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1st Wing or First Aviation Regiment

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http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_08/iss_3/CAJ_vol8.3_10_e.pdf

A pretty good article (IMO) by Major King; I thought I'd throw it up for people to debate and discuss.  It seems to be that incorporating the Tac Aviation into the Army should be done - the US, Aussies, and Brits do this.  This is more then simply Army aviators wearing a green costume - career cycles are oriented towards the land force.  AOC and ATOC, etc, etc - you could see a Pilot becoming a Brigade Commander or higher.  As well, I also like Major King's idea about recruiting some pilots from the ranks and serving as NCO/WO pilots.  These would be SNCO's/WO's akin to the US Warrant Officer - focusing on the trade without the duties of Staff and Command that loom in a young officers future....

Any thoughts?
 
If not in the exact details, certainly the spirit of this should be explored.  427 SOAS is in a similar, but not as extensive position with its assignment under OPCOM to CANSOFCOM.  The differences between OPCOM and Full Command would have to be assessed, but there is no reason that I can see, aside from willingness to move forward at the various levels, to make this work.  It would be interesting to see which is a bigger issue; 1 Wing to the "Army", or NCMs as pilots.  I have no problem with either.  Lastly, the new command structures that came into effect after Maj King published his paper would have to be taken in to consideration.  Transformation is continuing and it is hard to say exactly what will come of AIRCOM, LFC and MARCOM vis a vis CANADACOM, CEFCOM and CANSOFCOM.  I have a feeling that the issue might not be so clear as "1 Wing moves to the 'Army' (LFC)" as some might have thought in the past.  Overall, I support the effort to explore command relationships and responsiveness of Tactical Aviation to Land Forces.

Cheers,
Duey
 
Not a bad article, but something that has been debated for a long time already.

Let me add some of my problems with the whole thing...

“Army pilots” for the context of this discussion, could go through a similar and less expensive training programme for their wings, as they too would only be expected to fly helicopters throughout their career.
One of the ways that the CF tries to keep pilots in is by giving them the chance to change airframes.  I'm not talking helo to helo only, but helo to multi, jet to helo, etc.  The suggestion to have "Army" pilots would most likely completey eliminate the chance of such a pilot going back to Moose Jaw to teach, since they had never been there before.  Or maybe get a posting up North to Yellowknife, since they never did that common fixed wing training in MJ.

Flight engineers and aircraft technicians would only need to take the portions of training necessary to maintain and support helicopter operations.

Just insert FE or tech for pilot from  my response above, and include the applicable postings.

As for the comment about pilots not needing to be officers, although this is working in other countries, the massive amount of work that would have to be done wrt Sqn organization, secondary duties, CoC, would be insane.  The only way I could see a change such as this happening would be to slowly introduce this new rank structure as people signed on and to reorganize the units as the situations presented themselves.

Somewhere in the early stages of training the officers would also complete phase 2 training with one of the courses in Gagetown.

Right, don't mean to sound rude here, but when exaclty would these officers be required to take this course?  We can't even find time to get on the compulsory ones that we already have to take.  Sure, those who have training lags with their flying courses might be able to fit them in.  But you can't plan your life around those.  The fact the pilots would still have to take some Air Force related staff courses because of their close working relationship to the AF, on top of all their Army staff courses -- seems a little busy.  Oh wait, Tac Hel does that already.   ;D

I guess my biggest issue is the amount of doors that would be closed to the aircrew and techs if such a structure were to be adopted.  Sure, doors would open within the Army community, but they would be ground based, and what aviator wants to fly a desk?  If training were to remain common, as it is now, with the ability for aircrew to change "suits" if a desired posting were to come up, I could see this happening.  Otherwise, retention might become an issue.
 
The article postulates that Army effectiveness is not an Air Force priority and therefore 1 Wing is not required as part of the Air Force - however, that whole line of reasoning can be ignored if you accept that Joint effectiveness is one of the priorities. If changes are required by the Army to have greater (or more effective) support from the Air Force, then better direction is required from the higher levels of the CF/DND.

I'm not saying that more direct control shouldn't be sought, but Air Ops are Air Ops, and all aircraft should be "Air Force". There is no need for an Amphibious Assault ship to be crewed by the Army or for the troops being landed to be Navy.

Even if the article is correct on splitting Rotary and Fixed flight training earlier on, this doesn't call for any big changes. And as for having Sgts and WOs as pilots... it would be a waste of a Combat Arms Senior NCO, especially for what little they could add to being a pilot trainee.
 
John King will now be branded a heretic and his career will progress no further.

Iterater: "One of the ways that the CF tries to keep pilots in is by giving them the chance to change airframes.  I'm not talking helo to helo only, but helo to multi, jet to helo, etc.  The suggestion to have "Army" pilots would most likely completey eliminate the chance of such a pilot going back to Moose Jaw to teach, since they had never been there before.  Or maybe get a posting up North to Yellowknife, since they never did that common fixed wing training in MJ."

The Army does not try to keep Infantrymen in by giving them the chance to change much, short of reclassification/remuster. The notion that variety of airframe is a good thing is a bad one. It is simple to train somebody to drive a different vehicle, but it takes time to teach him how to employ it effectively. How about starting an Army officer out as a logistician, switching him to Arty after four years, and then to Armoured etcetera?

In my early days in 10 TAG (forerunner of 1 Wing) we used to regularly get fighter pilots parachuted in, usually in senior positions. They frequently had little interest in doing Army support stuff and not much more in helicopters of any sort. On the other hand, we lost way too many people to other flying communities just at the point where they began to become really useful.

When I first came to realize that linking Tac Hel to the a** f**ce was a Very Bad Thing and let my views be known (and became a heretic) I suggested that Tac Hel pilots be recruited as Army pilots with the understanding that they would be Tac Hel for their entire career. I was told by one non-thinker that nobody would ever join to fly Army helicopters. Huh? We can recruit people as other Combat Arms officers/NCMs with little difficulty, even Infantry, and many other armies have been able to recruit pilots, so why wouldn't we?

