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Canada's New, Liberal, Foreign Policy

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Rocky Mountains said:
New foreign policy?  Not sure about that.  The bureaucracy at External Affairs was at war with the Conservative government.  It was a sad day when they removed capital punishment for treason and replaced it with lashes with a wet noodle.

http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/clinton-email-canada-foreign-affairs-1.3344920
Trying to get foreign politicians to change your politicians' minds?  NOT on, no matter how much you don't like the bosses. 

Treason, though?  The Criminal Code talks more about trying to kill the Queen, overthrow governments or assisting an enemy at war with Canada - not all disloyal f**ks are treasonous.
 
Rocky Mountains said:
New foreign policy?  Not sure about that.  The bureaucracy at External Affairs was at war with the Conservative government.  It was a sad day when they removed capital punishment for treason and replaced it with lashes with a wet noodle.

http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/clinton-email-canada-foreign-affairs-1.3344920


Neither issue ~ middle level civil service hatred of the Conservatives (hate is not too strong a word) and going to the Americans asking them to "lobby" our government ~ was a big secret in official Ottawa, but it wasn't talked about very much. The Conservatives and the senior ranks of the civil service were slightly embarrassed, and the middle ranks were dismayed to find that their superiors didn't support them.

    (My impression, as an outsider, was that, by and large, the senior ranks of the civil service (ADMs and DMs) were, generally, happy to see Prime Minister Harper and a (maybe slight) majority of his policies. The middle ranks,
      on the other hand, were most unhappy ~ and that includes all those scientists who complained about being "muzzled.")

Foreign Affairs used to matter, in the 1940s, '50s and '60s, but it no longer does. The policy centre in official Ottawa is the troika of PCO, Finance and TB ... Foreign Affairs, like Defence, Health and Transport, is just another line department that is more likely to screw things up than make a real, meaningful contribution. Foreign policy is made in the PMO/PCO and in the office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs ... not by officials in the department.
 
E.R. Campbell said:
Foreign Affairs used to matter, in the 1940s, '50s and '60s, but it no longer does. The policy centre in official Ottawa is the troika of PCO, Finance and TB ... Foreign Affairs, like Defence, Health and Transport, is just another line department that is more likely to screw things up than make a real, meaningful contribution. Foreign policy is made in the PMO/PCO and in the office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs ... not by officials in the department.

Alan Gotlieb wrote a piece in the Globe a week or so ago, calling for the restoration of the Foreign Affairs mandarins as senior diplomats (vice political appointments to Washington, London and Paris).  It was (to be charitable) a rather shallow, self-important piece of puffery.  I suspect Canada's friends would rather an ambassador who can call the PM to address an issue of mutual concern over a well-rounded career diplomat whose connections may reach the level of the DM.
 
E.R. Campbell said:
Neither issue ~ middle level civil service hatred of the Conservatives (hate is not too strong a word) and going to the Americans asking them to "lobby" our government ~ was a big secret in official Ottawa, but it wasn't talked about very much. The Conservatives and the senior ranks of the civil service were slightly embarrassed, and the middle ranks were dismayed to find that their superiors didn't support them.

    (My impression, as an outsider, was that, by and large, the senior ranks of the civil service (ADMs and DMs) were, generally, happy to see Prime Minister Harper and a (maybe slight) majority of his policies. The middle ranks,
      on the other hand, were most unhappy ~ and that includes all those scientists who complained about being "muzzled.")

Foreign Affairs used to matter, in the 1940s, '50s and '60s, but it no longer does. The policy centre in official Ottawa is the troika of PCO, Finance and TB ... Foreign Affairs, like Defence, Health and Transport, is just another line department that is more likely to screw things up than make a real, meaningful contribution. Foreign policy is made in the PMO/PCO and in the office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs ... not by officials in the department.

If you can't trust the water-bearer to carry water where and when you want it why on earth would you give them any water to carry or keep them on strength?
 
Ministers don't run the department, so they can only do so much. Proving absolute disloyalty may be difficult and an issue the Union will contest for sure. frankly if your not willing to obey the lawful directions of your elected government, then your in the wrong business.
 
So you are saying that Harper was right all along?  That his dominance of the House did not eliminate the Opposition?

Or - putting it another way:  Even paranoiacs have enemies.
 
What BGen (ret'd) Jim Cox wrote on the CDAI website ought ot be required reading in Ottawa for ministers and the commentariat. The key point he makes, and one that bears repeating, over and over, is that Canada needs coherent foreign and defence policies, not Minister Dion's abstract plans.
 
