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FWSAR (CC130H, Buffalo, C27J, V22): Status & Possibilities

suffolkowner

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From the 2010 fall report

“We found that National Defence’s needs and priorities were not precisely defined at the outset and… were not finalized until the contract with Boeing was signed in 2009…The June 2006 statement of operational requirements was not reviewed or endorsed by the Senior Review Board or by the Joint Capability Requirements Board until October 2006 and, consequently, did not benefit from the rigorous challenge these bodies are expected to provide… The intended configuration of the Canadianized Chinook evolved as decisions were made… According to National Defence, the seven high-level mandatory requirements could have been met by a basic Chinook model (emphasis added). However, in the process of detailing its specifications with Boeing, National Defence also drew from the set of rated operational requirements, effectively treating extended-range fuel tanks, an upgraded electrical system, and aircraft survivability equipment as mandatory requirements, though none had been originally identified as such. These additional modifications resulted in significant changes to a basic Chinook model and also had an impact on the timing and complexity of certification for airworthiness…
The full extent of modifications was not initially presented to decision makers.… We disagree with the characterization of this helicopter as being off-the-shelf. It is evident that from the beginning, National Defence did not intend to procure an off-the-shelf Chinook but rather a modified one… So significant were the modifications to the basic Chinook helicopter that Boeing’s estimate included nearly US$360 million for one-time engineering costs… National Defence knew, prior to seeking preliminary project approval from the Treasury Board and issuing the ACAN, that significant modifications to a basic Chinook were desired and planned. It knew also that these would increase the risks to cost and schedule. However, this was not presented to the Treasury Board when seeking preliminary project approval… Ultimately, Canadian-required modifications increased the cost of each aircraft by 70 percent more than initially quoted by Boeing in early 2006
(emphasis added). This prolonged the negotiation of the contract by over two years and delayed the delivery of the aircraft.”
…Overall, in our opinion, the manner in which PWGSC used the 2006 ACAN did not comply with the letter or intent of the applicable regulations and policies and, consequently, the contract award process was not fair, open, and transparent. In addition, we believe a second ACAN should have been issued in 2009 and should have included the final helicopter requirements and specifications, the revised delivery and certification schedule, an indication of willingness to pay one-time engineering development costs, and other significant changes made to the project scope.”
The OAG report compares the C$ 2 billion advertised cost for 16 helicopters with the current C$ 4.9 billion, but it’s not an even comparison because the current program total includes long term support contracts, and the original cost did not. They do note, correctly, that planned delivery of the first fully capable CH-147 has been delayed from 2008 to 2010, and then again to 2013, while the buy was cut to 15, due in part to poor decision making within DND”


Don't get me wrong, I don't get seriously excited about how much the CAF capital equipment procurements cost as I often think we spend way too much time,money and resources trying to maintain to tight of a control especially on the big purchases, but playing fast and loose always comes back to bite the CAF on the ass
 

FJAG

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... What was the deal with O'Connor anyways? Why was he disliked?
O'Conner was Hillier's CO in the early years and I think Hillier got a dislike for him and his leadership style then. That subsequently became more of an issue as, while they agreed on most things, they had some different viewpoints on certain things and both of them had strong personalities. That led to the press picking up on the tension and, as the press is won't to do, running with it. Hillier was the CAF's golden child at the time so naturally O'Conner became the opposite. Personally I was never a Hillier fan. I didn't like a whole lot of things he did at the time vis a vis army transformation and the growth of the central headquarters. The DCDS shop needed reform for the Afghan War but I think Hillier took things far too far. Army transformation, again in my view, was myopic with too much concentration on Bosnia and OOTW. When you build an army down, it's hard to build it back up.

