C3 Howitzer Replacement

[Kirkhill]

And the USMC ANGLICO is likely to get a bit of a work out with the Long Range fires I would think.

Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO) - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

​

 

[FJAG]

IMHO the Army should stay the F out of the JTAC role - and leave it to US Air Force, or whoever else's zooms are in support).

I'm not far of with you on that. I was FAC trained in the old days and actually did three weeks as doing nothing but ground FACing on a Reforger in Germany. When I talk to the guys who are JTACs these days they leave me in the dust with what they know and can do. We had some good gunner JTACs in Afghanistan (both officers and NCOs) And I know of at least one situation where the USAF supplied JTAC basically packed it in during the middle of an operation and decided to go home on the next medevac 'cause humping a pack for days on end wasn't part of his conditioning training.

The problem that I see is that the training and the constant need for recertification makes it very tough for anyone to keep current on a secondary duty basis unless they are very tied in with the air force and their training cycles on a daily basis. I'll leave it to others more in the loop to tell me whether its more practical to make this an air force specialty or whether it needs to stay with the Army.

UAV's - I am all for ISR feeds - but armed UAV work needs 2 things 1) Experienced "Pilot" and an experienced Targeting assistant - someone with ground experience - I understand that CANSOFCOM adopted the same sort of setup that JSOC does down here - and put a shooter in the seat beside the pilot with the ability to No Go releases depending on the ground situation.
Armed UAV's have massive potential for Blue on Blue - and while a massive enabler - need to be controlled in the close battle with very delicate application.
** I say this, as I honestly don't see the CF conducting targeted killings like we do down here with drones, and I expect they will be a battlefield support tool - a tactical versus strategic strike asset.

We're talking apples and oranges. The predator type UAV is definitely an experienced pilot and targeting crew. I'm thinking of loitering munitions and small tube launched systems that operate on the tactical level. These kind of things:

or this:

I see these as the anti-tank artillery systems of the future (present?) - This is why I want to see recce regiments become cavalry regiments - a mix of a recce squadron with an artillery battery of these type of systems and an infantry company with Javelins systems would make a very effective screen (even guard) for a brigade in the defence.

Getting back to the AD aspect -- while AD like GS Arty is usually a Div asset - the fact that Canada never deploys (and can't really deploy) a Div Operationally means that it needs to be kicked down to a BCT Level - the Armored "Recce" aspect is where I think it fits best (and the UAV's), as it will be working with the Highest CDN deployed command HQ (ignoring the fact a NCE will probably come to add senior officers who can get a medal and extra pay) Whatever JOC it runs - will need to be the co-ordinator for that aspect with the Allies and RCAF (wait who am I kidding there, outside the TacHel guys no one is showing up)

A bde gp/BCT needs a SHORAD bty working as part of a larger umbrella. ADATS with Javelin Manpads fulfilled that function for us with 4 CMBG. Up until recently the US had Avenger batteries fulfill that role. Note though these were not Div resources per se. They (like Patriot) belong to AD brigades and are deployed on a theatre level to create an interrelated network that provide a layered system.

We've retained 4 AD's Air Support Coordination Centres within 4 GS (RCA) after we stood down the air defence function. An ASCC deploys as part of Canadian Bde HQs even when the manoeuvre force is only a single battlegroup. Our ASCCs routinely tie into US air management systems

Any imbecile can operate a MANPAD system - I don't view them as part as any actual AD plan - they are more self defense systems -
The range and most current versions have a decent IFF system that it will not let you lock on a friendly (I have seen people try though).
It really needs to be viewed like a Javelin (the AT one) - and a section enabler - to be employed as needed.

Betcha we'll never do that.

-- and edit - none of this gets the Res Arty units closer to a new gun

Indeed

 

[Kirkhill]

I think it works with the plug and play battle group concept Canada has worked out for itself but in the paraphrased words of the immortal Lou Grant " I hate plug and play". Like I said. I'm a Cold War guy. I like solid doctrines and to me "plug and play" is the antithesis of solid doctrine. I like organizations where everyone has a place, knows his job and knows where the other guys fit in. If you organize and train for that in peace then it becomes second nature in war. If you try to ad hoc your way through a war, like we did in Afghanistan, then the other guy will roll over you while everyone is trying to figure out their next move.

