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FORCE 2025: Informing the Army’s future structure

FJAG

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The argument I made was that tanks do not dominate anywhere above the tactical battlefield. A careful reading of those campaigns would suggest not.

Operationally, North Africa was as much about anti-tank weapons as it was tanks (see: CRUSADER - failure of massed British tanks). It was also about combined arms, and how not to do it (see: failure of British Jock Columns).

The Eastern Front was no different. Superior Soviet tanks could tactically dominate in 1941, when they outclassed anything the Germans could put in the field, but operationally (and strategically) the flawed execution of combined arms warfare meant it didn't matter how great a KV-2 or a T-34 was.

Your historical references do have me thinking because my research for our gunner book has me at the turn of the century where the Army is making the first tentative steps to converting it's rusting out Cold War army to the medium weight thing it has become.

My point here is that we were essentially experimenting with two concepts - on the one hand aggregation of sensors into an ISTAR company and on the other an aggregation of TOWs and ADATS and MGS into a Direct Fire System. Neither really panned out. Twenty years later our sensors did get better but I'm not so sure we ever achieved the degree of aggregation ever contemplated and DFS pretty much faded away. Afghanistan undoubtedly took our focus off the ball in a big way - but even that ended 11 years ago.

While we clearly haven't advanced the weapons' procurement process our doctrinal thought processes should not have stopped. Both the Navy and the Air Force seem to have some thoughts about where they are heading (albeit their processes [JUSTAS I'm talking about you] seem to be no faster than the Army's).

It's pretty clear to me sitting at home, long retired, that doctrinally we are much worse off then even during the decade of darkness. While LAVs have their issues they are heads and shoulders above the M113 and the Leo2 is much better than the C1 but we still haven't done anything about figuring out how to win the deep battle, how to deliver long range precision fires, how to counter the various air threats, how to fight the close in anti-armour battle or how to optimize the new capabilities coming out daily. It would seem to me that until we get a handle on how to actually participate in a heavy battle any thinking about what kit we want is a tad premature.

Quite frankly, I'm starting to think that one of the best things the Army could do for Force 2025 is to completely break up one of the CMBGs in order to create the numerous enablers that are needed on a modern battlefield. (or perhaps just one infantry battalion in each brigade and turn the remaining two and the armoured regiment into three proper combined arms battalions and a small but better designed cavalry regiment plus additional enablers) What's killing the Army is the high recurring cost of people. People are important but people without equipment and a doctrine are just a speed bump on the battlefield.

🍻
 

Good2Golf

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All right! I'll bite. Say what? :confused:
Look at the pintle wobbling, then imagine how that’s affecting where the huge rate of bullets is going. Methinks the beaten zone/path is all over the place…
 

Colin Parkinson

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But German AT screens were effective and remained effective because they discovered the use of AA artillery in the AT role, and were able to "dominate locally". If tanks were dominant, some Allied offensives should not have gone so badly. Part of the answer to "why" is that an effective counter to tanks is defence in depth; the further tanks move beyond range of their own artillery, the more vulnerable they become.

So, back to combined arms, the point of which is to force the enemy to simultaneously solve many different problems at once instead of optimizing against one threat at a time. But, again, that's just the battlefield. What makes tanks occasionally decisive is operating in formations that can exploit breaches and occupy rear areas. And for that, motorized/mechanized (ie. more balanced) formations are often just as good or better (infantry are harder to dislodge).
The Germans discovered the role of AA guns in the AT role during the Spanish civil war, luckily a 88mm HE shell was more than enough for a T26. During the invasion of France Medium AA units with 88's had AP ammunition already issued to deal with the Char B's. The Germans were experts in AT gun use and deployment and the European Terrain favoured them. That being said the Stugs in the Panzerjager units had the highest tank kill ratios as did the US Tank Destroyer Battalions. Lessons for us:

Learn the correct lessons early on and follow through on the solution.
If fighting a armour heavy force, dedicated AT resources are needed
If fighting a infantry or defensive entrenched foe, then dedicated HE resources are needed
If fighting a foe well equipped with unmanned assets, both surveillance and attack, make sure you have adequate and organized AD
 

Kirkhill

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The Germans discovered the role of AA guns in the AT role during the Spanish civil war, luckily a 88mm HE shell was more than enough for a T26. During the invasion of France Medium AA units with 88's had AP ammunition already issued to deal with the Char B's. The Germans were experts in AT gun use and deployment and the European Terrain favoured them. That being said the Stugs in the Panzerjager units had the highest tank kill ratios as did the US Tank Destroyer Battalions. Lessons for us:

Learn the correct lessons early on and follow through on the solution.
If fighting a armour heavy force, dedicated AT resources are needed
If fighting a infantry or defensive entrenched foe, then dedicated HE resources are needed
If fighting a foe well equipped with unmanned assets, both surveillance and attack, make sure you have adequate and organized AD


As I said: Rock, Paper, Scissors. :giggle:
 

Kirkhill

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Somewhere a while back some one noted that we could deliver a company rapidly anywhere, but once they got there what could they do?