One of the problems that we had with retention in the Tac Hel community back then was, I'm sure, due to the fact that we lied to people even before they walked through the door of the recruiting centre for the first time. The F18s were just coming into service, so that's what showed up in all of the TV, bus/subway/billboard poster, newspaper, and magazine recruiting ads. Recruiters would pump up prospective pilots with visions of supersonic-dogfighting-bogeys-at-twelve-o'clock adventure and admiring chicks hanging off of each elbow, neck, thigh, and whatever other body parts were accessible. During Portage (primary) and Moose Jaw (basic jet) we were constantly asked what we wanted to fly, and there was a very real bias towards fighters. I was the only guy that wanted Kiowas throughout the whole process. As the jet course in MJ progressed and more and more had problems with various aspects they tended to "lower" their expectations, but the vast majority still wanted seized-wing. And then came the rotary-wing selection point, and much wailing and gnashing of teeth as former fighter-wannabes got snared by the evil helicopter god. "But wait!!" they would hope, in order to console themselves, "I'll get SAR in Comox". The posting block would further shatter them when they found out that their helicopters would be grey or green rather than yellow.

Had we been honest from the start, however...

And we could have saved a bundle on jet fuel at the same time.

Interchangeability is an expensive, wasteful, illogical, and ineffective crock.

Iterater: "Just insert FE or tech for pilot from  my response above, and include the applicable postings."

Yes. See _my_ response above.

Iterater: "As for the comment about pilots not needing to be officers, although this is working in other countries, the massive amount of work that would have to be done wrt Sqn organization, secondary duties, CoC, would be insane.  The only way I could see a change such as this happening would be to slowly introduce this new rank structure as people signed on and to reorganize the units as the situations presented themselves."

What "Massive amount of work"? A warrant officer or sergeant pilot can be the Squadron Sports Guy or Fire Warden just as easily as one of the excess number of junior officer pilots, few of whom will ever get a true officer leadership position like their non-pilot officer buds. This is why French and OPDPs counted for far too much on one's PER - there was little else to judge. So many secondary duties were made up simply to give these people something to do/be assessed on outside of the cockpit, and that was when we were routinely doing two or three fights daily, every day. However do those Infantry battalions ever get by with only one officer per platoon of thirty-odd, plus a couple more per company, and another smattering in Bn HQ? Where on earth do they find enough Cadet Liaison Officers?

Nobody needs a commission or a university degree (at great public expense) to drive a helicopter any more than they do to drive any other vehicle.

And here's another stupid anomaly that arose from this: my crewman on Kiowas was a Combat Arms Sergeant or Warrant Officer (and a very, very good one). He had the map, the stab binos, and the two VHF-FM radios with which to talk to the supported unit and guns etcetera. He was in a much better position than I, his boss, to process all of the information coming in, make decisions, and give direction. Due to the rank difference, however, he could not; he had to give me options and suggestions for me to choose, then I had to brief him on my decision, and then carry it out while all of the time trying to avoid wires, trees, highway traffic, and cows and figure out where the hell my Number Two had buggered off to between that last bound and the one before, and all before his descriptive option/suggestion became outdated. The Army has a far better concept of crew commander and driver duties.

I would not force everybody into a green uniform, however, as that would not aid morale. Those that wanted to switch to green could, those that wanted to remain blue could, but anybody else being recruited into the new Army Aviation Corps trade structure would be issued green from the outset.

Iterater: "Right, don't mean to sound rude here, but when exaclty would these officers be required to take this course?  We can't even find time to get on the compulsory ones that we already have to take.  Sure, those who have training lags with their flying courses might be able to fit them in.  But you can't plan your life around those."

Right at the beginning. BOTC, then second language (presuming that that's still a requirement), then Infantry Phase 2 (or whatever it's called now), then Portage for Primary and Basic Helicopter (no wasting time and fuel on the Harvard II) just like the Jamaicans that we train, then 403 Squadron for the Griffon course.

Iterater: "The fact the pilots would still have to take some Air Force related staff courses because of their close working relationship to the AF, on top of all their Army staff courses -- seems a little busy.  Oh wait, Tac Hel does that already."

Completely unnecessary, except, now, for a** f**ce political reasons. The Army has enough career and other staff courses which would be far more relevent, and there would now be Tac Hel officers instructing on those just like they would occupy positions on Army staffs. Imagine an Aviator as Brigade Commander, or CLS. The British Army has been commanded by at least one Army Air Corps guy. What "close working relationship to the AF"? This is an unnecessary artificiality borne out of our current ridiculous situation. The closest real working relationship would be when FACing or co-operating in a joint HQ.

Iterater: "I guess my biggest issue is the amount of doors that would be closed to the aircrew and techs if such a structure were to be adopted.  Sure, doors would open within the Army community, but they would be ground based, and what aviator wants to fly a desk?"

A staff position in 1 CAD HQ or other a** f**ce HQs involves just as much time behind a desk as any other staff position. An Army staff position would be far more relevant to an Army Aviation officer, however, than one in 1 CAD. There would be just as many instructional positions as before, including joint technical schools similar to the ones that existed pre-Unification (Rivers, Manitoba).

Iterater: "If training were to remain common, as it is now, with the ability for aircrew to change "suits" if a desired posting were to come up, I could see this happening.  Otherwise, retention might become an issue."

It's not all that common. Additional training would still be required - ie multi-engine or fighter lead-in. As for retention, recruit people for the job and they'll be less inclined to want to leave it in the first place.

Tac Hel would benefit operationally, and so would the Army, if Tac Hel went back to the Army as it was before Unification, as is Right and Natural.

