Author Topic: Canadian Surface Combatant RFQ  (Read 489286 times)

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Offline GR66

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Re: Canadian Surface Combatant RFQ
« Reply #1100 on: August 21, 2018, 13:22:41 »
...
We don't need a ship to be able to counter this threat, because we don't have any real expectation of having to get into real combat, and we don't have the money or willpower to try and really prepare ourselves for that eventuality. Either we are going to avoid that conflict all together, or are we are going to expect the USN Air Wings to obliterate these vessels before they even get in range of our ships.

So, we don't need a ships that's optimized for modern combat,
...

These comments do sound a bit like they might fall into the "famous last words" category.

I would tend to agree though that anti-surface warfare may be among the least likely of the threats that we are likely to have to face in a future conflict (possibly outside an allied task force).

My personal opinion is that a far more likely scenario is that our primary role in any future major conflict will be the same as it was in both World Wars...working to ensure that the USA is able to project its military forces across the ocean to where they are needed to be.  In this case the larger threats are likely to be submarines and long range strike aircraft. 

The best counter to the aircraft threat may possibly be other aircraft due to their quicker reaction time and range (as well as attacks on the static airfields launching the aircraft) while the RCN, together with our MPAs will need to face the submarine threat.

That does raise the perpetual question though of quantity vs. quality in our fleet.  Is 15 CSCs enough to cover the area we may need them to cover, or is a return to the "Corvette Navy" model a better path forward (possibly including UUVs, etc.).

Offline LoboCanada

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Re: Canadian Surface Combatant RFQ
« Reply #1101 on: August 21, 2018, 15:21:16 »
These comments do sound a bit like they might fall into the "famous last words" category.

I would tend to agree though that anti-surface warfare may be among the least likely of the threats that we are likely to have to face in a future conflict (possibly outside an allied task force).

My personal opinion is that a far more likely scenario is that our primary role in any future major conflict will be the same as it was in both World Wars...working to ensure that the USA is able to project its military forces across the ocean to where they are needed to be.  In this case the larger threats are likely to be submarines and long range strike aircraft. 

The best counter to the aircraft threat may possibly be other aircraft due to their quicker reaction time and range (as well as attacks on the static airfields launching the aircraft) while the RCN, together with our MPAs will need to face the submarine threat.

That does raise the perpetual question though of quantity vs. quality in our fleet.  Is 15 CSCs enough to cover the area we may need them to cover, or is a return to the "Corvette Navy" model a better path forward (possibly including UUVs, etc.).

Agreed.

Although I feel like someone said the same thing about Bonnie. Do we really need an Aircraft Carrier or should we just get some smaller frigates/destroyers?

While I admit that I don't know **** about these things, I doubt being a 1 trick pony will help matters. What if the scenario isn't a repeat of our WW2 role? Although I am of the opinion that we should buy 1 for 1 AOPS to slowly replace the MCDVs. AOPS can be the new corvettes, and give us a big presence in the arctic should we chose to.

Offline Ashkan08

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Re: Canadian Surface Combatant RFQ
« Reply #1102 on: August 21, 2018, 15:57:13 »
These comments do sound a bit like they might fall into the "famous last words" category.

I would tend to agree though that anti-surface warfare may be among the least likely of the threats that we are likely to have to face in a future conflict (possibly outside an allied task force).

My personal opinion is that a far more likely scenario is that our primary role in any future major conflict will be the same as it was in both World Wars...working to ensure that the USA is able to project its military forces across the ocean to where they are needed to be.  In this case the larger threats are likely to be submarines and long range strike aircraft. 

The best counter to the aircraft threat may possibly be other aircraft due to their quicker reaction time and range (as well as attacks on the static airfields launching the aircraft) while the RCN, together with our MPAs will need to face the submarine threat.

That does raise the perpetual question though of quantity vs. quality in our fleet.  Is 15 CSCs enough to cover the area we may need them to cover, or is a return to the "Corvette Navy" model a better path forward (possibly including UUVs, etc.).

