C3 Howitzer Replacement

[Kirkhill]

... Air Defense units as a Total Force Unit was tried and found to be very costly. So most likely that will not happen again, training areas are too small for live fires, and costly to do, requires massive equipment for simulators to be installed. ...

I suggest that the reason for the failure was that the Army was looking to the Reserves to supply a ready, expeditionary, tactical capability to meet the needs of a deployed Army formation. And I believe that relying on the Reserves for any foreign service capability is a mug's game. No government wants to admit there is a problem they can't handle within their existing plans. And that is what calling up the Reserves declares - "we screwed up and we need to disrupt your daily lives".

On the other hand we have the RCAF's integration of its Reserves into its operational plans. Perhaps the RCAF would be a better match for the domestic GBAD (and Coastal Defence) than the RCA. As to training, I believe a centralized training facility, perhaps at Cold Lake, might work followed up by dry training on the actual systems deployed at the airports.

Then the Army can focus on its Mobile Air Defence requirements.

 

[FormerHorseGuard]

The Regiment I was in, was involved in various exercises and had a good turn out of Reserve troops along with the Reg Force side of the house. From what I learned it came down to money and lack of equipment, Petawawa was too small to do effective training on , then came down to mission statement and an enemy. ( I was never on any exercise as I was on class B else where. ) No mission, no money. No ones pet project to guard when it came to budget cuts

 

[Kirkhill]

And if I extend the thought a bit further, perhaps we should expand JTF(N)'s role and capabilities and permanently assign them their own Fliegerkorps. A small force based on the original First Special Service Force model. Complete with modern replacements for the Weasel.

www.canadiansoldiers.com

www.canadiansoldiers.com

www.canadiansoldiers.com

 

[Kirkhill]

The Regiment I was in, was involved in various exercises and had a good turn out of Reserve troops along with the Reg Force side of the house. From what I learned it came down to money and lack of equipment, Petawawa was too small to do effective training on , then came down to mission statement and an enemy. ( I was never on any exercise as I was on class B else where. ) No mission, no money. No ones pet project to guard when it came to budget cuts

I think that pretty much sums up the problem generally. If we can identify a need, one that the public and the politicians agree with, then the money will flow. And with the money, and an identified task, then equipment, training opportunities and recruiting follow.

But we seem to spend the time trying to justify the retention of people and equipment without a clearly identified and agreed need.

For example, 11 km howitzer, 379.4 km2 coverage, 10,000,000 km2 of area to cover. 1 howitzer moved 26,320 times or 26,320 howitzers.

Conversely 48 NASAMs Launchers with 25-40 km range AMRAAMs, only covering 100,000 km2 or 1% of the 10,000,000, protects provides some protection to >95% of the population. Which is the better investment? Because, in my opinion, howitzers don't protect anybody. They destroy opposing forces. And I don't see any suitable domestic targets available in any realistic scenario.

 

[Kirkhill]

I asked Dimsum if this was artillery or air force. We both agreed that if it came back it was air force. If it didn't come back it was artillery.

So, effectively any recoverable flying machine belongs to the RCAF until it thunders in. Then it gets transferred to the RCA.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I asked Dimsum if this was artillery or air force. We both agreed that if it came back it was air force. If it didn't come back it was artillery.

So, effectively any recoverable flying machine belongs to the RCAF until it thunders in. Then it gets transferred to the RCA.

You, sirs, win the internet for today.

 

[childs56]

On the other hand we have the RCAF's integration of its Reserves into its operational plans. Perhaps the RCAF would be a better match for the domestic GBAD (and Coastal Defence) than the RCA. As to training, I believe a centralized training facility, perhaps at Cold Lake, might work followed up by dry training on the actual systems deployed at the airports.

That right there is the key to success, and the reason why the Army has failed to employ the Reserve force up to and including the same peer to peer process. They do not include the Reserve Force in their real day to day operational plan, instead use as a last resort. The success of the Reserve Artillery units working with 2 RCHA this past two years providing a Troop, Recce and CP appears to be a huge success. If you give the Reserves a role, give them a budget to realistically attain that goal and it will all fall into place. Instead they are given sort of a mission, not much of a budget, and there really is not much expectation to attain any goals, that is where many of the Army Reserve Units are right now. They have some amazing people with a enormous background of skills. Yet it is under utilized.

For those saying that the Old AD Btty was a failure due to the Reg/Reserve split. Again one has to look at the expectations, budget and role.

