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Confusion plagued mission to Afghanistan: report
By PAUL KNOX
From Tuesday‘s Globe and Mail
Tuesday, Oct. 28, 2003
Inadequate planning, command confusion and supply foul-ups plagued the Canadian Forces during the first year of support for the U.S. counterterrorism campaign, an internal military report says.
Vaccines were ruined through mishandling, it says, some troops were not trained to protect themselves against nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and diplomatic support from the Foreign Affairs Department was weak.
The blunt "lessons learned" document says Canada lacked a national military objective, other than backing U.S. forces, when it decided to send troops, warships and aircraft to Afghanistan and the Arabian Sea.
Personnel and equipment were offered — and accepted — without knowing whether they would be useful or how long they would be needed, says the report prepared by the lessons-learned section in the office of the deputy chief of defence staff.
"There was no overall Canadian national strategy or goal to guide the development of potential contributions in the early phases of the operation," the report adds. "The primary objective was to be seen to be helping the U.S. with the overall plan."
Among its revelations:
Medical supplies were ruined through mishandling, putting soldiers at increased risk. Lieutenant-Commander Ross Lambert, chief of the lessons-learned unit, said in an interview that, twice, vaccine was spoiled when flight crews lacking medical knowledge turned off power to refrigeration units.
Although training in protection against weapons of mass destruction was supposed to be mandatory, some officers gave priority to other tasks. Some units had no medical teams, and military planners have been ordered to make sure that this does not happen again.
Operation Apollo‘s commanders were half a world away at U.S. Central Command headquarters in Tampa, Fla. The study quotes Major-General Michel Gauthier as saying this created a "risky command structure" and was inefficient.
Low stocks of spare parts and other vital equipment, the result of a decade of military cost-cutting, hampered rapid deployment. "There is no longer an effective method of exercising national ... control over scarce or critical supply items," the study says.
Canadian rules hampered soldiers guarding the airfield at Kandahar in southern Afghanistan. Ottawa wanted background checks on local allies before allowing Canadian soldiers to patrol with them. Troops asked for pepper spray after Afghan children threw water at them, but the request was denied on the ground that it would contravene the international treaty banning chemical weapons.
Troops were dispatched without diplomatic clearance from Persian Gulf governments. A projected 50-soldier logistics group in Bahrain was reduced after nervous authorities there balked at harbouring highly visible foreign soldiers.
Canadian warships searching for terrorists in the Arabian Sea had few speakers of local languages, while few of the vessels they hailed or boarded had English or French speakers. LCdr. Lambert said he plans to tell top military officials this week that little has been done to improve language skills.
Military officers clashed with foreign-aid officials over the use of money for humanitarian relief.
The report was completed in April but has not received wide circulation outside the Canadian Forces.
It examines Operation Apollo, Canada‘s continuing contribution to the counterterrorism campaign, from its beginnings in October, 2001, to September, 2002.
As a result of the examination, Canadian Forces staff have been ordered to integrate planning with that of their allies when offering aid to a military coalition. They should "not offer forces until the structure of the overall coalition plan is apparent" and a probable role is identified, the report says.
A month after the terror attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, Canada announced that it would join the United States in its war against Afghanistan‘s Taliban government and the al-Qaeda terror network.
Operation Apollo was eventually given written political guidance, and the report praises the federal government for it. "No other recent operation has received such comprehensive written direction," it says.
But the guidance did not arrive until late November — with troops already committed, planning well advanced, and some personnel on their way to the theatre of action.
"Canadian Forces elements were committed to a wide variety of disparate tasks, with little strategic focus, and were difficult to support and sustain," the study says.
"A clear analysis of Canadian interests, considerations of the economy and efficiency of Canadian Forces resources, and a concept of national [command and control], were apparently given little weight in the planning process."
The study highlighted the complexity of planning war operations as a member of a coalition, LCdr. Lambert said.
"Before we start offering forces, let‘s figure out what the rest of the coalition is doing so we can see where we can best contribute," he said. "That was not what occurred."
The report does not suggest soldiers‘ lives were placed in immediate danger because of the problems. And it says some aspects of Apollo were a success.
