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The last Nato secretary general?
The Guardian
By Ilana Bet-El
07/31/2009
Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who is about to take the reins at the alliance, is inheriting a troubled, sidelined organisation
And so farewell to Jaap de Hoop Scheffer as Nato secretary general, and a wary welcome to Anders Fogh Rasmussen. Given there is no such thing as a really good or successful SG – according to the blurb they all are, and in reality the job is impossible so no one can be – de Hoop Scheffer was not bad. An unremarkable politician in his own state, the Netherlands, he remained much the same throughout his tenure in Nato: intensely hardworking, well intentioned, intelligent and ultimately ineffective. But to be fair, one man alone cannot make Nato effective in Afghanistan – nor can he lead an organisation that is neither structured nor prepared to fight a widescale expeditionary war against an unconventional enemy.
The vacancy for Nato SG came up rather unexpectedly five years ago when the incumbent, George Robertson, decided not to extend his tenure. De Hoop Scheffer, then Dutch foreign minister and a strong advocate of his nation's participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom, was supported by the US for the job and not really opposed by anyone. This was partly to do with the vacancy falling at an inconvenient time for a round of jobs for the boys, the way in which senior international slots tend to be filled, and the Dutch often get such off-timing posts since they are neither big enough to offend a large state nor small enough to be totally irrelevant. However, it was also clearly to do with the fact that most European states had decided Nato was more or less a dying concern controlled by the US backed by the UK, and they were not too fussed who headed it.
De Hoop Scheffer could not have been unaware of this drift, since it was probably the principal reason Lord Robertson decided to leave the post: he knew there was no political will to sustain the organisation, let alone fight a war. Moreover, he knew that beyond general European post-cold war military disinterest, the origins of this situation lay in very specific circumstances: the effective rejection by the US of Nato and its members after the attacks of 9/11.
In the immediate aftermath of the attacks the alliance invoked, for the first and only time ever, article 5 of its treaty, that states that an armed attack against one or more is an attack against them all, and that each and all will therefore take "such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area". It was the strongest measure the alliance could take, and it was known that each member state was willing to back up its commitment with military action.
Unfortunately, while the US diplomatic corps understood the magnitude of the move, its political leadership did not – and effectively rejected it, preferring to go it alone with a few allies within the concept of "the mission determines the coalition". This was, as the then Nato assistant secretary general for defence policy, Edgar Buckley, put it, "a fundamental misjudgment about the nature of the alliance that devalued the importance of strategic solidarity. As a result, I share the frustration of those who believe that the United States could have done more to engage the alliance in its efforts against the Taliban and al-Qaida."
But the US misuse of Nato did not end there: having liberated Afghanistan of the Taliban, the US-led coalition basically lost interest in the state. Keeping its forces in a separate mission fighting insurgents on the border with Pakistan – Operation Enduring Freedom – it turned Afghanistan and its reconstruction over to the international community in the December 2001 Bonn conference. An outcome of the conference was the creation by UN mandate of an International Security Assistance Force (Isaf), of no institutional provenance, which the UK volunteered to lead in its first six months, followed by Turkey. Nato decided to take over the mission in April 2003, not least because it had become untenable as a free-floating entity to which alliance members were committing assets with no co-ordination. At the same time, the US put immense pressure on its allies, especially the central and east European member states, to do so.
Nato officially assumed command of Isaf in August 2003. There is a vague chance that all allies would have pulled together at this point – were it not for the fact that the US, once again in coalition with the UK and a few others, invaded Iraq in March 2003. The transatlantic community was in open dispute over the invasion, to put it mildly, a fact that clearly inhibited any fruitful co-operation on Afghanistan. Moreover, the concept and size of the mission was in constant flux: the original mandate of Isaf was to secure Kabul and its surroundings for the purposes of reconstruction, but in October 2003 the security council extended it to cover the entire country. Not too many states had been willing to contribute troops to the original mission, though a number had dispatched civilian "Provisional Reconstruction Teams" (PRTs), which were totally unco-ordinated. So the military extension meant each nation following its team in a spread that was not always logical while drumming up forces in any way possible – a process that took until October 2006 to complete. In the interim the Taliban both clawed back territory and reimposed itself upon the Afghan people – meaning that in many parts of the country the nature of the mission moved from security to intense military engagements.
It is important to understand these origins and chronology, which are usually absent from debate, since they explain the awful muddle in which Nato finds itself today in Afghanistan: it has not been there as an alliance since 2001, as many commentators tend to note, but rather since mid-2003, then straggling to "full" size over three years and endless disagreements among the allies. Moreover, it took until 2008 to develop a "strategic vision" for Isaf, which is still short of a clear military objective.
And while there are clear attempts on both sides of the Atlantic to let bygones be bygones, there remains a fundamental mistrust between the allies – not least over the leadership and purpose of the alliance. All of this is compounded by Nato's archaic industrial war command and control structure – which is totally inadequate to running a modern war among the people – and the simple fact that there are neither enough troops nor hardware to fight a deep-seated enemy in a country the size of Afghanistan.
De Hoop Scheffer did his best to navigate these stormy waters, but he had neither the institutional power nor the charisma to convince the US and the reluctant Europeans of the need for basic coherence, let alone greater commitment and political will. As a sitting prime minister when elected, it is hoped Fogh Rasmussen will be able to cajole them all more effectively. With the intensified fighting and increased deaths, the signs are not too good – but if he fails, he may go down in history as the last Nato secretary general.
