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As I've frequently highlighted in posts around these forums, I believe "War on Terror" is a misnomer for the current conflict and that a better framework is to view it as a global Islamic Insurgency - as I've pointed out, this is a view put forth by CIA analyst Michael Sheuer in his book Imperial Hubris. Indeed, a good portion of the enemy structure consists of terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda (which is probably better termed as a "Terrorist NGO"), but it is important to remember that terrorism is a tactic, one which will never be defeated, and that it is merely one weapon (albeit a dominant one in the past) of AQ and other loosely connected groups within the Insurgency - they have other methods for achieving their goals, and will use them in the conflict with the West.
Anyways, I've come across the Blog of Mr John Robb found here at http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com, who seems to be very astute observer (IMHO) of the current conflict which he has termed a "Global Guerilla War" (hence, an global Islamic Insurgency). Good thoughts to go through and examine, here is a few:
First, Al Qaeda is the "Lead Vocals" of the Insurgency, and is "bannering" its anti-Western jihad; here is an estimate at their grand strategy by an Islamic scholar (which is bound to be a little different than a Western outlook):
http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2004/05/al_qaedas_grand.html
As well, it seems Robb is a follower (like myself) of the theories of USAF Colonel John Boyd, and focuses the Insurgency through the Physical, Mental, and Moral lens of conflict:
http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2004/05/journal_boyd_on.html
As well, Robb looks at the role of terrorism as a tool within the Islamic Insurgency's belt:
http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2004/10/terror_as_a_tec.html
Finally, here is his discussion of the Long-Tail theory, which I brought up in another thread, and how it relates to the wide-range of groups within the Insurgency; basically AQ is gaining ground as a legitimate and effective war-fighting organization due to globalizing trends. This falls in line with Martin Van Crevald's theory in The Transformation of War and the The Rise and Decline of the State:
http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2005/03/journal_the_dar.html
Anyways, there is alot more on the site to go through if you are interested.
Cheers,
Infanteer
Anyways, I've come across the Blog of Mr John Robb found here at http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com, who seems to be very astute observer (IMHO) of the current conflict which he has termed a "Global Guerilla War" (hence, an global Islamic Insurgency). Good thoughts to go through and examine, here is a few:
First, Al Qaeda is the "Lead Vocals" of the Insurgency, and is "bannering" its anti-Western jihad; here is an estimate at their grand strategy by an Islamic scholar (which is bound to be a little different than a Western outlook):
http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2004/05/al_qaedas_grand.html
05/07/2004
AL QAEDA'S GRAND STRATEGY: SUPERPOWER BAITING
What is al Qaeda's grand strategy? An in depth interview with Saad al-Faqih, an expert on al Qaeda, provides some insight into this. Dr. al-Faqih (picture) highlights the role of Dr. Zawahiri in evolving the strategic thinking of bin Laden:
Zawahiri impressed upon Bin Laden the importance of understanding the American mentality. The American mentality is a cowboy mentality-- if you confront them with their identity theoretically and practically they will react in an extreme manner. In other words, America with all its resources and establishments will shrink into a cowboy when irritated successfully. They will then elevate you and this will satisfy the Muslim longing for a leader who can successfully challenge the West. Zawahiri advised Bin Laden to forget about the 12 page statement as nobody had read it and instead issue a short statement identifying every American as a target. Even though this was controversial from an Islamic perspective, Zawahiri argued on pragmatic grounds that it had to be sanctioned. The statement in February 1998, which was only 3 or 4 lines, effectively sanctioned shedding the blood of every American.
This decision resulted in the east African embassy attacks of 1998. The result of these attacks were as follows:
Zawahiri had prophesised correctlyâ â€the Americans over-reacted by bombing Afghanistan and Sudan and consequently shifted the focus of blame away from al-Qaeda. If the Americans had not over-reacted to that attack they would have won a great moral victory. Clinton himself identified Bin Laden as the enemy and, in effect, delivered a hero to the Muslims. Before the embassy attacks only a few intellectuals and people with scholastic and practical interests in Jihad remembered Bin Laden but after the attack Bin Laden was transformed into a popular hero. The Americans thereafter persisted in turning Bin Laden into an obsession. The immediate effect of this was that thousands of Muslims travelled to Afghanistan. I was told that before the Kenya and Tanzania bombings hardly one or two people from the Arab countries would make their way to Afghanistan in any given month but after the bombings almost ten people would make their way there on a daily basis....
