own handwave of this would suggest that Canada's Navy would be the big winner, followed by sufficient airpower to project meaningful amounts of force across continental or oceanic distances (covering Canada's arctic and projecting power overseas across the Atlantic or Pacific oceans). This also suggests the Army would be inverted, and regiments might only be built around one mechanized battalion and have two "light" battalions appropriately armed and equipped to move rapidly and deploy lethal force wherever they land (along with appropriate light support and enablers as well). Of course since I didn't really do much more than quickly prioritize overseas trade and freedom of passage as being key elements of the Grand Strategy and National Interest, the layout is very vague and sketchy at best.

I doubt this state of affairs won't change until there is a very substantial change in the mentality of our governing, academic and bureaucratic classes (or I become Imperator, which is much the same thing  ;))

For a government that is supposedly in tune with global warming and the plight of the 3rd world, the lack of shift towards the sea and the problems it will cause in the future is telling. No large flat deck ship that carries helicopters, landing craft, troops and equipment? That just shows a lack of imagination, foresight and strategic thinking that has bedeviled our governments since the Statute of Westminster.

IMHO of course.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Loachman on June 12, 2017, 01:25:07
God I hope not. I'd rather we have empty spots than people who cannot pass a fairly easy CFAT.

Or find the CFAT thread here on this Fine Site.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Loachman on June 12, 2017, 01:26:52
I want to see ... boots that don't fall apart or ruin people's feet in the QM shelves (and on soldier's feet
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Loachman on June 12, 2017, 01:31:31
http://www.ottawasun.com/2017/06/10/krayden-liberal-defence-review-is-as-durable-as-the-paper-its-printed-on

Krayden: Liberal defence review is as durable as the paper it’s printed on

David Krayden

First posted: Saturday, June 10, 2017 07:41 PM EDT | Updated: Saturday, June 10, 2017 07:49 PM EDT
 
Last week saw a pivotal moment in the life of Canada’s Liberal government. It achieved a profound moment of policy schizophrenia as it trumpeted a foreign policy on Tuesday that was undermined by a defence policy review on Wednesday.

Ultimately, however, both could be just the marijuana pipe dreams of a desultory government adrift in a sea of policy confusion.

Chrystia Freeland can be a credible foreign affairs minister, but there was not an air, but a stench of unreality to her House of Commons speech. She managed to exalt the soft power politics of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau while acknowledging the need for a credible military force to provide substance to the government’s rhetoric. The result was an exercise in muddled talking points, not consistent policy.

Her suggestions that Canada can no longer rely upon an America led by President Donald Trump and must therefore promulgate a defence policy and posture independent of the United States were false.

The first suggestion was merely wrong; the second assumption was ludicrous in the extreme.

The unveiling of the defence policy review the following day rectified those errors even as it  revealed a dangerous divide in the Liberal government between the people at foreign affairs and defence who don’t seem to be in direct communication with each other.

Reading the defence review, one is struck by how the tone of these documents changes very little from government to government, and this one, entitled Strong, Secure, Engaged, reads very much like a Conservative report in both tone and content. Unlike Freeland’s repudiation of the United States - or specifically the Trump administration - the policy review is ever mindful of Canada’s intimate defence relationship with the Americans and fully cognizant that Canada has not, cannot and will not ever provide for its defence needs without the co-operation of our closest ally.

That’s what’s good about this report. The fact that it also references $70 billion in extra defence spending over the next decade is also admirable, as are the promises to replace aging equipment, support military families, introduce cyber and intelligence functions within the military and increase the size of the regular force by 3,500.

Where this report fails is that it is essentially another trip through the Liberal fantasyland of defence procurement as the government - again - cruelly tempts and entices the Canadian Armed Forces with promises of money in the bank and equipment around the corner.
 
The Liberals might as well have promised $140 billion in new defence funding - and why not? When your promise takes a decade to unfold, it is a pledge that you can renege upon at any time.

Not only is it the height of arrogance for this government to assume it will be around for 10 years to implement this spending program, it illustrates the grand naïveté of any administration to think it can accurately predict how the world will look and what the military will need at the end of that decade.

Can you imagine how irrelevant a 10-year plan initiated in 1935 would have been in 1945? The world had changed almost beyond recognition.
Canadian governments have often played this wait-and-see game with national defence, proposing spending and planning projects that never comes to fruition.

