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Chinese Military,Political and Social Superthread

Readers need to remember that all this is taking place in East Asia and the concept of "face" ~ reputation, self-respect, prestige, honor, dignity ~ is very important. Face is not well understood in the West but trust me, please, it matters HUGELY in China.

The Chinese may have made a strategic blunder here but they will find it very, very hard to back away ~ the loss of "face" would be great, maybe too great.

I'm sure the Japanese understand this and I'm guessing that some Sinophiles in Washington do, too; but I'll bet that none of Chuck Hagel, John Kerry, Susan Rice or Barack Obama do ... OK, maybe Rice, she's actually very well informed, but she's not an Asian specialist.

The risk in losing face is domestic, internal to China, because the CCP's legitimacy rests, in large part,on its reputation for maintaining China's prestige in the world.
 
Speaking of China trying to save face in the face of US, Japanese and ROK/South Korean air incursions into its so-called E. China Sea ADIZ...

China Sends Warplanes Into Air Defense Zone

Quote:
China said it sent warplanes into its newly declared maritime air defense zone Thursday, days after the U.S., South Korea and Japan all sent flights through the airspace in defiance of rules Beijing says it has imposed in the East China Sea.

China's air force sent several fighter jets and an early warning aircraft on normal air patrols in the zone, the Xinhua agency reported, citing air force spokesman Shen Jinke.

The report did not specify exactly when the flights were sent or whether they had encountered foreign aircraft. The United States, Japan and South Korea have said they have sent flights through the zone without encountering any Chinese response since Beijing announced the creation of the zone last week.

Shen described Thursday's flights as "a defensive measure and in line with international common practices." He said China's air force would remain on high alert and will take measures to protect the country's airspace.

Quote:
South Korea's military said Thursday its planes flew through the zone this week without informing China and with no apparent interference. Japan also said its planes have been continuing to fly through it after the Chinese announcement, while the Philippines, locked in an increasingly bitter dispute with Beijing over South China Sea islands, said it also was rejecting China's declaration.

ABC News
 
A fairly simplified wargame of what might happen from Popular Mechanics. Note the emphasis on AA/AD (Anti Access/Area Denial), and the current situation WRT how to defeat AA/AD measures:

http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/military/news/heres-what-a-shooting-war-in-the-east-china-sea-might-look-like-16205950?click=pm_news

Here's What a Shooting War in the East China Sea Might Look Like
Tensions are escalating as China tries to claim a new zone of airspace authority—which the U.S. promptly ignores. Here's what to expect if this cold war involving Japan, China, the U.S., and other East Asian nations heats up.
By Joe Pappalardo

November 27, 2013 1:30

This past weekend China escalated tensions in the East China Sea by unilaterally establishing what it calls an Air Defense Identification Zone that includes islands claimed by other nations. China released a map and coordinates of this zone, demanding that any aircraft report to China before entering the airspace, declaring that its armed forces "will adopt defensive emergency measures to respond to aircraft that do not cooperate in the identification or refuse to follow the instructions."

This posturing got an early test on Monday when the United States flew two B-52s straight through the zone China has claimed, with no response from China. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel has said the flight, which took off from Guam, was part of a prescheduled exercise. But it seems clear that the U.S. is also sending a message that it won't respect such a claim. "We view this development as a destabilizing attempt to alter the status quo in the region," U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said this weekend. "This unilateral action increases the risk of misunderstanding and miscalculations."

Tensions were high already in this part of the East China Sea, as Japan and Taiwan both claim ownership of islands inside the Chinese zone (and South Korea is not thrilled that some of its airspace overlaps with the Air Defense ID Zone). The islands—called the Senkaku by the Japanese and the Diaoyudao by the Chinese—are valuable as fishing grounds and oil and natural gas fields. Recent incidents have seen Chinese fishermen arrested by the Japanese Coast Guard, and Japanese jets scrambling in response to impending Chinese incursions. (The Japanese have also rejected the Chinese zone.)

The war of words and maritime move–countermove has been under way for years, but this latest escalation could be the fuse to ignite a war that can't easily be stopped. Here's how a hypothetical scenario might unfold.

One: Drone Incursion

Drones are great tools of escalation. National leaders will fly them in areas where it might be too dangerous for a pilot. Other national leaders are not as hesitant to attack them. After all, it's only a robot.

Our hypothetical incident starts in the air, at 45,000 feet. An unarmed Chinese W-50 drone is dispatched to keep an eye on the waterways and airspace of the Air Defense ID Zone. In September 2012 the Xinhua news agency reported that China's State Oceanic Administration would step up the use of drones to "strengthen marine surveillance" in disputed areas of the South China Sea, and a string of bases have appeared on the shoreline in 2013.

The Japanese Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) operates Boeing E-767s, 160-foot airplanes stuffed with radar and electronics that enable them to detect aircraft from 200 miles away. They confirm that the Chinese drone is wheeling above the Senkakus, and Japan dispatches F-15Js to intercept it—and shoot it down—obviously ignoring China's Air Defense ID Zone. Chinese long-range, back-scatter radar spots the F-15Js in the air, and China dispatches quad-prop Y-8X maritime patrol for a better-resolution look. They also alert their best fighters—Sukhoi Flankers (Su 30) and Chengdu J-10s—to prepare to take off. Everyone will later say that these flights were meant for "verification and monitoring." But the F-15Js and Chinese jets are both armed.

Japanese pilots, trying to stay hidden, approach without radar on, instead using the data from the E-767s to get close to the Chinese forces. But the electronically steered array radar of the J-10s spot them. When the F-15Js' radar-warning receiver goes off, even though the chime indicates that it's not the guidance radar of an inbound missile, the Japanese pilot panics.

Action in the air is fast-paced. Snap judgments with lethal consequences come with the territory. When the Chinese fighters arrive to hem in the F-15Js, a Japanese pilot's evasive maneuvers cause a midair collision with a J-10. Then the air-to-air missiles fly—Japanese-built AAM-3s versus Chinese PL-11s. At the end of several minutes of fighting, pilots on both sides have died, but the skirmish ends there—for now. The battle started with enough ambiguity that both sides claim to be victims.

