Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)

[Kirkhill]

Good read ROJ.

If we are to be taken seriously by our peers as Gottlieb suggests and we want a realist foreign policy then we will have to invest more money.   Stipulated.

But perhaps we can still flatter ourselves by appealing to our "compassionate" "non-American" "do-gooder" nature by adopting different balance between Defence and Aid than the US adopts while still improving the Defence side of the house, not a difficult proposition

These two charts show what Canada would be spending on Defense and Aid if it spent like the listed countries. Data is take from CIA World Fact Book.

These are our peers.  

They do not aspire to superpower status but the do aspire to a more stable world.

To achieve that stability they are spending money and going out into the world.

You will note that everybody outspends us on their combined Defence and Development budget, including Luxembourg, and outspends us by a wide margin.

I don't happen to like Luxembourg's balance and it looks like they are still not pulling their weight despite the fact they may be the richest bunch of people on the planet.

Belgium isn't bad but the Netherlands is where we could and should be.   That's 1.6% of GDP on Defense and Pearson's 0.7% on Aid.

If we had that kind of budget then how about this for a plan.   Set up two permanent garrisons, smaller in scale but similar in concept to 4 CMBG in Germany.   One in Haiti and one in Afghanistan â “ assuming the locals want us.   They would contribute stability to the countries, be a source of foreign investment and jobs and be sally ports for Canadian operations in the regions.

We don't want to be like Americans.   We want to be different.   We want to act independently.

OK then, so prepare to act independently.   If we think we have a better way to stabilize regions then let us go to it and try.   I don't think the Americans will stop us.   They apparently like what we have done elsewhere.

The Americans do what they do because they want to sleep secure in their beds at night and want to be able to travel widely and make lots of money.   They need a peaceful, secure world.   They see threats coming from areas where the borders aren't secure and governments don't control their populations.   They might prefer democratic governments but order and security are more important than good government.

If we think that we can do a better job, if we think that we can supply security, peace, order AND good government then shouldn't we be doing it rather than just carping on at the Yanks about how they are doing it all wrong?

I am sure the Yanks would be ecstatic if they woke up one morning and Ottawa called to say that they could send their troops home from Afghanistan, that Canada will guarantee the stability of the country and it will be brought under the rule of law and a democratic government â “ with public health care for all.

By the way one of the borders they would like to see more secure would be our borders.  

We make them happy, they will keep the back door open.   We don't make them happy they are quite within their rights, and it is their responsibility to themselves and their kids, to close the door, lock it, and only invite in those people they know.   If we secure our borders and they come to trust our judgment on guaranteeing the character of the types of people we invite in then they will be more inclined to keep that door open.

 

[Edward Campbell]

I think we need to keep in mind that our foreign policy describes what we do about or to or, sometimes, even for the world around us, in pursuit of our own self interest.   A policy which does not, always, item-by-item, page-by-page and line-by-line keep our self interest as its highest priority is a failure.

We must understand what our self interest is: I have offered peace and prosperity as a shorthand description.   Allan Gotlieb says that, traditionally, our realist foreign policy "has three broad goals over time: control over territory and resources, national unity, and more secure economic access to foreign markets, in particular the United States ...â ?

I would argue that Gotlieb is enunciating a national policy which, I agree, exists and needs to be enunciated because it should 'drive' foreign, defence, economic and sundry domestic policies.

I believe that what Gotlieb describes as the romantic tendency in Canadian foreign policy has secured pride of place for two main reasons:

"¢ Pearson and, specially, Trudeau gave it intellectual respectability - mainly in the Trudeau/Head 1969 foreign policy white paper (a series of little booklets, actually, designed (with great care) to be 'easy' for grammar school children to understand and accept); and

"¢ Chrétien adopted and 'sold' it out of a combination of economic necessity and respect for Pink Lloyd Axworthy's hard left idealism.

The romantics are not interested in defence spending comparisons - "less is more,â ? they say; less defence spending means that more resources can be applied to the human security agenda - allocated to NGOs who, unlike the military, routinely and without fanfare, serve (and bravely and effectively, too, I hasten to add) where human security is most at risk.  

Realists should, also, be wary of spending charts and tables.   One of the main 'outputs' from a successful foreign policy ought to be the capability to reduce defence forces and defence expenditure because our policies - and our military muscle - should have created a safer, more peaceful and prosperous world - one in which we can trade our goods and services without the aid of frigates, battalions and bombers.

Both realists and romantics should be able to agree on a common strategic survey or overview.   Both 'wings' should be able to 'see' the world through a common, Canadian lens - they should, in other words, agree the factors which bear on our aims and interests and objectives even if they cannot agree on what those aims and objectives might be.   It stands to reason that, despite a common, Canadian world view, the deductions which the realists and romantics draw from their analysis of the commonly agreed factors will be quite different and the courses open and plan will be wildly divergent.

An acceptable Canadian foreign policy must, as Gotlieb suggests, be based upon a number if requirements.   He suggest that they are:

"¢ transcendent U.S. power is the dominant feature of the contemporary international order;

"¢ Canada's role as a middle power can never be regained;

"¢ Canadians [must] liberate themselves from the belief that the UN is the sacred foundation of our foreign policy;

"¢ we must also abandon our fixation with international rule-making;

"¢ Utopianism, millenarianism and visionary crusades should have no place in Canadian foreign policy;

"¢ [we must have a] willingness to commit significant resources to achieving Canada's goals; and, most important for Gotlieb

"¢ recognition that our destiny as a sovereign nation is inescapably tied to our geography.


I disagree with his second requirement (expanded on pps 32/33).   I do not think the concept of middle powers is passé ... I think, in fact, that a Western middle power based alliance may be vital to securing Canada's interests (and America's and Australia's and Britain's and ... too) in the re-emerging bipolar world.   The functionalism to which Gotlieb bids us return rests, firmly, on the idea of middle powers.   Our 'top ten' status does not obviate the fact that we are not a great power ... I said, elsewhere, that we are not in the major leagues we need to be a middle power with Triple A political, economic, foreign and military prowess.

With regard to the United Nations and rules based world government, I would go farther than Gotlieb.   I believe that Martin should pursue his G-20 idea - but with strict membership limits: members are invited to join because they are important or reasonably important and because they are responsible, respectable actors on the world stage.   There must be room in the G-20 for countries like Australia, Brazil, Chile, China, Denmark, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Russia Singapore, South Korea and Thailand but not for the likes of Armenia, Burkina Faso, Chad or Djibouti and so on.   This should be a league of great, large, middle and even small powers and Canada should aim to lead the middle powers.