Iterater: "Air Ops are Air Ops, and all aircraft should be "Air Force". There is no need for an Amphibious Assault ship to be crewed by the Army or for the troops being landed to be Navy."

Tac Hel is not, however, "air power". That is fighter, bomber, reconaissance, and transport etcetera. It is not the means of mobility (rotor rather than track, wheel, or air cushion) that is crucial but what it does and who it does it for. Tac Hel exists for no other reason than to support Army ground formations and units. If there was no Army, the a** f**ce would never invent Tac Hel. On the battlefield a tactical helicopter is simply another vehicle. If "all aircraft should be 'Air Force'", then it follows that all wheeled/tracked vehicles should be Army and all boats should be Navy. I don't think that any reasonable person would agree that every bowser driver at Cold Lake should be wearing green, and I don't think that too many Combat Engineers would fancy themselves in dark blue. If "there is no need for an Amphibious Assault ship to be crewed by the Army or for the troops being landed to be Navy", then there is similarly no need, or logical reason, for a battlefield vehicle that serves the Army to be crewed by a** f**ce personnel.

Iterater: "And as for having Sgts and WOs as pilots... it would be a waste of a Combat Arms Senior NCO, especially for what little they could add to being a pilot trainee.

Why? Who said that NCM pilots would be Combat Arms NCOs? NCO pilots and techs would follow a career progression similar to Army Officer Pilots. After Basic Infantry Qualification (has the name changed again?) they would receive further training as drivers, rad ops, and other semi-skilled functions. They would take their turn with basic servicing functions as well - refuelling and windscreen washing. We don't need fully-qualified highly-paid techs do do those things, or stand sentry. After a year or two they would stream off as either air or ground crew, receive the appropriate training, and carry on at whatever rank was decided upon - Corporal? All career/leadership courses would be the standard Army ones again, and these fine Army Aviation NCOs - who would themselves be, in fact, Combat Arms NCOs - would instruct on them in turn.
 
Loachman, I presented many reasonable, well organized, and informative points, and I thank you for taking the time to quote and respond to them. ;)

After reading your post I now find myself in agreement with you on the following:

- Switching airframes is probably not required for retention
- Recruiting for only Tac Hel would not be a problem
- Having Tac Hel pilots be in the Army can be done
- NCO Tac Hel pilots can be done
- And, well... quite a few other items

Having said that though, I will cherry pick a few items from my previous post:

Iterator said:
Even if the article is correct on splitting Rotary and Fixed flight training earlier on, this doesn't call for any big changes.
Isolating Tac Hel aircrew in their career from other Air Force personnel may allow for a more focused approach but, in my opinion, this does not take it out of the Air Force domain.

And I have even less belief in the idea of having a Tac Hel officer being the CO of an army Task Force (unless you had some sort of Tac Hel heavy air landing force). 

I can't see this reasoning following through to having Sea King pilots wearing navy blue and commanding a couple of frigates. Where would SCTF pilots end up? Would they get complete free choice in the formations they would command? Admittedly though, this wasn't discussed by the article, or yourself.



Loachman said:
...Tac Hel is not, however, "air power". That is fighter, bomber, reconaissance, and transport etcetera. It is not the means of mobility (rotor rather than track, wheel, or air cushion) that is crucial but what it does and who it does it for. Tac Hel exists for no other reason than to support Army ground formations and units. If there was no Army, the a** f**ce would never invent Tac Hel. On the battlefield a tactical helicopter is simply another vehicle. ...

Mostly from this I would disagree with how you remove Tac Hel from Air Power because it exclusively (almost) supports Army units. If there were enough F-18s to have dedicated ground attack squadrons would these now become Aviation Battalions? I see all aircraft as Air Force being a benefit for the CF. I wouldn't want the Army to "own and operate" amphibious ships.

Then again, if the Air Force is not giving enough weight to Tac Hel then why isn't DND/CF changing this?

Loachman said:
...If "all aircraft should be 'Air Force'", then it follows that all wheeled/tracked vehicles should be Army and all boats should be Navy. I don't think that any reasonable person would agree that every bowser driver at Cold Lake should be wearing green, and I don't think that too many Combat Engineers would fancy themselves in dark blue. If "there is no need for an Amphibious Assault ship to be crewed by the Army or for the troops being landed to be Navy", then there is similarly no need, or logical reason, for a battlefield vehicle that serves the Army to be crewed by a** f**ce personnel...

Just to dwell on a couple of other points from that quote (but could go way off topic):
- A bowser driver would be a purple trade. No matter which environment there is always the requirement for a Fort, Port, or Airfield and some of the service support is generic to all.
- Cbt Eng divers should remain few in numbers and capabilities at the CER level, while there should be an increase in their numbers under joint command with Navy divers as part of CANSOFCOM



Loachman said:
...Iterater: "And as for having Sgts and WOs as pilots... it would be a waste of a Combat Arms Senior NCO, especially for what little they could add to being a pilot trainee.

Why? Who said that NCM pilots would be Combat Arms NCOs? NCO pilots and techs would follow a career progression similar to Army Officer Pilots. After Basic Infantry Qualification (has the name changed again?) they would receive further training as drivers, rad ops, and other semi-skilled functions. They would take their turn with basic servicing functions as well - refuelling and windscreen washing. We don't need fully-qualified highly-paid techs do do those things, or stand sentry. After a year or two they would stream off as either air or ground crew, receive the appropriate training, and carry on at whatever rank was decided upon - Corporal? All career/leadership courses would be the standard Army ones again, and these fine Army Aviation NCOs - who would themselves be, in fact, Combat Arms NCOs - would instruct on them in turn. ...

Although your idea makes more sense to me than either making it a career path for a (current) Combat Arms Senior NCO, or training pilots and then giving them NCO ranks, if you're going the NCM route why not go straight to pilot training and come out a Private/Corporal?

Given the capabilities and scope of an aircraft, I would stick with commissioned officers.

