Canadian Military/Defence procurement process (Mega Thread)

[Kirkhill]

If you're interested, Canada's Library of Parliament has prepared a "compare and contrast" paper (attached) on military procurement systems in Canada and elsewhere - also compares procurement agencies and proposed reforms here & elsewhere.

Enjoy!

To sum up the report - in the words of a great friend of mine from Regina:  "There is no hope!!!"

 

[TCBF]

- If this was old country back in '44, the administrative saboteurs would be hung by piano wire from meat hooks, and their families sent to the camps.

 

[The Bread Guy]

- If this was old country back in '44, the administrative saboteurs would be hung by piano wire from meat hooks, and their families sent to the camps.

Shame the Library of Parliament doesn't have you writing its executive summaries  ;D

 

[McG]

The University of Calgary has also done a recent comparison with US DoD procurement:  http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/sites/default/files/research/us-defence-kimball.pdf

 

[McG]

Some outside the box thinking here suggests procurement should maybe be about something other that spreading jobs:

Procurement is about procurement
Editorial
National Post
11 May 2015

We read in the Ottawa Citizen that long-delayed trucks for the Canadian Army are finally expected to enter service in 2017. Originally promised by the federal Conservatives in 2006, what was supposed to be a two-year acquisition process has instead become yet another in a long line of bungled military procurement projects.

The government now reportedly hopes to have a contract signed with a winning bidder by the summer. But don't hold your breath. Since it was originally announced nine years ago, the project has been cancelled twice. The first delay came in 2011, when the government reported, five years into the process, that it needed to further refine its tender. A year later, minutes before bids were supposed to be taken, the government pulled the plug again, asserting a need to "reassess this procurement to ensure that the right equipment is acquired for the army at the best value for Canada."

Five years of dithering, one year of refining, three years of reassessing, and still no actual decision has been made - just hopes of one to come soon. Meanwhile, the Army must somehow do without. Trucks may not have the cool factor of a shiny new jet or a deadly tank, but they are absolutely vital pieces of military equipment. Whether in war zones or disaster areas, at home or abroad, trucks haul the gear that allows our soldiers to get their jobs done. Bullets, beans, bandages, diesel - all of it is carried by trucks. Logistics is what keeps the modern military machine running, even in peacetime. More often than not, that means trucks.

Of course, the trucks might have been delivered long ago, had the government made procurement, rather than jobs for the boys, the priority. There's no worldwide shortage of trucks, after all. If the army needed trucks, the government could have bought them off the shelf from any one of a number of international suppliers. But that would have required putting the needs of the military ahead of the needs of the Canadian defence industry, and the legions of economic nationalists ready to take up their cause.

Several years ago, the Conservative government, in a rare fit of economic sense, contracted with the American automotive company Navistar to provide 1,300 urgently needed medium-duty transport vehicles - essentially, a conventional commercial truck, with some modifications. The contract blew up in the government's face when it was announced the company was laying off hundreds of workers at an Ontario factory. Peter MacKay, then the minister of national defence, was forced to defend sending Canadian money to an American company that was laying off Canadians. It would be Canadians who maintained the trucks, MacKay said. The tires on the trucks would be Canadian made. And they'd, uh, run on fuel pumped from Canadian stations. (Yes, he actually said that.) This problem, needless to say, predates this government. For decades, governments of both the Liberal and Conservative stripe have treated defence procurement not as a means of supplying our troops with the best equipment fastest at the lowest price, but as a giant corporate welfare machine gussied up with the odd artillery tube and a bit of camouflage. But, as on so many fronts, the Harper government has taken this one step further: what once was fairly standard-issue pork-barrelling - steering contracts to domestic manufacturers that could have been filled at a fraction of the price elsewhere - has now been elevated into deliberate policy, overpriced military hardware having been "identified" as a "key" economic "growth promoter."

Just how crazy this is can be seen in a recent report from the CBC's Terry Milewski, on Canada's troubled $40 billion "shipbuilding procurement strategy." In five years, it has yet to build a single ship, possibly because there was no one available to build any: as Milewski reports, the industry has been moribund for 30 years. "So, before you build the ships, you have to build a shipbuilding industry."