Canada should start, soon, to distance itself from the United Nations because it is highly unlikely that the institutional reforms which are essential can be made under the current Charter.   Canada should insist - and it will achieve much support - that many, many UN agencies - like the International Civil Aviation Organization, International Maritime Organization, International Telecommunications Union, and World Intellectual Property Rights Organization should be transferred to the World Trade Organization.   The WTO should be reinforced with a .security council' based on the OECD or, perhaps better, the G-20 which should be able to enforce the WTO's dispute settlements.   The WTO is a 'rules based' organization and Canadians can indulge their fixation with international rule-making through it, if it is reformed and rebuilt.

I believe we must have a realist foreign policy, rooted in a national policy, supported by economic and defence policies which promotes and protects our vital interests around the world; I also believe this realist policy must be well camouflaged in romantic words.

 

[Edward Campbell]

I would like to address Gotlieb's two most important requirements for a return to a principled, realist foreign policy for Canada:

"¢ transcendent U.S. power is the dominant feature of the contemporary international order; and

"¢ recognition that our destiny as a sovereign nation is inescapably tied to our geography.

The question which our foreign policy must answer is: how to we exploit these two factors to protect and promote our vital interests?

How, in other words, do we help to focus the US' use of its own transcendent power so that it, preferably, supports our interests or, at least, does them no serious harm?   How do we ensure that the US' use of its power does not sideswipe us and our interests?   How do we exploit our geographic proximity to the US?

The latter is easier than the former.   We must, without fail, do a full and fair share in continental defence - including the defence of the US strategic forces.   This is more than NORAD - this involves more than just the defence department.   All of our 'security' services - including, especially, customs and immigration - must be on side with the Americans; the operative word for all of our security services in continental.

Our merchants - large and small - are, already, exploiting our geographic advantage by broadening and deepening the integration of North America.   This is not a matter of government policy - no one cares what Canadians, broadly, or Canadian political 'leaders' think; this is business and it has been going on - in earnest - for a century and will continue to go on.   It is not a policy, it is a fact; those who cannot see the fact cannot understand Canadian policy - not economic policy, not social policy, not environmental policy, not defence policy, not security policy and not foreign policy; all Canadian policies are tied, inescapably, to our geography.   (Parenthetically: Even our national unity is tied to geography - French speaking Canadians are an insignificant, minor league minority in North America; Spanish is North America's second language - black and brown are its second skin colours.)

There are a few answers:

First and foremost we are, we must remain and we must work at always being America's best friend and most trusted ally.   That does not mean we are or should ever be America's toady - we can, we do, we will disagree with our friends - we must do so as good, best friends do: respectfully.   The Anti-Americanism which, as Gotlieb notes, the Chrétien government made part and parcel of our policy base was an error which must be eradicated - quickly and thoroughly.   For a start, Prime Minister Martin must - as a matter of important national policy - expel Carolyn Parrish from the Liberal caucus and he must firmly and forcefully disavow her views and those of her followers.   This is politically difficult, especially in a minority government but there are many, many things which are far, far more important than the future of Paul Martin and his government - proper, useful, advantageous relations with the US is one of them.

Second, we must cooperate, effectively, in securing our shared continent - sealing the borders and access points to the outside world so that we can unseal our internal borders.

Third, we must work to strengthen the so called Anglosphere - that group of traditional allies and democracies consisting of: America, Australia, Britain, Canada, New Zealand and Singapore.   The Anglosphere allows us to deal with our neighbour and friend with the support of others - multilateralism has a long and honourable history in Canadian foreign policy because it works.   It has, since 1945, worked especially well with the United States - President Bush may say that he is content to act unilaterally but his government wants (and probably needs) allies and partners and friends.   We can, and should, exploit our existing bonds with our traditional allies, including the United States, to pursue our own vital interests.

 

[Kirkhill]

Gottlieb promotes â Å“Realismâ ? vs â Å“Romanticismâ ?.

Which of these two Principles of War should we consign to the scrap-heap?

Selection and Maintenance of the Aim, or Maintenance of Morale?

While it seems that some of our defence bureaucrats, and I hope it is only the civilian side and not the uniformed side, are willing to neglect morale as an issue it doesn't seem from the comments on this board to be an issue that the uniformed members of the CF are unconcerned with.

Morale is implicity and explicitly a â Å“Romanticâ ? notion.  It is about how people feel about themselves and about how other people feel about them. It is reinforced by everything from Caubeens, Balmorals, and Busbys, CoveraBusbiesilts and trousers, to tanks and frigates.

Most of the details of uniform that are so cherished by the CF, especially in the Reserves, find their origins in the Napoleonic period.  This period is the transitional period of the Rationalists of the Enlightenment to the rise of the Romantics like Lord Byron, the Brontes and Sir Walter Scott, author of the novel Ivanhoe.  Sir Walter Scott actually has a direct connection to my beloved kilt because it was he that convinced King George IV, a great ladies man and lover of fancy dress balls, to wear a philabeg (small kilt) complete with ribbons, feathers and flash buttons on the occasion of his visit to Scotland in 1824.  That  cemented the modern image of what a Scotsman is supposed to look like.  The image endures because of romantic sentiment.  There is very little of practical rationality in a feather bonnet.  These romantic images, like the 3 white stripes on RN collars for Nelson's three great victories, these symbols are the things that bind units to themselves and to their pasts.

However morale is not bought only with flash and high sounding mottos.  It also has practical needs.  â Å“Let the deed shawâ ? or â Å“Show me the moneyâ ? are also critical factors in building morale.  Those in uniform need to feel that they are doing the right thing, that their leaders and their nation support them and trust them and that their actions will benefit others.  Jean Chretien disparagingly referred to the need to feel like â Å“Boy Scoutsâ ?.  As much as he himself found this laughable he wasn't wrong.  Every serving member on this board, past and present feels that his or her service is service in a good cause, even if it service that benefits him or her personally.

One way that they want the support of their nation to be demonstrated is in being supplied with, and trusted to use correctly, the tools that they feel are necessary to do the job.  There are many examples but I will just cite Tanks.  The Tanks debate is as much about Maintenance of Morale as it is about Selection and Maintenance of the Aim.  Soldiers feel they need Tanks to support them.  Without them they feel insecure in the field.  There may be some point in the future where Tanks are demonstrated to have no tactical value (in my mind that day has not yet come).  Until that day comes it behoves the Government, representing the nation, to give the troops the tools necessary not just to perform the tasks in the manner  they see fit, but also the tools necessary to demonstrate support, trust in judgment and to make them feel more secure.  There may come a day when the military voluntarily wishes to give up Tanks but that will only happen when one of two things occurs. When a rich country that has Tanks chooses not to use them and wins without casualties regardless, or a poor country without Tanks defeats a force with Tanks.  That day happened for horses and elephants, for longbows and pikes.

