Author Topic: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis  (Read 503145 times)

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Offline PPCLI Guy

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Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
« Reply #1400 on: April 01, 2017, 15:29:05 »
If gov't wants to save big bucks could withdraw CC-150 and CP-140s plus support personnel.

Mark
Ottawa

You have it half right.  The Coalition would miss the airframes, especially the refueller.  No one, including Canadians, would miss the support staff in Kuwait, and the White Elephant in Erbil is a national embarassment
"The higher the rank, the more necessary it is that boldness should be accompanied by a reflective mind....for with increase in rank it becomes always a matter less of self-sacrifice and more a matter of the preservation of others, and the good of the whole."

Karl von Clausewitz

Offline MJP

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Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
« Reply #1401 on: April 01, 2017, 15:37:55 »
You have it half right.  The Coalition would miss the airframes, especially the refueller.  No one, including Canadians, would miss the support staff in Kuwait, and the White Elephant in Erbil is a national embarassment

frig yea...I would gladly go on the closeout team for Kuwait tomorrow.  It is a huge waste of resources and there are better ways to support the folks giving real effects on the ground (air & ground folks) than what we currently have in place.
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Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
« Reply #1402 on: April 04, 2017, 15:10:23 »
Article Link

Iraqis tried to convince Canada to keep CF-18s bombing ISIS, documents show

Documents show the Iraqis repeatedly tried during a meeting in December 2015 to keep Canada's CF-18 fighters in the coalition bombing campaign against ISIS. Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan said after that meeting he hadn't heard complaints from allies about the plan to pull the fighters. (Lars Hagberg/Canadian Press)

Conservatives accuse Harjit Sajjan of lying about allies' reaction to CF-18 withdrawal

Despite assurances to the contrary, the Iraqis did not quietly, nor happily, accept Canada's withdrawal of CF-18 jet fighters from combat against the Islamic State, new documents reveal.

In fact, Khalid Obaidi, the country's defence minister, argued for Prime Minister Justin Trudeau's government to change its mind in a high-level meeting prior to the suspension of the bombing campaign.

The meeting took place on Dec. 20, 2015, in Baghdad, as Canada's newly appointed defence minister made his first fact-finding trip to the region.

The red carpet — replete with an honour guard — was rolled out for Sajjan, a former soldier with a distinguished career in Afghanistan.

"The ensuing discussion touched on a range of issues, but the Iraqi Minister of Defence was clearly focused on Canada's decision to withdraw its CF18 fighter jets from the coalition air strikes, asking Minister Sajjan to reconsider this decision on numerous occasions," said a Global Affairs Canada summary of the meeting, dated Dec. 22, 2015.

The report, obtained by Conservative Party researchers and shared with CBC News, was written by the chargé d'affaires at the Baghdad mission and sent to a senior Global Affairs official in Ottawa who is responsible for Middle Eastern issues in the Gulf states.

The narrative the Liberal government promoted — both before and after Sajjan's meeting — was that Canada's allies understood and respected the decision to call a halt to the air force's participation in the campaign, which started under former prime minister Stephen Harper's Conservative government.

Following the Baghdad meeting, Sajjan flew to the Iraqi city of Erbil, where he had further sessions with Kurdish political and military leaders. Later, during a conference call with reporters back in Canada, he was asked how the withdrawal plan was going over.

"'The irony is, I haven't had one discussion about the CF-18s or discussing our contribution from the humanitarian side of things," Sajjan responded when asked how the Kurds, whom Canada had been working with directly, viewed the plan.

'A blatant lie:' Conservative MP

Conservative defence critic James Bezan said the Liberal government, and Sajjan in particular, deliberately misled Canadians about the fallout among allies.

"He did lie. This is proof that he lied," Bezan said in an interview with CBC News. "When he said there was no request to keep our CF-18s there, that is a blatant lie."

A spokeswoman for Sajjan said the context of the question specifically related to how the Kurds felt about the issue and the minister did not say anything misleading.

