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Informing the Army’s Future Structure

Or perhaps a misplaced sympathy trying to be magnanimous and failing hard? (RegF brain trust thinking a new non-hand me down to the PRes would ingratiate them)…
That fact that PRes have TAPV is a symptom of how wrong the defined requirements were. When TAPV was conceived, the then CLS was quite adamant that the army would never waste a dollar buying an A vehicle for the PRes. But when the contract was awarded years later, the vehicle was so useless for purpose that cascading it to the PRes was a way to save face.
 
TAPV is not a procurement failure. It's a requirements failure.
So the requirements out lined in the procurement process? I’ll wrap all that up in a single “procurement” bubble honestly.


@KevinB personally I think the targetry in our training areas could be updated.

Or perhaps a misplaced sympathy trying to be magnanimous and failing hard? (RegF brain trust thinking a new non-hand me down to the PRes would ingratiate them)…

Trying to show horn two wildly different vehicles into one.
 
That fact that PRes have TAPV is a symptom of how wrong the defined requirements were. When TAPV was conceived, the then CLS was quite adamant that the army would never waste a dollar buying an A vehicle for the PRes. But when the contract was awarded years later, the vehicle was so useless for purpose that cascading it to the PRes was a way to save face.
So DLR incompetence Maskirovka?
 
I don’t know. To some extent, DLR definitely played a role. But I don’t know who generated the impetus that army would buy a vehicle to institutionalize the RG-31 role. It may have been spawned from the same meeting where ADM(Mat) held LAV Up and LRPR hostage to force army to pursue CCV.
 
Retired RCA ADM Mat and serving RCA CLS/CCA butted heads, as I recall.
 
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Or perhaps a misplaced sympathy trying to be magnanimous and failing hard? (RegF brain trust thinking a new non-hand me down to the PRes would ingratiate them)…

.... because one of the things that keeps the Reg F up at night is thinking up ways to ingratiate themselves to the Reserves ...

Dr Evil Whatever GIF
 
Retired RCA ADM Mat and serving RCA CLS/CCA butted heads, as I recall.
If I recall, TAPV, LAV(UP) and CCV were all part of the same $5.2 billion package to solve the problem of the vulnerability of our then fleet of LAVIII and RG31 in Afghanistan and the wearing out of the Coyotes. I'm not sure how much CLS and ADM(Mat) at the time were at loggerheads on the issue because they both wanted better protection and manoeuverability. While we were already slated to leave Afghanistan, the failed-state type of mission was still on our agenda. I know both favoured CCV. I don't know where they stood on TAPV or who defined the requirements.

TAPV went into the planning in 2009, the CLS left the job in 2010 and it wasn't until 2012 that Textron won the contract for TAPV.

I'm not sure how much you can lay the actual Textron version of the TAPV on the then CLS's feet. He would have been gone shortly after the broad need was established and, I think, before the detailed requirements were laid down.

:unsure:
 
Next time you're in Ottawa we can meet and talk about things...
I would very much like that unfortunately (or fortunately) I haven't been back for a while. If your ever down London way and are looking for a place to stay and a friendly beer, give me a call. (I can show you the railroad 🚂😁)

🍻
 
That fact that PRes have TAPV is a symptom of how wrong the defined requirements were. When TAPV was conceived, the then CLS was quite adamant that the army would never waste a dollar buying an A vehicle for the PRes. But when the contract was awarded years later, the vehicle was so useless for purpose that cascading it to the PRes was a way to save face.

It's hard to say that there is one thing wrong with the procurement system but the highlighted sentence seems to be right up there.

The power of the short termers on the General Staff breeds discontinuity.

The TAPV's competitors

1663606579777.png1663606635343.png

Armoured Transports offered for Recce.....

vs an Armoured Security Vehicle designed for Convoy Escort and Base Patrol Vehicle offered for the same task.

When acquired, as noted, the CLS declared no armour for the Reserves.
That then became 25 vehicles for each Reserve Division to be communally held.
That then seems to have become give them all to the Reserves because we don't have any use for them.

I'm surprised the Regs aren't casting around to see if the Reserves have hidden any more Bisons they can grab.


I'm a fan of armoured transports but it seems to me that those programmes should by part of the LVM programme.

As far as the TAPV is concerned let it revert back to its original configuration and role as an ASV. And leave it with the Reserves and the Service Battalions as a Rear Echelon and LOC vehicle.