Morale is a critical factor in the maintenance of an effective military force.

Likewise it is a critical factor in the life of a Nation.

Hitler's Germans did not support him just out of a mindless hate of the rest of the World.  They were setting right the injustice of Versailles.  They were saving the Germans of the Alsace and the Saar, the Rhineland and the Sudetenland, of Prussia and Russia from the yoke of oppression.  They were, hideously and wrongly, saving the world from the economic tyranny of the Jews (and before anyone gets self righteous on me here remember Liberal Prime Minister William Lyon MacKenzie King turning away a cruise liner full of Jewish refugees with the comments in his administration â Å“None is too manyâ ?).    Hitler's Germans supported him in abominable acts for all the right reasons.  For the good of humanity and the German race and themselves individually.

The appeal was not an appeal to reason. It was an appeal to emotion. It was a romantic appeal.  Rational arguments were used to buttress that emotional appeal.  It was rationalized.

Pierre Elliot Trudeau successfully appealed to Canadian romanticism and still has a hold on a large chunk of Canadians today.  Pearson appealed more to rationalism and is accorded respect but does not move Canadians like Trudeau.

If we, the CF and its supporters, want to secure the necessary resources for the CF then we can not ignore the â Å“Romanticâ ? needs of the community at large.  We will not suddenly convert Canadians by appealing to jobs or dollars.  We must somehow figure out how achieve our ends while at the same time working within the â Å“Romanticâ ? self image of Canadians.

Like Ralph Klein says, the secret to success is to figure out which way the parade is going and get out in front of it.

We have to build capabilities that not only serve the legitimate war-fighting and security needs of both the CF and the Nation, even if the Nation doesn't share the perception, they also bolster, or at least conform to the National self-image of, in Chretien's derisory but accurate phrase,  â Å“Boy Scoutsâ ?.  Canadians see themselves as Boy Scouts, good kids with good morals helping deserving old ladies across the street.  Rightly or wrongly, realistically or romantically that is the way the see themselves. And until the Nation gets out more into the world and discover that not all old ladies want to cross the street and they certainly don't want any help, especially from nice Christian boys; until they discover that every decision results in making at least on side of the argument unhappy â “ if a compromise is achieved it is likely that both sides will feel aggrieved; until they discover that just as â Å“to govern is to decideâ ? to decide is to make enemies, they will continue to let their Romantic instincts rule over their Realistic appraisals.

We have to work with that situation, not work against it.  We have work through the seams and not try to attack strongpoints.

I had a similar discussion some years ago with a Danish woman on the occasion of Norway voting to join the EU.  She was arguing that the Norwegians would see the light and vote to join because rationally it was in their economic self-interest (markets etc).  I argued that Norway had just achieved its independence from Denmark in 1905 and the people that were voting were the children and grand-children, not to mention some of the self same people that had seen that day after 1000 years or more of dynastic struggles.  I felt that they would feel to attached to their independence, that the emotional ties were too strong, raw and relatively new, that they would vote their emotions over their pocket-books.  Hearts over Minds if you will.  Norway voted not to join.

Scotland has a parliament 300 years after the last one was dissolved and after many attempts to subdue the Scottish character.

In Quebec, they remember, â Å“Ils se souvientsâ ? 245 years after the loss on the Plains of Abraham in 1759 and the Acadians have not forgotten Evangeline.

We need a Rationalist foreign policy but we cannot devise an effective and long lasting one unless it carries the spirit of the Nation, unless it has a Romantic appeal.

In practical terms that means, and here I agree with ROJ and Gottlieb, an emphasis on Sovereignty, Control of the Approaches and Control of the Borders, because these things are seen as serving our self-interests and unfortunately can also be characterized as necessary to distinguish ourselves from the Americans.  On the plus side the Americans would be happy to accept a secure, democratic, independent  Canada on their border as long as it is non-threatening and not a haven for threats.

In terms of international engagement capabilities that allow us to act independently of the US, and occasionally ahead of the US, that allow us to act to bring stability to nations and regions before trouble flares up into a high intensity conflagration those are the types of capabilities we should seek.  The old British colonial maxim was better a battalion in time than a division too late.  If we were able to do act in this fashion, act to stabilize, we would be acting in the best interests of ourselves, the region in question, the international community at large and the interests of the US.

The US acts to reduce threats.  It seeks security and safety.  It desires "Peace, Order and Good Governance" so that its kids can sleep securely at night and so that commerce can proceed and bread can be put on the table. 

It is more concerned about security and order than good governance in foreign lands.  On the other hand it is not against democracy and good governance overseas.  If Canada thinks it can assist in supplying a secure environment while doing a better job at supplying "Good Governance" I am sure that the Americans will not object if we go ahead and try.

 

[sheikyerbouti]

Just my 2 cents worth, but why  hasn't there been a greater emphasis on supporting the Cadets across Canada as a means of both educating and recruiting a new generation of men and women?

Tens of thousands of kids have joined Cadets but how many  have continued their commitment to a higher degree. Not once in my years as a cadet did anyone from the corps come in and even explain when or if we could join. It seems that the simplest approach would be to rebuild confidence with the traditional groups that have supported the forces and then explore new ways of educating the public.




 

 

[Edward Campbell]

Kirkhill's argument is valid if you accept that the romantic tendency in Canadian (and American) foreign policy is, somehow, morally superior to the realist tendency.   I do not.

As a broad generalization (and all broad generalizations are wrong, even this one) I find the romantics to be grounded in greed, envy and timidity â “ the base instincts of too much of our nation.

I believe, as I said, in response to Infanteer â “ up above, 18 Oct 04, â Å“that   our interest might be best served, perhaps can only be served when some of our ideological values are satisfied.   Are our interests 'served' if we, and perhaps a very few others, are the only liberal-democracies in the world?   My own observations would suggest that peace and prosperity (a pretty fair, albeit grossly oversimplified, abbreviated version of our national interest) is enhanced when more and more nations are also liberal democracies, more interested in commercial competition than in militaristic expansion.â ?    Those ideological values mean that while I agree 100% with Gotlieb that â ?Utopianism, millenarianism and visionary crusades should have no place in Canadian foreign policyâ ? we must insist that our basic values: individual liberty, democracy, the rule of law â “ Roosevelt's freedom from fear, or peace, order and good government if you like, should be what we try to export to others â “ that's what I mean when I insist that foreign policy is what we do about foreign countries â “ we try to make them more like us because we believe that countries like Canada and our traditional allies are, really, honestly, peaceful and peace loving and responsible.

