• Thanks for stopping by. Logging in to a registered account will remove all generic ads. Please reach out with any questions or concerns.

Ukraine - Superthread

Great time to offload the small handful of useless Aussie F-18s we bought...
 

Adam Zivo: How Canada sabotaged its own fleet of tanks - NP -25 Jan 23

Maybe the reason we can't provide tanks to Ukraine is because a decade of neglect has rendered a significant portion of our tanks inoperable

504 Comments

When asked last week about whether Canada will send tanks to Ukraine, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau said, “We’re not there yet.” As it turns out, maybe the reason we aren’t “there” is because a decade of neglect has rendered a significant portion of our tanks inoperable.

To understand how Canada managed to sabotage its own fleet of tanks, it is important to understand some history.

In the mid-1970s, then-prime minister Pierre Trudeau reluctantly refreshed Canada’s arsenal of tanks by purchasing new Leopard 1 tanks from West Germany. Our NATO allies had demanded that Canada maintain a presence in Europe to deter a possible Soviet invasion, so procurement was primarily driven by foreign policy, not military, concerns.

Then, the Cold War ended and, throughout the ’90s, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) debated whether to switch to medium-weight heavy vehicles, which are nimbler than tanks but also more fragile. The debate was fraught, as critics argued that lighter vehicles would inadequately protect Canadian personnel.

In 2003, Canada decided to decommission the Leopard 1s and shift away from using tanks more generally, but was prevented from doing so by the war in Afghanistan. Fearful of casualties stemming from inadequate armour, Canada sent its Leopard 1s to the Middle East but quickly realized that newer vehicles were needed.

Ottawa subsequently purchased a fleet of over 80 slightly-used Leopard 2 tanks (a newer, but nonetheless decades-old model) from the Netherlands. The fleet cost $650 million to acquire and was expected to cost another $650 million to maintain over 20 years.

As with the preceding fleet, the purchase of the Leopard 2s had a political dimension — the continued use of tanks was seen as critical for maintaining Canada’s perceived commitment to its allies.

When Canada concluded its Afghan combat operations in 2011, the tanks were put into storage and essentially abandoned. There isn’t much public information on what happened over the ensuing decade and media coverage on the state of the tanks has been virtually nonexistent.

However, in recent years, the Canadian Forces College has published two academic papers alleging that chronic under-investment in maintenance has left Canada’s tank fleet “barely usable.”

As these are academic papers, they don’t necessarily reflect the opinions of any government department. However, both documents brim with detail and citations, and each was authored by senior CAF officers. Together, they are more than credible enough to raise eyebrows.

The first paper, “Leopards Without Claws,” written by Maj. Matthew D.C. Johns in 2018, argues that, despite a decade of troubleshooting, Canada’s tanks are a “hollow capacity that could not be deployed in support of (Government of Canada) direction.”

According to Maj. Johns, the CAF initially estimated that the Leopard 2’s maintenance requirements would be roughly the same as the Leopard 1’s. However, whereas Leopard 1C2 tanks require an average of 296 hours per year in maintenance, the Leopard 2 requires 1,795 hours — a six-fold increase. This “significant underestimation” left the fleet in “dire straits.”

Likewise, according to the report, the CAF had only half the technicians needed to adequately service the Leopard 2s. With the training rate of new technicians being “far below the required numbers,” it estimated that it would take at least 10 years (2028, based on time of writing) to fill the gap, assuming only minimal attrition of personnel. But multiple indicators suggested that the Leopard 2s would be obsolete by then.

Even worse, Maj. Johns wrote that the Leopard 2 fleet suffered from a chronic shortage of critical components, which at one point led to “a culture of cannibalizing and robbing of vehicles” to ensure that a minimum number of tanks would be available for key exercises. By 2018, the cannibalization issue had allegedly subsided, but the ongoing, total unavailability of some crucial parts meant that some tanks were impossible to repair.

General infrastructure for tank maintenance was also allegedly inadequate. For example, neither of the two usable training areas for tanks in Canada — Wainwright and Gagetown — had the facilities needed to maintain Leopard 2s in large quantities. As such, storage facilities were allegedly retrofitted into de facto work bays, leading to tanks being stored outside while repair work was done in cramped storage buildings, further exacerbating maintenance issues.

By Maj. Johns’ 2018 estimation, only 15-20 per cent of Canada’s Leopard 2 tanks were typically usable (if needed, a maximum of 30 per cent could be put into service). “The current approach to managing and employing the Leo 2 FoV is institutionally unsound, logistically unsupportable and rapidly approaching obsolescence,” he wrote.