 

[KevinB]

KevinB and I agree on a lot of things including the problem issues with the LAV as an IFV. Where he and I differ on that issue is that I recognize that we have a lot of LAVs and TAPVs and they're pretty new and we won't get them replaced anytime soon so we better figure out how to use them.

Oh I agree with you there - I just view it criminal to believe it to be an IFV to work with Tanks in a High Intensity Battlefield against a Peer threat.
I do believe that IF the CF wants to consider the Heavy Role in NATO - that it then needs to get a Heavy Tracked IFV to use with the INF.
Until then the LAV needs to be made to work - but I would be doing one of two things - finding a NONE Heavy Role for the CF in NATO, or seriously looking at how to get a Bradley style vehicle for that Bde...

Like him I'm disgusted by the fact that we've bought tons of variants of these things but not an ATGM variant nor a mortar variant nor an AD variant. Not that I've got anything against armoured administrative vehicles - I quite like them - but I dislike intensely what it says about our priorities. I don't for a minute think that not having 50 mortar carriers was a decision that the government made. It was made by the Army.

Agreed -

So, having said that I'd accept to work with the LAVs and TAPVs how do I see using them.

Firstly I'd never, ever, ever use SHORAD as a dual ADAT system. I'd use it exclusively for AD and keep it out of the platoons and companies so that it creates an umbrella air defence around whatever force or facilities it is being deployed to protect.

Agreed
I would however issue MANPADS at the Pl and Coy level and train Cbt Arms soldiers on their usage.

Within the companies I would have anti armour capability under armour probably by re-equipping TAPVs for that purpose. That would be over and above man portable ATGMs within the platoons.

I really really like adding Hellfire to the LAV turret

Within the companies I would also have a very short range anti-drone capability, again probably in specially equipped TAPVs.

I think Anti-Drone needs to go down to the Platoons and Sections as well - simply due to dispersed ops.

The battalions integral indirect fire asset would be 8 and ten 120 mortars mounted inside turretless LAVs. I'm open to whether to have 2 per company plus a 4 mortar platoon like the SBCT or just stay with an 8 tube mortar platoon for the battalion. I'd like to use TAPVs for this as well but I think sufficient on board ammo storage would probably be an issue.

There are lots of those HQ LAV's

I do wonder whether we need four turreted LAVs per platoon or whether we would be better off to increase internal space in some of them for more GIBs/dismounts and replace the existing turret with an RWS of a more appropriate mixture. I'll let a grunt make the arguments for that.

IMHO RWS on a CF LAV really would not increase space - they do in the Stryker because the way it's turret is positioned - the LAV was designed for the turret it has, and it is in a different hull position - and while you may gain some space below where the RWS where to sit on a pulled turret LAV - I doubt that would be enough for actual personnel increases.

There is no distinction in our systems as between a FOO det and the US concept of a FIST. A FOO det comes with a Captain, a sergeant and three to four bombardiers/gunners. All should be trained to fire mortars and guns and the Captain and Sergeant at a minimum should be qualified JTACs and fire planners. (Now that the war is over JTAC certification is once again a problem because of the heavy use of air for both dry and live certification runs - planes and bombs cost money and we tend to cut corners in peacetime) The team also comes with a highly specialized LAV OPV with a suite of target acquisition equipment. The team can be split up for short durations so that observers can be sent out to ride along with a platoon. So, one FOO Det per company is optimum although in certain circumstances that can be augmented - for example during a company sized attack, on FOO det may move with the company while another occupies an anchor OP. Its very flexible.

An FSCC cell at a bn TOC is essential. The TACP not so much. TACPs generally exist at brigade level although in Afghanistan many TFs put a TACP det with the bn. I'm not against that but you need to remember that a bn TOC is supposed to be a small lean element that is highly mobile and leaves a small signature. One tries to keep things out of it unless absolutely necessary. I would leave the TACP at brigade but with an ability to spin off a det to a bn where necessary. In a circumstance of a wholly independent bn such as you are suggestion a forward deployed TACP would be necessary.

+1

Back to the TLAVs. I'm not really sure why we ever bought them. They strike me as a marginal recce tool ... but ... they could be put to a lot of good use as weapon platforms for weapons that have a small detachment and a reasonable ammo load. My guess is they would make a good drone and rocket launch platform amongst the other things I mentioned above. That would save LAVs for carrying the larger people and equipment loads. We should exploit the hell out of those hulls.

