The Defence Budget [superthread]

[McG]

So a few years and the election of a new government have come to pass, but the recomendations from the first twenty pages of this thread are still generally relevant for the CAF (and Canada) to get the most from alloted defence dollars:
[quote author=MCG]
Here are a few ways that I see to immediately cut costs while protecting capability:

• Reduce/Stop the use of “tactical infrastructure” in field exercises
• Impose a moratorium on creating new headquarters
• Do not bring kitchen appliances to the field (with the exception of in field kitchens)
• Maximize the use of local training areas before traveling
• Teleconference to avoid TD for meetings and working groups
• Prohibit the deployment of pers into positions requiring WSE (We do not need to pay guys above their rank when there are other sitting at home already collecting pay at that level)  - exceptions only for in-theatre casualty replacement
• Deploy the next Op ATTENTION as 100% Reg F (again, Reg F pay is a sunk cost while a year of Class C pay for a Sr NCO of Jr Offr to train & deploy could instead added another training day for a Class A unit) (too late for this)
• No new “buttons & bows” initiatives
• Do not rebadged any more units for the sake of resurrecting old regiments
• Stop any unannounced plans to rebrand/rebadged/rename any branches, corps or organization for the purposes of historical sentimentalism
• Stop using rented civilian vehicles when military patter vehicles are available and serve the purpose
• Tie pay incentives for all ranks to performance and conduct.  If you are on a remedial measure (IC through to C&P) then the pay incentive is delayed by the duration of that remedial measure.  If you receive an unsatisfactory PER, then the pay incentive is delayed until you receive a satisfactory one.
• Rebalance officer enrollment paths to reduce the number of ROTP entrants while increasing the number of DEO entrants
• Stop the practice of sending new CF buttons & fasteners with all new DEU coats ordered on the Logistik Unicorps site (these buttons typically go straight to the garbage as most soldiers already have the buttons which are removable from the old coat, and most soldiers wear branch/regimental buttons) - if someone needs buttons they can spend more points to get them.
• Remove the recently introduced Army DEU parka from Logistik Unicorps issue - it duplicates a function already provided by the gabardine.
• Allow only one IPR move per service couple.  Instead, a reunification move will bring the first retiring member to live with the mbr continuing to serve, or if both retire at the same time then a reunification move will bring the mbr without F&E to the mbr with F&E.

And here are some options options for long-term savings (though most will cost money upfront prior to the savings being achieved later):

• Consolidate all of NDHQ and appropriate other NCR units on the Nortel Campus
• Move CFC from Toronto to Ottawa (Nortel Campus) or Kingston (RMC or the closing prison)
• Divest unnecessary niche vehicle micro-fleets (if required, increase size of standard fleets to maintain platform numbers)
• Smash LFDTS & CTC into a single layer of HQ, transfer capability development functions from LFDTS to COS Land Strat
• Re-close CMR and consolidate ROTP back into RMC
• Consolidate all of 1 CMBG in Edmonton (or Wainwright, Suffield or Shilo) to reduce future steady-state cost move requirements
• Procure more training simulators for fuel guzzling equipment (like aircraft, Engr Hy Eqpt and MBT) – include this in the initial acquisition of future systems
• Reevaluate rank levels in HQ establishments – the goal is to reduce where unnecessary inflation has occurred
• Replace military ID cards, PKI cards, building access cards, and military driver's licences with a single universal military identification (See US CAC for example)

In the current climate, we need to look at more than just where to cut.  We also need to look at where to get better mileage from the same resources.  Here are a few thoughts to that end:

• Replace SDA, LDA, dive pay and parachute allowance with enhanced casual allowances – the current systems reward posting messages as opposed to rewarding/compensating for the behaviour that we want: going to sea, going to the field, diving, and jumping out of aircraft.
• Reduce the number of PRes unit HQs in the Army.  Individual sub-units can retain unique regimental identities, but they will be grouped under a fewer stronger battalion HQs.
• Revisit the requirement for Reg F bands.  There are 71 musicians from Sgt to CWO on Army Ref F establishments alone.  That is a lot of PYs that could be put to better purpose (especially when we have been cutting from operational units to put PYs in new capabilities)

[/quote][quote author=dapaterson]
A few more contentious suggestions:

* Top to bottom compensation and benefits review to eliminate duplication and overlap
* Revisit posting policy to reduce annual move requirement (excluding off-BTL)
* Revisit IPR move policy to eliminate same-location moves (eg a paid move from Orleans to Kanata on release)
* Replace CANEX with private suppliers (who will pay market rents for CF facilities)
  * Retain small deployed NPF expertise to surge for deployments if required (hint: this does not include a Tim Hortons trailer)
* Return to annual TOS boards, particularly at ranks of LCol and above and MWO and above, to determine whether continued service meets a military requirement
* Enforce limits on GOFOs as ordered in the 1997 MND report (roughly a 1/3 reduction)
* Return to performance pay for GOFO and Capt(N)/Cols
  * Make PMAs and performance info per above public
* Make PMAs and performance information for all Public Servants public
* Restructure establishment to differentiate between Lt and Capt
* Return to competitive promotion to Capt
* Revisit Degreed Officer Corps decision
  * Permit short engagements with no promotion beyond Capt without a degree
* Eliminate full-time second language training
  * Individuals may elect to pursue SLT on their own time; a decision not to get a language profile will limit future promotion possibilities

For IM/IT

* Migrate from MS Office to Open Office to reduce IM/IT licensing costs
* Migrate from Outlook to open-source web-based DWAN email to reduce IM/IT licensing costs
* Dissolve ADM(IM), putting IM/IT support into CANOSCOM, IM/IT procurement into ADM(Mat), and comms and ISTAR systems under CJOC[/quote]

 

[McG]

Matt Gurney asks the question on all our minds: What does a "leaner" military mean?

Depending on how this plays out, it could foreshadow either good or bad for the military.  I hope to see that "leaner" is the reduction of bloat that former PM Harper directed from the former CDS but never saw delivered.

Matt Gurney: What does a ‘leaner’ military mean, exactly?
The National Post
07 Dec 2015

It’s just 36 words, out of a speech that totalled, as written, almost 1,700. But they were the ones that jumped out at me in the new Liberal government’s Speech from the Throne. The words were, “To keep Canadians safe and be ready to respond when needed, the government will launch an open and transparent process to review existing defence capabilities, and will invest in building a leaner, more agile, better-equipped military.”

Fair enough. But what, pray tell, does “leaner” mean?

Leaner could, one supposes, be good news. Even under the last government, the Armed Forces were looking at ways of getting more bang from the buck. In 2011, one of the Army’s most prominent and respected Afghan War veterans, a general no less, undertook a major report into streamlining the our top-heavy military, in shaking personnel and resources out of desk jobs and functions that could perhaps be better handled by non-military personnel. The report ran into bureaucratic resistance from the military — no kidding — and didn’t really go anywhere. It’s author was Lt. Gen. Andrew Leslie. If that name sounds familiar, it may be because of his wartime military service … or it may be because Prime Minister Trudeau just made him the Liberal House Whip. If the Liberals intend reform the military along Leslie’s proposed lines, that could be genuinely good news.

But there’s every chance it won’t mean that at all. And that leaner will simply mean smaller and less capable … and therefore cheaper. For a government that was just elected with a slate of costly promises and an already softening economy, that has to be appealing.

The problem, of course is that there’s only so small a military can be before it is no longer really effective. Since the Second World War, Canada has generally tried to retain the ability to project and sustain meaningful military power abroad. Good equipment and good training is a huge part of that. But you just can’t get it done without old-fashioned mass. Quality cannot totally replace for quantity.

One can quibble over where precisely the balance should be struck. In the context of North American military history, we’ve generally leaned more toward quality, as it’s easier and usually cheaper to train and equip someone well than it is to send a greater number of less well trained and equipped troops halfway around the world, and then keep them there.

There’s no magical “right” number for how many planes, ships and troops you want to be able to sustain abroad. But whatever your number is — we’ll unimaginatively call it X — you need roughly three times X. For every soldier and ship we want to be able to commit to military operations on a sustainable basis, you need one more ready to take over and one more that just finished and is resting up. When Canada sent 3,000 troops to Kandahar, that really meant about 10,000 were needed, because 3,000 would always be getting ready to deploy and 3,000 had just come back and needed time off (the number is larger even than that, since there were troops here at home involved in the war effort in a support role, but the 3X rule is approximate and works well enough here for our purposes). Likewise, if Canada decides to commit a ship to a NATO or UN operation on an indefinite basis, that’s really a three-ship commitment — one deployed, one just returned, one getting ready to leave.