Maybe something like the Sigma corvette 9113 the Indonesian navy uses? Each one is about half the length of the Type 26.

https://products.damen.com/en/ranges/sigma-frigate-and-corvette/sigma-corvette-9113

Offline Colin P

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Re: Canadian Surface Combatant RFQ
« Reply #1103 on: August 21, 2018, 16:23:47 »
I don't think the RN foresaw having to project themselves and land an amphibious force, into the South Atlantic. We didn't foresee Canada being in a ground combat mission for nearly a decade and few people predicted the Russian navy pounding Syria with ship launch cruise missile from the Black and Mediterranean Sea. So basically we are really bad at predicting where the next real fight will be and what it will look like. What you have is what you will bring.

Offline Infanteer

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Re: Canadian Surface Combatant RFQ
« Reply #1104 on: August 21, 2018, 17:59:18 »
in my opinion, a blue water navy would have a very bad day in battle against a green-water navy comprised of dozens of small attack craft carrying numerous modern anti-ship missiles.

The jeune école still lives, I see.
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Offline Chris Pook

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Re: Canadian Surface Combatant RFQ
« Reply #1105 on: August 21, 2018, 19:29:07 »
So when we talk about "tried and true" existing solutions vs the Type 26 paper solution are we talking about the existing vessels or the Canadianized vessels being created for CSC competition?  And are we considering the likelihood that by the time the Irving yards start building the first unit the Brits, Aussies and probably even the Yanks will be sailing in them?
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Offline E.R. Campbell

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Re: Canadian Surface Combatant RFQ
« Reply #1106 on: August 21, 2018, 19:31:05 »
I don't think the RN foresaw having to project themselves and land an amphibious force, into the South Atlantic. We didn't foresee Canada being in a ground combat mission for nearly a decade and few people predicted the Russian navy pounding Syria with ship launch cruise missile from the Black and Mediterranean Sea. So basically we are really bad at predicting where the next real fight will be and what it will look like. What you have is what you will bring.


Ah, the "come-as-you-are war" ... the concept has been around for eons but I like to give credit to then General (later President) Dwight D Eisenhower who, when he was NATO's first SACEUR, said that he didn't want millions and millions of allied soldiers standing shoulder-to-shoulder and nose-to-nose against Warsaw Pact troops across the Inner-German Border ... he said that he wanted those millions and millions of young allied men and women to be working in factories, making automobiles and refrigerators and raising families in safe, secure homes. He wanted, Ike said, to have just enough highly skilled, well equipped forces to be a "trip-wire" which, if it ever was tripped, would trigger a massive, devastating (meaning nuclear) allied response that would secure a quick victory.

It is pretty clear that the come-as-you-are war was what Brooke Claxton had in mind when he made what still are the most monumental changes to Canadian military organizations ~ including Paul Hellyer's integration/unification schemes ~ beginning in 1949/50: Claxton made quite fundamental changes to Canada's military, demanding a professional, regular force backed up by a militia, breaking with centuries if tradition in which a small cadre of regulars helped to train and manage a large militia that could be mobilized when needed. (By contrast, Mr Hellyer played with peripheral details like organizations and uniforms.) Claxton, under St Laurent's guidance, needed those changes because the grand strategy that would guide the West for 70 years required a new military model: forces in being ready for the come-as-you-are war ... we never looked back and i doubt anyone seriously wants to look back again.
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Offline Furniture

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Re: Canadian Surface Combatant RFQ
« Reply #1107 on: August 21, 2018, 19:53:31 »
So when we talk about "tried and true" existing solutions vs the Type 26 paper solution are we talking about the existing vessels or the Canadianized vessels being created for CSC competition?  And are we considering the likelihood that by the time the Irving yards start building the first unit the Brits, Aussies and probably even the Yanks will be sailing in them?

That's my thinking on the older designs as well. We aren't planning to buy exact copies of the ships, we are buying designs and changing them to suit our needs. Better to start with the most modern design in production, and go from there. The Aussies seemed to think it was the right choice as well.

Offline Underway

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Re: Canadian Surface Combatant RFQ
« Reply #1108 on: August 21, 2018, 20:10:34 »
That's my thinking on the older designs as well. We aren't planning to buy exact copies of the ships, we are buying designs and changing them to suit our needs. Better to start with the most modern design in production, and go from there. The Aussies seemed to think it was the right choice as well.

Aussies took the Type 26 because they believe its the best ASW platform.  Probably because of the engineering arrangement (with electric motors) allows for very quite submarine hunting.  They took the F100 (105) as the AAD platform, Aegis and SPY1 radar and 48 VLS tubes.  Its going to be an excellent combination.  We should be so lucky.