E.R. Campbell said:
What BGen (ret'd) Jim Cox wrote....
:goodpost:

From the summary paragraph:
Canadians will want to know if government is inclined to slide back into aimless soft power and naïve liberal internationalism, or whether they have a more realistic world view and notion of modern conflict management.
I suspect that the Liberals want 'a' (because it feels good), with any dabbling in 'b' (because it's necessary) being due more to Allies' pressure than to any understanding of modern international conflicts.  Time will tell.

Whatever the decision, it must be derived from a coherent hierarchy, topped by a clear policy, leading to a credible strategy with achievable objectives. In the end, it must all be sufficient to justify putting Canadians in harms way.
This, as highlighted by ERC, is the critical, currently absent, bit.  It's also the piece I feel will be the most disappointing if/when the government gets to it. Annunciating concrete policy, amongst its other purposes, facilitates holding the government accountable.  Avoiding that... awkwardness... suggests that amorphous foreign and defence policy "plans" may be the more likely way ahead.
 
Well said, JM, except that you may attribute a clarity of thought and purpose to them that I fear is far too optimistic. I may be cynical, but to my mind the overriding Liberal international affairs objective is to win another Nobel Peace Prize.
 
On the topic of Naive Liberal Internationalism, here is an excellent piece from renowned South African private military contractor, Eeben Barlow:

http://eebenbarlowsmilitaryandsecurityblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/africa-must-stop-demilitarising-its_2.html
AFRICA MUST STOP DEMILITARISING ITS MILITARIES

Having sat through numerous debates and discussions on ‘peacekeeping’, I have always been surprised and disappointed that this costly and failed approach to security and stability is, for some very (not so) strange reason, still being advocated and encouraged. 

The truth is that without sustainable peace, Africa will never see real development and prosperity. Economic development and stability is ensured by good governance, law and order, and the application of sound policies. But if the policies and approaches are wrong, no amount of strategy and tactics can provide peace and stability.

Ending a conflict or war can only be assured when the state has the political will and the military might—and will—to engage the enemy. This must result in the enemy or threat being decisively beaten, and begging and pleading for mercy to save it from complete annihilation. This requires a strong and capable deterrent force with strong military policies in place.

If a government cannot negotiate from a position of total strength, it is merely giving the adversary time to rebuild and rearm its forces and continue the conflict.  Besides, the terms of negotiation must be dictated by the government and not by the enemy or threat. Indeed, it must be an unconditional surrender or nothing at all. During negotiations, the enemy or threat must be subjected to intense intelligence scrutiny to ensure that the call to negotiate was not a deception measure aimed at reducing pressure on the crumbling threat forces.

A well-trained, well-equipped, well-led and disciplined armed force, correctly postured and able to rapidly project decisive force, is a significant deterrent to an armed adversary. So why have some African governments decided to demilitarise their armed forces and instead turn them into ‘peacekeepers’?

The mere thought of ‘peacekeeping’ when and where a conflict or war is raging is nothing short of idiotic and suicidal. But in order to remain politically correct, and in the good books of the UN and those governments driving the (failed) peacekeeping approach, this new form of ‘un-warfare’ has taken hold in some African governments whilst emasculating their armed forces.

Simultaneously, it has expanded the current and future market for ‘peacekeepers’ and other ‘partnership forces’ to enter fragile and troubled countries—the results of which, to date, have been catastrophic, disgraceful, and disastrous to say the least. The numerous scandals created by these forces have simply added to the already tarnished image of the ‘peacekeeping’ and ‘partnership’ approaches.

Besides, if peacekeeping was such a valuable tool in the arsenal for halting the spread of conflict and war, why aren’t these forces standing between the warring parties in Nigeria, Libya, Cameroon, Niger, Burundi, and so forth? And if they are there, such as in Mali, South Sudan, Somalia—why aren’t they keeping the peace?

Sadly, many African governments have allowed themselves to be cajoled and hoodwinked into training their armed forces for peacekeeping missions—a euphemism for demilitarising and emasculating the armed forces. Soldiers have now become ‘peacekeepers’ and ‘nation builders’ and time and money is spent on irrelevant ‘free’ training programmes supposedly aimed at keeping the peace and building nations—especially where there is no peace and governments have become fragile or failed. Soldiers have become quasi-policemen as opposed to fighting men who can and will fight to annihilate armed opposition or enemy forces.

The demilitarising of African armed forces has had serious knock-on effects such as a lack of intelligence gathering capacity—especially HUMINT, an inability to fight to decisively end conflicts and wars, a neglect of doctrine development and training, the neglect of essential combat equipment along with the procurement of unsuitable equipment, a watering-down of essential combat skills, the acceptance of bad advice, and so forth.

