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Informing the Army’s Future Structure

Don't let the rest of the RCAF catch you saying those words!

Maybe that's the key to solving personnel "issues".

Air force: any more shit out of you, and you're all re-roled to "battalions".

Navy: any more shit out of you, and all vessels are hereafter "boats" (except submarines, which will be "ships").

Army: any more shit out of you, and all units will be numbered only, starting from "Unit 1", "Unit 2" etc on the east coast and proceeding west.
 
GBAD and Loitering Munitions developments from Korea and Israel


LIG Nex1 displayed a missile that is expected to be modified from the company’s Korean Surface-to-Air Anti-Missile, or K-SAAM, co-developed by the Agency for Defense Development.

An LIG Nex1 official said the missile is to be fitted with an active radar seeker for terminal guidance and capable of intercepting targets up to 7 kilometers away at a maximum altitude of 5 kilometers. The launcher has 16 launch containers in a 4x4 arrangement and is expected to be mounted on a semi-trailer.


It seems to me that NetFires was not so much cancelled as covered. It seems to have become the basis of a lot of current thinking.

300px-NLOS-LS_missile_test_launch_from_truck.jpg


 
Maybe that's the key to solving personnel "issues".

Air force: any more shit out of you, and you're all re-roled to "battalions".

Navy: any more shit out of you, and all vessels are hereafter "boats" (except submarines, which will be "ships").

Army: any more shit out of you, and all units will be numbered only, starting from "Unit 1", "Unit 2" etc on the east coast and proceeding west.

Because Chinese and Arabic is read right to left, correct? :)
 
USMC - Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations, Adaptive Dispersed Operations.

A model for a national defence Militia? Predicated on supplying a force of small security dets for remote locations - specifically the North Warning Sites. Not necessarily because there is an imminent threat but because there is a potential threat against critical infrastructure. And, I believe, the model is useful, reproducible and scaleable, and can be effectively employed by Militia in a low threat environment. This would also supply a training and organization basis that would allow the Regular Force to exploit Militia personnel within their ranks.

47 North Warning Sites to defend.

Consider assigning a Platoon to each one of them. Each Platoon comprising 3x Sections/Squads/Groups of 16 (including Medic). One Squad assigned to a two week rotation. The other Squads back at home. The Platoon to be activated when the threat level demands. Annual training to include one Section/Squad/Group at the site for a week or two.


a137e0_0179688eeb0e4b2faa7bb54d34285577~mv2.png



Particular interest in the Carl Gustav.

Back to the Swedish Pansar model for a moment. The Carl Gustav represents the basal element for the organization. It is useful, flexible, compact, light and reloadable. A great, inexpensive, training device that has operational value.

However, in the Swedish organization, the CG84 can be replaced with its single-shot cousin, the AT-4, or the larger more effective single-hot N-LAW system. Or, and this gets to the heart of my issue, it can be replaced by something like the Javelin issued from Battalion stocks.

Which leads my wandering mind back to this article and the notion that the Javelin CLU could also be employed with the Stinger missile. Or, fevered speculation, the 70mm APKWS - with the flechette warhead? As an anti-drone option?


If a, lets call it Group, of 16, is on independent security tasking in the north, are they more likely to encounter tanks, or drones? Would the Group CG-84 operator be better provided with the Stingers? Or even, in flight of fancy, Flechette loaded APKWs? Either shoulder launched or launched from a UGV?

UGV_Mission_Master_-_Protection_2.jpg


Or

rheinmetall-mission-master-ugv-warmate-uav-1170x610.jpg




Edit, - By the way a force of 47 security, or Vital Point, Platoons, each of 3x Groups of 16 and an HQ of 3 = a force of 2397 in 47 Platoons, or 16 Companies or so, or 4 or 5 Battalions. Or, if based on the 10 Territorial Battle Groups, one large Company per TBG. Ally those with the 4 Arctic Response Company Groups and you start to have a firmer base for national defence.