Two: Quiet Escalation

Don't let the name fool you—Japan's Self Defense Forces are pretty advanced war fighters. Over the decades the island nation has built up the most formidable military in Asia. China has been pouring money into its military to match some of Japan's U.S.-made equipment, but the Japanese have better ships and airplanes. The United States is bound by treaty to protect Japan if it is attacked, but pundits debate whether the events in the East China Sea meet that standard. And both Japan and the U.S. are already war-weary and hoping the situation cools down.

The lull after the air battle is deceptive. While China is itching to prove itself as a regional hegemon, its military does not want to launch headlong into a fight for airspace it will lose. So it turns to other tactics, even as diplomats discuss ways to ease tensions. Chinese submarines—quiet diesel–electric models that are hard to spot in the shallows—begin to lay mines. This would be easier to do by air, but the Chinese don't have air superiority, and want to block Japanese ships from nearing the contested islands. This move will keep Japanese and American warships from getting close to the islands, a necessary condition in case China wants to land troops. It also hampers Japanese and American air operations by keeping naval radar out of the area. (Not to mention the inability to rescue pilots downed in any future air battle. And the pilots would become diplomatic bargaining chips upon capture.)

China has no shortage of mines. A 2012 paper by the U.S. Naval War College cited a Chinese article claiming the nation has more than 50,000 mines, including "over 30 varieties of contact, magnetic, acoustic, water pressure and mixed reaction sea mines, remote control sea mines, rocket-rising and mobile mines." The smartest mines in the inventory would be the most useful to the Chinese. They can be programmed to rise and strike ships with particular acoustic and magnetic signatures. The mines can also be remotely activated. China could lace the sea lanes with these and wait for the order to be given—a public warning to all in the East China Sea to keep out.

The United States is good at sniffing out submarines. When Americans find Chinese subs deploying mines in areas where U.S. carrier groups will be operating, they try to force them to the surface. Under the water, U.S. submarines outgun the Chinese. They try to run, try to hide, and ultimately scuttle their ships with all hands lost.

China activates the mines in anger and to save face—a retreat right now would humiliate the army and central government. A death spiral of war ensues. Ships explode. Sailors burn to death and drown. There is a call from Taiwan and Japan to degrade the Chinese navy, to strip them of their assets with air strikes and cruise missiles. Leaks in Washington, D.C., hint at a forceful plan. Knowing what the U.S. and Japanese militaries can do if given time to prepare, and knowing they are underdogs in the fight, the Chinese military have good reason to consider a preemptive strike.

Three: Missiles

The crux of the war is still centered on these virtually uninhabited islands, but the fighting is spreading. And missiles, not airplanes, will determine who dominates the airspace over the disputed islands.

It starts with a wave of unmanned aerial vehicle attacks from the Chinese mainland. The Harpy drones take off from trucks and boats, fly as far as 300 miles, and hone in on radar emissions of surface-to-air defenses. The Harpy, made in Israel and sold to China in 2004, ends its flight with a death dive into the radar, detonating 4.5 pounds of explosives on impact.

The American/Japanese alliance is ready to own the air over the Sendakus. The attack on Chinese radar and air-defense installations comes shortly thereafter. Submarine-launched Tomahawks, B-2 stealth bomber runs, and long-range "standoff" missiles fired from B-52s hit targets. The Chinese have moved mobile radar systems and switched them off to keep them hidden. F-22s take to the sky, ready to fight and win dogfights. But these never happen.

Instead, China deals its last card—a barrage of theater missiles. These are conventional ballistic and cruise missiles fired from land, as far as 3500 miles away. These target fixed locations—Japanese air bases, naval stations, and American Air Force and Marine Corps bases. Hundreds of warheads drop on targets, beating missile defense systems, wrecking runways, and blasting barracks. At sea the Navy is also targeted. Hypersonic missiles fired from land or submarines target U.S. warships and Japanese vessels. The lesson is clear: The closer to the Chinese coast U.S. forces operate, the more trouble Chinese forces can bring to bear.

The U.S. naval forces back off and use more standoff weapons. Our scenario ends with a stalemated game of barrage and counterbarrage. But the central claim—who owns the islands—has been answered. They are no longer safe for anyone.
 
Update on China's air defense zones.The PRC is busily trying to save face,but there is a dichotomy between the civilian leadership and the military.It wouldnt be the first time that the military pursued its own policy.Perhaps the Defense Minister will be retiring soon ?

http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304017204579226031095207724

The conflicting signals from Beijing highlight the challenge the Chinese leadership faces as it tries to contain the international fallout from its surprise decision to establish the zone, without appearing weak in front of an increasingly nationalistic domestic audience.

China's apparent easing of its original warning suggests its fighters will monitor and escort rather than repel U.S., Japanese and South Korean aircraft that violate the rules of the zone, which covers islands claimed by Beijing and Tokyo, said Chinese and foreign analysts. The spat over the uninhabited islands in the East China Sea—known as the Senkaku in Japan and Diaoyu in China—has escalated over the past year.

To maintain its credibility internationally and domestically, China is likely to increase such escorts, a move that in such a tense political climate greatly increases the risk of an aerial incident that could spiral into a military clash, analysts and diplomats said.

A defense ministry spokesman said China had "identified" all foreign aircraft entering the Air Defense Identification Zone over an area covering islands at the center of a fierce territorial dispute between Tokyo and Beijing.
 
Taiwan's President Ma Ying Jieou, whose Guomindang/GMD party (Kuomintang/KMT in old Wade-Giles romanization), has been sued and vilified by opposition politicians for abetting "foreign aggression" in the recent East China Sea ADIZ controversy. Take note that in spite of the fact that China's CCP and Taiwan's GMD are old enemies from the 1945-49 Chinese Civil War, many in both camps, including Ma, support reunification. 

