The bullshit artist consultants promising transformation and total enterprise visibility of everything, everywhere all at once without noting the data cleanup and ongoing data maintenance costs enter the conversation...
One challenge is that such a change would likely require significant PY investment, would still need people to fill the purple positions, and is in an environment where ever system change is seen as an excuse to further cut uniformed support PYs.
All while the CAF trained effective establishment is already too large a proportion of the maximum paid strength to ever be filled.
What are those significant PY investments? I do agree that moving to this model means there needs to be some realignment and more oversight on managing folks but generally posns would stay the same. It just proposes that RCN posns on RCN bases would be filled largely by RCN DEU'd personnel, ditto for the RCAF & CA. Purple posns can usually be filled by anyone. It also doesn't stop people from moving to a base that isn't their DEU when required. The largest officer Trade Log O does it ok enough so it can work.
There will be challenges of course, one of the largest at the onset is that currently there are many folks with DEU that don't match their base of employment. It would take a few posting cycles and DEU changes to make it become viable. There are lots of other issues that would have to worked out fo' sizzle
But, there is no appetite for this change so we will continue to think a newly promoted PO2 Sup Tech that matriculated in the RCN will be able to be a effectively operate in a CA Svc Bn (and vice versa) for years to come.
Yea there will be some adjustment of the ratios and some environments would lose some folks and some would gain. We aren't adding posns for the most part just potentially moving them to ensure if I am understanding you correctly.
The coming split has also done something else that may have unintended consequences. It has created a career path on the finance side that will slowly move them away from any true need to do operational, uniformed work, and thus making it easier to justify civilianizing that portion of the trade.
They already don't. The reality is most FinOs are trained as FinOs from day one and from day one occupy jobs where they literally will never go to the field, not even in their first few years of employment. They're put in purely office jobs.
That actually makes sense since the proper place for a Finance Platoon is no further forward than the Division Support Area when we're talking about conventional warfare, which should be the CAF's bread and butter and should be the baseline starting point for how it operates. Their jobs in theatre are office jobs as well - theoretically replaceable by a civilian, the problem being convincing a civilian to deploy to a theatre of war for 6 months, even if it is back two or three tactical bounds from the war, in a safe country nearby.
As someone who went into Finance after 5 years as an Infantry O, no one will tell you more about how useful that prior experience was. But I was also well-educated in accounting, doing my CPA, and miles ahead in accounting than the other finance staff (military and civilian). The reality is that the finance group is completely incompetent at everything to do with finance (from the Communique: "core competencies in budgeting, financial management, financial services and policy, and personnel administration") so if a choice needs to be made between getting them more field experience and more core competency training, I would recommend starting with the latter.
The coming split has also done something else that may have unintended consequences. It has created a career path on the finance side that will slowly move them away from any true need to do operational, uniformed work, and thus making it easier to justify civilianizing that portion of the trade. When you think about it, other than providing some actual military bearing into the finance world, why do we need uniformed finance officers? What tasks in the field or on a deployment require someone to be in situ, rather than sitting in an office somewhere with a reach back capability?
That no one* can provide an answer that question is not necessarily a good argument but rather evidence of the CAF's own operational/managerial incompetence - the answer exists but the CAF including it's most senior serving leaders, are oblivious to the answer. The reality is no one actually knows what a finance officer or a financial services administrator is supposed to be doing including those who should (i.e. ADM(Fin), CAF Comptroller, L1 Comptrollers, L2 Comptrollers, Base Comptrollers) it's one of those "you don't know what you don't know" scenarios. All they can think of is fin codes and claims.
one of the most useful ppl on the ground was the FinO as they literally held the purse strings and could react to the situation on the ground as needed by TF. That level flexibility couldn't be achieved with reach back in the same way.
Tenets of sustainment - provide it as far forward as possible.
In conventional warfare it would not be worth the risk of having them that far forward but in most of the current operations, the CAF would benefit immensely from good comptrollership, sadly it no longer knows what that looks like.
All you need as evidence is the news article about soldiers in Poland whose families were taking out loans in order to feed them. That was purely a failure of financial services that the folks in purple above were responsible for. That issue literally could have been fixed in a lazy afternoon by any competent finance officer, obviously it was hard to find one.