Canadian Surface Combatant RFQ

[Cloud Cover]

"The sinking of Sheffield is sometimes blamed on a superstructure made wholly or partially from magnesium-aluminium alloy, the melting point and ignition temperature of which are significantly lower than those of steel. However, this is incorrect as Sheffield's superstructure was made entirely of mild steel. The confusion is related to the US and British navies abandoning aluminium alloys after several fires in the 1970s involving USS Belknap and HMS Amazon and other ships that had aluminium alloy superstructures.[35][a] The sinking of the Type 21 frigates Antelope and Ardent, both of which had aluminium alloy superstructures, probably also had an effect on this belief, though these cases are again incorrect and the presence of aluminium alloy had nothing to do with their loss.[36][37]"

36. Crum, Kyle A.; McMichael, Jerri; Novak, Miloslav. "Advances in Aluminum Relative to Ship Survivability" (PDF). navalengineers.org. Archived from the original (PDF) on 28 December 2014. Retrieved 16 June 2015.
37. ^ "Aluminum Hull Structure in Naval Applications" (PDF). AUSTAL. Archived from the original (PDF) on 16 November 2011. Retrieved 16 June 2015.

One of the XO on Restigouche somehow managed to get himself attached to the RN and was in the conflict. I remember him saying that some of the ladders between decks were switched to aluminum during 1970’s refits. So I guess it’s not just superstructure, hull and decks but also deck grating, passageway fittings. I don’t know what RN ship he served on.

 

[Lumber]

Ultra is better than Thales?

Stay away from Thales (the company, not their gear).

 

[Lumber]

My opinion with this is that you are effectively bring the same issue up as we dealt with when the RCN decided to leave behind a split GP and AAW specification for the CSC, instead leaning into a single homogenous specification set. If you convert a handful of CSC's to remove the mission bay and replace it with VLS, you are going to be dealing with the same availability issues that most navies with small fleets of specialist AAW vessels have. You'd need to convert 2-3 (or more) ship to make sure you'll always have 1 AAW variant available, then you have two separate coasts to add into the equitation. Seems like you'd end up cutting a fair few of the CSC's mission bay capability out and I don't think that is especially wise.


The multi-mission bay is a hedge to allow the ships to take on the future developments and implementation of unmanned systems alongside bringing some much needed variety to the roles the class can undertake. Without the mission bay, the CSC only has a single boat bay on the port side. Taking out or cutting down the bay will have some major knock on effects for what the CSC can do now that it lacks any kind of small boat capability, drug interdiction and piracy control are two I'd point out. It would also pretty heavily remove any ability to do more covert operations like supporting CANSOFCOM operations with a platform that isn't an AOPS or a JSS. Being able to support mine warfare using unmanned systems is something that shouldn't be an explicit role but it is definitely something that could be useful, look at the 280's back during the Gulf War. Being able to do humanitarian work at home or abroad with that cargo capability and the ability to offload its own cargo is something else that is very useful, we've sent 280's and Halifax's to do these sorts of roles in the past and CSC will be able do exceed their limited capabilities by leaps and bounds.

The primary purpose I see for the mission bay is its ability to incorporate unmanned systems to supplement the ASW capability of the CSC significantly. Having this ability could be absolutely key going forward as these unmanned systems further develop. Other nations without this kind of mission bay could be stuck holding the bag with their legacy designs. This class will be the backbone of the RCN going forward, I expect to see them used sometimes in roles where they might be overkill but we've done that plenty with our current frigates. I would be cautious to not overly analyze current trends and developments, we are very much in the part of the arms race where the "disruptive technology" has the head start and developments from the other side have been somewhat slow. There are systems and ways for CSC to potentially harden itself against unmanned systems without something as drastic as the removal of the mission bay.

The image below showcases roles and equipment that the RN thinks will be useful for employment of their own mission bay equipped Type 26's, I don't think we should ignore of wave off the utility of such a system at this point. Weapons are something attractive to the point people can miss the more important but less glamorous capabilities a ship has.

View attachment 83207

My problem with this philosophy is that we need to stop acting like everything is ops normal and stop preparing for our typical constabulary and diplomatic roles and instead start preparing for the war that IS coming. We can figure out how to police the Arabian sea and get rice to Haiti later.

 

[Rainbow1910]

My problem with this philosophy is that we need to stop acting like everything is ops normal and stop preparing for our typical constabulary and diplomatic roles and instead start preparing for the war that IS coming. We can figure out how to police the Arabian sea and get rice to Haiti later.

