- ~200 on day 1
- ~70 yesterday
- ~20 today so far
Picking off launchers appears to be working really, really well. Iran may have to get creative soon if they want to use their munitions before those stockpiles all get picked off too.
14 total deaths in Israel now. Not anywhere close to what they were initially expecting, and I'm not sure if it'll even get close to the lower end (thankfully).
Something we don’t have a feel for is Israel’s stock of interceptors of various classes.
It sounds like Israe has air dominance over western Iran, and that helps. However I expect Iran still has a lot it can launch from farther east, largely out of range of Israel’s Air Force. Iran has to have considered survivability for this context. So, is Iran safeguarding the ability to continue to launch large volleys including some more difficult to intercept missiles later? Are they degrading Israel’s interceptor stocks enough to matter? And, if the balance
does shift towards some degree of interceptor exhaustion, can Iran hit enough of anything that matters? Slamming missiles into suburbs will piss people off, but it won’t improve the strategic position much.
Meanwhile, Israel seems to have a very free hand to hit things in western Iran that
do matter, militarily and economically. Satellite and ground imagery appear to show at least a couple hits at the Ahvaz oil field. That’s a huge vulnerability for Iran; if Israel were to hit Iran’s oil export infrastructure - and it seems to be well in range - that could be a huge problem for the regime.
Obviously everybody else is going to be trying to simmer this down, but I don’t think Israel has any interest in outsiders who think that can keep Iran gripped at this point. They’ll keep going so long as it remains in their strategic interest to.
Things I’m watching for outside of continued military objectives:
- U.S. entry into the fight, likely via strategic bombing on sites like Fordow that Israel will struggle to hit. The U.S. may decide the best way out of this is to forge the whole way through and complete the defensible Israel objective of decisively destroying Iran’s nuclear program.
- Conversely, direct Iranian targeting of U.S. forces. This would be dumb.
- Israeli targeting of Khamenei. This would signal a regime change objective and would likely be accompanied by a ton of influence ops and targeted economic hits. Reporting today claims the US already ‘vetoed’ such a proposed hit. Can’t assess the accuracy of that.
- Wider attacks on Iranian economic targets. Oil distribution facilities and pipelines. Kharg island, etc.
- Domestic Iranian popular unrest; if the population comes to feel that the regime has taken them down a path they can’t sustain and seeks governmental change, that could be a challenge for the government.
- Iranian proxy bullshit. I’m surprised at how quiet this has been so far, notwithstanding how bad Hezbollah got smoked. Iran still has a huge network overseas and we may see a quiet shadow war between them and Israel/US.
- Israeli establishment of any fixed ground presence; seizing a western Iranian airfield as a FOB, or anything like that- very unlikely I think, but a not-impossible wildcard that would really shift the tone of this. I don’t think Israel has the ability to do this with an acceptable risk tolerance, but I could absolutely be wrong.
Israel seems very confident, operating in broad daylight over Iran. They have a distinct advantage in the ability to kill proplr and break stuff. Can they ride that to victory in a meaningful strategic sense? We can reasonably assume Israel’s end state includes substantial destruction of Iran’s nuclear weapons program, but does it go beyond that? I don’t know.