Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[Kirkhill]

I actually like the Navy's direction with the CSC (albeit I think all its other ships need some serious weaponizing).

And there is another "trend".

Ships that sail with empty silos and rails. Helicopters without guns and missiles. Artillery without missiles. Infantry without missiles. Aircraft without missiles.

And god forbid we should have surface attack missiles.

Lack of understanding of missiles?
Lack of advocates for missiles?
Lack of TB dollars for missiles?
Lack of Political Will for missiles?
All of the above?

We can build platforms because, like hospitals, they look good and they provide jobs for Canadians and recycle Canadian dollars from taxpayers to taxpayers and make the politicians look as if they are doing something. They also provide full time jobs for a select number of Canadians.

But hospitals save people. They cure taxpayers or at least extend their lives and make them feel better.

What are military platforms supposed to do? Killing seems so crass.

 

[Kirkhill]

At the risk of rocketing off the rails again myself I took another look at the CBO Primer for clues on Canada.

I think I have been looking at the wrong "Department". I was looking at the "Department of the Army" chapter for clues on how to run the Army.

In fact I believe the better base of comparison is the "Department of the Navy". The USN is its own tri-service expeditionary force with its own cabinet representative and its own budget. And its own politics. The CAF has more in common with the USN notwithstanding that when it scrapes all of its pieces together it might just about be able to field the a semblance of a single Marine Expeditionary Force based on a Marine Division. But minus a whole bunch of enablers.

And the USN has been called out in Aid to the Civil Power in the US. Particularly US Marines in Los Angeles 1992 under the auspices of the Insurrection Act.

 

[KevinB]

At the risk of rocketing off the rails again myself I took another look at the CBO Primer for clues on Canada.

I think I have been looking at the wrong "Department". I was looking at the "Department of the Army" chapter for clues on how to run the Army.

In fact I believe the better base of comparison is the "Department of the Navy". The USN is its own tri-service expeditionary force with its own cabinet representative and its own budget. And its own politics. The CAF has more in common with the USN notwithstanding that when it scrapes all of its pieces together it might just about be able to field the a semblance of a single Marine Expeditionary Force based on a Marine Division. But minus a whole bunch of enablers.

And the USN has been called out in Aid to the Civil Power in the US. Particularly US Marines in Los Angeles 1992 under the auspices of the Insurrection Act.

The USMC is a better look - it is it's own Tri-Service inside the Navy.

Ground Forces; Conventional and Special
Aviation; Fixed wing of many shapes, sizes and roles, and Rotary of different flavors - oh and Rotary Attack too...
Sea going vessels; - no not just the Amphibs - but albeit new, they are getting into coastal/littoral "Brown Water" Navy stuff.


I often thought Unification of the CF back in the days of FJAG was a method to Marine"ize" the different elements of the CF into one.

 

[FSTO]

I actually like the Navy's direction with the CSC (albeit I think all its other ships need some serious weaponizing).

The question for you guys is how are you going to man it. That might have a knock on effect for the Army. If you cut the CSC fleet by just one that could free up some serious cash to buy a lot of ground-based stuff.

It’s too late on the other platforms to up-gun them.
As for the personnel issue. Well, that needs some serious focus and not just in the CAF. All aspects of our society are under severe “Manning” pressures.

 

[FSTO]

The USMC is a better look - it is it's own Tri-Service inside the Navy.

Ground Forces; Conventional and Special
Aviation; Fixed wing of many shapes, sizes and roles, and Rotary of different flavors - oh and Rotary Attack too...
Sea going vessels; - no not just the Amphibs - but albeit new, they are getting into coastal/littoral "Brown Water" Navy stuff.


I often thought Unification of the CF back in the days of FJAG was a method to Marine"ize" the different elements of the CF into one.

The Marines don’t get ashore without the Navy.

 

[daftandbarmy]

The Marines don’t get ashore without the Navy and Air Force top cover.

There, FTFY

 

[GR66]

And we can do a light force. We can't do a heavy force.

