Why Not Canadian Amphib/Marine Capability? (merged)

[daftandbarmy]

Thinking back a long way, the RN had impressed a bunch of cargo ships and converted them with makeshift landing pads during the Falklands war (remember the Atlantic Conveyor?) which might do in an emergency, but we would then have to be prepared to create cargo containers which can house and deploy various weapons, sensors and control stations that can be raipdly loaded onto the ship in question and made operational with a sort of turn key operation.

And the Atlantic Conveyor was sunk by an Exocet before it even reached the AO, along with all the Chinooks, nicely demostrating the problems with using STUFT shipping (which has no self-defence weaponry) in a shootin' war.

 

[Kirkhill]

...but we would then have to be prepared to create cargo containers which can house and deploy various weapons, sensors and control stations that can be raipdly loaded onto the ship in question and made operational with a sort of turn key operation.

But that is effectively the key to Danish naval procurement.  Their weapons systems are built in containers that can be slotted into spaces on their ships.  This allows three things: them to fit the weapons they need for the mission; to purchase the weapons they need as, and when they need them and can afford them; and to upgrade weapons easily.

The key issue though is one of space and I note that that is one of the development trends with all of the following vessels: Absalon, Iver Huitfeldt, Knud Rasmussen, Type 45 Daring, Future Surface Combatant (RN), the Littoral Combat Ship and the KVS Svalbard.  All of them have been designed with large, unallocated/flexible space on board for Helicopters, UAVs, boats and Embarked Military Forces.

If the Single Class Surface Combatant were to incorporate a "Mission Bay" with the ability to carry and launch small boats of the 10 to 20 tonne range and an enhanced hotel space, while at the same time the AORs retained even their current abilities then the Navy could lift usefully sized small packages (sub-unit/sub-sub-unit) of troops.  It could also more effectively respond on humanitarian operations, or act as a mother-ship to support armed patrol boats, or carry naval payloads or just be better positioned to upgrade their capbilities in the future.

The reason that current frigates and destroyers, as both Jungle and OGBD attest, are such poor candidates for lifting troops or anything else is that there is barely room for the sailors on board.    These days it seems, judging from the tendency of crews to get smaller, while vessels get bigger, both in the civilian world and in the military world that space is no longer as costly as it once was.

 

[cphansen]

But that is effectively the key to Danish naval procurement.  Their weapons systems are built in containers that can be slotted into spaces on their ships.  This allows three things: them to fit the weapons they need for the mission; to purchase the weapons they need as, and when they need them and can afford them; and to upgrade weapons easily.

Is that not the same policy the Americans were following in their LCS where they discovered a slight flaw in their idea of swapping modules to handle the mission.

The flaw was discovered during simulation where they were setup to perform one task but the threat changed as a result of enemy action whereby the threat became a swarm of small boats. The problem was the weapons needed to destroy the small boats were not part of the mission load. They had to retire and return to port to mount the needed weapons which of course was not possible in the face of the attack.

If we had modular design ships we would have to have really good intel on what we were going to meet

 

[drunknsubmrnr]

You'd need to carry whatever module you plan to deploy with through at least pre-deployment WUPS in order to effectively use it. Switching modules in the middle of a deployment isn't likely.

You can whip up a simulation to make any idea look bad. That doesn't mean it's a bad idea outside that sim.

The reason that current frigates and destroyers, as both Jungle and OGBD attest, are such poor candidates for lifting troops or anything else is that there is barely room for the sailors on board.    These days it seems, judging from the tendency of crews to get smaller, while vessels get bigger, both in the civilian world and in the military world that space is no longer as costly as it once was.

If you made the CSC big enough, you wouldn't even need the AOR's.

 

[Kirkhill]

If you made the CSC big enough, you wouldn't even need the AOR's.

You know what, I bet if you called them a [urlhttp://www.btinternet.com/~warship/Today/invincible.htm=]Through Deck Cruiser [/url] you could even make them big enough to land a small squadron of F35s on board  > ;D

But perhaps we don't need to go there.  Something in the 5500 to 7000 tonne displacement range, with the kit you could squeeze into a 4500 tonne hull, would probably get the job done.

If nothing else the extra hull would give you a longer water line and more tankage, equalling, if I understand dynamics correctly,  more speed and more endurance, which in turn means fewer stops at the AOR.