Opposition party sues president over Taiwan's stance on China ADIZ
Liu Shih-i and James Lee
2013/11/29


Taipei, Nov. 29 (CNA) A minor opposition party filed charges against President Ma Ying-jeou Friday for allegedly compromising national security through apparent inaction after China claimed a broad air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea.

Taiwan Solidarity Union Chairman Huang Kun-huei and Secretary-General Lin Chih-chia brought the charges to the Taiwan High Prosecutors Office, accusing Ma of the crime of abetting "foreign aggression."

Huang argued the Ma administration's lack of response to China's ADIZ, which encompasses waters and islets claimed by Taiwan, indicates a lack of loyalty on the Ma's part, contrasting the government's muted response with strong protests and bold actions by the United States, Japan and South Korea.

Following China's sudden proclamation of the ADIZ Nov. 23, Ma said that the establishment of the zone does not affect Taiwan as it is not related to either territorial sovereignty or air space rights, but said that his government would express "serious concerns" to China "and other parties" without giving more specifics.

Huang's suit against Ma follows respective dismissals of China's demands over the ADIZ by the United States, Japan and South Korea. Each of those countries has separately announced that they have flown military aircraft through the zone without informing China.

The major opposition Democratic Progressive Party has criticized Ma for being soft on China, calling for the government to "toughen up."

The 1992 Consensus refers to the outcome of talks in Hong Kong which left Taipei and Beijing agreeing that there is only one country called China, but disagreeing on whether that refers to the Republic of China in Taipei or the People's Republic in Beijing.


Focus Taiwan

Plus more on Taiwan's dilemma in this ADIZ controversy:

China's ADIZ: Taiwan's Dilemma
If Taiwan ever wants to be an equal participant in regional security, it must stand up to China over the new ADIZ.
By J. Michael Cole
November 28, 2013


East_China_Sea_Air_Defense_Identification_Zone-386x270.png

Like other countries in Northeast Asia, Taiwan reacted with alarm to Beijing's November 23 announcement that it had established, and would enforce, an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) that extends into the East China Sea and incorporates the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islets. However, Taipei's precarious situation vis-a-vis China, with which it is seeking to improve relations, seems to have constrained the administration's ability to react appropriately to China's unexpected move.

But Taipei's reaction has been surprisingly mild. President Ma Ying-jeou has stated that China's ADIZ has nothing to do with Taiwan's territory or airspace, and seems more concerned about the impact of Beijing's gambit on his legacy as the mind behind the East China Sea peace initiative. For its part, the Presidential Office has stated reservations in a subdued manner, with vague claims of its intent to "defend its sovereignty."

Although the ADIZ controversy has little to do with Taiwan, the crisis forces Taipei to walk a tightrope, if not to choose which camp it belongs in. By immediately acquiescing to Beijing's ADIZ regulations, Taiwan's Civil Aeronautics Administration legitimized China's move, which is understandable from the standpoint of ensuring air safety. However, if it doesn't want to be seen as siding with China, Taipei will have to do something - and vague platitudes are insufficient.

President Ma, who has invested substantial political capital in his East China Sea peace initiative, ostensibly wants Taiwan to be treated as an equal participant in regional security. If it wants to achieve this goal, Taiwan will have to develop enough backbone to stand up to China when the latter adopts policies that increase tensions in the region. Conversely, inaction risks being perceived as tacit approval of China's gradual efforts to create facts on the ground.



The Diplomat




Furthermore, in spite of what was said earlier in this thread about reunification being inevitable, it seems unlikely for now, as this 2011 article stated:

Taiwan unlikely to move to reunify with China, despite Ma Ying-jeou’s reelection

Reunification unpopular

In a 2011 poll, only 1.4 percent of respondents said that they wanted swift unification, and 60 percent favored keeping the status quo indefinitely or until some undecided future date. Only 8.7 percent said they preferred the status quo with eventual unification, compared with 23 percent who want either immediate independence or the status quo with moves toward independence.

Washington Post


http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/11/02/2003575969

http://www.worldtribune.com/2013/07/21/taiwans-pro-china-policies-under-ma-have-benefitted-neither-its-economy-nor-its-people/
 
Would it be too far-fetched to expect to see one over a greater area of the South China Sea in the future?

(map at the link)

Defense News

More Chinese Air ID Zones Predicted
Dec. 1, 2013 - 11:26AM  |  By WENDELL MINNICK, JUNG SUNG-KI and PAUL KALLENDER-UMEZU 

TAIPEI, SEOUL AND TOKYO — China’s establishment of an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) last week over the East China Sea has given the US an unexpected challenge as Vice President Joseph Biden prepares for a trip to China, Japan and South Korea beginning this week.

The trip was scheduled to address economic issues, but the Nov. 23 ADIZ announcement raised a troubling new issue for the US and allies in the region. China’s ADIZ overlaps the zones of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.

Sources indicate China’s ADIZ could be part of its larger anti-access/area-denial strategy designed to force the US military to operate farther from China’s shorelines.

China might also be planning additional identification zones in the South China Sea and near contested areas along India’s border, US and local sources say.

China’s ADIZ might be an attempt by Beijing to improve its claim to disputed islands in the East China Sea also claimed by Japan, sources said. These islands — known as the Senkaku in Japan and the Diaoyu in China — are under the administrative control of Japan.

Mike Green, senior vice president for Asia and Japan chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), said this is part of a larger Chinese strategy beyond disputes over islands.

“This should be viewed as a part of a Chinese effort to assert greater denial capacity and eventual pre-eminence over the First Island Chain” off the coast, he said.

Green, who served on the US National Security Council from 2001 to 2005, said China’s Central Military Commission in 2008 “promulgated the ‘Near Sea Doctrine,’ and is following it to the letter, testing the US, Japan, Philippines and others to see how far they can push.”