We're kidding ourselves that 80 refurbed, super-annuated Cold War relics is a solid foundation on which to build a heavy division. It is the basis on which to build a single armoured battle group and no more.

When are we going to roll the dice and take a chance? Because ultimately that is what this is all about. We can never know the future perfectly so we must always be prepared to chance it.

We debate interminably. We act so infrequently that movement seems imperceptible.

You're 100% right that a properly equipped and supported light force optimized for adaptive dispersed operations and capable of deep strike, etc., etc., etc. would almost certainly be much more effective and useful to both Canada and our allies than the force that we currently have (debates about specific platforms in specific situations like tanks and tracked AFVs aside).

The key part of that statement though is "properly equipped and supported". If you're going to go the radical route you have to go "all in". Half-assing it will only leave you with the worst of both worlds...an under-supported light force that can't respond quickly or effectively enough to make a difference on the battlefield and too under-armed/armoured to stand up to heavier enemy forces.

What is your confidence level that the Canadian Government, public, DND, Army will be on side to make the required commitment to make that actually happen?

I may be very cynical (I delude myself by calling it "pragmatic" in my less negative moments), but we have most of the basic building blocks in place for a traditional medium/light force with a sprinkling of tanks to provide a "heavy-ish" capability. With some targeted new (actually returning) capabilities like SHORAD, AT, SP Arty, UAVs, etc. we are capable of transforming the CA into a force that could hold its own against most enemy militaries.

The equipment however is likely the easiest part of the transformation that is required. In my opinion we need to restructure the CA in such a way that it is task focused on the capability of deploying, employing, supporting and sustaining combat forces in action. That requires structural changes to the way the CA is organized but also changes in the mindset of the leadership and members. If the CA doesn't think like a war-fighters then the culture won't support the structural and equipment changes that will allow them to excel as war-fighters.

 

[FSTO]

There, FTFY

As long as the Air Force get the diplomatic clearance, tanker support and prepositioned airfields to get to the beaches!

 

[Kirkhill]

You're 100% right that a properly equipped and supported light force optimized for adaptive dispersed operations and capable of deep strike, etc., etc., etc. would almost certainly be much more effective and useful to both Canada and our allies than the force that we currently have (debates about specific platforms in specific situations like tanks and tracked AFVs aside).

The key part of that statement though is "properly equipped and supported". If you're going to go the radical route you have to go "all in". Half-assing it will only leave you with the worst of both worlds...an under-supported light force that can't respond quickly or effectively enough to make a difference on the battlefield and too under-armed/armoured to stand up to heavier enemy forces.

What is your confidence level that the Canadian Government, public, DND, Army will be on side to make the required commitment to make that actually happen?

I may be very cynical (I delude myself by calling it "pragmatic" in my less negative moments), but we have most of the basic building blocks in place for a traditional medium/light force with a sprinkling of tanks to provide a "heavy-ish" capability. With some targeted new (actually returning) capabilities like SHORAD, AT, SP Arty, UAVs, etc. we are capable of transforming the CA into a force that could hold its own against most enemy militaries.

The equipment however is likely the easiest part of the transformation that is required. In my opinion we need to restructure the CA in such a way that it is task focused on the capability of deploying, employing, supporting and sustaining combat forces in action. That requires structural changes to the way the CA is organized but also changes in the mindset of the leadership and members. If the CA doesn't think like a war-fighters then the culture won't support the structural and equipment changes that will allow them to excel as war-fighters.

In my cynical/pragmatic mode - I have very little confidence of anybody doing anything.

As to properly equipped and supported - "With some targeted new (actually returning) capabilities like SHORAD, AT, SP Arty, UAVs, etc. " - that pretty much describes the problem right there, regardless of whether we are talking about light, medium, heavy or even special forces. We have none of the above so we "need" to buy all of the above.

My sense is that light force platforms cost less to acquire and require fewer, and lest costly, enablers (aircraft, ships and helicopters) to deploy. That means, in my view, that the scarce dollars the taxpayer affords DND can be spent ensuring that our troops don't die easily and that they are as effective as possible in killing large numbers of the enemy in target rich environments.