Have them operate in conjunction with the CRPG under JTF(N), and cover them with 3 regular Light Infantry Battle Groups each associated with an "Aviation Battalion" of Griffons and Chinooks supported by the CC-138s, CC-130s, CC-177s and CC-150s (as well as the CF-35s ?)

Issue Bv206s and CB-90s to the CRPGs and to the Territorial Battle Group Transport Companies for local response.

The Regs then get to figure out what they want to do with their three Brigades of 4 Artillery Regiments, 4 Engineer Regiments, 3 Cavalry Regiments and 3 Infantry Regiments of 6 Battalions.

CANSOFCOM - carry on.
 
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USMC - Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations, Adaptive Dispersed Operations.

A model for a national defence Militia? Predicated on supplying a force of small security dets for remote locations - specifically the North Warning Sites. Not necessarily because there is an imminent threat but because there is a potential threat against critical infrastructure. And, I believe, the model is useful, reproducible and scaleable, and can be effectively employed by Militia in a low threat environment. This would also supply a training and organization basis that would allow the Regular Force to exploit Militia personnel within their ranks.

47 North Warning Sites to defend.

Consider assigning a Platoon to each one of them. Each Platoon comprising 3x Sections/Squads/Groups of 16 (including Medic). One Squad assigned to a two week rotation. The other Squads back at home. The Platoon to be activated when the threat level demands. Annual training to include one Section/Squad/Group at the site for a week or two.


a137e0_0179688eeb0e4b2faa7bb54d34285577~mv2.png



Particular interest in the Carl Gustav.

Back to the Swedish Pansar model for a moment. The Carl Gustav represents the basal element for the organization. It is useful, flexible, compact, light and reloadable. A great, inexpensive, training device that has operational value.

However, in the Swedish organization, the CG84 can be replaced with its single-shot cousin, the AT-4, or the larger more effective single-hot N-LAW system. Or, and this gets to the heart of my issue, it can be replaced by something like the Javelin issued from Battalion stocks.

Which leads my wandering mind back to this article and the notion that the Javelin CLU could also be employed with the Stinger missile. Or, fevered speculation, the 70mm APKWS - with the flechette warhead? As an anti-drone option?


If a, lets call it Group, of 16, is on independent security tasking in the north, are they more likely to encounter tanks, or drones? Would the Group CG-84 operator be better provided with the Stingers? Or even, in flight of fancy, Flechette loaded APKWs? Either shoulder launched or launched from a UGV?

UGV_Mission_Master_-_Protection_2.jpg


Or

rheinmetall-mission-master-ugv-warmate-uav-1170x610.jpg





What, no flamethrowers? ;)

The Thing | The Blood Test​



 
The concept above sounds practical and useful, And the obvious skill sets taught could easily be employed elsewhere during a deployment.

If there was a fairly simple yet effective air defense capability provide provided by the reserve force, it would also allow members of the reserve force (or small subunits) to deploy on both high intensity and medium intensity deployments on short notice, while also providing an extremely valuable capability. * This could also quite easily be employed to provide loitering munitions from the same launching systems*
 
What, no flamethrowers? ;)

The Thing | The Blood Test​





Awright man! Gin ye must!

Time to reintroduce this beast?

1*8ToQVysrR1EDtwNoBLHS7w.jpeg


Although a lot of the younger cognoscenti seem to prefer their "enhanced blast" munitions (thermobarics if fielded by the bad guys).

By the way, if the training venues were moved north to the North Warning Sites - would there be more opportunities for range work?
 
A model for a national defence Militia? Predicated on supplying a force of small security dets for remote locations - specifically the North Warning Sites.
I see two issues.

The first is that I don't really feel a need to build 47 bespoke platoons to defend North Warning Sites. The sites biggest vulnerability is to EW or missile strikes and not sabotage or Spetsnaz raids. At what point in a warning phase do you deploy your six battalions up there and how many more battalions would you need to maintain reasonable rotations. If we do need a physical armed presence there can it be with enhanced Canadian Ranger forces?

