Author Topic: Dieppe merged thread (70th Anniversary, historical debates, etc.)  (Read 45712 times)

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Offline Tango2Bravo

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Re: Dieppe merged thread (70th Anniversary, historical debates, etc.)
« Reply #50 on: August 20, 2012, 09:49:52 »
The Canadians were involved because they wanted action. Combined Operations wanted to do something. They wanted to see if they could take a port and hold it. For the Canadians the raid was an answer looking for a question. The Royal Navy's refusal to risk cruisers in the channel to support the landings should have cancelled the mission. This also shows that the raid was not really a priority for anyone outside Combinded Operations and the enthusiastic 2nd Division aching for action.

The tactical plan was wildly optimistic. Going through the various objectives I was struck that the planners seemed to discount the German defenders. They figured that surprise would allow the attackers to simply overwhelm the defenders. The plan was, however, very detailed. The Canadians knew about the condition of the beach and outfitted the lead tanks of each wave with a bobbin system to overcome it. They knew about the concrete walls blocking the exits and had sappers tasked the deal with them. Unfortunately the sappers were on foot and were unable to get through the storm of fire. The tactical planners were, therefore, working very hard but without practicality.

I am extremely skeptical about the secret squirrel explanations for the raid. Commandos could have pulled that off on their own.
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Offline R.C.

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Re: Dieppe merged thread (70th Anniversary, historical debates, etc.)
« Reply #51 on: August 20, 2012, 10:11:39 »
An excellent documentary aired yesterday on the History channel called Dieppe Uncovered. Recently declassified documents reveal intelligence-gathering to be the primary objective behind the landing at Dieppe...specifically, a four-rotor Enigma machine recently developed by the Germans, which was to replace the old three-rotor Enigma. British intel had found that German Naval intelligence was housed in a building not far from the port at Dieppe.

The documentary puts to rest the theories that Dieppe was some sort of trial run for later operations, or simply an attempt at seizing a port, or an attempt to establish a second front in continental Europe at the request of the Russians.

Definitely worth a watch, if you get a chance.

http://www.history.ca/ontv/titledetails.aspx?titleid=274917

Apologies to those who had already mentioned this documentary -- I did not realize I had not scrolled all the way down to the bottom of the page and inadvertently missed the last few posts.  :yellow:
« Last Edit: August 20, 2012, 11:28:51 by R.C. »

Offline Old Sweat

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Re: Dieppe merged thread (70th Anniversary, historical debates, etc.)
« Reply #52 on: August 20, 2012, 11:00:18 »
Many of us watched the documentary, but do not accept the premise behind it, as a read of this thread will show. There were too many other factors involved ranging from the Green Beach theory from the book by James Lessor through the claim that the raid was designed to lure the Luftwaffe into a massive air battle (which it won, by the way) and included an attempt by the British to show the Americans a second front was impossible and a demonstration to draw Germans away from the Eastern Front. It merely could have been because Combined Operations Command had been created to conduct raids and it had to keep carrying them out, at lesst in its own corporate mind, or it would lose influence. The Enigma issue may have played a part, but it is unlikely it drove the operation, other than perhaps in the choice of the site.

What I am saying is there would have been a large raid in the summer of 1942, whether the target was Dieppe or someplace else. In fact the place selected was limited by too many factors to list, but the range of the RAF fighters and the vulnerability of the navy including its amphibious element ranked high among them.

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Re: Dieppe merged thread (70th Anniversary, historical debates, etc.)
« Reply #53 on: August 20, 2012, 11:34:57 »
The Germans went to great length to protect those machines. I'd have to guess that in the event of a full scale attack, like Dieppe, a machine that close to the front would've been bundled into a fast car and driven at speed as far as possible from the action.

I don't believe the action, as close as it was, would've required any coded messages of signifigance. The machine would have been idle for the taking. I don't think the Germans would've been willing to take that chance.

Just my  :2c:
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Offline E.R. Campbell

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Re: Dieppe merged thread (70th Anniversary, historical debates, etc.)
« Reply #54 on: August 20, 2012, 12:22:19 »
The Germans went to great length to protect those machines. I'd have to guess that in the event of a full scale attack, like Dieppe, a machine that close to the front would've been bundled into a fast car and driven at speed as far as possible from the action.

I don't believe the action, as close as it was, would've required any coded messages of signifigance. The machine would have been idle for the taking. I don't think the Germans would've been willing to take that chance.

Just my  :2c:


Oddly the machines, per se were not the holy grail. The Brits had them (one? a few? several?) since before the war started. What the folks a Bletchley Park, Dilly Knox, Alan Turing, et al, needed was decoded traffic which they could use to "reverse engineer" the key settings.

