Author Topic: C3 Howitzer Replacement  (Read 85314 times)

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Offline Rifleman62

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Re: C3 Howitzer Replacement
« Reply #150 on: January 05, 2019, 07:55:34 »
FJAG:
Quote
We have for many decades now spent untold wealth in building a vast bureaucracy to merely administer ourselves rather than building a more lethal force. I don't see that changing.


Or, as David Stirling, quoted in Rogue Heroes, stated " layer upon layer of fossilized sh-t"
« Last Edit: January 05, 2019, 09:23:43 by Rifleman62 »
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Offline MilEME09

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Re: C3 Howitzer Replacement
« Reply #151 on: January 05, 2019, 08:35:34 »
I believe Retired General Rick Hillier put it best in my opinion calling it a self licking ice cream cone.
"We are called a Battalion, Authorized to be company strength, parade as a platoon, Operating as a section"

Offline FJAG

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Re: C3 Howitzer Replacement
« Reply #152 on: January 05, 2019, 14:42:05 »
I believe Retired General Rick Hillier put it best in my opinion calling it a self licking ice cream cone.

I believe that your tag line:

Quote
"We are called a Battalion, Authorized to be company strength, parade as a platoon, Operating as a section"

sums up the whole sorry mess perfectly.

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Offline Petard

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Re: C3 Howitzer Replacement
« Reply #153 on: January 05, 2019, 16:14:45 »
The issue of funding has been mentioned a few times above.

It's been my understanding that each year, the CF/DND has to return a good chunk of money to Treasury Board that hasn't been spent.


I understand there are rules/regulations regarding the spending of money, the need for running competitions to procure equipment, etc etc.  However, I do not understand how some of these things can be 'funding related' when we are returning funds each year?  (Slightly off thread, I know.  Just curious about it pertains to this particular issue, sorry.)

Considering this thread is about replacing the C3, that's not really off topic. I don't know what background you might have about this, so I'll pitch this in kind of a crude way that hopefully doesn't sound condescending

I suppose what it comes down to is whether or not the C3 is meeting the need or not, the short answer is it does, but with risk. Despite that, I think the C3 should have a digital aiming system added, and a 120mm mortar system procured for the majority of Reserve Artillery units

There are essentially two types of funding related to this, one is for capitol expenditures (to actually buy something), and the other to sustain it (the overhead and maintenance costs, that also includes wages, ammunition etc). The subject of how convoluted and byzantine the military procurement system is, is discussed at length elsewhere on this site, but as it relates to this subject the funds you're talking about getting returned are largely (but not entirely) those identified for capitol expenditures for one reason or another (project delays, change of scope..the list is long). Far as I know, a case hasn't even been made to replace the C3 anytime soon. I believe one should be made, and it deserves to have a higher priority; it relates to the risk of using such an old gun. Another reason is to address some of the issues FJAG is getting at, albeit in a limited way

Right now the need appears to be met, since the purpose is to provide minimal training to Primary Reservists who might later go on task with a Regular Force artillery unit. The idea is that Reservists would show up with a deploying unit with at least some basic skills, and this would minimize the duration to get them fully trained for deployment. It is a cost saving measure; rather than keep Reg Force units fully manned, and the associated costs especially wages for that, gaps or holes are left that are to be filled by reservists as needed. 

Reg Force Artillery Regt's have two gun batteries, with three troops in each battery, the third troop is supposed to be largely covered off by Reservists. In theory, if a Reg Force Regt had to deploy a gun Bty, for the first roto the third troop would most likely come from the 2nd Gun Bty's Reg Force personnel. Reserve units would then be tasked to find volunteers to flesh out the second gun battery for subsequent roto's.

There is a valid point being made here, that the skill those Reservists are showing up with is too limited. More to the point, in a worst case scenario where there are significant losses experienced overseas, there's no real depth to the Reserves to quickly be mobilized, with relevant equipment to fill in. I would say the reason this isn't addressed in regards to equipping the reserves for operational deployment, largely goes to the limited risk and size of deployments our government tends to accept. It is also a cost saving measure. Consequently the role seen for the Reserves remains limited to only filling in spots in one of those gun Troops on an individual basis, rather than a Reserve unit stand up say an entire Troop itself with its own equipment and deploy (which by the way many other nations do operate that way)

Reserve units are hamstrung by the number of days their personnel can parade, and adding additional training, say to learn how to operate a digital gun aiming system, can exceed the time given right now to pay reservists. I think the problem could be addressed by cyclic training, that is one year you start with the basics, the subsequent year the more advance training with say the digital stuff. For now it appears the pattern will be to limit training to IBTS (basic soldier skills), and very limited basic trade training.