Offline RDBZ

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Re: Canadian Surface Combatant RFQ
« Reply #1109 on: August 22, 2018, 05:12:50 »
Aussies took the Type 26 because they believe its the best ASW platform.  Probably because of the engineering arrangement (with electric motors) allows for very quite submarine hunting.  They took the F100 (105) as the AAD platform, Aegis and SPY1 radar and 48 VLS tubes.  Its going to be an excellent combination.  We should be so lucky.

With the AESA CEAFAR2-L and CEAMOUNT, the same Aegis CMS with CEC, greater displacement and room for additional Mk41 cells, I wouldn't be surprised if the new Hunter class matches or surpasses the Hobarts as an air warfare platform.
« Last Edit: August 22, 2018, 05:30:22 by RDBZ »

Offline JMCanada

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Re: Canadian Surface Combatant RFQ
« Reply #1110 on: August 22, 2018, 10:03:13 »
Well... having different radar and CMS, the Hunter class and the British type 26 start to be not so similar.

For the moment Brit. T-26 will mount (AFAIK) only 24 (3x8) mk41 cells plus 48 (12 cells x4) CAMM missiles which might not work properly with AEGIS: studies are being carried out for integration feasibility.

With only 24+12 cells, T-26 will be well suited for self aerial-defence, but not to protect other vessels (area-coverage) depending on the scenario. Aussies rely for that on the Hobarts and Brits. on the type 45 AAW destroyers.

Hobarts have 48 mk 41 cells plus 8 Harpoon launchers  ... and everything is already tested and running.

Regarding displacement, type 26 requires increased weight and volume because of her CODLOG quieter propulsion: need to install electric generators an motors . We should not expect much more available space for upgrades than on the other two rival platforms.
 
« Last Edit: August 22, 2018, 10:12:04 by JMCanada »

Offline Lumber

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Re: Canadian Surface Combatant RFQ
« Reply #1111 on: August 22, 2018, 11:58:36 »
The jeune école still lives, I see.

lol Maybe, but from what I understand about the jeune école was it was an attempt to enhance and force multiply a conventional surface fleet (in this case, the French).

What I'm more referring to are those who have essentially forgone all ambitions of a conventional surface fleet, and instead have adopt numerous small fast attack craft (i.e. Iran and/or NK).
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Offline Underway

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Re: Canadian Surface Combatant RFQ
« Reply #1112 on: August 27, 2018, 14:06:26 »
So which of these ships can take two helicopters.  We are talking the Cyclone of course so a big helo. 

Type 26 can do it if the flex deck is opened to the hangar, I've seen drawings of that from BAE.  Anyone know if either of the other two can do that?

I'm pretty sure the staffing plans for CSC have an option for two flight crews embarked, which would be similar to the 280's in their heyday.

Offline Lumber

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Re: Canadian Surface Combatant RFQ
« Reply #1113 on: August 27, 2018, 14:29:43 »
So which of these ships can take two helicopters.  We are talking the Cyclone of course so a big helo. 

Type 26 can do it if the flex deck is opened to the hangar, I've seen drawings of that from BAE.  Anyone know if either of the other two can do that?

I'm pretty sure the staffing plans for CSC have an option for two flight crews embarked, which would be similar to the 280's in their heyday.

What happens when the one in the "back" is determine to be unfit to fly, and the "working" helo gets stuck in front of it?

I heard the Egyptians aren't doing much with their Mistrals. Maybe we should look at taking the burden off their hands...
"Aboard his ship, there is nothing outside a captain's control." - Captain Sir Edward Pellew

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Offline LoboCanada

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Re: Canadian Surface Combatant RFQ
« Reply #1114 on: August 27, 2018, 15:24:36 »
What happens when the one in the "back" is determine to be unfit to fly, and the "working" helo gets stuck in front of it?

I heard the Egyptians aren't doing much with their Mistrals. Maybe we should look at taking the burden off their hands...

Is the benefit of having 2 large helo's worth it? Having to buy more Cyclones and all the trimmings when the future seems to be directed at Helo+Rotary UCAV instead?

Dreams of Mistrals...

I know its too late, but who would be opposed to 2-3 less CSC in exchange for a Mistral (hull built overseas with expensive refit here)? Genuinely asking you people.

