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FORCE 2025: Informing the Army’s future structure

Kirkhill

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Here's my thought which I've already floated a month or so ago.

The Army has enough folks for about two divisions or so and enough equipment for one if everyone and everything was mobilized and deployed at once. So from a tactical viewpoint do we need more than one deployable divisional headquarters? No. Do we need administrative headquarters below Army level? - probably, 40,000+ folks need to be broken up in clumps so how many clumps can Army HQ manage. 40,000 folks add up to about 8 brigade size clumps (based on a brigade being roughly 3-5,000 folks depending on type). Can one headquarters control 8 clumps. Sure they can - it's a bit over optimum but quite doable and in not having an intermediate headquarters you have tighter control (not to mention saving the resources of the intermediate headquarters).

Based on manpower authorizations (ignore standards of training for the time being) we have people for roughly 4 equipped RegF brigades and 4 ResF underequipped ones.

So why bother keeping a ResF brigade headquarters at all? Well here's where I go in a different direction based, not on mobilization needs, but based on day to day Army deployment roles during peacetime.

Afghanistan built us a model where we deploy individual battlegroups supervised by brigade headquarters for periods of six months and nine months. SSE says we need to be able to deploy simultaneously two sustained battlegroups and one short duration battlegroup as well as two sustained and one short term force of less than battlegroup size. That's the potential for up to six elements simultaneously which means we need a generous command and control capability.

Canada currently has three (and one CS) bde HQs and 12 battle group HQ which are adequately staffed and trained for deployments. The other ten brigades and seventy some odd battalion HQs are entirely inadequate for that. That's not enough to sustain the SSE model adequately without much ad hocery and wearing out people. On the other hand, with a total of eight properly staffed brigades and 24 or so properly staffed battlegroup HQs we double that peacetime deployment capability. The key here is "properly staffed". That means full-time Reg F leadership and staffs.

Just one aside here. I do not see all the brigades and battle groups here as manoeuvre ones. If we properly analyze our defence needs and structure, I see retaining three Reg F manoeuvre brigades with 12 battlegroups, two Res F brigades with 8 battlegroups. one RegF CS brigade with one battlegroup, one ResF CS brigade with one battlegroup and one ResF CSS brigade with one battlegroup (the colocation of battlegroups with the CS and CSS brigades is mostly due to geographic factors and existing locations of sufficient combat arms reservists in those locals)

Again, a key here is "battlegroup HQs" as these are the entities we wish to be the C&C elements on deployment. I do not think that a given RegF battlegroup needs a full complement of RegF manoeuvre companies. Again, Afghanistan has given us a model of building block battlegroups formed by company size elements from a disparate group of battalions. IMHO in order to be a properly trained battlegroup headquarters it needs: a mostly fully staffed full-time headquarters; at least one full-time company to train and generate career development through and to provide a rapid reaction force; at least one ResF company to be augmented from and to provide additional company HQ staff to allow exercising at battle group level; access to appropriate battle group CSS elements to train with and draw on for deployment; access to appropriate CS elements to train with and draw on for deployment.

The point here is that with enough full-time brigade, battlegroup and company level staff you can train for all natures of operations even when many of the troops themselves are part-time reservists who only train and deploy occasionally. It's kind of a TEWT thing but with enough troops to add an additional layer of complexity. In effect the full-time Bde and BG HQs and Reg F Coy leadership form the backbone while RegF and ResF companies form the flesh in varying ratios.

This effectively is where the 70/30 concept comes from - every brigade and battalion has a deployable headquarters and at least one deployable sub-unit. Headquarters and deployable RegF subunits are fully equipped and share their equipment with their ResF counterparts. There are no longer any administrative bde or battalion HQs. Generally speaking, RegF 70/30 units have two RegF deployable subunits and a larger share of CS and CSS while ResF 30/70 units have one deployable RegF subunit and a lesser share of CS and CSS elements. Sub units become plug and play elements added to a given mission. In a major emergency, the entire force can be mobilized in whole or in part with the only real limitation being equipment available. The overall objective should be to start acquiring new equipment on a scale to equip ever larger elements of the total force and thereby enhance deployability. And I should mention that "deployable" is not synonymous with "expeditionary". Any unit should be capable of deploying internationally or domestically using its core RegF personnel as well as either volunteer or mobilized ResF members from its own or other units.