We want one and all, friend and foe, to prosper through free trade because we understand that people who are busy improving their lot in life are, except in very, very rare circumstances, unlikely to want to wage aggressive wars, etc.

There is no doubt, for me, that our national policy ought to be grounded in our best moral values - and that should 'drive' our foreign policy.   I do not believe that it is morally acceptable to bleat about Axworthy's human security agenda and then blanche at the prospect of using force â “ not even necessarily Canadian force â “ to implement it.   At its base, however, that is what our Canadian foreign policy does, it does so because extensive and intensive polling tells politicians and senior bureaucrats that Canadians don't want to be moral, they just want to believe they are a moral superpower - without having to spend any money.   Perhaps the first goal of our foreign policy ought to be the reform of our national public education system â “ maybe we should understand 'values.'

I agree with Kirkhill that Trudeau appealed to our romantic nature but he did so with a policy which made no sense, not little sense - none at all, and which, in its implementation, did far more harm to Canada than it did good for anyone.   Trudeau had charisma but no appreciable brains.

 

[Kirkhill]

I don't take a position that Romanticism is morally superior to Realism, Rusty Old Joint. 

I am referring to what motivates people.  Hitler's Germans were certainly not morally superior to their enemies although they were motivated by romantic notions of doing good.  I don't think that many members on this forum would be motivated to kill for the sake of oil, although oil is critical to the success of ourselves, our allies and our neighbours.  They will do it if ordered but not with the degree of enthusiasm they would have if they were doing to defend their families or to liberate others.

I agree that our policy needs to be a policy that addresses our real needs. In that sense it needs to be a rational policy.  We need to be able to secure our oil, our diamonds, our gold, and silver, our farmlands and ranchlands, our trade routes and our fishing grounds.  But does that sell as well as protecting our families and our home and native land.  One sounds greedy and materialistic.  The other sounds patriotic and worthy of sacrifice.

However, rationally, it also needs to be a policy that is accepted by the Canadian public.  It needs to appeal to their sense of what is important. What is important to them, as well as jobs and trade, as well as security, is the need to feel good about themselves, that their values are not being compromised.

Politicians can't just sell steak.  They have to have sizzle that they can sell as well.  And the CF is reliant on the politicians to sell it and its needs to the Canadian public. 

As to the observations on greed, envy and timidity, that may be the motives that drive some part of the electorate, but you are not going to win much support by telling people that they are a bunch of mean, nasty, vindictive cowards and that they need to become morally upright and develop a spine like us.    In any event the rational man would run away from a fight on the grounds that he is more likely to survive to raise kids and prosper that way.  Not the action of a hero.

I agree with the rest of your comments that romantic visions of utopia can't be allowed to prevent us from acting, Axworthy is a twit and Trudeau did make no sense on foreign policy.  Trudeau  however did motivate people, a whole generation, and unfortunately they haven't all retired yet.  Worse perhaps they have had 30 years to educate our children.  We can't redirect the population's world view over night.  We have to work within the context of the situation on the ground.  And the situation on the ground is that for good or ill many Canadians believe in their bones that Axworthy and Trudeau are right.  As well many of the people most convinced of the correctness of this position are the most activist inclined and most inclined to become politicians, teachers, journalists, United Church ministers and Green Peace members.  We won't win many battles trying to tell these people that they are wrong.  And we can't get through their barrier to communicate to the population at large because they control the message.  What we have to aim to achieve is convincing people that the judicious use of force is compatible with their self-image and part of being a responsible liberal democracy.  No different in fact from accepting that police can act to prevent or stop crime domestically and enlightened parents can act to prevent or stop their children from acting in dangerous or vile fashions at home.

I am simply saying that while the rational objective of selecting and maintaining the aim is paramount to mission success, the mission likewise will not succeed unless morale is maintained by appealing to the non-rational, romantic impulses of the community.

And just to repeat, I am fully in agreement that it is cowardly and unhelpful to both national interest and international interests to fail to act, especially if it is out of fear of the consequences.


Cheers, 

 

[a_majoor]

Here is another case where education is really needed before we can progress as a military or as a nation.

The centre of most Canadians universe seems to be their navels. Unlike us (who have at least seen some of the seamy underside of the planet), most Canadians who I know well enough to comment on are rather oblivious to the world that surrounds them. Think about the sort of mentality which seems to thrive on the idea that our national identity is defined by healthcare. (I suppose exploring and settling a large and climacticly hostile continent really has nothing to do with how we live and work today. Let's not even get into our historical interactions with other peoples). Even a declarative statement like "80% of Canada's trade is with the United States" seems really meaningless to these people. They feel quite free to make judgmental or rude or ignorant remarks about Americans without stopping to think these are people with their own goals and agendas.

We as a notion also forget the nations that make up the United Nations also have goals and agendas of their own, most of which do not coincide with our own.

Most of the posts on this thread have identified or quoted policy experts who have made a case for certain ideas or agendas to drive our foreign policy and thus our military. We need to find every means possible to hammer this home to our fellow Canadians, otherwise we will wither and die on the vine due to lack of support and coherent policy.

 

[Kirkhill]

a_majoor:

It sounds like you are describing a notional nation that can be easily swayed but is lacking leadership. 

Any leaders on the horizon?

 

[a_majoor]

In my more P/O'd moments, I start raving about running for Mayor here in London...(not rich enough to aim higher)

 

[Edward Campbell]

I don't think we are too far apart, really, Kirkhill, except that:

o I think too many people put too much emphasis on the military/national security component of foreign policy â “ understandable, to be sure, on army.ca but a bit dangerous all the same;

o I have difficulty with relating the tendencies towards 'romanticism' or 'realism' to hard principles â “ especially to the 'master principle.'

Going back to Gotlieb and his concerns that we recognize geopolitical realities: that should cause the authors of the next white paper to call for: Recognition of the fact that our American friends have been attacked and security now dominates their policies (the plural is important) and we should â “ as good neighbours, even if we don't want to talk about our own best (selfish) interests â “ cooperate with them.

Were it my call I would argue for some new, additional (beyond NORAD and the IBETs (Integrated Border Enforcement Teams)) super-national or continental organizations to deal with some customs and immigration matters.   This would require both countries to tighten up some of their procedures (the tourism lobby in the US advocates something akin to a gold card as proof of trustworthiness while the refugee lobby in Canada advocates a dark skin as proof of the same) and it might, even, involve combined (bi-national) 'units' in some places.   That rationale for this is that we need to do, roughly, what the Liberals said Mulroney wanted to do back in 1988: erase the border between Canada and the US and put a common 'fence' around our shares of the continent.