A major problem I see with the fixed organization, especially in a small army, is the problem of the Pal's Battalions on the Somme. Casualties gut the organization, destroy the morale. It would also take all the expertise with it.

So, while you aspire to the singular, perfect solution I would argue for the 80% solution as being "good enuff" in most circumstances.

 

[FJAG]

A major problem I see with the fixed organization, especially in a small army, is the problem of the Pal's Battalions on the Somme. Casualties gut the organization, destroy the morale. It would also take all the expertise with it.

So, while you aspire to the singular, perfect solution I would argue for the 80% solution as being "good enuff" in most circumstances.

Apparently so do our generals

 

[KevinB]

I'm not far of with you on that. I was FAC trained in the old days and actually did three weeks as doing nothing but ground FACing on a Reforger in Germany. When I talk to the guys who are JTACs these days they leave me in the dust with what they know and can do. We had some good gunner JTACs in Afghanistan (both officers and NCOs) And I know of at least one situation where the USAF supplied JTAC basically packed it in during the middle of an operation and decided to go home on the next medevac 'cause humping a pack for days on end wasn't part of his conditioning training.

Admittedly my only experience is with AFSOC ones, and I hadn't not considered the non SOF aspect there.

The problem that I see is that the training and the constant need for recertification makes it very tough for anyone to keep current on a secondary duty basis unless they are very tied in with the air force and their training cycles on a daily basis. I'll leave it to others more in the loop to tell me whether its more practical to make this an air force specialty or whether it needs to stay with the Army.

My belief if that Canada won't expend the resources too keep the FAC/JTAC role up to speed.

We're talking apples and oranges. The predator type UAV is definitely an experienced pilot and targeting crew. I'm thinking of loitering munitions and small tube launched systems that operate on the tactical level. These kind of things:

or this:

I see these as the anti-tank artillery systems of the future (present?) - This is why I want to see recce regiments become cavalry regiments - a mix of a recce squadron with an artillery battery of these type of systems and an infantry company with Javelins systems would make a very effective screen (even guard) for a brigade in the defence.

Okay I am tracking you now -- I don't consider them "real" UAV's

A bde gp/BCT needs a SHORAD bty working as part of a larger umbrella. ADATS with Javelin Manpads fulfilled that function for us with 4 CMBG. Up until recently the US had Avenger batteries fulfill that role. Note though these were not Div resources per se. They (like Patriot) belong to AD brigades and are deployed on a theatre level to create an interrelated network that provide a layered system.

I never understood the CF interest in the Javelin MANPADS - I get it was a UK thing, but in the same vintage the Stinger was a 031 brain level item than could be used by anyone.
Due to dispersed operations - I don't see MANPADS being a replacement for a SHORAD - I'd rather see a dedicated system to that - maybe weld the old Skyguard 35mm trailers to a LAV - and get a LAV based SHORAD.
Man portable systems never work as a linked setup - unless they have their own C2 - and then they have a logistics burden that reduces the practical notion of it.
(IMHO)

We've retained 4 AD's Air Support Coordination Centres within 4 GS (RCA) after we stood down the air defence function. An ASCC deploys as part of Canadian Bde HQs even when the manoeuvre force is only a single battlegroup. Our ASCCs routinely tie into US air management systems

SO with no RCAF AirPower, and no AD - still a HQ function is sent?
Maybe I am missing the point, but what exactly is it doing without teeth for the tiger?

Betcha we'll never do that.

True - but in order to fully embrace a dispersed multi domain operating force one needs too.

Indeed

Which is why I come back to the 777.
-- but it's pretty clear that before any new gun is thought of - the RCA Reserve needs to be reconstituted to fulfill needed roles - which rolls back to the whole Army Re-Org (or what should be a re-org).

 

[KevinB]

A major problem I see with the fixed organization, especially in a small army, is the problem of the Pal's Battalions on the Somme. Casualties gut the organization, destroy the morale. It would also take all the expertise with it.

So, while you aspire to the singular, perfect solution I would argue for the 80% solution as being "good enuff" in most circumstances.

