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Yep, another great example.  It is quite an interesting discipline, and a lot of skill sets to maintain: https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/rbn-srch-rsc/index-eng.aspx There also probably some great cross training opportunities which would allow us to back up the technical...

The key thing to keep in mind here is that outside of Defence of Canada/sovereignty tasks, DOMOPS are not the reason why we have armed forces.  DOMOPS are simply something else we can do, and while they are important for a variety of reasons, they should not and do not drive our force structure...

While we have a renewed focus on DOMOPS, I would offer that it should not be (nor is it) a primary task for the Army.  Instead, the Army is (as it should be) a force of last resort.  We also have to be careful about providing federally funded alternatives to capabilities that should be...

Agreed.  There are currently some institutional barriers to building those types of capabilities in the PRes, mostly due to the fact that our talent gets pushed into the succession planning racetrack to generate COs. Absolutely. Very true, but I would offer that if you want a vibrant and...

BGen Mackenzie's position and the Director Reserves and Cadets are two examples of the advisory roles I was referring to.  Neither of them command anything.  What I would like to see is a more integrated organizations with PRes and RegF commanders and staff in various positions to provide some...

From a tactical standpoint, absolutely, but I am talking institutional leadership here.  To become a full Col in the PRes, you have to command a CBG, a unit of 1500-2000 pers, and that is effectively a full time role.  Those officers have also completed a tenure as a unit CO, which is also...

I would be curious to know what specific skill set a reserve full Col or BGen is missing that would prevent them contributing effectively at the defence team at that level, but I see your point with regards to the deeper corporate institutional knowledge. Perhaps a better way to articulate my...

A few things: 1.  The budgets of PRes CBGs and units are captured within the budgets of their respective divisions.  There is no separate funding envelope dedicated to the PRes, and because there is no PRes commander above CBG level, there would be no authority to spend that money in a focused...

I agree with you that converting a civilian skill set to a military qual (such as a civvy heavy equipment mechanic into an Army Veh Tech) should be a relatively short conversion course, but up to this point we haven't been able to do that, even for the RegF where semi-skilled (red seal...

The "civilian equivalent skills" argument has been tossed around a fair bit, and while it has some merit, would require institutional change within the training system that would be no easier/less expensive than scaring up a few more radios and machine guns.  The army specific components of the...

While I agree with you with regards to the employability of the Army Reserve in Armor and Artillery roles, the broad trend of occupational re-assignment in the Canadian Army in WW2 was into the Infantry and not out of it.  Once the Italian and Normandy campaigns ramped up and the casualties...

We have the MSVS for now. We have already lost a significant portion of our MSVS(MILCOT) fleet in 3 Div to support R2HR.  I don't begrudge them the use of the vehicles.  Obviously, high readiness should be the priority.  However, as the MLVW fleet rusts out, and the MSVS(SMP) (ie the RegF MSVS...

Agreed, the reserve force is on life support at the moment, mainly due to a lack of recruiting and training capacity.  With the current limited capacity we have to prioritize all tasks and if it is a matter of sending a member on a career course (as an instructor or candidate), or an exercise...

There are plenty of roles.  The Army Force Employment Concept (via Waypoint 2018 articulates a bunch: http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/assets/ARMY_Internet/docs/en/waypoint-2018.pdf To summarize the key tasks: -Arctic Response Company Groups (ARCG) x4 - these are exercised every year -Territorial...

And/or clean out the the institutional fat.  The CAF spends a lot of money on things that do not result in operational capabilities, and the reserve force is an area where modest investments can lead to significant results. Keep in mind that the full cost of the reserve force (all elements) is...

Yep, they talk about several dimensions of training deficiencies: 1.  That there are training deltas between RegF and PRes IT courses.  I would consider this unavoidable in the current employment model, but if future TOS and job protection legislation (another recommendation in the report) make...

It is definitely an outsider's view, and not reflective of a nuanced understanding of the reserve force employment model, managed readiness, etc. However, sometimes you need an outsider to point out the blatantly obvious: 1. That the Army reserve is an essential, integral component of Army...

I think it is more for the CSS troops to avoid the "rifles in the truck" scenario that RecceGuy describes when there isn't a combat arms guys around to guilt them into carrying them.  It would ensure that there is no excuse for carrying a proper weapon if that weapon can be carried in a holster...

I would assume a semi-auto capability in any modern SMG/PDW, and in that configuration they can be very accurate within their effective range (<100m) with training comparable to what we would provide for a rifle.  My only frame of reference is MP5 and the Kel Tec Sub 2000 (which is more in the...

Fair enough, but we have to look somewhere.  How else can we account for the fact that the Aussies are maintaining an equivalent (arguably significantly more capable) Army, crew more ships, and fly more planes than us with 10,000 fewer people in uniform?