Jordan Owens told CBC News the issue was not brought up in Erbil and the revamped mission has since proven its worth to allies.

"Since February 2016, when the government of Canada announced the expansion of our whole-of-government approach to the conflict in Iraq and the region, Canada has received praise from allies, including the governments of Iraq, the Kurdish Regional Government and the United States," Owens said in a statement on Monday.

"We value the feedback we receive from our allies and the occasions we have to discuss the opportunities and challenges our nations face as we make policy decisions that impact the international community."

In an interview with CBC's The House, which aired in early January 2016, Sajjan did concede the allies had mixed feelings about Canada's plan.

"Of course they want to keep our CF-18s there," he said.

But sticking with the airstrike mission wouldn't be the "responsible" thing to do, he added.

"The responsible thing, in my opinion, is to make sure we as a coalition partner look at the current situation, the needs of the coalition," he said. "When you look at the current situation, the conversation is [...] 'How do we target more?'"

Election promise

The end of combat operations by the jets fulfilled a Liberal 2015 election pledge, and it was a decision supported by the country's top military commander.

It paved the way for the tripling of the number of special forces troops advising Kurdish Peshmerga fighters and the introduction of higher-level intelligence capabilities to help with the liberation of the northern city of Mosul.

When the Liberals announced the revamped mission on Feb. 8, 2016, Gen. Jonathan Vance, the chief of defence staff, said it was the "absolutely correct moment" to end air combat operations.

"The success of Iraq is going to be through its forces on the ground and for us to provide them with training and the expertise to be able to do that, to defend themselves and be able to conduct operations to defeat [ISIS] is exactly where we need to be," Vance said.

But Bezan said the narrative that allies were not fussed by the decision continued past the end of the bombing campaign, which formally wrapped up less than two weeks after the government announced the retooling.

Sajjan was the point man and the December 2015 comments represented, according to Bezan, the beginning of a series of "alternative fact" statements by the minister, which now includes the existence of a "capability gap" in the jet fighter fleet.

The Conservatives say the notion that Canada does not have enough CF-18s to meet its NORAD and NATO commitments simultaneously is political fiction, dreamed up by Liberals intent on not buying the F-35 stealth fighter, another of the Liberals' campaign promises.
The only time you have too much gas is when you're on fire.

Offline daftandbarmy

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Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
« Reply #1403 on: April 04, 2017, 16:37:11 »
It's official: we have now joined the 'Axis of Weasels'....
"The most important qualification of a soldier is fortitude under fatigue and privation. Courage is only second; hardship, poverty and want are the best school for a soldier." Napoleon

Online Bird_Gunner45

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Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
« Reply #1404 on: April 04, 2017, 17:26:20 »
Article Link

Iraqis tried to convince Canada to keep CF-18s bombing ISIS, documents show

Documents show the Iraqis repeatedly tried during a meeting in December 2015 to keep Canada's CF-18 fighters in the coalition bombing campaign against ISIS. Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan said after that meeting he hadn't heard complaints from allies about the plan to pull the fighters. (Lars Hagberg/Canadian Press)

Conservatives accuse Harjit Sajjan of lying about allies' reaction to CF-18 withdrawal

Despite assurances to the contrary, the Iraqis did not quietly, nor happily, accept Canada's withdrawal of CF-18 jet fighters from combat against the Islamic State, new documents reveal.

In fact, Khalid Obaidi, the country's defence minister, argued for Prime Minister Justin Trudeau's government to change its mind in a high-level meeting prior to the suspension of the bombing campaign.

The meeting took place on Dec. 20, 2015, in Baghdad, as Canada's newly appointed defence minister made his first fact-finding trip to the region.

The red carpet — replete with an honour guard — was rolled out for Sajjan, a former soldier with a distinguished career in Afghanistan.

"The ensuing discussion touched on a range of issues, but the Iraqi Minister of Defence was clearly focused on Canada's decision to withdraw its CF18 fighter jets from the coalition air strikes, asking Minister Sajjan to reconsider this decision on numerous occasions," said a Global Affairs Canada summary of the meeting, dated Dec. 22, 2015.

