Author Topic: Lessons Learned by a LAV Captain - Defense  (Read 24791 times)

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Offline Infanteer

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Re: Lessons Learned by a LAV Captain - Defense
« Reply #50 on: January 20, 2019, 21:36:01 »
All of that sounds about right to me.  I'd argue that at the lowest echelons of combat (company, battalion) you're probably going want to position elements in depth to mask them somehow from enemy direct fires.  If I'm a Bn CO, I'll pop a company in front in a series of strongpoints, and have the other companies in depth.  By being in depth, they can afford to wait before unmasking their fires as the enemy starts hitting the forward elements, helping to "absorb the momentum of the enemy's attack."
"Overall it appears that much of the apparent complexity of modern war stems in practice from the self-imposed complexity of modern HQs" LCol J.P. Storr

Offline Colin P

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Re: Lessons Learned by a LAV Captain - Defense
« Reply #51 on: August 08, 2019, 19:36:36 »
The need will likely come far faster than we can rearm the ships. The one thing Canada does very well is to fail at correctly predicting the military needs and likely conflicts. Hell even the Brits with their experience and resources failed to prepare for the Falklands, Had the Arges waited a bit long the RN would have had even less resources.

Offline Dimsum

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Re: Lessons Learned by a LAV Captain - Defense
« Reply #52 on: August 08, 2019, 20:20:32 »
The one thing Canada every country does very well is to fail at correctly predicting the military needs and likely conflicts.

At the risk of misremembering history, the French knew for a fact that Germany was going to invade again and there are only so many ways to do it by land - hence the Maginot Line. 

We all know how that turned out.
Philip II of Macedon to Spartans (346 BC):  "You are advised to submit without further delay, for if I bring my army into your land, I will destroy your farms, slay your people, and raze your city."

Reply:  "If."

Offline Retired AF Guy

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Re: Lessons Learned by a LAV Captain - Defense
« Reply #53 on: August 09, 2019, 18:59:16 »
At the risk of misremembering history, the French knew for a fact that Germany was going to invade again and there are only so many ways to do it by land - hence the Maginot Line. 

We all know how that turned out.

Unfortunately, the French didn't think that may be the Germans might do hook through Netherlands/Belgium to outflank the Maginot Line.
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Offline MarkOttawa

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Re: Lessons Learned by a LAV Captain - Defense
« Reply #54 on: August 09, 2019, 20:10:39 »
Retired AF Guy: In fact the French thought the Maginot Line would force the Germans to do the northern hook (as in WW I with Schlieffen Plan, though not including the Netherlands in the end).  And in 1939 the German General Staff's plan did involve doing just that; the French--and British--had anticipated that and the BEF and the best of French army were stationed in NE France, prepared to march into Belgium as soon as the Germans attacked (which they did in May 1940).

The Germans actually planned to execute the northern attack. Orders to execute it were repeatedly cancelled by Hitler in November and December and into January 1940, mainly because of bad weather. Then a light plane carrying a German officer with the plans crashed in Belgian territory and the Germans had to assume the allies had the plan.

So Hitler went back to the drawing board (he never really liked the initial planning) and adopted the Manstein Plan (Sichelschnitt) for the main Panzer attack to be switched to the Ardennes Forest in Luxembourg and the south of Belgium with the aim of outflanking and cutting off the French and British troops in northeast France, who were expected to move into Belgium thus increasing their vulnerability to being cut off.

All worked out a treat for the Germans. And the 1939 plan might well have been stopped or at least not led to any great war-winning breakthrough. Excuse the potted hiistory.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/fall_france_01.shtml

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« Last Edit: August 09, 2019, 20:20:43 by MarkOttawa »
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Offline Infanteer

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Re: Lessons Learned by a LAV Captain - Defense
« Reply #55 on: August 09, 2019, 20:55:38 »
Moving forward to the Dyle River line is what doomed the French, not the Maginot Line.
"Overall it appears that much of the apparent complexity of modern war stems in practice from the self-imposed complexity of modern HQs" LCol J.P. Storr

Offline daftandbarmy

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Re: Lessons Learned by a LAV Captain - Defense
« Reply #56 on: August 09, 2019, 21:03:37 »
Moving forward to the Dyle River line is what doomed the French, not the Maginot Line.

A couple of decades of a continuous succession weak and ineffective national governments beforehand didn't help much either...

...but that's probably not really within a LAV Captain's arcs.