FWIW

 

[PanaEng]

I would suggest that the RM doctrine (land where the enemy is not) is closer to our own than that of the USMC (land head on at the enemy). It's cheaper too, in more ways than one.

Like during the Operation Just Cause when a bunch of SEAL were dropped off the beach/muck in front of the Paitilla Airport, swam to the end of the runway and decided to assault Noriega's hanger straight down to the other end of the runway?

 

[daftandbarmy]

Like during the Operation Just Cause when a bunch of SEAL were dropped off the beach/muck in front of the Paitilla Airport, swam to the end of the runway and decided to assault Noriega's hanger straight down to the other end of the runway?

Well, knowing the SEALs, they probably only did that because they missed their daily workout and needed to keep up their VO2 Max scores 

 

[PanaEng]

Well, knowing the SEALs, they probably only did that because they missed their daily workout and needed to keep up their VO2 Max scores 

On average their score actually went down as 4 of them got killed... stupid move!

 

[Chilme]

Apparently Lt-Gen Peter Devlin is looking into progressing a Marine capability:

http://www.ottawacitizen.com/news/SOMNIA/3708752/story.html

 

[Ex-SHAD]

Why Canada doesn’t have a corps of marines or any sort of naval infantry is an age old debate, and can be especially prevalent among naval reservists, who will give you long and drawn out dissertations backed by slide shows and reams of other historical information which may or may not even be relevant to the debate.
That being said, here’s the short form (according to how it was taught in NAVRES when I was in).

Historic usage of marines:

During the era of wooden ships and iron men, discipline aboard vessels of most navies was enforced through the lash, and the iron will of its Master-at-Arms who with his ship’s corporals (senior ratings assigned to provost duties) along with a detachment of marines to ensure that law and order were maintained aboard naval vessels.

The primary function of most marines was relegated to being a fighting provost and they were employed at both shore establishments and aboard ship to ensure that order was maintained.
Now the marine also held a secondary duty of being trained in boarding techniques, and would be the tip of the spear when it came to naval warfare of that era (which emphasized the use of boarding whilst at close range).

However, with the advent of the ironclad and move towards the screw driven warship, marines for the most part lost the opportunity to engage in boarding’s, but instead were now tasked as part of naval brigades, which have a strong tradition in their own right, and from which comes the tradition of the “gun run”.

At the dawn of the 20th Century, debate had occurred across the Dominion in regards as to whether our nation should have a navy of its own, or if we should continue to rely upon the Royal Navy for the maritime defense of Canada. In 1910, the supporters of the idea of forming an independent naval service got their wish, and the Canadian Naval Service was established (gaining the title Royal Canadian the following year).

In the pre war era, though Canada began to show the flag, using her new navy, she did not engage in any major conflicts prior to the First World War. Due to this, and moreover budgetary concerns, it was felt that the ships police, along with dockyard and Dominion Police (the federal agency responsible for dockyard protection during that era) could handle any disciplinary issues, and there was no considerable need for a marine force.

During the First World War, Canada’s Navy made an honorable showing, but for the most part was used as a manpower tool for the RN, with a high percentage of Canadians joining the RN, rather than the RCN.
In the post WWI era, defense cutbacks were prevalent, and according to what I can best describe as a “naval reserve legend” in regards to selfless service, it is remarked upon that many ratings and officers of the RCNVR went without pay, to help preserve the institution of the navy, which had went up upon the chopping block.

During the Second World War, the RCN built up to fight the Battle of the Atlantic and for the first time in Canadian History they had the opportunity to field their own specialized landing force RCN Beach Commando W....unfortunately though, the RCN Beach Commando never landed during the Normandy invasion, but instead were landed after the beachhead had been secured. In the Pacific theater, HMCS Prince Robert mounted a few shore parties, but yet again no significant landing action on the part of the RCN.

The Cold War brought about changes in defense policies in Canada, and the role of the RCN had changed as well. However yet again, it had seemed that there was no concerted effort to build a marine landing capable force, but instead it was felt that the Army should have primary responsibility for all landing operations, while the navy did do some shore party training, it was often times limited and scope, and was primarily undertaken by the RCN(R) (and later the RCNR).
I
In the post Cold War era, the navy faced severe cutbacks, and aside from minor and often times scattered unit level training, there was no concerted effort to train either a marine landing force, or even shore parties.