Right now, we don’t have the mass to sustain those kinds of operations, even modestly. As I’ve noted in prior columns and editorials here, when you factor in how many of our CF-18 jets are down for long-term overhaul, short-term repairs or simply not currently assigned to an operational unit, we’ve got less than three dozen planes, total, we can use on any given day. The Navy is actually in even worse shape. We have precisely one (1) destroyer, and she’s so old she’s probably basically done her career. We have four submarines, but they’re just finally coming online now, so we can maybe deploy one abroad at a time. We have 12 frigates, and that’s good, but half of them are in the middle of a major mid-life overhaul and refit. We no longer have any supply ships to sustain them on their missions, anyway, and the Liberals recently deferred a key decision on a proposal to replace them with converted civilian vessels, on an interim basis, until replacements arrive sometime next decade. Canada has been sending small Kingston-class coastal patrol ships far overseas to participate in international missions and exercises in place of larger frigates and destroyers. The Kingston-class ships aren’t cut out for those missions, but we’re out of frigates and destroyers, which form the backbone of a modern fleet. So out go the Kingstons.

The long and short of it is this: a “leaner” military may be a good thing, but overall, it’s already too small. The Army should have more brigade groups, but so long as they’re kept fully staffed and properly trained and equipped, we can probably get by with three for now. But the Navy and the Air Force must absolutely be larger than they are now if they’re going to be worth keeping at all. And there’s no sign that any political party with a decent shot at forming government next election — the Liberals, Tories and, one supposes, still the NDP — gets that.

Up until recent years, our Navy had 15 heavy warships — 12 frigates and 3 destroyers. In theory, the government was planning to replace those ships on a one-to-one basis, with 15 new, Canadian-built vessels. Delays and cost overruns now threaten to force cuts to that total, and that will be bad, since 15 ships is really about the right number for either the Atlantic or Pacific Coasts, not both. The former government also planned on replacing our current fleet of 65 active CF-18s (which actually mean having the three dozens operational planes I referenced above) with the same number of F-35s — 65 jets. But that’s not enough. Whatever fighter we get next needs to be purchased in sufficient quantity to not just replace our threadbare, too-tiny squadrons, but to actually add some bulk back to the Air Force.

It probably won’t happen. Canadian military history is replete with examples of replacing weapons with a smaller number of new ones, and touting the sophistication of the new weapon as enough to make up the gap. But even advanced new military gear needs repairs, downtime and will sometimes simply break down. In an actual war, God forbid, you’ve got to count on the bad guys destroying some of your stuff, too. That’s why you need sheer quantity sometimes, too. So I hope “leaner” means more efficient, not smaller. But I have a bad feeling about what’s to come.

National Post
mgurney@nationalpost.com
Twitter.com/MattGurney

http://news.nationalpost.com/full-comment/matt-gurney-what-does-a-leaner-military-mean-exactly

 

[Scoobie Newbie]

Like anything, the path of least resistance which I believe to mean HQ will stay intact.

 

[jmt18325]

He could at least check his facts.  Project resolve is a go.

 

[RDBZ]

I wouldn't go as far as the average Australian thinking that way.  The various political parties, yes - hence why missions like OP OKRA in Iraq/Syria are supported by the major parties without much infighting - but I'd think that aside from ANZAC Day and Remembrance Day (which is much more subdued in Australia than elsewhere), most Australians would feel the same way about Defence as we do.

The politicians in Australia do know that it needs a fairly robust military as it is the big Western power in that side of the world with some powerful neighbours, and that the US may not arrive in time to help out.

The dark days 1942-43 - Japanese air raids across northern Australia, the battle of the Coral Sea being fought off the coast from Townsville and Cairns, and Japanese submarines in Sydney harbour are all etched into the Australian psyche.  The stance of the major parties just reflects that.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

He could at least check his facts.  Project resolve is a go.

the timing was tight on that, likely this went to print as they changed their minds again.

I have to wonder if the only way to develop a new military structure is to have a group of senior people from your allied militaries, take a good look and make the recommendations as they will not have a vested interest in the internal politics.