Re your last post - damn paywall.

Me too...

 

[quadrapiper]

I do believe that IF the CF wants to consider the Heavy Role in NATO - that it then needs to get a Heavy Tracked IFV to use with the INF.
Until then the LAV needs to be made to work - but I would be doing one of two things - finding a NONE Heavy Role for the CF in NATO, or seriously looking at how to get a Bradley style vehicle for that Bde...

Would something like the Puma be worth looking at, if it's meant to be working with tanks?

Shared manufacturer with the Leopard, so there might be some commonalities, too.

 

[FJAG]

The CF has been working on a solution and after reading a news story dated 18 May 2014 ( not allowed to quote or link to the story for copy right issues) The replacement program back then was consider to take over 2 decades to do.

With the book writing I've been involved in I've become very familiar with the Army's and the artillery's transformation process running through the 2000 to 2014 time frame but not so much thereafter. I'm trying to get myself educated as between what was real after 2014 and what was just scuttlebutt so I won't comment further at this time.

If Canada was to purchase 100 guns and replace gun for gun, 25 to 35 million dollars could do it , until we add in the make it Canadian Unique and have the right amount of Canadian Made content. So maybe 50 million in todays money should do it. Retraining gun crews and updating courses are all extra.

I'm positive that replacing C3s and LG1s with M119s is not the way to go. It just replaces old tired 105s with slightly newer 105s as a training aid. What we need is a corps wide study to see what the Army needs in the way of fire support from lightweight M777s to wheeled/tracked armoured SPs, to precision rockets, to STA, to drones, to loitering munitions, to command and control elements etc etc and then figure out the best way to allocate those as between the Reg F and Res F and equip them accordingly. Buying M119s just perpetuates a bad existing system of reserve service as well as a bad system of indirect fire support to the Army.

Air Defense units as a Total Force Unit was tried and found to be very costly. So most likely that will not happen again, training areas are too small for live fires, and costly to do, requires massive equipment for simulators to be installed.

The shut down of Total Force air defence was not because of cost of the reserve component. The shut down was for two major reasons: first, the five Res F troops were exclusively Javelin and for the sole purpose of augmenting 4 AD regiment which was in 4 CMBG at the time. When 4 CMBG shut down there was no longer a pressing need for the five Res F troops; and secondly, there was a need to "refresh" the Javelin stock which was expensive so the Javelin was shut down in favour of just keeping the ADATS which did not have a Res F component to it. Eventually when the ADATS was shut down it was for the cost of "refreshing' the system - MMEV hadn't panned out and the that project was shut down leaving ADATS limping along. Eventually with the changes to a strong STA component and the UAVs, the only thing left to cut ADATS. The biggest issues whenever it comes to capabilities is a) what priority do the PYs have in the bigger scheme of things and b) what cost is there to maintain training and a war stocks of ammunition through the equipment's life cycle. The weapon system itself is often the least expensive element in the equation.
Res F personnel costs are the least pricy component money wise but do add a readiness risk element.

There in lies the issue, doesn't it? This current GoC and indeed past GoCs see military spending as a detriment to social programs.

I honestly think that the fault is more within the Army than the government. I have yet to see an army or artillery commander fall on his sword, resign and publicly call out the government. Obviously I do not have intimate knowledge of what's going on inside the Army these days but it strikes me that what we have tight funding when it comes to capital budgets and difficult decisions are being made, however, it seems to me that when priority lists are being made up within the Army then weapon system essential to higher end combat are low on the list (probably because of the high cost of the ammunition required for training and war stocks all of which is much, much higher than a 5.56mm). Same goes for PY allocations. The Army drops critical combat enabler PYs in what, IMHO, is a desperate attempt to keep alive the three core infantry regiments. I like grunts as much as anyone, but grunts without the proper enablers just become casualties. CMTC, Div HQs and excess Res F Bde HQ are another place where the Army ought to control it's PY appetite.

I really really like adding Hellfire to the LAV turret

Absolutely within either an anti-armour platoon. There's a Javelin/TOW pod combination as well which gives a good mix of anti-armour capability to use within the company (however you organize it) --- Just so long as it isn't dual hatted for air defence

I think Anti-Drone needs to go down to the Platoons and Sections as well - simply due to dispersed ops.

Absolutely - I think the best self-defence systems for forward areas are probably still on the drawing board but not far away.