My guess is that the Germans must have known (or strongly suspected) that the Enigma machine, itself, was in allied hands, courtesy of the Poles who had captured one in 1939 and, later, through other losses. These machines were, after al, carefully guarded. But I'm also guessing that the Germans were overconfident in the technology and, seriously, underestimated the skill-sets and synergies found at Bletchley Park.


A three rotor Enigma machine

     
Alan Turing                                            Dilwin "Dilly" Knox
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Offline R.C.

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Re: Dieppe merged thread (70th Anniversary, historical debates, etc.)
« Reply #55 on: August 20, 2012, 13:04:25 »
British intelligence, as noted by Prof. O'Keefe in the documentary listed above, had suspected they'd be able to land their hands on a four-rotor Enigma machine at Dieppe. The allies, with assistance of Turing et. al., had been very successful in obtaining information coded using the three-rotor Enigma machine, but the Germans had begun replacing those machines with four-rotor machines, effectively leaving Bletchley Park blind (in terms of their ability to decode messages). A four-rotor machine was obtained some time later however.

The three-rotors are nicely visible in the photo posted above. Each rotor had 26 selection points, exponentially increasing the decoding difficulty.

Offline Old Sweat

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Re: Dieppe merged thread (70th Anniversary, historical debates, etc.)
« Reply #56 on: August 20, 2012, 14:51:49 »
I just watched the program again and had also done some research. The point of contention is whether the raid would have been carried out or not if the enigma machine had not been changed.

Here is a time line I constructed from my research and the program:

1 Feb. Germans adopt four rotor machine for U Boats.

4 Apr. Combined Operations Command planners discuss a list of seven potential targets and Captain Hughes-Hallett selects Dieppe.

5 Apr. Topographical Analysis Committee issues analysis of Dieppe. Note: the possibility exists that this team had collected data on several potential targets - perhaps even the seven candidates noted above - as part of the planning process by Combined Operations.

14 Apr. Chiefs of Staff Committee accept Dieppe as tactically feasible.

16 Apr. Two outline plans considered. One is for an attack on the flanks and the other for a frontal with subsidiary assaults on the flanks. The latter plan is accepted. The record of the discussion is sketchy, however according to the Canadian official history, the British Army opted for the frontal, while the Combined Operations staff had reservations about it and preferred the flank assaults. While Hughes-Hallett was not at the meeting, this suggests the capture of the enigma et al was not being considered.

And the rest of the battle procedure carried on down the route to Dieppe.

The plan to sieze the 'booty' in the harbour and the naval headquarters was overly complicated and every thing had to work exactly as designed and be completed on time for it to succeed. Leaving that aside, it is my contention that there would have been a raid in the summer of 1942 even if the Germans had not introduced the four rotor enigma. Professor O'Keefe has done an impressive job researching the primary source material and building his case from it. The fact still remains that we cannot say there would not have been a raid in any case.

Edit: Additional material on 16 Apr added in yellow.
« Last Edit: August 20, 2012, 15:52:02 by Old Sweat »

Offline Dan M

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Re: Dieppe merged thread (70th Anniversary, historical debates, etc.)
« Reply #57 on: August 20, 2012, 16:49:15 »
Very interesting points have been made about the reasons for the Dieppe raid in this thread.  From what I've read here, and from the interpretations of the evidence that have been cited, I would have to agree with the theory that there is no secret to Dieppe.  It was simply a raid organized by Combined Operations for their own ends using Canadian troops who were available because of theirs.  It does not seem that either the British Army, the RAF or the RN had the least little interest in it.  Radar and Ultra notwithstanding, the raid would have occurred somewhere on the coast of France during the summer of '42, badly planned, with huge casualties.

Mountbatten's folly, I should think.

Cheers,
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Offline charlesm

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Re: Dieppe merged thread (70th Anniversary, historical debates, etc.)
« Reply #58 on: August 20, 2012, 17:20:17 »
I was in Dieppe 3 weeks ago and the town had lots of information on Operation Jubliee. They had kiosks setup where each unit came ashore with a story about each unit. Had a lot of canadian flags flying. It was very nice to see.

But when you are on the beaches lookinng at the town and you see the cliff's on either side, I have to wonder who really thought this through?
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Offline Thucydides

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Re: Dieppe merged thread (70th Anniversary, historical debates, etc.)
« Reply #59 on: August 20, 2012, 20:34:47 »
In the end, a lot of this theorizing has more to do with the human tendency to look for patterns in large amounts of material, and for survivors to try to answer the question of "why"?

No one likes to believe that they have carried out a difficult task or made a great sacrifice for nothing, and Dieppe certainly would seem to have been a very pointless expenditure of blood and treasure. I will not attempt to argue for reasons why or why not (since I am totally unqualified to do so anyway), but stories like "Dieppe Uncovered", "Green Beach" and so on are attempts to rationalize the disaster by assigning it a greater purpose.

