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Canadian Surface Combatant RFQ

Kirkhill

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I think the point is though, what is a class, what is a batch, what is a flight, what is simply a different ship with a different load out?

If Irving builds the same hulls with the same power plants and the same bridges, with the same wireways, ducts and pipes, but not all of those conduits are filled identically because they are supporting different weapons, sensors and comms, do the costs of the boats change?

The estimates should say they will because the weight of the ships will drop. But the amount of work to build the hulls is probably identical. As is the amount of steel.

The project costs may drop, because fewer missiles will be needed and acquired, fewer high end radars and other sensors.

But if we put a 32 cell Strike Length Mk41 VLS on board, but don't fill it with Tomahawks or SM-6s, how much money do we save on the build?

I'm just curious.



On the other hand there is the Multi-Role Support Ship and the Type 31/32 frigates being considered by the RN (8+5+5).

Sometimes I wonder how the RN manages to do it. So many ships of so many types in so many places delivered so fast.
 

suffolkowner

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I think the point is though, what is a class, what is a batch, what is a flight, what is simply a different ship with a different load out?

If Irving builds the same hulls with the same power plants and the same bridges, with the same wireways, ducts and pipes, but not all of those conduits are filled identically because they are supporting different weapons, sensors and comms, do the costs of the boats change?

The estimates should say they will because the weight of the ships will drop. But the amount of work to build the hulls is probably identical. As is the amount of steel.

The project costs may drop, because fewer missiles will be needed and acquired, fewer high end radars and other sensors.

But if we put a 32 cell Strike Length Mk41 VLS on board, but don't fill it with Tomahawks or SM-6s, how much money do we save on the build?

I'm just curious.



On the other hand there is the Multi-Role Support Ship and the Type 31/32 frigates being considered by the RN (8+5+5).

Sometimes I wonder how the RN manages to do it. So many ships of so many types in so many places delivered so fast.
Personally I think the RN has way too many ship designs on the go but I guess the continual design and build keeps everyone fresh

River Class
Type 23
Type 26
Type 45
Type 31
Type 32
Type 83

but it seems the same for their Army too
 

dapaterson

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As I understand, the hulls and sensor suites will be fixed, weapons modular, with incremental improvements between flights, which in turn can be integrated into prior flights during the regularly scheduled extended docking periods.

The battlespace integration between platforms means you could have HMCS Whatever firing HMCS Wherever's SM2 missiles to intercept an attack against HMCS Whenever.
 

Kirkhill

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The interesting bits are between minutes 20 and 25 (plus or minus a couple)

Looking over the SeaSpan Multi-Purpose Vessel offer I see two or three things.

First off it is a long build, Comparable to the CSC build. 16 vessels over 20 years or so.

Secondly the base build looks an awful like the AOPS's original mother concept - The Norwegian Coast Guard's Svalbard - complete with the Svalbard's original power train and the ability to break 1st year ice (0.9m ice+ 0.3m snow)

99.9 m by 6.2m by 19.5m displacing 8200 tonnes full load and 6200 tonnes light. 50 Crew

Same ball park as the AOPS, as the Svalbard and the CSC.

Thirdly the vessel is to replace three different vessels so the 16 vessels will be built in three flights

6 to replace the HEMTVs
6 to replace the MEMTVs
4 to replace the OPVs

There is room to rethink the design after every flight. There is an intention to rethink the power plant in the third flight in the initial planning - leaning towards hydrogen. The Norwegians are favouring Natural Gas these days. They, and BC, have a lot available and they think it is clean.

So, on one hand we have the RCN betting the farm on a single spec for 15 ships while the Coast Guard is working with room for three specs over 16 ships. Both ships are of similar size and displacement.
 

Kirkhill

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Personally I think the RN has way too many ship designs on the go but I guess the continual design and build keeps everyone fresh

River Class
Type 23
Type 26
Type 45
Type 31
Type 32
Type 83

but it seems the same for their Army too

River Class has been in service since 2003 and there are no additional vessels planned. It will be replaced by Type 31s and/or Type 32s.

Type 23 has been in service since 1987 and is being withdrawn from service now to be replaced by the Type 26s post 2027 or there abouts

Type 45 has been in service since 2003 with the last delivery in 2010. The Type 83 is in the planning stages as the Type 45 replacement from the early 2030s.

