The Iraqi Marines

[Ex-Dragoon]

From the Marine Corps Gazette:

The Iraqi Marines

by Capt Giles D. Walger

Assistance for a fledgling Marine organization.

Starting as the Iraqi Coastal Defense Force (ICDF) during the initial phases of the reconstruction of Iraq, the Iraqi Marines have undergone several name changes. At one point the ICDF was split in two. Half became the Iraqi Navy while the other half became the Iraqi Naval Infantry Battalion. In May 2005 the Iraqi Navy Board and the Iraqi Ministry of Defense agreed to expand the Iraqi Naval Infantry Battalion and its mission. With those changes a decision to formally change the title to the Iraqi Marines was reached. The Marine Corps should foster a relationship with these new Marines and in doing so consider their mission, operational tasks, training, and the development of a future relationship with them.

Background
It is no secret that Iraq’s economy revolves around oil. Most of Iraq’s oil is distributed to the world via two offshore oil terminals in the Persian Gulf. The Al-Basrah oil terminal (ABOT) is the economic center of gravity for Iraq. It is directly responsible for 75 percent of Iraq’s economy. It is two-thirds of a mile long and located approximately 50 miles from the Iraqi Naval Base at Umm Qasr. When demand is high—and the pipelines from the north are secure—the second terminal, the Khawr Al-Amaya oil terminal (KAAOT), meets the demand. The KAAOT borders Iran and sits 5 nautical miles (nm) from ABOT.

Iraq’s oil terminals are vital to its future. Together, ABOT and KAAOT are directly responsible for distributing 65 million barrels of oil to the world and contributing more than $12 billion annually to Iraq’s gross national product. There is a constant threat to the terminals from terrorist attack. The two terminals are targets representing the highest economic value for terrorists in Iraq. The two terminals were the first targets seized during the coalition invasion. The terminals have been targeted by al-Qaeda on three separate occasions since the invasion. They are of such critical value that U.S. forces (SEALs, fleet antiterrorism security team (FAST) company, and the U.S. Navy’s maritime security detachments) have been providing security on the terminals, while Coalition Task Force 58 (CTF–58) maintains a vigilant security posture in the sectors surrounding the terminals.

The Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT) for the Iraqi Navy and Marines is based in Umm Qasr. Since 2003 the Australian Commandos, Dutch Marines, Royal Marines, and U.S. Marines have all provided individual augments to the CMATT. The CMATT for the Iraqi Navy and Marines has been focused on three objectives: (1) to man, train, and equip them; (2) to assist the Iraqis in developing a roadmap to meet the requirements for handover of oil terminal responsibility, sustaining a Navy and Marine force capable of defending Iraq’s coast and protecting Iraqi national interests out to 12nm; and (3) to advise them in meeting the coalition’s operational requirements. Due to the drawdown of the CMATT for the Iraqi Navy and Marines, no U.S. Marines remain on the team, and the Royal Marines will draw down to termination in early 2006.

Mission
The Iraqi Marine mission is to provide security and point defense on ABOT and KAAOT; to provide base security for the Iraqi Naval Base, Umm Qasr; and to assist the Iraqi Navy with coastal maritime defense of Iraq’s vital national interests.

Operations
The Iraqi Marines have three explicit operational tasks. Providing security for the oil terminals is their primary operational task. Since May 2005 the Iraqi Marines have been embedded within the U.S. Navy’s maritime security detachment aboard ABOT. In order for the Iraqi Marines to meet the CTF requirements for security of the sectors around the oil terminals, they will also provide board and search teams, shipboard security teams for operational support vessels, and small boat quick reaction forces. Following CTF–58 assessments of the Iraqi Navy and Marines, the Iraqis will take over operational responsibility of Iraq’s oil terminals. Realistically, coalition advisors and Marine leaders should acknowledge that the Iraqi Navy and Marines will need mentoring, training, and interoperability events to ensure that readiness and a long-term security posture is sufficiently maintained.