The Americans have a 'right' â “ I believe â “ to expect no less than enhanced cooperation given the facts that they have been attacked and that some enemy elements do (or try to) operate 'through' Canada; we have a selfish interest in easing American fears â “ enhanced flow of goods, services and people within our commonwealth â “ which ought to reinforce our romantic desire to be good neighbours.

Margaret Thatcher used to end arguments with â Å“TINAâ ? -   There Is No Alternative!   Someone else â “ not me, sadly â “ coined the very clever dictum of TINA2 by which he meant that in dealing with the Americans we must remember that:

1. We are Trapped In North America; and

2. There Is No Alternative!

Good advice to foreign policy developers, I think.

That being said, our major interests with the Americans are economic, social, cultural and political â “ not military.   Our foreign policy needs to emphasize that we should enhance our continental military/security capabilities as enablers â “ supporting other, more important matters, rather than for their own sake.   This is realism â “ identifying what our vital interests are and then identifying the enablers needed to protect and promote them.   As a general rule military/security capabilities are enablers for more important, valuable and productive economic, social and political capabilities.

I do not like the analogue of: principles of war/policy tendencies.   While I agree that our best (rather than our base) values should animate our national and foreign policies (and the economic and social ones, too) we must strive, always, for clarity â “ realism â “ when we identify and assess all the factors which bear upon our 'aim' (peace and prosperity, in my shorthand).   After we have analyzed the factors and the 'courses open' and made a plan to implement our foreign policy then it may be necessary to camouflage our realism in some romantic verbiage.   But, big BUT realism and romanticism are not competing principles; they are, rather, more akin to beliefs â “ and one is sense, grounded in a careful appreciation of the situation â “ as it really exists, and the other is nonsense, wishful thinking, at best.
 

 

[Kirkhill]

You're right ROJ, we are not far apart.

All I am saying is that if you ignore morale and you issue an order you may not get the response from your troops you were expecting.  Likewise any policy that doesn't take into account the "morale" of the nation, romantic notions and all, you will not gain the necessary support and resources for the policy.

That being said I think there is a lot of scope available for a determined Government to make a strong case, both rational and romantic, to the nation to justify a rational foreign and defence policy.

Cheers Sir.

 

[Edward Campbell]

This may be a wee tiny bit off topic but, the article below; from today's Ottawa Citizen sheds some light on the effects of Trudeau's selling of the pacifist sizzle rather than the self interest steak.   The 30-44 age group came of age well after the infamous 1969 white paper became the base for how we were to see ourselves in the world: little, timid, peaceful Canada.

As others have mentioned elsewhere it wasn't just Trudeau and his fellow travellers who detested the military â “ even their own military â “ we had two generations who saw no good in anything military; they wanted, and got, a pacifist foreign policy and emasculated diplomatic services, aid programmes and armed forces.

----------

http://www.canada.com/ottawa/ottawacitizen/news/story.html?id=0c1c4959-063c-4732-b772-48bdeba85234

Canada's leaders of tomorrow more than a little confused about the past

Here's a hint: he was PM for much of the first half of the 20th century, writes Randy Boswell.

Randy Boswell

The Ottawa Citizen

Monday, November 08, 2004


They're the up-and-comers of Canadian society and the leaders of tomorrow, but ask Generation X a fairly simple question about the country's recent history and prepare to laugh -- or weep -- at their Remembrance Day Duh.

A new survey aimed at gauging Canadians' basic knowledge of the Second World War has revealed a startling blind spot among the 30-to-44 age group. By a whopping margin, more of these prime-of-life citizens believed the prime minister during the 1939-45 conflict was Lester B. Pearson instead of Mackenzie King, the country's true wartime leader.

The error seems all the more egregious because even younger Canadians -- those aged 18 to 29 -- knew enough history to pick Mr. King over Mr. Pearson, who was best known for the postwar diplomacy that won him a Nobel Peace Prize in 1957 and his so-so performance as prime minister of two minority governments in the 1960s.

Try to imagine a whole generation of Britons choosing Harold Macmillan over Winston Churchill as their wartime leader, and you get some idea of the significance of the thirtysomethings' view of history.

"That is very surprising," said McGill University historian Jack Jedwab, executive director of the Association for Canadian Studies, who double-checked the numbers just to be sure. "It clearly speaks to a problem in retention of learning."

The survey of 2,100 Canadians, conducted by Environics on behalf of Montreal-based ACS, was part of a study of attitudes toward this country's experience of war. The results are to be discussed this week at a conference in Montreal called Remembering Canada: How We Recall and Represent the Past.

Respondents were asked, "Who was prime minister of Canada during the Second World War?" and given a list of choices: King (who was PM for two terms in the 1920s and then from 1935 to 1948), Pearson (1963-68), Wilfrid Laurier (1896-1911) and Louis St. Laurent (1948-57).

More than half of those over 60 correctly identified Mr. King, with just 16 per cent naming Mr. Pearson. Respondents aged 45 to 59 were twice as likely to choose Mr. King over Mr. Pearson -- 40 per cent to 20 -- with another 20 per cent admitting they didn't know the answer.

Recent high school graduates, those 18 to 29 years old, also made Mr. King the top response: 30 per cent compared with 23 per cent for Mr. Pearson and 26 per cent who didn't know.

But more than a third of the 30-to-44 demographic -- 35 per cent -- named Mr. Pearson as our wartime PM, while only 25 per cent got it right with Mr. King, and 26 per cent couldn't say.

It's no surprise the two oldest groups -- many of whom were born in the King era or just after -- tended to get the right answer. And Mr. Jedwab suspects the youngest cohort in the survey still remembers enough of their high school history to strongly associate Mr. King with the Second World War, while the 30-to-44 set has simply forgotten what they must have once been taught.

He also figures that Mr. Pearson's sterling reputation as the architect of Canada's role in international peacekeeping was particularly ingrained in the minds of those who grew up in the 1960s and '70s.

"Pearson is remembered very well by history," agrees pollster Derek Leebosh, who conducted the survey.

Some people's memories, he suspects, might be jogged by reference to Mr. King's famously equivocal utterance on the key political issue of the war: "Conscription if necessary, but not necessarily conscription."

But there were "no great speeches" by Mr. King to really rivet him into Canadian consciousness, says Mr. Leebosh, none of Churchill's dramatic pledging of blood, toil, tears and sweat.