June Teufel Dreyer, a veteran China watcher at the University of Miami, Fla., said “salami slicing” is a large part of China’s strategic policy. “The salami tactic has been stunningly successful, so incremental that it’s hard to decide what Japan, or any other country, should respond forcefully to. No clear ‘red line’ seems to have been established,” Dreyer said.


The Chinese refer to it as “ling chi” or “death from a thousand cuts.”

For example, China’s new ADIZ overlaps not only Japan’s zone to encompass disputed islands, but South Korea’s zone by 20 kilometers in width and 115 kilometers in length to cover the Socotra Rock (Ieodo or Parangdo). Socotra is under South Korean control but claimed by China as the Suyan Rock.

Seoul decided to expand its ADIZ after China refused to redraw its declared zone covering the islands. Seoul’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) and related government agencies are consulting on how to expand the South Korean ADIZ, drawn in 1951 by the US military, officials said.

“We’re considering ways of expanding [South] Korea’s air defense identification zone to include Ieodo,” said Wi Yong-seop, vice spokesman for the MND.

During annual high-level defense talks between Seoul and Beijing on Nov. 28, South Korean Vice Defense Minister Baek Seung-joo demanded that Wang Guanzhong, deputy chief of the General Staff of the Chinese Army, modify China’s ADIZ.

“We expressed regret over China’s air defense identification zone that overlaps our zone and even includes Ieodo,” Wi said after the bilateral meeting. “We made it clear that we can’t recognize China’s move and jurisdiction over Ieodo waters.”

Amid these growing tensions, South Korea’s arms procurement agency announced Nov. 27 it would push forward on procurement of four aerial refueling planes. Currently, South Korea’s F-15 fighter jets are limited to flying missions over Ieodo for 20 minutes. New tankers will extend that time to 80 minutes.

“With midair refueling, the operational range and flight hours of our fighter jets will be extended to a greater extent, and we will be able to respond to potential territorial disputes with neighboring countries,” a spokesman for South Korea’s Defense Acquisition Program Administration said.

In the southern part of China’s ADIZ, which overlaps Taiwan’s ADIZ, Beijing was careful not to cover Taiwan’s Pengjia Island, which is manned by a Taiwan Coast Guard unit.

(...)
 
We can play that game as well.ADZ over Guam.Japan could set up an ADZ over Okinawa.The PI ADZ.
 
A friend suggested to me that China doesn't really care about enforcing their ADIZ, and not about losing face, either.

But they will expect reciprocity: if US and Japanese warplanes can penetrate Chinese ADIZs without "checking in" then Chinese warplanes will require exactly the same courtesy in US, Korean and Japanese zones.  :dunno:
 
More on the Chinese ADIZ by Michael J Green* in this article which is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from Foreign Affairs:

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140307/michael-j-green/safeguarding-the-seas#cid=soc-twitter-at-snapshot-safeguarding_the_seas-000000
2-4-Foreign-Affairs-logo.jpg

Safeguarding the Seas
How to Defend Against China's New Air Defense Zone

By Michael J Green

December 2, 2013

Much of the coverage of China’s November 23 announcement of a new Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over waters claimed by Japan and South Korea has focused on the reactive and blundering nature of Chinese diplomacy. China’s sudden insistence on its right to take defensive action against foreign aircraft in this zone, the argument goes, was either an attempt to play to domestic nationalism or else to respond to Japan’s own increasing assertiveness in the region. Either way, the coverage concludes, China underestimated how quickly and vigorously other countries in the region would respond, including with flights directly into that airspace. 

The implication of this analysis, which may be tempting to the overstretched Obama administration, is that Beijing made a hasty move that the region will now correct with a little help from Washington. Unfortunately for the administration, however, this was not just an ill-conceived slap by Beijing against a testy Japan. The reality is that the new ADIZ is part of a longer-term attempt by Beijing to chip away at the regional status quo and assert greater control over the East and South China Seas.

To understand this reality, one must begin the story of the ADIZ before Japan’s nationalization of three of the eight disputed Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands in 2012, which is where most assessments start. Over three decades ago, China and Japan agreed to set aside their disagreement over the islands and focus on a common problem: the Soviet Union. It was China that first nullified the understanding by staking claim to the islands in 1992. It was also China that, in 2008, began significantly expanding its maritime patrols in and around those waters. In recent years, the Chinese maritime services have conducted patrols at least once a day near the islands and have crossed Japan’s 12-nautical-mile border around the islands on hundreds of occasions. Meanwhile, Chinese navy units have circumnavigated Japan and conducted major military exercises on all sides of the Japanese archipelago. In other words, by the time Tokyo purchased some of the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands from private landowners in 2012, Chinese pressure had reached alarming levels for Tokyo.

Both Japanese and Chinese diplomacy on the issue have been inept at times, of course, but the difference is that Japan -- which has effective administrative control of the islands -- is trying to preserve the status quo, whereas China is bent on using coercive pressure to try to change it. And Japan is not China’s only target. Beijing has also been pressing Manila over the Scarborough Shoal (Huangyan Island) in the South China Sea. China has increased its maritime and air presence around the contested area and imposed export bans on key products from the Philippines. (This strategy smacks of the same mercantilism China showed when it halted rare earth exports to Japan because of those two countries’ island disputes.)

Unlike the ongoing dispute with Japan, the Scarborough Shoal confrontation going badly for Manila. In 2012, Chinese maritime patrol ships finally overwhelmed the tiny Philippine navy and took de facto control of the shoals. Filipinos whose families have fished those waters for a millennium are now barred from entering.

Japan’s air force and navy are too strong for China to attempt a similar grab of the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands anytime soon. But Hanoi, Manila, Taipei, and Tokyo all sense that, in the Scarborough Shoal, Beijing “killed the chicken to scare the monkey,” as officials from those governments say. Most observers would agree that China has every intention of following the same strategy against Japan, just in slow motion. Although the smaller powers have remained quiet about the announcement of a new Chinese defense zone, most are privately urging Japan not to back down.