Present:

In the wake of 9/11 and the emergence of the threat of international terrorism, the navy began a focus upon force protection, and protecting the fleet, with a definite drive towards training professional and competent boarding parties. The reserve force took over the role of defending naval  yards(I won’t go into this at length, since there’s too many mixed feelings on the issue), and the creation of the Port Security Unit was deemed the best defensive measure in protecting naval assets.

In conclusion, I see now potential for the developing of a large scale marine landing force in the near future, as though it would be a great capability to have, the creation of the infrastructure and support system needing to establish and maintain a marine landing force, might outweigh its value. Now that being said, if an elected government in the future were to go into a massive defense spending increase then there’s an opportunity to open up the debate on creating a proper Canadian Marine Corps, but until such time, it will simply be a dream, better left to defense analysts and fiction writers.

 

[Pusser]

However, with the advent of the ironclad and move towards the screw driven warship, marines for the most part lost the opportunity to engage in boarding’s, but instead were now tasked as part of naval brigades, which have a strong tradition in their own right, and from which comes the tradition of the “gun run”.


it was often times limited and scope, and was primarily undertaken by the RCN(R) (and later the RCNR).

Although Royal Marines would make up the bulk of landing parties, they really only provided the infantry portion.  Sailors using the ship's guns taken ashore, would provide the artillery portion.  The Gun Run tradition is about sailors moving and firing guns, not marines.  William Hall VC, for whom the Gun Run Trophy is named, was an RN petty officer decorated for staying with his gun and continuing to fire it at Lucknow, during the Indian Mutiny.

Small point:  The RCNR came first.  After WWII, the RCNR and RCNVR were combined to form the RCN(R).

 

[Ex-SHAD]

Although Royal Marines would make up the bulk of landing parties, they really only provided the infantry portion.  Sailors using the ship's guns taken ashore, would provide the artillery portion.  The Gun Run tradition is about sailors moving and firing guns, not marines.  William Hall VC, for whom the Gun Run Trophy is named, was an RN petty officer decorated for staying with his gun and continuing to fire it at Lucknow, during the Indian Mutiny.

Small point:  The RCNR came first.  After WWII, the RCNR and RCNVR were combined to form the RCN(R).

Yes you're correct, with reference to the gun run, and I should have known better in regards to that....just what happens when you're out of the service long enough I suppose.

Though I thought that it intitally began as the Royal Canadian Navy(Reserve) and then during the 60's changed to the Royal Canadian Naval Reserve, though I'll defer to your experience, since it dwarfs my own.

 

[Journeyman]

Apparently Lt-Gen Peter Devlin is looking into progressing a Marine capability:
http://www.ottawacitizen.com/news/SOMNIA/3708752/story.html

The actual quote is, "there would also be more mountain warfare training and a taste of amphibious operations because Canadian troops had to go ashore in Haiti and in Timor."

I hardly think "a taste" equates to "a capability"....kind of like playing Call of Duty: Black Ops to get your  Assaulter qualification for JTF2. 

 

[Infanteer]

Canada has, for the last two iterations, attached a Company to the USMC to take part in amphibious operations in Exercise RIMPAC.  This is, hopefully, the start of some regularity in exposure to these types of operations.

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

I think Infanteer just hit the right term: "exposure".

Canada has never had a "Marine" force, but has participated in numerous opposed or unopposed landings. They were always carried out by the army and quite competently. All that is needed, as for any other military skill, is exposure to the process and techniques from time to time to keep the skill set at a reasonable level.

Even if Canada was to acquire the infamous "big honking ships", there would be no need for Canadian Marines, as the army is perfectly competent to carry out amphibious warfare.

 

[Old Sweat]

I think Infanteer just hit the right term: "exposure".

Canada has never had a "Marine" force, but has participated in numerous opposed or unopposed landings. They were always carried out by the army and quite competently. All that is needed, as for any other military skill, is exposure to the process and techniques from time to time to keep the skill set at a reasonable level.

Even if Canada was to acquire the infamous "big honking ships", there would be no need for Canadian Marines, as the army is perfectly competent to carry out amphibious warfare.

The other side of this is the requirement for the navy to also develop some expertise in planning and conducting amphibious operations. Putting troops in landing craft and/or helicopters and moving them between  ship and shore is only part of the equation. There also is the tasks involved with managing the landing in the areas not involved in actually assaulting, clearing and securing the beach head. For example, how do we control the flow of traffic ashore and manage the build up on the beach? Who takes charge of the combat supplies and getting them from the ships to the beach head? How about the collection and handling of casualties and perhaps POWs?