This, however, suits those powers who have encouraged a mission diversion to ‘peacekeeping’ as they are guaranteed that African governments and their armies will be required to call for foreign help when the wheels fall off. And fall off they will—and are.

Anyone who dares criticise the farce of ‘peacekeeping’ is shouted down and viewed as a warmonger. It is, after all, not politically correct to criticise a failed approach that gives violent and murderous threat forces—viewed by many in the West as ‘moderate terrorists’, ‘pro-democracy fighters’ and ‘freedom fighters’—the advantage. Also, ‘human rights’ have overridden common sense as national armies are expected to show tolerance and understanding to the very people trying to kill them, murder and terrorise the populace, destroy infrastructure, and collapse the government.

The ‘peacekeeping’ mantra has become a dangerous cancer that is eating away at the combat effectiveness of African armies—and it is subsequently endangering the populace, destroying societies, and eroding the stability of states.

For Africa to survive in an ever-increasing turbulent environment, be independent, and ensure the safety and security for its people, the concept of ‘peacekeeping’ needs to be given a very serious rethink. 

Perhaps the time has come for African governments to stop demilitarizing their armed forces and instead redefine their missions—away from peacekeeping and towards enemy and threat identification, deterrence, targeting, and annihilation.

After all, that is what the armed forces are supposed to do—isn’t it?

You could probably replace African with Canadian and this piece wouldn't need to be altered very much.

 
Old Sweat said:
.....the overriding Liberal international affairs objective is to win another Nobel Peace Prize.
Hey Obama got one just for showing up and not being that last guy, and Trudeau has much more awesome hair.  The Prize is likely just lost in the holiday postal rush.    :nod:
 
Journeyman said:
Hey Obama got one just for showing up and not being that last guy, and Trudeau has much more awesome hair.  The Prize is likely just lost in the holiday postal rush.    :nod:

peace.jpg
 
Humphrey Bogart said:
Sadly, many African governments have allowed themselves to be cajoled and hoodwinked into training their armed forces for peacekeeping missions—a euphemism for demilitarising and emasculating the armed forces

I haven't seen any cajoling or hoodwinking; African nations are becoming "peacekeepers" for the simple reason that it's a massive cash cow for the African dictators troop-contributing nations.

33cxf6s.png


There are the added benefits of having your potentially problematic fighting-aged males dealing with their testosterone in someone else's country. 

And for the UN, Africans patrolling Africans is a much better image than having those 'white, colonial oppressors' doing it....regardless of the chronic scandals, malfeasance, and incompetence.
 
Humphrey & JM:

There is an illuminating discussion in the comments attached to that article that Humphrey posted.

The author of the blog is going out of his way not to name names and keep to generalities.  It is a dark art, reading between the lines, but the discussion between Barlow and "Unknown" references some of the driving forces.

 
Journeyman said:
I haven't seen any cajoling or hoodwinking; African nations are becoming "peacekeepers" for the simple reason that it's a massive cash cow for the African dictators troop-contributing nations.

33cxf6s.png


There are the added benefits of having your potentially problematic fighting-aged males dealing with their testosterone in someone else's country. 

And for the UN, Africans patrolling Africans is a much better image than having those 'white, colonial oppressors' doing it....regardless of the chronic scandals, malfeasance, and incompetence.

The part you noted in yellow is exactly what I think he meant when he said "cajoled and hoodwinked"

I see peacekeeping and the money that comes with it as basically another form of bribery.  Of course Mr. Barlow and his company are also in direct competition with the UN for business from African governments so his viewpoint ins't completely altruistic. 

He is indirectly telling African governments their money would be better spent hiring him and his cohorts (actual Africans) to solve their problems rather than a bunch of unproven outsiders.  Given some of his successes, I think he has a pretty good business case.

Chris Pook said:
Humphrey & JM:

There is an illuminating discussion in the comments attached to that article that Humphrey posted.

The author of the blog is going out of his way not to name names and keep to generalities.  It is a dark art, reading between the lines, but the discussion between Barlow and "Unknown" references some of the driving forces.

Chris,

I'm glad you picked up on that  ;)

There is also an interesting little message he gave to a CBC reporter who requested an interview with him  ;D.

I'll say it now, I'm a big fan of Mr. Barlow.  I've been following his blog for a number of years and have read pretty much every post he has ever made.  I also own his first book "Against all odds" and have pre-ordered his upcoming book "Composite Warfare".  I'm particularly interested in his views on the profession of arms and the concept of warfare he calls relentless pursuit.