Training facilities and base infrastructure is consolidated under Army HQ. I would have CADTC control all recruiting and training through it's existing facilities as well as through depot battalions located at each of the current training centres and who also command depot companies, platoons and detachments down to local armoury level - one overarching individual and collective training system. Similarly all infrastructure remains under Army HQ. In a worse case scenario, an entire brigade could pack up and deploy and yet the training and support infrastructure would remain in place and be capable of recruiting and generating a new brigade insitu.

🍻

And the battle group has become the new metric it seems.

Dispersed Operations.


TASS,

10 AUG 2021, 07:50

Russian Army operates around 170 battalion tactical groups — defense chief

These are the forces that are ready for deployment in an hour after an alert signal, Sergey Shoigu pointed out

SOLNECHNOGORSK /Moscow Region/, August 10. /TASS/.

Around 170 battalion tactical groups are operational in the Russian Army today, Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu said on Tuesday.

"Today we actually have constant alert troops. Today we have no forces that we need to gather and find. All the troops are on constant alert. We have formations called battalion tactical groups. These are the forces that are ready for deployment in an hour after an alert signal. We have 168 such groups today and this is a very high figure," the defense chief said at the Territory of Senses educational youth forum.

A battalion tactical group is a temporary operationally flexible formation set up on the basis of a battalion and attached artillery, air defense, engineering and logistics support units for combat operations as part of motor rifle and tank brigades. Aviation groups, special operations forces and other units can also be attached to a battalion tactical group to accomplish assigned missions.

Ukraine: How big is Russia's military build-up?​

By David Brown
BBC News

19 January, 2022

Russia has moved about 100,000 troops - equipped with everything from tanks and artillery to ammunition and air power - to Ukraine's border but denies it is planning an invasion.

About 35,000 Russian personnel are permanently stationed near Ukrainian territory.

Some newly arrived units have travelled almost 4,000 miles, from the Russian Far East.

Most estimates put the number of Russian troops deployed around Ukraine - to the country's north, south and east - at about 100,000.
But one Ukrainian assessment, reported by CNN, says there are 106,000 ground troops and 21,000 navy and air-force personnel.

On Tuesday, UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson said: "The intelligence is very clear that there are 60 Russian battle groups on the borders of Ukraine," about a third of the total available numbers.

In addition to the regular Russian troops, there are thought to be about 15,000 Russian separatists in Ukraine's Luhansk and Donetsk regions.

We used to talk about Army Groups. Now we talk about Battlegroups. That in and of itself is a significant de-escalation in the temper of human affairs.
 

RangerRay

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As much as it pains me as a former member of a “battalion” that fielded close to a platoon once, I think the Reserves are long overdue for some unit consolidation. My old regiment with over 100 years of local history will likely disappear, but it would probably be for the best. Maybe there’s a reason to have a bn HQ for a unit that struggles to field a platoon, but no one has been able to articulate one to me.
 

Good2Golf

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@FJAG, of course one should take care not to inadvertently inject/force ‘Silent-J Jarmy (reserve)’ issues/problems/challenges/shortfalls into the Supp Res construct.
 

Kirkhill

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Back to my favourite model for a Militia. Although there is a permanent command and suppor structured the highest rank for a volunteer (all unpaid) is that of Captain, commanding a regional company.




I find the Infrastructure Home Guard particularly interesting

Infrastructure Home Guard​

The Infrastructure Home Guard (Virksomhedshjemmeværnet) VHV ensures that civilian companies and authorities continue operating during times of crisis or catastrophe.

  • Employees at power plants, water works and purification plants can participate in the four Energihjemmeværnet HJVK VE-companies.
  • Employees at railway companies can participate in the six Jernbanehjemmeværnet HJVK VJ-companies. Predecessor founded in 1913.
  • Employees at telecommunications companies can participate in the eight Telehjemmeværnet HJVK VT-companies. Predecessor founded in 1914.
  • They assist in keeping their places of work intact and prevent sabotage with use of lethal force.
  • Until 2008 the Danish Post also had a Home Guard detachment, but this was closed in preparation for the merge between the Danish and Swedish postal services. Members of the postal service were offered transfer to the railway home guard, and can still (with greater limitations) get time off from their job, when performing home guard duties.

Created after World War II, the Danish Home Guard was inspired by the Danish Resistance Movement during the war. It was always implied (though never explicitly stated) that the primary objective was defence and guerrilla activity against a Soviet invasion.