And the situation does not appear to have improved since then. Last year, Maj. Michael Timms authored a paper, “Understanding Tank Serviceability in the Canadian Army,” which reiterated many of Maj. Johns’ concerns, though with a bit more optimism. He wrote that “a perception persists that the deployment of tanks is not possible,” but that “existing perceptions frequently exaggerate the extent of the situation.”

According to Maj. Timms’ research, the CAF was able to keep, on average, 15 of 39 tanks maintained at an operable level (the remaining tanks appear to have been in storage). However, that figure puts the “serviceability rate” of the total fleet at only 18 per cent, seemingly affirming Maj. Johns’ dismal assessment.

Maj. Timms believed Canada suffered from a “lack of strategic investment in tank sustainment.” Technicians were “nearing the point of maximum efficiency within the resource envelope available” and, although they had managed to slow down the deterioration of the fleet, the CAF would need to double the number of available technicians and parts to increase the number of usable tanks.

Ultimately, Maj. Timms felt that if Canada’s Leopard 2 fleet cannot be maintained at a level that allows it to be useful beyond training exercises, then “justifying the existence” of tanks in the Canadian Army would be “challenging.”

I asked the Department of National Defence about how much money has been spent on maintaining Canada’s Leopard 2 tanks so far and how many of the tanks are currently operable. The department could not readily provide the requested expenditure figures and, due to operational security concerns, was unable to confirm how many Leopard 2s are currently usable.

And what happened to the Leopard 1 tanks? After decommissioning them in 2017, Canada tried to find buyers for the approximately 60 surplus Leopard 1s that remained from the original fleet of 127. It proved near-impossible to find a buyer who matched Canada’s human rights commitments and whose purchase would not have destabilizing political effects.

After a last-ditch effort to sell the tanks to Jordan fell through due to concerns about disrupting Israeli security, the CAF gave up on finding a buyer. In 2021, a Quebec-based company was contracted to gut the tanks. A few of the decommissioned Leopard 1s were used as historical monuments in small towns, but the majority were used for target practice.

Perhaps the Leopard 2s will share a similar fate.

National Post

RECOMMENDED FROM EDITORIAL
 
He can’t. He’s just trying to get out in front of the plane issue that is next months topic for donation.

Scholz wants no more than stalemate in UKR, as he doesn’t want the Ukrainians to be successful in kicking Russia out of their home, as he’s concerned his buddy Vlad will go to the Nuclear option. He’s got the Polish buffer, so he likes to live with his head in the sand.

I suspect that most Western Governments feel like a slow roll is the best way forward, gradually increasing the support and level of pain Russia feels. More support is added to keep Ukraine viable, but not dominating. With the goal that eventually Russia sees their efforts are futile and goes home.

I don’t think that’s a great solution as at some point Russia is going to decide their commitments and losses require a win no matter what.

Better to provide more firepower now, and have Russians understand immediately that they are in a losing situation and need to leave.
Of course I’m also the guy that wanted to drop a NATO Corps into Ukraine mid Feb last year to stop this back then from even starting.

WRT the F16 issue: I think this is just the latest flash point in the internal EU war to find out if Brussels or JEF prevails. And I think Joe is having difficulty whose side he is on - AUKUS and JEF or Brussels and the EU.

WRT the slow roll: I think you are absolutely on target there. The problem is the day after. I don't believe there will be a return to business as usual. I believe that it is more likely that Ukraine will emerge with its tail up and Russia humiliated and sullen. Chastised if not impotent. The problem that presents is that the Ukrainians will start taking a hard look at who helped and who hindered with every dead and dismembered Ukrainian being blamed on those who did not help.

Equally, I suspect, those that have been inclined to help will reevaluate their association with those who hindered and reconsider their security and economic partnerships.

Between US war weariness (GWOT inspired isolationism) and Joe's indecision, there is a real possibility of not just an EU realignment but also a NATO realignment. Even, perhaps a Western oriented Silk Road stretching through Ankara from London to Tokyo.
 
Politico's take on Scholz as an anti-Reagan Marxist in the SPD with close ties to East Germany and opposed to both Intermediate Range Missiles and NATO.....


The Cold War roots of Scholz’s tank trauma​

Olaf Scholz’s long dithering before sending tanks is symptomatic of a deep-seated mindset that détente won the Cold War, not Reagan’s belligerence.