The second deals with establishment. Like it or not six of our nine Reg F infantry battalions are LAV mounted and LAVs come with a space limitation that is significantly exceeded by a fifteen man section. Effectively you would need two LAVs per section which means a section in total (including each LAV's 3 man crew) would need to be 21 folks. That's a small platoon in its own right (and your platoon would grow to in excess of 70 personnel).

The answer might be to have two separate establishments: one for a LAV battalion and another for your USMC-like non-LAV "light" platoons albeit one still needs to work out the light platoons' vehicle structure. That's doable but does somewhat limit the usability of the leadership (and to an extent, the rank and file) of the non-LAV folks vis-a-vis operating as augmentees/replacements in a LAV-based unit because the section organizations and platoon tactics will be quite different. That's not to say it can't be overcome but it creates an unnecessary difficulty.

I tend to favour an infantry section organization that is identical in its basic numbers and in weapon configuration to that of the dismounts that will fit in a LAV. Those seven or eight people become both type of platoons' standard manoeuvre elements.

The first level where I see a difference is just above the dismounted rifle section in what constitutes the organic fire support availability of the two different platoons.

In a LAV platoon that fire support is based on the four LAVs and their three-man crews as well as the platoon's small weapons' detachment.

In a light platoon that fire support should be based on a much larger and fairly robust heavy weapons section that's organic to the light platoon (essentially one could add the equivalent the 12 LAV crewmen to the light platoon's weapons section which would end up in having both types of platoon with the same number of personnel). (To go a step further, if a light platoon's weapon section were to be cross-trained in LAV operation and a LAV platoon's LAV crew cross-trained as a dismounted weapons section, then converting from one type of platoon to the other type would be a fairly simple process)

The key here is that the rifle sections are identical and work the same way regardless of whether they are LAV dismounts or a light platoon's rifle sections while the LAV platoon's LAVs and weapons' det and the light platoon's weapons' section perform similar functions making the tactical handling of the two platoon types very similar and easily adaptable/convertible.

🍻
 
I see two issues.

The first is that I don't really feel a need to build 47 bespoke platoons to defend North Warning Sites. The sites biggest vulnerability is to EW or missile strikes and not sabotage or Spetsnaz raids. At what point in a warning phase do you deploy your six battalions up there and how many more battalions would you need to maintain reasonable rotations. If we do need a physical armed presence there can it be with enhanced Canadian Ranger forces?

The second deals with establishment. Like it or not six of our nine Reg F infantry battalions are LAV mounted and LAVs come with a space limitation that is significantly exceeded by a fifteen man section. Effectively you would need two LAVs per section which means a section in total (including each LAV's 3 man crew) would need to be 21 folks. That's a small platoon in its own right (and your platoon would grow to in excess of 70 personnel).

The answer might be to have two separate establishments: one for a LAV battalion and another for your USMC-like non-LAV "light" platoons albeit one still needs to work out the light platoons' vehicle structure. That's doable but does somewhat limit the usability of the leadership (and to an extent, the rank and file) of the non-LAV folks vis-a-vis operating as augmentees/replacements in a LAV-based unit because the section organizations and platoon tactics will be quite different. That's not to say it can't be overcome but it creates an unnecessary difficulty.

I tend to favour an infantry section organization that is identical in its basic numbers and in weapon configuration to that of the dismounts that will fit in a LAV. Those seven or eight people become both type of platoons' standard manoeuvre elements.

The first level where I see a difference is just above the dismounted rifle section in what constitutes the organic fire support availability of the two different platoons.

In a LAV platoon that fire support is based on the four LAVs and their three-man crews as well as the platoon's small weapons' detachment.