The report, obtained by Conservative Party researchers and shared with CBC News, was written by the chargé d'affaires at the Baghdad mission and sent to a senior Global Affairs official in Ottawa who is responsible for Middle Eastern issues in the Gulf states.

The narrative the Liberal government promoted — both before and after Sajjan's meeting — was that Canada's allies understood and respected the decision to call a halt to the air force's participation in the campaign, which started under former prime minister Stephen Harper's Conservative government.

Following the Baghdad meeting, Sajjan flew to the Iraqi city of Erbil, where he had further sessions with Kurdish political and military leaders. Later, during a conference call with reporters back in Canada, he was asked how the withdrawal plan was going over.

"'The irony is, I haven't had one discussion about the CF-18s or discussing our contribution from the humanitarian side of things," Sajjan responded when asked how the Kurds, whom Canada had been working with directly, viewed the plan.

'A blatant lie:' Conservative MP

Conservative defence critic James Bezan said the Liberal government, and Sajjan in particular, deliberately misled Canadians about the fallout among allies.

"He did lie. This is proof that he lied," Bezan said in an interview with CBC News. "When he said there was no request to keep our CF-18s there, that is a blatant lie."

A spokeswoman for Sajjan said the context of the question specifically related to how the Kurds felt about the issue and the minister did not say anything misleading.

Jordan Owens told CBC News the issue was not brought up in Erbil and the revamped mission has since proven its worth to allies.

"Since February 2016, when the government of Canada announced the expansion of our whole-of-government approach to the conflict in Iraq and the region, Canada has received praise from allies, including the governments of Iraq, the Kurdish Regional Government and the United States," Owens said in a statement on Monday.

"We value the feedback we receive from our allies and the occasions we have to discuss the opportunities and challenges our nations face as we make policy decisions that impact the international community."

In an interview with CBC's The House, which aired in early January 2016, Sajjan did concede the allies had mixed feelings about Canada's plan.

"Of course they want to keep our CF-18s there," he said.

But sticking with the airstrike mission wouldn't be the "responsible" thing to do, he added.

"The responsible thing, in my opinion, is to make sure we as a coalition partner look at the current situation, the needs of the coalition," he said. "When you look at the current situation, the conversation is [...] 'How do we target more?'"

Election promise

The end of combat operations by the jets fulfilled a Liberal 2015 election pledge, and it was a decision supported by the country's top military commander.

It paved the way for the tripling of the number of special forces troops advising Kurdish Peshmerga fighters and the introduction of higher-level intelligence capabilities to help with the liberation of the northern city of Mosul.

When the Liberals announced the revamped mission on Feb. 8, 2016, Gen. Jonathan Vance, the chief of defence staff, said it was the "absolutely correct moment" to end air combat operations.

"The success of Iraq is going to be through its forces on the ground and for us to provide them with training and the expertise to be able to do that, to defend themselves and be able to conduct operations to defeat [ISIS] is exactly where we need to be," Vance said.

But Bezan said the narrative that allies were not fussed by the decision continued past the end of the bombing campaign, which formally wrapped up less than two weeks after the government announced the retooling.

Sajjan was the point man and the December 2015 comments represented, according to Bezan, the beginning of a series of "alternative fact" statements by the minister, which now includes the existence of a "capability gap" in the jet fighter fleet.

The Conservatives say the notion that Canada does not have enough CF-18s to meet its NORAD and NATO commitments simultaneously is political fiction, dreamed up by Liberals intent on not buying the F-35 stealth fighter, another of the Liberals' campaign promises.