I don't believe (like many people here) that these operations were the prime factors behind the Dieppe raid, although I can accept that once the plan was in motion, clever and ambitious people such as the ones depicted in the documentary quickly siezed on it as a means to carry out plans of their own. With a divisional sized force in play, it would be quite easy to slip in one or even several commando units to carry out secondary actions under the cover of the raid, and so there is no reason not to believe that the attempted raids on Naval HQ and the radar station were not planned and partially executed under cover of the larger mission.

Professor O'Keefe has done a marvelous job of uncovering new material and filling in many blank spots about the raid, and we should all give thanks and wish him well regardless if we agree or disagree with his conclusions.
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Offline PanaEng

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Re: Dieppe merged thread (70th Anniversary, historical debates, etc.)
« Reply #60 on: August 21, 2012, 13:11:47 »
 :goodpost:
In the end, a lot of this theorizing has more to do with the human tendency to look for patterns in large amounts of material, and for survivors to try to answer the question of "why"?

No one likes to believe that they have carried out a difficult task or made a great sacrifice for nothing, and Dieppe certainly would seem to have been a very pointless expenditure of blood and treasure. I will not attempt to argue for reasons why or why not (since I am totally unqualified to do so anyway), but stories like "Dieppe Uncovered", "Green Beach" and so on are attempts to rationalize the disaster by assigning it a greater purpose.

I don't believe (like many people here) that these operations were the prime factors behind the Dieppe raid, although I can accept that once the plan was in motion, clever and ambitious people such as the ones depicted in the documentary quickly siezed on it as a means to carry out plans of their own. With a divisional sized force in play, it would be quite easy to slip in one or even several commando units to carry out secondary actions under the cover of the raid, and so there is no reason not to believe that the attempted raids on Naval HQ and the radar station were not planned and partially executed under cover of the larger mission.

Professor O'Keefe has done a marvelous job of uncovering new material and filling in many blank spots about the raid, and we should all give thanks and wish him well regardless if we agree or disagree with his conclusions.
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Offline gordjenkins

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Re: Dieppe merged thread (70th Anniversary, historical debates, etc.)
« Reply #61 on: August 26, 2012, 08:52:49 »
One  final question raised by recent CBC documentary on Dieppe Raid

-   who is this Prof David O'Keefe? - he seems to be an expert in revealing "secrets" and "reasons for"previous Canadian Military disasters "The Secret War Files: The Battle of The Mace -The Battle of the Mace was the last battle of the Normandy Campaign taking place over three days from August 19th to 21st, 1944." http://www.history.ca/ontv/titledetails.aspx?titleid=251045



Tend to agree -if there was a German Navy latest 4 wheel Enigma machine at all in Dieppe- that this was an "add on" to "siezing Freya airborne radar set " etc. (Why would Germans have latest Navy Enigma machine anyway in a remote fishing village right opposite UKcoasts of Dover. Plus why not send in small Commando
Unit to seize -either of above - if either of above were there in first place??)

ps
note 4th wheel -not 3 -on attached German Navy Enigma machine
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Offline E.R. Campbell

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Re: Dieppe merged thread (70th Anniversary, historical debates, etc.)
« Reply #62 on: August 26, 2012, 09:19:54 »
One  final question raised by recent CBC documentary on Dieppe Raid

-   who is this Prof David O'Keefe? - he seems to be an expert in revealing "secrets" and "reasons for"previous Canadian Military disasters "The Secret War Files: The Battle of The Mace -The Battle of the Mace was the last battle of the Normandy Campaign taking place over three days from August 19th to 21st, 1944." http://www.history.ca/ontv/titledetails.aspx?titleid=251045



Tend to agree -if there was a German Navy latest 4 wheel Enigma machine at all in Dieppe- that this was an "add on" to "siezing Freya airborne radar set " etc. (Why would Germans have latest Navy Enigma machine anyway in a remote fishing village right opposite UKcoasts of Dover. Plus why not send in small Commando
Unit to seize -either of above - if either of above were there in first place??)

ps
note 4th wheel -not 3 -on attached German Navy Enigma machine


This is from a self congratulatory publicity 'blurb' from Random House, announcing that it is publishing "the remarkable ultra-secret story behind the greatest raid of the Second World War," so take it with a small grain of salt.