 

[Kirkhill]

As long as the Air Force get the diplomatic clearance, tanker support and prepositioned airfields to get to the beaches!

Dont forget the hotels!

 

[KevinB]

My sense is that light force platforms cost less to acquire and require fewer, and lest costly, enablers (aircraft, ships and helicopters) to deploy. That means, in my view, that the scarce dollars the taxpayer affords DND can be spent ensuring that our troops don't die easily and that they are as effective as possible in killing large numbers of the enemy in target rich environments.

All enablers are costly

But yes - the there are three main reasons why I think the CDN Army should be Light centric:
1) Cost: Light Forces while still capital intensive to equip to the modern standard are much cheaper than Heavy Forces - who need most of the same individual items, please costly large items.

2) Bang for the Buck: Getting to and fro is easier and cheaper, and you don't have to rejig a slew of training areas for operations.

3) QRF/IRF Roles gain political capital, and allow Canada to determine what areas to quickly support - and to get out quickly as needed/desired.

 

[FJAG]

... The key part of that statement though is "properly equipped and supported". If you're going to go the radical route you have to go "all in". Half-assing it will only leave you with the worst of both worlds...an under-supported light force that can't respond quickly or effectively enough to make a difference on the battlefield and too under-armed/armoured to stand up to heavier enemy forces.

What is your confidence level that the Canadian Government, public, DND, Army will be on side to make the required commitment to make that actually happen? ...

You also have to keep in mind the circumstances of how we got to where we are.

At the end of the 90s we did go all in on a medium force concept leaving behind a force that was principally heavy (with some light). We did this based on the failed state notion that Bosnia et al kept as occupied in the 90s. Our concept was similar and slightly ahead of the Stryker medium force that the US built for the purpose of rapid deployment which was heavy enough to protect itself but was always considered an advance force for the heavy follow up ABCT. For us it was top of the line.

We dropped the MGS and replaced them with older tanks and then newer mine resistant tanks (using the money earmarked for the MGS) in a hurry once the Taliban started blowing up our LAVs. In fact we went so far as to start a project to add an IFV to create one heavy brigade. After the CLS who championed that left for another job his replacement scrapped that project for the LAV Up instead and then cancelled air defence. All with the intent that failed states was our business model.

Then came the Ukraine and we're back facing the same old foe who runs an armoured heavy organization preceded by little green men.

We're where we are because we shuffle around capabilities to meet circumstances. Right now we're on a par with a Soviet Motor Rifle Regiment of the 1990s but without the artillery, air defence and anti-armour systems that they have.

It looks like it will probably be a long time before we do the failed state thing again based on the Afghan experience. It's a very uncertain time for the Army. The Navy will have a role, in the Pacific unless I'm missing my guess. If we ever do get F 35s then the Air Force will also have a role with its numerous allies sharing the same air frame. (Transport is always "in" but I don't give much hope for helicopters getting substantially better).

The Army on the other hand has little direction. NATO will put pressure on us for something. A medium brigade with some tanks might be the thing. Even the Americans have a Stryker brigade there but those are significantly more powerful than our medium brigades and getting more powerful but do remember that this is only one brigade while the Americans advance headquarters is a Corps which signals quite strongly that there are heavy elements envisioned for deployment.

And lets not fool ourselves. When we talk heavy v medium in a Canadian context we're actually talking the same thing because our infantry, regardless of the name, will be in LAV 6.0s. The true difference between heavy and medium is the combat context. Heavy armoured generally has tanks and armoured infantry fighting mounted on and through objectives (That's where the CV90, the Marder and the Bradley come in). Medium forces (like the Stryker) move mounted but fight dismounted like light infantry with some extra direct fire support from their transports. I have no idea what tactics and TTPs they are teaching our mech, tanks supported, infantry, but I do hope it's not "heavy armour" ones.