The more I see of General Vance's support for the Liberals the more I wonder about his political aspirations... the article that did it for me was the one where he stated that we had enough money to meet all of our requirements and could afford to defer to 2030.. there's no way he can really believe that

Offline Eye In The Sky

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Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
« Reply #1405 on: April 04, 2017, 19:40:23 »
Both the MND and CDS are probably receiving informal Developing PERs from people who lace the boots up for a living. 
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Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
« Reply #1406 on: April 19, 2017, 12:42:49 »
Just noticed this from the info-machine:
Quote
The Government of Canada approved on April 11, 2017, the Minister of National Defense’s request to grandfather the hardship and risk levels for the locations of Arifjan and Ali Al Salem in Kuwait for Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) members currently deployed on Operation IMPACT.

Last year, the Departmental Hardship and Risk Committee (DHRC), responsible for assessing hardship and risk on our deployed operations, determined that the levels were lower for Arifjan and Ali Al Salem as a result of a lower risk to CAF members.

As a result of the Government’s decision to approve the Minister of National Defence’s request, all CAF members who were in those regions when the decisions were made to reduce hardship and risk levels will not see their levels drop for the duration of their deployment.

With respect to our personnel in Kuwait, those in Ali Al Salem will have their tax-exempt status extended until August 16, 2017 and those in Arifjan will have their tax-exempt status extended until December 18, 2016 and not September 1, 2016.

The review of the overall policy, as requested by the Minister of National Defence to the Chief of the Defence Staff is still underway.

Quotes

    “Our government is committed to making sure our women and men in uniform have all the right benefits, and I am happy to see that those who were deployed on Operation IMPACT when the decision was made to reduce the hardship and risk levels will now enjoy the benefits they had when they started their deployment. We will continue to review the overall policy towards better respecting and reflecting the hard work and sacrifices of Canadian Armed Forces personnel on behalf of Canadians.”

    -Harjit S. Sajjan, Defence Minister

Quick Facts

    The Departmental Hardship and Risk Committee, in establishing Hardship and Risk levels, endeavors to assign levels that accurately reflect the actual conditions and risks that personnel are exposed to in a specific geographic location and on a specific operation.

    Canadian Armed Forces members deployed as part of Operation IMPACT are entitled to Hardship and Risk allowances in recognition of the conditions and risks associated with specific locations.

    The Hardship and Risk levels for all operations are continuously reviewed and reflects a rating or level supported by analysis and advice from subject-matter experts, including the force employer, medical and intelligence advisors.

    The Canadian Armed Forces continues to look at how best to appropriately compensate its personnel for the outstanding work they do on operations and this includes reviewing internal procedures on addressing hardship and risk conditions ...
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Offline Eye In The Sky

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Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
« Reply #1407 on: April 19, 2017, 17:12:21 »
The flaw in the whole RA and HA methodology is the assumption people remain in those specific locations, and that's not the case.

However, this is still good financial news for those deployed.  As has been said before, IF there's no risk in Kuwait, why are Canadians confined to camp?   ^-^
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Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
« Reply #1408 on: April 19, 2017, 19:27:23 »
There's no reason why the levels can't change over time, just not in the middle. There's also no reason why someone's risk level (not hardship) shouldn't go up for a day when they fly a sortie into dangerous airspace. I don't think our pay system is able to handle all that manual inputs though.

Much like PLD, our benefits/compensation systems are a mess.

Offline MarkOttawa

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Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
« Reply #1409 on: April 19, 2017, 19:54:24 »
Not the impression one gets from Western gov'ts and media:
Quote
Study Shows Islamic State’s Primary Opponent in Syria Is Government Forces, IHS Markit Says
Weakening Syrian government would extend life of the Islamic State’s caliphate

The Islamic State fought Syrian government forces more than any other opponent over the past 12 months, according to new analysis from Conflict Monitor by IHS Markit (Nasdaq: INFO), a world leader in critical information, analytics and solutions.

Between 1 April 2016 and 31 March 2017, 43 percent of all Islamic State fighting in Syria was directed against President Assad’s forces, 17 against the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the remaining 40 percent involved fighting rival Sunni opposition groups -- in particular, those who formed part of the Turkey-backed Euphrates Shield coalition.