So with such a limited requirement, to permit basic artillery training, it looks like the C3 gets the job done, and it doesn't cost much to sustain. Where the risk is, is that with such an old gun if a significant problem occurs then even the basic training is next to impossible to achieve.

In the spring of 2011, a W Bty C3 in Gagetown literally snapped in two, and nobody knew why. About the same time, significant corrosion issues were identified in the trail legs of some guns. All training with the gun had to stop, and at the time not all Reserve units had mortars to fall back on. For a short while it did look like a capitol project would be needed to replace the C3. The cause of the gun snapping in two was resolved, and so was the matter of corrosion. Some consideration was given to continue with a project to replace the C3, but it would take time to get going, as a stop gap measure all reserve units were given 81mm mortars.

As time went on it seemed like the need wasn't that urgent, and I'm not sure what the timeline is to replace the C3 is. but I would hazard a guess it is more than decade away because it appears everything is ok to some. I would argue things have changed to the point that thinking should be challenged

Mortars are going back to infantry units, and I think that's a good thing, but that now means we're back to the risk of no back up if the whole C3 fleet is grounded again. The more recent problem is C3 barrel cracking near the muzzle, and I don't know if they've solved it. Oddly enough the problem could be easily solved by replacing the barrels used on the M119, but I'm not involved with that kind of thing anymore so I don't know if it's being pursued or not. I think they should mount the M119's ordnance on the C3 carriage, and the LINAPS used on the M777. The training time that used to be given for the mortar in Reserve units could be used towards learning how to use digital gun aiming. The occupation drills alone are so significantly different, that it really should be part of basic training, and the old optic sight method only retained for emergency all fails purposes.

Better yet, I wish we'd see Reserve artillery units not at a saluting base (Ottawa and provincial capitals), get towed 120mm mortars with digital aiming systems. Their back up would be 81mm mortars. These units would be tasked to Force Generate individuals, and if need be complete Troops, to Reg Force infantry Battalions. The C3's withdrawn from those units equipped with 120 mortars can be used to sustain the remaining C3's. Replace the C3 barrels with those from the M119 for the units at the saluting bases, fit them with LINAPS, and they would be the ones tasked to Force generate individuals to the Reg Force gun troops. They would then show up with more relavent skills, and the army would have more depth to deal with the unknowns especially for the PBI

But if wished were horses..


Offline FJAG

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Re: C3 Howitzer Replacement
« Reply #154 on: January 05, 2019, 18:50:20 »
There are a lot of truth in much of what you say. Quite frankly I can't argue with the truth of those things, I can only argue that I wish they weren't true. Let me touch on a couple of things you mention.

Reserve units are hamstrung by the number of days their personnel can parade, and adding additional training, say to learn how to operate a digital gun aiming system, can exceed the time given right now to pay reservists. I think the problem could be addressed by cyclic training, that is one year you start with the basics, the subsequent year the more advance training with say the digital stuff. For now it appears the pattern will be to limit training to IBTS (basic soldier skills), and very limited basic trade training.

It's true that budgets are limited but that doesn't mean units can't use our budgets better or more selectively. I spent two years in RSS and can attest to the fact that a good 1/3 of our budget was blown on useless activities. Just as an example, a half day training is anything under six hours. Weekday sessions are usually three hours but usually only about two spent training actively. That's wasted money. Weekends are much more productive and we should end mid week parading completely.

The youngsters reaching us as recruits these days live in a digital world. Learning to use digital equipment is not that difficult for them if taught right.

The big issue that I have, however, is cyclical training as you propose. I fully agree with cyclical training for team skills. Learn to be a troop one year, a battery the next. For individual training, however, we should condense all the skills to be a gun number into one phase so that all gun numbers are trained to service the piece fully from square one.

I do note that in the US artillery these days the MOS 13B teaches the soldier as a crewmember with all skills except the digital data system whereas the operation of the automated data systems are specialists designated MOS 13D. This is similar to the US Infantry's division of infantryman and mortarman as two separate MOSs. Maybe that could be the idea; divide your recruit intake class into two groups train 3 out of 4 recruits as crewmembers and 1 out of 4 as digital specialists. I'm not too fond of this for the obvious battle casualty reasons.