Is Tac Hel something the Air Force wants to be rid of?
 
Interesting Thread.  Alot of what Loachman is saying, IMHO, could be applied to the MH world as well.  We are (usually) roundly ignored by the rest of the Air Force and might fit better by taking Navy Career course, not the ridiculous Air Force ones where we get indoctrinated into the "real" Air Force world of fighters- and spend no time at all discussing sea power.

I wonder- might there not be scope for creating a Helicopter "Wing" in the CF that combines MH and Tac Hel?  The "Wing" could be divided into two parts- Martime and Land Aviation.  Each side would be primarily responsible for supporting it's own element, but there would be enought cross-pollination to allow MH crews, on certain ops, to take part in land ops (under tac hel leadership) and vice versa. 
Could this create synergy?
I'm not the first, BTW, to suggest this approach...
 
Iterater:

I am not sure what you mean by "Isolating Tac Hel aircrew in their career from other Air Force personnel" - and I include all Tac Hel personnel, not just aircrew.

If you mean keeping them within the Tac Hel community rather than letting them flood out to other communities, that's a start, but it doesn't go far enough.

That is why I stress the need for an Army Aviation Corps.

Tac Hel units do not operate out of airfields with all of the attendant facilities, defences, and security in wartime, unlike fighter and transport units. They live and operate in the field with those that they support. They must be as proficient in such things as local defence as any other Army unit as they are just as responsible for their turf. The a** f**ce has no interest in formal training for that; there is no equivalency for initial Army officer or NCM training that would generate basic competency and interest. People are left to learn by osomosis during their first tour, and that's not good. As supervisors are largely ignorant of these things, and hence have little interest, not a lot of real training occurs and it's always in conflict with the number one priority: flying operations. We would be incredibly, and unnecessarily, vulnerable in wartime and subsequently weaken adjacent units and the parent brigade or division. As a result, we were the only unit at brigade level to be assigned a D&S platoon of Infantry by doctrine. This is a complete waste of a platoon - and we knew full well that we'd never get it anyway - and would not be required if all Tac Hel personnel were adequately trained in the first place.

The a** f**ce does not care about that, only the Army does. For the a** f**ce, the ground stops at the perimeter fence of the airfield.

Army Aviation officers would take the same career (staff and command) courses as their other Combat, Combat Support, and Combat Service Support brethren, and be just as eligible for brigade and higher command positions, and why not? They would be just as qualified. You cannot look at any brigade or higher commander today and determine his background as there is one cap badge for all colonels, regardless of their original corps - and the same goes for generals. That brigade commander could just as easily have been Infantry, Combat Engineer, or Logistics - or a Tac Hel Pilot.

The US Army does just that. One out of the four manoeuvre brigades in each division is an Aviation brigade. Aviation does not support, it fights. Many division and corps commanders have been aviators. US Army Aviation would not have achieved its current level of capability and importance were it not fully integrated into the Army.

Because we are not, we have flopped around like a dying fish since the formation of Air Command in 1975.

We do not belong to the Army that we exist for, and we are too Army-oriented for the a** f**ce. We are and will remain the bastard child outcast as long as that situation remains, and our growth will be consequently stunted ("growth"? We've withered away from our late eighties/early nineties peak of one group and two reserve wing HQs, seven regular and four reserve flying squadrons, and two reserve support squadrons and three types of helicopter) forever.

Sea Kings, as well as the Trackers, Banshees, and our other carrier-based aircraft, were originally Navy, just as Tac Hel originated in the Army. Look at old pictures of Sea Kings and see what it says in big, bold, block letters on their sides: "NAVY". Most of the air and "ground" crew were very bitter about being sucked into the a** f**ce with the formation of Air Command. A former DCO of mine was still proudly and obstinately wearing his Navy mess dress on formal occasions.

The Sea Kings are an integral part of their ships' capabilities, and like Tac Hel personnel, theirs must be just as capable as any other sailor with operating and surviving at sea.

Determining service assignment based purely on method of mobility rather than function is completely illogical. What is more important, operationally - what something does and for whom it does it, or how it moves?

I am not "remov(ing) Tac Hel from Air Power" - it never was "air power". Tac Hel is land power. Air power is long-range, wanders all over the place, and has very little connection to the ground commander. Tac Hel units live, fight, and die within their assigned brigade's or division's area. They are, and need to be, very intimately connected to the ground battle 24/7 rather than for five to twenty minute chunks.

What is the difference between a Tac Hel unit and any other unit in a brigade, other than its primary vehicle's method of mobility, in real terms?

F18s would never be dedicated to ground attack regardless of how many we have. It's a multi-role aircraft. In any case, there are varieties of ground attack - Close Air Support (CAS) being the one that most interests brigade and division commanders and individual soldiers. As this occurs over friendly territory and normally in times of local air superiority (at least), it is relatively simple. Deep strikes, however, require tanker support, Combat Air Patrols (CAP), EW and other escort and protection measures to cover the strike aircraft. This needs to be a** f**ce as it's a very complex air operation. Pure CAS aircraft are very rare these days, the A10 being the best-known and one of the most effective. It's still operating at altitude with the other zoomie stuff, flashing in over a battlefield, expending its ordnance, and heading back for shower, beer, pizza, and starry-eyed chicks. It's told what to do by the FAC, but has no other contact or concern with anybody else below. It contributes to, but is not part of, the land battle, which its pilot does not really have to understand to be effective.

I am not advocating that the Army own amphibious ships because they are an occasional-use thing and they operate within a naval environment: the delivery of troops is a naval responsibility as it involves all aspects of naval operations. The Army commander has a position on the planning team but has no role until he leaves the vessel, and the naval commander has no responsibility once the last soldier gets his/her feet wet. There is no intimacy or sharing of environment for long periods.