The Iraqi Marines provide security for the Iraqi Naval Base, Umm Qasr. Due to its proximity to the commercial port at North Port, Umm Qasr that is adjacent to the Iraqi naval base, the Iraqi Marines reinforce and augment the Iraqi Security Forces for the commercial port and provide a quick reaction force at the commercial port on a weekly rotation. Multiple construction projects and training programs are underway to ensure that the port meets United Nations (U.N.) security standards. Because meeting U.N. security standards is a politically and economically charged issue that promises to help kick start Iraq’s economy in the coming years, the Iraqi Marine task there is a high-profile one. Once North Port meets U.N. standards, trade volume at the port will increase. Magnifying the importance of this task is another explicit subtask of the Iraqi Navy and Marines. The Iraqi Ministry of Defense directed the Iraqi Marines to provide security for the offload and temporary storage of all ammunition and war materials entering Iraq from the sea, all of which is now entering Iraq through Umm Qasr and secured by the Iraqi Marines.

The third operational task for the Iraqi Marines is to help the Iraqi Navy with coastal maritime interdiction. At this time the Iraqis interpret this task to mean board and search, which limits the offensive capability of the Iraqi Marines. However, the Iraqi Navy and Marines have developed an operations plan that increases their role in coastal maritime interdiction. The Iraqi Marines will likely grow in size and provide forces on the Al Faw peninsula to deter and interdict terrorist infiltration and smuggling of oil and drugs.

The Iraqi Navy and Marines work together to provide a maritime force that is capable of policing and defending Iraq’s coast, territorial waters, ports, and vital offshore infrastructure. It is a force capable of contributing to international efforts that ensure regional maritime security. Their operational tasks are critical to the security of Iraq.

Training
The coalition had been responsible for delivering training and is now focused on mentoring and guiding the Iraqi Navy and Marine training. In the fall of 2004 a common skills training package was delivered under the supervision of a U.S. Marine Corps lieutenant colonel and Royal Marine warrant officer 2/sergeant major. The 52-day training package, delivered by the coalition trainers, was designed to lay the groundwork and standardize training. In the winter of 2005 a noncommissioned officer (NCO) instructor course was delivered to selected and screened NCOs of the Iraqi Navy and Marines in order to develop a core of NCOs ready to take responsibility for training. Simultaneously, the training team delivered a senior staff NCO (SNCO) course and focused on developing the junior officers. The courses, training, and operations have formed the foundation for the battalion’s future.

In the spring of 2005 the focus of the coalition trainers was on advanced training for the NCOs to deliver. The coalition trained the NCOs in advanced skills of visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS); force protection/security; and physical and combat conditioning. The graduates of the NCO course, along with the new junior officers, are now responsible for the delivery of training and only receive guidance and mentoring from the Royal Marine advisors. Each of the Iraqi Marine platoons has undergone week-long enhanced training packages to increase proficiency and establish a benchmark standard in each of these common skills.

In the spring of 2005 the top graduates from the NCO instructor course received additional training and were selected to be drill instructors for the recruit training for 228 enlisted and officer recruits. The first direct recruit replacement boot camp graduated in July 2005. The new Marines will double the battalion’s current end strength to 452 personnel. However, they will require week-long training packages in VBSS, force protection/security, and physical and combat conditioning to bring them up to the standard of the rest of the Iraqi Marines. Since the Iraqi Ministry of Defense set the end strength of the Iraqi Marines to 900, several evolutions of boot camp will be required in the coming years to meet this objective.

Engagement
The Marine Corps has a window of opportunity to assist in the training and development of the Iraqi Marines. It is an opportunity that should not be squandered.