As time went on it seemed like the need wasn't that urgent, and I'm not sure what the timeline is to replace the C3 is. but I would hazard a guess it is more than decade away because it appears everything is ok to some. I would argue things have changed to the point that thinking should be challenged

This, unfortunately, is typical of our leadership; to think reactively rather than proactively. We wait until the problem gob-smacks us. We really do need to get ahead of the curve and decide how to make our force more lethal and then move in that direction by deciding what weapons we need and how to properly train our people on it.

Mortars are going back to infantry units, and I think that's a good thing, but that now means we're back to the risk of no back up if the whole C3 fleet is grounded again. The more recent problem is C3 barrel cracking near the muzzle, and I don't know if they've solved it. Oddly enough the problem could be easily solved by replacing the barrels used on the M119, but I'm not involved with that kind of thing anymore so I don't know if it's being pursued or not. I think they should mount the M119's ordnance on the C3 carriage, and the LINAPS used on the M777. The training time that used to be given for the mortar in Reserve units could be used towards learning how to use digital gun aiming. The occupation drills alone are so significantly different, that it really should be part of basic training, and the old optic sight method only retained for emergency all fails purposes.

We should not try McGyver a roughly seventy-five year-old weapon system. (that's right, the first M1 variant was developed at Rock Island in the early 1920s and was fielded as the redesignated M2 in 1934 and entered service as the M2A1 in 1940)

Better yet, I wish we'd see Reserve artillery units not at a saluting base (Ottawa and provincial capitals), get towed 120mm mortars with digital aiming systems. Their back up would be 81mm mortars. These units would be tasked to Force Generate individuals, and if need be complete Troops, to Reg Force infantry Battalions. The C3's withdrawn from those units equipped with 120 mortars can be used to sustain the remaining C3's. Replace the C3 barrels with those from the M119 for the units at the saluting bases, fit them with LINAPS, and they would be the ones tasked to Force generate individuals to the Reg Force gun troops. They would then show up with more relavent skills, and the army would have more depth to deal with the unknowns especially for the PBI

Sorry. I'm dead against 120mm mortars (especially with 81mm backups) It's not that I don't think we should have 120s (I do think we should) nor that I think that mortars are somehow beneath the artillery (they aren't - Russians who in my view are the unrivalled experts in artillery have 120mm as an artillery weapon system)

My reasoning is that we have already emasculated the regular force artillery by limiting how few firing units we have. Before we start handing 120s to reserve gunner units we should first ensure that there are sufficient reservists allocated and trained to fully man properly organized reg force regiments (and 2 batteries of six guns is NOT enough for a three manoeuvre battalion brigade) and that we provide a proper long range artillery capability with rockets.

I saw the artillery locating and missile skills disappear in the 1960s. If we continue to have gunners man what are basically battalion weapons we will never achieve the firepower we need on the battlefield. By all means buy 120s for the infantry but not the artillery. We'll never get the skills back.

More to the point, in a worst case scenario where there are significant losses experienced overseas, there's no real depth to the Reserves to quickly be mobilized, with relevant equipment to fill in. I would say the reason this isn't addressed in regards to equipping the reserves for operational deployment, largely goes to the limited risk and size of deployments our government tends to accept.

I've moved this comment out of order and saved it for last because I think that while the statement is mostly true it's the crux of our problem as a force. I've said this before and believe it to be the God's honest truth. It's not the politicians that are behind our low risk limited operational deployments, it's our military leadership who is telling them that is all we are capable of doing.

Look at Strong, Secure and Engaged. While it recognizes the fact that Russia and China are our biggest potential "near peer" enemies (and "near peer" gives us much more credibility and lethality than we deserve) it nonetheless envisions missions which in essence are a single battle group in size. Yet we maintain a regular force army of three mechanized brigades, a half a$$ed Combat Support Brigade and a divisional headquarters which is tasked to generate nothing more than two battle groups simultaneously.

That is fundamentally ridiculous. I see nothing wrong with the idea of having a mission to supply such limited forces from time to time as may be needed, but if we identify two major and sophisticated enemies as our biggest threat then surely to God we should have an ultimate role to generate the full force and have a capability to support it and replace battle casualties. If all we're prepared to send is a battle group or two then why have 22,000 regulars and 20,000 reservists in the first place? The government has allocated the manpower and enough serious equipment to field a division (although some essential pieces are missing). It's the military's job to make it a viable fighting force. We are failing our government every day.

