3 RCR transfers to the Light Infantry Regiment

[FJAG]

Its very likely 3 CIR will work closely with the planned aviation brigade

I'd be surprised if it didn't what with our continued 1st Air Cav wishful thinking. Lord, if I had a nickel for every helicopter exercise we had and every ride I took . . . Have I ever told you how much I hated hitching guns to Voyageurs in winter?

The only air assault operation mounted in Ukraine didn't work. We're still thinking Afghanistan.

I'm thinking the Canadian plan for an aviation brigade in the div has its roots in the old US light infantry divisions (as does the protection brigade). The Americans are changing those structures . . . bigly. Give Transforming in Contact more time - I don't think they have address it fully yet but they are making major reductions reducing aviation brigades to just three battalions from five. Last year they cut the establishment by 20% - some 6,500 positions.

My guess is that more unmanned resources will be put into the line divisions and manned systems pulled back as a corps combat support resource. IMHO, while there may be a role for some aviation resources operating in a div's AO from time to time, an agile, MCO division can't afford the logistics overhead that comes with "owning" organic aviation.

 

[MilEME09]

That’s crazy talk. You’re cut off for the night.

You qoute you... "you're not my real dad"

 

[thecdn]

The fact that the Corps 86 structure bore no resemblance to what we had on the ground confused a lot of folks but if you frame things in the aspirational then at least you have a vision to build and train for. You need a vision and a path to get to its end state.

During a tewt with the Strats our British Sqn 2 I/C said his A Ech vehicles couldn't cross a ford in a river we were dealing with. Our OC said no worries, everything is tracked in Corps 86. Then we went to position our milans.....

 

[boredtoon]

Its a regiment in formation, not in ceremony and name. so 3 RCR still wears the 8 point star and green/maroon berets. But under command of the new LIR

For now. The presentations and briefings on modernization naming referred to the Light Infantry Regiment as a placeholder name. The same for the planned heavy cav regiment. Some of the lower level slide decks (RCIC and RCAC) pitched the Royal Rifles of Canada and the PLDG as possible cap badges for the LIR and new HCAV regt.

Will the regimental mafias allow such a thing? Who knows. Not me.

I'm actually somewhat surprised that we are going through the rigamarole of naming it a "regiment" in the first place. Back in the day of divisions, "infantry brigades" merely had three infantry battalions and a brigade headquarters and nothing else. That's where "brigade group" had its genesis - "infantry brigades" became "infantry brigade groups" when we downloaded divisional engineer, artillery, recce and service support enablers onto them.

As far as I'm concerned they should have simply named it 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade right from the get go.

Some discussion talks about the LIR growing into a light brigade by 2040. So they probably should have just named it a brigade right off the hop.

 

[FJAG]

Some discussion talks about the LIR growing into a light brigade by 2040. So they probably should have just named it a brigade right off the hop.

That's the point, isn't it. Its already a "brigade" without needing to grow anything except maybe a sigs sqn for the brigade headquarters. I'm not sure if the "regiment" has a sigs element or just some staff wienees.

 

[Kirkhill]

I don't think that it ever was. I went to 3 RCHA in 1970 and we were in 1 CIBG at the time but changed to 1 Combat Gp shortly after. I think 3 was 3 CMBG until the end (It had M109s, M113s and Centurions). I think 2 CIBG actually went light and became 2 CG a few years before we did in the 1st. 5 was created as 5 CG right from when it was formed in 1968.

The aim was that in Canada we were all rerolling into light rapid deployment organizations while 4 CMBG was the heavy outfit (but not as heavy had been in the 1960s because it too underwent some Trudeau downsizing). We might have been designated as light in Canada - we gunners all went to L5s here - but tankers still had Centurions and then Leopard 1s for quite some time and some of the battalions were in M113s while others were wheeled in 3/4 ton trucks.

It was a confusing time to study doctrine. We were making it up as we went along.

One defining principle of that era: Everything in the infantry battalion, including the M113s, Lynxes, Ferrets and Deuces, could all be transported by air in the fleet of 24 C130 Es purchased by Paul Hellyer in 1964. Another 6 were purchased later.

Concurrently purchased was a fleet of
8 CH-147 Chinooks (1973)
74 CH-136 Kiowas (1971)
50 CH-135 Twin Hueys (1968)
10 CH-118 Iroquois (1968)

IMHO the helicopters, while increasing tactical mobility, decreased strategic mobility, necessitating sealift.