🍻
 

kev994

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From the 2010 fall report

“We found that National Defence’s needs and priorities were not precisely defined at the outset and… were not finalized until the contract with Boeing was signed in 2009…The June 2006 statement of operational requirements was not reviewed or endorsed by the Senior Review Board or by the Joint Capability Requirements Board until October 2006 and, consequently, did not benefit from the rigorous challenge these bodies are expected to provide… The intended configuration of the Canadianized Chinook evolved as decisions were made… According to National Defence, the seven high-level mandatory requirements could have been met by a basic Chinook model (emphasis added). However, in the process of detailing its specifications with Boeing, National Defence also drew from the set of rated operational requirements, effectively treating extended-range fuel tanks, an upgraded electrical system, and aircraft survivability equipment as mandatory requirements, though none had been originally identified as such. These additional modifications resulted in significant changes to a basic Chinook model and also had an impact on the timing and complexity of certification for airworthiness…
The full extent of modifications was not initially presented to decision makers.… We disagree with the characterization of this helicopter as being off-the-shelf. It is evident that from the beginning, National Defence did not intend to procure an off-the-shelf Chinook but rather a modified one… So significant were the modifications to the basic Chinook helicopter that Boeing’s estimate included nearly US$360 million for one-time engineering costs… National Defence knew, prior to seeking preliminary project approval from the Treasury Board and issuing the ACAN, that significant modifications to a basic Chinook were desired and planned. It knew also that these would increase the risks to cost and schedule. However, this was not presented to the Treasury Board when seeking preliminary project approval… Ultimately, Canadian-required modifications increased the cost of each aircraft by 70 percent more than initially quoted by Boeing in early 2006 (emphasis added). This prolonged the negotiation of the contract by over two years and delayed the delivery of the aircraft.”
…Overall, in our opinion, the manner in which PWGSC used the 2006 ACAN did not comply with the letter or intent of the applicable regulations and policies and, consequently, the contract award process was not fair, open, and transparent. In addition, we believe a second ACAN should have been issued in 2009 and should have included the final helicopter requirements and specifications, the revised delivery and certification schedule, an indication of willingness to pay one-time engineering development costs, and other significant changes made to the project scope.”
The OAG report compares the C$ 2 billion advertised cost for 16 helicopters with the current C$ 4.9 billion, but it’s not an even comparison because the current program total includes long term support contracts, and the original cost did not. They do note, correctly, that planned delivery of the first fully capable CH-147 has been delayed from 2008 to 2010, and then again to 2013, while the buy was cut to 15, due in part to poor decision making within DND”


Don't get me wrong, I don't get seriously excited about how much the CAF capital equipment procurements cost as I often think we spend way too much time,money and resources trying to maintain to tight of a control especially on the big purchases, but playing fast and loose always comes back to bite the CAF on the ass
I think we get royalties for some of these developments if other buyers pick them up. Don’t see any complaints about that.
 

Good2Golf

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From the 2010 fall report

“We found that National Defence’s needs and priorities were not precisely defined at the outset and… were not finalized until the contract with Boeing was signed in 2009…The June 2006 statement of operational requirements was not reviewed or endorsed by the Senior Review Board or by the Joint Capability Requirements Board until October 2006 and, consequently, did not benefit from the rigorous challenge these bodies are expected to provide… The intended configuration of the Canadianized Chinook evolved as decisions were made… According to National Defence, the seven high-level mandatory requirements could have been met by a basic Chinook model (emphasis added). However, in the process of detailing its specifications with Boeing, National Defence also drew from the set of rated operational requirements, effectively treating extended-range fuel tanks, an upgraded electrical system, and aircraft survivability equipment as mandatory requirements, though none had been originally identified as such. These additional modifications resulted in significant changes to a basic Chinook model and also had an impact on the timing and complexity of certification for airworthiness…
The full extent of modifications was not initially presented to decision makers.… We disagree with the characterization of this helicopter as being off-the-shelf. It is evident that from the beginning, National Defence did not intend to procure an off-the-shelf Chinook but rather a modified one… So significant were the modifications to the basic Chinook helicopter that Boeing’s estimate included nearly US$360 million for one-time engineering costs… National Defence knew, prior to seeking preliminary project approval from the Treasury Board and issuing the ACAN, that significant modifications to a basic Chinook were desired and planned. It knew also that these would increase the risks to cost and schedule. However, this was not presented to the Treasury Board when seeking preliminary project approval… Ultimately, Canadian-required modifications increased the cost of each aircraft by 70 percent more than initially quoted by Boeing in early 2006 (emphasis added). This prolonged the negotiation of the contract by over two years and delayed the delivery of the aircraft.”
…Overall, in our opinion, the manner in which PWGSC used the 2006 ACAN did not comply with the letter or intent of the applicable regulations and policies and, consequently, the contract award process was not fair, open, and transparent. In addition, we believe a second ACAN should have been issued in 2009 and should have included the final helicopter requirements and specifications, the revised delivery and certification schedule, an indication of willingness to pay one-time engineering development costs, and other significant changes made to the project scope.”
The OAG report compares the C$ 2 billion advertised cost for 16 helicopters with the current C$ 4.9 billion, but it’s not an even comparison because the current program total includes long term support contracts, and the original cost did not. They do note, correctly, that planned delivery of the first fully capable CH-147 has been delayed from 2008 to 2010, and then again to 2013, while the buy was cut to 15, due in part to poor decision making within DND”