The a** f**ce doen't want to give Tac Hel up because we represent numbers and therefore power and influence, yet it does not want to give us the means to be fully effective as that takes funds from core a** f**ce activities. It does not understand our operating environment or requirements. The lack of understanding is obvious to anybody who's spent time within Tac Hel (I'm sitting at 24 years so far). It doesn't care about us. The priority is fighters, and then transport/SAR. We could be down to our last F18 and the a** f**ce would revolve around that.

The title of the main doctrine says it all: "Out of the Sun". Pure fighter stuff. As a Tac Hel guy I do NOT want sun at all while on the job. It glints off of windscreens and rotor blades and gives us away (as a Kiowa guy this was always a major consideration during recce missions). I want a low ceiling so that enemy fighters cannot safely operate at the altitudes that I'm operating in.

Obviously, it makes no difference what dress uniform a driver wears. You could put a few individual Navy or a** f**ce drivers into a service battalion and they'd pick up what they needed to know in the field pretty quickly, but you couldn't take a full-blown unit of Navy or a** f**ce drivers, toss them out in the bush, and expect them to function. And it wasn't the combat divers that I was referring to, but all of the Combat Engineers' things that float: ferries, rafts, and a variety of small boats that support water crossings. If the Army can have boat operators in green uniforms, why can it not have helicopter operators in green uniforms? Would you advocate that the Navy take over the Combat Engineer fleets? Why or why not?

As for Army Aviation Corps training, yes, you could train junior ranks right from the start. The early career development model that I described was that of the British Army during the eighties/nineties. I'm not sure if it's changed since then, or how. The bulk of their pilots are still NCOs, and mainly Sergeants. As for rank, I did say "Corporal". Given the length of training, the aptitude requirement, and the responsibilities involved I wouldn't go down to Private, though.

You don't need commissioned officers as drivers of anything - tank, HLVW, LAV III, or helicopter. Rank is immaterial in that regard. Sergeants make perfectly fine tank commanders, gun det commanders, and helicopter crew commanders. Other armies all around the planet have proven that - and saved a pile of money as well. Commissioned officers are required only in command roles. A helicopter unit is no different from any other Army unit in that regard.

The Army is not getting full value out of the Tac Hel community as it now stands, mainly because of a** f**ce politics and mishandling (overall budget deficiencies aside). The Army could do a better job.

Remember, if you want something done properly, do it yourself.

My opinions are based upon 2.4 decades of living in this environment. Depsite my reserve Infantry origins, I came into Tac Hel free of all prejudices. We didn't even use the terms "a** f**ce and Army back then, not in Tac Hel itself, at least. It didn't take me too long to see the deficiencies and problems caused buy our Air Command affiliation, though. The blue uniform was another wedge driven between us and those that we exist to support. When I was in 427 Squadron, we Kiowa pilots spent as much, if not more, time drinking in the Liri Valley Mess with the Armoured Recce and Arty officers with whom we worked as/than we did in our own mess - and we spent a lot of time in the 2 Service Battalion (now Normandy) Mess as well but that was because there were generally more women there.  We were part of the bunch. From the late eighties on, though, we became "you a** f**ce guys".

Sea King Tacco:

Yes, there are great similarities between our communities and I agree thoroughly with your comments regarding career courses. I will allow that there's some merit to your amalgamation concept however I believe that it would lead to rather schizophrenic command relationships. I wouldn't want to go that far but I'll continue to mull it over for some time to come. We would all benefit from some co-operative training and exercises, most definitely.

Synergy? Oh, yes.

What are you doing from 19-27 August? I'm a bit short of airframes for Vigilant Guardian. Can you guys sling, and how much? How low can you fly tactically over land? We'll provide the tents, and we've got pretty good cooks. No poopy suits required. Not many mosquitoes where we camp...
 
Item 1: Tac Hel doesn't receive the proper priority/support/attention.

Loachman said:
...We do not belong to the Army that we exist for, and we are too Army-oriented for the a** f**ce. We are and will remain the ******* child outcast as long as that situation remains, and our growth will be consequently stunted ("growth"? We've withered away from our late eighties/early nineties peak of one group and two reserve wing HQs, seven regular and four reserve flying squadrons, and two reserve support squadrons and three types of helicopter) forever.
...

I am reluctant to believe that having Tac Hel as a branch of the Army would change the priority associated with Tac Hel in Canada. None of the environments are the creators of their own paths.

The Army, Navy, and the Air Force receive direction through the same higher Government/DND/CF decision makers.

Consider the following: Does the Army owning Leopards get them deployed, or replaced, or expanded in numbers?




Item 2: Tac Hel is naturally a part of the Army rather than the Air Force.

Loachman said:
...Determining service assignment based purely on method of mobility rather than function is completely illogical. What is more important, operationally - what something does and for whom it does it, or how it moves?

I am not "remov(ing) Tac Hel from Air Power" - it never was "air power". Tac Hel is land power. Air power is long-range, wanders all over the place, and has very little connection to the ground commander. Tac Hel units live, fight, and die within their assigned brigade's or division's area. They are, and need to be, very intimately connected to the ground battle 24/7 rather than for five to twenty minute chunks.

What is the difference between a Tac Hel unit and any other unit in a brigade, other than its primary vehicle's method of mobility, in real terms?
...
...And it wasn't the combat divers that I was referring to, but all of the Combat Engineers' things that float: ferries, rafts, and a variety of small boats that support water crossings. If the Army can have boat operators in green uniforms, why can it not have helicopter operators in green uniforms? Would you advocate that the Navy take over the Combat Engineer fleets? Why or why not?
...

There is a fair bit of baggage that goes along with having the 3 services, but main function isn't the only criteria. After you look at what units fight, patrol, and supply maritime forces, and what units fight, patrol, and supply ground forces - that almost leaves you with no Air Force at all.