In early January of 1984, an aspiring young West German socialist with a shoulder-length curly mane traveled by train to East Berlin with his comrades for an important meeting.
It was a tense time in the Cold War with the arms race between the U.S. and the Soviet Union at a fever pitch. Even so, the young man’s entourage was welcomed with open arms and even spared the rigors of East Germany’s border guards; after all, he was a friend.
At the meeting between the young socialists and East Germany’s communist leadership, the young man, a Hamburg law student in his mid-20s named Olaf Scholz, could be seen sitting directly across from Egon Krenz, the protégé of East German leader Erich Honecker.

Details of the visit featured prominently on East Germany’s main TV news program and the next day it was front-page news in Neues Deutschland, the communist regime’s newspaper.


Scholz is once again front page news this week over his reversal on sending tanks to Ukraine. To understand that decision — and the stubborn refusals that preceded it — one needs to delve into his past.
Back in the early 1980s, Scholz and the communists shared a common goal: to block the U.S. from stationing mid-range nuclear missiles in Europe. The U.S. plans, triggered by a similar step from the Soviets, had unleashed some of the largest and most violent protests West Germany had seen in decades. The organizers of the protests, including Scholz, who was then a deputy leader of the socialist youth movement, viewed then-U.S. President Ronald Reagan as a loose cannon and worried he might start a nuclear war.
In their meetings with the East German officials, Scholz’s group called on the USSR to respond in kind by “putting something on America’s doorstep,” i.e. nuclear weapons, because the Soviet missiles pointed at Europe “were not an adequate threat to the U.S.A.,” according to a detailed report on the visit complied by East Germany’s Stasi secret police.
Throughout the 1980s, Scholz made at least nine trips to the DDR, according to the records, including a 1986 visit to Krenz, who succeeded Honecker as East Germany’s leader shortly before the fall of the Berlin Wall. (In 1997, Krenz was convicted of manslaughter in four cases connected to the killing of East Germans trying to flee the country.)
Scholz, who was finance minister in Angela Merkel’s last government before succeeding her as chancellor at the end of 2021, has largely dodged questions about his dealings in East Germany (including the circumstances around a visit to a sauna he made during a weeklong retreat with communist youth leaders in 1983).

Scholz’s supporters have characterized his history as a Marxist trying to undo capitalism as a youthful indiscretion and point to his later political career during which he was regarded as a moderate.
Yet there are strong echoes between Scholz’s steadfast refusal to take a more resolute stance on Russia over Ukraine and his youthful enthusiasm for socialism and the Soviet-led sphere which was accompanied by fervent anti-Americanism.
After months of stubborn resistance, Scholz has cleared the way for Germany and other countries that own German-made Leopard tanks to send them to Ukraine. As welcome as his about-face is, it comes only after Scholz triggered a massive row both within NATO and in his own German coalition over the issue.

Russian President Vladimir Putin and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz ahead of their meeting over Ukraine security at the Kremlin, in Moscow, on February 15, 2022 | Mikhail Klimentyev/AFP via Getty Images
For Scholz and his cohorts in the 1980s, the communists were allies and NATO the aggressor. Scholz, who was regarded as a leftist within the Social Democratic Party, pushed his party to consider a West German exit from NATO, which he characterized as “aggressive and imperial.”
In recent weeks, as Germany’s allies tried to pressure Berlin to lift its veto on sending German-made battle tanks to Ukraine, some western officials and analysts have posited that the resistance is rooted in the country’s World War II history and its invasion of the Soviet Union. That argument rings hollow, however, if one considers the millions of Ukrainians the Germans killed in the war. If Germany’s World War II ghosts were really driving Scholz’s policy, he should equally be doing whatever he could to defend Ukraine.
Nonetheless, the Nazi card has been an effective tool for Germany to shirk its responsibility for Europe’s security and Scholz knows better than anyone what buttons to push at home and abroad



That doesn’t change the fact that his own views and actions are shaped more by the Cold War and a fear of antagonizing Russia.
He’s not alone. Rolf Mützenich, the leader of Scholz’s Social Democrats in the German parliament who came of age at the same time as the chancellor, has spent decades trying to rid Germany of American nuclear weapons. Amid the tank debate, he played a crucial role in playing defense for his old comrade.
The Scholz-Mützenich approach to Vladimir Putin’s Russia is rooted in the prevailing German narrative about what ended the Cold War and led to reunification. In the German mind, it was Ostpolitik, the détente policies introduced by Chancellor Willy Brandt in the early 1970s. It was Germany’s engagement with the Soviets, both economic and diplomatic, that led to a peaceful end to the Cold War and not Reagan’s belligerence.

