• Thanks for stopping by. Logging in to a registered account will remove all generic ads. Please reach out with any questions or concerns.

Ortona: Canada's Epic World War II Battle (Book Review)

Danjanou

Army.ca Fixture
Inactive
Reaction score
0
Points
410
On December 25th 1943 a group of battle weary members of the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, part of the First Canadian Infantry Division found themselves relief from the horrors of war if only for a few hours. Company-by-Company the Seaforths were taken out of the frontline and back to the bomber out remains of an Ortona church and fed a hot Christmas Dinner.

They sat down to meal of roast pork with all the fixings, including mashed potatoes and gravy. It was washed down with bottles of beer and rough Italian red wine. While they ate and drank the Regimental Padre serenaded them with Christmas Carols played on the church’s organ.

For many of the men, it would be the last Christmas dinner they ever had. For far too many more it would also be their last meal ever. Dinner finished the solemn young men grabbed their rifles and trudged back into the man made hell that was Ortona.

The First Canadian Division (1CID) found itself fighting in this small Adriatic seaport in the waning weeks of 1943 for one reason. Since landing in Italy both the American Fifth Army and the British (with a substantial Dominion and Empire contingents) Eighth Army had been racing each other up the Italian peninsula both with the same Goal. The American Commander General Mark Clark and the British Commander Field Marshall Montgomery had each decided they deserved the glory in capturing/liberating the Italian capital.

The Italian campaign was dictated by one major aspect, terrain. The Italian peninsula is literally split in two by a series of mountains that run down its spine. This meant each allied army was forced to operate on a separate side, the Americans on the Mediterranean coast, the British on the Adriatic.

While this may have been perfect for a race, it meant cooperation between the two armies was minimal at best. A fact the German took advantage of slowing the allied advance to a crawl.

Montgomery despite being on the wrong side of the mountains still believed he could launch a massive offensive across them outflanking the Germans and taking Rome. However to do so he needed a deep-water port to supply his army. At present all supplies were being brought up the length of the peninsula from ports far to the south over an imperfect road system.

Planning determined that the sleepy coastal fishing town of Ortona south east of Rome would be suitable. The nearest Eighth Army troops opposite Ortona were the Canadians and their commander Major General Chris Vokes was given the job, take Ortona and the port.

The Canadians initially were not supposed to be a part of the Mediterranean campaign at all. Canada had entered the war on September 10, 1939 and 1CID had been swiftly mobilized and arrived in England in early 1940. There it waited and trained, soon joined by the Second (2CID) and Third Divisions (3CID). The Royal Canadian Navy and The Royal Canadian Air Force were soon involved and fighting on various fronts, but for political reasons the Army continued to wait and train.

The first Canadian Soldiers to see combat were two untrained under equipped Battalions sent to Hong Kong that arrived just prior to the Japanese Invasion in December 1941. The conducted a furious if futile defence of the colony before the survivors were marched off to captivity.

Following this 2CID conducted the one-day disastrous raid on the French seaport of Dieppe. The rest of the Army including 1 CID now on their third year of garrison duty continue to train and wait. Canadian politicians were committed to and all Canadian army fighting under it’s own command if and when the invasion of Europe came. Canadian’s would not fight as colonial troops under British command. The events at Hong Kong and Dieppe most likely only served to reinforce this belief.

Eventually though public pressure won out and it was agree that a British Infantry Division earmarked for the coming invasion of Sicily in July 1943 would be replaced by 1 CID and their accompanying tank unit, the First Canadian Armoured Brigade (1CAB).

The Canadians fought their first actions in Sicily in the brief and bloody six-week campaign and acquitted themselves well. While no longer green troops though they were still far from being seasoned veterans. Soon after they joined the rest of the Eighth Army in invading the Italian mainland and when the Italian Government surrendered in the fast dash up the peninsula. This ended when the Germans moved south to block the allied advance in the fall of 1943.

Ortona: Canada's Epic World War II Battle is Mark Zuehlke ’s first foray into military history and the first in a trilogy that covers the Canadian campaign in the Italian theatre. Zuehlke is a novelist and as such has an interesting approach to writing history. Ortona reads more like a face paced adventure novel in some places complete with interesting characters rather than a dry official history of a battle.

Zuehlke achieves this by not relying on only one source of material for the battle, the official unit histories and war diaries recorded at the time. He uses these as a base only and supplements them with unofficial accounts of the battle and interviews and correspondence with and of the participants. He also chooses to not limit himself to just Canadian participants but make use of German records and documents including personal reminisces as well. Finally he also uses the accounts of Italian citizens, living in Ortona at the time.