I'm going to assume that we can get anyone anywhere in the CC-150 Polaris (assuming they are not being shot at). Each CC-150 carries 194 Pax - Self Loading Cargo that walks through the door.

Assuming that limitation let's say that 3 of our CC-150s can carry 3x 194 Infanteers or 582 soldiers used to carrying their kit on their backs. That is a good sized battalion. What can they carry on board with them?

Pyro, Det Cord and C4
Pistols, Rifles, DMRs, LMGs and GPMGs
CG-84s, Javelins, NLAWs, AT4s etc
40mm UGLs, 60mm Mortars and 81mm Mortars
MANPADS
Radios
EO/IR gear
UAVs

If they just parked themselves at the airport as a security force I believe they would make a statement.

But, there's more.

Let's say we task 3 of our 5 C17s to land along with them.

One C17 can transport 21x MRZRs in a single level, and I am inclined to believe a clever load master could figure out how to double that amount. But let's assume that we only add 21 MRZRs to the infantry battalion for command, recce, DFS and CQ duties. Or twice that. And the other C17s to bring in various other arms and their gear.

I believe that such a force would make at least as useful a contribution, in the short term, as the ePF. And it could be reinforced, as time permitted, by air, with heavier gear.

The key elements for me would be lots of AT gear, lots of MGs and DMRs, lots of mortars, lots of UAVs and lots of surveillance gear and NVGs. Oh. And Air Defence.
 

Kirkhill

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On rare occasions, soldiers may want food and water.
There you go with the details again. :giggle:

The first 72 hours of water and IMPs can walk through the doors of the CC150s with them. Or be stowed in the lower hold beneath them.

And we still have a couple of CC-150s and CC-177s in hand.
 

dapaterson

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Water: 30L per person per day for hydration and ablutions. So, 582 pers x 30L/pers/day x 3 days = 52,380L water.

That's roughly one point five CC150 cargo planes carrying nothing but water.

For three days supply only.
 

blacktriangle

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I guess it all depends on what weapons go in those ACSV in terms of how effective will they be in engaging UAVs, and at what level they can do so. I believe the vehicle pictured at the end of your message is the new "Brimstone" concept for Spike NLOS.
Just to clarify, Spike NLOS & Brimstone are separate systems.

Spike NLOS (Exactor) was procured as UOR during Iraq, IIRC. It was originally mounted on M113 and they now have a trailer mounted version (Exactor-2) It’s operated by Royal Artillery units.

And yes, the mounted overwatch capability being planned is supposedly going to be based around Brimstone.

Regardless of system or cap badge used, NLOS missile capability would go a long ways to making Canada relevant on the modern battlefield. It should be a priority along with ALAWS. Not holding my breath though.
 

daftandbarmy

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Water: 30L per person per day for hydration and ablutions. So, 582 pers x 30L/pers/day x 3 days = 52,380L water.

That's roughly one point five CC150 cargo planes carrying nothing but water.

For three days supply only.

Paratroopers don't 'ablute' so there's a good logistics argument for employing them on certain ops ;)
 

Infanteer

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Water: 30L per person per day for hydration and ablutions. So, 582 pers x 30L/pers/day x 3 days = 52,380L water.
Maybe if you're supplying some cozy camp or something. I don't recall ever expending that much water with a rifle platoon on its own in Afghanstan. 10L a day perhaps? So that's 1/3 of your estimate.

...and why would you have to fly it in? Water exists on most places in the planet, and there are numerous ways to procure, clean, and store it.
 

Kirkhill

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Water: 30L per person per day for hydration and ablutions. So, 582 pers x 30L/pers/day x 3 days = 52,380L water.

That's roughly one point five CC150 cargo planes carrying nothing but water.

For three days supply only.

1623887205944.png

1947. One quart per man per day. And drink when the Corporal tells you.

30 litres?

Lets assume that the CC-150s are arriving at a functional airport. And lets assume that the troops can go 72 hours without a shower. Allow 2l per man per day. They are also carrying a 9 kg case of IMPs each for 10 meals.