Offline Colin P

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Re: Canadian Surface Combatant RFQ
« Reply #1115 on: August 27, 2018, 15:51:14 »
They be a bitter fight because having those two ships would force the 3 services to work together and possibly change priorities. Politically they make great sense, as the ships can be provided as task force support vessels for piracy duties, disaster relief and coastal UN missions. The troops and helo's do not have to be Canadian. Canada can earn diplomatic brownie points with minimal domestic political risks. It would also mean that you would see them practicing landings in the Arctic with LAV's.

Offline Baz

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Re: Canadian Surface Combatant RFQ
« Reply #1116 on: August 27, 2018, 16:06:39 »
I'm pretty sure the staffing plans for CSC have an option for two flight crews embarked, which would be similar to the 280's in their heyday.

A standard 280 det was three crews with two helos; it also had two shift maintenance.  Halifax is two crews with one helo.

The interesting one is the tankers; they had up to three helos but when in a TG as few as 1 crew plus an LSO. They also had second line aircraft maintenance.  Reason being is that they weren't meant to fly them, they were meant to keep serviceable ones for the other ships.  The biggest det I'm aware of would be 3 aircraft with 4 crews.

Canadian doctrine for TG employment of helos was and largely remains based around keeping two airborne 24/7.  Originally it was meant to keep two in the screen.  Even the maintenance cycle of the aircraft is based on that; that's why the Sea King had 20-25 hours between inspections; it meant two flying days then an inspection.  Therefore a normal TG would have 2 on the 280 covering 12 hours, two on two steamers covering the other 12, and 2 on the tanker for depth, filling in a flight here and there as well depending on how many crews they had.  In sustained ops you could swap with the tanker instead of doing the large inspections on the other decks.

The entire force structure of 12 Wing and the number of aircraft bought is based on that.  The maintenance program with the Cyclone is different; it is almost certain that 2nd line at Sea isn't coming back.  It may have changed in the last little while, but 12 Wing manning for Cyclone was based on "15 det equivalents in 11 dets;" ie, having 11 actual dets, but 4 of them or two helo dets.  It will be a long time before they are anywhere near that manning.

Most other countries don't fly like that anymore.  As MH is a "naturally reactive vehicle" they keep it on the deck in an alert state and then launch as required, do whatever needs doing, and recover, shut down, and reassume an alert state.  The Sea King maintenance requirements as developed didn't support that very well; time will tell with the Cyclone.

Offline E.R. Campbell

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Re: Canadian Surface Combatant RFQ
« Reply #1117 on: August 27, 2018, 18:04:38 »
One of the reasons I love Army.ca is that, time and again, people with real knowledge provide informed commentary about the issues.
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Offline Underway

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Re: Canadian Surface Combatant RFQ
« Reply #1118 on: August 27, 2018, 19:47:56 »
A standard 280 det was three crews with two helos; it also had two shift maintenance.  Halifax is two crews with one helo.

The interesting one is the tankers; they had up to three helos but when in a TG as few as 1 crew plus an LSO. They also had second line aircraft maintenance.  Reason being is that they weren't meant to fly them, they were meant to keep serviceable ones for the other ships.  The biggest det I'm aware of would be 3 aircraft with 4 crews.

Canadian doctrine for TG employment of helos was and largely remains based around keeping two airborne 24/7.  Originally it was meant to keep two in the screen.  Even the maintenance cycle of the aircraft is based on that; that's why the Sea King had 20-25 hours between inspections; it meant two flying days then an inspection.  Therefore a normal TG would have 2 on the 280 covering 12 hours, two on two steamers covering the other 12, and 2 on the tanker for depth, filling in a flight here and there as well depending on how many crews they had.  In sustained ops you could swap with the tanker instead of doing the large inspections on the other decks.

The entire force structure of 12 Wing and the number of aircraft bought is based on that.  The maintenance program with the Cyclone is different; it is almost certain that 2nd line at Sea isn't coming back.  It may have changed in the last little while, but 12 Wing manning for Cyclone was based on "15 det equivalents in 11 dets;" ie, having 11 actual dets, but 4 of them or two helo dets.  It will be a long time before they are anywhere near that manning.

Most other countries don't fly like that anymore.  As MH is a "naturally reactive vehicle" they keep it on the deck in an alert state and then launch as required, do whatever needs doing, and recover, shut down, and reassume an alert state.  The Sea King maintenance requirements as developed didn't support that very well; time will tell with the Cyclone.