When founded on 11 June 1945 in the city of Odense, the 250 representatives of resistance movements and those of the government, both had demands to the new Home Guard. The resistance movements were not interested in a people's army run by the government and the government was not interested in a people's army being independent and run solely by a military figure without parliament representation. Because of these bi-lateral demands, a simple solution to the problem was made. The Home Guard would have two chief executives: A Major General and a representative chosen by parliament.

Naturally, the organization would be funded by parliament, but organized directly under the Ministry of Defence, so that both sides had an overview of what the Home Guard was doing.

For some very simple reasons, the Danish Home Guard would ultimately owe its loyalty to the will of the people, and not the government. The reason for this was, that if a situation like that of World War II was ever to occur again, whether in peace or wartime, the Home Guard would be a guarantee brought by the people, for the people, that the organization do all in its power to protect the individual citizen from crimes against humanity. Among these would be persecution due to political and religious stands, direct oppression and genocide. It would above all ensure that democracy, or people's rule, would be enforced. The Home Guard was well respected among the public as many members were former resistance fighters; people who fought for and had an interest in the individual person, their families, friends and loved ones.
 

FJAG

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You are a lot more generous than me.
I don't see equipment for 2 Brigades - let alone a Div.
Which is why I don't honestly see 1 Cdn Div ever being deployable.
Yeah. But let's ignore arty, air defence and ATGMs and all those other things we don't have because quite rightly, we're screwed on that until we get our equipment crap together - I guess one could always make 18 gun C3 regiments and watch one's people die.

I'm looking at the mech side which should provide six LAV battalions (or more accurately 18 LAV companies). And I agree that a LAV isn't an IFV but that's enough for two Stryker brigades. the third brigade is light and at this point (barring the above CS equipment) we're at the equipment level of an IBCT - so that gives us three "equipped" brigades.

I do not see a deployable division either ... but ... I want to see a deployable Div HQ if for no other reason that Europe needs some and it doesn't matter if the division is made up with two brigades and CS from another country. On top of that one needs to keep the staff skills alive both from the view of our brigade HQs being exercised within a divisional context as well as having sufficient staff that when we do get our crap together we'll be able to run one of those without stepping on our d**ks. I've seen too many skills fade only to see them having to be revived through a torturous process that was highly dysfunctional. Quite frankly I'm more concerned about the inability of our CSS system to function at higher levels than the div headquarters and brigades but anything to help keep the mentality of a higher field force alive is of value even if it is not a practical deployable entiry.

Would you accept 1 Equipped Reg Bde - 3 Under Equipped - and 4 Res non equipped ;)
No. The only way that I see the ResF regaining its utility would be through blended battalions and for blended battalions to keep theirs is in blended brigades.
SSE also promised a Heavy Div to NATO for Europe, color me not impressed with a lot of the SSE demands, when compared to the actual reality of the CA on the ground.
I actually don't see that in the SSE. I've seen that discussed in F2025 literature but someone has yet to show me the definitive document that says that. What I see in SSE is i.e. "two sustained deployments of 500 - 1500 personnel, including one as a lead nation" etc language which speaks to me of battlegroups with an NCE/NSE "brigade" construct in some cases. That's why my focus is on more "deployable" brigade and battalion/regiment headquarters with plug an play companies. Believe me, that's not my optimum solution for real life but the one for what the SSE points us to.
Looking at the PY's - the current Cdn CMBG model allows for 2 of those to be filled with Regular Force personnel - yes it is bloated and x1.5-2 of what most other Bde consist of - but even if you have 8 properly staffed Bde's - you don't have any troops to fill them.
All I see is the CA HQ Cart attempting to pull a horse.
This reminds me of my trip to Italy with a mule equipped mountain artillery regiment at a time where everyone up to and including the ranks of sergeant and second lieutenants were draftees who serve a year. The guys who took the longest training were the mule drivers and not the sergeants or officers. Mule production itself was very lengthy as first you had to get a horse and a donkey together in a field and then wait.

My point here is that there are certain choke points in career development where you either have trained staff in place or you need to get a donkey and a horse together in a field in order to produce the right staff officer for the job. A lot of the young privates who went to Afghanistan were fresh off of their DP1 infantry training when they started their predeployment training. You can generate the necessary privates and even corporals and 2nd lieutenants given a year or so lead time but unless you have sufficient rained sergeants and captains and above it's hard to put any mass together above a company. That takes time and a combination of book learning and experience to get there.