That view is not just at odds with America’s historical understanding of the period, it also runs counter to what most eastern Europeans believe. For Poland, it was the courage of the Solidarity movement to stand up to their communist masters that ushered in change, for example.
Yet Germany’s perception of how and why the Cold War ended has become its reality and informs both policy-making and public opinion. Remember ex-Chancellor Merkel’s years-long insistence on pursuing fruitless “dialogue” with Putin instead of standing up to him?
Scholz too has shown that the only thing allies can count on Germany for is that it will drag its feet, parse every decision large or small and then play what Germans like to call a “beleidigte Leberwurst” (an offended liver sausage), demanding more “respect.”

Yes, Scholz is now willing to send Ukraine tanks, but only after a year of pressure and in numbers (14 in total) that leave something to be desired
Putin’s erstwhile socialist comrades in Berlin may not be willing to ignore the atrocities he has committed in Ukraine, but as the German chancellor has proved over the past year, the Russian leader can at the very least count on them to buy him more time. Scholz’s spinmeisters are now declaring “All’s well that ends well.” That may provide some comfort to the chancellor and his inner circle.
But considering the daily carnage Ukrainian forces face on the front lines as a result of the delays, it shouldn’t.

 
Politico's take on Scholz as an anti-Reagan Marxist in the SPD with close ties to East Germany and opposed to both Intermediate Range Missiles and NATO.....




Maybe he needs to fall out a window onto an icepick.
 
JEF - Joint Expedtionary Force

I have been paying a lot of attention to this group as it seems to be at odds with the prevailing tendencies in the Brussels centric EU.

I was surprised to find there is another JEF at play in Europe. One that is tightly bound to Brussels and the Jacques Delors vision - Young European Federalists are known in France as JEF (Jeunes Européens Fédéralistes).

They are ardently pro-EU, strongly in favour of a unitary Europe and vehemently opposed to Brexit.

They penned this:


As the crisis deepens, more cooperation and unity will be needed between European countries. If the UK truly wants to pursue a global future and retain a good relationship with its neighbours, the next PM will have to further adapt to the rest of the continent’s stance on the war and show a united European front to support Ukraine’s struggle for freedom.

A call, once again, for Britain to get in line with the Continent, as exemplified by the stance of Macron.



WORDS AND ACTIONS: UNDERSTANDING THE UK’S CONTRADICTORY STANCE ON UKRAINE​

16 September 2022, by Martin Penov


The United Kingdom is a country which has historically prided itself on its support of humanitarianism. Thinking globally is the basis of Boris Johnson’s post-Brexit vision of a “Global Britain”. It may seem bewildering then that the UK is the only country in Europe which does not accept Ukrainian refugees without a visa. While Eastern European diaspora communities have come together to organise rallies, launch fundraisers and host charity events, many are wondering why Britain has been so cautious. While Central & Eastern European countries such as Poland, Romania and Moldova have opened their borders to accept over 5 million refugees, the UK only begun to ease visa restrictions on the 14th of March after a petition to the Parliament passed one thousand signatures. The response has been disappointing to say the least, and there is an evident gap between what the government says and what it actually does. While many buildings across the country have been lit up in the colours of the Ukrainian flag, such symbolic gestures do not compensate for the fact that the government has refused to waive visas. Instead, the government has opted for a new “Homes for Ukrainians” scheme, allowing Brits to apply to house Ukrainian visa-holders if they so wish.