Quote
About David O'Keefe: David R. O'Keefe is an award-winning historian, documentarian and professor at prestigious Marianopolis College in Westmount, Quebec. O'Keefe served with the Royal Highland Regiment (The Black Watch of Canada) in Montreal, and worked as a Signals Intelligence specialist for the Directorate of History and Heritage (DND) that produced the Official History of the Royal Canadian Navy in the Second World War. His publications include influential articles in Canadian Defence Quarterly, the Journal of Canadian Military History, and the Canadian Army Journal, to name but a few. He has served as a historian for History Television in Canada, appeared on CBC Radio, Global Television, UKTV Network in Great Britain, and has numerous television documentaries and publications to his credit.

Marioanopolis College, where Prof O'Keefe teaches, self-describes itself as:

Quote
For more than a century, Marianopolis College has provided a student-friendly environment where motivated young people achieve their goals, grow as global citizens and succeed at university and beyond.

Established in 1908 by the Congrégation de Notre-Dame, Marianopolis began as a university-degree-granting institution for women. In 1969, following educational changes in Quebec, Marianopolis phased out its university-degree programs and admitted its first students to a CEGEP-equivalent program. Also that year, Marianopolis began accepting male students.

Marianopolis College’s track record is one of change, development and growth from its earliest days to the present. Initially called Notre Dame Ladies College, a bilingual school and the first institution of higher learning for English Catholic women in Quebec, it was renamed Marguerite Bourgeoys College in 1926. During World War II, its English sector’s curriculum was named Marianopolis and reorganized along the lines of English-language universities to include programs in general science and honours chemistry.

Today, Marianopolis is recognized as one of the top pre-university colleges in Quebec, with a culturally diverse student body of about 2,000 students culled from the top graduates from high schools, public and private, English and French, from across the province and abroad.

Thanks to the College’s strong academics, small size and diverse activities beyond the classroom, students discover new interests, network with industry leaders and participate in endeavours that provide them with an advantage when they apply to the world’s leading universities. Almost all Marianopolis graduates attend university, a majority in their top choice of program.
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Offline Dan M

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Re: Dieppe merged thread (70th Anniversary, historical debates, etc.)
« Reply #63 on: August 26, 2012, 17:25:07 »
Quote
In 1969...Marianopolis phased out its university-degree programs and admitted its first students to a CEGEP-equivalent program.

So he's a high school teacher (or would be in any other province).  How does that qualify him to use the title Professor?  No mention of him having obtained a PhD.

Still, he's written and published more than I have, so I really shouldn't carp about his academic qualifications.

Cheers,
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Offline gordjenkins

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Re: Dieppe merged thread (70th Anniversary, historical debates, etc.)
« Reply #64 on: October 30, 2012, 14:50:40 »
Tend to agree with Dan -
-Mountbatten -and remember Montgommery was involved in planning also- but got out at last minute.
As for High School CGEP teacher theory that raid was for Navy Enigma machine - check out his CGEP at
http://www.marianopolis.edu/
this theory is ludicrous!
And it is being legitimized by special presentation at War Museum Ottawa during Remembrance Day week
as "THE reason   -"Dieppe Uncovered" -sponsored by Veterans affairs Canadaon 6 Nov if you care to attend.
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Offline GAP

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Were Allied Soldiers Betrayed At Dieppe?
« Reply #65 on: April 17, 2013, 13:05:53 »
Not sure if this has been posted already, but an interesting theory....

Were Allied Soldiers Betrayed At Dieppe? New book raises questions on an infamous World War Two battle
http://boxscorenews.com/were-allied-soldiers-betrayed-at-dieppe-new-book-raises-questions-on-an-in-p55752-68.htm

Stryker-Indigo Media - NEW YORK (April 16, 2013) - New and troubling accusations surrounding the controversial 1942 Battle of Dieppe are being raised, pointing a damning finger at American and British news organizations, including "Time" and "Life" magazines, accusing them of leaking pre-raid information to the Germans resulting in the deaths, woundings, and capture of over 4,300 American, British and Canadian soldiers.
 
In their first major book release in almost nine years, best-selling Canadian authors George and Darril Fosty, in their new book "Where Brave Men Fall: The Battle of Dieppe and the Allied Espionage War Against Hitler, 1939-1942", explore the controversial 1942 Battle of Dieppe looking at pre-raid advertisements, in what the authors claim, were part of a complex campaign initiated at the highest levels of American and British political and military circles designed to tip off the Germans prior to the August 1942 raid and thus ensuring the raid's failure. The revelations, stunning in detail and scope, are the latest accusations to surface concerning the battle.
much more on link
« Last Edit: April 17, 2013, 13:09:46 by GAP »
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Offline Colin P

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Re: Were Allied Soldiers Betrayed At Dieppe?
« Reply #66 on: April 17, 2013, 16:33:22 »
Link to the modern Dieppe
https://maps.google.ca/maps?q=Dieppe,+France&hl=en&ll=49.927411,1.067648&spn=0.044866,0.111494&sll=49.257735,-123.123904&sspn=0.131082,0.21801&oq=dieppe&t=h&hnear=Dieppe,+Seine-Maritime,+Upper+Normandy,+France&z=14

Coded messages in radio programs was common, however this means that the Germans had a very robust intelligence service network that was not unraveled, possibly based on bitter IRA types?. I don't really buy the deliberate leaking. A successful raid would have far more effect on forcing the Germans to double their defense efforts, than a failed one. There are many other ways for the Germans to figure what was the likely attack location.