Type 31 is building now as a replacement for the Rivers which seem to be something of a stop gap. The Rivers are likely to work in concert with the three Bay Class LSDAs acting as interim Multi-Role Support ships (Previously known as Littoral Strike Ships). The Type 31s will likely start their working life with the LSDAs and then move on to supporting the MRSSs when they are introduced in the early 30s. By that time the 32s will be defined and scheduled.

The point seems to be that the RN will not have a large batch of obsolescent ships in their fleet, nor will they have a lot of different designs. What they will have is a fleet made up of smaller batches of vessels matched to the most current shipbuilding technologies, weapons and adversaries. And that can work in support of their more long-lived capital ships like their CVs, SSBNs and LPDs.

Circa 2032, when the first Cdn Type 26 is commissioning the RN will be operating a fleet of 4 SSBNs, 7 SSNs, 2 CVs, 2 LPDs, 6-8 MRSSs, 6 Type 45s with their Type 83 replacements building, 5 Type 26s with 3 more building, 5 Type 31s with 5 more Type 32s building. There may be one or two Rivers or Type 23s still in service.
 

Kirkhill

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I meant to include the MPV design details and image - This is the 6 ship Flight One proposal to replace the existing HEMTVs.


1632695364954.png
 

Kirkhill

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No_OPV_W303_Svalbard-1.png


hmcs-aops-line1.gif
AOPS Original


image-asset.jpeg
AOPS Revised
 

Kirkhill

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Or, looking at another way, Canada is going to end up with 24 Svalbard variants in her fleet. 8 built by Irving and 16 by SeaSpan. 6 operated by the Navy and 18 by the Coast Guard.

Here's a thought. Give the Coast Guard the third AOPS as soon as she completes trials to play with for a while. Let them figure out what they can make do with and what they really need and then pass the word back to Irving and SeaSpan before final designs are drawn up.

LOA​
BOA​
Draught​
Displacement​
Heavy​
Thrusters​
Engines​
Svalbard​
103.7​
19.1​
6.5​
6300​
2x 5 MW​
13 MW​
AOPS 2008​
109.6​
18.2​
7​
6940​
2x 7.5 MW​
18 MW​
AOPS 2012​
98​
19​
5.75​
5874​
2x 4.5 MW​
13.2 MW​
AOPS ISY​
103.6​
19​
5200​
HdW RCN​
103​
19​
6440​
2x 4.5 MW​
14.4 MW​
MPV​
99.9
19.5​
6.2​
6200​
8200​
2x 3.5 MW​
10 MW​
 
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Uzlu

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If Irving builds the same hulls with the same power plants and the same bridges, with the same wireways, ducts and pipes, but not all of those conduits are filled identically because they are supporting different weapons, sensors and comms, do the costs of the boats change?
Yes. Inflation in building warships is greater than the general rate of inflation.
The estimates should say they will because the weight of the ships will drop.
Why should displacement drop? Displacement usually increases. Since the Second World War, displacements of frigates and destroyers have been on a steady upward trend.
But the amount of work to build the hulls is probably identical. As is the amount of steel.
But how about the amount of work to redesign the ships?
The project costs may drop, because fewer missiles will be needed and acquired, fewer high end radars and other sensors.
I doubt the project costs will drop. Because you have to add increased costs for redesigns, you have to add increased costs for spare parts, you have to add increased costs for repairs, you have to add increased costs for maintenance, you have to add increased costs for refits, and you have to add increased costs for training.

So the Royal Canadian Navy ends up paying more money for less capable frigates. The original plan was to build two classes of frigates. This plan was rejected for the reasons above. These fifteen frigates, however, will probably be built in batches—gradual improvements in later batches.
Sometimes I wonder how the RN manages to do it. So many ships of so many types in so many places delivered so fast.
This is why a constant-build strategy is important. More money also helps.
 

Kirkhill

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Yes. Inflation in building warships is greater than the general rate of inflation.

Why should displacement drop? Displacement usually increases. Since the Second World War, displacements of frigates and destroyers have been on a steady upward trend.

But how about the amount of work to redesign the ships?

I doubt the project costs will drop. Because you have to add increased costs for redesigns, you have to add increased costs for spare parts, you have to add increased costs for repairs, you have to add increased costs for maintenance, you have to add increased costs for refits, and you have to add increased costs for training.

So the Royal Canadian Navy ends up paying more money for less capable frigates. The original plan was to build two classes of frigates. This plan was rejected for the reasons above. These fifteen frigates, however, will probably be built in batches—gradual improvements in later batches.