In June 2005 one platoon from the Iraqi Marines deployed to the USS Ponce (LPD 15) for a week-long training package. Due to weather conditions, training on the Ponce was restricted to the ship. The U.S. Marine assault amphibious vehicle platoon that was aboard assisted in training the Iraqi Marines with nightly martial arts training that the Iraqi and U.S. Marines thoroughly enjoyed. The captain of the Ponce worked with the Iraqi Marine battalion commander to ensure that the Iraqi Marines had appropriate spaces to conduct search operations. The fact that Marine Forces Central Command (MarCent), Navy Forces Central Command (NavCent), and CTF–58 helped to coordinate the Ponce training and followed it up with an evolution on the USS Ashland (LSD 48) suggests that more opportunities will exist in the future.

Communications from CTF–58, NavCent, and the expeditionary strike group (ESG) to the Iraqi Marines and the coalition trainers must improve to ensure proper coordination and planning. This will solidify the relationship between MarCent, U.S. Marines at sea, and the Iraqi Marines.

Marine expeditionary units (MEUs) and ESGs should coordinate and plan with MarCent to send U.S. Marines forward to Umm Qasr to help the Iraqi Marines plan and coordinate interoperability events. As new communications equipment is procured and delivered, MEUs and ESGs should consider communications and command and control training to continue to develop the junior and senior Iraqi Marine leaders. The battalion commander has been promoted out of the battalion, and therefore, coordination and planning should be forced on the new Iraqi Marine battalion commander. As the training areas in the vicinity of the Iraqi Naval Base, Umm Qasr improve and are developed, more opportunities for live fire training will present themselves. In the meantime, NavCent and MarCent can use the Marine Corps FAST company in Bahrain and the MEU/ESG that rotates into the area of operations (AO) to target the Iraqi Navy and Marines for interoperability and training events.

A deeper opportunity presents itself as the Iraqi Marines evolve. Because the mission of the Iraqi Marines is expanding along with their end strength, the U.S. Marine leadership should target the Iraqi Marines with a foreign military training unit (FMTU). Ideally, the training team will include NCOs, SNCOs, and junior officers with a background in communications, small boats, FAST company, and a marine combat instructor or drill instructor. An FMTU will provide continuity and should focus on mentoring the junior and senior officers to ensure that the progress made is not lost. Coordination with CMATT, U.S. Central Command, Multinational Division Support Element (MND SE), and the Iraqi Marines will ensure a comprehensive strategy is developed. Developing a sound plan will require the U.S. Marines to work together with the Royal Marines. Because the Commanding General, Royal Marines is also the commander of British Forces in MND SE, there is significant opportunity for coordination of a long-term strategy.

As the picture of Iraqi Marine training and education clears, the Marine Corps should consider opening formal school seats to Iraqi Marine junior NCO, SNCO, and officer leaders. As U.S. Marines prepare to train with the Iraqi Marines, care should be taken to learn the Iraqi tables of organization and equipment (especially weapons systems). They have WKM/DShK (Polish 12.7mm rifles) and general-purpose (M240G) crew-served weapons for oil terminal security. Their individual weapons include the AK, Walther P–99, and Pakistani copies of the MP–5k. Clearly there are opportunities for future joint and combined training and operations, and U.S. Marines should be prepared to work with the Iraqi Marines.

Future
Because of the significance of the Iraqi Navy and Marine mission to the vitality of Iraq, certain steps should be taken to train with and develop them. As the coalition advisors and trainers downsize, this need is magnified, and we must prepare to work with the Iraqi Marines. Since the timing of the Federal budget requires Department of State (DoS)/International Military Education and Training (IMET) funding to be determined now, the Marine Corps would be wise to identify a need for an FMTU to the Iraqi Marines now. The Department of Defense, DoS, and the Marine Corps should consider our future role with the Iraqi Marines in providing IMET funding for future FMTUs. MEU/ESGs must consider working with Iraqi Marines while in the AO, in the vicinity of the oil terminals, and at the Iraqi Naval Base, Umm Qasr.

>Capt Walger was a student at Expeditionary Warfare School when he wrote this article.