It is time for governments to stop using our military for partisan ends. Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan had the opportunity to break that vile tradition last week. Despite his disgraced stature as a man who claimed to be the “architect” of battle in Afghanistan in which he was merely a participant, Sajjan is a former military member and he is capable to speaking soldier to soldier, sailor and airman.

Instead, he dragged 1,000 or more navy, army and Air Force personnel into the Cartier Drill Hall last week and forced them to listen to a blatantly political speech that lauded the Liberals’ unflinching support for defence and eviscerated the Conservatives for failing Canada’s military.

Sajjan knows that Canadian military is overwhelmingly Conservative in outlook and voting patterns, so he knows that statement would be received with a mixture of cynicism and disbelief.

For this defence policy review to become reality, it must be taken out of the hands of politicians and the funding needs to be not discretionary but a guaranteed budget that will be paid in annual instalments until the last dollar is spent.

Otherwise, this review is just another carpet that will be pulled from under the feet of the military men and women whenever the government deems it expedient or fiscally prudent to do so.

David Krayden is an Ottawa-based former Air Force public affairs officer and Parliament Hill communications manager.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: quadrapiper on June 12, 2017, 02:08:54
My personal thoughts on the new Defence Policy are a mixed bag. On the one hand, more support for soldiers, their families and veterans is a good thing. On the other, I'm scratching my head over why we need reservists functioning as linguists. I mean, wouldn't this be a function better allocated to regular force intelligence units?
Back door for civilian academic types, or keeping a surge capacity in a broad range of languages, beyond what's fiscally responsible in full time positions?
As to having reservists take on light urban SAR duties - wouldn't this kind of tasking be better and more cheaply handled by civilians? Maybe stand up a civilian-operated Civil Defence Corps like they have in Ireland to handle this sort of thing, and then augment it with trained reservists if and when conditions dictate?
Possibly this is being looked at as a task that can be a) effectively supported by the reserves, will b) allow some good interagency/photo-op/out in the public eye time, and c) will allow for greater variety in training at PRes units. Maybe also d) there's already CAF involvement in e.g. flooding (I know LUSAR as such is more broken buildings, but...) so might as well train to meet that task.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: George Wallace on June 12, 2017, 07:25:07
I want to see ....... boots that don't fall apart or ruin people's feet in the QM shelves (and on soldier's feet


Hard to do when those contracts are given out by Public Works to the LOWEST BIDDER, not the best manufacturer with the best quality product.  Decisions made by some penny pincher who has no idea of the real need, the real cost in the end, and does not care for the end user.  Saving five cents up front, but costing a dollar down the road, seems to the financial philosophy of these people......and perhaps the reason the Government can not balance its books properly.  A question I always seem to come back to when I wonder what our 'Financial Gurus' are teaching in our Business Schools and universities these days?
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MCG on June 12, 2017, 07:36:23
... would the standards on the aptitude tests be dropped a bit to help attract more people for those jobs?
God I hope not. I'd rather we have empty spots than people who cannot pass a fairly easy CFAT.
It would seem that both recruiting and retention requirements may be under consideration for review:
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/canadian-military-to-relax-deployment-readiness-rule/article35281256/

... but, if Cyber is the new example for a rising occupation where pers could enrol and never deploy, should we not actually be asking if cyber aught not to be a civilian vocation?
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MCG on June 12, 2017, 07:42:22
Hard to do when those contracts are given out by Public Works to the LOWEST BIDDER ...
Do you know this, or is your entire post an argument from the point of assumption?  Generally, lowest cost compliant has been a discouraged selection criteria for major projects as it is not seen to get good value.

Now, I am not arguing in defence of any particular boot.  But I will say we manage to screw up a lot of things ourselves without the "lowest cost compliant" bogeyman ever playing a role.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: George Wallace on June 12, 2017, 08:05:58
Do you know this, or is your entire post an argument from the point of assumption?

If you really want to nit pick; then, not being the actual purchasing agent, it is from the "point of assumption" taken from a long experience of seeing what kind of kit we have been handed over the years and off handed conversations with some people a little closer to the inner workings of those decision makers.

Numerous examples are out there.  I could point to the Iltis purchase.  I could point out the Leopard roadwheels manufactured in Canada and re-rubbered in Canada versus the roadwheels of German origin.  Or perhaps look at some of the construction being done on Bases across the country.  The range that one can cover, Ships to infrastructure to clothing to vehicles to aircraft......the whole spectrum; have examples of low bidders winning everywhere.  Added expense is added to undo or replace some of these products.   

Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Loachman on June 12, 2017, 08:24:44
Assumptions are not always correct, regardless of appearances.

Generally, lowest cost compliant has been a discouraged selection criteria for major projects as it is not seen to get good value.

Good. Has this helped?

I will say we manage to screw up a lot of things ourselves without the "lowest cost compliant" bogeyman ever playing a role.

Tac Vest.

Political decisions vice military ones come to mind as well.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Humphrey Bogart on June 12, 2017, 09:20:44
If you really want to nit pick; then, not being the actual purchasing agent, it is from the "point of assumption" taken from a long experience of seeing what kind of kit we have been handed over the years and off handed conversations with some people a little closer to the inner workings of those decision makers.

Numerous examples are out there.  I could point to the Iltis purchase.  I could point out the Leopard roadwheels manufactured in Canada and re-rubbered in Canada versus the roadwheels of German origin.  Or perhaps look at some of the construction being done on Bases across the country.  The range that one can cover, Ships to infrastructure to clothing to vehicles to aircraft......the whole spectrum; have examples of low bidders winning everywhere.  Added expense is added to undo or replace some of these products.

I happen to personally know the owner of the company that does this work.  Here is an interesting tidbit for you George, the rubber used isn't the best rubber but it is not the company doing this. 

Track pads and wheels use synthetic rubber instead of natural rubber.  The reason for this is because in WWII the Axis controlled nearly all the Worlds natural rubber supply.  There was a rubber shortage so it was mandated that track pads be made with synthetic rubber.

The problem is synthetic rubber is 4x the cost of natural rubber and has a lifespan that's a quarter that of synthetic rubber. 

He actually made a pitch to make track pads using natural rubber; however, the military refused to change their specs.  In the end, he is more than happy to take more money  ;D
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: George Wallace on June 12, 2017, 09:46:12
I happen to personally know the owner of the company that does this work.  Here is an interesting tidbit for you George, the rubber used isn't the best rubber but it is not the company doing this. 

Track pads and wheels use synthetic rubber instead of natural rubber.  The reason for this is because in WWII the Axis controlled nearly all the Worlds natural rubber supply.  There was a rubber shortage so it was mandated that track pads be made with synthetic rubber.

The problem is synthetic rubber is 4x the cost of natural rubber and has a lifespan that's a quarter that of synthetic rubber. 

He actually made a pitch to make track pads using natural rubber; however, the military refused to change their specs.  In the end, he is more than happy to take more money  ;D

...And we replaced roadwheels daily, if not more often, instead of weekly or longer.   [:(

We had roadwheels where the rubber actually caught fire (from the inside of rubber) in the middle of traces.  Roadwheels that may have been put on that very morning.  We then got very picky as to what the NSN were on the wheels.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Humphrey Bogart on June 12, 2017, 09:48:23
...And we replaced roadwheels daily, if not more often, instead of weekly or longer.   [:(

We had roadwheels where the rubber actually caught fire (from the inside of rubber) in the middle of traces.  Roadwheels that may have been put on that very morning.  We then got very picky as to what the NSN were on the wheels.

Yep, now if the military would get around to changing the specs, you could use natural rubber and only need to pound track once a week  ;D
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: George Wallace on June 12, 2017, 09:57:16
Yep, now if the military would get around to changing the specs, you could use natural rubber and only need to pound track once a week  ;D

But how would you keep Tankers fit?
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Bruce Monkhouse on June 12, 2017, 09:59:13
But how would you keep Tankers fit?

And somehow you typed that with a straight face. :stirpot:
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Humphrey Bogart on June 12, 2017, 10:01:00
And somehow you typed that with a straight face. :stirpot:

Round is a shape  ;D
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MilEME09 on June 12, 2017, 11:00:18
Round is a shape  ;D

The hatch is round, so shouldn't the soldier be round to fit?  >:D
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Humphrey Bogart on June 12, 2017, 11:15:38
The hatch is round, so shouldn't the soldier be round to fit?  >:D

Pear also works!  Who needs hatches when your love handles will catch you if you happen to get blown out of the turret  ;D

Also, You should always have a Reserve!  I think a nice beer belly fits the bill!
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Good2Golf on June 12, 2017, 14:06:12
That is quite the rag! Read this article too. It's a couple years old, but I doubt they have changed their mind since then. There are a few doozies in there.