This is why a constant-build strategy is important. More money also helps.

My thought was running along the lines of tossing deadweight (capabilities) overboard and by definition lightening ship.

My interest is in how valid the estimation process based on ship's weight is. A fully loaded ship of 9400 tonnes, with fuel and munitions is estimated to cost a given amount. How much is saved by building a ship fitted for but not with? Lets say you reduce the weight to light ship weight. 5700 tonnes. Which is the valid weight for estimating the cost of the ship?

If we build 15 ships at 5700 tonnes each that are perfectly functional but have an additional few thousand tonnes of disposable tonnage. Tonnage that can be converted into capabilities when the need evolves.

Is the full load estimate or the light ship estimate the right one?

As to changing designs at this stage, I am fully aware of how much engineering firms enjoy Engineering Changes. But there again we have cut no steel and we are almost a decade away from first delivery. We might have a bit of time to consider the situation.
 

Uzlu

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My thought was running along the lines of tossing deadweight (capabilities) overboard and by definition lightening ship.

My interest is in how valid the estimation process based on ship's weight is. A fully loaded ship of 9400 tonnes, with fuel and munitions is estimated to cost a given amount. How much is saved by building a ship fitted for but not with? Lets say you reduce the weight to light ship weight. 5700 tonnes. Which is the valid weight for estimating the cost of the ship?

If we build 15 ships at 5700 tonnes each that are perfectly functional but have an additional few thousand tonnes of disposable tonnage. Tonnage that can be converted into capabilities when the need evolves.

Is the full load estimate or the light ship estimate the right one?

As to changing designs at this stage, I am fully aware of how much engineering firms enjoy Engineering Changes. But there again we have cut no steel and we are almost a decade away from first delivery. We might have a bit of time to consider the situation.
Are you proposing that the Royal Canadian Navy operates fifteen offshore patrol vessels based on the Type 26 and using AN/SPY-7(V)1 and the Aegis Combat System? If a shooting war begins, how long do you think it will take to convert these offshore patrol vessels to frigates? Will foreign countries supply Canada with the equipment?

Do you think the Americans and Europeans will supply us with munitions? Will the Americans and our other NATO allies be happy with the idea of Canada operating fifteen offshore patrol vessels instead of fifteen frigates? What about our promise to the Americans to bolster our armed forces by spending a minimum of 2% of our gross domestic product on our armed forces?
 

Kirkhill

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Are you proposing that the Royal Canadian Navy operates fifteen offshore patrol vessels based on the Type 26 and using AN/SPY-7(V)1 and the Aegis Combat System? If a shooting war begins, how long do you think it will take to convert these offshore patrol vessels to frigates? Will foreign countries supply Canada with the equipment?

Do you think the Americans and Europeans will supply us with munitions? Will the Americans and our other NATO allies be happy with the idea of Canada operating fifteen offshore patrol vessels instead of fifteen frigates? What about our promise to the Americans to bolster our armed forces by spending a minimum of 2% of our gross domestic product on our armed forces?

I am not proposing so much as wondering.

Our 280s were launched in 1972 and served to 2017. 45 years.
The CPFs were commissioned between 1992 and 1996. They are now 25 to 30 years old. They will be 35 to 40 years old before their first replacement joins them. At a build rate of one a year they will be 50 to 60 years old before the last one is replaced sometime round about 2050.

The capabilities that you are suggesting will not, in my opinion, transform the fleet. There will be no surge in new capabilities. They will leak into the fleet. And while they are leaking into the fleet the nature of the enemy, the fight and our allies are likely to be changing.

My sense is that we are picking a point on the horizon and setting a 30 year course. I am trying to get a sense of how we are managing that journey and trying to compare it to others facing the same situation.

And wondering if a high end / low end mix that can easily be converted and upgraded with updates every decade or so is a viable alternate.
 

Underway

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Are there that many differences between the first of the Halifax’s and the later ships?

The ships are old enough and have had enough refits that there are only a few things that go back to the initial build. They are generally structural or marine system related. To add to NP's comment (below) there are also two variants in how the Emerg Fuel Tank works. VDQ quarterdeck is 2 feet lower than the other ships and needed to have a "raised" deck patch so that the CANTASS could fit. That was a change that was not communicated to Davie by St. John's and thus when the spool was installed it didn't fit. So a patch was installed.

