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The utility of three military colleges, funded undergrad degrees; Officer trg & the need for a degre

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Old Sweat said:
Now you've done it. This is one of my pet bugbears - the "if one word is good, twenty words are better" theory of military writing.
...
Sorry for the rant, which is a bit off theme.  :salute:

If you've ever had to deal with the Canadian Defence Academy, parent formation of the Royal Military College of Canada, you would not be apologizing for being off theme.
 
E.R. Campbell said:
Oh, I think you're getting closer.

But it's not the GOFOs (not most of them, anyway) who are risk averse ninnies concerned only with media spin, they (most of them) understand the business end of war ...

Nor is it the senior civil servants, who can be just as bloody minded as any admiral or general, they run the business end of government (the machinery of government) and they know there are prices to be paid ...

No, it's two groups who are at the root of our problem:

    First, it's the people, often quite young people, who run the "business of politics," of opinion making, of "Manufacturing Consent," they are the ones who impose nonsensical standards on a rough and dirty business; and

    Second, it's the people, often in the military themselves, who try to bureaucratize the most human and idiosyncratic of all "businesses," and end up replacing a clear, simple, definition of battle procedure* with 17 f'ing steps!

They're the ones who change simple concepts, like a "start line" to something more complex, like a "line of departure" and who try to bend the nature of military service and leadership into something that suits prevailing (and ever shifting) public norms.


_____
* Battle procedure: the whole process by which a commander does his reconnaissance, makes his appreciation and plan and issues the order that commit his troops to battle.

Sadly, and largely through our own damaged self-image, I believe the military has too often aped the worst of the corporate world.

I'd look at someone who holds the Queen's Commission first, vs. just an MBA, any day.
 
E.R. Campbell said:
Oh, I think you're getting closer.

But it's not the GOFOs (not most of them, anyway) who are risk averse ninnies concerned only with media spin, they (most of them) understand the business end of war ...

Nor is it the senior civil servants, who can be just as bloody minded as any admiral or general, they run the business end of government (the machinery of government) and they know there are prices to be paid ...

No, it's two groups who are at the root of our problem:

    First, it's the people, often quite young people, who run the "business of politics," of opinion making, of "Manufacturing Consent," they are the ones who impose nonsensical standards on a rough and dirty business; and

    Second, it's the people, often in the military themselves, who try to bureaucratize the most human and idiosyncratic of all "businesses," and end up replacing a clear, simple, definition of battle procedure* with 17 f'ing steps!

They're the ones who change simple concepts, like a "start line" to something more complex, like a "line of departure" and who try to bend the nature of military service and leadership into something that suits prevailing (and ever shifting) public norms.


_____
* Battle procedure: the whole process by which a commander does his reconnaissance, makes his appreciation and plan and issues the order that commit his troops to battle.
The Unified Theory of Global Military Inefficiency - well summed up.
 
milnews.ca said:
The Unified Theory of Global Military Inefficiency - well summed up.

It is personified, and this is not exclusive to the military, the act of confusing achieving efficient in processing the work coming into one's office by moving it through and sending it on as expeditiously as possible, regardless of the chaos it causes downstream, with effective staff work.
 
Dimsum said:
tomahawk6 said:
Warrants would be a good solution,but one that the USAF wont pursue.They will want to use aircrew to operate UAV's as there will be fewer planes for them to fly.

Fair, but I meant aircrew Warrants like the US Army.  Or commission (warrant?) those "enlisted" folks into some RPA Warrant Officer stream.  Problem solved.


A question, based on an observation ...

Back in the 1950s and into the 1960s both the Canadian Army and the RCAF believed that a high school graduate was ready to be trained to become a junior officer ~ troop/platoon commander, or a line pilot. Now, to be fair, we had much bigger forces ~ 20+ large (600 to 1,000+ soldiers), major units, and even more, smaller (100 to 400 soldiers) minor units in the field force and many squadrons of fighters (four wings in Germany, flying F-86 Sabres and several squadrons in Canada flying the CF-100 Canucks) and other aircraft.