The recently developed Coyote reconnaissance vehicle was "universally admired," it says, and Canadian snipers were praised. Canadian sailors fit "seamlessly" into coalition fighting units because their electronics systems are harmonized with those of the U.S. Navy, it adds.
But it repeats long-standing criticisms of aging Sea King helicopters, Aurora maritime patrol aircraft and Hercules cargo planes. "Many of the aircraft are old and are only kept going through extraordinary maintenance efforts," it says.
The study shows the effect of maintaining a level of readiness adequate for peacekeeping and then asking the Forces to deploy rapidly for war, said defence analyst Jocelyn Coulon, director of the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre in Montreal.
"When you look at lessons-learned reports from peacekeeping missions, you have the same complaints. It becomes quite dangerous if we‘re involved in a war."
Apollo was the first time since the Korean War that Canadian Forces have taken part in offensive land operations as part of a coalition of allies.
Four Canadian soldiers died during Operation Apollo when they were mistakenly bombed by a U.S. pilot in April, 2002.
Apollo‘s 750-member infantry battalion, whose main duties were guarding the airport at Kandahar in southeast Afghanistan, was withdrawn after six months in July, 2002.
At its peak, Apollo also included six warships and transport and maritime patrol aircraft. The frigate HMCS Calgary and 250 Canadian Forces members remain.
Meanwhile, in a separate operation dubbed Athena, a 1,950-member army contingent is now in Kabul, Afghanistan‘s capital, as part of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization stabilization force.
LCdr. Lambert said debate was intense within the armed forces over whether Apollo‘s commander should be in Tampa or closer to Afghanistan.
The study suggests it would have been better to move the commander to the theatre of operations once fighting got under way.
The report says Canadian embassies gave valuable aid to Apollo but support from the Foreign Affairs Department in Ottawa "was not brought to bear at a high enough level, or with sufficient priority, to meet the military requirement."
Foreign Affairs spokeswoman Kimberley Phillips declined to comment on the report‘s specific claims.
Confusion plagued mission to Afghanistan: report
By PAUL KNOX
From Tuesday‘s Globe and Mail
Tuesday, Oct. 28, 2003
Inadequate planning, command confusion and supply foul-ups plagued the Canadian Forces during the first year of support for the U.S. counterterrorism campaign, an internal military report says.
Vaccines were ruined through mishandling, it says, some troops were not trained to protect themselves against nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and diplomatic support from the Foreign Affairs Department was weak.
The blunt "lessons learned" document says Canada lacked a national military objective, other than backing U.S. forces, when it decided to send troops, warships and aircraft to Afghanistan and the Arabian Sea.
Personnel and equipment were offered — and accepted — without knowing whether they would be useful or how long they would be needed, says the report prepared by the lessons-learned section in the office of the deputy chief of defence staff.
"There was no overall Canadian national strategy or goal to guide the development of potential contributions in the early phases of the operation," the report adds. "The primary objective was to be seen to be helping the U.S. with the overall plan."
Among its revelations:
Medical supplies were ruined through mishandling, putting soldiers at increased risk. Lieutenant-Commander Ross Lambert, chief of the lessons-learned unit, said in an interview that, twice, vaccine was spoiled when flight crews lacking medical knowledge turned off power to refrigeration units.
Although training in protection against weapons of mass destruction was supposed to be mandatory, some officers gave priority to other tasks. Some units had no medical teams, and military planners have been ordered to make sure that this does not happen again.
Operation Apollo‘s commanders were half a world away at U.S. Central Command headquarters in Tampa, Fla. The study quotes Major-General Michel Gauthier as saying this created a "risky command structure" and was inefficient.
Low stocks of spare parts and other vital equipment, the result of a decade of military cost-cutting, hampered rapid deployment. "There is no longer an effective method of exercising national ... control over scarce or critical supply items," the study says.
Canadian rules hampered soldiers guarding the airfield at Kandahar in southern Afghanistan. Ottawa wanted background checks on local allies before allowing Canadian soldiers to patrol with them. Troops asked for pepper spray after Afghan children threw water at them, but the request was denied on the ground that it would contravene the international treaty banning chemical weapons.