 :cheers:




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Offline dapaterson

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Re: C3 Howitzer Replacement
« Reply #155 on: January 05, 2019, 19:22:49 »
Canada's problems lie in both personnel and equipment.  We lack modern equipment for more than a reinforced battlegroup.

Thus, any solution space requires equipment for training, equipment for operations, and soldiers to train and operate them.

My 30 second assessment:

1. The Army needs an inexpensive indirect fire platform that is common to both components that can be used both for training and deployed - a towed 105mm meets that need;
2. That platform needs to be integrated into the fire control system so there is common training on necessary supporting tools;
3. The Army Reserve needs to revisit its structures and construct viable units, even if that means a loss of command positions (this is not a problem unique to the Artillery).  This may also mean a need to invest more Regular Force positions into units to enable an increased force output - whether at the individual, sub-sub or sub-unit or unit level;
4. Long, hard thought is needed to decide what is wanted out of a part-time force, and what level of time and commitment is viable to require; and
5. A commitment to modernizing indirect fire in the CAF (regardless of component) is needed - now.  With the current fleet of 105mm guns nearing collapse, and the 155mm fleet being well below the critical size to sustain anything beyond two batteries deployed, there needs to be a dedicated effort to modernize and expand the Army's capabilities (HIMARS anybody?)
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Offline FormerHorseGuard

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Re: C3 Howitzer Replacement
« Reply #156 on: January 05, 2019, 20:57:45 »
I spoke with a now retired RSM about the lack of replacement parts and spare parts for the C3 105mm gun.
I did not understand everything he told me but here was the basics of the conversation

I said to him with life span of the 105mm running out and lack of spare guns  I thought the Res units who did the salutes and other special events would end up with the best of the guns available, so they could retain the taskings and the skill sets to do those events as required. Meaning 7 Toronto and 30 RCA would get the guns in Ontario. Everyone else would be doing dry training and very little live fires to extend gun life. That was my opinion.

He replied in a typical  RSM  fashion and a quick education and lesson on the guns and replacement programs.

Another country ( not naming it, it was from  South America) was going thru the process of  manufacturing a new version of the 105mm , very close if not exact copy of the C3 used by the Canadian Forces. He said there was talk at higher levels of command about purchasing some guns from that country's manufacturer but then the Treasury Board and others got involved,  no Canadian content,  no deal would be made.

just a chat over a drink in the mess.
just some thoughts and opinions


Offline Colin P

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Re: C3 Howitzer Replacement
« Reply #157 on: January 05, 2019, 21:21:37 »
We used to parade 1.5 days a week plus a variety of exercises and a gun camp. The evening parade was mostly administrative with some training. The full days were normally devoted to training course, such as gunnery, sigs, tech and drivers. We were supported by generally excellent RSS staff (1 officer, 1 WO and one M/BDR) and about 3 Class B (office staff, vehicle tech and QM). This ensured a lot of the admin tasks were done, kit was procured, repaired and readied for the Saturday courses or exercises. I remember on Class B, exercising the recoil systems of the C2's as per the manual with the supplied kit on a regular basis.

Somehow we managed to maintain a 6 gun battery, tractors, 2x ammo trucks, 2x CP's, 2x FOO parties, Flying kitchen, ambulance, REME truck. (We did a lot of our own vehicle repairs as well). 

Offline quadrapiper

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Re: C3 Howitzer Replacement
« Reply #158 on: January 06, 2019, 00:35:17 »
(We did a lot of our own vehicle repairs as well).
Wonder, on a tangent, if the loss of that sort of low-level "real" activity might have something to do with retention issues?

Offline Colin P

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Re: C3 Howitzer Replacement
« Reply #159 on: January 06, 2019, 12:37:01 »
There was real satisfaction in resolving issues and we kept our 3 tonner stake truck running for several more years, when the powers above us would have taken her away and not replaced her. Considering we used the Stake truck for administrative truck every week instead of driving the Deuces, getting rid of it and wearing out the hard to replace trucks just shows the stupidity that went on. In general there was a lot of "ownership" of kit and responsibility to maintain it. The various local units QM's and RSS staff helped each other out and loaned equipment, on the expectation that it was taken care of. The steady reduction in vehicles and kit really hurt, basically ever new vehicle was issued on a scale of 3 or 2 old for 1 new. So vehicle wear goes up, there is no slack for making sure you have enough working vehicles, no ability to support other units on a combined exercise.