This is adding enormously to the cost. Milewski points out that Britain, which knows a thing or two about naval warfare, is building four new supply ships in South Korea for about $1.1 billion, less than half as much as Canada plans to spend building two, much smaller, supply ships in Vancouver. Denmark, likewise, will spend just $100 million on its new Arctic patrol ship, having sourced the hull from a Polish yard. That's one-seventh as much as Canada's new patrol ships are projected to cost, whenever they are eventually built. Meanwhile, the Navy is rusting out, but hey: look at all the jobs we're creating in competitive coastal ridings.

Enough. The military is a fighting force, not a public works project. If a foreign manufacturer is best able to supply its needs, a government that purports to have any commitment to the military - or the taxpayer - shouldn't hesitate to sign the contract.

 

[Halifax Tar]

Some outside the box thinking here suggests procurement should maybe be about something other that spreading jobs:

I feel the authors pain. 

 

[McG]

A thought: perhaps the defence budget, which some have suggested ought be an election issue, is not the only element of the department that should be under examination.  Perhaps the procurement process is also part of what need be addressed.

From helicopters to fighter jets, problems facing Canada’s defence procurement are systemic
John Ivison
National Post
28 May 2015

Fifty two years ago, Bob Dylan released Blowing in the Wind, Lester B. Pearson was elected 14th prime minister of Canada, JFK was shot and the Sea King maritime helicopters entered service.

For the past 25 years, we’ve been trying to replace them in what has been called “the most poorly executed military procurement ever undertaken – anywhere.”

But, hang out the bunting, the wait is over.

“In June, we expect delivery of the first block one C148 Cyclone Maritime helicopters… It will mark the beginning of the long-awaited retirement of the Sea Kings,” Diane Finley, the public works minister told the CANSEC industry conference in Ottawa Thursday.

Readers with prodigious memories will remember Brian Mulroney signed a contract to purchase 50 EH101 helicopters to replace the Sea Kings back when Progressive Conservatives still roamed the earth.

That contract was cancelled by Jean Chrétien’s government, at a cost of $478-million, and the long process to replace the Sea Kings with the Sikorsky Cyclones began.

The consequences of such delays, in a world where inflation runs at around 7% a year, were predictable.

As Sheila Fraser, the then-auditor general noted in a critical 2010 report, costs for the project nearly doubled to $5.7-billion in the period after it was finally given the green light in 2003.

The blame was placed squarely on National Defence staff, who “under-estimated and under-stated” the complexities of the project. In other words, the politicians were like mushrooms – kept in the dark and fed BS.

This brings us neatly to another project where the military’s enthusiasm for the shiniest toy in the store persuaded officials to “under-state” costs and complexities – the efforts to replace Canada’s fighter jets.

Finley and defence minister Jason Kenney were at CANSEC to promote the merits of the new Defence Procurement Strategy. Neither mentioned the words “fighter jets” nor “F35s.” It is the project that dare not speak its name.

What we do know is only in barest bones form, thanks to the new defence acquisition guide released this week by the government. It suggests that the contract for new fighter jets will be approved and awarded sometime between 2018 and 2020, with final delivery between 2026 and 2035 (the initial delivery schedule was 2017-22).

The military has bought itself an extra five years by announcing a plan to extend the life-span of the current CF-18 fighters.

But that’s one long delivery window.

There may be some upside to pushing back the replacement program. By 2025, it will be much clearer whether the F35 actually works – the U.S. will start flying the aircraft this year.

Canada might also save money on each F35 aircraft, if it is in full production by the time its order lands – the price is around $100-million per aircraft in 2016/18 but is projected to fall to unit price of a mere $85-million.

But those small blessings do not detract from the fact that the whole F35 episode was, in Tom Mulcair’s words, “a combination of arrogance and incompetence” that voters should bear in mind when they enter the polling booth in October.

Punting it down the road will simply store up problems for whichever shade of government is set to inherit the blame.

For one thing, the Conservatives maintain no decision has been taken on the contract. But by 2020, the options may well be limited. The Europeans have already warned that the Eurofighter Typhoon might be out of production if no new contracts come through, while Boeing’s Super Hornet may also have stopped production by then. This would likely see the F35 win by default.

Another major concern is the capital funding for the project, which has been static at $9-billion for 65 aircraft. As with the $33-billion National Shipbuilding strategy, escalating costs and delays are eating into budgets. “Inflation is going to push that to the point of unaffordability,” said David Perry, senior analyst at the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute. Throw in a 20% depreciation in the value of the Canadian dollar and you have a project that is inevitably going to need to be re-financed by billions, even if there is some relief on the price per unit.