“It is an inconvenient reality that any US action taken to weaken the Syrian government will inadvertently benefit the Islamic State and other jihadist groups,” said Columb Strack, senior Middle East analyst at IHS Markit. “The Syrian government is essentially the anvil to the US-led Coalition’s hammer. While US-backed forces surround Raqqa, the Islamic State is engaged in intense fighting with the Syrian government around Palmyra and in other parts of Homs and Deir al-Zour provinces.”

Any further reduction in the capability of Syria’s already overstretched forces would reduce their ability to prevent the Islamic State from pushing out of the desert into the more heavily populated western Syria, threatening cities like Homs and Damascus, the analysis said...

Almost half of original territory lost

Between 1 January 2015 and 3 April 2017, the Islamic State lost almost 50 percent of its territory. On 1 January 2015, Conflict Monitor estimated the Islamic State controlled 90,800 km2 in Iraq and Syria. Now, the Islamic State controls 48,500 km2...
http://news.ihsmarkit.com/press-release/aerospace-defense-security/study-shows-islamic-states-primary-opponent-syria-governmen

Mark
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Offline Eye In The Sky

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Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
« Reply #1410 on: April 19, 2017, 19:58:18 »
Nice summary of events the past few years...

The only time you have too much gas is when you're on fire.

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Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
« Reply #1411 on: April 19, 2017, 22:57:03 »
The flaw in the whole RA and HA methodology is the assumption people remain in those specific locations, and that's not the case.

However, this is still good financial news for those deployed.  As has been said before, IF there's no risk in Kuwait, why are Canadians confined to camp?   ^-^

Mostly to justify their tax free from what I could tell. Proteus (no tax free), Jordan (no tax free), and lebanon (no tax free) are infinitely more "dangerous" than to anyone not flying a plane in kuwait. Even that is arguable tbh

Offline PPCLI Guy

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Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
« Reply #1412 on: April 19, 2017, 23:54:07 »
  As has been said before, IF there's no risk in Kuwait, why are Canadians confined to camp?   ^-^

To qualify for RA and HA.....
"The higher the rank, the more necessary it is that boldness should be accompanied by a reflective mind....for with increase in rank it becomes always a matter less of self-sacrifice and more a matter of the preservation of others, and the good of the whole."

Karl von Clausewitz

Offline SupersonicMax

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Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
« Reply #1413 on: April 20, 2017, 00:19:31 »
There's no reason why the levels can't change over time, just not in the middle. There's also no reason why someone's risk level (not hardship) shouldn't go up for a day when they fly a sortie into dangerous airspace. I don't think our pay system is able to handle all that manual inputs though.

Much like PLD, our benefits/compensation systems are a mess.

Try sitting in a small cockpit with no food, limited water, can't move for 10-12 hours at a time and tell if hardship (or living conditions) is different from being on the camp 24/7.  Compensating for those days you endure this is only appropriate since the airplane is where you live for a significant amount of time on those days.

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Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
« Reply #1414 on: April 20, 2017, 00:31:54 »
Try sitting in a small cockpit with no food, limited water, can't move for 10-12 hours at a time and tell if hardship (or living conditions) is different from being on the camp 24/7.

I'll take "things the recruiters don't tell you about fighter planes" for $400, Alex.   ^-^
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Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
« Reply #1415 on: April 20, 2017, 07:21:59 »
Try sitting in a small cockpit with no food, limited water, can't move for 10-12 hours at a time and tell if hardship (or living conditions) is different from being on the camp 24/7.  Compensating for those days you endure this is only appropriate since the airplane is where you live for a significant amount of time on those days.
Probably why you get aircrew pay, right? And a different pay scale for pilots over and above a general service officer?

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Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
« Reply #1416 on: April 20, 2017, 07:30:30 »
Probably why you get aircrew pay, right? And a different pay scale for pilots over and above a general service officer?

But that has sweet frig all to do with HA/RA and I do believe the higher pay scale is for retention.

Of note aircrew allowance, SDA, and LDA all start at the same amount but the SDA and LDA amounts increase by a higher amount at each incentive level.