Having adaptable vessels able to take on a variety of roles is key to any navy but especially for a nation like Canada. We need to walk a line where we can be prepared as much as possible for conflict but not to the point where important missions like you mention are shirked. These sorts of things are how our sailors get sea time and increase their aptitude while also objectively helping people. These two are not mutually exclusive, we can and seemingly are going to do both. Navies have always been a tool of diplomacy, not simply a cudgel to beat your enemy with.

 

[GR66]

Having adaptable vessels able to take on a variety of roles is key to any navy but especially for a nation like Canada. We need to walk a line where we can be prepared as much as possible for conflict but not to the point where important missions like you mention are shirked. These sorts of things are how our sailors get sea time and increase their aptitude while also objectively helping people. These two are not mutually exclusive, we can and seemingly are going to do both. Navies have always been a tool of diplomacy, not simply a cudgel to beat your enemy with.

Which is why I see the CSC and AOPS as they are being well suited for the 99% of the time we're not at war. No need to frankenstein them into heavy cruisers.

At the same time however I think it's important to accept the fact that the chance of open conflict between major powers is increasingly likely given the political trajectories we're seeing around the globe. It would be stupid of us not to prepare for that possibility.

That's where I see the utility of unmanned/minimally manned platforms to supplement our CSC's (as well as our subs and MPAs) with additional war fighting capability - be that an expanded sensor web or additional fire power in the form of arsenal ships.

This is why I'm also in favour of up-gunning the MCDV replacements somewhat considering the potential for conflict. IF war comes than 15 combatant hulls isn't going to be enough and the loss of just a couple would seriously cripple our ability to make any significant contribution.

This is where I think tough choices will have to be made that will probably please neither side of the MCDV vs Corvette argument. The existing MCDV's are quite well suited for their roles in peacetime...and can do it cheaply with a minimal personnel burden but they have no role in combat operations (beyond their designed mine counter-measures role). Go too far down the Corvette path and you get a vessel that's still not a terribly combat effective platform (compared to a CSC), has a difficult to fulfill personnel burden and also loses most the benefits that a small, inexpensive to operate vessel.

 

[suffolkowner]

IF war comes than 15 combatant hulls isn't going to be enough and the loss of just a couple would seriously cripple our ability to make any significant contribution.

https://twitter.com/x/status/1759267322286489927

a situation not unique to Canada but also why we have alliances

 

[Baz]

The Canadian Acoustics gear and software both tend to be world beaters.

It is something that we still do very well.

Historically this is due to the strong linkages between GDMS-C and DREA, and certain personalities in both. I've worked with a couple of amazing math guys (the heart of acoustics), one in DREA and one in GDMS-C.

These linkages are still present for the RCN, but for the RCAF (Auroras and Cyclones) they have broken down somewhat. Also, some of the personalities have moved on.

GDMS-C has hung their hat on it always being the case; it may not remain true for Airborne. The delivery of UWSU will tell us where we are for Surface/Subsurface.

 

[Kirkhill]

Which is why I see the CSC and AOPS as they are being well suited for the 99% of the time we're not at war. No need to frankenstein them into heavy cruisers.

At the same time however I think it's important to accept the fact that the chance of open conflict between major powers is increasingly likely given the political trajectories we're seeing around the globe. It would be stupid of us not to prepare for that possibility.

That's where I see the utility of unmanned/minimally manned platforms to supplement our CSC's (as well as our subs and MPAs) with additional war fighting capability - be that an expanded sensor web or additional fire power in the form of arsenal ships.

This is why I'm also in favour of up-gunning the MCDV replacements somewhat considering the potential for conflict. IF war comes than 15 combatant hulls isn't going to be enough and the loss of just a couple would seriously cripple our ability to make any significant contribution.

This is where I think tough choices will have to be made that will probably please neither side of the MCDV vs Corvette argument. The existing MCDV's are quite well suited for their roles in peacetime...and can do it cheaply with a minimal personnel burden but they have no role in combat operations (beyond their designed mine counter-measures role). Go too far down the Corvette path and you get a vessel that's still not a terribly combat effective platform (compared to a CSC), has a difficult to fulfill personnel burden and also loses most the benefits that a small, inexpensive to operate vessel.

"Give me a place to stand, and a lever long enough, and I will move the world,"

A ship is a place to stand. A place from which long levers can be employed.
It is also a tractor. A pulling device.