A lot of minor things, like trunking and wiring runs in slightly different locations, but normally only really an issue when you are trying to install things years later. Some of those details are left to the installers discretion on the build drawings, but things like plumbing runs for the sinks can vary depending on who was setting it up. Usually there are tolerances on all the measurements as well, but sometimes the individual +/- 5 mm can add up to everything being shifted over a foot when you use relative positions on the drawings.

There are a few equipment design differences; like the fuel main has two setups (ring main vice normal distribution), plus 3 different versions of the steering system. Not really sure about the background on the first one, but on the 2nd one was because the manufacturer went out of business or something during the build. Most people have never see that though, so really only matters for the technicians. In general, if you know how to get from A to B on one CPF, you can do it on the others.

They drift apart over the years as well, but with a few known exceptions for some compartment layouts, it's still effectively the same ship. Takes a lot of work to make sure all the safety equipment is kept in the same spots and things like that, but that's all part of the configuration management program (and that includes ship specific particularization of the drawings as required).

Configuration management is brutal. I agree that ships drift apart in various ways. Not every ship has a gym right now either but the refits are working on that.

CSE systems are generally aligned between ships however software configurations are not. There are incremental improvements that happen when a ship goes into a docking work period. Not all ships currently have 3 MASS launchers but eventually will. Not all ships currently have NRWS but eventually will. The IT architecture for each ship is mostly aligned but that's always in flux. Software versions are never aligned for various systems as sometimes you need hardware improvements.
 

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A far as the ability to change things as we go I can tell you that during the design process you can often identify areas that need to be changed or are suboptimal.

At some point, you run out of time, money, or even long lead purchases box you into a solution space that isn't ideal. You can't change the design anymore. So building in a Flight is a good way to mitigate that. You build the first three ships, when the final design is approved you can immediately switch over to design changes for the next four or so. This is particularly important for any computer-related assets. Software and hardware have short cycles and you can look at improvements almost immediately. Heck, the first ship's Wifi will probably be delivered already obsolete as the lead times for equipment purchases is likely 3-4 years.
 

Uzlu

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And wondering if a high end / low end mix that can easily be converted and upgraded with updates every decade or so is a viable alternate.
The Royal Canadian Navy also thought about the idea of a high-low mix of warships—high-end air defence and lower-end general purpose.
By Captain Christopher Nucci, Royal Canadian Navy

Canada is pursuing a single class of 15 surface combatants for the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), unlike some of its allies who are building multiple classes of more specialized ships. A single variant Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC) is better than the project’s original vision of two variants based on a common hull (the first a task group command/air-defense version, the other a more general-purpose/antisubmarine warfare version). While all naval force structure is essentially driven by national strategic defense and security interests, a single-class solution is based on three principal factors. First, it fits best for Canada’s unique naval requirements shaped by its geography, modest fleet size, and the RCN’s operational needs. Second, it optimizes effectiveness now and into the future, while responsibly seeking maximum cost efficiencies. Finally, it is an innovative approach that has only recently become both practical and advantageous because of recent technological developments, such as convergence and digitization.

The General Purpose Warship Moment

Naval force planning decisions must coexist in harmony with decisions regarding a navy’s overall fleet mix of capital ships, “high-end” surface combatants, “low-end” combatants, and submarines—and the roles of each type.1 In particular, surface combatants have historically fulfilled one or two warfare roles, such as antiair and antisubmarine warfare. Until recently, fielding an affordable “general purpose warship” was too difficult to achieve. The technological limitations of the latter half of the 20th century and into the first decade of the 21st imposed inescapable constraints stemming from the necessary physical size and power requirements of electronics and equipment, along with the expensive and challenging integration of the various single-purpose weapons, sensors, communications, and command-and-control arrangements (as well as the operations and maintenance personnel) required for each role. These limitations could only be surmounted by increasing space, weight, crew size, and the commensurate complexity. As a result, many navies introduced multiple classes of surface combatants to handle the different warfare roles, as well as low-end ships (at less cost) to have sufficient numbers of ships available to respond to contingencies.

For the RCN, with a small force of submarines and no capital ships, the approach until now followed this pattern, with the Iroquois-class destroyers focused until their divestment on task group command and area air defense and the more numerous Halifax-class frigates acting as more general-purpose/antisubmarine warfare platforms. Canada’s allies have had to confront similar considerations. For example, in the United Kingdom, the number of hulls and capabilities of the Type 26 (the CSC’s parent design, known as the Global Combat Ship) are directly connected to the planned acquisition of less-capable Type 31 frigates, the existence of Type 45 antiair-warfare destroyers, a larger submarine fleet, and the importance of capital ships, such as Royal Navy aircraft carriers. For Australia (which is also acquiring the Type 26/GCS-derived Hunter-class), the requirement to protect amphibious ships, more submarines in the fleet, and a separate class of air-warfare destroyers are key factors. Different requirements ultimately lead to different priorities and trade-off decisions, and Canada’s circumstances are unlike any others.