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Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
« Reply #1417 on: April 20, 2017, 08:19:26 »
Probably why you get aircrew pay, right? And a different pay scale for pilots over and above a general service officer?

Nope.  We never do this on a regular  basis at home.  This is exceptional and due to being deployed on operation.

FWIW, we received increased HA/RA for days we were flying during MOBILE.

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Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
« Reply #1418 on: April 20, 2017, 08:43:26 »
Try sitting in a small cockpit with no food, limited water, can't move for 10-12 hours at a time and tell if hardship (or living conditions) is different from being on the camp 24/7.  Compensating for those days you endure this is only appropriate since the airplane is where you live for a significant amount of time on those days.

You did your job, same as anyone else who deploys.....

As for HA/RA, your being in a plane has nothing to do with the analysis since it's done by operation. Kuwait, particularly the OS Hub, has far lower actual risk than every other part of Op IMPACT (including Jordan and Lebanon before they moved to TF ME). The "camp inside a camp inside a camp" is basically just a smaller, more depressing, and less operational version of KAF

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Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
« Reply #1419 on: April 20, 2017, 09:01:05 »


But that has sweet frig all to do with HA/RA and I do believe the higher pay scale is for retention.

Of note aircrew allowance, SDA, and LDA all start at the same amount but the SDA and LDA amounts increase by a higher amount at each incentive level.

LDA stops when you start getting HA, although the points still accumulate. Willing to turn off aircrew pay to get hardship? I lose money going from my LDA to hardship 4.

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Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
« Reply #1420 on: April 20, 2017, 09:11:47 »
We got HA/RA and AIRCRA (they were designated flying positions) during operations.

DH: same could be said of the the infantryman out the wire in Afghanistan: they are only doing their job.  But while doing their job, they are exposed to conditions that warrant HA/RA.  The fact we fly to our AO on a daily basis is irrelevant.  In that AO, we are faced to increased risk and conditions that people back at the camp are not faced with.  It should be compensated.

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Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
« Reply #1421 on: April 20, 2017, 09:14:08 »
We got HA/RA and AIRCRA (they were designated flying positions) during operations.

DH: same could be said of the the infantryman out the wire in Afghanistan: they are only doing their job.  But while doing their job, they are exposed to conditions that warrant HA/RA.  The fact we fly to our AO on a daily basis is irrelevant.  In that AO, we are faced to increased risk and conditions that people back at the camp are not faced with.  It should be compensated.

Wait a second.  You got HA/RA, Foreign Service ? and Aircrew pay ?  Why does the Navy lose SDA and the Army LDA when they deploy ?
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Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
« Reply #1422 on: April 20, 2017, 09:48:54 »
Wait a second.  You got HA/RA, Foreign Service ? and Aircrew pay ?  Why does the Navy lose SDA and the Army LDA when they deploy ?

Because the army and the navy decide to use their S/LDA envelopes that way.  The air force decides to do it the other way.  Got look after the troops, right?
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Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
« Reply #1423 on: April 20, 2017, 09:54:18 »
We got HA/RA and AIRCRA (they were designated flying positions) during operations.

DH: same could be said of the the infantryman out the wire in Afghanistan: they are only doing their job.  But while doing their job, they are exposed to conditions that warrant HA/RA.  The fact we fly to our AO on a daily basis is irrelevant.  In that AO, we are faced to increased risk and conditions that people back at the camp are not faced with.  It should be compensated.

As has been stated, RA and HA are based on operation, not individual experience, so the infantryman in your scenario gets the exact same RA/HA as the clerk at the camp. That's not even getting into the comparison of how you define the risk to someone flying a plane in a light AD AO vice someone driving without weapons to Hebron in the west bank. 

So, no, you shouldn't be compensated above and beyond the fact that you get paid more to be a pilot.

Offline Halifax Tar

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Re: Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis
« Reply #1424 on: April 20, 2017, 10:23:20 »
Because the army and the navy decide to use their S/LDA envelopes that way.  The air force decides to do it the other way.  Got look after the troops, right?

You have to be kidding me.  :facepalm:
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