In wartime, in my opinion, the key element is going to be the number of levers available - the number of missiles - the number of things that can be thrown at the enemy. So for me the key metric now is how many low cost, smart munitions can be produced, supplied on a continuing basis and made available on the day war breaks out. Magellan of Winnipeg and GDOTS of Quebec are more important than Bombardier with their Challenger lines.

Getting those missiles in range, or supplying them with launch platforms is going to be critical. And I don't accept that they have to be manned.

OSVs with dynamic positioning. Use them as lightships, as warehouses, as arsenals, as carriers, as shuttles, as sensors, as emitters, at tractors for towed arrays, as repeater nodes, as landmarks, as floating islands. And turn them out by the hundreds, if not the thousands. Make the floodable or semi-submersible.

Plan to outproduce the opposition. Plan to accept casualties in the fleet.

 

[Rainbow1910]

This is why I'm also in favour of up-gunning the MCDV replacements somewhat considering the potential for conflict. IF war comes than 15 combatant hulls isn't going to be enough and the loss of just a couple would seriously cripple our ability to make any significant contribution.

This is where I think tough choices will have to be made that will probably please neither side of the MCDV vs Corvette argument. The existing MCDV's are quite well suited for their roles in peacetime...and can do it cheaply with a minimal personnel burden but they have no role in combat operations (beyond their designed mine counter-measures role). Go too far down the Corvette path and you get a vessel that's still not a terribly combat effective platform (compared to a CSC), has a difficult to fulfill personnel burden and also loses most the benefits that a small, inexpensive to operate vessel.

I don't think there is a reasonable middle ground for a platform which is cost effective and suitable for peacetime roles like we are looking for in an MCDV replacement but is also able to be a worthwhile combatant in wartime. Haphazardly slapping weapons and sensors onto an OPV does not make a proper combatant yet a proper combatant is very poor OPV.

 

[Retired AF Guy]

My opinion with this is that you are effectively bring the same issue up as we dealt with when the RCN decided to leave behind a split GP and AAW specification for the CSC, instead leaning into a single homogenous specification set. If you convert a handful of CSC's to remove the mission bay and replace it with VLS, you are going to be dealing with the same availability issues that most navies with small fleets of specialist AAW vessels have. You'd need to convert 2-3 (or more) ship to make sure you'll always have 1 AAW variant available, then you have two separate coasts to add into the equitation. Seems like you'd end up cutting a fair few of the CSC's mission bay capability out and I don't think that is especially wise.


The multi-mission bay is a hedge to allow the ships to take on the future developments and implementation of unmanned systems alongside bringing some much needed variety to the roles the class can undertake. Without the mission bay, the CSC only has a single boat bay on the port side. Taking out or cutting down the bay will have some major knock on effects for what the CSC can do now that it lacks any kind of small boat capability, drug interdiction and piracy control are two I'd point out. It would also pretty heavily remove any ability to do more covert operations like supporting CANSOFCOM operations with a platform that isn't an AOPS or a JSS. Being able to support mine warfare using unmanned systems is something that shouldn't be an explicit role but it is definitely something that could be useful, look at the 280's back during the Gulf War. Being able to do humanitarian work at home or abroad with that cargo capability and the ability to offload its own cargo is something else that is very useful, we've sent 280's and Halifax's to do these sorts of roles in the past and CSC will be able do exceed their limited capabilities by leaps and bounds.

The primary purpose I see for the mission bay is its ability to incorporate unmanned systems to supplement the ASW capability of the CSC significantly. Having this ability could be absolutely key going forward as these unmanned systems further develop. Other nations without this kind of mission bay could be stuck holding the bag with their legacy designs. This class will be the backbone of the RCN going forward, I expect to see them used sometimes in roles where they might be overkill but we've done that plenty with our current frigates. I would be cautious to not overly analyze current trends and developments, we are very much in the part of the arms race where the "disruptive technology" has the head start and developments from the other side have been somewhat slow. There are systems and ways for CSC to potentially harden itself against unmanned systems without something as drastic as the removal of the mission bay.

The image below showcases roles and equipment that the RN thinks will be useful for employment of their own mission bay equipped Type 26's, I don't think we should ignore of wave off the utility of such a system at this point. Weapons are something attractive to the point people can miss the more important but less glamorous capabilities a ship has.

View attachment 83207

Disregard my emoji, hit the wrong one - big fingers!!