There are specific political reasons why the fighter replacement project has been delayed. But the problems facing defence procurement are systemic.

According to Perry’s analysis, one quarter of the money allocated by Parliament in any given year for defence projects goes unspent.

He suggests that since 2007/8 exceptional delays have meant $7.2-billion was not spent as intended.

His belief is that the military, in attempting to live up to its mandate of dealing with a “full range of threats” on land, sea and air, prioritizes everything, with the result that it prioritizes nothing.

There are just too many projects competing for too little time at Treasury Board and in Cabinet, with the result that, though Parliament consents to Defence’s capital budget, approval for specific projects are not granted.

The new procurement strategy was designed with three objectives: to deliver the right equipment in a timely manner; streamline the process; and, leverage purchases to create jobs.

While the pork-barreling associated with “industrial benefits” is indeed working well, there are few signs the process is moving in a more timely fashion. The prospects of a project being hi-jacked by the military are much reduced, thanks to new developments, such as the third party review panel for major defence projects announced by Kenney at CANSEC Wednesday.

But their introduction has not streamlined the process – on the contrary.

Since no party appears keen to increase defence spending to NATO’s 2% of GDP target – this year’s $20-billion is just 0.89% of output – the failure to effectively spend capital budgets eats into operational capability. At some point, new kit needs to be funded, yet purchasing power is lost over time.

There is an emerging belief that both capital and operational budgets should be more tightly focused on fewer areas of operation.

As voiced by retired vice-admiral Ron Buck, this view holds the current strategy of being all things is “neither affordable nor viable in today’s fiscal reality.”

$20-billion might have paid for a gold-plated military back in 1963, when Dr. No, the first James Bond movie, hit the big screen. These days, you’re lucky if you get much change from a Walther PPK, 007’s weapon of choice.

http://news.nationalpost.com/full-comment/problems-facing-canadas-defence-procurement-are-systemic

 

[Edward Campbell]

This, from the government's info-machine, may be just pre-election window dressing or it may be a serious attempt to address systemic issues with requirements:

----------------------------------------------------------------------​

    http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=982839&_ga=1.104174400.171406700.1426899832

    Canada Launches Third-Party Oversight of Defence Procurement
    Defence Minister announces membership of the Independent Review Panel for Defence Acquisition

    June 1, 2015

    OTTAWA – Canadian defence procurement will now be subject to the rigour of a new independent, third-party challenge function with today’s announcement of the first Independent Review Panel for Defence Acquisition, a core component of
    the Government of Canada’s Defence Procurement Strategy.

    The Panel brings together the right combination of knowledge, experience and expertise to help validate the requirements for major military procurement projects and to provide independent, third-party advice to the Minister of National Defence.
    The establishment of this panel is an important initiative to help National Defence achieve greater clarity and certainty in the initial stages of the procurement process.

    On the recommendation of the Prime Minister, the Governor in Council (GIC) has appointed the following panel members:

          Mr. Larry Murray, CM, CMM, CD (also the chair designate)
          Mr. Martin Gagné
          Ms. Renée Jolicoeur
          Mr. Philippe Lagassé
          Mr. David N. Caddey

    Quick Facts

    The expert third-party panel will review and validate requirements for all projects valued over $100 million, and other select projects below this value. The Defence Procurement Strategy (DPS) aims to deliver the right equipment to the
    Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) in a timely manner, leverage these purchases to create jobs and growth, and streamline procurement processes. The strategy committed to the establishment of a third-party challenge function at DND.

    On July 24, 2014, Mr. Keith Coulter was appointed as a Special Advisor to provide advice on the implementation of this new function and the establishment of the Panel. He will serve as the initial chairperson until the end of his term
    in July 2015. Mr. Larry Murray will then become the chair.

    Defence procurement spending has significant potential to produce substantial spin-off benefits to Canada’s knowledge, innovation and export-based economy.

    Quotes

    “We’re taking a significant step forward in our Government’s commitment to develop and maintain a first-class, modern military that is well-equipped to take on the challenges of the 21st century. The Independent Review Panel for
    Defence Acquisition will help us deliver the right equipment in a timely manner to the men and women of the Canadian Armed Forces at the best value for Canadian taxpayers.”