 
33cxf6s.png


The one thing I find curious about that graph, given the imprecision of the x-axis, is that the UN budget appears to have shot up circa 1992-1994 - or roughly the time that Jean Chretien decided to get Canada out of the Peace-Keeping business.

Can I infer that prior to 1992 Canada, amongst others, contributed standing forces to meet emergency situations when and as necessary?  And that after 1994 they started chucking dollars at the problem, effectively buying "indulgences" and leaving the locals to their own devices?

That UN Aid money would, in my humble opinion, be much better employed, in putting the capabilities back into the forces of the contributing nations.

I believe the UK is coming around to that position.

Foreign Aid money used to fund British military operations abroad
http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/379139/David-Cameron-keen-to-give-foreign-aid-to-war-zones

Foreign Aid money used to resettle refugees in Britain
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/refugee-crisis-uk-foreign-aid-budget-to-be-spent-housing-people-in-britain-george-osborne-says-10488561.html

Britain is using the 0.7% of GDP model which results in a budget of some 12 Bn UKP  vice a defence budget of 2.0% of GDP.

In Canada with a Defence budget of 1.0% of GDP a "Foreign Aid Budget" of 0.7% would supply a pool of funds from which military operations could be financed.

And if the government/military knew that those funds were available then projects like air transport, logistics ships, truck fleets, communications, IMPs, shelters - all of which benefit the ability to react immediately to international disasters - could be funded.  The fact that, in time of war, they could also be commandeered for combat purposes - is entirely immaterial and a happy coincidence.

 
Mr. Pook, I'm not sure "standing force" would be the best description.  Perhaps 'forces available to support IGO sabilization activities' would be more accurate.  Although I have in the past, pointed out data (UNPK itself) that shows a fundamental reduction in Canada's contributions to UN PK ops after PM Chretien assumed power (IIRC, dropping from #1 under Mulroney to, by memory, #32 when Chretien left), I will note that much of Canada's 'available PK forces' were otherwise engaged in UNSCR-supported, BUT, NATO-executed peace-making ops (IFOR, SFOR, etc...).  So, troops were assigned in numbers not far off the late 80s/very-Ealy-90s, just not firefly under the UN's 'operational' mandate.

Regards,
G2G
 
Good2Golf said:
Mr. Pook, I'm not sure "standing force" would be the best description.  Perhaps 'forces available to support IGO sabilization activities' would be more accurate.  Although I have in the past, pointed out data (UNPK itself) that shows a fundamental reduction in Canada's contributions to UN PK ops after PM Chretien assumed power (IIRC, dropping from #1 under Mulroney to, by memory, #32 when Chretien left), I will note that much of Canada's 'available PK forces' were otherwise engaged in UNSCR-supported, BUT, NATO-executed peace-making ops (IFOR, SFOR, etc...).  So, troops were assigned in numbers not far off the late 80s/very-Ealy-90s, just not firefly under the UN's 'operational' mandate.

Regards,
G2G

Would those "UNSCR-supported, NATO executed peace-making ops" have been funded under UN peace-keeping budget though? 

Another coincidental event of the era would have been the formation of the African Union in 1999 and the concomitant funding of the African peace-keeping efforts.
 
Chris Pook said:
Would those "UNSCR-supported, NATO executed peace-making ops" have been funded under UN peace-keeping budget though? 

Another coincidental event of the era would have been the formation of the African Union in 1999 and the concomitant funding of the African peace-keeping efforts.

Only if the op is a UN-op.  IFOR and SFOR, while supported mandate-wise by a UN Security Council Resolution, were not funded by the UN.

Some (primarily Western) nations will pass a significant portion of the UN's per-soldier payment to the nation(s), through to the soldiers.  The trend with other nations, however, is that the soldier gets very little additional stipend, and the majority of the money from the UN is retained by the particular nation's government.

Regards,
G2G
 
Good2Golf said:
....the soldier gets very little additional stipend, and the majority of the money from the UN is retained by the particular nation's government.
Kleptocracy is such an awkward term....but's it's how much of the 'third world' works.


Nigeria, as a light-hearted romp through the heart of darkness:

Percentage of Nigerians earning less than $1/day rose from 55% (2004) to 61% (2014), while millionaires have increased by 44% to 16,000 -- overwhelmingly government and military leaders.  Yet Boko Haram continues to run amok, while the UN says " :tsktsk: "


Globe & Mail, 17 June 2014.
 
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