Japan, South Korea, and the United States have stated that they will not let the Chinese ADIZ announcement change their military operations in the area. To prove the point, the Pentagon sent two B-52 bombers out of Guam to fly through the new defense zone. Japan and South Korea quickly followed suit with their own patrols. The administration’s opening move certainly demonstrated by word and deed that Beijing went too far. But if the Chinese announcement comes from a deeper strategy of coercing smaller states and establish greater control in the Western Pacific -- as many governments in the region rightly suspect -- then Washington had better be prepared for a longer-term test of wills with Beijing.

The administration needs to consider the larger context that the rest of the region sees. Some of the policies included in the so-called rebalance to Asia will help, including the announcement in October that Washington and Tokyo will revise their bilateral defense guidelines to deal with new contingencies, including from China. Other moves have been less helpful. It was not lost on China or Japan, for example, that U.S. service chiefs testified in front of Congress that planned defense budget cuts would leave the armed forces unable to fulfill their current missions or security commitments; that U.S. President Barack Obama threw the decision about honoring his redline in Syria to Congress; or that senior U.S. officers in the Pacific continue trying to calm the waters by speaking of a new strategic partnership with China and naming climate change as their greatest security concern in the region.

More immediately, the disconnect between Washington and Tokyo this week over whether commercial flights should recognize the ADIZ and file flight plans with Beijing (Tokyo says no and Washington says yes) was a poor case of alliance management and an embarrassment for Tokyo during a serious security problem. Whatever the merits of each side’s respective policies in terms of strategic signals and airline safety, the two will have to work as one in the future.

The Obama administration needs to stick to a disciplined message of resolve and reassurance. And that would mean accurately assessing Beijing’s strategic intent. Confrontation with China is far from inevitable, and the potential areas for productive U.S.-Chinese cooperation remain vast. Vice President Joe Biden will no doubt emphasize the positive in U.S.-Chinese relations when he travels to Beijing this week. And that makes sense. But he should also leave no doubt that the United States is prepared to work with regional allies and partners to ensure Beijing understands that its attempts at coercion will not work. Then, when he is in Tokyo and Seoul, he should take time to listen carefully to what those allies think is at stake in the troubled East and South China Seas. Their problem is our problem, not just because we are allies but also because this moment could determine how China uses its growing power.


I'm still perplexed by this whole issue. I think Prof Green is correct that China is pursuing a longer-term strategy "to chip away at the regional status quo and assert greater control over the East and South China Seas." I'm less sure that this is doing to Tokyo, in slow motion, what has, already been done to the Philippines. In fact I'm not sure China has actually "won" the Scarborough Shoal dispute. I wonder if this is not a unilateral, uncoordinated act by the Ministry of Defence that actually complicates China's strategy.

_____
* MICHAEL J. GREEN is Senior Vice President for Asia and Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and Associate Professor at Georgetown University. He served as Director and then Senior Director for Asian Affairs on the staff of the National Security Council staff from 2001 to 2005.
 
US-China spy games in the storm-ravaged areas of the Philippines. 

He was wearing tattered clothes but, suspiciously, had a brand-new camera. And he was using it to snap photos not of the evacuees he was with, but of the US military aircraft on the runway.

Source: Alaska Dispatch
 
Seoul's response to Beijing's E.China Sea ADIZ:

Defense News

South Korea To Expand Air Defense Zone

SEOUL — South Korea is announcing next week that it will extend its air defense identification zone in response to China’s declaration of a new air defense zone overlapping the country’s southern islands and underwater rock.

President Park Geun-hye held talks Dec. 6 with US Vice President Joe Biden here to discuss the matter.

According to the presidential office, Biden, who had received no concession from China on its new air defense zone, appreciates Seoul’s plan to expand its air defense zone, drawn in 1951 by the UN Command in the middle of the Korean War.

“The two sides agreed to continue to discuss the matter,” Foreign Minister Yoon Byung-se said after the meeting.

In a speech at Yonsei University here, Biden reiterated the US government doesn’t recognize China’s unilateral move announced Nov. 23.

(...)
 
Huawei in the news again.

Source: AP News

Chinese firm paid US gov't intelligence adviser

A longtime adviser to the U.S. Director of National Intelligence has resigned after the government learned he has worked since 2010 as a paid consultant for Huawei Technologies Ltd., the Chinese technology company the U.S. has condemned as an espionage threat, The Associated Press has learned.

Theodore H. Moran, a respected expert on China's international investment and professor at Georgetown University, had served since 2007 as adviser to the intelligence director's advisory panel on foreign investment in the United States. Moran also was an adviser to the National Intelligence Council, a group of 18 senior analysts and policy experts who provide U.S. spy agencies with judgments on important international issues.

The case highlights the ongoing fractious relationship between the U.S. government and Huawei, China's leading developer of telephone and Internet infrastructure, which has been condemned in the U.S. as a potential national security threat. Huawei has aggressively disputed this, and its chief executive, Ren Zhengfei, has said the company has decided to abandon the U.S. market.

The House Intelligence Committee last year said Huawei and another firm, ZTE, posed a threat that could enable Chinese intelligence services to tamper with American communications networks. The committee said it could not prove wrongdoing but recommended that the companies be barred from doing business in the country.
 
This is interesting from multiple perspectives. It forecasts some profound changes in the Chinese economy, it alters the financial "balance of power" between China and the United States, it has implications with American fiscal policy, and can potentially be read in terms of "Unrestricted Warfare" as a positioning move to gain advantage in global financial markets or pull the rug out from under the United States at the time and place of their choosing:

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-20/pboc-says-no-longer-in-china-s-favor-to-boost-record-reserves.html

PBOC Says No Longer in China’s Interest to Increase Reserves
By Bloomberg News  Nov 20, 2013 10:03 PM ET  38 Comments  Email  Print

The People’s Bank of China said the country does not benefit any more from increases in its foreign-currency holdings, adding to signs policy makers will rein in dollar purchases that limit the yuan’s appreciation.