"Churchill is an iconic figure associated with World War II all through the world," says Mr. Leebosh. "What did King do? Well, he hosted the Quebec Conference, where he pretty much poured drinks for Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt while they talked about the real stuff."

Mr. Pearson, a veteran of the First World War, was a diplomat during the Second World War. He was posted to the Canadian High Commission in London and also worked in Ottawa before becoming Canada's ambassador to the U.S. in 1945.

Mr. King died in 1950; Mr. Pearson in 1972.

Elsewhere in the survey, which was conducted in May and September this year, there may be some explanation for the surprising Gen-X aberration on the King question. While those aged 18-29 responded that they'd learned "a great deal" about the Second World War during their school days, only 22 per cent of the 30-to-44 group said the same.

But no other cut at the numbers reveals such a strong tendency toward mistaking the identity of our wartime prime minister as that exhibited by those born between 1960 and 1974. A fairly high awareness of Mr. King's role in the Second World War was registered overall in each region of the country, with Atlantic Canadians giving the correct answer most often (41 per cent) and Quebec respondents notching the lowest score, a still relatively respectable 35 per cent.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Getting back on topic: I notice in the weekend's news that Prime Minister Martin is musing out loud about Canada having a 'role' to play in the Middle East peace process, which we all hope can be restarted after Palestinian elections.

I agree.

A two state solution - two independent states, with secure borders, living up to the provisions of a peace treaty - is the only answer.

There are two huge sticking points:

"¢ Secure borders; and

"¢ Honouring a peace treaty.

No one at the UN ever thought that the 1948 'green line' (the so called pre '67 boundaries) provided Israel with anything like a secure border; that's why Lord Caradon and his colleagues crafted UNSC Res. 242 as they did.   No one thinks that Sharon's new fence is the right answer, either - but the wall is, almost certainly, part of the answer, once there is some agreement, of some sort, re: how much less of the West Bank the Palestinians get,

The Israelis do not believe that the Palestinians can be trusted to keep any treaty they have signed.

There is a third problem area: the United Nations.   It is highly unlikely that Israel will cooperate in any useful way with any United Nations officials or organizations.

From the point of view of helping the peace to take root, then, there would seem to be two broad courses open:

"¢ A major role for the United Nations on the Palestinian side; or

"¢ A non-UN organization supervising the truce.

I would argue for the latter and I would argue for Canada, as a leading middle power, to play a major role in forming and maintaining this new, multilateral Israel/Palestine Truce Supervisory Organization.

Canada, and several other nations can come to the table with reasonable reputations - both in Israel and amongst the Arabs - for fairness and trustworthiness.   That list might include, for example, and in addition to Canada: Australia, Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Fiji, Finland, Hungary, Italy, India, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore and South Korea.   There are some Islamic countries which will, likely be acceptable to Israel: Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan and Turkey would be about it, I think.   There are a few European countries which are considered very pro-Arab but would still be acceptable to Israel, I think: France, Germany and Spain come to mind.   There are also some American nations - Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico, for example - that may also be acceptable.

A list like that - 20 or 25 or so members of another coalition of the willing - might provide a good, fairly compact, reliable team to do a number of tasks:

"¢ 'Secure' Palestine - make it relatively safe from Israeli incursions by putting a 'trip wire' between Israel and Palestine - a trip wire Israel will be unwilling to cross;

"¢ 'Secure' Israel by, for a period of a few years, replacing any sort of Palestinian army - in the near term;

"¢ 'Secure' both Israel and Palestine by creating, training and, initially, leading Palestine's eventual armed forces;

"¢ 'Secure' both Israel and Palestine by supervising the Palestinian security forces and by actually managing the Israel/Palestine border crossings;

"¢ 'Secure' Palestine for the Palestinians by recreating and supervising the Palestinian public service - especially major institutions like the central bank, the courts and regulatory agencies; and

"¢ 'Secure' Palestine by the Palestinians by replacing UNRWA in Palestine.

These tasks require, from the Group of 20+:

"¢ Politicians;

"¢ Senior bureaucrats;

"¢ Military leaders and trainers - senior and junior;

"¢ Police and security managers and officers;

"¢ Officials; and

"¢ Formed military units and formations.

This is a useful foreign policy initiative for the Martin government: worthy but, since the military burden can be shared broadly, not too expensive.

I expect Martin to offer Canada's good offices to the Haitians next week.   He will offer a bit of money and a few people - mostly retired politicians and bureaucrats, but, maybe, some soldiers, too - to help with the negotiations.   That is not enough, however, to placate either the US or many Canadians.   He needs, desperately, to be able to say, when George Bush comes calling - looking for a formal Canadian military contribution to Iraq, that: "We have just taken on new tasks, Mr. President, and the cupboard is bare - but we will, yet again, add our naval forces to the Persian Gulf area of operations.   We have assigned troops to Afghanistan and we have just earmarked others for Haiti and Palestine.   We are fully committed - to the global war on terror, to Middle East peace and to problems in our (shared) region.   We can do no more, at this time.â ?

 

[Edward Campbell]

The CBC's Brian Stewart wants us to go back to peacekeeping in this article which is reproduced udner the Fair Dealing provisons of the Copyright Act from the CBC:

http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/story/2012/11/30/f-vp-stewart-peacekeeping.html

Time for Canada to get back to peacekeeping

By Brian Stewart, CBC News

Posted: Dec 3, 2012

For years now, the Canadian army has fretted about finding a new role for itself after Afghanistan. Well, that day has arrived and it can no longer dodge the stark post-war questions: What next, and where?

Spare us an eternity of training at home and aiding with floods and ice storms, is a common lament among soldiers who see little that's challenging or career-enhancing ahead.

With little chance of another overseas mission in the foreseeable future, there is little for our 25,500 regular soldiers and 16,000 reservists to do, and it's not hard for them to read the tea leaves. An inactive army is both easily bored and easily cut at budget time.

When Prime Minister Stephen Harper recently called for a leaner military "as ready to bring disaster relief as to deliver lethal force," grim images of snow shovels and sandbags surely flashed through many a military mind.

From a command perspective, this is a critical worry for an army that saw both its political clout and domestic popularity soar to remarkable heights over the past decade, even after Canadians soured on the Afghan war itself.

Now all that remains is a little-noticed, short-term training role in Afghanistan.

In Ottawa, the political masters have learned that sending ships and a few aircraft, as we did in the overthrow of Libya's Moammar Gadhafi, is a far safer security investment than putting infantry boots on foreign ground.

What's more, the country has had its fill of fighting land wars in far off places.

But the irony in all this is that Canada — with our military's eager blessing — has ditched the alternative international role our soldiers were long renowned for: peacekeeping.