This gets me back to what I've been whining about in this forum for quite some time; we need to really focus on what potential threats we need to prepare for and then build the right doctrine for it and equip accordingly. Many of us have different viewpoints about that direction on this forum, which is just fine. There are undoubtedly the same varying opinions within the Army. What is needed, as you point out, is that someone gets off their butt, makes a decision and then gets the appropriate government buy-in. With all the crap sidetracking the GOFOs right now, I'm not so sure anyone really has their eye on the ball. I'm certainly not holding my breath for the incumbent MND to give any direction. Regardless of who wins this election, the next guy/gal will hopefully be better.

 

[CBH99]

Regardless of who wins this election, the next guy/gal will hopefully be better.

I hope so too. But IF the LPC wins, I think we should expect more of the same.

In theory, we had a winning team at the helm. Vance was highly regarded for how he conducted himself as Task Force Commander in AFG, and our MND was an experienced guy who had a few tours in the sandbox.

Neither of them accomplished much of note during their time at the helm. I imagine this is because the PM and leadership of the LPC want “yes men” in those roles.

If the LPC is voted in again, I don’t see much changing. Especially in regards to drastic changes in how the CAF is organized or operates. If two experienced officers at the helm aren’t allowed to steer the ship, I doubt a random appointee will be able to do so.

(I have high hopes for this election! Truly, I do! Just feeling pessimistic if the old boys club gets voted in again is all.)

 

[Kirkhill]

Leopard 1 - 114x 42.2 tonnes
M109 A4B+ - 76x 27.5 tons





M113 - 1143x 12.3 tonnes
Lynx - 174x 8.8 tonnes
Ferret - 124x 3.7 tonnes

M151A2 - 935x 1.1 tonnes
MLVW - 2700x 6.3 to 7.5 tonnes

C1 Howitzer - 2.3 tonnes
L5 Pack Howizer - 1.3 tonnes

Now, were we a "principally heavy force with some light" - the CMBG 4 vision?

Or were we a globally deployable light force with prepositioned heavy elements - Hellyer's Force Mobile Command vision?

Personally I lean towards the globally deployable light force view.

The M113, as purchased was a lightly armoured, amphibious, tracked vehicle capable of being delivered by Canada's sizeable fleet of C130s anywhere in Canada for tactical employment. It moved 10 troops and only required a crew of one, the driver. It moved the troops anywhere. It kept them warm and dry. It could protect them in an NBC environment. It could even slow down the occasional bullet and shell fragment.

It could be delivered by airlanding, by LAPES or by parachute. And that was true of all of the other gear that was lighter than the M113, ie anything other than the Leos and the M109s.

Operating in support of them the RCAF purchased 24 C-130 E Hercules in 1964, 15 DHC-5A Buffalo in 1967, 9 DHC-6 Twin Otters ca 1971, 74 OH-58 Kiowas in 1970, 10 UH-1 Iroquois in 1968, 50 Canadian designed "Twin Hueys" in 1971 and 8 CH-47C Chinooks in 1974.

The reason CMBG4 wanted the M113s replaced/augmented by the Marder, and the US wanted the Bradley, was precisely because they were considered to be too light to fight on the North German Plains.

We were a useful light force.

We were never a heavy force.

PS. The Marder weighed the same as the M109. 28 tonnes.

 

[MilEME09]

The problem with trying to be a heavy force, we need a way to get that force moved across the ocean, The RCN has no such capability to do that right now.

 

[daftandbarmy]

The problem with trying to be a heavy force, we need a way to get that force moved across the ocean, The RCN has no such capability to do that right now.

Not if we maintain a Heavy Brigade in Europe 24/7/365 because, you know, statistics show that they're prone to 'family feuds' that get out of hand.

 

[Infanteer]

I don't think ANY MECH/ARMOR should be in Edmonton - the transport to go anywhere is ridiculous.

Edmonton should be a Light Bde

If you actually compare what you can do in training areas across the country your logic is backwards. Western Canada offers the best manoeuvre areas for a heavy force by far, while you have to leave the area to find good training for the light battalion (although the location of the Rockies is helpful).

Transport of tanks isn't ridiculous, it's actually rehearsing something that would be done in a real contingency. Just need all the heavy haulers in one place.