          Jason Kenney, Minister of National Defence

    “The appointment of an independent, third-party panel of experts – who are able to provide advice on military requirements, and which includes industry representatives – is an important step forward in operationalizing the Defence
    Procurement Strategy and shows our combined commitment to improving the procurement system.”

          Christyn Cianfarani, Canadian Association of Defence and Security Industries (CADSI) President

    “The independent, third-party panel announced today, which includes several industry experts well-versed in the complex nature of federal procurements, is another strong step forward in the ongoing implementation of the
    Defence Procurement Strategy. The panel will have an important role to play in providing expert, independent advice to government on procurement projects and requirements, and the panel members announced today are well-qualified
    to meet this responsibility. We are very pleased that this panel has been struck and look forward to continuing to work together with government on strengthening our procurement process.”

          Jim Quick, Aerospace Industries Association of Canada (AIAC) President and CEO

-----------------------------------------------------------------------​

Bios of the panel members are here. (I know a couple of the members, I served under one of them) and I think I have met all of them.)

This sort of panel reflects the prime minister's belief in using tiger teams of independent experts (often public servants) to cut through the crap that is, often, too hard for politicians.

The mandate of the panel assumes that senior military officers (and equally senior bureaucrats in DND) are unable (professionally not competent) to define military operational requirements for the services in which they have spent a career. (See, also: General versus Economist from almost a decade ago when I noted that "There is a deep mistrust and lack of respect held by the bureaucratic centre (PCO, Finance, Treasury) about and towards DND – both military and civilian components.")

 

[MilEME09]

ER, I'm getting more convinced by the day that problems would be solved if we got you into political office. Moving on, This to me seems like just throwing a band aid at the problem but doesn't fix the fundamental flaws in the procurement system we have.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Several Western (and a couple of Eastern) democracies have tried to "fix" defence procurement but, it seems to me, that we must accept that the process is inherently political. (It's been that way, in our (British based) tradition since, at the very least, 1560 ot 70ish when Elizabeth I and her Lord Treasurer (William Cecil, Lord Burghley) took very direct control of the navy and its dockyards.)

It seems to me that the process can be both political and efficient.

Military requirements must be properly developed and presented. That means, first, that there must be a reference, a "baseline" capability statement ~ the (political) government's responsibility ~ against which deficiencies can be identified and requirements stated.

The government, the bureaucracy, must agree on the the requirements ~ and an independent "challenge" function is not a bad idea ~ and then, equally as importantly, agree on the price.

The "price" may have two components:

    1. The "fair market price" which must be agreed my bureaucrats and come from the defence budget; and

    2. The surcharges that politicians might want to "buy Canadian," etc ~ this should not be a charge against the defence budget.

The final decision on what to buy and how much to pay is 100% political. Admirals and generals get to say what they need (to meet the government's stated objectives) and want (to be flexible, etc) but they do not get to decide: cabinet does for a variety of reasons, some blatantly political and partisan.

One suggestion is to split PWGSC. "Common" use procurement should remain a core function of PWGSC but "special to service" items for DND and very high value projects should be managed by a reborn Department of Munitions and Supply (you can call it whatever you want) which would answer to a separate minister and deputy, disconnected from both DND and PWGSC. It is still "government procurement," with all the current implications, but a separate, powerful, big spending ministry might be more efficient and effective.

 

[SeaKingTacco]

If Larry Murray has been selected as chair, then this is not a window dressing exercise.

I have met the man and I respect him immensely. He is principled, courageous and very smart.

 

[Edward Campbell]

If Larry Murray has been selected as chair, then this is not a window dressing exercise.

I have met the man and I respect him immensely. He is principled, courageous and very smart.

 

[Kirkhill]

....

The "price" may have two components:

    1. The "fair market price" which must be agreed my bureaucrats and come from the defence budget; and

    2. The surcharges that politicians might want to "buy Canadian," etc ~ this should not be a charge against the defence budget.

....

I like.

 

[McG]

I am not convinced that “off-the-shelf” (OTS) is rarely the right procurement path for the CAF.  Sometimes, it is the path that allows us to afford more of something with little trade-off or the path to get good-enough quickly.  Other times, we are stuck investing extra money to make an OTS solution fit our uses (the project to modify the Leopard 2 into a viable plough & roller pusher is still ongoing).