 

[McG]

I have to wonder if the only way to develop a new military structure is to have a group of senior people from your allied militaries, take a good look and make the recommendations as they will not have a vested interest in the internal politics.

The danger, as I saw with development of the ANA, is that the allies just attempt to duplicate their system in another country without consideration for how that other country has different requirements.

 

[jollyjacktar]

How true, they'll never be up to western standards on the whole.  Especially the mall cops (ANP).  No, wait, real mall cops are more professional (better find another nick name for the ANP).

 

[The Bread Guy]

The danger, as I saw with development of the ANA, is that the allies just attempt to duplicate their system in another country without consideration for how that other country has different requirements.

And, going further (and maybe a bit  :Tin-Foil-Hat: of me), maybe even try to "recommend" things that may be better for them as "allies" than for the CF as a whole.

 

[Old Sweat]

This oped piece from the National Post is reproduced under the Fair Dealing Provision of the Copyright Act.

Hugh Segal: If ‘Canada’s back,’ we’ll need a military

Hugh Segal, National Post | January 5, 2016 | Last Updated: Jan 6 8:25 AM ET

Whatever the trajectory, priorities or intensity of our new government’s foreign policy, however the election of Oct. 19 is interpreted as a mandate for foreign policy change, no meaningful Canadian foreign policy can exist without a competent, well-resourced and multi-skilled armed forces. This is not about an obscure dialectic between those who prefer peacekeeping versus those who support combat capacity. Both preferences require a strong and capable armed forces.


Even supporting the important “responsibility to protect” principle embraced by a UN task force with Lloyd Axworthy as a leading member, now a formal UN doctrine, requires the “capacity to deploy.” In fact, supporting that doctrine or more engagement in peacekeeping also requires more deployable capacity. As does a commitment to more “on the ground training” in support of Peshmerga and other land forces arrayed against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.

To the new government’s credit, it has a rooted, practical and highly skilled brain trust in place to serve both the Prime Minister and the national interest. There’s the new defence minister, who has outstanding battle theatre command credentials from several tours of duty in Afghanistan and as a commander of a reserve regiment. The Chief of Defence Staff has been in serious and complex operational command roles globally. The Chief Government Whip is a retired general staff officer who served in the field. The senior National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister is a former head of CSIS and deputy defence minister. Likewise, the Foreign Affairs minister has the legitimacy of long parliamentary service and the analytical mindset of a distinguished academic before entering public life. Like any compelling mix of outstanding assets, they prove nothing by their mere existence. How they combine to shape policy and priorities with the Prime Minister and cabinet is what will determine their success and impact. Still, with such qualified individuals in government, there is reason for optimism.

When it comes to establishing and preserving a strong national defence, the lawful protection of national security and the core freedoms of our democracy, there is an enemy in Ottawa. It is not to be found in the media or opposition benches. Every finance department, under any party or minister, has within it those who believe that defence expenditures are unnecessary or excessive. And they have allies on the Treasury Board and in other government departments. They are driven by two policy models which, on occasion, have had support from the highest levels of government: that as the Americans would defend Canada in the event of any serious threat, our own defence expenditures are unnecessary or excessive and are better put toward other spending priorities (say infrastructure); and that, like Japan, we can use foreign aid, trade and investment to obviate any military obligations or ensuing missions worldwide. The massive cuts to our defence budget and capacity in the 1990s were driven not only by the fiscal crunch Canada faced, but by support, from the-then prime minister on down, for these “What me, worry?” theories of defence and sovereignty.

A G8 country with no deployable defence capacity for humanitarian, peacekeeping or, when there is no other choice, combat in support of our allies or national interest, should simply not be taken seriously — and won’t be, by many, including some of our friends. This is not a great premise for a “Canada is Back” foreign policy thematic.

The new government’s commitment to the rebuild, hopefully at a more rapid rate, of the Royal Canadian Navy, and the new Defence Minister’s refusal to rule out any aircraft from the review of RCAF procurement needs, are very constructive beacons of both hope and sanity. Between now and the March budget it is vital that it be clear that “lean” military capacity must be about focus, instrumental reform, new technologies and a re-calibration in favour of front-line intelligence, deployable combat and reserve capacity, not a smaller, less capable force. Reduced back office and bureaucracy and more deployable capabilities is the right balance. Cuts to diminish deficits is not.