 

[Kirkhill]

I'd be surprised if it didn't what with our continued 1st Air Cav wishful thinking. Lord, if I had a nickel for every helicopter exercise we had and every ride I took . . . Have I ever told you how much I hated hitching guns to Voyageurs in winter?

The only air assault operation mounted in Ukraine didn't work. We're still thinking Afghanistan.

I'm thinking the Canadian plan for an aviation brigade in the div has its roots in the old US light infantry divisions (as does the protection brigade). The Americans are changing those structures . . . bigly. Give Transforming in Contact more time - I don't think they have address it fully yet but they are making major reductions reducing aviation brigades to just three battalions from five. Last year they cut the establishment by 20% - some 6,500 positions.

My guess is that more unmanned resources will be put into the line divisions and manned systems pulled back as a corps combat support resource. IMHO, while there may be a role for some aviation resources operating in a div's AO from time to time, an agile, MCO division can't afford the logistics overhead that comes with "owning" organic aviation.

Security, principle number 5, seems to be something that we skip over lightly. It is almost as if we assume we will have a secure base from which to operate.

I believe that manpower is required to secure the rear, especially in the face of concerted efforts by enemies to make life miserable.

That is my take on foreign wars, co-in operations and domestic operations. The Americans started hollowing out their heavy forces in the sandbox years because they had to find more boots they could task with security.

Those security positions fell into the category my old man used to describe in the phrase "they also serve who only stand and wait." No glorious advances or attacks. Simply holding their ground and keeping the peace,

That is why, I believe, the Americans continue to invest in lots of light infantry in the National Guard. They can provide security in Iraq, Afghanistan, Poland or Washington DC.

Or Yellowknife or Toronto.

 

[Kirkhill]

One defining principle of that era: Everything in the infantry battalion, including the M113s, Lynxes, Ferrets and Deuces, could all be transported by air in the fleet of 24 C130 Es purchased by Paul Hellyer in 1964. Another 6 were purchased later.

Concurrently purchased was a fleet of
8 CH-147 Chinooks (1973)
74 CH-136 Kiowas (1971)
50 CH-135 Twin Hueys (1968)
10 CH-118 Iroquois (1968)

IMHO the helicopters, while increasing tactical mobility, decreased strategic mobility, necessitating sealift.

Edit:

The Hercs could transport all the helicopters with the exception of the Chinooks. Some assembly required.

Edit 2:

Apparently the early Chinooks could be rigged to self-deploy over 2000 km.

 

[FJAG]

Concurrently purchased was a fleet of
8 CH-147 Chinooks (1973)

Those took a while to get to us. In 2 RCHA we were slinging L5s under Hueys and the C1s under Voyageurs until 1976 before they were given to the navy and turned into Labradors.

IMHO the helicopters, while increasing tactical mobility, decreased strategic mobility, necessitating sealift.

It's quite clear that they increased tactical mobility. Remember this was the Vietnam era and aviation was shiny and new and the solution to all our problems. I'm not sure what you mean by they "decreased strategic mobility." We still had the same Hercs, M113s and 3/4 ton trucks. The seal lift capability we needed was to move 5 CMGG as the CAST to Norway. We could have done that by air with many many chalks. We could barely get the AMF(L) there as it was. That wasn't a helicopter issue though, it was just volume.

The Americans started hollowing out their heavy forces in the sandbox years because they had to find more boots they could task with security.

I think that their hollowing out the heavy forces was in part a peace dividend and in part the utter belief that air power could win any and all wars.

They did concurrently use National Guard light brigades (with a whole lot of added HMWWVs that weren't on their TOE) in security force roles. They also started forming SBCTs at the time which were essentially light forces with armoured transport.

I get your point though. IMHO, the heavy division (whether armoured or mech) doesn't need organic light forces BUT, the corps or theatre headquarters does and part of its job should be to provide security of divisional rear areas either directly with its own MP and wheeled infantry or attaching a light battalion or two to the divisions DAA forces which to me is either the sustainment brigade or the protection brigade (if one exists - which I don't think it should)

That is why, I believe, the Americans continue to invest in lots of light infantry in the National Guard. They can provide security in Iraq, Afghanistan, Poland or Washington DC.

It's interesting to watch all the IBCTs, SBCTs and ABCTs, active and ARNG, converting to MBCTs right now.

 

[Cloud Cover]

You know when I went to the old army command and staff course and used Corps 86 as a model, doctrine actually was easy and made sense.

The fact that the Corps 86 structure bore no resemblance to what we had on the ground confused a lot of folks but if you frame things in the aspirational then at least you have a vision to build and train for. You need a vision and a path to get to its end state.