IMHO RWS on a CF LAV really would not increase space - they do in the Stryker because the way it's turret is positioned - the LAV was designed for the turret it has, and it is in a different hull position - and while you may gain some space below where the RWS where to sit on a pulled turret LAV - I doubt that would be enough for actual personnel increases.

I've never seen what the various RWS options offer vis-a-vis internal space. Every time I see a LAV 6.0 with its internal basket I see 4 GIB positions. I'm not sure how to organize a proper anti-armour weapons station (I assume a commander and gunner but at terminals) then I still see 2 spare GIB positions depending on reload ammo storage etc. That's really why I'd see the anti-armour role go into a TAPV with no GIBs and maybe convert a LAV or two to just a machine gun/grenade launcher RWS with one operator, no big ammo issue and thus more room for dismounts (like a Stryker)

Would something like the Puma be worth looking at, if it's meant to be working with tanks?

An IFV has three key elements: mobility; armament; and protection. Puma is tracked and designed to keep up with Leopard cross country so +1; Its armament is a 30mm and FFR Spike so +2; its protection is variable armour from Class A to Class C and can be uparmoured from kits very quickly - I don't know to what extent the LAV 6.0 can be uparmoured. By their relative weights there doesn't seem to be much difference so it could be comparable. It looks to me like the protection advantage is with the Puma but I'll let others speak to that especially as to mine resistance. I think Puma would be a good choice. Unfortunately the concept of an IFV, or Close Combat Vehicle (CCV) as we called it, died in 2013 with the LAV 6.0 upgrade project. I don't see anyone about to try to revive it preferring to delude themselves that the LAV 6.0 as configured is good enough.

 

[Kirkhill]

Strangely enough an anti-drone system looks a lot like M-SHORAD - with

October 20, 2021 Topic: Army Region: Americas Blog Brand: The Buzz Tags: ArmyStrykerMissilesDronesTroops

The Army Is Ready to Capitalize on Anti-Drone Technological Achievements​

Weapons developers are beginning early conceptual work on the third increment, which is a yet-to-be-determined effort to bring paradigm-shifting anti-air weapons to the SHORAD program, due to recent progress with the second increment.

by Kris Osborn

The Army’s first anti-drone, missile-armed Stryker vehicles have arrived in Europe and are ready for combat. This is a first step for the Army’s Short Range Air Defense (SHORAD) program, which will bring air-defense operational reality to Army Stryker maneuver formations.

The M-SHORAD program, which arms Strykers with AGM-114 Hellfire and FIM-92 Stinger missiles, will prioritize a Cold War-era air defense plan to counter advancing infantry formations that have “atrophied” or disappeared during years of counterinsurgency when there was no air threat.
Maj. Gen. Brian Gibson, the director of the Air & Missile Defense Cross-Functional Team for Army Futures Command, referred to the first equipped unit as a “milestone” effort. That is because a Stryker vehicle with the ability to fire Hellfire and Stinger missiles can track, target and destroy drones, helicopters and low-flying fixed-wing aircraft. Advancing infantry units can be protected in unprecedented ways since the advent of the Stryker more than twenty years ago. Mobile Strykers armed with anti-aircraft weapons are particularly relevant to the United States and its allies, which could demonstrate an ability to quickly deploy troops on the European continent and across the region. Additionally, they could conduct expeditionary operations in response to Russian activity in contested or high-tension areas in Eastern Europe.
Deploying the SHORAD-capable Strykers in Europe represents the first increment in a three-fold process to evolve the capability for the vehicles. The second increment involves arming the Stryker with a fifty-kilowatt laser weapon, an effort that is progressing quickly with the Army and its defense industry partners. This will introduce a new sphere of silent, high-speed precision attacks against enemy air assets or even incoming munitions such as missiles, rockets or artillery.
Army futurists and weapons developers are beginning early conceptual work on the third increment, which is a yet-to-be-determined effort to bring paradigm-shifting anti-air weapons to the SHORAD program, due to recent progress with the second increment.
“It might be easiest to put a new missile in the same form factor, however, technology may provide you with a much greater capability,” Gibson said. “We have every intent to see ourselves and find out what the realm of the possible is. We should understand the art of the possible by putting as many arrows into our quiver as possible. We remain committed to prototyping as quickly as we can without locking down too quickly.”
Kris Osborn is the defense editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Master’s Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.