If it flies - it's Air Force (this includes associated specific technical support).
If it's a sea going vessel - it's Navy (this includes associated specific technical support).
If it's a ground fighting unit - it's Army (this includes associated specific technical support).
If your name hasn't been mentioned then you are probably purple.

There are plenty of circumstances to illustrate.

The rescue boats at Comox (are they still there?) are Navy even though it's the Air Force that requires them.
Helicopters are Air Force - they operate in the air, no matter what they take off of.
Coastal Artillery, if we had any, would be Army.
Dedicated amphibious vessels are Navy.
Monitor (shore bombardment) vessels are Navy

Yes, Combat Engineers do use boats and have divers - but these aren't their fulltime activities. The CER has equipment and people qualified for "if" they encounter a water obstacle. At some level of organization where these boats and qualified personnel would be permanent then eventually it would become a Navy task (unless SOF). And there will always be non-career, one-time postings across environments (e.g. Tac Hel NCO Observer).




Item 3: A Tac Hel squadron is the similar to Combat Arms units and so its officers could be Brigade commanders.

Loachman said:
...Army Aviation officers would take the same career (staff and command) courses as their other Combat, Combat Support, and Combat Service Support brethren, and be just as eligible for brigade and higher command positions, and why not? They would be just as qualified. You cannot look at any brigade or higher commander today and determine his background as there is one cap badge for all colonels, regardless of their original corps - and the same goes for generals. That brigade commander could just as easily have been Infantry, Combat Engineer, or Logistics - or a Tac Hel Pilot.
...

While it is good to see that Joint forces continues to gain acceptance, there is no need to change what branch controls the environment specific Task Forces.

I can't see a Tac Hel squadron re-rolling as an infantry style force to go to Bosnia like the artillery did.


Loachman said:
...Obviously, it makes no difference what dress uniform a driver wears. You could put a few individual Navy or a** f**ce drivers into a service battalion and they'd pick up what they needed to know in the field pretty quickly, but you couldn't take a full-blown unit of Navy or a** f**ce drivers, toss them out in the bush, and expect them to function.
...

Much like I would expect anyone in a non-sea trade, who was posted to a ship, to complete environment specific training. I would also expect there to be a real course for those posted to Army formations (and further training for NCOs and Officers).

 
Iterator

That has to be one of the least thoughtout and most illogical posts,  I have read yet.
 
Loachman-

I agree with everything that you are saying. I have watched in horror the absolute mess the A** F**ce  has made over tactical UAVs by throwing a hissy fit when the Artillery was going to operate them, only to win the battle and then discover that that they did not understand the battle that they had won.  In a perfect world, I too, would like to see MH wearing Navy uniforms.  It's just that I fear we have passed the Rubicon.  So much damage has been done to the organization, I think that there is no way back to where we were in the late 60's. Unfortunately.

As for your exercise in August- you know very well that we can sling loads.  Big loads. Tactical flying over land is our weakness, mind you.  However, I do not believe that my Wing Commander would approve of me committing resources on his behalf  ;D.  Sorry!

 
George Wallace said:
Iterator

That has to be one of the least thoughtout and most illogical posts,  I have read yet.

+1


Iterator, Maj King has references to the deductions he made.  There is much of your post that's hard to follow.  Tac Hel issues aside, my 20+ years operating jointly with AF, Army and SOF assets makes me wonder about some of the things you're talking about?  In no particular order:

  • Your view of the environments taking direction through the same higher Gov't/DND/CF decision makers seems to support a less joint and less integrated view of operational and tactical command...I think you are exactly 180* out of phase on what is really happening with command and control.
  • I know a bunch of combat divers who would really want to have a chat with you over your views of how little they have to do with water and how any permanent water tasks would be done by the Navy or SOF;
  • Air = Air Force, water = Navy, dirt = Army is an incredibly myopic and partitioned view of life...if just is not true;  Hmmm...let's see...ADATS/MMEV missiles are an airborne weapon system - Air Force...errr, uh-oh...army?...but you said....
  • You are reluctant to see how being some part of the Army command structure would serve Tac Hel's operational prioritization better?  Well, if the Army becoming an active proponent of Tac Hel where the air force really doesn't actively attempt to further TH employment in anything but a reactional mode, consider then how SOF proponency for SOA has developed from a residual capability tasking in the early 90's to SOA falling under operational command of CANSOFCOM...now that's proponency and a model for how the Army could influence the support it receives from tactical aviation;
  • Tac Hel re-role to infantry (per your e.g. of Arty in Bosnia) - did you mean you didn't think that aviation wouldn't do a good job pushing their helicopters through the streets on ground handling wheels as part of their re-roled infantry-like patrols through the countryside...hmmmm...I suppose I'll have to agree with you on that one.  Yup, TH would not re-role very well into infanteers...remind me again what exactly that point of yours was about.
  • Coastal Artillery.  ???

The only comment I'll make in opposition to Maj King's hypothesis, is that as CF Transformation continues and operational command shifts from an environmentally-driven model to a regional/theatre-driven model with environmental specialization in support of the operationally generated forces, I would think that the increase in integrated forces will pressure the Air Force to have a more operationally-balanced view of (and responsibility to generate) tactical aviation within its arcs of fire.

Cheers,
Duey
 
SeaKingTacco said:
As for your exercise in August- you know very well that we can sling loads.  Big loads.
I was pretty sure, but not entirely so at the time of day that I was pecking that out.
SeaKingTacco said:
Tactical flying over land is our weakness, mind you.
Given the scenario, we could probably live with that.
SeaKingTacco said:
However, I do not believe that my Wing Commander would approve of me committing resources on his behalf
Can you ask him? Jazz up the cross-country, exciting new training opportunity, and jointness aspects? If you can get him to bite I'll look after the formal invitation. Even one Sea King as an appetizer would be a significant contribution for many reasons.