A dirty word

For more than a decade, Canada's top military officers along with staunchly pro-military politicians and a dedicated handful of academics and journalists, battered and besmirched UN peacekeeping to the point that it became a dirty word uttered with a sneer within the Canadian Armed Forces.

"The UN itself couldn't run a one-man race to the outhouse," wrote Canada's super-star general Rick Hillier in his memoirs a few years ago. He's not always that polite on this subject.

I know many officers and military writers who share the view that UN peacekeeping doesn't deserve us.

But to me this looks like a case of that old adage "Be careful what you ask for." Or in this case, what you are too proud to ask for.

My guess is that a few big peacekeeping operations in Africa and perhaps even the Middle East won't look so bad to a generation of young soldiers and junior officers who feel Afghanistan prepared them to face the real challenges of the world.

32 soldiers

The irony, however, is that at a time when the UN is making serious strides to reform and expand peacekeeping, Canada, which largely invented the practice in the 1950s, is noticeably absent, and unless Ottawa has a change of heart, will remain so.

Since the late 1990s the pro-military lobby did such a good job bad-mouthing UN operations that both Liberal and Conservative governments have been only too happy to eviscerate our peacekeeping contributions.

The Harper government in particular treats the UN as an irritating irrelevance at best, to the point that we forget a UN operation like peacekeeping is something we used to be pretty good at, and that helped define us as a country.

In fact, more than 100,000 Canadian military personnel have worn the blue armband abroad over the years, usually with great distinction.

In the 1990s, Canada made up 10 per cent of all peacekeeping troops worldwide with as many as 4,000 soldiers serving at any one time in places like Cyprus, Lebanon, the Golan Heights, the Balkans, Africa and parts of South America and Asia.

Today, as peacekeepers from other countries have quadrupled in just a dozen years (from 20,000 to 95,000) we have shrunk to a near invisible 52nd place, alongside Fiji and Paraguay.

While nations like India, Brazil and the still impoverish Ethiopia are now the main peacekeeping forces in the UN arsenal, Canada's entire 100,000-strong land, sea and air components contribute "less than a school bus-load of Canadian soldiers" in the striking image of the Globe and Mail's Paul Koring.

That's right, only 32 soldiers, according to the latest UN figures. And these are doled out in tiny packets: one in Cyprus, three in the Golan Heights, six in Darfur, and so on.

'Warrior nation'

When it comes to peacekeeping, we can't blame our low effort on the strain of Afghanistan, for some of our allies in that struggle continued to maintain respectable numbers, particularly Britain (278 soldiers), France (916) and Germany (207).

What degraded peacekeeping here was the mindset that used Afghanistan as a way to seek a full revival of a "warrior nation" ethos through support-our-troops campaigns and media messaging that seemed determined to crush all that was allegedly squishy about our past internationalism.

"The damming of peacekeepers became, among the coterie of military historians and fellow travellers in the media, something of a blood sport, and the game in their sights was liberal Canada," writes Noah Richler in his recent polemic What We Talk about When We Talk about War.

Yes, the critics of UN peacekeeping often had real grievances. It can be inefficient, poorly led, and will forever be identified with disasters like Somalia, Rwanda, and Srebrenica.

But only emphasizing the negatives distorts the picture and takes no account of the many successes, from Mozambique to Cyprus and East Timor, that saved countless lives and regional peace.

In fact, countries caught up in civil war have a 50 per cent greater chance of finding lasting peace if peacekeepers are deployed, according to the most detailed study to date, Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents' Choices after Civil War, by Virginia Page Fortna of Columbia University.

Canadians, to their credit, never entirely bought the anti-peacekeeping vitriol that was making the rounds.

Two years ago, pollsters at Nanos Research found 52 per cent of respondents considered peacekeeping the most important role for our military; only 21 per cent saw combat as the priority.

Yes, we do need an army that can handle combat in crisis zones when necessary, but we also need one that can also use the sophisticated, patient and humane skills required for robust peacekeeping in a world that badly requires such help.

The UN very much wants Canada to return. But one can only imagine the embarrassing back-flips our military boosters will have to perform before our current government says it is time we volunteered again for more UN duty.

The criticism of UN peacekeeping that Brian Stewart acknowledges - "It can be inefficient, poorly led, and will forever be identified with disasters like Somalia, Rwanda, and Srebrenica." - are not just symptoms of a problem: they are permanent attributes of the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations. It, DPKO, is not capable of planning, mounting, commanding or controlling any useful sort of military operation and posting in 1,000 well trained people would not even begin to address the issue.

We probably can and, in some cases, should "return to peacekeeping" but not, ever, wearing UN baby blue berets.

The UN must be forced to:

1. Use second and third world nations to do the kinds of peacekeeping which the UN can manage - the kinds of operations in which Canada should always decline to participate; and

2. Subcontract "robust" peacekeeping to a coalition, like ABCA+. (I regard NATO as too big, too bureaucratic and too inefficient to conduct operations properly.)

My ABCA+ would include America, Britain, Canada and Australia but also a couple more Europeans (say the Netherlands and a non-NATO member like Finland) and one African country (South Africa) and three more Asians (China, India and Singapore). It would be informal - no treaty status, at all - but it would have small, permanent, diplomatic (about 10 members) and military staffs (of no more than say 50 officers 25 NCMs) based in North America to facilitate close liaison with the UN and with the US military's logistic base.

 

[Edward Campbell]

If the CF can't get the money to do everything it would like (or even need) to do as a fully self-sufficient, multi-role military perhaps we need to take a closer look at how we can provide the most bang for our buck with our allies.  When do we deploy on our own?  The rest of the world is going through the same cutbacks that we are so will we just end up with a whole bunch of smaller, less capable allied militaries that can each work less effectively alongside the Americans? 

Maybe if we look at the gaps that exist in the effective deployment of our probable coalition partners (our typical deployment scenario) we could identify some capabilities which we could develop/expand in order to magnify the strengths of our partners.  If our partners have forces to deploy but can't get them there then maybe we could expand our air transport fleet.  More air-to-air refueling or AORs to support allied air/naval deployments.  Specialist units like electronic warfare, counter-battery, CRBN, etc.  I'm not saying that these are the specific capabilities we could/should focus on...just giving some possible examples.

There would of course then have to be a trade-off by decreasing, or possibly even eliminating, other existing capabilities (this is fundamentally about the money after all).  For example, what if we dropped out of the armoured business and relied on our more capable allies to provide that support when required (like some of our allies relied on our tank support in Afghanistan when they didn't have the capability in theatre)?  Where could we put that money in other capabilities that would provide an even larger positive impact on coalition military operations than our relatively small armoured force?  Again...I'm not making that recommendation, just using it as a possible example.