No, this is easy and I think the Army has grasped the game well.
You take one battalion per regiment and move it from the operating books to the capital books. But keep each battalion actually on the operating books. Do not open and view both books at the same time.

Oh and a new regiment.

All brought to you by Canadas New Government.

 

[Kirkhill]

Those took a while to get to us. In 2 RCHA we were slinging L5s under Hueys and the C1s under Voyageurs until 1976 before they were given to the navy and turned into Labradors.


It's quite clear that they increased tactical mobility. Remember this was the Vietnam era and aviation was shiny and new and the solution to all our problems. I'm not sure what you mean by they "decreased strategic mobility." We still had the same Hercs, M113s and 3/4 ton trucks. The seal lift capability we needed was to move 5 CMGG as the CAST to Norway. We could have done that by air with many many chalks. We could barely get the AMF(L) there as it was. That wasn't a helicopter issue though, it was just volume.


I think that their hollowing out the heavy forces was in part a peace dividend and in part the utter belief that air power could win any and all wars.

They did concurrently use National Guard light brigades (with a whole lot of added HMWWVs that weren't on their TOE) in security force roles. They also started forming SBCTs at the time which were essentially light forces with armoured transport.

I get your point though. IMHO, the heavy division (whether armoured or mech) doesn't need organic light forces BUT, the corps or theatre headquarters does and part of its job should be to provide security of divisional rear areas either directly with its own MP and wheeled infantry or attaching a light battalion or two to the divisions DAA forces which to me is either the sustainment brigade or the protection brigade (if one exists - which I don't think it should)



It's interesting to watch all the conversion of IBCTs, SBCTs and ABCTs, active and ARNG, converting to MBCTs right now.

Re the strategic mobility issue.

My comment was based on the difficulty of transporting the helicopters by air. My subsequent edits were due to me realizing that even in the 60s Canada could lift Kiowas and Hueys by air.

But, as you note, as with the M113s, while it was possible it would be a slow process. Not impossible but painful. As in Afghanistan, given time, an all arms group could be assembled.

 

[PrairieFella]

What kind of enablers and supporters would a light brigade have within our doctrine?

 

[FJAG]

What kind of enablers and supporters would a light brigade have within our doctrine?

I guess that depends on what time frame you look at and which army. Back in WW2, Canadian infantry brigades were routinely supported by divisional artillery field regiments, engineers field companies, a brigade service company, a field ambulance, a brigade RCEME workshop and its LADs,.

If you look at today's 101 Airborne Division you'll see a similar structure.

Note this shows the infantry units as airmobile. For an MBCT the symbol should be the infantry symbol with a vertical line through the middle for "Motorized."

The organization for the Canada's manoeuvre division doesn't go this far as these examples and leaves a combat engineer regiment and a service battalion as organic elements of each of the three CMBGs, but not for the light infantry regiment. The biggest enabler that the division has gathered together into a separate brigade is the field artillery and rocket regiment and those which were already part of the CSSB. There is probably some meaning as well in the fact that each of the CMBGs has a "tactical bde HQ" while the LIR only has a "Bde HQ."

The LIR looks like it is neither fish not fowl. I presume if it was to follow the CMBG examples then it would get an engineer battalion and a service battalion in order to become a light infantry brigade group.

Anyhow. There's a long way to go. Not everything is out yet and things are changing so a lot of stuff here is sheer speculation.

 

[Kirkhill]

Kuwait - Operation Granby (Brits)

Operation Granby order of battle - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

3 battalions of IFVs
4 battalions of security troops

And many, many enablers, including transport.

• 1st Battalion, The Staffordshire Regiment (Prince of Wales's) (Warrriors)
• 1st Battalion, The Royal Scots (The Royal Regiment) (Warriors)
• 3rd Battalion, Royal Regiment of Fusiliers (Warriors)

• 1st Battalion Scots Guards
• 1st Battalion Coldstream Guards
• 1st Battalion Royal Highland Fusiliers
• 1st Battalion King's Own Scottish Borderers
• Elements of 1st Battalion Queen's Own Highlanders

 

[Blackadder1916]

Kuwait - Operation Granby (Brits)

Operation Granby order of battle - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

3 battalions of IFVs
4 battalions of security troops

And many, many enablers, including transport.

• 1st Battalion, The Staffordshire Regiment (Prince of Wales's) (Warrriors)
• 1st Battalion, The Royal Scots (The Royal Regiment) (Warriors)
• 3rd Battalion, Royal Regiment of Fusiliers (Warriors)

• 1st Battalion Scots Guards
• 1st Battalion Coldstream Guards
• 1st Battalion Royal Highland Fusiliers
• 1st Battalion King's Own Scottish Borderers
• Elements of 1st Battalion Queen's Own Highlanders

I was wondering what "security" tasks those additional infantry battalions performed.