In truth, I should have thought of and asked about this months ago. It's an intriguing possibility. If it doesn't work out this year I'm definitely going to push for it next year.
 
Duey said:
The only comment I'll make in opposition to Maj King's hypothesis, is that as CF Transformation continues and operational command shifts from an environmentally-driven model to a regional/theatre-driven model with environmental specialization in support of the operationally generated forces, I would think that the increase in integrated forces will pressure the Air Force to have a more operationally-balanced view of (and responsibility to generate) tactical aviation within its arcs of fire.
What I've seen so far is anything but encouraging. The tendency appears to be increasing micro-management at 1 CAD, with no balancing increase in understanding. 1 CAD cannot even comprehend or accept that the LFAs still exist, and continues to believe that the missions that I staff for LFCA formations and units are for JTFC. There is no world beyond the new commands as far as they are concerned. I'm still hammering away at that one.

I see a very real risk that we are being drawn more and more into the a** f**ce morass and away from the Army that we exist for. Neither the a** f**ce, Tac Hel, nor the Army (in particular) will be well-served by this.

I am trying very very hard not to be close-minded or dinosaurian, however I've been around long enough to see what works and what does not and to trust my instincts.

Changes to date only reinforce my already firm conviction that things would be better for everybody if things reverted to the pre-unification natural situation.
 
"Can you ask him? Jazz up the cross-country, exciting new training opportunity, and jointness aspects? If you can get him to bite I'll look after the formal invitation. Even one Sea King as an appetizer would be a significant contribution for many reasons."

- If you actually need support - seized wing or fling wing - why not just ask the Americans?  The US looks for excuses to train, Canada looks for excuses not to. 

Wasn't that way when I joined, but "cost accounting", "whole fleet management" and other bean-counting forms of witchcraft have taken their toll over the last few decades.

Tom
 
I've been trying that for the last three years, Tom, but I haven't got lucky yet. Every time that I've got close, another priority has popped up for them, be it Katrina or Iraq or something else. I had ten Griffons on some days last year, and eight the previous two. I'm unlikely to have more than four this year. I'm still holding out for two Guard Black Hawks this time - at least they haven't been cancelled (yet). The Chinook unit pulled out a few months ago though.

Aside form purely helping out, Sea Kings would be a neat addition to the mix. Their presence would indeed be significant.
 
Iterator:

There is no guarantee that Tac Hel would receive any better priority were it back in the Army where it belongs. There will always be competition for scarce funding. It could not be any worse than it is now, however, where the a** f**ce is reluctant to spend anything on something that works for somebody else.

The Leopards would have been deployed anywhere where there was a need for tanks. So far, since the Cold War ended, there has been no need. There has been a need for helicopters in support of our ground forces in certain situations, so they have been deployed - at least to those locations where our current crop of airborne LSVWs can perform to at least some minimal level. They weren't deployed because they are owned by CAS.

You are too wrapped up in the method of mobility rather than the overall function. On the battlefield, the helicopter is simply a platform for sensors, weapons, or transportation of troops and cargo for short distances. If a wheeled or tracked vehicle could perform those tasks equally as well then there would be no need for rotors at all.

A** f**ce units have no direct connection to the battlefield or to any ground commanders. They may contribute significantly to a ground battle, but are still really not part of it. Tac Hel involves a far greater level of intimacy - full, round-the-clock, we'll-all-be-home-by-Christmas integration into the ground commander's battle just like any Infantry, Armoured, Artillery, Engineer, or Logistics unit. That is the significant and critical thing, and outside of the Tac Hel community, the a** f**ce has no more demonstrated understanding than you show.

I would argue that coastal artillery, if we had it, would be Navy, as it's the Navy who's responsible for stuff at sea. The Navy has shore establishments of other types, and guns on their ships, so why would the Army be given responsibility for something that does not contribute to the land battle.

As for the Engineers and full-time water activities, when I was in Lahr I used to enjoy watching the French engineer units playing in the Rhine. The French maintained forces in Germany, but they were there to delay Russian approach to the Rhine whereupon these engineer units would float them back to France to defend along the major obstacle along their border - the serious defence from their point-of-view. For some reason the whole concept amused me. These engineer units existed for no other reason than to ferry troops on water. They did nothing else. Should they, then, have been Navy? I don't think that any of those div commanders on the German side would have wanted it that way. They wanted them under their firm control, and a guarantee that that remained their prime focus.

The only reason that we needed to have combat arms observers inTac Hel was because we did not train our own people to the level required. That was more a sign of organizational immaturity and dysfunction than anything else. No Army that owns its own helicopters needs to do that.

Tac Hel officers will never command brigades in a joint situation. They will never be qualified to do so. This only works when Tac Hel becomes part of the Army again, as in the US (the prime example of what is achievable when the affiliations are correct). I would never advocate putting a light blue colonel into the top slot in 2 CMBG. That would be a disaster.

Arty units performed traditionally Infantry functions on missions where there was no requirement for artillery and there was a manpower gap. CSS units did not, to the best of my knowledge, do this. If there is a situation where there is no need for helicopters then other functions could be performed, although there's a trade-off when you consider the value of various specialized skill-sets. The closest parallel is the UAV situation which has sucked a lot of the helicopter capacity out of 408 Squadron.

You cannot train somebody, especially somebody with lower interest levels because they are loyal to a different service, how to operate to the maximum possible level in a land environment with a quicky course. We currently have a LOFT (Land Operations Familiarization Training) course to attempt to do that. It's a month long. In the Kiowa days, we also did another week of Arty LOFT II and another week of Recce LOFT II. It's pretty limited in its value, though.

Our current situation is not working. It has never worked. It never will. I've been living it for 24 years. Others here are saying the same thing.

It doesn't work any better in other countries that have their a** f**ces try and do it either, that I've seen. The Dutch have a similar set-up. Granted, I haven't observed them since the late eighties but they were far more screwed up than we were back then.