Canada’s Geography, Fleet Size, and Operational Requirements

Aside from the overall fleet mix, the other considerations for any state’s naval force structure are the geographic factors, overall fleet size, and operational requirements. In Canada’s case, unique geography includes the bicoastal nature of the RCN’s homeports in Victoria, British Columbia, and Halifax, Nova Scotia, and the tricoastal areas of responsibility in the Pacific, Arctic, and Atlantic. Each area is very distant from the others, and therefore any timely maritime response generally must come from the closest base. In other words, when you need a ship from the opposite coast for any unexpected reason, it is a long way to go. So, it is best if all ships are equally capable and allocated more or less evenly among homeports. Similarly, the RCN must consider the long-range nature of its ship deployments—even domestic ones—because of the significant distances to anticipated theaters of operation.

A single combatant class that can perform a wide range of tasks while remaining deployed best meets this challenge and provides more options to government when far away from homeport. For example, a CSC operating in the Asia-Pacific region as an air-defense platform for an allied amphibious task group can quickly respond to a requirement to hunt an adversary’s submarine, if needed. Similarly, assembling a national naval task group of several multirole CSCs in response to a crisis is much more achievable when the RCN can draw from the whole surface combatant fleet to assign ships at the necessary readiness levels. The alternative may not guarantee a sufficient number of specialized variants needed for the task when the call comes. In other words, if any one ship becomes unavailable to perform a task for any reason, there is more depth available in the fleet to fill the gap and complete the mission. Consequently, having more ships of similar capabilities ensures a higher rate of operational availability, which is especially important with the RCN’s relatively modest fleet size. For small fleets, a “high/low” mix of warships or multiple classes of more specialized combatants actually constrains operational availability.

Cost-Saving Value

While increasing complexity would ordinarily imply increasing cost, a single class of ships can actually present opportunities to increase cost efficiency. First, a single class of ships eliminates duplication of fixed program costs such as design and engineering and, during ship construction, further eliminates additional costs derived from retooling and pausing work in the shipyard between the construction of different classes, while achieving better learning curves and lowering overall costs per unit compared with two shorter construction runs. As each ship enters service, a single ship class in sufficient numbers has dedicated supply chains and more efficiency and equipment availability from the provision of common parts (especially given that two allies are procuring additional ships based on the common Type 26/GCS design.) Higher cost efficiencies in maintenance from labor specialization also can be expected, as well as the ability for more efficient repair training and use of required ship repair facilities and equipment. Furthermore, training costs associated with a single class are reduced through the ability to deliver common training modules to a larger student cohort, while simultaneously allowing for deeper knowledge and specialist personnel development among a larger pool of available crew with common qualifications.

This latter point cannot be overstated—crew availability is a key requirement for operational availability, and the efficiencies made possible with a single set of common qualifications and training enables a larger pool of available personnel to deploy and more flexibility for sustained operations at the unit level. It includes Royal Canadian Air Force maritime helicopter crews and embarked unmanned systems specialists, as well as Army, special operations forces, and even Royal Canadian Mounted Police personnel in a law enforcement mission who would require no additional conversion training between classes once familiar with the CSC’s modular mission bay arrangement or boat launching procedures.

An Opportunity Enabled by Modern Technology

Compared with a few decades ago, several recent technological developments are making multirole ships much more practical. Information-age innovation is, in essence, enabling all the potential advantages a single class of surface combatants while minimizing the traditional disadvantages. For example, any operations room or bridge display can now easily show video or data feeds from any sensor, weapon, or software support system—convergence. Likewise, instead of several stand-alone unmanned systems controllers, consoles that can control any of the ship’s unmanned air, surface, or subsurface system are becoming available. Widespread digitization has reduced space requirements, while increasing system capability, flexibility, and power and cooling efficiency. This miniaturization allows for smaller components that can fit into smaller spaces.