I think we need to see more brigade and battalion HQs because at the rate we are going (especially with our short six month tours) our critical middle management is seeing itself coming and going on deployments and burning out without the ability to regenerate properly. I think the only way that you can fix that is to slow down those deployments for individual units and give them time to progress naturally during training.

I also worry about the lower ranks but they're not as heavily involved as the middle leadership. In effect the Ukraine is instructor level ranks and Latvia is just a company plus so their pace is currently not as challenging.
I fully embrace the 70/30 or 30/70 outlook, but I don't see the Bodies available for more than 4 Bde total.
I'm looking purely at total PYs and ResF paid ceilings and not the actual numbers we're short. IMHO, if the situation is as dire as some on this site (who have much better information than I do) say it is then a whole lot of our senior leadership needs firing. There are armies large enough to absorb such losses for a while but we're not one of them. I lived through the massive downsizing of the late Sixties and early Seventies which caused massive rank stagnation which itself resulted in good people voting with their feet. It, like cutting capabilities, is very hard to recover from.

Let's just say my model is "aspirational" based on available numbers. It is far from simple to achieve under the present unfit for purpose system.

🍻
 

Kirkhill

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Back to my favourite model for a Militia. Although there is a permanent command and suppor structured the highest rank for a volunteer (all unpaid) is that of Captain, commanding a regional company.





I find the Infrastructure Home Guard particularly interesting






Interesting that as I re-read that bit about the history of the Danish Homeguard is that it is effectively the army of the Danish Parliament rather than the army of the Danish Government, which exists separately.

Kind of changes the dynamics and tensions in both the Armed Forces and on Parliament Hill (the Folketing) I would think.
 

FJAG

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Just sayin'....

In my business we are able to work with a couple of dozen clients concurrently across Canada, using email, Zoom and/or MS Teams, for fairly complex large scale projects involving high levels of change management and business performance improvement.

My clients, large, geographically and culturally diverse organizations, do the same in their businesses. Many of them have more employees than all of the reservists in Alberta and BC combined - that's full time employees.

I have no idea why we need hundreds of full time staff to keep tabs on a couple of dozen part time units that already have, embedded, full time Reg F/ Class B staff in their HQs.
We agree entirely. In my thinking, for an army our size and other than Army headquarters itself, the recruiting and training system and the base support infrastructure, if a headquarters isn't designed, equipped and trained to be deployable, it shouldn't exist.

There are enough RegF personnel in the divisional and reserve brigade HQs and RSS staff to fill all the leadership positions within my contemplated 30/70 battalions and their four (and I sometimes toy with an additional CSS brigade) brigade and additional battalion headquarters to make the changeover PY neutral. They may need to weed out the physically unfit though.

🍻
 

Kirkhill

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I'm looking at the mech side which should provide six LAV battalions (or more accurately 18 LAV companies). And I agree that a LAV isn't an IFV but that's enough for two Stryker brigades. the third brigade is light and at this point (barring the above CS equipment) we're at the equipment level of an IBCT - so that gives us three "equipped" brigades.

With respect FJAG I'm looking a 38 Coys in an SBCT. 13 of them are Close Combat Companies (10 Inf and 3 Cav) and 3 of them are Fires Companies.

16 out of 38 with the remainder being Command and Support.


1643657444700.png


I'm closer to Kevin on this one. One Reinforced Stryker Brigade is about our limit.
 

Kirkhill

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We already have such a force in the Supplementary Reserve. The problem is that it is mostly unused and voluntary. One could easily change that by making it a term of service that any retired RegF or Primary Reserve soldier must serve in the Supplementary Reserve for X years. That's the easy part. The hard part is finding a role and the requisite equipment for them. (There's also that NDA provision which says that they can't be called out for training or duty unless they first consent or are placed on active service)

They are valuable for bulking up the Army when its committed full in and strapped for resources but it seems we've avoided situations like that since WW2.

For me the limitation is infrastructure and equipment. Unless you are looking at a pure labour pool activated Supp reservists must have task to fulfill and equipment to do it with. I'm hard pressed to find a use for them beyond the filling in in combat or CS or CSS units that are short on manpower.

Agreement

I'm not and that's primarily because I think every element of the Army should be capable of combat and, if so, it should use terminology commensurate with that of our allies. It avoids confusion.

We already have LOs assigned to Provincial EMOs and Army, Bde and CJOC staff that have op plans to support domestic ops within their assigned territories. We are not a large enough organization to either need or afford separate administrative staffs solely for that function.