The only plan is that there is no plan, it's all reaction and bandaid applying.

Offline Petard

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Re: C3 Howitzer Replacement
« Reply #160 on: January 06, 2019, 16:00:51 »
I spoke with a now retired RSM about the lack of replacement parts and spare parts for the C3 105mm gun.
I did not understand everything he told me but here was the basics of the conversation

He replied in a typical  RSM  fashion and a quick education and lesson on the guns and replacement programs.

Another country ( not naming it, it was from  South America) was going thru the process of  manufacturing a new version of the 105mm , very close if not exact copy of the C3 used by the Canadian Forces. He said there was talk at higher levels of command about purchasing some guns from that country's manufacturer but then the Treasury Board and others got involved,  no Canadian content,  no deal would be made.

just a chat over a drink in the mess.
just some thoughts and opinions

The gun he was probably talking about is the Chilean version of the C3, which they call the M101/33. It might have been an option awhile ago, but I think they've done away with them a few years ago. I don't think the Canadian content was the main factor it was avoided, more likely it was that no one saw the urgency of the need anymore. Besides which, there are other options besides more of the same, which I suppose is what this thread is supposed to be about

Something to keep in mind too, is that Reg Force Arty Regt's now have to cover off a considerable number of STA tasks, certainly more than they did pre-Afghanistan, but with no increase in personnel. So it does make sense to have a viable plan for Reservists to fill in the gaps in the gun Bty's. As has been mentioned, there doesn't seem to be a plan to do that, other than the catch as catch can one 2 RCHA has improvised

Perhaps it's worth looking at a 10/90 type of solution again, and posting the personnel that are supposed to be in the leadership positions of the hollow gun Troops in each Reg Force Regt, to the Primary Reserve units that are supposed to FG the remainder. When it comes time to support their nearest Reg Force Regt those Reg Force members and Reservists stand up the Troop as a whole from that region (much as JeffB seen during the collective training event in 2015). I know from my experience with it the early 90's the results, especially in turn out/availability of Class A pers, was impressive.  The example of the arty units in 31 and 32 Bde forming a Bty, and 33 Bde for the other one, and actually deploy with 2 RCHA for 2 weeks, I think is a good start point (4 Div and Army G3 should try to nudge 2 RCHA's training schedule a bit to line up better with end of RST to support this), but I'm talking more along the lines of being more involved with work up training, including Maple Resolve type Ex's and actually deploying as well, as formed Troops from a given region.
« Last Edit: January 06, 2019, 21:03:36 by Petard »

Offline jeffb

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Re: C3 Howitzer Replacement
« Reply #161 on: January 08, 2019, 00:45:57 »
It would be hard to nudge 2 RCHA's training schedule much. July and August are spent supporting national tasks and leave. The first two weeks are a write off for collective training with support to Ex Collaborative Spirit, Terry Fox Run and Ironwarrior (Ironman). There's a right shoulder as well of supporting RCR and RCD exercises. Therefore, there's really only a 2-3 week period at the end of September to Thanksgiving where 2 RCHA can run Regimental training. Batteries need some time shakeout at well. After APS, that usually means that Bty training events are running in August and around the other events in September.

It all comes down to priorities and where you accept risk. I for one would not want to accept risk supporting live fire CT with maneuver arms in late Oct/Nov over PRes artillery training. I'd argue that a better time if someone is looking to carve out some ammo and resources would be at the start of the fiscal year in that period just after University exams finish. It would exactly be progressive from RST but it could serve as the PRes final CT event. 
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Re: C3 Howitzer Replacement
« Reply #162 on: January 08, 2019, 02:03:37 »
I'd argue that a better time if someone is looking to carve out some ammo and resources would be at the start of the fiscal year in that period just after University exams finish. It would exactly be progressive from RST but it could serve as the PRes final CT event.

The whole Army should do that.  Perfect timing. :nod:
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Offline Petard

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Re: C3 Howitzer Replacement
« Reply #163 on: January 08, 2019, 03:46:46 »
It would be hard to nudge 2 RCHA's training schedule much. July and August are spent supporting national tasks and leave.
It all comes down to priorities and where you accept risk. I for one would not want to accept risk supporting live fire CT with maneuver arms in late Oct/Nov over PRes artillery training. I'd argue that a better time if someone is looking to carve out some ammo and resources would be at the start of the fiscal year in that period just after University exams finish. It would exactly be progressive from RST but it could serve as the PRes final CT event.


