• Thanks for stopping by. Logging in to a registered account will remove all generic ads. Please reach out with any questions or concerns.

Future uses of the Leopard: APC, AD, FIBUA tanks, etc (Idea Feasibility?)

Ex-Dragoon

Army.ca Fixture
Inactive
Reaction score
1
Points
430
Just curious how feasible this idea would be. Based on IDF experience of converting tanks into HAPC could we do that with the extra Leopards we have?
 
Good idea, but we don't have any "extra" Leopards, 2 Sqns are going to be used in the LdSH, 8 tanks for the Armour School and the rest in Wainwright for CMTC.
 
Are the Strats not being converted into a Stryker Regiment like the rest of the Armoured Corps?
 
NO. They are to maintain 2 Sqn's of Leo's and 1 Recce Sqn. Down the road who knows what will happen but for now and the immediate future this is the plan. The LdSH will get MGS (Stryker is the American name for LAV 3) as part of Recce Sqn, Counter Recce Troop. How that is organised is yet to be determined. I will be moving into that position come September as Armour Standards for Counter Recce.
 
If we are binning the Leo as our medium tank we should save the chassis and try to get some Gepard turrets from the Germans. If we want to prep for FIBUA lets learn a lesson from the Americans and the Russians. Tanks in cities can not engage most targets as their guns do not elevate enough. If you look at Grozny the Russians started to use SP Anti-Aircraft guns to engage the enemy. The lighter armour left them very vulnerable to RPGs. So now they are using modified T-90s with two AZP-23 23mm autocannons mounted in a remote weapons station. I believe max elevation is 85 deg. Think about having that as support. Twin 35mm cannons will destroy darn near anything you could want destroyed and the tank will crush darn near anything you can stuff under it.   

Thoughts on the idea?
 
There are two objections to the conversion of the Leopard C2 to a heavy APC like the ACHZARIT or BTR-T.

First, you will be expending a lot of time, effort and money on a worn out platform. For the same expenditure of effort, a totally new machine could be designed and built. It can even be done quickly and cheaply by using as many COTS and MOTS parts as possible inside the armoured "shell".

The second, and more serious objection is the infantry will have a well protected assault vehicle, but nothing to back them up. It is possible to imagine a LAV III/ LAV DFSV combat team, but would you team the 105mm LAV DFSV with something like an ACHZARIT? The poor infantrymen will loose their armoured support long before they can move to effective dismount range. (This is the inverse of stripping away the supporting infantry form the tanks!) Unless you are prepared to provide the extra resources for a real "Generation 3" gun tank like the M1A2, Challenger, Leopard 2A5 or Merkava 4 in sufficient quantities to outfit the "square" combat teams in whatever numbers of heavy APC's you are proposing, this is a non starter.

And we havn't even gotten into the doctrinal reasoning...

 
How would an APC on an MBT chassis contribute to a more deployable force? It would be a step backward, not to mention requiring Inf bn Maint Pls to carry much heavier spare parts loads as well as having a Leopard ARV instead of a wheeled wrecker. You would also have to maintain some HLVW-type lowbed capability to move them long distances- heavy tracked vehicles get worn out if they self-deploy-this is one of the distinct advantages of a wheeled fleet. This would be great in a heavy mech force, but we aren't going that way. Cheers.
 
While the issues of maintainence and logistics are important factors, they should not dominate when "sussing out" requirments. Based on the experience of the IDF in Urban OPs, heavy armour is essential to conducting successful operations.

The Isreali troops deploy into the West Bank in Merkava/Achzarit combat teams because these vehicles can shrug off small arms fire up to RPGs, mount a good mix of weapons that can be used under protection (Merkavas mount a 120mm main gun which is great for bunker busting, usually a .50 cal HMG fixed over the main gun barrel, three GPMG's (co-ax, and two up top) and a 60mm mortar which can be loaded and fired from the inside.) The Achzarit APC has 3 X GPMGs (one on an "Overhead Weapons Station" and two on side pintle mounts), a 60mm mortar like the Merkava's and banks of grenade dischargers which can fire WP smoke or frag grenades. With this amount of firepower and protection, IDF forces can deliver the infantry right to the objective. The Americans used heavy forces for their "Thunder Runs" up the streets of Bhagdad at the close of phase one of the Iraqi war. A LAV based force might find itself dismounted fairly early due to vehicle casualties, with the Infantry fighting on foot to the objective.

Like it or not, Urban Ops is still a close range slugging match, and troops need the proper tools to do the job. Light and Medium forces still have places supporting the "heavies", and are well suited for open warfare. I have my own ideas about how heavy vehicles will evolve in the future, but it will take a rewrite of several doctrinal ideas to bring heavy forces back into the CF.
 
strat0 said:
Good idea, but we don't have any "extra" Leopards, 2 Sqns are going to be used in the LdSH, 8 tanks for the Armour School and the rest in Wainwright for CMTC.

I don't quite understand the math here? 

At present on the books Canada has some 114 Leopards.

A TOE Leopard Squadron has 19 tanks (4x4 tank troops and 3 for Sqn. HQs OC, BC and dozer).  That would mean that the LdSH (RC) would be using around 38-40 Leopards.