"The most important qualification of a soldier is fortitude under fatigue and privation. Courage is only second; hardship, poverty and want are the best school for a soldier." Napoleon

Offline Haligonian

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Re: Lessons Learned by a LAV Captain - Defense
« Reply #57 on: January 05, 2020, 20:53:13 »
Spent some time over the last few days reviewing Jim Storr's new book again and discussing the issues with another person who enjoys this stuff. He has enlightened me on some of his conclusions based on his historical research.  Some of the stuff we've talked about:

1.  From a coy perspective four rifle sections provide the framework, the positional elements, of the defence.  The are what would have been called in WW 2 the Main Line of Resistance.  These sections with an automatic weapon, spread out as much as 500m ground allowing, give a coy a frontage of (no more) than 2000 meters.  Probably closer to 1500.  These sections can defeat an infantry attack.  On top of that framework layer on anti armour weapons and indirect fire and you have the start of defeating a combined arms attack.

2.  Depth positions primary role is counter attack to re-establish the MLR.  If they can also have direct fire into the KZ then that is gravy but there will be a conflict with placing them where they are protected from direct fire and allowing them to service the KZ.  They're direct fire will probably be more important ONTO the forward positions.  They are dug in and so should be somewhere they could prevent or limit penetration.  Their tasks sound something like:  BPT CLEAR front right/front left BP. BPT CLEAR neighboring pl/coy BP. BLOCK en penetration...  The c-atk task could potentially be SEIZE or DESTROY I suppose. Depth starting with a platoon's depth section needs to be outside the footprint of an arty battery to ensure it isn't suppressed or neutralized with the lead sections. I won't go into detail on whether elements in depth (particularly at Coy and below levels) are reserves tonight, but I no longer think that it would be totally unreasonable to see them that way and some of our allies do describe them as reserves.  That is discussed earlier in this thread.

3.  The focus on counter attack makes for a much more resilient and flexible defence which is optimized for surprise and shock.  If we say depth = counter attack we now have a situation with a Bn with 8 sections in positional defence and 19 in the counter attack role controlled by pl, coy, and the Bn comd.  This raises the question of how does one echelon these counter attack forces?  You don't want a bunch of piecemeal attacks going in and being defeated in detail.

4.  We need to be thinking about outposts.  This was a common practice in both World Wars and if we want to deceive the enemy as to the location of our MDA then outposts are even more important to an army like ours.  It will be clear to an enemy fighting us when they've reached the MDA as the types of forces they're fighting will change.  They'll go from Coyotes/TAPVs to infantry, LAVs, and tanks.  Outposts provided from the infantry battalions will help the covering force in breaking clean and then engage the enemy and deceive him as to the location of the MDA.  They then make their way back to the MDA after delaying the enemy.  They are likely sections drawn from the depth of rifle coy's or the Bn's depth rifle coy.

Offline Haligonian

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Re: Lessons Learned by a LAV Captain - Defense
« Reply #58 on: January 07, 2020, 12:40:39 »
Thoughts continued.

5.  There is a significant battle to be fought in the covering force area that I think sometimes gets paid short shrift.  Covering forces are there to deceive the enemy as to the location of the MDA as well as delaying and attriting the enemy.  They will also provide information to the protected force in terms of where the enemy's main effort lies and the composition and disposition of their forces.  The enemy will know that they will fight a security force prior to the MDA and will either try to penetrate it with their own reconnaissance forces without fighting or they'll use a heavier reconnaissance and security force to push off the covering force.  The attacker will also lead with an advanced guard behind their security element to protect the main body, defeat any minor opposition and prevent delay via deployment of the main body.  The defender wants to prevent an attack on the MDA by anything less than the main body meaning the attacker should arrive at the MDA will little information on its composition and disposition, likely forcing them to conduct probing attacks to gain information and thereby dissolving some of their combat power.  Even better if they commit their main body prior to the MDA.  Ideally, the attacker meets the MDA under conditions of uncertainty and executes a hasty attack into a deliberate defence. 

So, the covering force area sees the collision of two forces each trying to determine the purpose of the other in order to best establish conditions for the others defeat.  As the defender you're looking to delay the attacker as much as possible and disrupt his combat power with the early commitment of his main body being the best outcome.  You'd also want to provide sufficient depth to force him to do things like displace his artillery which might provide gaps in his coverage and additional opportunities to strike.  Early commitment of CS assets like engineers would also be optimal, allowing for attrition against mission critical equipment prior to the MDA. Fighting will cause bunching, concentration of forces, which will provide targets for fires. One of the defenders challenges will be to
determine when elements are allowed to break contact.  This is just as much for the covering force as it is in the MDA.  Trying to assess when you've achieved what you wanted in conjunction with trying to preserve your combat power (your soldiers lives) will be a balance. It seems to me that prior to contact you would want to have visualized what the indicators are for things like the attacker committing his main body and opportunities to attrit the reconnaissance elements and the advanced guard as well as having a specific goal to be accomplished within the covering force area.  The obvious one being to achieve a certain amount of delay or attrition but it could include other objectives for destruction of other specific systems or effects on the enemy's march formation and security.
« Last Edit: January 07, 2020, 13:14:49 by Haligonian »