One Foot In, One Foot Out
The UK has a history of supporting Ukraine militarily. It was one of the original signatories of the infamous Budapest Memorandum, the now void agreement on security assurances made between Ukraine and the permanent UN Security Council members to strip Ukraine of its Soviet-era nuclear arsenal. Following the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea, the British military has helped train 22,000 Ukrainian soldiers with ‘Operation Orbital’ and supported the country’s aspiration to join NATO. Prior to the invasion on the 24th of February, the British, Polish and Ukrainian governments signed a trilateral pact to enhance their strategic cooperation. The British government continues to be one of Ukraine’s biggest supporters, providing billions in military aid and announcing in June a program to train up to 10,000 Ukrainian soldiers on British soil. Former PM Boris Johnson has made numerous trips to Kyiv, with the most recent being on Ukraine’s Independence Day on the 24th of August. It is all the more puzzling, then, that the government has been so wary of allowing Ukrainians to enter the country.
Hostility towards migration is nothing new for British politics, with Eastern Europeans all sharing a history of being targeted by British populists and the infamous right-wing media. Polish, Bulgarian and Romanian nationals were for a long time the favourite scapegoat of politicians, with wild accusations against Eastern Europeans of stealing jobs and criminality running rampant, especially in the country’s most read tabloids. This was especially prevalent in the election campaigns of Nigel Farage’s UKIP prior to the 2015 Migrant Crisis, and once again during the run-up to the 2016 Brexit Referendum. It can be argued that this xenophobia towards Eastern EU nationals among parts of the electorate is what pushed David Cameron to organise the referendum. Following the results of the Brexit vote, the ruling Conservative Party styled itself as the part to get Brexit done. From the countryside to the affluent towns and hamlets, conservative voters have an expectation that the government will put an end to what they viewed as uncontrolled migration, so allowing a large number of Eastern Europeans, Ukrainian or otherwise, would be antithetical to the party’s promises.
The Conservative Party’s relationship with Russian oligarchs is also complicated to say the least. The party has a long history of accepting donations from wealthy Russian backers, disincentivising the government from following the EU’s sanctions regime, earning it much criticism during the initial months of the war. This was only worsened in 2019 by the government’s delay of the so-called ‘Russia Report’, inquiring about possible Russian interference in the Brexit Referendum. Ever since the fall of the Soviet Union, London itself has been a safe haven for Eastern European oligarchs to hide their dirty money and live comfortably in luxurious houses in prime boroughs such as Kensington & Chelsea and Westminster. Eaton Square in Belgravia has become almost synonymous with this phenomenon, earning it the nickname of London’s very own ‘Red Square’, while ‘Londongrad’ has been used to describe the city itself. Since the start of the war, measures have been taken to curb Russian influence in British politics, but the damage to the UK’s reputation will be hard to overcome.

Good Friends in Times of Need
In a very cynical twist of fate, Mr. Johnson could not have been any luckier with the war’s timing. The string of controversies finally started catching up with the ex-PM as leaks of lockdown parties began emerging in late-2021 and early-2022, leading to the infamous ‘’Partygate’’ scandal which saw the PM lose the support of many of his fellow party members and colleagues, as well as face an unsuccessful no-confidence vote. This was only exacerbated by the 2022 local elections in May which saw the Conservative Party lose 487 seats. The Ukraine war, in turn, seemed like a saving grace for the PM’s battered reputation. In a sharp shift in rhetoric, Johnson painted himself as Ukraine’s greatest ally, pledging large amounts of military aid, visiting Kyiv whenever a domestic scandal was brewing and adorning the facades of numerous British landmarks with the colours of the Ukrainian flag. The firm support has been an opportunity to both mask ongoing controversies, as well as flex the UK’s diplomatic muscles in front of Brussels. While this may have helped the then-PM’s reputation, it only slowed down the inevitable. In July 2022, allegations emerged of a history of sexual misconduct by Johnson’s Deputy Chief Whip, Chris Pincher, which led to the PM announcing his resignation on the 7th of July. During his resignation speech, Johnson stated:
“Let me say now to the people of Ukraine, I know that we in the UK will continue to back your fight for freedom for as long as it takes.”
The question remains, however: How will the next British PM approach the conflict? Support for Ukraine is high among the British public. Any moves by the new leadership to reverse the current course of action would be viewed as political suicide. Prior to her appointment as PM, Liz Truss and her opponent, Rishi Sunak, both showed support for the country and claimed they will continue the country’s current approach – increasing economic sanctions and military aid. Truss has not changed course yet, having chosen Ukraine’s President Zelenskyy for her first official correspondence since becoming PM. Direct confrontation with Russia remains off the table. However, the ongoing energy crisis has become a leading topic in British politics, one which both candidates have done their best to avoid. Whether UK leadership will continue its large financial support of Ukraine in light of the mounting economic challenges is yet to be seen.

The apparent duality of the governments’ response has been openly criticised by many, including French President Emmanuel Macron who noted that Britain should live up to its “grand statements”. The “Homes for Ukrainians” scheme has also received a fair amount of criticism for putting the responsibility on British citizens who have been asked to volunteer to house refugees, making Ukrainians dependent on the goodwill of strangers and opening them up to the possibility of exploitation. Regardless of the criticism, the government is unlikely to change its stance soon. As the crisis deepens, more cooperation and unity will be needed between European countries. If the UK truly wants to pursue a global future and retain a good relationship with its neighbours, the next PM will have to further adapt to the rest of the continent’s stance on the war and show a united European front to support Ukraine’s struggle for freedom.