Zuehlke received more than some cristism for his work with other historians citing there were discrepancies between his accounts of events and those previously published.

His defence is that many of these accounts were written immediately after the war and relied almost completely on the war diaries and official accounts of the units involved. In many cases errors in judgement made by commanders in the field were glossed over in these accounts to avoid prejudicing their careers.

By examining different accounts of the same action from differing perspectives Zuehlke hopes he has presented a truer picture of actual events, even if it at times s not flattering.

When Chris Vokes was given the task of taking Ortona he had first had to get there. Prior to reaching the town the Canadians would have to cross over the Moro River well defended by veteran German troops. An assault river crossing is a difficult military procedure at best of times. Conducting one against seasoned defenders with relatively new troops only adds to the difficulty. Added to this was the miserable Italian winter, which was turning everything to mud and making movement almost impossible.

The Canadian eventually managed to establish a bridgehead across the Moro, although not without difficulty and heavy casualties. Any thoughts of an exploitation of this breach and a rapid advance up the coast though soon disappeared. The weather, mountainous terrain and tenacity of the German defenders with their aggressive doctrine of counter attacks to retake any ground lost slowed the Canadian’s advance to a crawl. Then they hit their next natural obstacle.

Just south of the south of Ortona was a ravine one of many in the region caused by run offs from the central mountainous spine to the coast. This particular feature had no known name, however it would soon become another battle honour to the Canadian units that fought there, The Gully.

The German defenders members of the 90th Panzer Grenadier Division quickly took advantage of this natural defensive feature and heavily fortified it awaiting the Canadian attack.

Vokes was rather unimaginative in his plans to deal with this obstacle. It stretched from the sea inland covering his whole front and there seemed no way around. Therefore he began to launch a series of piecemeal frontal assaults on the gully with predictable assaults. Each and every Battalion thrown in was stopped cold with heavy casualties.

Eventually the left flank of the gully was turned by a determined attack by Canadian infantry and tanks. Exploiting this elements of the Royal 22e Regiment the “Vandoos” were able to advance eastward along one of the main roads towards Ortona.

Here at Casa Beradi Captain Paul Triquet and his company found themselves the literal spear of the allied advance in the sector and cut off. The Vandoos beat back repeated counter attacks and kept the way open for the relief forces following them. Triquet would earn the first Victoria Cross awarded to a Canadian in the Italian campaign.

With the way into Ortona open there were only three units available and in a position to capture the town, The Loyal Edmonton Regiment and the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, both from the Second Infantry Brigade, supported by the tanks of the Three Rivers Regiment cautiously began to enter the southern approaches to the town.

Here they discovered something the western allies had yet to face in this war, a defended built up area. British and American doctrine at this time did not call for fighting in built up areas. All such areas were to be bypassed. As the advancing Canadians soon discovered the Germans were using a different book.

A battalion of the German First Parachute Divison, the elite Fallshirmjagers, defended Ortona. Adolf Hitler himself had declared that Ortona was to be held at all costs. The defenders had plenty of time to prepare the defences while the Canadians were held up at the Moro and the Gully.

Every street in Ortona was covered by fire; every house and building had been turned into strongpoint defended by seasoned veterans. The Germans had also mined and booby-trapped everything from a building to innocent items that a soldier seeking souvenirs may pick up.

The Fallshirmjagers, unlike the allies were experts in urban combat. Many had learned it’s finer points at Stalingrad. They had in turned passed on their expertise to the rest of their comrades

The Canadian while initially lacking any training or knowledge in this new type of warfare were quick studies. The Seaforths and Loyal Eddies soon became experts at spotting booby traps and then at setting their own.

Unable to move through the rubble Strewn streets because of enemy fire, the Canadians soon found a new way to advance to the centre of the town. The buildings in Ortona were mostly built adjacent to each other with shared walls. The Canadians soon began blowing small holes in these walls allowing them to move from room to room, building-to-building and block-to-block avoiding the death traps the streets and open spaces had become. This technique became known as mouse holing and after Ortona became a standard in both British and American armies.

For Eight days the Canadians and their German opponents fought a deadly and intimate battle in the small town. The savagery of the fighting captured the attention of the world. Soon Ortona had a new name, Little Stalingrad.