Budget 2016 would be a superb opportunity for a budget paper on how we can begin in 2017, Canada’s 150th anniversary of Confederation, to build a total force of 100,000 regular force members and a reserve of 50,000 members. Whether for aid to the civil power in face of natural disasters, humanitarian or peacekeeping deployments and maintaining our air, sea and land force obligations to our allies, not to mention our own defence and air/sea rescue needs across three of the longest coasts in the world and a land base larger than Europe,‎ anything less is putting our national interest at risk. We can do better and, as has been suggested, “better” is always possible in Canada.

National Post

Hugh Segal, Master of Massey College, is a senior fellow of the Munk School of Global Affairs in Toronto and the Institute of Global Affairs in Calgary. He is a former chair of the Senate Committees of Foreign Affairs and of Anti-Terrorism.

 

[McG]

The UK is not happy with our investments in defence, and the US is commenting on "free riders."  I don't hold too much hope that either fact will see improved defence spending in Canada.

NATO allies miffed over Canada’s failure to meet defence spending commitment
John Ivison
The National Post
21 Jan 2016

The British may form the world’s most orderly line-ups but they tend to lose patience when people don’t live up to their commitments.

At the conclusion of the NATO summit in Wales two years ago, all countries signed a declaration reaffirming collective defence, after Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, and agreeing to increase defence spending to two per cent of gross domestic product within a decade.

With another summit due in Warsaw this summer, the Brits indicated this week they are a little bit cross, if not slightly miffed, no visible progress is being made by several countries, including Canada.

There was no official comment but sources said London sent the diplomatic message through embassies and high commissions this week. They were at pains to point out that Canada was not the only recipient of the rebuke.

But it came in the same week that the Trudeau government was excluded from a U.S.-led meeting of defence ministers from countries spearheading the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. U.S. Defence Secretary Ashley Carter warned allies that there was no room for “free-riders” in the coalition.

The pressure is piling on the government’s defence agenda from all sides. One particularly damning commentary doing the rounds points out that, according to estimated expenditures for 2015, only four NATO members are expected to spend less as a percentage of GDP than Canada  and one of them is Luxembourg. The author of that piece was Roland Paris, Justin Trudeau’s new foreign policy adviser.

The Liberals are not responsible for the Harper government’s record on defence spending, but talk of a “leaner, more agile” military does not suggest a sharp uptick in expenditure.

The reason for the furrowed brows in London, and in Washington, is easily explained by a glance at military spending by GDP, still the benchmark measure used by NATO.

Only five nations – the U.S., Britain, Greece, Estonia and Poland – will meet the two per cent target this year. Canada’s defence expenditure is now less than half that, having fallen from about two per cent under Brian Mulroney in 1988. The Americans account for three quarters of the alliance’s spending.

Budget 2015 earmarked another $11.8 billion for defence over 10 years, but that amount doesn’t start flowing until next year and will barely keep spending increases above inflation.

Canada, whose armed forces are about the same size as those of NATO ally Romania, also falls short on another commitment made in Wales — one fifth of defence spending would be devoted to equipment. It currently spends about 16 per cent of its defence budget on equipment, research and development.

In the past, Canadian governments have argued allies should look at the quality of their contribution, not the quantity. Further, they have pointed out that Canada always answers the call.

But that argument carries little water in light of the decision to pull the CF-18 fighters from Iraq.

The Americans said Thursday they will convene a meeting of defence ministers from 27 countries next month to discuss how each coalition member can contribute more to defeating ISIL.

“Every nation must come prepared to further contributions to the fight,” said Carter.

Even in the relatively honeyed words of international diplomacy, it is apparent that our principal allies believe we have short arms and long pockets; that if we had to choose between our money and our lives, we would have to think it over.

As a nation, we signed on to an agreement that pledged to strengthen the partnerships on which the foundations of our prosperity and way of life are built.

We said we would provide the resources, capabilities and political will to meet any challenge; that we would stand ready to act together to defend freedom and our shared values.

Apparently, the Harper government signed the summit declaration, with no intention of even trying to live up to it. For once, the Liberals are in full agreement.

But we live in a dangerous world and the alliance is the bedrock of this country’s security.