Offline Old Sweat

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Re: Were Allied Soldiers Betrayed At Dieppe?
« Reply #67 on: April 17, 2013, 20:19:03 »
Now the Dieppe raid was originally titled Operation RUTTER and was planned for early July. On 7 July it was cancelled and three days later resurrected as Operation JUBILEE to be executed on 19 August. Given the technology of the time, was it possible to design ads and contract with publications to insert them in less than six weeks? Had similar adds appeared in late June or early July?

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Re: Were Allied Soldiers Betrayed At Dieppe?
« Reply #68 on: April 17, 2013, 20:27:51 »
There were similar coincidences with D-Day as well. The one that stands out is the crossword puzzle that had answers which were codenames for the operation and various targets.
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Re: Were Allied Soldiers Betrayed At Dieppe?
« Reply #69 on: April 17, 2013, 20:56:56 »
Coded messages in radio programs was common, <snip>

An example was, "Nous allons rendre visite a Maginot ce soir."

Andre Maginot, the French Minister of War who gave his name to the famous "Line", had been born in Revigny.

Bomber Command had "visited" Revigny on the nights of 12/13 and 14/15 July, 1944. Both raids had been failures with 17 Lancasters shot down.

Broadcast by the BBC during the afternoon of 18 July, it was a warning, given as one of the conditions for the continued bombing of French railway centres.

That night, 24 more of the Lancasters sent to Revigny were shot down. 22 per cent of the force.

The question is, if French officials knew that an attack was heading for Revigny that night, did the Luftwaffe also know?


 
« Last Edit: April 18, 2013, 00:25:04 by mariomike »
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Lessons learned at Dieppe?
« Reply #70 on: November 15, 2016, 22:56:02 »
Hi folks,
Recently, I've been reading a lot about the Dieppe Raid, and while most articles and books I've come across state that it was a total failure, many say that it was valuable and lessons learned during this raid were applied during D-Day...

I was wondering if there is any evidence of the Allies directly changing strategies due to the outcome of Dieppe, or if saying that 'we learned a lot' is just easier to digest. For the info I have found regarding the lessons learned, most of it seems like common sense that shouldn't need to be learned, such as the need for surprise and air support. Are there any good books that you could recommend that focus on strategies learned during Dieppe and later applied on D-Day?
Thanks!

Offline Larry Strong

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Re: Lessons learned at Dieppe?
« Reply #71 on: November 16, 2016, 09:01:08 »
New research suggests the real intent of the historic raid on Dieppe in 1942 was to steal a "Ultra" machine that would help crack top-secret German codes with the release of once-classified and ultra-secret war files.

http://globalnews.ca/news/274605/breaking-german-codes-real-reason-for-1942-dieppe-raid-historian/

http://www.canadashistory.ca/Community/Community-Features/Articles/A-New-Look-at-WW2-Dieppe-Raid


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Larry
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Offline Chispa

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Re: Lessons learned at Dieppe?
« Reply #72 on: November 24, 2016, 11:20:53 »
First thank U too the Mods for unlocking the thread, we must remember way too many camps, and vigorously debated since the needless aftermath.:brit poppy:


Hi folks,
Recently, I've been reading a lot about the Dieppe Raid, and while most articles and books I've come across state that it was a total failure, many say that it was valuable and lessons learned during this raid were applied during D-Day...

I was wondering if there is any evidence of the Allies directly changing strategies due to the outcome of Dieppe, or if saying that 'we learned a lot' is just easier to digest. For the info I have found regarding the lessons learned, most of it seems like common sense that shouldn't need to be learned, such as the need for surprise and air support. Are there any good books that you could recommend that focus on strategies learned during Dieppe and later applied on D-Day?
Thanks!