Plug and Play to me is an entire misnomer in the CF.
Someone needed a leads change checkmark.

A lot of GOFO's have said plug and play to simply describe the Regimental Mafia system - and tried to sell it as a good thing.
All it does is encourage robbing Pete to pay Paul, rather than address the actual issues.

 

[Kirkhill]

With the 80% solution I believe we buy time to find the appropriate 95% solution for the situation that presents itself at the indeterminate time in the future. With the 100% solution don't we risk creating a highly polished, beautifully engraved, custom-crafted hammer encouraging us to see every problem as a nail? Iterate towards success.

Plug and play, absolutely can be misused. Especially if the bits are never tested, never modified, never exercised together.

And that is where all of our models fail. It is not the lack of wiring diagrams. It is the lack of bullets, beans and bandages. It is the lack of range time. It is the lack of field time. It is the lack of current technologies. It is the lack of opportunities to "play". And I use the word "play" advisedly and with care and precision. War games are a critical part of developing a functional force. They allow people to determine how to get the best out of the tools they have available to them, to write doctrine for the things that work, to determine the gaps that they can't cover and the additional kit they absolutely must have.

Here's a thought. Ditch all the schools. Take all the money spent on instructors for 5 years and invest it in play time for the Brigades.

WRT the AD my middle of the road solution begins with the German Wiesel Airportable Weapons Carriers. I believe they are the right size for the light force and as a result allow the light force to bring networked capabilities to the field, and significant weights of weaponry, and are sufficiently mobile on the ground to maintain contact with the light, foot-borne soldiers they would support. Rheinmetall also has a canned 120mm mortar platoon solution as well as a light AD solution. Both solutions come with coordination cells, sense cells and act cells. And could be lifted whole and entire from the Wiesel platform to other platforms like the LAV. The Wiesel is also compatible with the LAV's 25mm Bushmaster and ATGMs in the Javelin to Hellfire range meaning that a light battalion could bring at least the same weight of manoeuverable firepower into the field as a LAV company.

And that doesn't take into account filling the man-portable gaps in kit that the Canadian Army has allowed to emerge.

 

[FJAG]

I never understood the CF interest in the Javelin MANPADS - I get it was a UK thing, but in the same vintage the Stinger was a 031 brain level item than could be used by anyone.
Due to dispersed operations - I don't see MANPADS being a replacement for a SHORAD - I'd rather see a dedicated system to that - maybe weld the old Skyguard 35mm trailers to a LAV - and get a LAV based SHORAD.
Man portable systems never work as a linked setup - unless they have their own C2 - and then they have a logistics burden that reduces the practical notion of it.
(IMHO)

Hell - I was there when we first got Blowpipe - The motto at the time was "Buy British! Buy Second Best!"

There is a current GBAD project on the books that has quite comprehensive requirements to it. I have zero knowledge as to how its progressing, however.

SO with no RCAF AirPower, and no AD - still a HQ function is sent?
Maybe I am missing the point, but what exactly is it doing without teeth for the tiger?

ASCCs do not control air power or AD assets. They coordinate airspace usage so that all relevant air space users such as UAVs, winged and rotary aircraft, field artillery, AD artillery etc are aware of each other and are deconflicted. This used to first be big business in Vietnam and then went quiet as we started subscribing to the theory of "big sky; little bullet". Skies are getting more crowded again. Basically an ASCC is collocated with FSCCs, TACPs etc at Cdn Bde HQs. ASCC-like entities are located at all US formation and theatre levels. They weren't a robust capability for European NATO forces at the turn of the century (primarily because before then everyone depended on the Yanks for this) but are becoming more prevalent there now.

If AD resources are allocated then they would have their own command and control element which would also tie in with an ASCC.

... Plug and play, absolutely can be misused....

"Plug and Play" is my own irreverent term for the concept which first made its presence felt when Hillier as CLS in 2003 issued "Future Force: Concepts for Future Army Capabilities" which in my mind provided the rationale behind much of what shaped "Advancing with Purpose". The terminologies that FF uses is "Modularity" and "Tactical Self-sufficient Unit" which are described at pp 162 to 167.