The Army Is Ready to Capitalize on Anti-Drone Technological Achievements

Weapons developers are beginning early conceptual work on the third increment, which is a yet-to-be-determined effort to bring paradigm-shifting anti-air weapons to the SHORAD program, due to recent progress with the second increment.

nationalinterest.org

Maneuver Short-Range Air Defense (M-SHORAD)​

​

Providing Precision Ground-to-Ground and Ground-to-Air Lethality​

Maneuver-Short Range Air Defense (M-SHORAD) is an Air Defense Artillery capability which moves and maneuvers in direct support of Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) to destroy, neutralize or deter low altitude aerial threats, including Group 3 UAS, rotary wing and fixed wing aircraft.
With Leonardo DRS’ M-SHORAD Mission Equipment Package (MEP) on a purpose-built Stryker, Warfighters maneuver with tactical units to detect, identify, track and defeat air threats.
The superior ground-to-air and ground-to-ground lethality creates overmatch for the Warfighters on the point of the spear.

M-SHORAD CAPABILITIES

• Moves and maneuvers with BCTs with necessary mobility, survivability and lethality to fight at the tactical level
• Detects, identifies and tracks air threats with on-board sensors providing 360 degree aerial surveillance
• Destroys or defeats ground and air threats using multiple kinetic effectors (direct fire and missiles)
• Provides protection for the vehicle and crew with the XM914 (30mm) and M240 (7.62mm)
• Integrates with existing Army networks and interoperable with Sentinel radar
• Defeats smaller air threats (Group 1 and 2 UAS) at closer ranges with direct fire (as required)
• Supports growth to directed energy when available

Maneuver Short Range Air Defense (M-SHORAD) | Leonardo DRS

M-SHORAD Mission Equipment Package (MEP) for maneuvering with tactical units to detect, identify, track and defeat air threats.

www.leonardodrs.com

When the Army selected Leonardo DRS as the winner of the IM-SHORAD competition, there were reports that its proposal also included some type of so-called soft-kill system, such as an electronic warfare jammer. RADA's radars are notably a component of various soft-kill counter-drone systems, including the U.S. Marine Corps' Light Marine Air Defense Integrated System (LMADIS), which is mounted the Polaris MRZR all-terrain vehicle.

The Army Has Started Fielding Its First New Short Range Air Defense System In Decades

Marine Air Defense Integrated System (MADIS) – Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance

missiledefenseadvocacy.org

 

[Colin Parkinson]

I shook my head when the CCV project did not rule out wheeled vehicles, why on earth would we even consider having two different fleets of 8x8 AFV's? In the weight class that a well protected APC/IFV is getting, you need tracks, particularity to work closely with tanks.

 

[KevinB]

I shook my head when the CCV project did not rule out wheeled vehicles, why on earth would we even consider having two different fleets of 8x8 AFV's? In the weight class that a well protected APC/IFV is getting, you need tracks, particularity to work closely with tanks.

I think the issue comes out of not understand what the differences between wheeled and tracked vehicles so often hampers issues.
But IF you have a mobility/protection requirement - if the requirement is written correctly - you will end up with the correct vehicle - regardless of what is submitted --> the problem is there seems to be an CA refusal to look at any vehicle that isn't LAV based - and the off-road mobility differences between tracked and 8x8 wheeled is significant - esepcailyl when one looks at the ground pressure the track vehicle exerts - so it can often stay on top of a lot of terrain rather than digging giant ruts in and getting high centered like a Wheeled vehicle.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Strangely enough an anti-drone system looks a lot like M-SHORAD - with

The Army Is Ready to Capitalize on Anti-Drone Technological Achievements

Weapons developers are beginning early conceptual work on the third increment, which is a yet-to-be-determined effort to bring paradigm-shifting anti-air weapons to the SHORAD program, due to recent progress with the second increment.

nationalinterest.org

Maneuver Short Range Air Defense (M-SHORAD) | Leonardo DRS

M-SHORAD Mission Equipment Package (MEP) for maneuvering with tactical units to detect, identify, track and defeat air threats.

www.leonardodrs.com

The Army Has Started Fielding Its First New Short Range Air Defense System In Decades

Marine Air Defense Integrated System (MADIS) – Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance

missiledefenseadvocacy.org

 

[FJAG]

I shook my head when the CCV project did not rule out wheeled vehicles, why on earth would we even consider having two different fleets of 8x8 AFV's? In the weight class that a well protected APC/IFV is getting, you need tracks, particularity to work closely with tanks.