The Bigger Problem though

Institutionalizing requirements to guarantee continuity -
 
The functionally similar, if not identical, Dutch Fennek.

1663608566016.png

Lower ride. lower and lighter top hamper.
 
If I recall, TAPV, LAV(UP) and CCV were all part of the same $5.2 billion package to solve the problem of the vulnerability of our then fleet of LAVIII and RG31 in Afghanistan and the wearing out of the Coyotes. I'm not sure how much CLS and ADM(Mat) at the time were at loggerheads on the issue because they both wanted better protection and manoeuverability. While we were already slated to leave Afghanistan, the failed-state type of mission was still on our agenda. I know both favoured CCV. I don't know where they stood on TAPV or who defined the requirements.

TAPV went into the planning in 2009, the CLS left the job in 2010 and it wasn't until 2012 that Textron won the contract for TAPV.

I'm not sure how much you can lay the actual Textron version of the TAPV on the then CLS's feet. He would have been gone shortly after the broad need was established and, I think, before the detailed requirements were laid down.

:unsure:
The TAPV project was absolutely rolling in 2008. I was part of an RCAC Working Group that was convened in Oct 2008 when the scope of the project was expanded to replace the Coyote instead of just the LUVW and RG31. The TAPV was conceived in the darkest days of Kandahar - a response to the IED threat. There were six vehicles on the PowerPoints, but one was conceptual and one was not for sale.

The infantry were also supposed to get the TAPV, but they applied the five Ds and ignored it. Should they find themselves in a place like Mali, though, it would quite useful for them in its intended role.

Anyhoo.
 
Recently in from the BattleOrder

Force 2030 - 7x MEUs from MEF I and MEF II with 3x MLRs from MEF III

1663791167878.png

Graphic: Marine Expeditionary Unit in 2030

Notional future Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) composition under the tentative Force Design 2030/EABO plan. MEUs are inherently flexible organizations so even if this idea persists, it will vary in practice most likely.

The MEU will still consist of a command element (permanently under the I MEF or II MEF), a ground combat element (battalion landing team with units sourced from either 1st Marine Div for I MEF or 2nd Marine Div for II MEF), aviation combat element (a composite aviation squadron sourced from the MEFs' respective Marine Air Wings), and a logistics combat element (a task organized combat logistics battalion).

I MEF and II MEF will be focused on generating 7 MEUs while III MEF forward deployed to the Pacific will have 3 new Marine Littoral Regiments (MLRs) instead.

As usual a very robust Air Combat Element based on Ospreys but supported by Sea Stallions, Vipers and Venoms as well as MQ-9B SkyGuardians, Hercs and F35-Bs.

The Ground Combat Element (poetic licence here) includes an SOF Coy and 3 Rifle Coys as well as an LAR Coy. Ground transport is by a platoon of the wheeled ACVs which would be compatible with the LAVs of the LAR Coy.

The novel addition is a Long Range Unmanned Surface Vessel Platoon. Vessels and Platoons are not two words you commonly see linked.

The other bit of note - Ground Combat Fire Support comes in the form of a single HIMARS battery operating in support of the battalion. Presumably the unit will rely on the F35Bs and the Vipers and Venoms for additional support. And organic loitering munitions?


1663792270217.png

1663792383463.png

Crew of 3 + 13

 
The Ground Combat Element (poetic licence here) includes an SOF Coy and 3 Rifle Coys as well as an LAR Coy.

Note that the SOF Coy and the SOLE are under the CE and not the GCE. The distinction is important.
 
The TAPV project was absolutely rolling in 2008. I was part of an RCAC Working Group that was convened in Oct 2008 when the scope of the project was expanded to replace the Coyote instead of just the LUVW and RG31. The TAPV was conceived in the darkest days of Kandahar - a response to the IED threat. There were six vehicles on the PowerPoints, but one was conceptual and one was not for sale.

The infantry were also supposed to get the TAPV, but they applied the five Ds and ignored it. Should they find themselves in a place like Mali, though, it would quite useful for them in its intended role.

Anyhoo.

5 Ds? Please enlighten us ;)
 
Note that the SOF Coy and the SOLE are under the CE and not the GCE. The distinction is important.
Understood. Although I did allow myself a bit of poetic license, as I said.

I assume that the SOF component would be separately tasked and the GCE/ACE just as likely to be acting in support/relief of the SOF component.
 
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