If you read that much on Dieppe your head must be spinning, considering the vast amount of historians/authors, questionable narratives, suggestions. As posted by Mr. Larry Strong; have you read One Day in August by Cdn and very Black Watch military historian David R. O'keefe? It's on special at Indigo hard cover for $10.00, regular price $31. great stocking stuffer: https://www.chapters.indigo.ca/en-ca/books/product/9780345807694-item.html?mkwid=sglCNn6VL_dc&pcrid=44154474422&pkw=&pmt=&s_campaign=goo-Shopping_Books&gclid=CNSCo7HiwdACFZZMDQodHyoONA


Although some have been critical of the findings, It's considered by many the benchmark in the Deippe saga; David O'Keefe rewrites history, the Prof., humbly replied; "there are still many questions need answering, I believe this is just the tip of the iceberg."

The Dieppe Raid and the Question of German Foreknowledge Captain S.W. Roskill, Journal of the Royal United Service Institution 109  (Feb 1, 1964): 27.

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03071846409419700


Ross Munro’s anecdote while in the landing craft with eight others: “Even before we put to sea some had ominous feeling about what was ahead of them at the other side.”

Mountbatten: “I felt that even if the Germans knew that an operation had been planned against Dieppe and then abandoned, that the very last thing they'd ever imagine is we would be so stupid as to lay on the same operation again.”

David O’Keefe: Ian Fleming's Commandos, X Platoon from the Royal Marine Commando (later No. 40 (Royal Marine) Commando and No 30 Assault Unit) who made their debut at the core of the Dieppe Raid on August 19th 1942. Notice how young and youthful they were before the raid in the first two photos leading up to Dieppe and their "official" debut as 30AU in Torch two months later. The final photos show the strain of three years of war which tends to make one grow up fast. Perhaps too fast. Photos courtesy of Paul McGrath pictured prominently in all and Commando Veterans Archive.

Fallow link for all photos: https://www.facebook.com/1382094788690080/photos/pcb.1829681473931407/1829652913934263/?type=3&theater


Thursday, August 16, 2012: British Intelligence Told Germans in Advance of Dieppe Raid: By Donald Sensing.

On 19 August 1942, a force of 4,963 Canadian troops, accompanied by just over a thousand British soldiers, 50 US Rangers and 15 Frenchmen, conducted the catastrophe of Operation Jubilee. According to O’Keefe’s research, British naval officers used Operation Jubilee to target the German-made Enigma code machine, an electro-mechanical piece of equipment that used a series of rotors for the encryption and decryption of secret messages. ...

While the British were successful breaking into the three-rotor Enigma machines, everything changed on February 1, 1942, when the Germans introduced the four-rotor Enigma device — instantly blacking out Bletchley Park.

According to files, British naval intelligence believed that in order to crack the four-rotor Enigma machine, a pinch raid was necessary. A successful pinch would mean secretly stealing parts of the machine, code books and setting sheets.

This may well be, with the other objectives listed above being also true, but of lesser strategic importance. It doesn't change the fact that the SIS blew the secrecy of the whole show…….

Three months later a similarly accurate-but-late message was sent warning of a commando raid against the French port of St. Nazaire, where the destroyer Campbelltown, loaded with explosives, was remotely crashed into the only drydock along that coast large enough to handle German U-boats.

The SIS was given permission to send just such a too-late-but-true message to the Germans about the Dieppe raid. The message was to be sent Monday evening the 18th of August, about 12 hours after the Allied forces had landed.

The SIS was not told that the landing was postponed until Tuesday. The Germans received the message Monday evening, alerted their forces at Dieppe and were waiting before dawn on the 19th.

Lovell writes that a director of Britain's Special Operation, Executive told him that the SIS operation escaped being closed down by the thinnest of margins, surviving only when a Briton pointed out that the doubled agent's standing with the Abwehr could not possibly be higher, and that the Germans would now believe anything he told them.

Claiming to have very highly-placed sources deep within General Dwight D. Eisenhower's headquarters, the agent became deeply involved in deception operations covering Operation Overlord, the invasion of France in 1944. Most important was to deceive the Germans of the place and time of the invasion. I'll let Lovell finish the story (click for larger image): http://senseofevents.blogspot.ca/2012/08/british-intelligence-told-germans-in.html



C.U.
« Last Edit: November 24, 2016, 12:28:22 by Chispa »
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Offline Old Sweat

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Re: Dieppe merged thread (70th Anniversary, historical debates, etc.)
« Reply #73 on: November 25, 2016, 07:07:55 »
To me, wearing my cynic's badge, is that the main lesson of Dieppe was the Combined Operations Command had outlived its usefulness. There certainly was a place for it in the dear days of 1940 and 1941, but by mid-1942 the initiative was shifting to the Allies.

Dieppe was planned as a divisional raid, with two brigades (including their headquarters) landing, completing fairly challenging tactical tasks and withdrawing in one day. It was conceived as a raid, but evolved into a mini-imnvasion. Just as a fighting patrol is not a battalion attack, a multi-battalion assault landing on several beaches was not a raid. The Combined Operations planners were enthusiastic amateurs who seemed to have been wildly optimistic. For example, it should have been obvious it would have been difficult to achieve surprise with staggered H-Hours. As a gunner, I can't avoid adding that the fire plan was a farce.