He goes on to explain the motivation for 9/11 and the result of the American reaction:
The next stage involved initiating a full scale polarization between Muslims and America. Therefore, even if al-Qaeda disappears there would be a huge interest in fighting the U.S. and its allies. This underpinned the planning of the 9/11 attacks. The purpose was not to kill thousands of people. Nobody saw the attacks as an assault against buildings and people, almost everyone saw it as a symbolic action. And everybody is agreed that the world changed after 9/11. The way the attacks were orchestrated had a lot to do with thisâ â€those young boys came with nothing and only relied on their will, secrecy, devotion and great perseverance. How on earth could 19 young men with box cutters wreak such humiliation on the sole Super Power of the world? The answer is linked to the â Å“asymmetrical warfareâ ? that I will address later. The 9/11 attacks forced America into a cosmic battle with Muslims. Of course America claims it is waging war against terrorism but actually Muslims perceive this war as an unprecedented assault on Islam. Ultimately the real issue here is the perception of Muslims and the vast majority of Muslims around the world feel besieged by America.
The result of this, according to al-Faqih will be internal turmoil in America and its eventual adoption of an isolationist policy:
Now strategically I think America has not only lost but it is likely to vanish. It has started a campaign which has forced the majority of Muslims against it. But of course tactically it has scored major gains. A lot of these so-called strategic analysts mistake these tactical gains for strategic leverage. The point is that these people are not strategic analysts because they never bring the historical, ideological and social dimensions into their calculations. They only consider political and military factors....
There are many people in America who want to tackle the matter in a much more intelligent manner but they have been silenced by this pervasive McCarthyism. There are people that are very tired with this cowboy attitude. Once the next attack occurs they are likely to say that Bush has had two years of this cosmic battle against terrorism and we ended up with an even bigger attack. Now is the time to try a different approach. Now of course the right wingers, the Zionists and the arms lobby will refuse to give ground and then a clash inside America is likely to ensue.
Posted by John Robb on 05/07/2004 at 12:32 PM | Permalink
As well, it seems Robb is a follower (like myself) of the theories of USAF Colonel John Boyd, and focuses the Insurgency through the Physical, Mental, and Moral lens of conflict:
http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2004/05/journal_boyd_on.html
05/08/2004
BOYD ON AL QAEDA'S GRAND STRATEGY
Col. John Boyd (he died in 1997) is considered one of America's best military thinkers. His thinking dramatically influenced the plan of attack in the first gulf war. Boyd's thinking also serves as a good basis for a deeper understanding 4GW (fourth generation warfare).
Grand strategy, according to Boyd, is a quest to isolate your enemy's (a nation-state or a global terrorist network) thinking processes from connections to the external/reference environment. This process of isolation is essentially the imposition of insanity on a group. To wit: any organism that operates without reference to external stimuli (the real world), falls into a destructive cycle of false internal dialogues. These corrupt internal dialogues eventually cause dissolution and defeat.
The dynamic of Boyd's grand strategy is to isolate your enemy across three essential vectors (physical, mental, and moral), while at the same time improving your connectivity across those same vectors. Here's more detail:
Physical isolation is accomplished by severing communications both to the outside world (ie. allies) and internal audiences (ie. between branches of command and between the command organization and its supporters).
Mental isolation is done through the introduction of ambiguous information, novel situations, and by operating at a tempo an enemy cannot keep up with. A lack of solid information impedes decision making.
Moral isolation is achieved when an enemy improves its well being at the expense of others (allies) or violates rules of behavior they profess to uphold (standards of conduct). Moral rules are a very important reference point in times of uncertainty. When these are violated, it is very hard to recover.
Our progress so far
When we evaluate our progress in the war on terrorism based on Boyd's measures of isolation, the following is seen:
Physical isolation. America has been physically isolated from many of its allies due to its rush to war in Iraq. It also has demonstated (via the slow process by which news of Abu Ghraib reached the President and Congress) that internal communications have been disrupted. The destruction of al Qaeda's training camps and visible communications systems have resulted in a degree of isolation. However, the network-based organizational structure of al Qaeda and its ability to manipulate the media to send messages to supporters has mitigated this effort.
