CAF Procurement

[MilEME09]

That is what I am referring to when I say us policies. The TB didn't restrict those, we did. Both of those policy documents are ours to manage. Military pattern spares is usually not allowed but those should be centrally bought and managed as they generally have rigorous specs attached to them, but for many fleets (green, blue or white) there are lots of LPO items that can (and are) bought via LPO.

my only issue with LPO is sometimes equipment isn't easy to maintain that we buy locally, we encountered an issue recently that the OEM suppliers in Canada for Dewalt don't want to work with DND's payment system (my LPO didn't give details) so we are now waiting on direction from higher on what to do with these generators that we have that are NS, hopefully we can find someone in the US to ship us parts but who knows.

 

[MJP]

my only issue with LPO is sometimes equipment isn't easy to maintain that we buy locally, we encountered an issue recently that the OEM suppliers in Canada for Dewalt don't want to work with DND's payment system (my LPO didn't give details) so we are now waiting on direction from higher on what to do with these generators that we have that are NS, hopefully we can find someone in the US to ship us parts but who knows.

Most LPO is paid via credit card. It is highly unusual to see as business refuse credit card payment, but I suspect there is something else at play.

It is more likely that they don't want to be set up as a vendor and paid for ongoing orders via a contract. While not common, we are a pain to deal with so I can see some vendors refusing to do business in that way.

 

[Halifax Tar]

Most LPO is paid via credit card. It is highly unusual to see as business refuse credit card payment, but I suspect there is something else at play.

It is more likely that they don't want to be set up as a vendor and paid for ongoing orders via a contract. While not common, we are a pain to deal with so I can see some vendors refusing to do business in that way.

I've experienced that but it was always for services vice goods.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Most LPO is paid via credit card. It is highly unusual to see as business refuse credit card payment, but I suspect there is something else at play.

It is more likely that they don't want to be set up as a vendor and paid for ongoing orders via a contract. While not common, we are a pain to deal with so I can see some vendors refusing to do business in that way.

It was far worse when we used just Purchase Orders, venders either refused to deal with us or charged up to 25% more due to us taking 6 months to pay out.

 

[MysticMango]

It could even be because they’re nervous about how their billing or fulfilment practices might hold up under scrutiny. Government contract fraud is a real thing, and some vendors play it safe by steering clear of anything that might trigger compliance checks or audits. If you’re curious how messy it can get, this breakdown explains it well: Government Contract Fraud Lawyers - The Criminal Defense Firm

 

[CountDC]

Nah - most likely been burned by someone not processing their invoices on time and then making them wait the extra 30 days when they did finally process it. Too often the invoices are received by bloggins and not passed to the accounts payable people until the vendor raises a stink. Then accounts payable uses the date they receive the invoice for the entry so the vendor waits another 30 days after that. Dealt with too many that sat on someone's desk for several months. Unless there is a contract providing invoice delivery details the vendor ignored the date used should be when bloggins received it, not accounts payable, so the payment gets issued right away. Bloggins should also apologize to the vendor.

 

[regulator12]

Yea, working with one team right now where they largely solved an LPO logjam for a major base with some smart process mapping, tweaks in the process and better use of DRMIS. Still a work in process but it is promising as they get stuff to folks faster and while they buy more, the actual workload decreases because ancillary stuff that use to be in the process has been removed

Curious to know what processes you made more efficient and how you made better use of DRMIS? I love to take any opportunity to utilize and implement efficiencies.

 

[MJP]

Curious to know what processes you made more efficient and how you made better use of DRMIS? I love to take any opportunity to utilize and implement efficiencies.

I can link you in with their team. Drop me a contact email via PM. I was just talking to their boss this afternoon and their big hope is to export their successes

 

[daftandbarmy]

Let's see if we can make a firehose out of a watering can

Carney wants to spend an extra $9B on defence by April. Is that possible?​

Experts say there are risks and serious challenges to hitting this year's NATO target​

"By the time we get back into Parliament and a budget is passed, we're going to have half a year to spend money that the department won't be able to shovel out the door," Bezan said in an interview with CBC News.

He wonders if the government will just engage in a "game of creative accounting" to meet its NATO commitments on paper.

But some within the Canadian defence industry as well as DND and Public Services and Procurement Canada (PSPC) themselves point to existing mechanisms that can be leveraged to move quickly.

Those include the use of standing offers, supply arrangements and pre-qualified vendor lists, as well as strategic partnerships with defence companies identified as centres of excellence, bilateral partnerships with other countries and the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program.