The CAF has more in common with the USN notwithstanding that when it scrapes all of its pieces together it might just about be able to field the a semblance of a single Marine Expeditionary Force based on a Marine Division. But minus a whole bunch of enablers.

Nope. The Department of the Navy has a Marine Corps, but one that isn't obligated to consider major land war requirements, and is actively trying to move away from that posture (hence, eliminating its tank capability). The USN and USMC have air elements, but those are subordinated to servicing the CSG/MAGTF (and jealously guarded from the CAOC), and can let the USAF worry about the air campaign. The DND and the CAF must consider the whole gamut of operations in all domains, while the Department of the Navy and the USN/USMC are singularly focused on the maritime domain.

The Marines don’t get ashore without the Navy.

Really? They just spent 20 years fighting in the landlocked areas of Iraq and Afghanistan, and have standing SPMAGTF's that are globally deployed to land bases abroad. They wish to reinvigorate the "Green/Blue" relationship to "get back to their roots", but they frequently do go ashore without the Navy.

Heavy armoured generally has tanks and armoured infantry fighting mounted on and through objectives (That's where the CV90, the Marder and the Bradley come in). Medium forces (like the Stryker) move mounted but fight dismounted like light infantry with some extra direct fire support from their transports. I have no idea what tactics and TTPs they are teaching our mech, tanks supported, infantry, but I do hope it's not "heavy armour" ones.

Weight of a Stryker ICV = 16,800kg

Weight of a CV 90 MkIV = 37,000kg

Weight of a Marder 1A5 = 34,000kg

Weight of a M2 Bradley = 27,500kg

Weight of a LAV 6.0 = 28,600kg

Weight of Namer ICV = 60,000kg

Be careful how you define light, medium, and heavy forces....

 

[Kirkhill]

Nope. The Department of the Navy has a Marine Corps, but one that isn't obligated to consider major land war requirements, and is actively trying to move away from that posture (hence, eliminating its tank capability). The USN and USMC have air elements, but those are subordinated to servicing the CSG/MAGTF (and jealously guarded from the CAOC), and can let the USAF worry about the air campaign. The DND and the CAF must consider the whole gamut of operations in all domains, while the Department of the Navy and the USN/USMC are singularly focused on the maritime domain.

To clarify.

I agree with you operationally. From an administration standpoint, ie having all the right spreadsheets with all the right boxes to fill I think the USN is still the better model. This particularly caught my eye

The Department of the Navy’s forces are distinctive not
only for their number and variety of units but also for
the way in which different types of forces routinely work
closely together. The Army and Air Force each essentially
focus on a single type of military power (ground
combat or air combat), but the Navy and Marine Corps
routinely integrate ships with aircraft (as in carrier strike
groups), ships with ground combat units (as in amphibious
ready groups), and aircraft with ground combat
units (as in Marine expeditionary forces). Although all
U.S. forces are expected to be able to operate jointly
with other services, the routine and habitual integration
of different types of military power within DoN goes
beyond typical joint operations. For example, the Marine
Corps has fewer artillery units to support its ground
combat units than the Army does, in part because the
Corps prefers to provide additional firepower (fire
support) for its combat units by using its attack
aircraft—aircraft that may well be based on Navy ships.
In contrast, the Army has traditionally structured itself
on the assumption that it must have substantial artillery
capability in case Air Force aircraft are not available to
provide fire support.

The U.S. Military’s Force Structure: A Primer, 2021 Update Chapter 3, page 46

As you read through the primer, especially on the Navy/USMC, it becomes apparent how difficult it is to unfuggle the Navy and Marine and Logistics and Air budgets because of how intertwined their jointness is.

As the CBO notes the Army and the Air Force have pretty clear boundaries (except when they overlap with the Navy and Marines). The Navy and Marines are the original purple mess. And thus, just the right model for DND accountants.

 

[FJAG]

...
Now, were we a "principally heavy force with some light" - the CMBG 4 vision?

Or were we a globally deployable light force with prepositioned heavy elements - Hellyer's Force Mobile Command vision?
...

We were kind of both.