A possible side benefit could also be that some of these capabilities might be more politically sellable to the Canadian public than more traditional military capabilities.  Procuring and deploying support units/equipment is much more politically safe than nasty, warlike thinks like tanks, submarines and stealth fighters. 

Such a policy certainly wouldn't be without risks either.  The world is a very uncertain place and what happens if a situation should arise where we really NEED a particular military capability and don't have it available anymore?  Canadian blood and treasure could certainly be on the line.  There is also the political risk that we wouldn't get credit from our allies for the things we do in the same way as putting "boots on the ground" in a more traditional way.  If we're not seen as useful and helpful then we could lose much of our say at a lot of important tables around the world.  I think such a policy would certainly require a VERY close relationship, cooperation, coordination and interoperability with our closest allies.  We'd need to work hand-in-hand with them so that they're intimately aware of how important OUR role is in their successful fulfillment of THEIR roles. 

Regardless of what we do money for the CF will likely be quite tight for a number of years to come.  Any course of action (or inaction) is going to have impacts on the capabilities of the CF.  The military might wither across the board, waiting for a return of money and a chance to renew in the same basic structure, or it might make some very specific and targeted changes which could see the CF with very different capabilities and structures than it has currently.  Either way I think it's important to have these very basic level discussions so that the government and the CF can be proactive in facing the budget constraints rather than just reacting to them.

And this brings us back to a nine year old thread: Defining Foreign and Defence Policies.

We cannot structure a force, not in any sensible way, much less assign resources to our defence, until we know what we want the military to do.

GR66 suggests, for example, that we might want to discard the capability for unilateral, solo deployments. That's an idea, but upon what is it based?

I see a spectrum of problems for which the military is part of the solution:

<== Very Low Intensity == Low Intensity == Low/Mid Intensity == Mid Intensity == Mid/High Intensity == High Intensity ==>

I can, without stretching my imagination too far, conceive of situations (in the Caribbean, for example) where we might have vital interests that are not shared with any of the major powers but which might convince us to intervene, militarily, into a (Very) Low Intensity situation in order to protect or promote our own interests. That doesn't mean that we should, much less must have a capability for unilateral military action; it does mean that we should decide, after due consideration, to give up that capability, not just slough it off.

The government has expert military advisors. But we, ordinary Canadians, as the NDP would call us, have a right and, indeed, in my opinion, a duty to tell our politicians what strategic objectives we want the Government of Canada to pursue.

I would suggest that any Canadian can develop a "little list" of tasks (s)he insists our military must be ready and able to perform. Mine would include, but, probably, not be limited to:

    1. Provide the Government of Canada with reliable, expert military advice;

    2. participate in gathering and analyzing strategic, operational and tactical intelligence;

    3. Maintain near real time surveillance (and identification) over Canada's land mass, the waters contiguous to it, and the airspace over both;

    4. Be able to intercept any intruder into the territories, waters and airspace we claim as our own and "deal with" such intruders;

    5. Conduct small scale (less than 5,000 people) unilateral, low intensity military operations when our vital interest require; and

    ---------- After appropriate periods of mobilization and with (perhaps considerable) extra resources ----------

    6. Conduct small and medium scale (less than 15,000 people), mid intensity operations as part of a coalition of like minded nations when our interests are served; and

    7. Conduct large scale (anything from 25,000 to 2.5 million people), high intensity military operations with a coalition that includes our traditional allies in order to restore peace and security.

My first five are what I think the CF should be able to do, day after day, year after year, decade after decade, with a modest, fixed budget - in my view, something akin to 2% of GDP.

 

[The Bread Guy]

We cannot structure a force, not in any sensible way, much less assign resources to our defence, until we know what we want the military to do.

QFTT

 

[Kirkhill]

Corollary:

We cannot decide what we want our military to do until we know what we can do with the resources available.

Chicken! Meet Egg. 

This 2012 discussion in the UK about the Aussie Beersheba plan emphasises that we are not alone.

http://ukarmedforcescommentary.blogspot.ca/2012/05/australian-army-reform-and-british-army.html

Coupled with the Yankee struggles I think it is fair to say that nobody has a grip on what is possible and how much it costs.  Equally everybody is having to revisit all their planning assumptions.

WW1, WW2 and the Cold War are well behind us now.

Edit: There is going to have to be a period of experimentation akin to the 1930s to determine what is workable and what it costs.
The Aussies, with their ACR (Armoured Cav Regiment) experiments, are in the midst of that experiment just now.

They are trying to balance Abrams, LAVs, M113s and Bushmasters in a single 3 Squadron, 600 man construct.  Canada = Leos, LAVs, TLAVs and TAPVs.

 

[Edward Campbell]

We know about:

    1. The global strategic situation. We know who we have for friends ~ say a dozen countries upon which we can rely, come hell or high water. We know who our current enemies are ~ again a dozen, maybe more, countries, all far away and
        unable, in any conventional military way, to threaten us, but enemies, all the same;

    2. We know about our own interests ~ and they are global and some are in areas which our enemies can reach;

    3. We know about our strategic objectives: oversimplified they are peace and prosperity; and

    4. We know about our resources ~ we are one of the dozen or so richest countries in the world.

We ought to know:

    1. What our (broad and general) foreign policy is ~ what we plan to do about, for, with and, sometimes, to other countries, and why we plan to do those things; and

    2. What sorts of military power we need, and, again why we need it.

I will accept that we cannot assign precise costs to each and every capability we need but as each need (operational requirement) becomes achievable then the costs should become more and more clear.

(The broad outlines of both foreign and defence policy ought to be agreeable to Conservatives and Liberals alike. I can accept that fringes of both the CPC and the LPC will detest the other's polcies but the mainstreams ought to be close ~ if they aren't then I would suggest that one or the other's policy is wrong. I'm not suggesting that there is, or should be unanimity ~ on several issues, there will be difference that are grounded in both principle and domestic politics: Israel and the Middle East, for example, but on the core issues ~ America, China, India, Europe, etc ~ there should be broad, general agreement between the two main Canadian centrist political parties.)

If my parenthetical hopes are true then sensible long term planning ought to be both possible and the norm.

 

[MilEME09]

I don't think the CAF can get any where unless we come up with a clear strategic goal/direction for where we want the forces to go. Without that we are trying to do everything and accomplish nothing, maybe we can see some change as I hear revision is being made to the CFDS but i doubt that would give us a direction to go.