“It’s no longer in China’s favor to accumulate foreign-exchange reserves,” Yi Gang, a deputy governor at the central bank, said in a speech organized by China Economists 50 Forum at Tsinghua University yesterday. The monetary authority will “basically” end normal intervention in the currency market and broaden the yuan’s daily trading range, Governor Zhou Xiaochuan wrote in an article in a guidebook explaining reforms outlined last week following a Communist Party meeting. Neither Yi nor Zhou gave a timeframe for any changes.

China’s foreign-exchange reserves surged $166 billion in the third quarter to a record $3.66 trillion, more than triple those of any other country and bigger than the gross domestic product of Germany, Europe’s largest economy. The increase suggested money poured into the nation’s assets even as developing nations from Brazil to India saw an exit of capital because of concern the Federal Reserve will taper stimulus.

Yi, who is also head of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, said in the speech that the yuan’s appreciation benefits more people in China than it hurts.

‘Less Interventionist’

His comments are “consistent with the plans to increase the renminbi’s flexibility so they become less interventionist,” Sacha Tihanyi, senior currency strategist at Scotiabank in Hong Kong, said by phone today. The central bank may widen the yuan’s trading band in “the coming few months,” he added.

The yuan’s spot rate is allowed to diverge a maximum 1 percent on either side of a daily reference rate set by the People’s Bank of China. The trading range was doubled in April 2012, after being expanded from 0.3 percent in May 2007. The band could be widened to 2 percent, Hong Kong Apple Daily reported today, citing an interview with the Hong Kong Monetary Authority’s former chief executive Joseph Yam.

Capital inflows into China accelerated in October, official data suggest. Yuan positions at the nation’s financial institutions accumulated from foreign-exchange purchases, a gauge of capital flows, climbed 441.6 billion yuan ($72 billion), the most since January.

About half of October’s increase in the positions was attributable to surpluses in trade and foreign direct investment, with the rest accounted for by inflows of “hot money,” Goldman Sachs Group Inc. Hong Kong-based analysts MK Tang and Li Cui wrote in a Nov. 18 note.

Stronger Yuan

The yuan has appreciated 2.3 percent against the greenback this year, the best-performance of 24 emerging-market currencies tracked by Bloomberg. Non-deliverable 12-month forwards rose 0.2 percent this week and reached 6.1430 per dollar on Nov. 20, matching an all-time high recorded on Oct. 16. The currency was little changed at 6.0932 as of 10:33 a.m. in Shanghai today.

“It appears that many in the People’s Bank think the time is about right to scale back currency interventions,” Mark Williams, London-based chief Asia economist at Capital Economics Ltd., wrote in an e-mail yesterday. “But China has got itself into a situation where stopping intervention will be very hard to do” and comments such as Yi’s will spur speculative inflows, he added.

Less intervention and smaller gains in foreign-exchange reserves may damp China’s appetite for U.S. government debt. The nation is the largest foreign creditor to the U.S. and its holdings of Treasuries increased by $25.7 billion, or 2 percent, to $1.294 trillion in September, the biggest gain since February. U.S. government securities lost 2.6 percent this year, according to the Bloomberg U.S. Treasury Bond Index. (BUSY)

Yi’s comments didn’t imply China will be cutting its holdings of U.S. government debt, said Scotiabank’s Tihanyi. “They are probably going to keep their allocations reasonably stable unless there’s a big policy shift, but it means they will possibly be buying less at the margin,” he said.

To contact Bloomberg News staff for this story: Xin Zhou in Beijing at xzhou68@bloomberg.net; Fion Li in Hong Kong at fli59@bloomberg.net

To contact the editors responsible for this story: James Regan at jregan19@bloomberg.net; Rosalind Mathieson at rmathieson3@bloomberg.net

and:

http://www.metal.com/newscontent/55523_chinas-yuan-vaults-to-record-as-c.bank-signals-policy-shift

China's yuan vaults to record as c.bank signals policy shift
Dec 09, 2013 09:26 GMT  Source: Reuters

Summary:China's yuan jumped to a record high against the dollar on Monday lifting some Asian currencies in its wake after the central bank relaxed its grip on the currency following strong trade data.

Mon, 9 Dec 05:12:00 GMT

By Saikat Chatterjee

HONG KONG, Dec 9 (Reuters) - China's yuan jumped to a record high against the dollar on Monday lifting some Asian currencies in its wake after the central bank relaxed its grip on the currency following strong trade data, suggesting a noticeable shift in policy.

The People's Bank of China appears to have flagged a new round of appreciation for its tightly-managed currency at the year-end after it aggressively fixed the daily midpoint at a record high for a second consecutive day.

The yuan, also known as the renminbi, is allowed to trade on the mainland within a range of one percent on each side of the fixing which has repeatedly hit fresh highs in past weeks.

Underlining market optimism about the upward trend of the Chinese currency, the spot market has also become disconnected to the daily fixing, consistently trading at the stronger end of the range.

The continued gains in the yuan has confounded bank models and triggered a washout of long dollar bets in the spot market.

"Authorities appear to be comfortable with the yuan's rise and we expect a moderate pace of gains in the near term," said Sacha Tihanyi, senior currency strategist at Scotia Bank in Hong Kong who expects the yuan to rise to 6.07 per dollar by the end of March and to 6.01 by end 2014.

"With stronger downside fixings on days like today, it is suggestive that policymakers may be allowing already the degree of flexibility that was hinted at in recent statements," he said. [ID:nL3N0JO04J]

In opening trades on Monday, the yuan barrelled to a record of 6.0715 per dollar before retreating, compared with 6.0817 at the previous close after the People's Bank of China set the daily fixing at 6.1130 – its highest since a 2005 revaluation.

The sharp gains for yuan come after it spent November crawling in a tiny band, despite volatile fixings as state-run banks, likely acting on behalf of the central bank, capped moves. The Australian dollar , which has a strong correlation to the yuan due to Australia's large trade in commodities with China, briefly perked higher after the strong fixing.

