Canada has bought itself a classic moral obligation
TheStar.com - comment - November 13, 2007 Eric Morse
Article Link
It became known last month that the Canadian military contingent in Kandahar Province has begun paying the salaries of some Afghan National Police (ANP) units in their area of operations.
In the circumstances, this makes perfect sense. The ANP are notoriously corrupt and very little of an ANP constable's salary finds its way into his pocket, let alone on time. The incentive to take bribes from the insurgents and drug lords and to extort from local villagers is almost irresistible, and direct payment from Canadian hands ensures reasonable discipline and attention to duty. An effective police presence in the countryside is vital and this goes some way toward providing it.
There is another side though. By the simple act of providing regular pay, we have created bonds that go well beyond economic relationships. We may not realize it, coming from a culture which has come to view the employer-employee relationship as a marriage of convenience for both sides. But things are far otherwise in a traditional society like Afghanistan. Relationships are much more solemn and personal. By doing what we have done, we have created a classic patron-client relationship, with the Afghan clients almost certainly making assumptions about the patron's obligations which the Canadian command and government may not have entirely thought through or bought into.
Nasty words like "mercenaries" or "camp followers" do not enter into it. Any time an army sets down anywhere, it has an effect on the local population, benign or otherwise and usually both. When the Canadian NATO brigade in West Germany moved from Soest in the north to Lahr in the south, many of the German people who had made a living serving their needs followed them. By then, many were already members of Canadian families. The Canadians picked up a similar following in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 1990s as they moved about the country.
The process is even more visible in countries like Korea, where massive U.S. bases have existed for more than half a century. In South Vietnam during the Vietnam War it reached an apogee – and provided a horrific example of consequences at the bitter end.
The trouble begins when it is time to go home, especially if the departure is from a place where there is still a strong enemy in the field. The locals have placed their bets irrevocably; if the other side wins, they and their families have very poor prospects or life expectancy. Those suspected of having served the former regime in uniform or out are in the worst position of all. The haunting image is that of the last helicopter departing the U.S. embassy roof as Saigon fell to the North Vietnamese in 1975, dangling a trail of desperate and doomed Vietnamese abandoned to their fate by their erstwhile employers.
More on link
TheStar.com - comment - November 13, 2007 Eric Morse
Article Link
It became known last month that the Canadian military contingent in Kandahar Province has begun paying the salaries of some Afghan National Police (ANP) units in their area of operations.
In the circumstances, this makes perfect sense. The ANP are notoriously corrupt and very little of an ANP constable's salary finds its way into his pocket, let alone on time. The incentive to take bribes from the insurgents and drug lords and to extort from local villagers is almost irresistible, and direct payment from Canadian hands ensures reasonable discipline and attention to duty. An effective police presence in the countryside is vital and this goes some way toward providing it.
There is another side though. By the simple act of providing regular pay, we have created bonds that go well beyond economic relationships. We may not realize it, coming from a culture which has come to view the employer-employee relationship as a marriage of convenience for both sides. But things are far otherwise in a traditional society like Afghanistan. Relationships are much more solemn and personal. By doing what we have done, we have created a classic patron-client relationship, with the Afghan clients almost certainly making assumptions about the patron's obligations which the Canadian command and government may not have entirely thought through or bought into.
Nasty words like "mercenaries" or "camp followers" do not enter into it. Any time an army sets down anywhere, it has an effect on the local population, benign or otherwise and usually both. When the Canadian NATO brigade in West Germany moved from Soest in the north to Lahr in the south, many of the German people who had made a living serving their needs followed them. By then, many were already members of Canadian families. The Canadians picked up a similar following in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 1990s as they moved about the country.
The process is even more visible in countries like Korea, where massive U.S. bases have existed for more than half a century. In South Vietnam during the Vietnam War it reached an apogee – and provided a horrific example of consequences at the bitter end.
The trouble begins when it is time to go home, especially if the departure is from a place where there is still a strong enemy in the field. The locals have placed their bets irrevocably; if the other side wins, they and their families have very poor prospects or life expectancy. Those suspected of having served the former regime in uniform or out are in the worst position of all. The haunting image is that of the last helicopter departing the U.S. embassy roof as Saigon fell to the North Vietnamese in 1975, dangling a trail of desperate and doomed Vietnamese abandoned to their fate by their erstwhile employers.
More on link