Canada can’t be back unless it plays a fuller part in NATO.

http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/canadian-politics/john-ivison-nato-allies-miffed-over-canadas-failure-to-meet-defence-spending-commitment

 

[Good2Golf]

Not sure there is anyone willing to take on a wager that Canada would ever one day spend $40B (current year dollars) annually on Defence.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Just look at the figure for inflation in naval systems I quote above, Underway. The RAND Corporation pins it at 11% a year.

That means that the price of system (which includes a whole ship) doubles every seven years. Which also means it quadruples in 14 years. Fourteen years is not an unusual number of years for a naval construction project to go from start of the development phase to completion of the first ship in class.

And I agree: It's crazy.

It has been this way since circa 1960, when we, finally, had exhausted all the "free" technology gains from World War II and Korea, and now we had to pay for the (largely American) R&D that was needed to develop e.g. solid-state microelectronics and advanced jet fighters and precision guidance systems and space based things and, and, and ... and pay for them we did, in some part because (mostly American) companies hid the gods alone know what and how many R&D failures in military projects that actually got sold.

Since the 1950s the "cost," to the defence industry, of brain-power has also gone up because the market place for "brains" has grown. Engineers are no longer available in abundance because the salaries are so high ~ now business degrees are equally or more popular (and require a lot less math, too!).

It's a point I have made over and over here on Army.ca. Senior officials are well aware of the problem but no one in the political stream (CPC or LPC) is willing to give the defence budget "credit" for the real rates of inflation for aerospace and defence ~ assuming someone actually believes the reports that are out there.

 

[Journeyman]

One particularly damning commentary [comes from] Roland Paris, Justin Trudeau’s new foreign policy adviser.

http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/canadian-politics/john-ivison-nato-allies-miffed-over-canadas-failure-to-meet-defence-spending-commitment

Roland Paris is generally considered to be one of the "peacekeeping guys" at the University of Ottawa. 

One of his more interesting works is At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict.  In it, he seems to understand that forcing democracy onto countries has had a pretty abysmal track record.  The major flaw seems to be a gap between war-fighting and academic advisors showing up to save the day -- that 'suddenly, peace magically happens' gap.  I'm not sure if "Trudeau’s new foreign policy adviser" fully understands what is required to pull that rabbit out of the hat.

 

[Old Sweat]

Roland Paris is generally considered to be one of the "peacekeeping guys" at the University of Ottawa. 

One of his more interesting works is At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict.  In it, he seems to understand that forcing democracy onto countries has had a pretty abysmal track record.  The major flaw seems to be a gap between war-fighting and academic advisors showing up to save the day -- that 'suddenly, peace magically happens' gap.  I'm not sure if "Trudeau’s new foreign policy adviser" fully understands what is required to pull that rabbit out of the hat.

I haven't read the book or any of the rest of his work, but it seems to me unless the winner(s) - occupying power(s) in other words - are willing to devote the time and treasure to slowly build the structure they want nothing will change. That implies an invasion by a powerful external force that may support one side or the other after a long period of nation building.

As a side issue most popular revolutions fall prey to an extreme faction after the "nice guys" are subverted perhaps because they are not hard and ruthless enough to cement their power. The question is how does an outside force influence the winners to set up a "democratic" structure when the winners are looking to take their turn running a kleptocracy?

And as an example of apparent success can go wrong, remember how quickly the communist political system collapsed in the Warsaw Pact states once the Soviet Union imploded.

 

[dapaterson]

Roland Paris is generally considered to be one of the "peacekeeping guys" at the University of Ottawa. 

One of his more interesting works is At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict.  In it, he seems to understand that forcing democracy onto countries has had a pretty abysmal track record.  The major flaw seems to be a gap between war-fighting and academic advisors showing up to save the day -- that 'suddenly, peace magically happens' gap.  I'm not sure if "Trudeau’s new foreign policy adviser" fully understands what is required to pull that rabbit out of the hat.

Seems as if we need... a comprehensive approach?

Or maybe send in the academics before peace is established - perhpas being in a conflict zone would hone some of their models...

 

[Happy Guy]

Ref: http://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/military-shrinks-to-lowest-level-in-years-and-could-shrink-further

The Canadian Armed Forces have been bleeding personnel at an increasing rate, as attrition and recruiting problems push the number of men and women in uniform down to levels not seen in years.