🍻

And if that then separate the Army from the Militia. And give the Militia a secondary wartime role in support of the Canadian Armed Forces (and not just the Army).

The Alternate Solution to the Defence Staff

Miller, Allard, Sharp, Dextraze, Theriault, Manson, Boyle, Henault, Lawson.
 

FJAG

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With respect FJAG I'm looking a 38 Coys in an SBCT. 13 of them are Close Combat Companies (10 Inf and 3 Cav) and 3 of them are Fires Companies.

16 out of 38 with the remainder being Command and Support.


View attachment 68392


I'm closer to Kevin on this one. One Reinforced Stryker Brigade is about our limit.
If you take the three existing CMBGs and exchange the two mech battalions from one of those brigades with the two light battalions in the other two then you end up with three full brigades, one light and two mech with three battalions each. Each of those brigades will also have the command and control element and the assets of an engineer regiment, an artillery regiment, a reconnaissance regiment with some tanks added in, a HQ and Sigs sqn, and a service battalion.

Its three full brigades - two mech and one light. Yes they are short guns and ATGMs and need to be brought up to strength with people but the equipment and command and control structure and the PY allocation is there. Each of the mech brigades is fully equipped with nine LAV companies (I'm not sure where you see the tenth in the SBCT). You should note that there is no longer an ATGM company in the SBCT engineer battalion. Further, the SBCT Cavalry squadron's recce cars are Strykers not much different from what we employ albeit that now the three armoured car troops are supported by a 12 gun MGS troop - we seem to be flirting in strange ways with tanks in that role while we also pretend that our LAVs measure up as IFVs. Obviously the SBCT and the reorganized mech brigade are not identical but close enough for government work and certainly equipped well enough to be considered a brigade.

🍻
 

Kirkhill

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Task and Purpose.... ;)

But a neat video by an ex-Stryker soldier who loved his ride on the Stryker, the BCT and the mods coming.


Best line.

"Our Army Sux. But it doesn't suck as bad as the other guys!" :)

And the follow up video? "Who names a recoilless rifle Carl?"
 

FJAG

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Task and Purpose.... ;)

But a neat video by an ex-Stryker soldier who loved his ride on the Stryker, the BCT and the mods coming.


Best line.

"Our Army Sux. But it doesn't suck as bad as the other guys!" :)

And the follow up video? "Who names a recoilless rifle Carl?"
That's actually a very good video. He's nailed the development and purpose and tactics of the Stryker very well. I've always thought of the difference between the unturreted Stryker v the turreted LAV and what this means as far as dismounts and small team tactics and employment goes. His brief comments about the basic Stryker and the Dragoon and the heavy v light Stryker brigades interesting - wish he'd gone further with that.
 

Blackadder1916

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And the follow up video? "Who names a recoilless rifle Carl?"

If he's going to dis the Carl Gustaf name, he should get his history right. While the wpn is currently made by Saab Bofors Dynamics, that company (under that name) is relatively recent and came by the name (and this particularly product) through mergers and acquisitions. The company (which dated from the early 1800s) that developed the 84mm was Carl Gustafs Stads Gevärsfaktori ("Rifle Factory of Carl Gustaf's Town"). That's who names a recoiless rifle Carl.

In the same vein . . . Who names a rifle Garand?
 

Kirkhill

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If he's going to dis the Carl Gustaf name, he should get his history right. While the wpn is currently made by Saab Bofors Dynamics, that company (under that name) is relatively recent and came by the name (and this particularly product) through mergers and acquisitions. The company (which dated from the early 1800s) that developed the 84mm was Carl Gustafs Stads Gevärsfaktori ("Rifle Factory of Carl Gustaf's Town"). That's who names a recoiless rifle Carl.

In the same vein . . . Who names a rifle Garand?

I couldn't finish watching the Carl video -the constant reference to it as a rocket launcher and launching rockets did me in.
 

KevinB

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I couldn't finish watching the Carl video -the constant reference to it as a rocket launcher and launching rockets did me in.
Most of the rounds down here are RAP - so he's partially right - as it is launching a rocket assisted projectile (what most would call a rocket) - Also anyone who calls it "recoilless" rifle, I have a bone to pick with. While it is rifled, the whole lack of recoil (especially when firing RAP rounds) isn't totally true - and the M3 and M4 versions significantly more than the M2.
 