Multifunctionality can now be found in all kinds of components. For example, a single digital beam-forming radar can replace multiple traditional radars, software-defined radios can support different communications requirements on the fly, programmable multipurpose weapons can engage more than one kind of target but be fired from a common vertical launcher, and decoy launchers can now deploy a variety of defensive munitions. Multifunctionality even extends beyond individual systems to encompass features like the CSC’s modular mission bay—a reconfigurable space able to accommodate and integrate any containerized payload imaginable. With an air-transportable, container-based set of payloads, embarking additional specialized equipment or capabilities into a deployed ship during an overseas port visit can be done in just a few days. These developments enable a single ship to rapidly transition to and execute many naval roles while defending itself against a myriad of threats.

Although a ship’s overall capacity (e.g., the desired number of crew accommodated, missiles embarked, unmanned systems carried, endurance and seakeeping performance, etc.) will still be constrained by its size, a single ship class can have a full range of capabilities. The CSC balances multirole capabilities with a modest amount of capacity. For example, it has one main gun and 32 vertical-launch cells, one helicopter, one mission bay, one multifunction radar, and the ability to embark approximately 204 personnel for crew and mission personnel.

Further technological development and additional advantages will accrue from operating a single ship class, such as those from software development and data analytics. For example, the analysis of detailed technical data, such as system-error codes, from across the entire class in near-real time enables the efficient updating of control software to improve cyber security. Or, consider the ability to perform virtual research and development work on a digital twin of a physical system, such as a gas turbine, to examine performance limitations without risking the equipment itself. Data analytics performed on the same system when a part fails can help determine which sensors are critical and what patterns are early indicators of impending failure. This will allow the crew to perform preventive maintenance before the system fails catastrophically and should prevent failures in the other ships of the class. In a connected world, it is even possible to rapidly and remotely inject operational capability enhancements to deployed ships. Ultimately, the relative ease with which the software elements of a combat system can be changed will allow ships of the same class a greater capability to act and react with agility, the most efficient way to maximize potential for a relatively small fleet.

Acknowledging the unique Canadian geographical and operational requirements, the imposed limitations on naval force structure, and the need to maximize the RCN’s effectiveness while seeking cost efficiencies calls for a single class of surface combatant—the current CSC project. Canada will benefit from this innovative solution for decades. The RCN is well-positioned to make the most of this new platform and the inherent flexibility and multirole capabilities it will bring. The Canadian government’s decision to move forward with the CSC program as a single surface combatant class is not only eminently feasible, but also the most sensible for the situation we face.
 

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The Royal Canadian Navy also thought about the idea of a high-low mix of warships—high-end air defence and lower-end general purpose.


Uzlu, I am a civilian with an interest.

I am sure other people with more knowledge and a fuller understanding have answers to why certain things are done. I thank you for the information.

Cheers.
 

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So who wants to see the updated design for the CSC? LMC has released the new renderings on their website and there is plenty to compare and contrast.

8M3jPZJ.jpg


Compare to the older plan here:

PrxBhtX.jpg


Of note is the reduction in VLS numbers from 32+6 to 24+6 (based on the factsheet released). The mast structure is much more robust with many more sensors placed up high. Also, the main gun is now the 127/64 LW. The various domes have been moved around and the large comms antenna aft has been removed as well.

Another image of the new design, different angle.
c9fzLai.jpg
 

Underway

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Before the insanity starts, I suspect that the VLS change was due to two things. First, that mast is much more significant than the previous version. That has to cut into design margin.

Second, the addition of the VLS amidships is also high on the ship. The CAMM missiles may have also eaten into that margin.

This all being said, its still 24 CAMM and 96 ESSM II for self defence. Or likely 16 SM families, 32 ESSM II, and 24 CAMM. That's a ridiculous improvement over HFX class.

As for how heavy the armament is, that would be an odd discussion.
The UK version has 24 Mk41VLS with no AAW missiles to place in them. It will also have 48 individual CAMM launchers. I suspect that cruise missiles are slated for those VLS, either anti-ship or land attack. Perhaps the UK is future-proofing as well
 
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suffolkowner

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Is this the beginning of the cost cutting-going from 32 to 24 VLS? There was already lots of criticism on this in comparison to the Arleigh Burke

I see you kinda answered above

But still concerns about weight management?
 

MTShaw

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Is this the beginning of the cost cutting-going from 32 to 24 VLS? There was already lots of criticism on this in comparison to the Arleigh Burke

I see you kinda answered above

But still concerns about weight management?
None of the computer renderings have had 32VLS
 
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