At the risk of playing armchair general, climbing into landing craft and going ashore is no more than exposure to amphibious operations. It is important, and it gets all the publicity, but it is a bit like the duck on the pond. Most of the action is out of view.

 

[Blackadder1916]

As noted, the conduct of amphibious operations (or even training) by the Canadian Army and Navy (and also the Air Force) is not new.  As seen in this excerpt from a DLSC research note, amphibious operations were an aspect of many Defence of Canada exercises during the 60s and 70s.  We didn't need a "Marine Corps" back then other than occasionally partnering with the USMC.


Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts
DLSC Research Note 01/02
Homeland Defence by Sean M. Maloney, PhD  JANUARY 2001

Available to download as a PDF here

6. Defence of Canada Operations 1960-70

The Mobile Striking Force, as a formation, ceased to exist by the 1960s.
The continental defence commitment, however, still existed though the threat
estimate had changed. The concern now was that, given the adoption of a
strategic concept in which conventional operations were possible prior to the
outbreak of nuclear war, the Soviets might attempt to use small airborne,
trawler, or submarine-landed special forces to destroy vital installations. The
target installations were extremely vital for the defence of North America in
an all-out nuclear war. They included nuclear weapon storage sites housing
anti-bomber rockets and missiles like CFB Comox, BC; underwater listening
SOSUS installations like CFS Shelburne, Nova Scotia; or radar and air
defence control stations like CFS Holberg, BC.

Instead of having a MSF-like formation, the Army, and later Mobile
Command, tasked each brigade group based in Canada to develop and
exercise contingency plans for independent battalion group-level Defence of
Canada Force (DCF) operations.

One of the first DCF exercises was Ex BOAT CLOAK held in 1963. BOAT
CLOAK involved 1st Battalion, Royal Highland Regiment of Canada (the
Black Watch), a detachment from the Royal Canadian Engineers, and two
troops from the RCD Recce Squadron. Two ASW destroyers, Terra Nova and
Chaudiere, along with the destroyer HMCS Buckingham, moved the
composite force from Halifax, conducted a small-scale ASW exercise first, and
then headed for Cape Breton. Several small recce parties were landed by boat
several days before the main landing force went in under cover of naval
gunfire support.50

On the west coast, there was Exercise CANLEX 64. 1st Battalion, Queen's
Own Rifles of Canada was tasked by Mobile Command through 1 Brigade to
develop a plan to protect or retake CFS Holberg, the western-most end of one
cross-Canada air defence radar line. Two officers, one with Royal Marines
assault training and another who was a graduate of the U.S. Army Ranger
course, were put in charge of a 180-man composite company group. The unit
trained for eight months. Starting from scratch, a Joint Operations Centre
was established with Maritime Command forces at HMCS Dockyard in
Victoria. Boarding, embarkation, and disembarkation drills were developed,
and a composite beach party was formed. Soldiers and sailors who had D-Day
experience assisted and even produced old doctrinal manuals.51

The DCF Company Group then boarded four Ocean Escorts (converted
minesweepers) for the exercises. Tactical air support was provided by T-33's
based out of CFB Comox. Naval gunfire support was also used. The DCF
company group then tracked down the enemy landing force, raided its base
camp, and successfully protected the radar station.52

The amphibious exercises continued annually on each coast throughout
the 1960s. These included Exercise MOHAWK (1964) held at CFS Shelburne
(a SOSUS terminal). MOHAWK included six destroyers, submarines, and
patrol aircraft as well as a company group. YEOMAN (1964) was held at
Argentia, Newfoundland where the U.S. Navy had a SOSUS station and a
nuclear weapons storage site. YEOMAN included nine Prestonian-class
frigates, a diving support vessel with divers, and the Operational Support
Ship (AOR) HMCS Provider with her helicopters and landing craft (assault).
A composite company group drawn from 1st Bn, The Black Watch as well as
several T-33 ground support aircraft participated. Similarly, Exercise
SOCKEYE employed three destroyers, another Queen's Own Rifles company
group in a mission to CFS Masset, a signals intelligence station located in the
Queen Charlotte Islands.53