My experience with German Leos and Marders in Shilo, on over a dozen battleruns, that anything but a heavy tracked IFV is incapable of keeping up with tanks even on relatively smooth prairie and providing the close protection they need. The lack of any anti-armour missile on the turret to aid in providing flank protection to the assaulting tanks is also a severe handicap.

The LAV 6.0 as built and equipped is neither a CCV nor an IFV. Its the rough equivalent of a Motor Rifle Divisions BTR 80A with better optics.

A common fleet is not always the answer. Most of the maintenance issues can be easily solved by concentrating the CCV fleet in one brigade (which of course would undoubtedly piss off one or the other of the regimental mafias). Another system to increase commonality would have been to buy a common turret for both the LAV and the CCV (and yes with a common gun and anti-armour missile - maybe like ). There are so many ways that can be done intelligently with a thing like an RIwP cupola system. You could probably use that tracked chassis as well for an arty SP and a whole fleet of support vehicles.

Strangely enough an anti-drone system looks a lot like M-SHORAD ...

Using $150,000 Hellfires and $38,000 Stingers against $1,000 drones makes no tactical or economic sense.

One can basically disarm the AD force quickly with a swarm of drones and then follow that up with the hard stuff. My money is on small calibre-radar controlled machine guns; quick recharging high energy weapons and medium complex autocannons such as Mantis. You need, from square one, to be able to procure and sustain the ammo supply to be able to defeat large fleets of small inexpensive weapon systems.

Many systems these days, like the GBAD project, are also concentrating on intercepting airborne projectile such as mortars, guns and rockets. That too needs high ammo availability. Hellfires and Stingers are too expensive and to hard to resupply to frontline units in large quantities.

 

[Kirkhill]

The M-SHORAD system consists primarily of a new turret, as well as associated fire control, power generation, and other components, installed on a Stryker. The turret features a four-round FIM-92 Stinger heat-seeking surface-to-air missile launcher, similar to the ones found on the Avenger system, which you can read more about here, on one side. On the other side, there are two launch rails for millimeter-wave radar-guided AGM-114L Longbow Hellfire missiles. The AGM-114L is in U.S. military service today primarily as an air-to-surface and surface-to-surface weapon, but it has a demonstrated secondary surface-to-air capability against slower-flying threats.

The turret is also equipped with a 30mm M230 automatic cannon and a 7.62mm M240 machine gun, which can be used against aerial targets or threats on the ground. Lastly, it features a turreted sensor system with electro-optical and infrared cameras for target acquisition and general situational awareness. In addition, four small fixed-position RADA active electronically-scanned array (AESA) radars are position on the vehicle's rear detect to help spot and track targets.

When the Army selected Leonardo DRS as the winner of the IM-SHORAD competition, there were reports that its proposal also included some type of so-called soft-kill system, such as an electronic warfare jammer. RADA's radars are notably a component of various soft-kill counter-drone systems, including the U.S. Marine Corps' Light Marine Air Defense Integrated System (LMADIS), which is mounted the Polaris MRZR all-terrain vehicle.

The Army Has Started Fielding Its First New Short Range Air Defense System In Decades

The arrival of new Stryker-based air defense vehicles in Germany comes as aerial threats, especially small drones, continue to grow.

www.thedrive.com

The MADIS system relies on two vehicles per section working in a complementary pair, the MADIS Mk1 and Mk2.[iv] The MADIS Mk1 will be responsible for primarily neutralizing fixed and rotary-wing aircraft. The Mk2 will fulfill the Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System (C-UAS) mission, while also providing radar and C2 for the pair. The Marine corps also has the Light MADIS (LMADIS), which hosts the radar and EW suite on a Polaris MRZR. The LMADIS served as a testbed and interim C-UAS solution before the fielding of the MADIS Mk1 and Mk2. The LMADIS is still in operational use with Marine Corps LAAD battalions.

Mk1​

(Photo: USNI News )
For kinetic weapons, the Mk1 variant possesses a missile pod holding 4 Stinger missiles. The main direct fire weapon on the turret is a 30mm cannon. Inside the vehicle are handheld Stinger launchers to be used by the crew. The optical sensors for the weapons system is produced by Lockheed Martin.