Don't get me wrong, I don't get seriously excited about how much the CAF capital equipment procurements cost as I often think we spend way too much time,money and resources trying to maintain to tight of a control especially on the big purchases, but playing fast and loose always comes back to bite the CAF on the ass
What also changed was that between the original specifications and requirements were established, Cánada went green and decommissioned and remediated all the Northern Fuel chaches spread throughout the Canadian arctic archipelago, so now explain how to get to the north to respond to a MAJAID, for example, in a timely fashion when your basic fuel load won’t reach between the northern airbases. That’s one very significant change that had to be taken into account. US Army standard Chinooks don’t need long legs because they’re always part of a larger package. Take a look at what the US Army does when if operates it’s Chinooks over very long ranges and desolate operational theatres 😉 …Canadian Chinooks do now and will in the future operate autonomously at the types of extended rates that precisely demand the final configuration that the CH-147F ended up in. And anybody who tries to portray that the RCAF was building the Chinook with gold to put on defensive protection suites? Then I know such a person would be just parroting some imperfect assessment from the AG. Just because she and her team wrote it, doesn’t make everything inside accurate. The last bit I’ll critique was her point that senior leaders didn’t look at the specific requirements developed for….three whole months! Imagine taking 90 days to get reviewing something that would take another 8-10 years by the very process mandated in DND by government. I mean, it’s not like there was much going on with the CAF in 2005-2006, right? 😆
 

Good2Golf

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I think we get royalties for some of these developments if other buyers pick them up. Don’t see any complaints about that.
Not exactly royalties, but credits against the support contract. Yes. 👍🏼
 

Spencer100

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Not exactly royalties, but credits against the support contract. Yes. 👍🏼
I have been meaning to ask. Does that in include the Marine One contract? We get a credit for those? Plus I think that is the only only customer?
 

Good2Golf

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I have been meaning to ask. Does that in include the Marine One contract? We get a credit for those? Plus I think that is the only only customer?
AFAIK just CH-47 specific, as it was for modifications to the baseline CH-47F for the CH-147F that Boeing wanted to market to other CH-47 customers. For example, while there are other ‘fat tank’ Chinook variants out there, they had essentially all been based on the CH-47D (even MH-47E and G Block 1 are remanufactured D-model airframes). The CH-147F was the first Chinook to integrate the fat tanks into an F-model monolithically-machined airframe (ie. all the stringers and formers are machined from a single piece of metal…there is no multi-piece buildup with overlaps and riveting, like on D-models - that saves weight and increases structural integrity). SOCOM MH-47G Block II aircraft, for example, now use the same design as the CH-147F, using new-build monolithic airframe structure with the fat tanks. MH-47G Block IIs also have the solid-state electrical system of the CH-147F, using simpler and more reliable high-power MOSFETs to switch and distribute system power, in place of older style mechanical relays.
 

kev994

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You could say the same for almost every other project undertaken in the past twenty years. I can think of only a handful that actually went well:

CH47 procurement
C17 procurement
M777 procurement

Any procurement project that has gone well has been because we bought it OTS due to an UOR. Literally everything else has been a dogs breakfast.
Our favourite defence analyst that we don’t talk about picked it up. It’s like they can hear what I’m saying.
 

Spencer100

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AFAIK just CH-47 specific, as it was for modifications to the baseline CH-47F for the CH-147F that Boeing wanted to market to other CH-47 customers. For example, while there are other ‘fat tank’ Chinook variants out there, they had essentially all been based on the CH-47D (even MH-47E and G Block 1 are remanufactured D-model airframes). The CH-147F was the first Chinook to integrate the fat tanks into an F-model monolithically-machined airframe (ie. all the stringers and formers are machined from a single piece of metal…there is no multi-piece buildup with overlaps and riveting, like on D-models - that saves weight and increases structural integrity). SOCOM MH-47G Block II aircraft, for example, now use the same design as the CH-147F, using new-build monolithic airframe structure with the fat tanks. MH-47G Block IIs also have the solid-state electrical system of the CH-147F, using simpler and more reliable high-power MOSFETs to switch and distribute system power, in place of older style mechanical relays.
Thanks. That is a great answer and interesting too.

I got the Cyclone and this one mixed up in my head. I had read somewhere that there is a deal with Lockheed too about the CH-148 upgrades (total fly by wire I think) that if they sold the S-92 with those upgrades Canada would receive a royalty. IE the Marine One.
 

Good2Golf

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Ah, got it. Conceivably, Lockheed/Sikorsky could have had the same incentivization built into their proposal, it’s quite common, but I’m not very familiar with the specifics of the MHP project.
 

Zoomie

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Our favourite defence analyst that we don’t talk about picked it up. It’s like they can hear what I’m saying.
Eerie timing no doubt.

Funny how nobody in the MSM seeks actual SME input from these anonymous sources found on army.ca. That story could have been written a year ago.
 

Good2Golf

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SupersonicMax

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« Although operationalization of the CC-295 will take more time, the DND said it currently expects “to remain within the project’s approved budget. »

Hey, we’ll be a bit behind (by almost 100% of the original timeline) but worry not. Your money is safe. In project management, we balance scope, budget and schedule. You can only really achieve two of the three. Seems like the priority is remaining on budget at the expense of timely capabilities. Maybe it’s a symptom of a technical organization led by engineers managing the delivery of capabilities?
 

Quirky

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So we should have not retired the buffs so soon?
I’m glad they did, we can’t keep stretching current equipment because of political incompetence to procure new. This goes for every piece of kit, when it outlives its use then throw it out.
 
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