In situations that are truly time sensitive, the government can invoke a National Security Exception (NSE), Urgent Operational Requirements (UORs) or issue an Advance Contract Award Notice (ACAN). Although these have strict eligibility criteria and are not everyday tools.

https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/carney-defence-spending-1.7598150?cmp=newsletter_Morning%20Headlines%20from%20CBC%20News_1613_1975660

 

[PuckChaser]

Won't even be close to spending the $9B, but buying 60,000 sets of DICE gear so everyone gets it, actually funding the new rain/field gear that just finished trials and immediately purchasing C8A4 would put a dent in $1B of it and drastically increase morale of a huge chunk of the CAF.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Won't even be close to spending the $9B, but buying 60,000 sets of DICE gear so everyone gets it, actually funding the new rain/field gear that just finished trials and immediately purchasing C8A4 would put a dent in $1B of it and drastically increase morale of a huge chunk of the CAF.

 

[SeaKingTacco]

Won't even be close to spending the $9B, but buying 60,000 sets of DICE gear so everyone gets it, actually funding the new rain/field gear that just finished trials and immediately purchasing C8A4 would put a dent in $1B of it and drastically increase morale of a huge chunk of the CAF.

Delivered by 31 Mar 26?

 

[PuckChaser]

Delivered by 31 Mar 26?

Unless we're buying pallets of paper, nothing we buy is being delivered by 31 March.

 

[MJP]

Even DICE's original order for 3000 rucks isn't delivering until summer 26. They haven't even exercised their option for an additional 5000.

 

[SeaKingTacco]

Unless we're buying pallets of paper, nothing we buy is being delivered by 31 March.

Exactly.

Unless PSPC/TBS change how we are expected to pay for/take delivery of gear, this dance will continue, forever.

 

[Navy_Pete]

@daftandbarmy I think the only one that might work is the FMS sale of the HIMARs (for Ukraine) and I guess the shuffling of CCG under DND.

They still haven't restored the $900M/year cut to O&M which is nuts, and still don't have capacity at PSPC to support our growth, so lots of chokepoints and shortages, despite all the discussions of spending increases.

Trying to hire people, and even with having SME funding running into HR chokepoints, from lack of people there (as well as the insanely standardized process that doesn't react well to square pegs).

 

[Czech_pivo]

If they commit to a second set 16 F35’s and allocate the cost by 31 March, 2026, that would eat up a sizeable chunk of the 9$ billion would it not?

 

[PuckChaser]

If they commit to a second set 16 F35’s and allocate the cost by 31 March, 2026, that would eat up a sizeable chunk of the 9$ billion would it not?

Maybe we could replace eFP Latvia with those aircraft without maintainers or pilots since all everyone is focused on is unsexy stuff.

 

[Czech_pivo]

Maybe we could replace eFP Latvia with those aircraft without maintainers or pilots since all everyone is focused on is unsexy stuff.

Maybe 50,000 155mm rounds?

 

[daftandbarmy]

@daftandbarmy I think the only one that might work is the FMS sale of the HIMARs (for Ukraine) and I guess the shuffling of CCG under DND.

They still haven't restored the $900M/year cut to O&M which is nuts, and still don't have capacity at PSPC to support our growth, so lots of chokepoints and shortages, despite all the discussions of spending increases.

Trying to hire people, and even with having SME funding running into HR chokepoints, from lack of people there (as well as the insanely standardized process that doesn't react well to square pegs).

Nothing that Carney mentioned had much to do with the 'bayonet end' of defence spending...

Militarism without militarization​

What makes this moment particularly complex is that Carney’s militarism does not carry the traditional baggage of military nationalism. This is militarism without spectacle, without the boots-and-flags theatre often associated with defence expansion in larger powers. There are no sweeping declarations of global posture, no hints of expeditionary ambition. Instead, the language is resolutely domestic, even intimate: “protecting Canadians,” “resilience,” “strategic autonomy.”

It is in this quiet reframing that the ideological breakthrough occurs. Defence is no longer a siloed ministry of war; it has now been recast as a lever of economic security, a form of insurance against both kinetic threats and systemic shocks.

This discursive shift mirrors what scholars like Karl Polanyi might call a re-embedding of the economy into the social fabric. In the post-COVID landscape, where global supply chains fractured and state capacity was tested, Canadians have become more amenable to state-led investments in national capability.

Carney is leveraging this disposition, reframing military expenditure not as an exception to welfare economics but as an extension of it. In this narrative the state’s coercive arm is reconciled with its redistributive one — a subtle but profound shift in Canada’s economic self-conception.

Canada’s defence spending reimagined as economic renewal under Carney

Mark Carney reframes defence spending as a tool for economic resilience, introducing a new political economy rooted in strategic autonomy.

policyoptions.irpp.org