With 8 at the School and another 38-40 in Wainwright for CMTC that brings us up to 84 Leopards accounted for.  What are the rest going to be doing?

 
Matt, you're right in being confused.

Canada has decided (or someone in power, rather) to maintain a total of 66 tanks.

The LdSH is going to maintain one squadron in Edmonton.  Another two squadrons will be at the CMTC, which the LdSH will crew on an as-required basis.  Eight at the School, the remainder parked and rusting away.  Er, I mean "placed in storage".
 
  Eight at the School, the remainder parked and rusting away.   Er, I mean "placed in storage".

Remainder being used for spare parts
 
Long Term storage.
The decision to canalibize equipment rests with Ottawa and only Ottawa.Besides,we can still get parts.It might take awhile but thier still availible.
 
why reinvent the wheel....  if the CAF desires and finds a need for something like the IDF T-55 ACHZARIT, then sell off the Leopards to some wanting 3-rd world ally and buy the IDF ACHZARIT.  much easier to buy off the shelf then spend time redesigning the Leopard. 

One downside to the ACHZARIT I would venture is speed....  the IDF in the Gaza and West Bank ain't really looking for speed, but protection.  The IDF does some interesting improvization.  They did the hard work, save the R&D and cut a deal....

Speaking of the IDF, they did some "interesting work" with 155mm Howitzer shells.... he he they put Sabot's around them and fired them from 175mm tubes on thier M107's
cool trick, tossed them bullets 60+ km's if I remember right.  This was the mid 1970's, he he the Syrians freaked out lookjing for the 155mm howitzer batterys rooming outside Dumascus, ha ha seems when thier Arty boys look at the craters they said "yep, 155mm's"  kept them busy looking close to the captial all along the M107's where up on the Golan heights.  Get-some.... Thats reaching out and touching someone.  Golan Heights to Demascus. 

Oh and speaking of getting some...  during the 1982 Lebbenon invasion the IDF used 155mm M109A2's and M110 8" howitzers as close support couter-sniper weapons along side thier APCs and tanks in Beruit.  No need for CQB when the buildings rubble.

Improvise, Adapt, Overcome.....



 
While the issues of maintainence and logistics are important factors, they should not dominate when "sussing out" requirments. Based on the experience of the IDF in Urban OPs, heavy armour is essential to conducting successful operations.

Then, the way we're going, we're not going to engage in these kind of ops unless an Ally provides armour sp, the same way we would need AH sp now, or we adjust our tactics in some way. I wonder what the USMC are doing, since they are equipped with the LAV not the Bradley?....

I would argue that your ability to project/sustain a force must be given high priority if you intend to fight anywhere outside your country. This is exactly the situation we are in: we have heavy gear that is largely Germany-legacy stuff, but very limited/no means to project or sustain it in any timely or useful manner. It doesn't matter about the urban slugging match if you can't get to it until it's over.

I don't quite understand the math here?  

Don't feel bad-this is the second post I've seen "definitively" stating figures that were off/OBE. (See Iltis/LUVW thread)

Cheers.

 
pbi said:
Then, the way we're going, we're not going to engage in these kind of ops unless an Ally provides armour sp, the same way we would need AH sp now, or we adjust our tactics in some way. I wonder what the USMC are doing, since they are equipped with the LAV not the Bradley?....

I would rather not have to make a plan that relies so much on the ability or willingness of allies to do the job ("Sorry Colonel, but there is a spot of trouble in my sector; those tanks you need will be delayed"). The Marines have a wide range of kit, including M1 tanks. This is the point, there has to be the right tools available to do the job. Tying kit buys and doctrine to transport and logistics is inside out. First we need to know what we are expected to do, then we see what is needed for the sharp end to do the job, then we work out the supporting arrangements. If this turns out to be too expensive for our political masters, then we must say forthrightly: "No, we cannot do this task".

As for heavy vehicles, I believe that current and near term technology will allow a "convergence" of roles. When Armoured and Infantry platforms can now fire rounds to engage targets from 8-13km away (ground launched "Hellfire" or LAHAT through tube missiles), and improved sensors, communications and command and control systems can give relevant target information to the shooters in real time, then composite units may well emerge. These would use the vehicle mounted systems to engage "hard" targets from direct fire to "light artillery" range, while carrying infantry soldiers to deal with "close" threats. An Achzarit with a remote weapons mount on the deck is a mental starting point, or you could think of the Merkava's ability to carry a section in the back (the Italian Centurio tank destroyer can also be configured to carry a "close support section" of four troops). This will be a nightmare for many traditionalists (Is the team Infantry or Armoured? If there are no dedicated "guns" what happens to the Artillery?), but many new options have to be explored.

If company sized units can pack the fighting power a "combat team" does today, then some of the logistics and transport issues are eased.

Getting back to first principles, why would we want to convert a Leopard to a heavy APC? What role would it play? Do we want to do that role? If you can answer those questions and come up with what role do we need to do that requires such kit, and why it is so important we are able to do that role, then the case for a heavy APC and supporting arms is made.
 