The last Nato secretary general?
The Guardian
By Ilana Bet-El
07/31/2009
Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who is about to take the reins at the alliance, is inheriting a troubled, sidelined organisation
And so farewell to Jaap de Hoop Scheffer as Nato secretary general, and a wary welcome to Anders Fogh Rasmussen. Given there is no such thing as a really good or successful SG – according to the blurb they all are, and in reality the job is impossible so no one can be – de Hoop Scheffer was not bad. An unremarkable politician in his own state, the Netherlands, he remained much the same throughout his tenure in Nato: intensely hardworking, well intentioned, intelligent and ultimately ineffective. But to be fair, one man alone cannot make Nato effective in Afghanistan – nor can he lead an organisation that is neither structured nor prepared to fight a widescale expeditionary war against an unconventional enemy.
The vacancy for Nato SG came up rather unexpectedly five years ago when the incumbent, George Robertson, decided not to extend his tenure. De Hoop Scheffer, then Dutch foreign minister and a strong advocate of his nation's participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom, was supported by the US for the job and not really opposed by anyone. This was partly to do with the vacancy falling at an inconvenient time for a round of jobs for the boys, the way in which senior international slots tend to be filled, and the Dutch often get such off-timing posts since they are neither big enough to offend a large state nor small enough to be totally irrelevant. However, it was also clearly to do with the fact that most European states had decided Nato was more or less a dying concern controlled by the US backed by the UK, and they were not too fussed who headed it.
De Hoop Scheffer could not have been unaware of this drift, since it was probably the principal reason Lord Robertson decided to leave the post: he knew there was no political will to sustain the organisation, let alone fight a war. Moreover, he knew that beyond general European post-cold war military disinterest, the origins of this situation lay in very specific circumstances: the effective rejection by the US of Nato and its members after the attacks of 9/11.
In the immediate aftermath of the attacks the alliance invoked, for the first and only time ever, article 5 of its treaty, that states that an armed attack against one or more is an attack against them all, and that each and all will therefore take "such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area". It was the strongest measure the alliance could take, and it was known that each member state was willing to back up its commitment with military action.
Unfortunately, while the US diplomatic corps understood the magnitude of the move, its political leadership did not – and effectively rejected it, preferring to go it alone with a few allies within the concept of "the mission determines the coalition". This was, as the then Nato assistant secretary general for defence policy, Edgar Buckley, put it, "a fundamental misjudgment about the nature of the alliance that devalued the importance of strategic solidarity. As a result, I share the frustration of those who believe that the United States could have done more to engage the alliance in its efforts against the Taliban and al-Qaida."
But the US misuse of Nato did not end there: having liberated Afghanistan of the Taliban, the US-led coalition basically lost interest in the state. Keeping its forces in a separate mission fighting insurgents on the border with Pakistan – Operation Enduring Freedom – it turned Afghanistan and its reconstruction over to the international community in the December 2001 Bonn conference. An outcome of the conference was the creation by UN mandate of an International Security Assistance Force (Isaf), of no institutional provenance, which the UK volunteered to lead in its first six months, followed by Turkey. Nato decided to take over the mission in April 2003, not least because it had become untenable as a free-floating entity to which alliance members were committing assets with no co-ordination. At the same time, the US put immense pressure on its allies, especially the central and east European member states, to do so.
Nato officially assumed command of Isaf in August 2003. There is a vague chance that all allies would have pulled together at this point – were it not for the fact that the US, once again in coalition with the UK and a few others, invaded Iraq in March 2003. The transatlantic community was in open dispute over the invasion, to put it mildly, a fact that clearly inhibited any fruitful co-operation on Afghanistan. Moreover, the concept and size of the mission was in constant flux: the original mandate of Isaf was to secure Kabul and its surroundings for the purposes of reconstruction, but in October 2003 the security council extended it to cover the entire country. Not too many states had been willing to contribute troops to the original mission, though a number had dispatched civilian "Provisional Reconstruction Teams" (PRTs), which were totally unco-ordinated. So the military extension meant each nation following its team in a spread that was not always logical while drumming up forces in any way possible – a process that took until October 2006 to complete. In the interim the Taliban both clawed back territory and reimposed itself upon the Afghan people – meaning that in many parts of the country the nature of the mission moved from security to intense military engagements.
It is important to understand these origins and chronology, which are usually absent from debate, since they explain the awful muddle in which Nato finds itself today in Afghanistan: it has not been there as an alliance since 2001, as many commentators tend to note, but rather since mid-2003, then straggling to "full" size over three years and endless disagreements among the allies. Moreover, it took until 2008 to develop a "strategic vision" for Isaf, which is still short of a clear military objective.
And while there are clear attempts on both sides of the Atlantic to let bygones be bygones, there remains a fundamental mistrust between the allies – not least over the leadership and purpose of the alliance. All of this is compounded by Nato's archaic industrial war command and control structure – which is totally inadequate to running a modern war among the people – and the simple fact that there are neither enough troops nor hardware to fight a deep-seated enemy in a country the size of Afghanistan.
De Hoop Scheffer did his best to navigate these stormy waters, but he had neither the institutional power nor the charisma to convince the US and the reluctant Europeans of the need for basic coherence, let alone greater commitment and political will. As a sitting prime minister when elected, it is hoped Fogh Rasmussen will be able to cajole them all more effectively. With the intensified fighting and increased deaths, the signs are not too good – but if he fails, he may go down in history as the last Nato secretary general.