Against this backdrop we have the Northern Ireland Protocol Debate that pits Brexiteers and Unionists against Republicans and the EU with Joe Biden and the IRA caucus in the US coming down heavily in favour of Ireland and the EU.

Steve Baker warns 'large gap to be bridged' over hated Brexit deal impasse​

The Northern Ireland Office minister warned: "Today there is no deal on the table, there is a large gap to be bridged."​


By KATIE HARRIS
21:06, Mon, Jan 23, 2023 | UPDATED: 21:24, Mon, Jan 23, 2023






There does seem to be some lessening of the pressure however -

Biden is not coming to celebrate the Good Friday Agreement anniversary.


Britain is not seeking a Free Trade Agreement with the US - an agreement that was being used by both the EU and the US as leverage against the UK.

Leo Varadkar, the Irish PM who backed the EU and the NI Protocol is now allowing as how he might have misjudged

And Bertie Ahern, the Irish PM who negotiated the Good Friday Agreement, is calling to back off the pressure




Ireland finds itself in between its own rock and a hard place. It is an English speaking country which has built its wealth on its Common Law history and its cut rate tax regime. That puts its wallet at odds with its revolutionary heart. Politically and emotionally it sides with Paris and Berlin. But it relied on Britain and the New Hanseatic League to support its financial position against the Brussels consensus.

Now with security moving up the ladder Ireland has to ask how much it can afford to perturb London - especially if London gains a useful following from JEF, the New Hanseatics and the Easterners.


I feel the ties that bind loosening in Europe, and across the Atlantic.
 
Looks like an announcement on the leopards today. 4 initially with up to 14 total in time.

Guessing some working units were found and maintainers are going to be working over time to get more ready , too bad the CAF does not pay over time.

 
Looks like an announcement on the leopards today. 4 initially with up to 14 total in time.
Glad to see the plan for 14 in total. Initial four can be used for training and ultimately a full Company for deployment.
 
Guessing some working units were found and maintainers are going to be working over time to get more ready , too bad the CAF does not pay over time.

I heard 4 tanks and the only way more can be sent is if there is enough spare parts available for them, along with our remaining tanks - this speaks volumes of how bad things have gotten. If we can only spare 4 tanks now because we need to ensure that there are enough spares parts for the remaining ones, wow.
 
I heard 4 tanks and the only way more can be sent is if there is enough spare parts available for them, along with our remaining tanks - this speaks volumes of how bad things have gotten. If we can only spare 4 tanks now because we need to ensure that there are enough spares parts for the remaining ones, wow.
The sad thing is Russia invaded Ukraine 11 months ago. From that date everyone in NATO has realized that our forces need to be brought to high readiness to face any potential escalation. What has been done with that 11 months to get as many tanks as possible ready for potential combat in case things go pear shaped? Is a full scale Russian invasion of a European nation and threats of nuclear escalation against NATO not enough to have us do everything possible to get our forces on a war footing? If not, then what the hell must it take?
 
The sad thing is Russia invaded Ukraine 11 months ago. From that date everyone in NATO has realized that our forces need to be brought to high readiness to face any potential escalation. What has been done with that 11 months to get as many tanks as possible ready for potential combat in case things go pear shaped? Is a full scale Russian invasion of a European nation and threats of nuclear escalation against NATO not enough to have us do everything possible to get our forces on a war footing? If not, then what the hell must it take?
no it isn't. Need to study the issue first and bring in the consultants
 
The sad thing is Russia invaded Ukraine 11 months ago. From that date everyone in NATO has realized that our forces need to be brought to high readiness to face any potential escalation. What has been done with that 11 months to get as many tanks as possible ready for potential combat in case things go pear shaped? Is a full scale Russian invasion of a European nation and threats of nuclear escalation against NATO not enough to have us do everything possible to get our forces on a war footing? If not, then what the hell must it take?
Happiest interpretation of "we can only send four" is that everything else has been evaluated and sequestered to support exactly that sort of move.
 
I heard 4 tanks and the only way more can be sent is if there is enough spare parts available for them, along with our remaining tanks - this speaks volumes of how bad things have gotten. If we can only spare 4 tanks now because we need to ensure that there are enough spares parts for the remaining ones, wow.
How many tanks in a Squadron? So.if shit hit the fan and NATO asked us to deploy a square combat team, would we have enough functioning tanks to do so?
 
Back
Top