https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2025/01/31/is_upgrading_the_canadian_army_a_mission_impossible_1088453.html
Andrew Latham, Ph.D., a tenured professor at Macalester College in Saint Paul, Minnesota. He is also a Senior Washington Fellow with the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy in Ottawa and a non-resident fellow with DefensePriorities, a think tank in Washington, DC.
The Indirect Fire Modernization project he discusses makes an interesting point but fails to mention the fact that the project has been going on for over two decades, when, by 2004, it was two projects called the Future Indirect Fire Capability project (FIFC) and the Mobile Artillery Vehicle System project (MAVS). The former covered wheeled and tracked SPs, and mortars and HIMARS. The latter was aimed at replacing reserve force systems with a vehicle borne light howitzer. The expected in-service date for these unfunded projects was 2015. Effectively the army divested M109s with no hope of replacement for a full decade (Against the army's wishes, ADM(Mat), a former gunner, kept a regiment's worth in preservation)
Then came Afghanistan and the M777 UOR and FIFC was waylaid. The MAVS died a sudden death on the VCDS's death when the army had failed to deliver to him their plan him as to how the direct fire systems would work (which he tied indirectly to the indirect fire that MAVS was to solve).
The M777 UOR and FIFC subsequently begat the Light Weight Towed Howitzer project (LWTH) which brought the total M777 inventory to 37 - inadequate to even equip the three RegF regiments fully by its in-service date of 2011. The LWTH [project was part of the army's Family of Land Combat Systems group of projects which also included the unfunded Long Range Precision Rocket project (LRPR) which has ever since been perpetually kicked down the road from horizon to horizon.
What is of interest is that the basic components of these projects has not changed over the decades. Certainly there has been a change in viable systems to fill the bill at any given time, but that isn't the issue. The issue is funding priorities varying from regime to regime (both military and civilian)
And don't get me started on air defence.
Let's be honest. Canada has been deprioritizing any capability that it thinks it can off load on a member of a coalition (to call a spade a spade - the US). We've been funding, more or less, the tools of a battle group and the ability to force generate battle groups and a supervising headquarters. Canada has been very conservative when it comes to funding any brigade enablers - and that's at some surprisingly low levels such as infantry mortars and ATGMs and even tanks, much less artillery and air defence or logistics.