The numbers are likely a sign of things to come as the Liberal government moves on its promise to create a “leaner, more agile” force.

The previous Conservative government expanded the military after coming to power a decade ago, adding thousands of men and women to the ranks. After the 2009 financial crisis, the government promised to keep 68,000 full-time military members and 27,000 reservists in uniform despite billions in spending cuts.

But a Defence Department report tabled in the House of Commons this week shows a shortage of nearly 1,900 regular force members and 5,300 part-time reservists as of March 2015, thanks to higher than expected attrition and, for reservists, “challenges in meeting recruiting quotas.”

That compares with a shortage of 900 full-time military personnel and 4,500 reservists the previous year. The military has said it needs more than 4,000 new recruits each year just to offset attrition and keep 68,000 full-time troops in uniform.

The report doesn’t explain the difficulties in recruiting and retaining personnel, but the shortfall created problems, at least in the short term. Of 95 occupations in the regular forces, 24 were “stressed” – that is, understaffed – though the report said new recruits in the system would “gradually” make up the difference.

The shortage of reservists was especially acute as the part-time force has been called upon numerous times to help with missions such as Afghanistan, or in crises at home such as floods and forest fires. The shortage of army and navy reservists was cited as a particular concern.

Defence analyst David Perry of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute said the numbers in the report put the Canadian Armed Forces at their smallest size since at least 2009. But rather than rushing to the rescue, the Liberal government could end up shrinking the military even more.

The Liberal government has ruled out any significant budget increases for defence. Instead, it has promised a comprehensive defence review to create the first defence white paper in more than 20 years, with a plan to making the military “leaner, more agile.”

Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan confirmed Tuesday that one of the things the government will be looking at is the size of the force.

“It’s going to look not just look at the procurement, it’s going to look at our number of forces, how it connects into our global footprint,” he told reporters outside the House of Commons. “We want to make sure that the Defence Review is done in a manner that sets us ­ Canada up for the next 10, 20 years and how we fit as part of the world.”

The Conservatives were sensitive about reducing the size of the military after criticizing previous Liberal governments for doing exactly that in the 1990s.

But the Tories’ refusal to reduce the number of personnel in uniform at the same time it was cutting billions of dollars in defence spending put a disproportionate amount of budgetary pressure on other parts of the military, including maintenance and procurement.

One former defence chief, retired general Rick Hillier, warned in 2013 that reducing the size of the military was the only way to ensure the force remained strong and stable. He said the number of full-time members should be reduced from 68,000 to 50,000.

Most analysts agree that the mandated staffing levels and planned procurement projects are unsustainable under the current defence budget.

“Something has to give,” said Perry, who has estimated that cutting the size of the force by 1,000 regular-force members would save about $105 million a year.

National Defence also reported that it was short about 2,200 civilian employees, against an authorized strength of more than 24,000. The Conservative government did not have a target for the number of civilian workers, though it did put a priority on employing those in uniform.

lberthiaume@postmedia.com

Twitter.com/leeberthiaume

The Canadian Armed Forces, by the Numbers

68,000: Mandated strength of the regular force

66,130: Actual strength of the regular force on March 31, 2015

1,870: Difference between mandated and actual strength

27,000: Mandated strength of the reserve force

21,707: Actual strength of the reserve force on March 31, 2015

5,293: Difference between mandated and actual strength

— Source: Department of National Defence
______________________________________________________________________________________

As it correctly states in this article something has to give.  Given the rapidly declining source of revenue coming into the federal coffers, DND, as it always is, will most likely face some sort of budget cut in the next federal budget.  Like father like son?

 

[Fishbone Jones]

National Defence also reported that it was short about 2,200 civilian employees, against an authorized strength of more than 24,000. The Conservative government did not have a target for the number of civilian workers, though it did put a priority on employing those in uniform.

Why can't we take these 2,200 civie positions and give them to uniforms? Simplistic, I know, but is there any insurmountable reason why not?

 

[dapaterson]

Because military are more expensive than civilian pers, so why waste uniformed person on functions that do not need it?

 

[GR66]

Why can't we take these 2,200 civie positions and give them to uniforms? Simplistic, I know, but is there any insurmountable reason why not?

And while you're at it maybe ask why you need 1 civilian employee to support less than 3 reg force members...many of which themselves are "tails" supporting a very tiny number of "teeth".