(from the source material that Wiki page used)

1 (British) Armoured Division

Prisoner of War Guard Force	Brigade strength force, lacking in organic transportation and support assets
1 Coldstream Guards	Under Tactical Control (TACON) of 4 Brigade. Tasked with collecting prisoners
1 Royal Highland Fusiliers	1 Div. Rear HQ maintained TACON . Guarded PoW transportation to rear
1 Kings Own Scottish Borderers	Guarded PoW holding areas in rear

Queen's own Highlanders - Cabarfeidh

1st Queen's Own Highlanders in the Gulf War - 1991
The Queen’s Own Highlanders took part in Operation ‘Granby’, the military action to recover Kuwait from the occupying forces of Iraq. The battalion deployed piecemeal, Battalion Headquarters providing command for the Armoured Delivery Group, the reinforcements of vehicles and crews, including three armoured squadrons and three armoured infantry companies, which were ready to replace casualties if they occurred. A (Atbara) Company Group provided the guard force HQ 1 Armoured Division in the field, and B (Alamein) Company Group the guard for Headquarters British Forces Middle East in Riyadh. The battalion also provided reinforcements for units of the 7th and 4th Armoured Brigades, including 1st Battalion Royal Scots and 3rd Battalion Royal Regiment of Fusiliers. The Regimental Band deployed as medical orderlies in October 1990 under command of 1st Armoured Division Field Ambulance.

The use of POW Guard Force and Armoured Delivery Group is also mentioned in a Canadian analysis of GRANBY.

https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/dnd-mdn/army/lineofsight/files/articlefiles/en/B-GL-900-J01_JP-006_JADEX06_ENG.pdf

The Prisoner of War Guard Force, commanded by the Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion Coldstream Guards, consisted of three infantry battalions and was responsible for guarding the British prisoner of war camp and collecting and escorting prisoners to that camp.

Central to this group was Armoured Delivery Group, another ad hoc grouping, built around the 1st Battalion Queen’s Own Highlanders, which would “receive, hold, train and deploy reinforcements of men and vehicles to fighting formations” and/or form a reserve.

and . . .

British Forces Middle East Army Units

Elements of 1st Battalion Scots Guards

In another forum (now long dormant), discussion about OP GRANBY's order of battle had 1 Scots Guards tasked for BCRs (Battle Casualty Replacement ?) but fortunately not needed. The other Scots Guards unit that deployed, the Regimental Band (like a fair number of bands from other regiments), was attached to a medical unit for their wartime role, though they also performed some ceremonial duties.

 

[ytz]

That's the point, isn't it. Its already a "brigade" without needing to grow anything except maybe a sigs sqn for the brigade headquarters.

I actually think they are allocated that.....

 

[ytz]

What kind of enablers and supporters would a light brigade have within our doctrine?

I mean the joke earlier wasn't wrong. The Tac Avn restructure with nTACS will make the LIR highly mobile and substantially air assault capable.

 

[PrairieFella]

I mean the joke earlier wasn't wrong. The Tac Avn restructure with nTACS will make the LIR highly mobile and substantially air assault capable.

Fantastic. We finally get an air assault brigade in time for it to be obsolete lmao

 

[MilEME09]

For now. The presentations and briefings on modernization naming referred to the Light Infantry Regiment as a placeholder name. The same for the planned heavy cav regiment. Some of the lower level slide decks (RCIC and RCAC) pitched the Royal Rifles of Canada and the PLDG as possible cap badges for the LIR and new HCAV regt.

Will the regimental mafias allow such a thing? Who knows. Not me.


Some discussion talks about the LIR growing into a light brigade by 2040. So they probably should have just named it a brigade right off the hop.

Im sure there will be plenty of arguments over what regiment gets brought back to the reg force. Im partial to the RHRC to have a regular force highland regiment again, and the FGH since they already have roots in western canada.

 

[PrairieFella]

Im sure there will be plenty of arguments over what regiment gets brought back to the reg force. Im partial to the RHRC to have a regular force highland regiment again, and the FGH since they already have roots in western canada.

Problem with the FGH is theyre still around lol. 1 FGH has its guidon laid up in the Manitoba legislature. 2 FGH is the current reserve unit. A benefit of the Princess Louise Dragoon Guards is its location agnostic.

Certainly would be cool to see Reg Garrys again though. One of the most storied regiments in the armoured corps.