Exercise POOL SHARK I and II (September/October 1970): Held on the
west coast of Vancouver island, an infantry battalion with naval gunfire
support teams boarded the ASW destroyer HMCS Mackenzie and the
minesweepers HMCS Fundy and Chignecto to 'eliminate' and enemy
lodgment near Bamfield, a communications station.54

Exercise POTLATCH (September 1974): Another northern Vancouver
Island operation, POTLATCH was a joint Canada-US exercise involving a
Canadian infantry battalion and a USMC battalion. The Canadian force was
transported by the operational support ship HMCS Provider and the ASW
destroyers HMCS Restigouche and Gatineau. The Marines were lifted by the
landing ships USS Mount Vernon and Barber County. HMCS Rainbow, a
Canadian submarine, opposed the amphibious force while in transit to the
landing area.55

Exercise KERNAL POTLACH II (September 1979): KERNAL POTLATCH
II was an even bigger version of POTLATCH and was probably the largest
amphibious exercise held on the Canadian west coast. A Canadian infantry
battalion group married up with a Marine Amphibious Unit in California for
joint exercises. The land forces were then supported by, in the Canadian case,
the operational support ship HMCS Provider and the ASW destroyers HMCS
Gatineau, Terra Nova, and Restigouche, while the Americans were loaded
into the landing ships USS Alamo, Cleveland, Mobile, Anchorage, and New
Orleans. The second phase of the exercise was a transit to Vancouver Island
while the escort vessels warded off enemy submarines and aircraft, played by
Maritime Air Command Argus and USN P-3 maritime patrol aircraft and
Air Command CF-100 electronic warfare aircraft based at CFB Comox. The
amphibious force was screened by nine USN cruisers and destroyers,
including USS Long Beach, and an undisclosed number of nuclear
submarines.56

I was on the last exercise mentioned, KERNAL POTLACH II.  The 3 PPCLI battalion group embarked aboard the Canadian ships and sailed to San Diego where we crossed to the USN amphibious ships. We had a few days of familiarization training on the Mike-boats before heading to the northern end of Vancouver Island for the amphibious landing phase of the exercise.  Along the way, we did a practice landing on the beaches at Camp Pendleton.

 

[dapaterson]

Canada has, for the last two iterations, attached a Company to the USMC to take part in amphibious operations in Exercise RIMPAC.  This is, hopefully, the start of some regularity in exposure to these types of operations.

The fact that it's a side trip to Hawaii is a little bonus for the company.  And the bn HQ folks that come to see what's happening.  And the Bde HQ folks who need to see it as well.
(CO 1 CMBG crashed my honeymoon.  Not that I'm bitter...)

 

[Journeyman]

CO 1 CMBG crashed my honeymoon.  Not that I'm bitter...

Yet your wife has never complained....  >

 

[Infanteer]

At the risk of playing armchair general, climbing into landing craft and going ashore is no more than exposure to amphibious operations. It is important, and it gets all the publicity, but it is a bit like the duck on the pond. Most of the action is out of view.

You're absolutely correct.  Being part of the BLT means exposure to the Ground Combat Element (GCE) of a MAGTF, which is only 1/4 of the amphibious team (which is only 1/2 of the Marine/Navy expeditionary team).  The first RIMPAC featured a Canadian sub-unit as part of a SPMAGTF commanded by 3rd Marine Regiment.  There were no battalions to plug into (they were in some phase of an OIF/OEF deployment), so the company essentially became the BLT and dealt directly with the MAGTF Command Element (CE).

The USMC has an entire element posted into amphibious ships that work for the XO - these guys deal with linking Navy support to the Marines.  As well, the MAGTF CE has an embarkation officer deals directly with the ships XO to get the amphibious forces into and around the ship.  The MAGTF Commander and his Navy counterpart conduct a unique form of Battle Procedure to launch an amphibious team.  The Aviation Combat Element (ACE) and Logistic Combat Element (LCE) also require liason to get the troops ashore via aviation and to sustain them ashore via LCAC delivery of stores (that are usually contained in quadcons on the ships - something quartermasters have to work with the LCE).

Although this work-up is very similar to an NCE/NSE/BG/Air Wing arrangement that we see in Afghanistan, the fact that it is done in an amphibious environment while working for the Navy means that an extensive degree of corporate knowledge is required to do it well.  Many Marines have commented how focus on Iraq and Afghanistan has minimized amphibious training time and that this was evident with the friction that manifested itself while trying to mount a MAGTF after so long.