April might be a bit too soon, IIRC, I think mid May at the earliest is about when most of the P Res Bde's are typically ready for a CT event (but transition to RST instead)

The RST training cycle could probably start about mid June, then ending just before labour day, without a CT event at the end of the summer, which would be a good thing IMO. First it would line up better with the PLQ courses, and more importantly it address a deficiency in essential P Res Arty training. The way it stands right now, almost all of the local defence training has been made supplemental, so isn't covered during RST.  DP 1s don't get trained on any support weapons other than C9 (not even C6 or hand grenades, never mind anti-armour), and the DP 2 Det 2 IC and the DP 3 Det Comd courses don't really cover local defence either. So by allowing them to to return to unit and develop those skills, as well as the normal progressive BTS training, possibly doing training with their nearest Reg Force Regt as well, it'll allow them to confirm it hopefully with live fire during a major CT event in May (prior to the long weekend).

I'm not sure why this hasn't been attempted, since over the past few years there have been some bizarre CT event dates, I think in 2017 some Bde's even had their own dates separate from the others, right in the middle of RST. The only push back I can remember from when it was suggested before, is because of the availability of those attending high school
 FWIW, I agree, it should be tried, better yet with digitized guns in the P Res.

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Re: C3 Howitzer Replacement
« Reply #164 on: January 08, 2019, 10:38:06 »
The Reserves schedules are locked into the civilian world and it's just a reality that's not going to change. 

Offline jeffb

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Re: C3 Howitzer Replacement
« Reply #165 on: January 08, 2019, 17:44:19 »
The Reserves schedules are locked into the civilian world and it's just a reality that's not going to change.

Tracking and I totally get it. And thus we come back full circle to the problem of what exactly is the role of the PRes? Is it there primarily for individual augmentation on deployments, DomOps and to provide a presence across Canada or is it there to force generate sub or sub-sub units (or higher)? If the answer is that it is the first than having a mechanism such as Op REINFORCEMENT that 4 Div had going on a few years ago (Class B funding for PRes individual augmentation of Reg Force units during CT events) is likely the way to go in my view. That way, individuals are able to slot into Reg Force training events as it suits their personal lives while getting literally the same training as their Reg Force counterparts instead of some sort of half-baked Level 5 training. I'm a firm believer that that solution was on the right path but that it needed to be extended slightly to allow PRes members who were slotted to attend CT events (Unit Level up to MAPLE RESOLVE) to arrive a few weeks before said event to participate in the garrison work-up training, IBTS, etc. If institutionalized then it could become just another step within a unit's/Bde's Battle Procedure that PRes augmentees have to do the gateway training and deliver said training accordingly.

(Straying off topic here I know).
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Re: C3 Howitzer Replacement
« Reply #166 on: January 08, 2019, 20:34:25 »
Tracking and I totally get it. And thus we come back full circle to the problem of what exactly is the role of the PRes? Is it there primarily for individual augmentation on deployments, DomOps and to provide a presence across Canada or is it there to force generate sub or sub-sub units (or higher)? If the answer is that it is the first than having a mechanism such as Op REINFORCEMENT that 4 Div had going on a few years ago (Class B funding for PRes individual augmentation of Reg Force units during CT events) is likely the way to go in my view. That way, individuals are able to slot into Reg Force training events as it suits their personal lives while getting literally the same training as their Reg Force counterparts instead of some sort of half-baked Level 5 training. I'm a firm believer that that solution was on the right path but that it needed to be extended slightly to allow PRes members who were slotted to attend CT events (Unit Level up to MAPLE RESOLVE) to arrive a few weeks before said event to participate in the garrison work-up training, IBTS, etc. If institutionalized then it could become just another step within a unit's/Bde's Battle Procedure that PRes augmentees have to do the gateway training and deliver said training accordingly.

(Straying off topic here I know).
Addressing the same points: might be some benefit from running the numbers as far as "personal commitments at X years in the PRes:" years one through four-six are full of students, so an attenuated winter and loaded summer training scheme is probably ideal. After that, it might switch: might have a better chance of your now-employed Reservist getting time off for a course if it's not during school breaks.

Offline daftandbarmy

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Re: C3 Howitzer Replacement
« Reply #167 on: January 08, 2019, 21:18:17 »
The Reserves schedules are locked into the civilian world and it's just a reality that's not going to change.