That makes way more sense.  I was not aware it was two crews per helo. 

Offline Colin P

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Re: Canadian Surface Combatant RFQ
« Reply #1119 on: August 28, 2018, 10:20:39 »
Would it make sense to have the Astreix/JSS with 2 helo's and the capability to do deeper maintenance? More of fleet support than ASW protection. Basically they can cycle helo's through the escorts and have a spare.

Offline Baz

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Re: Canadian Surface Combatant RFQ
« Reply #1120 on: August 28, 2018, 11:36:58 »
Would it make sense to have the Astreix/JSS with 2 helo's and the capability to do deeper maintenance? More of fleet support than ASW protection. Basically they can cycle helo's through the escorts and have a spare.

Absolutely that would be the plan, to the extent that the Cyclone maintenance concept allows it.

Asterix has space for two helos, but I don't have any sources for how much aviation maintenance space there is.  Same goes for Protecteur and Preserver.  I also haven't heard if/when 12 Wing intends to build up a larger det for Asterix.  When manning allows it, and the full set of air trials for an embarked det are complete (vice the Ships Without Air Detachment [SWOAD] trials that have been done) my *guess* would be that it would make sense to build up a det that has 2 aircraft with 3 crews, and a split shift maintenance, in order to do more effective first line maintenance activities for a task group.

However, having this maintenance depth at Sea is not the same as 2nd line maintenance.  The old Preserver and Protecteur had avionics labs to do 2nd line recovery of spares, and could also do "streamlined" 2nd line periodic inspections (500 hour) with support from Shearwater.  I am only aware of this being done once, so it wasn't doctrine, but it could be done.  I've attached below, sorry for the long post.  However, the maintenance concept for Cyclone is different.  For example, 2nd line avionics recovery is not even done at Shearwater, it is passed back to the OEM.

So yes, that is the plan, but not to the extent it used to be.  Just as a note, an aircraft carrier does; for example, they have 2nd line engine bays including run-up facilities, and I remember anecdotally they actually carry OEM contractors at times.

Quote
Having obtained a suitably upgraded organic air capability, the Canadian Task Group came close to having to do without it. This situation arose in late October, over the issue of replacement of the Task Group. The decision reached by NDHQ was that the cost of refitting three more ships and five additional helicopters would be prohibitive, and crews would be rotated instead. This had profound operational implications, quite aside from the obvious withdrawal of each of the ships from patrol in sequence while the changeovers were affected. Unlike the air task group in Doha, which frequently rotated CF18s from the Canadian bases in Germany, 423 Squadron had no practical way to transport replacement aircraft to the Gulf without a relieving task group. On top of that, back in August, even as the upgrades were being undertaken at Shearwater, MAGHQ had predicted that, with the projected flying rate (proven in actual operations), “[a]ircraft technical requirements in terms of maintainability/sustainability [would be] problematic ... [and] there will be a requirement for one in-theatre periodic inspection per aircraft during a possible six-month deployment." Although direction had been requested from DMAEM, none had arrived.

Now, the problem of diminishing aircraft flying hours reached a crisis, and the investment made in the augmentation of the air maintenance detachment aboard PROTECTEUR reaped its dividend. In the short term, the afloat technicians had proven equal to the task of routine maintenance, keeping all of the aging and temperamental Sea Kings on the ready roster for an astounding 98 per cent availability, but the necessity for periodic inspections presented a longer-term problem. A regular 20‑day-long maintenance routine was required for flight safety reasons on all aircraft every 500 flying hours, and this was a major undertaking involving specialist technical support. Significantly, one had never before been conducted away from home base, let alone on a ship at sea. Together, the five task group helicopters were averaging 12 hours flying per day, or over 350 hours per month. The pace had been determined in part by the intention that the Task Group would return to Halifax in the early months of 1991. At the beginning of November, the total hours remaining were just over 1,250, sufficient to carry through to mid-February at the present rate, which in wartime was expected to rise.