Troops were dispatched without diplomatic clearance from Persian Gulf governments. A projected 50-soldier logistics group in Bahrain was reduced after nervous authorities there balked at harbouring highly visible foreign soldiers.
Canadian warships searching for terrorists in the Arabian Sea had few speakers of local languages, while few of the vessels they hailed or boarded had English or French speakers. LCdr. Lambert said he plans to tell top military officials this week that little has been done to improve language skills.
Military officers clashed with foreign-aid officials over the use of money for humanitarian relief.
The report was completed in April but has not received wide circulation outside the Canadian Forces.
It examines Operation Apollo, Canada‘s continuing contribution to the counterterrorism campaign, from its beginnings in October, 2001, to September, 2002.
As a result of the examination, Canadian Forces staff have been ordered to integrate planning with that of their allies when offering aid to a military coalition. They should "not offer forces until the structure of the overall coalition plan is apparent" and a probable role is identified, the report says.
A month after the terror attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, Canada announced that it would join the United States in its war against Afghanistan‘s Taliban government and the al-Qaeda terror network.
Operation Apollo was eventually given written political guidance, and the report praises the federal government for it. "No other recent operation has received such comprehensive written direction," it says.
But the guidance did not arrive until late November — with troops already committed, planning well advanced, and some personnel on their way to the theatre of action.
"Canadian Forces elements were committed to a wide variety of disparate tasks, with little strategic focus, and were difficult to support and sustain," the study says.
"A clear analysis of Canadian interests, considerations of the economy and efficiency of Canadian Forces resources, and a concept of national [command and control], were apparently given little weight in the planning process."
The study highlighted the complexity of planning war operations as a member of a coalition, LCdr. Lambert said.
"Before we start offering forces, let‘s figure out what the rest of the coalition is doing so we can see where we can best contribute," he said. "That was not what occurred."
The report does not suggest soldiers‘ lives were placed in immediate danger because of the problems. And it says some aspects of Apollo were a success.
The recently developed Coyote reconnaissance vehicle was "universally admired," it says, and Canadian snipers were praised. Canadian sailors fit "seamlessly" into coalition fighting units because their electronics systems are harmonized with those of the U.S. Navy, it adds.
But it repeats long-standing criticisms of aging Sea King helicopters, Aurora maritime patrol aircraft and Hercules cargo planes. "Many of the aircraft are old and are only kept going through extraordinary maintenance efforts," it says.
The study shows the effect of maintaining a level of readiness adequate for peacekeeping and then asking the Forces to deploy rapidly for war, said defence analyst Jocelyn Coulon, director of the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre in Montreal.
"When you look at lessons-learned reports from peacekeeping missions, you have the same complaints. It becomes quite dangerous if we‘re involved in a war."
Apollo was the first time since the Korean War that Canadian Forces have taken part in offensive land operations as part of a coalition of allies.
Four Canadian soldiers died during Operation Apollo when they were mistakenly bombed by a U.S. pilot in April, 2002.
Apollo‘s 750-member infantry battalion, whose main duties were guarding the airport at Kandahar in southeast Afghanistan, was withdrawn after six months in July, 2002.
At its peak, Apollo also included six warships and transport and maritime patrol aircraft. The frigate HMCS Calgary and 250 Canadian Forces members remain.
Meanwhile, in a separate operation dubbed Athena, a 1,950-member army contingent is now in Kabul, Afghanistan‘s capital, as part of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization stabilization force.
LCdr. Lambert said debate was intense within the armed forces over whether Apollo‘s commander should be in Tampa or closer to Afghanistan.
The study suggests it would have been better to move the commander to the theatre of operations once fighting got under way.
The report says Canadian embassies gave valuable aid to Apollo but support from the Foreign Affairs Department in Ottawa "was not brought to bear at a high enough level, or with sufficient priority, to meet the military requirement."
Foreign Affairs spokeswoman Kimberley Phillips declined to comment on the report‘s specific claims.