Kirkhill

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Most of the rounds down here are RAP - so he's partially right - as it is launching a rocket assisted projectile (what most would call a rocket) - Also anyone who calls it "recoilless" rifle, I have a bone to pick with. While it is rifled, the whole lack of recoil (especially when firing RAP rounds) isn't totally true - and the M3 and M4 versions significantly more than the M2.

I can see that, I guess. I suppose it would be particularly true if, in addition to the RAP rounds, you are also looking at the Confined Space rounds and the Guided Projectile.

It just that it grates on the ear after years of it being emphasized that the CG was not a "Bazooka", not a "Rocket Launcher" but a Recoilless Rifle.

I guess, these days, it isn't inappropriate to describe it as a Rifled Rocket Launcher.
 

Kirkhill

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Only 26% of Canadian Rangers are indigenous, according to a 2019 statement by the Army Commander to a parliamentary committee. Whatever the Rangers are, and they are many things, they are not predominantly First Nations.


Your comment caught my attention and I went looking for the report. The report apparently caught the attention of others.


It suggests an alternate reading of the information available would suggest

1643730960195.png

With representation among First Nations being particularly strong North of 60 (1 CRPG) and in North West Ontario (3 CRPG).

5 CRPG is a bit anomalous for historical reasons. The Rangers of Newfoundland are predominantly not indigenous there being a distinct lack of Beothuk residents on the Rock.

2 CRPG has a strong First Nations component. I think the Lower St Lawrence Rangers may also have a strong non-indigenous component, again for historical reasons.

That leaves 4 CRPG, or BC and the Prairies as being worth taking another look at.

Regardless, identification of the Rangers with First Nations is not completely implausible.

The discussion actually has a knock on effect wrt Diversity and Recruiting in the CAF/CF.

1643731466361.png

With enhanced Ranger numbers and including the Rangers in the CAF structure then the indigenous participation rate rises

1643731567023.png



The Author:

  • Dr. P. Whitney Lackenbauer: Canada Research Chair (Tier 1) in the Study of the Canadian North and Professor in the School for the Study of Canada at Trent University. He is on leave as a Professor in the Department of History at St. Jerome’s University in the University of Waterloo, Ontario, where he remains co-director of the Centre for Foreign Policy and Federalism. He is Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel of 1st Canadian Ranger Patrol Group based in Yellowknife, Northwest Territories. He is also a Fellow with the Bill Graham Centre for Contemporary History at the University of Toronto; the Arctic Institute of North America; the Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary; and an adjunct professor with the Mulroney Institute for Government at St. Francis Xavier University. Whitney specializes in Arctic security, sovereignty and governance issues, modern Canadian military and diplomatic history, and Aboriginal-state relations.
The Organization

NAADSN/RDSNAA addresses three core policy challenges – the Defence role in the Arctic, NORAD modernization and the future of North American defence, and the evolving role of major powers in global strategic competition – and their many intersection points by:

  • conducting leading-edge research with students, emerging scholars, and Northern stakeholders/rightsholders that tests core assumptions and prompts policy innovation
  • convening conferences, workshops, and symposia that bring together diverse stakeholders on issues of core interest to the Defence Team
  • educating the next generation of policy thinkers and analysts
Researchers work in multi-/inter-disciplinary research clusters organized across three scales (circumpolar and international security, defence of North America, and defence of Canada) and specific topic areas. Our network structure is deliberately elastic so that we can respond efficiently to emerging issues and mobilize small expert teams to present relevant and timely advice to the Defence Team.

 

Infanteer

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I actually don't see that in the SSE. I've seen that discussed in F2025 literature but someone has yet to show me the definitive document that says that. What I see in SSE is i.e. "two sustained deployments of 500 - 1500 personnel, including one as a lead nation" etc language which speaks to me of battlegroups with an NCE/NSE "brigade" construct in some cases.
It's in SSE, under the clause "meet commitments to NATO Allies under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty."
 

Kirkhill

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It's in SSE, under the clause "meet commitments to NATO Allies under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty."

So there is a NATO or Canadian Government document specifically referencing a Heavy Division and its deployment?
 

MilEME09

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As much as it pains me as a former member of a “battalion” that fielded close to a platoon once, I think the Reserves are long overdue for some unit consolidation. My old regiment with over 100 years of local history will likely disappear, but it would probably be for the best. Maybe there’s a reason to have a bn HQ for a unit that struggles to field a platoon, but no one has been able to articulate one to me.
Luckily it's finally happened from what I've been reading
 
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