 

[Cloud Cover]

The problem with having anything other than very light defensive armament on MCDV or AOPS is that it creates options in the minds of civilians to create a case for cutting CSC numbers afloat or to be built ( they see “warships” and “not warships”).
I believe this is the RCN itself very wisely slamming the door on any such thoughts entering the process.

 

[Stoker]

The problem with having anything other than very light defensive armament on MCDV or AOPS is that it creates options in the minds of civilians to create a case for cutting CSC numbers afloat or to be built ( they see “warships” and “not warships”).
I believe this is the RCN itself very wisely slamming the door on any such thoughts entering the process.

From what I have been told by someone looking into the requirements and the CRCN's own words the intention is to have a replacement globally deployable. That may not mean missiles or a helo but certainly better armed than a Kingston Class.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

To be fair the MCDV's where a big step up in capability from the GATE boats/Minesweepers and arming them was a change for the RCN at the time.

 

[Stoker]

To be fair the MCDV's where a big step up in capability from the GATE boats/Minesweepers and arming them was a change for the RCN at the time.

As someone who has sailed in both yes.

 

[dapaterson]

As someone who has sailed in both yes.

Didn't you sail in Rainbow as well ?

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Didn't you sail in Rainbow as well ?

Hence "Stoker" as with a shovel. I think the last coal fired ship in government service was the Acadia retired in 1969?

 

[Navy_Pete]

Plan to increase the number of sailors wanted? Or decrease the number of sailors needed?

Yes.

Even with decreased crew, we don't have the numbers required for CSC (or AOPS or JSS or MCDV replacement or new Subs). This year's intake was a 1/3rd of the target, and the target was still below the numbers that left. Believe this is what is normally described in biology as a 'population collapse.

That's not even taking into account that a new S3 doesn't replace the MS/PO2 that is retiring in a 1 for 1, or that that the entire ops room and CSE departmental trade structure needs realigned to work with AEGIS.

So yes, different number of sailors (with a different trade distribution) needed but also need a lot more. I think at the moment we could actually sail maybe 6 or 7 CSCs if they were magically delivered tomorrow, and not many of those at HR.

The actual crew numbers won't have enough people to do any real maintenance though, so also need to significantly up the shore resources/ISSC, which isn't planned or funded either.

All while trying to figure out why our contractor travel is lumped into section travel at ADM(Mat) now, so the existing ISSC support that needs travel wiped out our travel budget, so we had to cut any LCMM travel that wasn't needed by contract (like see FATs) or by federal legislation. And yet, in person collaboration is critical, so come back to work from the office. (but only about a 1/3rd of the team at any given day because we are reducing desk allocations).

It's like working for a schizophrenic hydra.

 

[FJAG]

The problem with having anything other than very light defensive armament on MCDV or AOPS is that it creates options in the minds of civilians to create a case for cutting CSC numbers afloat or to be built ( they see “warships” and “not warships”).
I believe this is the RCN itself very wisely slamming the door on any such thoughts entering the process.

Honestly, I've seen that rationale over and over again. It's a false premise, especially if an MCDV or an AOPS properly weaponized is capable of doing a needed job. Maybe if we had more lower level but armed ships, we wouldn't need 15 CSC. If civilians in government just see "warship" without context then it is up the the CDS and CRCN to educate them and properly articulate the need. As a civilian I think the question that I would have is "why do we even have minimally armed MCDVs and AOPS in the first place? Are they optimized for purpose and if not, why waste money on them?"

It's the same rationale that is used to divest equipment: If we don't get rid of it we won't get a replacement. And if we find a job for some of that old equipment which is still serviceable then we won't get as much new. The fact that we always get less new and are on a death spiral simply doesn't sink in.

It's kind of like getting DND to justify why it has 24,000 full-time employees when the CAF has an army of only has 22,500, a Navy of 8,400, an air force of 12,000 and yet there are another 35,000 "other" (incl of HSvcs and MPs).

These are games. High priced games that directly effect defence outputs.

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

The answer to your civilian question is: The MCDV's have a role, mine warfare, including diving support, and harbour guardship/inspection ship. Those are duties they are perfectly suitable for as currently armed. As for the AOPS, the Navy can't tell you what they are for and whether they are suitable, because they are not a Navy choice. They are a political decision of the Harper government imposed on the RCN for no other reason than Harper liked the Arctic.

 

[dapaterson]

They are a political decision of the Harper government imposed on the RCN for no other reason than Harper liked the Arctic. offshore bank accounts of the Irving family.

FTFY.