Mental isolation. The rapid emergence of new threats (al Sadr, al Zarqawi, and Fallujah) and the myriad of geographically dispersed attacks that require response (from Spain to Saudi Arabia -- from Basra to Mosel) have served to isolate the US on the mental plane. It is also very difficult, due to ambiguity of information, to determine who the enemy is (this is true in Iraq and across the world from Pakistan to Saudi Arabia). The bulk of the early effort to continuously attack al Qaeda has subsided as the US concentrates on Iraq -- our early gains have been squandered.
Moral isolation. The excesses at the Abu Ghraib prison demonstrate a classic violation of moral codes of conduct. The evidence indicates that the US intentionally (in that there was a climate of urgency that permitted it) violated these rules due to desire to gain information needed to fight guerrilla groups in Iraq. Another example of moral isolation is America's insistance on the right to self-defense, at the expense of the rest of the world. There has not been any evidence that al Qaeda sponsored operations have drastically violated any internal moral codes. However, the proliferation of groups associated with al Qaeda have resulted in attacks (for example: attacks on Shiites in Pakistan and Iraq that are against al Qaeda policy) may serve to isolate al Qaeda if their actions are adopted by the main organization.
A vision statement for this conflict
From this analysis it is clear that the US is, as the result of this war, more isolated than our enemy. However, Boyd suggests that the best corrective action is for the US to articulate a grand unifying vision for this war. A "with us or against us" approach and unilateral military action is not productive (it drives isolation). A better vision statement (we should have a contest for this):
The United States will commit all of the resources at its disposal to help nations everywhere preserve those values that we all hold as vital to our future success."
Posted by John Robb on 05/08/2004 at 10:59 PM | Permalink
As well, Robb looks at the role of terrorism as a tool within the Islamic Insurgency's belt:
http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2004/10/terror_as_a_tec.html
10/30/2004
TERRORISM AS A TECHNIQUE
Terrorism is a technique of warfare grounded on the theories of fourth generation warfare and Boyd's framework of pscyhological conflict. As a technique of war, it is blunt weapon that directly assaults the enemy's society and the minds of its decision makers by killing its citizens. The wanton and random nature of the technique provides much of its strength and its weakness. Further, the method is limited to three vectors by which its effectiveness can be improved. These include:
Scale improvements. Bigger attacks, better results.
Symbol selection. The more dear the symbol atttacked, the greater the impact.
Extended reach. The deeper inside a society's comfort zone a strike is made, the better the results.
Terrorism hits the wall
Al Qaeda adopted terrorism as its method of warfare when it first began operations. It improved the effectiveness of its strikes by pushing along the vectors outlined above. The end result of this effort was the attack on 9/11. That attack was the apex of conventional terrorism, only nuclear terrorism could exceed it. Without a nuclear alternative, terrorism is declining as a technique. There is reason to believe, based on strategic and theoretical analysis, that nuclear terrorism isn't likely to arrive in any relevant time period. If al Qaeda did have a nuke, it would have used it in that attack rather than method it chose. Additionally, the current emphasis on nuclear non-proliferation makes it very difficult to obtain one. Left without this alternative, terrorism is in decline due to the following (all of which are acutely felt by al Qaeda and affiliated groups):
Diminished returns. People become inured to terrorism the more it is used.
The comparision to 9/11. All attacks, when held up in comparison to 9/11, pale.
Indecisive results. While 9/11 was able to gain a victory within Boyd's framework, it was unable to gain a decisive result that achieved the stated goals of al Qaeda. As a result of this perceived failure, al Qaeda intentionally opted for a rural insurgency in Afghanistan (that never materialized due to the emergence of a stable, decentralized, narco state alternative).
Post Terrorism Conflict
As a result of these factors, terrorism is in deep decline as a method of warfare. It won't disappear, particularly given its historical momentum and the fragmentation of the opposition's effort. However, it is in the process of being replaced by a more effective alternative mainly through a highly decentralized and innovative process of development in Iraq that has stripped al Qaeda of its control of the movement (despite its attempt to integrate Zaraqawi into its command and funding system). Within that conflict, global guerrilla warfare is on the rise. This method of warfare differs from from terrorism and classic guerrilla warfare because it attacks systems as a means of decisively undermining the psychology of its opponents. Its elements include:
Infrastructure sabotage.