I think the concepts were designed to react to "future mission uncertainty" with "flexibility" and "cost restraints" with "modularity". There was very significant debates as to how the vision of FF was to be implemented and there were champions for advancement and champions for restraint. In typical Canadian fashion what developed was the result of compromises along the way. Personally, I never drank the FF Kool-Aid. I had, and still have, too much Cold War DNA in me.

 

[Kirkhill]

I had, and still have, too much Cold War DNA in me.

Selbstverstaendlich!

 

[KevinB]

Hell - I was there when we first got Blowpipe - The motto at the time was "Buy British! Buy Second Best!"

There is a current GBAD project on the books that has quite comprehensive requirements to it. I have zero knowledge as to how its progressing, however.

I thought no one every admitting to seeing or knowing the Blowpipe...

ASCCs do not control air power or AD assets. They coordinate airspace usage so that all relevant air space users such as UAVs, winged and rotary aircraft, field artillery, AD artillery etc are aware of each other and are deconflicted. This used to first be big business in Vietnam and then went quiet as we started subscribing to the theory of "big sky; little bullet". Skies are getting more crowded again. Basically an ASCC is collocated with FSCCs, TACPs etc at Cdn Bde HQs. ASCC-like entities are located at all US formation and theatre levels. They weren't a robust capability for European NATO forces at the turn of the century (primarily because before then everyone depended on the Yanks for this) but are becoming more prevalent there now.

Yes - but in reference to the CF isn't that just for 95% en empty HQ?
I'm not trying to be a jerk - but it seems that it is more of "yet another deploying HQ" position at this point to justify senior positions.
Looking at what the CF has deployed for those task in the last 20 years doesn't really justify not just attaching to a higher formation in a coalition - and supplying some bodies to work in that.
I'm open to correction.

If AD resources are allocated then they would have their own command and control element which would also tie in with an ASCC.

Big IF

"Plug and Play" is my own irreverent term for the concept which first made its presence felt when Hillier as CLS in 2003 issued "Future Force: Concepts for Future Army Capabilities" which in my mind provided the rationale behind much of what shaped "Advancing with Purpose". The terminologies that FF uses is "Modularity" and "Tactical Self-sufficient Unit" which are described at pp 162 to 167.

Modularity is great to a point - my take away since that paper has been the Modularity was co-opted by people who thought it was a good cover for equality amongst the Forces - and each unit would be a mirror despite different hat badges

I think the concepts were designed to react to "future mission uncertainty" with "flexibility" and "cost restraints" with "modularity". There was very significant debates as to how the vision of FF was to be implemented and there were champions for advancement and champions for restraint. In typical Canadian fashion what developed was the result of compromises along the way. Personally, I never drank the FF Kool-Aid. I had, and still have, too much Cold War DNA in me.

I thought Future Force was simply a way to modernize with acceptance of budget realities even that shortly after 9/11.
It went off track soles due to regimental (and corps) loyalties and rivalries

 

[Colin Parkinson]

I am going to harp on the "doable" new 60mm mortars for the infantry, start our AD buildup around Manpads and try to buy some of the US SHORAD systems. Lease some 105's from them and start the buy for 120mm mortars and ammuntion. Start replacing all our Carl G's with the newer version, but properly preserve and keep the old ones. Start adding the newer types of ammunition to the stock. Start building up stocks of small arms ammunition, LAW's and 105/155mm ammunition so we have a healthy war reserve stock.
We also need some proper tactical 1 ton and 2.5 ton trucks.

 

[KevinB]

Having been on the giving and receiving end of 60mm Mortar fire - throw them the F out.
What a colossal chunk of garbage. All they are is a burden to carry - and the HE aspect is lacking, and the smoke can be better effected by other assets.


Honestly while the low hanging fruit approach may be easy - it will likely not work out the best for anyone.

IMHO the CDN Army needs to have a deep doctrinal introspective period - and determine what roles it is willing to do based on funding.
Then when that is done - sit down and look at the equipment it needs for that mission.