Turnover of these young line pilots in the RCAF was fairly high, some couldn't qualify, others decided, after a few years of flying, that "civvie street" offered more opportunities. The RCAF, back in the 1950s, was very honest with these young men (they were all men): they were told that the RCAF wanted them to fly and, in some cases to teach others to fly, but the more senior ranks were more or less reserved for a few with good educations and advanced flying, technical and staff training. (My cousin was one of those line pilots ~ after his short service engagement was up he left the RCAF, went back to university, thanks to a generous release benefit, and became a diplomat.) 

The army was much the same but, I think, opportunities for OCP (as the army's high school entry plan was called) officers were better and the army did offer some of its officers university educations when circumstances permitted.

We know that, well into the 1960s, the US Army accepted candidates into its Officer Candidate Schools (OCS) with just high school educations and the UK regarded A levels (Grade 12 equivalent) as fully acceptable for entry into officer training well into the and beyond the 1980s.

So, my question, related to the notion that we have too many, too senior officers serving in too many bloated HQs, is: is a beneficial "split" possible, even desirable, between candidates for careers in the commissioned ranks (who must have university degrees, be bilingual, etc) and for a pool of "fighters," young men and women who will sail, serve in field units and fly for a few years and then leave the CF, perhaps being "forced" out after a short service engagement, because they have filled the roles for which they were needed and engaged? Might we decide that we can provide a short (say one year) post secondary academic programme to make our junior officers into the sorts of young apprentice officers we want and then offer the best of that lot full degrees after they have served three to five years in the field? (the ones we keep and educated would then fill the (fewer) staff and command slots.) Could we not have "pilot officers" or even "pilot warrant officers," or  :o pilot sergeants  :o in the cockpits of some of our helicopters, fighters and transports and in the "driver's seats" of our RPVs?
 
The late '60s CAF model was jut that: a large pool of short-service officers who would provide the lower-ranking "fighters" and receive a payout after their nine years of service, who would not have a degree; coupled with a smaller group through ROTP or DEO that would form the basis of a smaller, long-term professional officer corps.
 
E.R. Campbell said:
Could we not have "pilot officers" or even "pilot warrant officers," or  :o pilot sergeants  :o in the cockpits of some of our helicopters, fighters and transports and in the "driver's seats" of our RPVs?
It's not like it hasn't been done before ....
.... Roughly two-thirds of the 3,000 or so RAF pilots who flew in the Battle of Britain were officers, the other third being sergeant and flight sergeant pilots ....
 
One factor to consider today is the cost of training.  50-60 years ago, it was relatively cheap to train a pilot.  Airplanes were simple, fuel and maintenance were cheap.  And it was quick. To train a CF-18 pilot these days cost upwards of $1.5M.  It would be very fiscally irresponsible to force someone out after 9 years (of which 3 are spent training).  The approach I would push is a 2-stream one:  professionnal officers (university educated, meant to be promoted rather quickly) and the field officers (meant to stay Capt to Major all their career) that would become your technical experts and your corporate knowledge.

This way, people that want to fly for 25 years in the military can: they are not posted to staff units and can keep flying.  I know several pilots that released early because they were posted in a ground job and this wasn't why they joined (and the military lost on their training and experience).
 
Perhaps the concept of a fully degreed officer corps could be slightly modified in concept to include officers deemed capable of earning a degree.  Some officers could be accepted right out of high school but maybe go through an extended (1-year?) combined BMOQ/educational "prep" year.  The CF could provide a general, college/university level general education to the candidates which would give the young officers a solid grounding in topics like military science, international relations, organizational theory, etc., while at the same time confirming for the CF that the young candidates have the basic skills and attitude to make them successful officers. 

This could provide a core of young new officers in the physical prime of their life that have also been "tested" by the CF to ensure that they have the basic skills and attitudes to allow them to succeed in the military (with less of an up-front investment than putting them through a full university degree).  Advancement beyond a certain rank (Captain?) could require completion of a full university degree.  Those non-degreed officers that have proven their excellence and ability to advance could then be offered the opportunity to complete their degree and continue their CF career.  Those not selected to be trained for further promotion would be thanked for their service to their country but not have their contracts extended. 