Knowing now that there would be no replacement of the ships or their embarked aircraft until the summer of 1991 at the earliest, the initial reaction of Lieutenant-Colonel McWha was to order a drastic reduction in the hours flown by the air detachments. Henceforth, they were to fly only when necessary and otherwise remain at alert status, but that was only postponing the inevitable. Other than waiving the periodic inspection requirement, there was no alternative to in-theatre inspections. The situation was forced on 5 November when an airframe crack was discovered on one of the aircraft, “grounding” it aboard PROTECTEUR until a specialist metal technician from Shearwater could arrive to effect the repairs. Urgent communications passed from the task group ships at sea to the Canadian theatre headquarters in Manamah and thence to Shearwater and Ottawa, resulting in the decision to take this opportunity simultaneously to begin the 20‑day routine on the stricken helicopter immediately.

The only outstanding issue was where to undertake it. Both the US and Royal Navies also operated Sea Kings in the Gulf, but they were attached mostly to shore units, and there were sufficient differences between the models that making use of their facilities was not a viable option. In fact, PROTECTEUR’s facilities surpassed anything readily available elsewhere in the Gulf for the Sea Kings, and the embarked maintenance team was quickly set to the task. With their effective confinement on board because of the patrol schedule, the first inspection took only 15 days, and subsequent ones were reduced to 12 days. A sequence was worked out to have the remaining aircraft completed by February, which, with judicious scheduling and barring the outbreak of hostilities, would leave the five aircraft sufficient flying hours to resume the accustomed rate and support task group operations well into 1992.

Sic Itur Ad Astra: Canadian Aerospace Power Studies Volume 5 Wings for the Fleet: Fifty Years of the Canadian Sea King Edited by W. A. March, Chapter 6 Rethinking Maritime Air: Preparing and Maintaining Canadian Sea King Helicopters for Operations in the Persian Gulf 1990–1991 by Richard Gimblett, Page 75 http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2015/mdn-dnd/D4-7-5-2015-eng.pdf

Offline Czech_pivo

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Re: Canadian Surface Combatant RFQ
« Reply #1121 on: August 28, 2018, 11:46:49 »
Well, we've ordered/bought 28 of them.  If 15 go the 15 CSC's and 1 each go the 2 JSS, that leave's 11 onshore for training and deep maintenance.  Is that the correct ratio?  Does this mean that some are sitting idle with no jobs to perform? Or does this mean that we don't have enough of them?
From what I've been able to see, we used to have 24 on ships 10yrs ago, out of the 41 ordered.  Six on the Iroquois's, 6 on the replenishment ships and 1 on each Halifax. That's basically the exact same ratio (ship to land) - 58.5% on the Sea Kings' to 60% on the Cyclone's, so I'm going out on a limb here and saying that each JSS will only carry a single Cyclone.

Offline Chief Engineer

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Re: Canadian Surface Combatant RFQ
« Reply #1122 on: August 28, 2018, 11:56:36 »
Well, we've ordered/bought 28 of them.  If 15 go the 15 CSC's and 1 each go the 2 JSS, that leave's 11 onshore for training and deep maintenance.  Is that the correct ratio?  Does this mean that some are sitting idle with no jobs to perform? Or does this mean that we don't have enough of them?
From what I've been able to see, we used to have 24 on ships 10yrs ago, out of the 41 ordered.  Six on the Iroquois's, 6 on the replenishment ships and 1 on each Halifax. That's basically the exact same ratio (ship to land) - 58.5% on the Sea Kings' to 60% on the Cyclone's, so I'm going out on a limb here and saying that each JSS will only carry a single Cyclone.

You're forgetting the Harry DeWolf class that has the capability of embarking a Cyclone.
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Offline Chris Pook

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Re: Canadian Surface Combatant RFQ
« Reply #1123 on: August 28, 2018, 12:08:36 »
Aren't we also forgetting the vessels that are alongside or in for maintenance?

Of the "11-15" CSCs, "5-6" AOPS and "2-3" AORs how many will actually be at sea either on station or in transit?

15+6+3 = 24
11+5+2 = 18

Will there be 1/4, 1/3 or 1/2 of the fleet at sea at any one time?
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Offline Swampbuggy

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Re: Canadian Surface Combatant RFQ
« Reply #1124 on: August 28, 2018, 12:28:16 »
You're forgetting the Harry DeWolf class that has the capability of embarking a Cyclone.

Good point. But, I do wonder how often they will be used with AOPS. At least initially, I heard the plan was to fly with CCG helo’s and Air Dets. Then, there were some rumblings about Griffons. I got the impression from all this that the Cyclones were going to be too much in demand to be tasked to do whatever the DEWOLF’s will be doing.