I use the term "natural" frequently, and I do it for good reason.

Tac Hel began in the Army in Canada, because the Army had needs that the helicopter could fulfil. The first Tac Hel unit belonged to the Royal Canadian Army Service Corps - 1 Transport Helicopter Platoon (One Thump). Army pilots flew its CH113 Voyageurs and RCEME techs maintained them. Armoured reconnaissance squadrons later had helicopter troops equipped with Hillers, and the Artillery had Air Observation Post Troops with L19s and Cessna 172s - all maintained by RCEME guys.

The British Army's Royal Flying Corps began in WWII to support trench warfare offensively or defensively, provide aerial observation for artillery, and reconnaissance. Post-amalgamation with the Royal Naval Air Service to form the Royal Air Force, the British Army began to see direct support drop and hence re-formed the Royal Flying Corps under a different name - the Army Air Corps. The Royal Navy had a similar decline in support and did the same thing, by forming the Fleet Air Arm.

The US Air Force began as the US Army Air Corps, which did not become the US Air Force until after WWII (there was a transitional period where the title was "US Army Air Force"). After noticeable declines in direct support as the USAF, like the RAF, became more strategic and long-range in its focus, the US Army re-formed its own aviation branch.

The US Navy, wisely, never let go of its aviation component, which represents a huge proportion of its overall combat capability.

The Germans, French, Italians, Australians, New Zealanders, and many others followed the same route and formed or re-formed Army aviation components.

Focus was the prime reason. Their a** f**ces were not interested, support could not be guaranteed if it was not owned outright, and the level of integration into the land battle required it. Technology was also a driving factor - the helicopter lent itself to this role as it could operate at similar altitudes to ground vehicles yet was not restricted by terrain.

Regardless of what you may think, what we do now does not work well here or anywhere else and I am not the only one saying that.

Reality trumps theory.
 
Duey said:
...Iterator...  There is much of your post that's hard to follow.
...
  • Your view of the environments taking direction through the same higher Gov't/DND/CF decision makers seems to support a less joint and less integrated view of operational and tactical command...I think you are exactly 180* out of phase on what is really happening with command and control.
  • You are reluctant to see how being some part of the Army command structure would serve Tac Hel's operational prioritization better?  Well, if the Army becoming an active proponent of Tac Hel where the air force really doesn't actively attempt to further TH employment in anything but a reactional mode, consider then how SOF proponency for SOA has developed from a residual capability tasking in the early 90's to SOA falling under operational command of CANSOFCOM...now that's proponency and a model for how the Army could influence the support it receives from tactical aviation;
...

I'll try to clear it up.

- My point:

If Tac Hel isn't a priority in the Air Force it is because it has not been directed to by higher. So I see no advantage in it being in the Army - since these levels of priorities would still stem from Gov't/DND/CF.

I take note of your CANSOFCOM example - but I would use this as an example of how Gov't/DND/CF has given priority to CANSOFCOM from which the SOA priority stems.



Duey said:
...
  • Air = Air Force, water = Navy, dirt = Army is an incredibly myopic and partitioned view of life...if just is not true;  Hmmm...let's see...ADATS/MMEV missiles are an airborne weapon system - Air Force...errr, uh-oh...army?...but you said....
  • Coastal Artillery.  ???
...

- My point:
When it comes to determining which units/systems are in which environmental service, the best system is a simple system of Aircraft == Air Force, Sea craft == Navy, and Ground fighting units/systems == Army.

Myopic perhaps, but I would say focused. I gave a number of examples of where the role of a unit/system was diametrical to its correct environmental placement. I used some examples that are not CF capabilities (i.e. Coastal Artillery).

ADATS, while on a ground vehicle, is Army, if you were to put the same system onto a ship it would be Navy, attach it to an aircraft it would be Air Force (that the missile, like a bullet, goes through the air is irrelevant).


Duey said:
...
  • Tac Hel re-role to infantry (per your e.g. of Arty in Bosnia) - did you mean you didn't think that aviation wouldn't do a good job pushing their helicopters through the streets on ground handling wheels as part of their re-roled infantry-like patrols through the countryside...hmmmm...I suppose I'll have to agree with you on that one.  Yup, TH would not re-role very well into infanteers...remind me again what exactly that point of yours was about.
...

- My point:
A Tac Hel squadron is not an Army Combat Arms unit and Tac Hel officers would not be likely to command a Task Force consisting mainly of Army units.

Just because helicopters might be slow and short ranged compared to fighter aircraft doesn't mean they are not a form of Air Power (they are at least as fast and far ranging as the fighter aircraft used when the Air Force was first formed).
 
"The Leopards would have been deployed anywhere where there was a need for tanks. So far, since the Cold War ended, there has been no need."

- Leopards were deployed to Kosovo as a 'conservation of force'  measure.  Eastern Europeans respect tanks, and parking a tank outside the church in a village had the same effect a coy of Grizzlies would have had.  Leopards could also go virtually anywhere, the heavier NATO MBTs could not use a lot of the bridges.

Tom
 
"that the missile, like a bullet, goes through the air is irrelevant".

That the helicopter, like a missile, goes through the air is irrelevant.

"Focussed", yes, but focussed on the wrong aspect. Mobility is not as important as function.

Tac Hel units are not currently Army Combat Arms units, but should be, as they are in other major armies elsewhere.

"helicopters might be slow and short ranged compared to fighter aircraft doesn't mean they are not a form of Air Power (they are at least as fast and far ranging as the fighter aircraft used when the Air Force was first formed"

Things have changed everywhere. The artillery couldn't shoot as far or anywhere near as accurately, there were no surface-to-surface missiles like MLRS, and Gore-Tex was unheard of.

Range and speed are completely irrelevant. Function is.

If a design existed for a hovercraft that could carry the same load as an MLVW and operate for only slightly increased cost, who should own it?
 
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