Go back to the end 50s and into the 60s and you'll remember that we used to rotate brigades through Germany until 1959. That settled down with 4th CIBG. At the time we had four CIBGs: 1 in Calgary, 2 in Petawawa, 3 in Gagetown and 4 in Germany.

When the the M113s came they went to 3 and 4 CIBG (They were renamed in 1968 to CBG and then CMBG). Same with the M109s they were with 3 and 4 bdes. Incidentally 3 CIBG had both Black Watch battalions and two Van Doo battalions. These and the other battalions (Cdn Guards, QOR, RCR and PPCLI) all rotated around back and forth to Germany.

Anyway, while 3 and 4 CIBGs were heavyish and eventually got the M113s (basically 3 was the feeder force for 4), 1 and 2 CIBGs stayed fairly light (3/4 ton section carriers). With unification everything went to hell in a handbasket as 3 CIBG was disbanded in 1970 and its gear either redistributed or put in mothballs. 5th CMBG was formed and received the going to Norway role while the government directed that the Army turn light and airmobile (that's where the term "Mobile Command" came in, the Airborne Regiment was created and we gunners in Canada got L5s.

The big deal though was that the government wanted 4th brigade to go light as well. Lots of war game modelling with attack helicopters and heliborne anti armour teams came and went but both NATO and the Army was well dug into keeping 4 CMBG heavy and basically dragged its feet for decades. The move to getting Cougars and Grizzlies was to appear light to the government while having training tanks and APCs to keep training folks for Germany. (By the way much of this is well documented [albeit with a fairly opinionated viewpoint] by Peter Kazurak in A National Force)

I won't take sides in this debate (albeit I've always had a tracks fetish) but the Army has a way of getting around government direction when it wants to. Quite frankly though, I don't think either Trudeau or Cabinet gives a Rat's A as to how we organize and configure as long as we don't go out there to buy a whole lot of expensive crap that isn't built by Irving. I swear to the gods though that if Irving or whatever's left of Canadair ever got interested in tank and IFV building we'd have a well equipped army in no time.

The problem with trying to be a heavy force, we need a way to get that force moved across the ocean, The RCN has no such capability to do that right now.

The world is awash in RORO ships to lease. That's the least of the problem.

Not if we maintain a Heavy Brigade in Europe 24/7/365 because, you know, statistics show that they're prone to 'family feuds' that get out of hand.

And that's my favourite idea. You could even flyover reserve units in the summer for Milcons when all the Reg F takes three months of annual leave.

Be careful how you define light, medium, and heavy forces....

I try to be. I know that the weight of the LAV 6.0 has greatly increased over that of the LAV III and that much of that comes from a double V hull, heavier engine and running gear and while there has been some armour enhancement to the sides it still falls (I think) into a Class III. I understand the Strykers are undergoing similar upgrades. My classifying it "medium" comes mostly from a combination of firepower at the low end, especially no anti-armour missiles (which also limits the CV90 but it has a larger gun) and lack of tracks.

I'm somewhat hampered in that I have an older 2003 version of Combat Team Operations Interim (based on the Leopard C1 and LAV III) and that all my practical experience is with Centurions, older Leopard, Marders and M113s but I would have concerns with a wheeled LAV as to the requirement in the assault that "infantry platoons must remain close to intimate support tanks". I've seen that work well with Marders but even M113s had problems in keeping up with Leos on relatively even ground much less rutted farm fields or, heaven forbid, grape orchards.

I'll certainly yield to your much greater experience than mine in this area. The way that I see it, it's not the weight per se that defines heavy; its the protection, maneuverability and armament that matters. Strykers are clearly medium (hell, technically "light" hence "Light Armoured Vehicle") and not meant to fight onto and through objectives. As far as I see, LAV 6.0s are still the same way despite the extra weight. They provide transportation and fire support to dismounted elements but not much more.

 

[Kirkhill]

....

I won't take sides in this debate ...

I think you might be a wee bit late for that.

the Army has a way of getting around government direction when it wants to

Do I hear "swamp"? "Blob"?

Government? Who needs 'em?