Heavy dollar purchases by Beijing until last Thursday in its currency markets comes at a time when growth has rebounded and investors have regained confidence in the economy's outlook after an ambitious reform roadmap released last month. [ID:nL4N0JK1UB]

In contrast with the relative calm in the onshore currency markets, the Chinese yuan traded in Hong Kong has outperformed its counterpart onshore and Chinese stocks listed offshore are seeing heavy demand from global money managers. [ID:nL4N0JB19S]

But as more data has became available, the authorities have begun to change their stance towards the yuan by asking state-run banks to loosen their grip on the market and by fixing the daily midpoint higher.

On the weekend, data showed China's export growth in November blowing past estimates while import growth was broadly in line with estimates resulting in a gigantic trade surplus – its highest since 2009.

While some of the trade data may be amplified, with capital flows being disguised as trade, it is likely to provide further impetus to the currency's outlook in the near term, though some analysts warn on betting on aggressive gains. There are signs that China's trade figures are again being distorted by speculative capital inflows disguised as exports of goods and services, with the State Administration of Foreign Exchange

(SAFE) announcing over the weekend it will clamp down on the usage of foreign currency for trade finance. [ID:nL4N0JM081]

"We expect the Chinese government to be more cautious this time and will prevent the yuan from appreciating too much," said Bank of America Merrill Lynch strategists in a note.

Another factor boosting the yuan has been the widening interest rate differentials between onshore and the offshore markets. Over the last two months, the spread between one-year debt in the Hong Kong and onshore markets has nearly doubled to 340 basis points, according to Thomson Reuters data.

The central bank has controlled the pace of yuan rises since the currency's landmark revaluation in July 2005. It has let the currency appreciate mainly for major political events, such as Chinese leaders' visits to the United States or participation in global forums, while maintaining stability at other times.

Despite this gradualism, the yuan has strengthened 36 percent since the revaluation, signalling that the government is determined to move towards a fully convertible currency over time, starting with pilot zones around the country. [ID:nL4N0JJ0RU]

The currency has risen 2.6 percent so far this year and is heading for a 3 percent appreciation for 2013 assuming it lands somewhere around 6.05 per dollar by year-end, tripling a 1-percent rise in 2012 and exceeding traders' expectations for a 2-percent gain. [ID:nL3N0F71YS]

The onshore spot yuan market at a glance:



Item Current Previous Change

PBOC midpoint 6.113 6.1232 0.17%

Spot yuan 6.0725 6.0817 0.15%

Divergence from midpoint* -0.66%

Spot change ytd 2.60%

Spot change since 2005 revaluation 36.29%


*Divergence of the dollar/yuan exchange rate. Negative number indicates that spot yuan is trading stronger than the midpoint. The People's Bank of China (PBOC) allows the exchange rate to rise or fall 1 percent from official midpoint rate it sets each morning.

OFFSHORE CNH MARKET

Text

The offshore yuan market at a glance:


Instrument Current Difference from onshore

Offshore spot yuan 6.0650 0.12%

Offshore non-deliverable 6.12 -0.11%

forwards

*Premium for offshore spot over onshore
**Figure reflects difference from PBOC's official midpoint, since non-deliverable forwards are settled against the midpoint. .

KEY DATA POINTS

- Gap between PBOC midpoint and spot rate is narrowing. GRAPHIC: http://link.reuters.com/qyx74t

- China's trade surpluses mainly driven by weak imports rather than strong exports. GRAPHIC: http://link.reuters.com/qav68s

- Corporate FX purchases in May show reduction in yuan appreciation expectations. GRAPHIC: http://link.reuters.com/tyx74t

- Hot money inflows turn to outflows in May GRAPHIC: http://link.reuters.com/saz74t

- Despite relatively stable dollar/yuan exchange rate, the yuan is appreciating on a trade-weighted basis. GRAPHIC: http://link.reuters.com/sed74t
 
The "rabbit" has landed.

China successfully soft-lands probe on the moon
Dec 14, 10:08 AM EST

5fea3392-3812-4a8f-9e7e-be2ea7c51ec0-small.jpg
 

BEIJING (AP) -- China on Saturday successfully carried out the world's first soft landing of a space probe on the moon in nearly four decades, state media said, the next stage in an ambitious space program that aims to eventually put a Chinese astronaut on the moon.

The unmanned Chang'e 3 lander, named after a mythical Chinese goddess of the moon, touched down on Earth's nearest neighbor following a 12-minute landing process.

The probe carried a six-wheeled moon rover called "Yutu," or "Jade Rabbit," the goddess' pet. After landing Saturday evening on a fairly flat, Earth-facing part of the moon, the rover was slated to separate from the Chang'e eight hours later and embark on a three-month scientific exploration.

... 

Associated Press
 
E.R. Campbell said:
A friend suggested to me that China doesn't really care about enforcing their ADIZ, and not about losing face, either.

But they will expect reciprocity: if US and Japanese warplanes can penetrate Chinese ADIZs without "checking in" then Chinese warplanes will require exactly the same courtesy in US, Korean and Japanese zones.  :dunno:

Speaking of "not checking in" ... Seoul and Tokyo thumb their noses at Beijing...


Japan and South Korea hold joint exercise in China’s air defence zone


Rescue exercise near Suyan Rock is seen as sending out a strong signal to Beijing, but two nations are at odds over commercial flights

South China Morning Post link

Both countries said that while they didn't inform the Chinese authorities, the joint maritime rescue drill was planned long before Beijing announced the controversial zone over the East China Sea. Under Chinese rules, all aircraft are required to report flight plans in advance.

(...)
 
More on the illicit Chinese acquisition of sensitive US technology:

Special Report: How China's weapon snatchers are penetrating U.S. defenses
Reuters
By John Shiffman and Duff Wilson 13 hours ago


OAKLAND, California (Reuters) - Agents from Homeland Security sneaked into a tiny office in Oakland's Chinatown before sunrise on December 4, 2011. They tread carefully, quickly snapping digital pictures so they could put everything back in place. They didn't want Philip Chaohui He, the businessman who rented the space, to learn they had been there.