The electronic warfare system is the Modi II produced by Sierra Nevada Corporation (SNC). It is the most advanced dismounted electronic countermeasure (ECM) system in the DoD inventory. It can be used to disrupt enemy drones, communications, and radio-controlled improvised explosive devices (RCIED). Using electronic warfare, air defenders can trick or “spoof” the drone’s navigation system, jam its communications by separating its data link, or defeat fuses and weapons’ triggers[v] The Modi II is the successor to the Thor II/AN PLT-5 and Thor III AN/PLQ-9. [iii]

Mk2​

(Photo: Marine Corps Systems Command GBAD PEO)
The radar on the MADIS Mk2 is the RPS-42 produced by RADA Electronic Industries Ltd. What makes the radar so unique is that it is able to detect the extremely small radar cross-sections of commercial, off-the-shelf drones that have been proliferated on the modern battlefield by nonstate actors for lethal and nonlethal purposes. The RPS-42 is able to identify and detect targets flying at an altitude of 30 to 30,000 ft within a 30km radius.[vi]

The electronic warfare system is the Modi II, the same as the Mk 1 variant.

The direct-fire weapon on the MADIS Mk2 is an M134 Minigun, a 7.62x51mm NATO six-barrel rotary machine gun with a high, sustained rate of fire (2,000 to 6,000 rounds per minute).[vii]

The Mk 2 as part of its C2 capability will possess a Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS) gateway/server capability.[viii] This will allow the pair to engage targets being spotted by other ground-based radar in the same network.

So my sense is that the M-SHORAD also integrates a soft-kill electronic warfare counter-uas capability based on the 4 circular AESA radars on the corners from RADA. Apparently they work both to detect targets and to fry targets that are close enough.

And if Wiki is to be believed that is within about 1 km


"AESA radars mounted on fighter aircraft have been slated as directed energy weapons against missiles, however, a senior US Air Force officer noted: "they aren't particularly suited to create weapons effects on missiles because of limited antenna size, power and field of view".[38] Potentially lethal effects are produced only inside 100 meters range, and disruptive effects at distances on the order of one kilometer. Moreover, cheap countermeasures can be applied to existing missiles."

Directed-energy weapon - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Of course the Hellfires and the Stingers could be replaced by $22,000 APKWS or the even cheaper $2200 70mm rockets with flechette warheads.

Either way, my understanding is that these are going to be close to FEBA and engaging ground targets as well as aerial targets.

 

[FJAG]

So my sense is that the M-SHORAD also integrates a soft-kill electronic warfare counter-uas capability based on the 4 circular AESA radars on the corners from RADA. Apparently they work both to detect targets and to fry targets that are close enough.

The literature describes those as RADA's multi-mission hemispheric radar (MHR) which are described here:

Multi-Mission Hemispheric Radar (MHR) | Leonardo DRS

MHR is a cutting-edge, software-defined 4D AESA pulse-Doppler radar platform that can host a variety of operational missions.

www.leonardodrs.com

I think that they only fulfill a sensor role.

M-SHORAD's literature says that it "supports growth to directed energy when available". Al I can see respecting UAVs and smaller threats is by using kinetic direct fire i.e. the .50. That's not to say that M-SHORAD teams can't be accompanied by a EW capability or have one added. I just haven't seen that in any literature for M-SHORAD at this time.

I'm sure EW or directed energy will come. It makes sense. My money's on directed energy maybe coupled with EW. One of the problems with EW is it's hard to discriminate what you impede and you're going to have a lot of your own stuff up there (Frequency management is harder than you think - just ask the Sigs)

 

[Kirkhill]

The prototypes are already here and have had their first shoot off. The video at the bottom is interesting.

New DE M-SHORAD Weapon Zaps UAS And Other Threats | Joint Forces News

New DE M-SHORAD weapon zaps UAS & other threats ~ the US Army is to field a 50-kW laser on Stryker combat vehicles to protect convoys.

www.joint-forces.com

US Army to Order 8 Prototype Stryker-Mounted Laser Weapons

The US Army will request Kord Technologies to develop prototypes of an air-defense laser weapon to be integrated into the Stryker armored combat vehicle.

www.thedefensepost.com

 

[Kirkhill]

Raytheon video demonstrating some target operating scenarios for the Directed Energy version of the M-Shorad.

One scenario is convoy escort.

 

[FJAG]

Raytheon video demonstrating some target operating scenarios for the Directed Energy version of the M-Shorad.

One scenario is convoy escort.

That's definitely the result one wants. It's some time yet but these are interesting times for air defenders as well as UAVs and loitering munition operators.

Next step - counter hypersonic missile systems.

Oh, but to have a larger share in the military industrial complex.