After Dieppe the planning for the return to Europe fell under the purview of an organization titled Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC) and this organization developed the initial concept of operations and outline plan for D Day.

Offline Chispa

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Re: Dieppe merged thread (70th Anniversary, historical debates, etc.)
« Reply #74 on: November 26, 2016, 12:37:21 »
To me, wearing my cynic's badge, is that the main lesson of Dieppe was the Combined Operations Command had outlived its usefulness. There certainly was a place for it in the dear days of 1940 and 1941, but by mid-1942 the initiative was shifting to the Allies.

Dieppe was planned as a divisional raid, with two brigades (including their headquarters) landing, completing fairly challenging tactical tasks and withdrawing in one day. It was conceived as a raid, but evolved into a mini-imnvasion. Just as a fighting patrol is not a battalion attack, a multi-battalion assault landing on several beaches was not a raid. The Combined Operations planners were enthusiastic amateurs who seemed to have been wildly optimistic. For example, it should have been obvious it would have been difficult to achieve surprise with staggered H-Hours. As a gunner, I can't avoid adding that the fire plan was a farce.

After Dieppe the planning for the return to Europe fell under the purview of an organization titled Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC) and this organization developed the initial concept of operations and outline plan for D Day.


Many support that narrative, COC in the top 5 of lessons learned, the "planners" were biting on more then they could chew. 


CBC Digital Archives 1942: Carnage on the beaches of Dieppe LISTEN 00:00 14:35

"We have suffered heavy losses, and I saw our men die," says CBC Radio's Robert Bowman, just returned from the bloody beaches of Dieppe. The grim reality of what happened in France yeserday is just setting in: hundreds of Canadians killed, untold numbers taken prisoner. Reading from grimy notes taken during his eight hours ashore, Bowman does not use words like "failure" or "disaster." Instead, he lauds the bravery of the troops, and the lessons learned from the assault.

http://www.cbc.ca/archives/entry/1942-carnage-on-the-beaches-of-dieppe

Just elaborating on COC: Arising from the armistice concluded by France with Germany in June 1940 and the evacuation of British forces from the Continent, a small organisation was established to take command of subsequent raiding operations against enemy territory and to provide advice on combined assaults. From this emerged a distinct Combined Operations Headquarters, staffed by all three services, but independent of all of them and under the command of a Director of Combined Operations. Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Roger Keyes, was appointed first director in July 1940; he was succeeded in October 1941 by Commodore Lord Louis Mountbatten with the title Adviser on Combined Operations. In March 1942 this title was altered to Chief of Combined Operations; it was also decided that the Chief of Combined Operations should attend meetings of the Chiefs of Staff as a full member whenever major issues were in question and, as previously, when his own combined operations or any special matters in which he was concerned were under consideration.

From the establishment of a Combined Training Centre in August 1940 at Inveraray, Argyllshire, the Combined Operations Command expanded rapidly both within the United Kingdom and overseas, notably in the Middle East and India. In 1942 it sent a permanent representative to the Joint Staffs Mission in Washington and in the same year a Combined Operations Experimental Establishment was set up at Appledore, Devon. This establishment was much involved in the investigation of problems likely to be encountered on the beaches in connection with an invasion of Europe, particularly as regards the landing of armoured vehicles, stores, supplies, etc. Following the successful invasion of Normandy in 1944, a similar establishment was set up in India to carry out the developments and trials necessary in the very different conditions in the Far East.

From its formation, Combined Operations Headquarters maintained a close, though sometimes strained, contact on the naval side with the Admiralty, which set up a number of combined operations branches within its own departments, particularly in relation to operations, materials and personnel. Raiding forces, such as commandos, came under the command of Combined Operations Headquarters, except when they were employed as part of larger operations. Throughout the war Combined Operations Headquarters played a key role in the development of offensive operations against the enemy. This was notably the case in the raid on Dieppe in August 1942 and the preparation and planning of the North Africa and Sicily campaigns in 1942 to 1943, the invasion of Europe in 1944 and similarly, through its directorate in India, in operations in the Far East.