In a light platoon that fire support should be based on a much larger and fairly robust heavy weapons section that's organic to the light platoon (essentially one could add the equivalent the 12 LAV crewmen to the light platoon's weapons section which would end up in having both types of platoon with the same number of personnel). (To go a step further, if a light platoon's weapon section were to be cross-trained in LAV operation and a LAV platoon's LAV crew cross-trained as a dismounted weapons section, then converting from one type of platoon to the other type would be a fairly simple process)

The key here is that the rifle sections are identical and work the same way regardless of whether they are LAV dismounts or a light platoon's rifle sections while the LAV platoon's LAVs and weapons' det and the light platoon's weapons' section perform similar functions making the tactical handling of the two platoon types very similar and easily adaptable/convertible.

🍻


There may not be a need for 47 platoons on the North Warning Line. There is, in my view a need to create an organisational and training focus for the Canadian Militia - and hanging around waiting for the opportunity to climb in the back of a couple of dozen LAVs in Latvia isn't getting the job done.

47 Platoons? 51 Reserve Infantry battalions. One Platoon per battalion, each one tasked to launch one Group of 16 every summer to the High Arctic for focused training, and to get familiar both with their site and their country.

And if somebody with a credit card and a wrench starts expressing interest in those sites (I believe sabotage is much more likely than an overt assault, or missile strike, or an EW strike - all of which leave trails) then there is a ready security force available for deployment.

Does the Reserves/Militia have any difficulty getting troops to sign up for the northern exercises and the Arctic Response Company Groups? I don't believe so? Despite the lack of a neighbourhood hofbraeuhaus. :giggle:

As to the infantry section being translatable to the LAVs. Why isn't the 16 person group translatable to the LAVs?

16 people. 4 LAVS. 4 people per LAV. 1 C&S Team. 3 Fire Teams.

C&S Team is Gp Ldr, Asst Gp Ldr (Laser Designator and Rear-Link), Gp Systems Op (Radio and UAVs with ISR payloads) and Medic-Orderly-Rfmn.

3 Fire Teams with 12 HB Auto Rifles, 3 M320 Grenade Launchers, 1 DMR rifle, 1 CG-84 (M2/M3/M4)

Such pyro and single use munitions are appropriate to the mission. Very large selection available.


16 organized dismounts in a single Gp allied with 12 organized LAV crew. An organized, co-operative, flexible force of 28. Command structure and cap badges to be sorted out at the mess after the definitive crud match. ;)


14 LAVs = 1 Platoon of 3 Groups of Rifles and 3 Tps or Sections of LAVs.

And 1917 Doctrine is chucked.

By the way - if each infantry battalion is tasked to secure a specific site then the Gp Systems Operators could be tasked to monitor remotely an EO/IR system surveilling (and recording) activities at the site. I am going to speculate (hope) that somebody in the NORAD system is already doing that. However just in the interest of creating ties, and situational awareness, like the monitors in the backs of the LAVs for the GIBs, I think it would be worthwhile letting the troops see what they are up against.


And, as stated above, the Regs can organize to suit their view of the situation.
 
And, wrt the 6 LAV battalions - fill your boots. Take the PYs you want and organize as you see fit. I would reccomend the group configuration but that is just me.

WRT the Light Battalions, once the LAV battalions have taken what they want then form the LIBs around the remainder as XX:YY battalions formed from Regs and Militia (Class A, B and C service).
 
Maybe that's the key to solving personnel "issues".

Air force: any more shit out of you, and you're all re-roled to "battalions".

Navy: any more shit out of you, and all vessels are hereafter "boats" (except submarines, which will be "ships").

Army: any more shit out of you, and all units will be numbered only, starting from "Unit 1", "Unit 2" etc on the east coast and proceeding west.
That last one is closer to reality then you think for the PRes
 
Clarification

Calgary Highlanders Arctic Platoon tasked to the security of North Warning Station FOX-CA.

Calgary Highlanders required to raise 48 Class A volunteers trained to conduct security and defend a locality.

Proficient in the service pistol, service rifle and unit machine guns as are found in the local armoury, the service grenade launcher and the CG-84 M2 (also found in the local armouries?) and such radios, EO/IR devices and single use pyro and munitions as are on common issue.

Trained and equipped to operate in Canada at temperatures down to -50C.