May to August is a pretty good time frame annually to provide some good training for reservists.

I went through Phase II and III Infantry over the course of two summers and emerged a qualified Pl Comd, with the rank of Lt, at the tender age of 20. Some years later I did a pretty good 2 week ACT course and was promoted to Major. During various summer collective training events I commanded platoons and companies in the field to build up my OJT.

There's no reason why we can't churn out qualified NCMs/NCOs during those same two, or maybe three, summers, including the intervening 'inter-summer' training back at the units, especially if Reg F collective training events are scheduled so trainees can get some solid OJT.
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Offline Old Sweat

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Re: C3 Howitzer Replacement
« Reply #168 on: January 08, 2019, 21:35:19 »
In the mid-seventies the army developed and introduced a three phase programme called the Reserve Officer University Training Programme. We managed to cover all the important POs of the regular training system in three phases while the regulars needed four by careful design. In fact I know that in gunner land we produced some very capable individuals including a certain officer cadet Leslie. (He may have gone regular some time during his three years, so don't bet the bank on this.)

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Re: C3 Howitzer Replacement
« Reply #169 on: January 09, 2019, 15:45:53 »
I don't think JeffB's points are off topic at all

Surely some better method can be implemented than the "half baked" method being used (as he rightly describes it), and better equipment is needed to support that.
I get the bulk of a Reserve unit availability is tied to the rhythms of work and school, but at some point units will need to be able to FG individuals at least, if not a (sub-) sub unit, or there really is no purpose to having Reserves at all. If we can assume that's valid, then anything that minimizes the training delta between Reg Force and Primary Reservists is a step in the right direction, since the methods artillery use now are getting more complex compared to legacy methods Reservists are currently limited to
 
One of these changes relates to deploying guns with an (automatic) Azimuth Pointing System (APS)
It drives me nuts when I hear someone say "a gun is a gun", as a means to justifying the C3 as good enough. That's as idiotic as saying "a plane is a plane". The difference between a gun with say LINAPS deploying and one using legacy optic sights and survey instruments is enormous. The speed of occupation alone is significant, especially at night, but it takes a lot of practice to learn those differences for Recce and occupation drills, as well as safety. So much so I believe it's worth mounting some kind of APS on the C3 and LG1's, so those Reservists available to take on a task with a Reg unit at least have the basics worked out.

It would be best if all the Reserve units could be equipped with guns that had APS, but if that's not possible at least do some kind of whole fleet management approach then. I worked with a US National Guard Stryker Bn that was going into the equivalent of high readiness status, after which the majority of their high speed equipment would go to another unit as they went into a reconstitution phase. Maybe something similar could be adopted by Cdn units. For example, 7 Tor, 11 Fd and 56 Fd are tasked for two years to provide a complete Gun Tp, a dismounted ATG and an LCMR Det. During that time for the first year they go from legacy occupation drills with C3 to learning how to do it with APS. At least one LCMR to a unit with that task (think that's 7 Tor). Year two those Reservists who are available fill in Class B with the Reg Force Regt they're supporting, the remainder of the unit continues training with legacy equipment while the APS and LCMR go to the next units. The following units would be 30 Fd, 42nd, and the 49th. This way 2 RCHA always has, as a minimum, another Troop that can deploy as needed

The ROTP method for officer training OS describes, somewhat still goes on with officer candidates attending DP 1.1, but that only covers the legacy methods of occupation; they need additional training too once back with their units.

Something needs to give here, because it sure sounds like what's going on is not guaranteeing the availability of FG individuals, with some kind of current skill set, never mind sub-sub units
« Last Edit: January 09, 2019, 21:06:59 by Petard »

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Re: C3 Howitzer Replacement
« Reply #170 on: January 09, 2019, 17:15:24 »
At each unit there will be individuals who will be free to deploy at various times with the Regular Force. Reserve units should have an electronic list of members willing to deploy and for how long. To get on that list member agrees to be ready to deploy within 2 weeks notification and for the time period they have indicated. Member responsible for advising unit if temporarily medically unfit or unavailable.

