B
Bill Green
Guest
Here are several points to consider when looking at the armour and recce role.
First to armour..., in nearly every Nato and UN mission that Canada has been involved in the antagonists have all had some tracked armour. While it would be easy to say that just because others have armour doesn‘t neccesarily mean the CF needs armour, the reality is that a heavily armoured mobile large gun platform Ie greater than a chaingun brings a real asset to the Battle Group. I think we are many years away from even coming close with wheeled technolgy. Our Leopard tanks do outstanding work and provide authority on Balkan missions or in combat team work with the Inf. Descaling the armour corps to a LAV violates our tactical doctrine and leaves us only open for police actions---not quite the general purpose combat capability we would need in time of crisis.
On the recce side of the house if reservists can gain access to reg f courses they will succeed. However the real issue is how do they hone these newly aquired skills? It seems to me we have two choices one we issue the same platform to both reg and reserve. Although costly initially this would solve the maintenace isssues that arise when trying to maintain dissimilar fleets of veh and we would have standardized training. Or second we go to different or specialized roles. Personally I would not want to be on a battlefield as Bde recce in a Lav. It is not designed to be a mobile stealthy veh and it doesn‘t have the armour or gun to fight for information. LUUVW should be designed and trialed on its stealth and mobility.
In conclusion, I would hate to see the demise of the armour corps because I believe it brings a relevant and powerful resource to the battlefield whatever we invision that battlefield to be.
First to armour..., in nearly every Nato and UN mission that Canada has been involved in the antagonists have all had some tracked armour. While it would be easy to say that just because others have armour doesn‘t neccesarily mean the CF needs armour, the reality is that a heavily armoured mobile large gun platform Ie greater than a chaingun brings a real asset to the Battle Group. I think we are many years away from even coming close with wheeled technolgy. Our Leopard tanks do outstanding work and provide authority on Balkan missions or in combat team work with the Inf. Descaling the armour corps to a LAV violates our tactical doctrine and leaves us only open for police actions---not quite the general purpose combat capability we would need in time of crisis.
On the recce side of the house if reservists can gain access to reg f courses they will succeed. However the real issue is how do they hone these newly aquired skills? It seems to me we have two choices one we issue the same platform to both reg and reserve. Although costly initially this would solve the maintenace isssues that arise when trying to maintain dissimilar fleets of veh and we would have standardized training. Or second we go to different or specialized roles. Personally I would not want to be on a battlefield as Bde recce in a Lav. It is not designed to be a mobile stealthy veh and it doesn‘t have the armour or gun to fight for information. LUUVW should be designed and trialed on its stealth and mobility.
In conclusion, I would hate to see the demise of the armour corps because I believe it brings a relevant and powerful resource to the battlefield whatever we invision that battlefield to be.