These young men and women could then take with them to civy world (at an age young enough to take on a new direction) a partial (first year) university education and the benefit of having been thrust into a leadership position much younger than most of their peers.  They could also be a great source of skilled young officers for the Reserves.
 
I agree with both Maxand GR66. We dump far to much education into most junior officers, far too soon. The implicit message we send is that advancement is more important than mastering your craft.

I wish we would do as Max suggests- let those that want to fly (or sail or ruck up) do so. Those (relatively) few that should advance to become the institutional leaders should have the bulk of the education resources focused on them. There could be a risk of creating bottle necks in units, but I think we could easily manage that going back to actually using the career gate tools we have and not offering IPS conversion to 100 percent of every occupation as we currently do.
 
We have CEOTP as the entry plan that matches what is suggested here.  It enrolls without a dergree, but places a promotion ceiling for those who do not get a degree. 
 
MCG said:
We have CEOTP as the entry plan that matches what is suggested here.  It enrolls without a dergree, but places a promotion ceiling for those who do not get a degree.

The difference is that under CEOTP the officers are still committing to complete their degree during their enrollment period and the CF is still committing to provide the time and support for the officer to complete their degree during their enrollment period.  Would there be an advantage to having young officers that have no plan to stay long term and make a career out of the CF that can focus completely on their trade rather than splitting their focus on their trade and their CEOTP promise to obtain their degree?
 
SeaKingTacco said:
I agree with both Maxand GR66. We dump far to much education into most junior officers, far too soon. The implicit message we send is that advancement is more important than mastering your craft.

I wish we would do as Max suggests- let those that want to fly (or sail or ruck up) do so. Those (relatively) few that should advance to become the institutional leaders should have the bulk of the education resources focused on them. There could be a risk of creating bottle necks in units, but I think we could easily manage that going back to actually using the career gate tools we have and not offering IPS conversion to 100 percent of every occupation as we currently do.


I agree with all three of you.

That's why this: "Might we decide that we can provide a short (say one year) post secondary academic programme to make our junior officers into the sorts of young apprentice officers we want and then offer the best of that lot full degrees after they have served three to five years in the field? (the ones we keep and educated would then fill the (fewer) staff and command slots.)" was hidded away in the middle of my post.

My thought, unformed, is this:

All general service officer candidates, regardless of age and educational attainment, provided they have, at the bare minimum, university entrance level educational attainments, are sent to one of RMC, in Kinston or CMR in St Jean (there is no language training: Anglophone officers will be sent to English language units, Francophone officers to French language units). At RMC or CMR they undertake, starting in July, an 18 month course that combines basic officer training, (first phase) and a "second phase" special to service course and some academics. (Perhaps some candidates who already have degrees will find the academics too basic ... doesn't matter it is a common core course that everyone takes.) On completion of their 18 month course the candidates are sent on a nice long Christmas leave and then to service schools for "phase three" (begins in January) and then commissioned as 2Lts in, say, June ~ after about 24 months of training. The officers remain as 2Lts until they have competed all professional training and have completed six months in a ship or unit. (That may mean that we need pay raises and several incentive grades for 2Lts, especially for pilots who have very long training programmes.)

The initial engagement for all is seven years: two under training and five in a mix of training and ship/unit employment.

At the end of the "seven year hitch" (yes, I picked that term just so I could make that pun  :nod: ) the CF and the officers take good looks at one another and the CF then decides to whom it will offer intermediate engagements (IE), which includes a requirement for second language training and completion of, at least, a first university degree. About seven years into the IE officers will be "streamed" into senior (high flyer), normal (career ends at about captain/colonel) and out (officer will not, likely, be offered service after 20 years). On the basis of their streams officers will be offered staff training, graduate school and so on.
 
The RAF have a stream Officer trades can enter into called Professional aircrew.  I am not sure exactly how it works but from talking to the ones I have been on crew with, they stay at the lower end of the ranks (the ones I've known were Sqn Leader/Majors) but go on a different pay scale.  Those who go PA may never be a Wing Commander but will become technical and tactical SMEs but continue to get pay increases. 