582x 2kg x 3 days = 3,492 kg
582x 9kg = 5,238 kg

8,730 kg food and water for 582 for 72 hours.

1.5 CC-150s = 53,380 l
1x CC-150 = 34,920 l = 34,920 kg

8,730 kg = 25% of a CC-150. Significant right enough. But please don't tell me that that is a show stopper? Maybe we have to send some of our C130s along as well.

PS D&B

The 1947 guys were Paras. And they were required to shave every morning.
 
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GR66

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Somewhere a while back some one noted that we could deliver a company rapidly anywhere, but once they got there what could they do?

I'm going to assume that we can get anyone anywhere in the CC-150 Polaris (assuming they are not being shot at). Each CC-150 carries 194 Pax - Self Loading Cargo that walks through the door.

Assuming that limitation let's say that 3 of our CC-150s can carry 3x 194 Infanteers or 582 soldiers used to carrying their kit on their backs. That is a good sized battalion. What can they carry on board with them?

Pyro, Det Cord and C4
Pistols, Rifles, DMRs, LMGs and GPMGs
CG-84s, Javelins, NLAWs, AT4s etc
40mm UGLs, 60mm Mortars and 81mm Mortars
MANPADS
Radios
EO/IR gear
UAVs

If they just parked themselves at the airport as a security force I believe they would make a statement.

But, there's more.

Let's say we task 3 of our 5 C17s to land along with them.

One C17 can transport 21x MRZRs in a single level, and I am inclined to believe a clever load master could figure out how to double that amount. But let's assume that we only add 21 MRZRs to the infantry battalion for command, recce, DFS and CQ duties. Or twice that. And the other C17s to bring in various other arms and their gear.

I believe that such a force would make at least as useful a contribution, in the short term, as the ePF. And it could be reinforced, as time permitted, by air, with heavier gear.

The key elements for me would be lots of AT gear, lots of MGs and DMRs, lots of mortars, lots of UAVs and lots of surveillance gear and NVGs. Oh. And Air Defence.
A realistic initial goal for your limited rapid response forces would be to determine the main direction of attack of the enemy and assist with providing targets for allied aircraft and long-range precision strike weapons which would form the bulk of the initial response while the heavy forces prepare to move to theatre.

So instead of dropping a Battalion of light infantry to form a fairly immobile blocking force you could instead do something like this...

A C-17 can carry 10 x Humvee-class vehicles. Two x 5 vehicle squads each with:

1 x EW/SIGINT vehicle to assist in identifying targets
Prophet-EW.jpg

2 x multi-tube loitering munition launchers to attack and/or laze targets for other launchers
JLTV-LM.jpg

1 x SHORAD/C-UAS vehicle to protect the launch vehicles from enemy UAVs
C-UAS.jpg

1 x Support Vehicle with reloads/supplies, etc.
JLTV-Cargo.jpg
 

dapaterson

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Planning figure is 30L daily. Short term you can go lower. But to maintain a fighting force you will need it. And yes, there are other sources that require purification and storage, but those are equipment and personnel not included in your assumptions.

Ignore sustainment at your peril. Perhaps watch the movie "A Bridge Too Far".
 

dapaterson

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Why would you need ammunition resupply?

In Gulf War I, the initial deployment of Airborne forces was primarily a psychological operation to demonstrate resolve, not an effect military force.
 

Kirkhill

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To refine my assumptions

The first battalion goes over to secure the forward end of the conveyor with a single landing of 3x CC-150 and 3x C-17s.

After that the conveyor can exploit the sustained carrying capacity of 4x CC-144, 5x CC-150, 5x CC-177, 17x CC-130J indefinitely, or at least as long as the skies are clear.

We're also modelling the intervention after the ePF which assumes a functioning, passably modern economy. Which even Afghanistan and Mali provided.

All bets are off if the other guys are shooting already.


If those assumptions are accepted then how long would it take to deploy an entire CMBG by air as a deterrent force?

The alternative would be shipping the CMBGs kit by sea and transporting the rest of the personnel by the air conveyor.
 

Infanteer

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If those assumptions are accepted then how long would it take to deploy an entire CMBG by air as a deterrent force?
See the RAND link I posted earlier. They've done the math for an SBCT. An SBCT, three DOS, and the necessary package to secure/run an airhead weighs in at 16,200 short tons and has 4,525 personnel.

The analysis estimated 182 C-17 lifts to move this 5,000 nmi into a functional airfield. 8 Wing would fall out of the sky before pulling that off.
 
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