Seven months had passed since they'd launched an undercover operation against a suspected Chinese arms-trafficking network - one of scores operating in support of Beijing's ambitious military expansion into outer space.

The agents had allowed a Colorado manufacturer to ship He a type of technology that China covets but cannot replicate: radiation-hardened microchips. Known as rad-chips, the dime-sized devices are critical for operating satellites, for guiding ballistic missiles, and for protecting military hardware from nuclear and solar radiation.

It was a gamble. This was a chance to take down an entire Chinese smuggling ring. But if He succeeded in trafficking the rad-chips to China, the devices might someday be turned against U.S. sailors, soldiers or pilots, deployed on satellites providing the battlefield eyes and ears for the People's Liberation Army.

------------------------

China's efforts to obtain U.S. technology have tracked its accelerated defense buildup. The Chinese military budget - second only to America's - has soared to close to $200 billion.

President Xi Jinping is championing a renaissance aimed at China's asserting its dominance in the region and beyond. In recent weeks, Beijing has declared control over air space in the contested East China Sea and launched China's first rover mission to the moon.

IMMEDIATE THREAT

As China rises to challenge the United States as a power in the Pacific, American officials say Beijing is penetrating the U.S. defense industry in ways that not only compromise weapons systems but also enable it to secure some of the best and most dangerous technology. A classified Pentagon advisory-board report this year, for instance, asserted that Chinese hackers had gained access to plans for two dozen U.S. weapons systems, according to the Washington Post.

But the smuggling of technology such as radiation-hardened microchips out of America may present a more immediate challenge to the U.S. military, Reuters has found. If China hacks into a sensitive blueprint, years might pass before a weapon can be manufactured. Ready-made components and weapons systems can be - and are - used immediately.


------------------
Quite often, sensitive U.S. technology is legally shipped to friendly nations and then immediately and illegally reshipped to China.



A MAN NAMED "HOPE"

The Oakland investigation began in spring 2011. The manufacturer, Aeroflex of Colorado Springs, Colorado, received an email from a man who called himself Philip Hope of Oakland. The man wanted to buy two kinds of rad-chips - 112 of one type and 200 of the other.

The suspicious Aeroflex employees contacted Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), a division of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, which keeps a special counter-proliferation office in the space technology hub of Colorado Springs.

Based on quick record checks, the HSI agents drew a portrait of "Philip Hope." The man was a Chinese immigrant and legal permanent resident, Philip Chaohui He, an engineer for the state of California assigned to a Bay Bridge renovation project. Sierra Electronic Instruments was a start-up run from the one-room office in Chinatown.

The HSI agents concluded that He was buying the rad-chips on behalf of someone else. Someone rich. Someone who couldn't legally acquire them. Probably someone in China - likely the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corp, a state-run entity that operates nearly all of China's military and civilian space projects.

China Aerospace officials did not respond to requests for comment. An official at a Shanghai subsidiary said he was unaware of the He purchases.

The rad-chips He ordered from Aeroflex are not the most powerful on the market, and could not operate a sophisticated military satellite on their own. But experts say they have few uses other than as one of the many components of a sophisticated satellite.


"You wouldn't spend that kind of money on those microchips unless you intended to use them in much bigger satellites," said Alvar Saenz-Otero, associate director of the Space Systems Lab at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. "They fit the design of a satellite that you'd want to stay in space for a reasonably long time, and therefore are likely small parts of a bigger satellite."


THE AGENTS' DILEMMA

The agents faced the key question that comes in almost every counter-proliferation case: Could they lure the suspect into a sting? If so, would it be worth the trouble?

Undercover operations are time-consuming, expensive and risky. If agents dangled rad-chips in front of the suspect and he got away, the components would probably end up on Chinese satellites. If they delivered the chips and watched him closely, he might lead them to a network traceable to Beijing.

The agents in the case faced another complication: At the time, Aeroflex - the very manufacturer enlisted to help with the sting - was itself under civil investigation for sending rad-chips to China.

Although that investigation was still under way, Aeroflex had already admitted that it sent more than 14,500 rad-chips to China between 2003 and 2008. Aeroflex exported more than half of those chips even after U.S. officials had directed it to stop doing so.

The company declined to comment. But documents show two mitigating factors - Aeroflex voluntarily disclosed the transgressions, and it blamed them in part on misreading complex and sometimes competing Commerce Department and State Department regulations.

Even so, State Department regulators would ultimately conclude: "The exports directly supported Chinese satellites and military aircraft, and caused harm to U.S. national security."

-----------------

The L.A. agents followed the cell-tracker to a Best Western hotel south of the city. In the early evening, they located He's Honda sedan in the hotel parking lot. They confirmed that He had checked in, and they settled in for surveillance.

At about 8:45 a.m. on December 11, 2011, He left his hotel room with an unidentified traveling companion and pulled the Honda onto Interstate 110, driving south. Tijuana was two hours away. The HSI agents planned to stop him at the Mexico border.

But after just 3 miles, He pulled into the Port of Long Beach. Then, he used a Transportation Safety Administration pass - a badge he carried for his Bay Bridge repair assignment - to swiftly get through port security.


THE MISSING CHIPS


The fate of the first shipment of 112 radiation-hardened chips - the ones that got away - is unknown. U.S. officials strongly suspect they are either in China or orbiting the Earth aboard one of Beijing's satellites.

Yahoo News
 
Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from China Business Review, is an open source guesstimate of the scope and scale of Chinese investment in Africa in 2012:

BcBveBZCEAABhW6.jpg:large


The key point, I think, is to note the distribution: about 70% of it is investment in resources (oil, iron ore, copper and uranium) and the railroads and seaports needed to move those resources to global markets. Less than 2% is aid. That ratio is, I believe, good for both Africa and China.
 
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