"A Canadian Defence and Security Policy for the 21st Century"
http://www.ceasefire.ca/?p=20741 (http://www.ceasefire.ca/?p=20741)

Does anyone know in contrast to a "staggering $62B" [more] spent on defence in the next 20 years, what adjective would be used to describe the approximately $340B* spent on EI in the same period? ???

Regards
G2G

* - Annual Financial Report of the Government of Canada for Fiscal Year 2015–2016 (https://www.fin.gc.ca/afr-rfa/2016/report-rapport-eng.asp)
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: MCG on June 12, 2017, 15:30:03
Generally, lowest cost compliant has been a discouraged selection criteria for major projects as it is not seen to get good value.
Good. Has this helped?
Good question.  I don't know, but you will have seen its outputs.  It has been over a decade now that the philosophy in ADM(Mat) has been that lowest cost compliant is the wrong procurement method for new capabilities or major equipment.  Instead, they talk about "best value for money" which really boils down to recognizing that spending more to get something better often pays off in lower lifecycle costs, longer equipment relevance (ie. does not need to be replaced as soon), and/or greater operational capability.  So, we define the minimum compliance standard and then some calculus to compare cost and performance above minimum compliance across all proposals.  This will have made a difference both in the proposals that industry has packaged together in response to RFPs (they know they can get more money by offering something that exceeds the minimum requirements) and in the proposals that are eventually selected by the project team. 

However, I worry that we lack the professional competencies to always craft beneficial statements of requirement or cost-per-point selection criteria.  On the Army side, we send people to our requirements staff without having put them through technical staff training, and we have people with technical staff training who spend little to no time in requirements staff.  The RCEME capbage is seemingly believed to imbue the wearer great abilities in the field of capitol equipment procurement projects, when what we really need is expert civilian procurement project managers who take the outputs of the requirement staffs and then buy the things we need; the RCEME capbadges should focus on maintenance management (which could include in-service equipment management, and it should include inputs to requirement writing) and leave strategic purchasing to professionals in that field.

If you really want to nit pick...
No.  It is not nit picking to want to differentiate between some guy's assumptions and known facts when having an informed discussion.  This goes directly to the credibility, value and weight to be given to statements being made.  So, you made a blanket statement based on assumption but presented as though it were truth in order to segue into a broad-brush slagging of people that you don't even know. When a little light was shone onto the assumption, you doubled down with decades old examples (at least one going back to 4 CMBG and potentially both being linked to your lowest-cost conclusion by, again, an assumption) and threw-out "nit pick" to trivialize the distinction between facts vs "invented facts".   I too have had "conversations with some people a little closer to the inner workings of those decision makers" (in fact, for a brief period I was one of those people), and I have followed a few SITREPS through this site that indicated there were trials involved in the selection process that you have written off as just being handed to the lowest bidder.  Maybe one does not agree with the conclusion of those trials, but that is a different story.  Based on my observations it appears to me that the foundational premise, in your argument accusing "penny pinching" procurement officers of not caring for the troops, is probably wrong.  More so than malice, individual incompetencies and/or a dysfunctional system could be the driving factor(s) behind symptoms that you see.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Remius on June 12, 2017, 16:21:32
The adoption of Performance Based Contracting comes to mind.  How well it is being used or understood is another matter but other countries seem to be doing well by it.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: suffolkowner on June 12, 2017, 19:12:21
16. Modernized CH-146
17. Modernized CH-149
18. New ground based air defence systems.

To the person you were responding to - it would be a good idea to read the plan before criticizing it, I'd say.

i had the GBAD but missed the ISR platform to augment SOF, i wonder if they are thinking of king airs or maybe something more substantial based on the global express?

Do the Germans use natural rubber on their tanks?
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: Eye In The Sky on June 12, 2017, 22:01:07
ISR platform to augment SOF, i wonder if they are thinking of king airs or maybe something more substantial based on the global express?


http://army.ca/forums/index.php/topic,111835.0.html

MAISR project.
Title: Re: Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
Post by: jmt18325 on June 13, 2017, 01:08:38
i had the GBAD but missed the ISR platform to augment SOF, i wonder if they are thinking of king