Market disruption.
State failure and deligitimization.
Epilogue
To the global guerrillas in Iraq, it may appear that they are participating in classic terrorism or guerrilla warfare since this new method of warfare draws on a similar tactical approach. However, the results of their efforts point in another direction. Almost all of the attacks in Iraq can be aggregated into categories of system attack that lay waste to the processes of globalization and state power. In contrast to terrorism, global guerrilla warfare is a greenfield technique -- in that it never suffers diminishing reutrns (I will post more on this later). It also converts the inevitable civilian casualties that often over time detract from terror's effectiveness into a more acceptable "collatoral damage" -- people that are killed while near valid targets (this is another lesson learned from the US military). The net result is an effort that is likely going to be decisive within Boyd's framework. It will win the war in Iraq (unless there is immediate action to counter it). It will also be a method of warfare that will be exported around the world.
Posted by John Robb on 10/30/2004 at 05:41 AM | Permalink
Finally, here is his discussion of the Long-Tail theory, which I brought up in another thread, and how it relates to the wide-range of groups within the Insurgency; basically AQ is gaining ground as a legitimate and effective war-fighting organization due to globalizing trends. This falls in line with Martin Van Crevald's theory in The Transformation of War and the The Rise and Decline of the State:
http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2005/03/journal_the_dar.html
03/18/2005
THE DARK SIDE OF THE LONG TAIL
Chris Anderson has done some excellent work on the economics of the Long Tail (weblog and presentation). The concept of the Long Tail is that globalization, new tools of production, and the Internet have made it possible to radically increase the supply and demand of niche products (in certain product categories). In traditional markets, based on scarcity of shelf space and limited product diversity, the vast majority of revenues are derived from a very limited number of products. In long tail markets, a diversity of products made by new entrants (via newly democratized tools of production and globalization), in combination with unlimited low cost shelf space (the Internet), and an accelerated word of mouth (the Internet) have radically expanded the supply curve. Additionally, this newly diverse supply has energized demand for niche products that meet specific needs.
In a traditional market, hit products often get 80% of the revenue. In a long tail market, hit products get 50% of the revenue while the other 50% is shared by a plethora of niche producers. Niche demand and supply shifts the revenue to the tail.
The long tail has applicability to my work here on Global Guerrillas. Traditionally, warfare (the ability to change society through violence) has been limited to nation-states (except in rare cases). States had a monopoly on violence. The result was a limited, truncated distribution of violence (a power law). That monopoly is on the skids due to three trends:
A democratization of the tools of warfare. Niche producers (for example: gangs) are made possible by the dislocation of globalization. All it takes to participate is a few men, some boxcutters, and a plane (as an example of simple tools combined with leverage from ubiquitous economic infrastructure).
An amplification of the damage caused by niche producers of warfare. The magic of global guerrilla systems disruption which turns inexpensive attacks into major economic and social events.
The acceleration of word of mouth. New groups can more easily find/train recruits, convey their message to a wide audience, and find/coordinate their activities with other groups (allies).
The result: a long tail has developed. New niche producers of violence have flourished. Demand for the results these niche suppliers can produce has also radically increased. Big concepts (such as a struggle between Islam and the US), not championed by states, has supercharged niche suppliers like al Qaeda and its clones. In some cases, the niche producer creates its own demand (see Transnational Gangs) or through its activites create demand for other niche producers (see Primary Loyalties). I have taken liberties with a very small portion Chris' presentation to describe how the tail developed (Download warfare's_long_tail.ppt ).
This new distribution shows a balance of power between nation-states (and their proxies) and non-state producers (global guerrillas). In warfare, a 50/50 distribution of power is the recipe for an epochal conflict. As always, please feel free to post a critique and thereby improve my effort here.
Posted by John Robb on 03/18/2005 at 11:25 PM | Permalink
Anyways, there is alot more on the site to go through if you are interested.
Cheers,
Infanteer