Have the list based on a shared excel spreadsheet, the member lists qualifications they have (vehicles, tracks, gun, tech, sigs, etc) , rank into fields. . 1 RCHA wants a troop of gunners, they select desired qualifications, input into the shared excel sheet, up pops qualified members, invites for those members sent to them and their unit. Invites expire in X time, acceptance starts the ball rolling. Have some preapproved requirements done (extra kit could be already drawn, but stored at the unit to reduce wear) medical, dental checks, etc. Member is on their way in short order.     

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Re: C3 Howitzer Replacement
« Reply #171 on: January 09, 2019, 18:50:06 »
At each unit there will be individuals who will be free to deploy at various times with the Regular Force...Member is on their way in short order.     

I think that's they way it's supposed to work, but..
Right now they'll show up completely unfamiliar with the main way the howitzer they're going to work on operates, even the general sequence of activities for occupation will be foreign to most of them. Save for the few that might of been on a M777 conversion course, improvised by the nearest Reg Force unit, but have had no practice on since
Trying to synchronize an Op plan to take into account that kind of training delta, and variations, is not going to be easy in the best of circumstances. Something more deliberate than a "just in case" self identification list is needed IMO; I've seen how hit or miss that actually works in practice. Typically the number of pers that self ID can grow significantly if they know it is for an actual task and not a maybe. I believe what is needed is equipment among the Reserves that supports building up a common experience level among them as much as possible, and a routine of deploying with the nearest Reg Force unit to develop that skill     

If replacing the C3 is unrealistic, at least make it more suitable for the task; a digital fire control system on the C3 would at least help towards building a more relevant baseline of training
(Just trying to keep this relevant to the thread)

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Re: C3 Howitzer Replacement
« Reply #172 on: January 09, 2019, 19:09:25 »
. . .
I get the bulk of a Reserve unit availability is tied to the rhythms of work and school, but at some point units will need to be able to FG individuals at least, if not a (sub-) sub unit, or there really is no purpose to having Reserves at all. If we can assume that's valid, then anything that minimizes the training delta between Reg Force and Primary Reservists is a step in the right direction, since the methods artillery use now are getting more complex compared to legacy methods Reservists are currently limited to
. . .

My point exactly. We always have a fall-back in that we can call individuals to active service, but we never do that.

I disagree with the band-aid ideas of units having lists of ready volunteers. Our system shouldn't be run in a haphazard manner that depends on the whims of what are now dysfunctional "regiments" and "battalions". The whole system is more than ripe for a major and radical revision.

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Offline Colin P

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Re: C3 Howitzer Replacement
« Reply #173 on: January 09, 2019, 21:16:21 »
The problem is that people who join want to have some identity within a community, the regular army has already pretty divorced itself from the public, cutting the remaining links with communities might have unintended consequence. The Reserves also have to market themselves to the public to get people to give up their free time willingly. What does the reg force have to offer that's better than the Reserves with their antique regiments that offers community links, history, comradery, funky hats, cap badges and buddies to work and drink with?
perhaps the regs need to take a hard look also at how they run courses and ask why you can't teach some basic repetitive skillsets on an artillery piece to someone who already is familiar with a simpler one. They used to take people from C2's to tracked SPG's which is quite the leap.   

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Re: C3 Howitzer Replacement
« Reply #174 on: January 09, 2019, 23:12:21 »
The youngsters reaching us as recruits these days live in a digital world. Learning to use digital equipment is not that difficult for them if taught right.

By all means buy 120s for the infantry but not the artillery. We'll never get the skills back.

The newer generation catching on to digital easily is very true, probably teaching the instructors a thing or two on some occasions. Good thing our current AIGs aren't as crusty and resistant to change as the old guard.

I don't have much concerns with not getting our skills back or changing systems. We are used to being "adaptive" and gunnery is gunnery, regardless of platform IMO. We transitioned to the 777 very quickly, with Res F included.     

Canada's problems lie in both personnel and equipment.  We lack modern equipment for more than a reinforced battlegroup.

My 30 second assessment:

1. The Army needs an inexpensive indirect fire platform that is common to both components that can be used both for training and deployed - a towed 105mm meets that need;
2. That platform needs to be integrated into the fire control system so there is common training on necessary supporting tools;

I don't believe the 105mm even comes close to meeting our need, especially in the growth potential category where is gets extremely low marks, essentially 0. The only reason they'll even exist 50 years from now is because there is a lot of them.

If we talk digital FCS, a proper 120 is arguably closer to the 777 than any 105, solely because of guided extended range ammo. Having your systems in place for this is probably the largest training gap, for Arty, Sigs and EME.

Cheers!