Suggestion: Readers take a look at CASR DND 101 for a comprehensive and highly detailed
overview of a potential major upgrade of CF "Leopard" Tank to turn it into a "street
fighter". CASR DND 101 as I have mentioned before on this valuable and informative site
is an excellent source of information about national security, weapon systems, vehicles
military perspectives, and academic opionions of National defence and security.
CASR is "Canadian American Strategic Review". MacLeod
 
it would seem best to me that any heavy APC would best be based on the respective countries MBT, why mix componants too much? Israel uses T-55 hulls for a bases for thier, but they have a large stock pile of these around the area.  The CAF does not seem to have a large stock pile of tank chassis to retrofit. The USMC is looking at new ideas, right now they use the LAV but mostly in the recce more (Matt Fisher I feel is more up to speed on this)  But the Current AmTrack (AAV-7 family) was designed to bring troops from ship to shore and a little inland.  Turning that into a heavy APC would pretty much destroy the Amphipbious nature of this beast.  The US Army uas had some success with the LAV-111 Striker, since the USMC uses the LAV-25 going to this APC might be a simble adjustment, but not harder a heavy APC.  I hate to see the USMC burdered with too much heavy armor since thier main task is quick and fast hello and ampihbious attacks, but warfare seems to be turing more and more to the urban scene.  And heavy armor is needed in an APC.  Better heads in design teams everywhere are doing a better job then I can to suggest a solution.

But is the need for a heavy APC really needed? It seems to this dumb old Marine the the more we depend on heavy APCs the more we create a Target Vehical.  Should the real solution be more tropps on the ground clearing out the threats in the first place? and enough troops that once that area is cleared it stays clear?  I'll be the first to say that what I just wrote is a vast simplifacation that more then likely is far from the mark.

Personally I think with the new modern composit armor used these days a lighter faster MBT be designed, something that from the design stage is configurable as a MBT and APC later in production, something modular in concept.  I'd hate to see the M1A2 and equal type MBT disappear since they have thier place. I guess a simple soultion would be an APC based on the M1A2 chassis and the Challanger 2 chassis, this would simplifiy the maintenance and supply chains.

It would be nice (possible? ) if the US/Canada/Britian all got togarther and come up with one design they all would use.  I think all agree this is not a simple solution, this is an old problem dating back to the first mechinized infantry in WW2.
 
The LVTP-7 represents another example of a special tool to do the job, which otherwise would require landing craft, a narrower range of potential landing sites and a lot more support. (If we do have heavy armour as part of the expeditionary force package, we should also consider getting those marine hovercraft to bring them ashore).

A common chassis for a HAPC and a gun tank would end up looking much like the Merkava. The engine block in the front provides a clear space in the rear for the weapons mount (in the tank/fire support version), and room for an 8-10 man section in the HAPC version, however configured. An additional benefit is the engine block adds mass to the armour envelope, even if the frontal armour is breached. Since Canada needs a new generation of tanks anyway (despite all the loud noises from the MGS/LAV TOW/MMEV crowd), designing it as a front engined machine isn't much of a stretch. We could even go full circle in basing the new machine on the TAM medium tank, which was derived from the German Marder IFV.

Pappy is right in that heavy vehicles are only part of the mix. The "heavy" team can be used in urban assaults, deliberate attacks against prepared positions and as the countermove force to hammer enemy penetrations. LAV and post LAV forces will be more like the Cavalry, capable of doing screening, flanking and economy of force roles, as well as following behind the heavies for the exploitation role. Light forces can operate in complex terrain, or be inserted to gain operational and strategic goals which the other forces cannot reach.

 
Why not the CV90?   It can come as an APC with a 25 mm or 30mm or a 40mm gun and is modular as it comes also in the form of CV90105 or 120, carrying your choice of a 105mm or 120mm main gun.   Pretty wicked fire power for something only topping out at 22 tons.   And they have that dual 120mm AMOS mortar job.   And a top speed of 70+kmh.  

The basic vehicle
http://www.wendel.se/rswa/strf90.htm

The variants
http://www.wendel.se/rswa/cv90derivat.htm
 
CV 90 is an interesting vehicle (I am getting quite behind in my Jane's)

Heretical thought: CV 90/120 would not just be a gun tank, but have the elevation mechanism and gun cradle modified for high angle fire so it would be the MMEV. In the direct fire role, it would be loaded with high velocity "tank" rounds and through tube missiles. In the support role, it can fire 120mm rounds based on 120 mm mortar rounds (HE, Smoke, Illum, STRIX smart rounds) and through tube missiles like the LAHAT (anti tank engagements at a 13 km range). I recognize the 120mm cannon is designed for a high velocity round, but a 120mm low/medium velocity round can be fired using a "stub"  casing which fills the breech, but does not have the propellant load of an anti-tank round.

The Infantry version should have a low profile mount for the weapon (similar to the STRYKER, but up gunned to 25mm if possible).

Specialist versions like FOO/FAC/MFC, surveillance (with a "cherry picker" mast that can be deployed/retracted in a few minutes) AAA or SAM and engineer versions are all desirable, and can be built on the common chassis for common logistics and economy of scale.
 
Back
Top