Instead of blanket statements for or against OTS, the real need is for requirements staff who can completely define what the CAF needs and wants in its equipment (and to clearly distinguish between needs and wants).  Both requirement staff and procurement staff need to know what exists "on-the-shelf".

No such thing as a bargain in defence procurement
Jeffrey Collins
National Post
02 Jul 2015

Canadians need to be clear-eyed that if we want to have a modern, rightly equipped, capable Canadian Forces, our geostrategic position practically dictates that we pay more for equipment to meet our unique operational requirements.

This is why purchasing “off-the-shelf” (OTS) military equipment is so problematic. OTS refers to equipment that is already in production or in use. The expression implies that because equipment is in production and in use, it is operationally proven, theoretically cheaper to purchase and quicker to acquire than if it were still in development.

The problem is that OTS is rarely faster to acquire or cheaper to buy, as its advocates claim (the C-17 and C-130J transport aircraft are the exception that proves the rule). Our geography is partially to blame for this. Canada is a large country with a small population that happens to border its major ally, a world superpower.

Such unique geostrategic circumstances have left Canada with a relatively small Armed Forces (est. 68,000 regular force personnel). Consequently, the Canadian Forces are faced with having to depend on fewer platforms that have to be capable of operating over long distances, across uninhabited and inhospitable terrain and, in some cases, from the decks of ships hundreds of kilometres from shore. They also have to be able to inter-operate with the Americans, with whom we jointly defend the continent and fight alongside overseas.

However, unlike the United States with its large defence budget, which gives it the ability to purchase multiple versions of a platform in bulk to accomplish multiple tasks, Canada’s relatively small defence budget leaves this country relying on a single platform to do the same. The end result is cost increases and delays as (mostly) American manufacturers modify their existing designs to meet Canadian needs.

This problem was most apparent in the auditor general’s 2010 report into the CH-148 Cyclone and Ch-147F Chinook helicopter contracts. In both cases, the helicopters were initially seen by the government as OTS technology.

With the Cyclone, the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) was getting a “militarized” version of Sikorsky’s S-92 commercial helicopter to replace the five-decade-old Sea King.

The contract — valued at $7.6 billion, including $1.9 billion for the helicopters and $5.7 billion for in-service support — called for 28 helicopters with deliveries beginning in 2008. The problem was that the militarized S-92s had not even been developed yet. This led to years of delays as Sikorsky incorporated Canadian requirements into its commercial design. Only on June 19 were the first six Cyclones accepted into RCAF service. The remaining 22 are due sometime between now and 2021.

Likewise, once Boeing took into account Canada’s requirements, an entirely new variant of the Chinook was produced. Long considered a workhorse of militaries throughout the world, the Chinook is capable of lifting heavy artillery, armoured vehicles and up to 40 combat-equipped troops. At one time, eight older variants of the Chinook, the CH-147D, were in Canadian service before Ottawa sold the surviving seven to the Dutch in 1991 as a cost-saving measure.

Given the difficulties of transporting troops in Afghanistan, in 2008 Boeing and Ottawa signed a contract for 16 new Chinooks at a cost of $4.9 billion ($200 million more than originally estimated). Defence inflation and cost increases eventually saw the order reduced to 15 units. In 2013, five years after they were to begin entering service, the first of the new Chinook fleet arrived; the fleet is now fully operational at CFB Petawawa.

Each alteration in the original aircraft design meant that more testing and certification was required, adding costs and delays. In fact, in the case of the Chinook, Canadian modifications led to a 70 per cent increase in per-unit cost above the 2006 Boeing quote. The final contract even includes a provision that gives Ottawa the opportunity to recover some of the costs should another country purchase the same “Canadianized” Chinook.

Save for the establishment of a large-scale domestic defence industry, or a willingness literally to buy equipment as is — that is, without modifications and therefore operationally limited — Canadians better be prepared to invest the resources needed to have a capable Armed Forces. When it comes to complex weapons systems, attempting to save costs by procuring off-the-shelf technology will remain more of an aspiration than a reality.