Given SOF units hand out MANPADS in some theaters like candy - the idea of using that as a building block for AD is IMHO a recipe for disaster.
Like anything you need to figure out what capabilities you can have - and see what can fill that - is it 1 system, or 5, and do the range bands overlap etc. Furthermore you want to involved the RCAF (cringe I know) into any of the AD Doctrine - and requirements - not just because they can offer you a threat perspective - but also AD end up around airfields - and interoperability helps.

 

[Kirkhill]

But Kevin, you seem to be suggesting that CCA and CRCAF talk to each other about operational matters. Can CCJOC get them and CRCN (and CCanSOFCom) all to sit down at one table and do something other than decide to divide PYs four ways?

 

[KevinB]

But Kevin, you seem to be suggesting that CCA and CRCAF talk to each other about operational matters. Can CCJOC get them and CRCN (and CCanSOFCom) all to sit down at one table and do something other than decide to divide PYs four ways?

SHOULD - and MUST - not do (or will) sorry...

Unless you get a MND and a CDS at a point in time where they can bring everyone to a knee, I don't see a good solution.

 

[Ostrozac]

I thought no one every admitting to seeing or knowing the Blowpipe...

Blowpipe had the small disadvantage that it didn’t actually work. More than 200 were fired over the course of the Falklands War, with the result of only two aircraft being shot down. It did have a good sales team, though, something like 16 countries ended up acquiring the things.

 

[KevinB]

Blowpipe had the small disadvantage that it didn’t actually work. More than 200 were fired over the course of the Falklands War, with the result of only two aircraft being shot down. It did have a good sales team, though, something like 16 countries ended up acquiring the things.

I'm going to admit I've actually seen Blowpipes on the range in Petawawa - firing, misfiring, and missing targets.

 

[Kirkhill]

Blowpipe had the small disadvantage that it didn’t actually work. More than 200 were fired over the course of the Falklands War, with the result of only two aircraft being shot down. It did have a good sales team, though, something like 16 countries ended up acquiring the things.

As good as the Eryx sales team?

 

[FJAG]

I thought no one every admitting to seeing or knowing the Blowpipe...

I was never in an AD battery but I'll admit to having held (but not fired) a Blowpipe once.

Yes - but in reference to the CF isn't that just for 95% en empty HQ?
I'm not trying to be a jerk - but it seems that it is more of "yet another deploying HQ" position at this point to justify senior positions.
Looking at what the CF has deployed for those task in the last 20 years doesn't really justify not just attaching to a higher formation in a coalition - and supplying some bodies to work in that.
I'm open to correction.

An ASCC is run by a captain with a senior NCO and a couple or so technicians/operators. They do come with their own Bison and a bunch of special comms and computer gear that ties into the wider/higher radar and air planning systems. It's a low end node in a theatre wide system of nodes.

 

[KevinB]

I was never in an AD battery but I'll admit to having held (but not fired) a Blowpipe once.

I honestly don't remember what was going on -- we landed via CH-135 and had to wait for several hours for the AD guys to do their thing, or to not do their thing, then we continued on (after the Twin Hueys went back to the Mattawa) - but it seemed to be a massive cluster - but not nearly as bad as due to temperature me being asked on a previous Ex to exit a Kiowa (we will just sit you down here near Juliette Tower and come back when we burn more fuel (4 hrs later, and I suspect it got back to the hangar and they asked where the other guy was) as it no longer was able to carry two passengers and two crew...
*who thinks it's a good idea to drop 19yr old me off alone with - C1 SMG and a C5 tool with a creative mind (and a radio that didn't talk to the helicopters)

An ASCC is run by a captain with a senior NCO and a couple or so technicians/operators. They do come with their own Bison and a bunch of special comms and computer gear that ties into the wider/higher radar and air planning systems. It's a low end node in a theatre wide system of nodes.

Oh that thing - got it -- sorry I having a moment where I thought I knew what I was talking about.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Having been on the giving and receiving end of 60mm Mortar fire - throw them the F out.
What a colossal chunk of garbage. All they are is a burden to carry - and the HE aspect is lacking, and the smoke can be better effected by other assets.


Was that our old ones or the new ones used by the US army? Special Forces Warrant Officer(retired) Steve Balestrieri on the tried and true 60mm mortar. You can also snuff out small fires with it as it turns out.