Outside the town the remainder of 1CID fought both determined German resistance, and the weather to try outflanking the town and ending the slaughter inside it. By the last week of December after bitter fighting they were in apposition to shell the German supply lines north of Ortona. Realising they could not longer hold out, The Fallshirmjagers disobeyed the direct orders of Adolf Hitler and slipped away in the night. The Battle of Ortona had ended.

Zuehlke has nothing but praise for the efforts of the Canadians soldiers fighting at Ortona and this comes across throughout the work. He is also extravagant in his admiration for the German defenders.

None of this holds true for his opinion of the Canadian high Command. The inexperience of the Canadian Brigade and Divisional Commander and the costly errors they made are well documented, especially Vokes unimaginative piecemeal frontal assaults on the gully and their exorbitant costs in men and material are more reminiscent of the First World Wart than anything in this war.

Ortona is well illustrated with several black and white photos of or the battle and some of the key participants. There is a fairly good section of maps covering the Canadian advance at the beginning of the book, although more on the actual street fighting would have been helpful. Several appendices cover the order of battles and a glossary of military terms and weapons for the uninitiated.

In the end Ortona was not a crucial battle in the Second World War. Montgomery’s ambitious plans to outflank the German defences and seize Rome were defeated by the weather and other factors. Another campaign would have to be launched that spring by a new commander to reach the Eternal City. The Canadians now veteran campaigners would play a crucial role in that campaign.

 
Good writeup Danjanou +1

well.... hindsight has 20/20 vision.
The old story of "to the victors go the spoils" AND history books are written by those who win the wars...

I know of some who do not have many nice things to say about Maj Triquet... but that`s just someone's opinion.  Someone who is bent and twisted.

Was Gen Vokes a great general?... better than some, worse than others might be the final answer.
 
Vokes seem to grow into the role. Moro River, the Gulley and Ortona were really his first tests as a Div Comd. The next year at the Hitler Line the 1st Div and Vokes did well as they did later at the Gothic Line ( guess what I'm finishing off now). As many note he was no Simmods and Divisional Command was as far as he was going.
 
Still a good read. Thanks Danajou :salute: Some people don't seem to like Mark Zuehlke, However I have read 2 of his books and will buy more in due time.
 
Zuelke stopped by one of our regimental association functions while he was doing the research for Ortona, and I assume he talked to many of the same vets for Liri Valley and Gothic Line as well.  I personally know many of the vets he talked to and none had anything bad to say about the books.

Excellent reads, and having walked along some of the same ground during a battlefield tour in 2005, I can say that unless you actually see the ground no map can do justice to what the combatants at the time faced. 

The consensus from talking to the vets and from our own observations during our battlefield tour is that in light of some of the decisions made in the attempt to cross the Moro River that perhaps someone should have severed the brake lines in Vokes' jeep.

 
Ah speculation on what could have been, the historical equivelent of Monday Morning Quarterbacking.

Vokes piecemeal battalion attacks in fron to of Ortona were costly, and in the end limited the available Bns for the fighting in the town and for the attempted outflanking, the 48th being sent out on their own on the 25th for example.

It may have been interesting if Simmonds hadn't become ill and was still in command at Ortona. However that would have meant he would most likely still have been there for the Hitler Line and later actions and therefore not available for command of 2nd Corps in Normandy. Possibly Leese would have eventually moved him up to command a 8th Army Corps later though.

With Vokes still a Brigade Commander, Hoffemeister would also never have been given the chance at first Brigade and then Divisional command either.

 
Zuehlke achieves this by not relying on only one source of material for the battle, the official unit histories and war diaries recorded at the time. He uses these as a base only and supplements them with unofficial accounts of the battle and interviews and correspondence with and of the participants. He also chooses to not limit himself to just Canadian participants but make use of German records and documents including personal reminisces as well. Finally he also uses the accounts of Italian citizens, living in Ortona at the time.

Zuehlke received more than some cristism for his work with other historians citing there were discrepancies between his accounts of events and those previously published.


I have just about all of his books. Not so much because of an interest in the Italian campaign but because of his methodology. It seems the better writers are finally straying away from the "traditional drum and bugle" style that predominated for so long. Am I going to toss my C.P. Stacey collection in the garbage, hardly. But history is about perspective and the more perspective offered the better the ability to make an informed educated decision. Interestingly, a comment came up about the use of "official unit war diaries". One should shy away from using them as "gospel verse" being written by the regimental IO, there were subject to scrutiny by the CO. If they did not reflect a positive view, rewritings and coaching was applied. A quote from novelist John Harris in his novel Broadsword "Generals see battles from one view, Privates from another". For too long the Generals have been educating us on their view.
 
Back
Top