Require the Platoon's 3 Gp Systems Operators to maintain intermittent situational awareness of the site and its environs and update their command and their Gp.

Require the Calgary Highlands Arctic Platoon of 47 to launch a Gp of 15, augmented by a Militia Medic, to NWS FOX-CA every summer for a period of no more than two weeks.

In the event of the threat level rising then the Calgary Highlanders will consistently rotate Groups to NWS FOX-CA on a two week schedule with each Gp spending 2 weeks on site and 4 weeks in Calgary conducting their usual civilian routine.



The Remainder of the Calgary Highlanders will reorganize their Company Platoons on the Gp system. Gps can be attached to the Arctic Rapid Response Company Gp, the Territorial Battle Gp, the Light Infantry Battle Gp or to Reg Force LAV Battle Gps/Brigades.
 
OK

My fever dreams continue.

If my Calgary Highland Arctic Group System Operators can observe activities at NWS FOX-CA then they can control their UGVs at FOX-CA.

UGV options

1635023901110.png1635023969799.png1635024039056.png1635024092056.png

A Search and Rescue Package for each NWS site? Comms, ISTAR, Drone and Ambulance?
 
47 North Warning Sites to defend.

Consider assigning a Platoon to each one of them. Each Platoon comprising 3x Sections/Squads/Groups of 16 (including Medic). One Squad assigned to a two week rotation. The other Squads back at home. The Platoon to be activated when the threat level demands. Annual training to include one Section/Squad/Group at the site for a week or

. . .

Threat level response . . .

Your vision for current threat level response

Infantry section.jpg

A more realistic response

Security guard with phone.jpg
 
Don't let the rest of the RCAF catch you saying those words!

Disagree Clean It Up GIF by NOW WE'RE TALKING TV SERIES'RE TALKING TV SERIES
CRCAF used that term (including when he was the AFG ATF Comd) in the past, so I’d say it’s more an issue with light-blue hotel dwellers getting all pissy over a term that all our Allie’s implicitly understand with great clarity.
 
Threat level response . . .

Your vision for current threat level response

View attachment 66863

A more realistic response

View attachment 66864

Agreed that much of the response, if not all, could be handled by a nightwatchman.

But.

My intention is to create a focus for organization and training in our backyard. And, to prepare to defend the country, in the off-chance that someday somebody decides Canada is worth attacking (and defending).
 
Soldiers from the Swedish Home Guard and U.S. Special Forces assigned to 10th Special Forces Group Airborne conduct mission planning during a bilateral exercise in Sweden, on November 25, 2020. The Home Guard is part of the Swedish Armed Forces and comprises nearly half of the Swedish Armed Forces’ body of personnel who are designed to operate across the entire conflict scale from providing peacetime assistance to society in times of crisis, to armed struggle in wartime. (U.S Army photo by Sgt. Patrik Orcutt)

1000w_q95.jpg


Sweden


Denmark
 
Soldiers from the Swedish Home Guard and U.S. Special Forces assigned to 10th Special Forces Group Airborne conduct mission planning during a bilateral exercise in Sweden, on November 25, 2020. The Home Guard is part of the Swedish Armed Forces and comprises nearly half of the Swedish Armed Forces’ body of personnel who are designed to operate across the entire conflict scale from providing peacetime assistance to society in times of crisis, to armed struggle in wartime. (U.S Army photo by Sgt. Patrik Orcutt)

1000w_q95.jpg


Sweden


Denmark

We worked a bit with the Danish Home Guard, and the Norwegian equivalent.

My impression was that a good Canadian militia unit is better trained, in many ways.

However, their role was mainly point site defence e.g., bridges, communications nodes etc., and they were integrated with the overal national mobilization strategy. The plan was that they would hold the vital points while the standing army bought time - by striking the Russkies - for the conscripts to be mobilized, I think.

The Noggies could mobilize about a million troops in a week, so the Home Guards kept their weapons at home with enough CSupps on hand for about that length of time.
 
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