Following the war it was the Admiralty view that Combined Operations Headquarters should cease to be an independent organisation and should be replaced by a joint Combined Operational Planning Staff within the Chiefs of Staff organisation. In 1947, however, it was decided that Combined Operations Headquarters should continue to be responsible for policy, training and technique in amphibious warfare under the direction of the Chiefs of Staff; at the same time the title of chief of combined operations was changed to Chief of Combined Operations Staff and responsibility for Combined Operations estimates was transferred from the Service ministries to the newly-established Ministry of Defence. On 1 April 1948 Combined Operations Headquarters was placed under the administration of that ministry and in 1951 it was re-named Amphibious Warfare Headquarters.

https://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C5760


According too sources: British Combined Operations formed spring of 1940 "to coordinate commando raids along the German-occupied coast of Europe utilizing the integrated support of the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force. In its seven years of existence, it had four commanders. The first lasted only about a month. Its second, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger Keyes, lasted about a year before resigning in October 1941 due to an administrative reorganization that he saw diminish his independence."


COMBINED OPERATIONS THE OFFICIAL STORY OF THE COMMANDOS
by LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN: Published 1943.


Free download of book on PDF: https://archive.org/details/combinedoperatio006231mbp


“Too large to be a symbol, too small to be a success.” — Lord Haw Haw, German propagandist commenting on the Dieppe raid.

Illusive Winston Churchill’s explanation; the supposed raid was in fact a “reconnaissance in force.”

Montgomery: “To assault and capture a port quickly, both troops and tanks would have to go in over the main beaches confronting the town, relying on heavy bombardment and surprise to neutralise the defences.”

The British records show the raid party for Dieppe given 16 objects, one mainly being, Pinch secret documents from German Div., H.Q., at Arques-La Bataille.

Adding more:

After humiliated in June, retreating, rescued on mass from Dunkirk, France, it dawned on the British High Brass returning would require new techniques, equipment, etc., for amphibious landings. Their goal, efficiently combining air, land and sea force operations, hence styled combined operations. They first created a task force overseeing labelled as Directorate for Combined Operations (DCO), authorised on July 1940.

Prior of Op Rutter scuttled on 6th July, British Chiefs of Staff approved Mountbatten’s recommendation; if the raid was cancelled it would be rejuvenated. In B. Loring Villa’s 1989 Unauthorized Action: Once Op. Rutter cancelled, Winston Churchill, British Chiefs of staff never authorised, re-launching or renamed the operation. Without their knowledge, Admiral Mountbatten took “unauthorised action,” revising the raid incognito.


Quote
It was conceived as a raid, but evolved into a mini-imnvasion. Just as a fighting patrol is not a battalion attack, a multi-battalion assault landing on several beaches was not a raid.

I've heard it styled as a small-invasion, that argument is questionable considering the definition, size of force involved in a "raid" is not relevant, the action taken is. Post aftermath Churchill used it to his advantage, all smoke and mirrors, owing prior to the incident Russia and American were busting his bollocks concerning opening a second front. Churchill stated after Dieppe: With so much fight amongst use, now we can concentrate on fighting Germans.

IMO, mini or small does not apply to the word invasion, however if that small force conquers' ground per say 300 conquistadors, that is certainly a small mini-invasion force.


Invasion Vs Raid.

Invasion: A military action consisting of armed forces of one geopolitical entity entering territory controlled by another such entity, generally with the objective of conquering territory or altering the established government. (figuratively) The entry of a large group into a new area.

Raid: Mission which has a specific purpose and is not normally intended to capture and hold terrain, but instead finish with the raiding force quickly retreating to a previous defended position prior to enemy forces being able to respond in a co-ordinated manner or formulate a counter-attack. A raiding group may consist of combatants specially trained in this tactic, such as commandos, or as a special mission assigned to any general troops. Raids are often a standard tactic in irregular warfare, employed by warriors, guerrilla fighters, or other irregular military forces.

During the Second World War, the British set up the Combined Operations Headquarters organised harassing raids against the Germans in Europe. The first operation conducted by a "commando" formation, known as Operation Ambassador, took place in July 1940, but it was a small-scale operation that resulted in negligible success. The next major raid was Operation Claymore, which was launched in March 1941 against the Lofoten Islands.[19] Throughout the war there were many other operations of varied size, ranging from small scale operations like those undertaken by Z Special Unit against the Japanese in the Pacific, such as Project Opossum,[20] to Operation Chariot – a raid on Saint-Nazaire – and the Dieppe Raid, which was a large scale raid employing about 6,000 soldiers, over 200 ships and 74 squadrons of aircraft intended to take and hold Dieppe sufficiently to cause sufficient destruction to the port.[21] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Raid_(military)


COC was only authorised for small with provisions for large scale raids. Prime war role of the COC, a center for experimentation, innovations, planning in development of equipment and techniques essential too carrying out successful amphibious operations.



C.U.
« Last Edit: November 27, 2016, 12:41:30 by Chispa »
History is not like playing horseshoes where close enough counts; those that have done the proper legwork have a responsibility to insure a detailed accurate account. Canada at War Blog  http://wp.me/55eja