FWIW I have flown with a handful of RAF aircrew, both NCM and Commissioned.  The NCM types come out of their trg stream as Sgt and my experience is it works well.  Most, if not all, of the Officers I have flown with do not have degrees and they are a talented and capable group. 
 
Eye In The Sky said:
The RAF have a stream Officer trades can enter into called Professional aircrew.  I am not sure exactly how it works but from talking to the ones I have been on crew with, the stay at the lower end of the ranks but go on a different pay scale.  Those who go PA will never be a Wing Commander but will become technical and tactical SMEs but continue to get pay increases. 

FWIW I have flown with a handful of RAF aircrew, both NCM and Commissioned.  The NCM types come out of their trg stream as Sgt and my experience is it works well.  Most, if not all, of the Officers I have flown with do not have degrees and they are a talented and capable group.

The Australians have something similar to Prof Aircrew, except that it's a posting (essentially demotion to FLT LT but zero admin responsibilities and keep pay at current levels) called Specialist Aircrew.  I've known of a WG CDR who did that, but it's not a career thing. 

RAAF NCM aircrew (FEs, AESOPs primarily) also show up to training as NCM Cadets (Sgt Cadets, essentially) and get their Sgts at the end of training.  Whether that works or not depends on who you ask - the aircrew think it works (dealing with Officers, etc) but some ground crew can get a bit chafed that there are 30-year old Warrant Officers* when it would be much longer before some trades even get considered for WO or even FSgt. 

I'm not really sure what is "better" since I haven't worked with any Pte/Cpl AESOPs yet.  I think it's less the rank and more the personality that will dictate how s/he fits in the crew anyway - I've worked with awesome, professional, mature RAAF LAC Int Ops and awful, immature WOs as well.

* RAAF WO = Our CWO.  RAAF Flight Sergeant = Either our WO or MWO, depending on trade/responsibility.
 
https://www.raf.mod.uk/recruitment/about-the-raf/structure/

RAAF and RAF are similar then.  NCM aircrew have 3 ranks only.  A MACr is equal to our CWO.



 
Further evidence for delaying earning a degree in this article about Ernst & Young removing the degree requirement from their recruiting (most E&Y recruits would be the same sort of people we would look at as potential officers). They (E&Y) say that "Our own internal research of over 400 graduates found that screening students based on academic performance alone was too blunt an approach to recruitment ... it (the company's own, expert research) found no evidence to conclude that previous success in higher education correlated with future success in subsequent professional qualifications undertaken."

I would like to see degree selection deferred until after an officer has a bit of experience. My own, personal, experience suggests that our ideas on what we want to "be," in academic terms ~ what sort of degree we might want to earn ~ will change with age. Certainly, in my case, my ideas at age 27ish were quite different from when I was 17.
 
SeaKingTacco said:
I agree with both Maxand GR66. We dump far to much education into most junior officers, far too soon. The implicit message we send is that advancement is more important than mastering your craft.

I wish we would do as Max suggests- let those that want to fly (or sail or ruck up) do so. Those (relatively) few that should advance to become the institutional leaders should have the bulk of the education resources focused on them. There could be a risk of creating bottle necks in units, but I think we could easily manage that going back to actually using the career gate tools we have and not offering IPS conversion to 100 percent of every occupation as we currently do.

2 years as a platoon commander was the best education I could have ever hoped for.
 
I had a thought about all those World War Two veterans, who came home after years away- a great number of whom went on to university at 24-30 years old.

That generation, in particular, seemed to drive genius and technological advancement more than any other generation. I wonder if it was at least in part because they went to university later in life and therefore, had a more thoughtful educational experience?
 
SeaKingTacco said:
I had a thought about all those World War Two veterans, who came home after years away- a great number of whom went on to university at 24-30 years old.

That generation, in particular, seemed to drive genius and technological advancement more than any other generation. I wonder if it was at least in part because they went to university later in life and therefore, had a more thoughtful educational experience?

....And the largest, fastest growth in global economic activity in recorded history. That might have helped too  ;D
 
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