Jeffrey Collins is a research associate at the Atlantic Institute for Market Studies (www.aims.ca). He is currently completing doctoral research in defence policy and procurement at Carleton University.

http://news.nationalpost.com/full-comment/jeffrey-collins-no-such-thing-as-a-bargain-in-defence-procurement

 

[Kirkhill]

Aye, but in the meantime you have a working fleet of usable tanks.  And work arounds on TTPs can also do wonders - along with a bit of welding rod and ingenuity.

And, with respect to the Chinooks, how many of the upgrades were mandated by the core requirement and how many were add-ons that were nice to have?

I know you were flying unCanadian CH-47Ds in Afghanistan.  I also know that the Americans developed not just the CH-47F utility version but also the MH-47G with long range tanks, in flight refuelling and a whole raft of Comms and surveillance gear.

Our CH-147F seems to fall somewhere between the  US F and G fleets.

I'm sure there is an SME on the subject lurking on these boards somewhere that could help the discussion along.

 

[MarkOttawa]

Some fundamental realities are noted at the CDA Institute Blog: The Forum:

The Third Party Challenge Function and Implementing the Defence Procurement Strategy

…the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy (NSPS) has yet to obtain the benefits the government likely expected it would get though a depoliticized process. Recent negative media attention is not what the government was hoping for when it launched the NSPS. The reality in Canada is that there will never be a good time to announce major capital investment projects for the military. Military equipment is expensive and there will always be a vocal constituency in Canada that will question both the need and value of spending taxpayer money on military equipment rather than education, health care, and other social programs.

Individuals involved in the procurement process should be concerned about two things with the third party challenge function. First, it is a function being added to an already existing challenge function, which is supposed to be conducted at the Defence Capability Board and Project Management Board, chaired by the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, as part of the capability development process. How much additional time this new challenge function will add remains to be seen. If additional time upfront leads to less friction later in the process, then that will be a good thing. It is what members of the challenge function want to achieve.

More pragmatically, the second issue relates to what happens after everyone, including the independent panel, agrees on the statement of requirement. What happens when industry proposals come back costing more money than initially planned for? If everyone has agreed that the requirements are valid, then that would imply the government needs to provide additional funding. Yet the government is fixated on initial rough order of magnitude estimates established before the detailed requirements are finalized – a recipe to be wrong every time. Cost estimating is difficult enough even when the requirements are known and agreed upon because the estimates are based on a set of assumptions around how a weapon system will be employed. Such assumptions are generally not agreed to by all the players involved and will inevitably change as the security environment evolves. Events in the Ukraine and the Crimean peninsula are an example of how unexpected events occur…

Dr. Craig Stone teaches resource management at the Canadian Forces College and was the Director of Academics until 30 June 2015. He is a defence economist who specializes in defence budgets, defence procurement and the defence industry [more here http://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/136/292-eng.html ].
https://www.cdainstitute.ca/en/blog/entry/the-third-party-challenge-function-and-implementing-the-defence-procurement-strategy

Mark
Ottawa

 

[Petard]

Kind of like reading any Dilbert cartoon on cost estimates

 

[Retired AF Guy]

As an aside, I have a copy Roy Rempel's, "The Chatter Box: An insider's Account of the Irrelevance of Parliament in the Making of Canadian Foreign and Defence Policy." A little dated (2002), but I was wondering if its still worth while reading.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Now there is a report from CBC News that, "Canada's CF18 bases won't have radar units replaced as $55M deal cancelled."

The report says that, "Another multimillion-dollar military purchase has gone off the rails ... The Harper government is terminating its contract with Thales Canada Ltd., which was to supply new radar units to support Canada's CF-18 fighter jet squadrons in Cold Lake, Alta., and Bagotville, Que ... The deal signed in November 2010 was initially worth $55 million for two tactical-control radar systems, with delivery to begin in 2013. Thales won the tender over one other bidder ... Defence Department documents show costs had risen to more than $78 million by 2013. And by November last year, the Public Works Department was deep in negotiations with Thales to resolve problems ... "In February 2015, Canada and Thales reached agreement in principle to terminate this contract by mutual consent," said Public Works spokeswoman Annie Trepanier."

 

[larry Strong]

It's looking like it's more a Thales issue than DND. This is the second time they have made the news this week.

The city of Edmonton has issues with them as well.

http://www.edmontonjournal.com/City+contractor+odds+over+safety+NAIT+line/11195050/story.html


Cheers
Larry