'critical' failings found regarding Nimrod fuel system

[GAP]

The title sucks ....

MoD accused over spy plane deaths
Internal report into explosion above Afghanistan supports claims that safety fears were ignored
Mark Townsend, defence correspondent Sunday November 11, 2007 The Observer
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A dozen major deficiencies in the repair and maintenance of the RAF's Nimrod spy planes were identified shortly before one of the aircraft exploded above Afghanistan, causing the biggest loss of life suffered by Britain's armed forces since the Falklands war.
An internal defence report, seen by The Observer, highlights a catalogue of 'critical' failings found during an investigation into the recurrent problem of fuel leaks within the Nimrod fleet.

It found that deep-rooted concerns relating to a 'low standard of workmanship' and 'inadequate' training of mechanics working on the Nimrod fuel system were first identified eight years ago. Investigators found no evidence to suggest such issues had been rectified.

The official inquiry into the explosion above Afghanistan that killed 14 people - to be published this month - is expected to pinpoint a fuel leak in the Nimrod MR2 as the cause of the tragedy. The inquiry comes days after a Nimrod suffered a serious leak in mid-air, spraying fuel into an empty bomb bay while refuelling over southern Afghanistan. Last night families of the crew who died in the explosion over Kandahar province claimed it was the fourth such incident since the tragedy.
Last night the father of one of the servicemen killed accused the RAF of 'wasting' the life of his 25-year-old son Ben. Graham Knight, from Bridgwater, Somerset, said the report proved that safety fears over fuel leaks had been repeatedly ignored by defence officials.

'I was speaking to one of the widows involved in the crash recently and she agreed that her husband's life has been thrown away,' he said. 'This report shows that mechanics were not using the proper equipment, there were problems with training and also with the sealants.'

In addition to the 12 areas of concern found by experts, the report detected a further six factors that appear to have compounded problems relating to the aircraft's fuel tank system, including the age of the fleet and the Nimrod's design
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[GAP]

Coroner Delivers Scathing Indictment of UK Nimrod Fleet, Procedures
02-Apr-2009 17:26 EDT
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On Sept 3/06, an RAF Nimrod MR2 sea control aircraft was flying near Kandahar, Afghanistan, using its advanced sensors and long endurance in support of NATO ISAF forces on land. The aircraft moved to take on additional fuel from an aerial tanker, in order to remain on station longer. That’s when the trouble began. Alerts soon began to sound, and the crew remained professional and businesslike as they steered their ailing plane toward Kandahar for an emergency landing. They never arrived. RAF Nimrod #XV230 exploded in mid-air over Afghanistan, killing all 14 crew members.

“Nimrod Was Actually a Fine Hunter: Upgrading Britain’s Fleet (updated)” details Britain’s current and future Nimrod sea control aircraft fleet, which first entered service in 1969. In the aftermath of the inquests and enquiries that have followed the September 2006 explosion, however, serious questions have been raised concerning the Nimrod’s fleet’s ongoing fitness, and the measures taken to maintain these aging aircraft.

The latest development is a set of High Court filings by the UK MoD that admit to failures in the RAF’s duty of care. Those are weighty legal words, and they come in the context of a court case that could set a very difficult precedent for Britain’s military…


Nimrod MR2 – Afghanistan
(click to view full)An RAF Board of Inquiry had already delivered a December 2007 report which declared that ageing components and lack of fire suppressants on board were among the “contributory factors” to the accident. In response to a perceived dearth of answers from official channels, however, some of the parents began to undertake investigations of their own. Graham Knight’s son was Sgt. Benjamin “Tapper” Knight, XV230’s Weapons Systems Operator on that fateful day. Knight was one of the leading figures, and spent over a year carrying out his own investigations into the matter, filing freedom of information requests, and acting as an advocate for all of the bereaved families.

According to Graham Knight, BAE Systems had recommended installing fire detection systems in the serving fleet 2 years before the accident. He also claims to have emails from high-ranking officers detailing problems with fuel leaks from December 2005 to February 2006. He is quoted as saying that:

“Since launching my investigations I have had a lot of people contact me from the RAF and MoD. There are so many people within the organizations who are not happy with what has been going on.”

Some of that emerged at the inquest. Nimrod engineer Sgt. Andrew Whitmore testified that he had discovered a “quite shocking” level of corrosion in the couplings which were used to join the fuel pipe to the point where they had to be sawn off rather than unscrewed. Sgt. Whitmore told the inquest that he had reported that matter, but a complete check of the Nimrod fleet only took place after the September 2006 crash.

Even so, Wing Commander John Bromehead told the inquest that he was not told in the months before the tragedy about increased levels of fuel leaks on Nimrod aircraft. Sgt. Mark Wallington, who supervised maintenance for the Nimrods operating in southern Afghanistan, said the same.

Assistant deputy coroner for Oxfordshire Andrew Walker, who led the inquest, is calling for the entire Nimrod fleet to be grounded. His report is not official, and cannot compel official action. Nevertheless, its verdict is scathing:

“The crew and passengers were not to know that this aircraft, like every other aircraft within the Nimrod fleet, was not airworthy. What is more, the aircraft was, in my judgment, never airworthy from the first release to service in 1969 to the point where the Nimrod XV 230 was lost.”
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[geo]

Well... once you start neglecting your maintenance - you know you are neglecting maintenance - you know your staff are neglecting maintenance, you stop listening & your staff stops reporting problems that have become "routine".  You are running the machines into the ground & know it BUT due to budgetary constraints, you don't see what else you can do about it... so things continue.

Until the fateful day where machines stop working & they either fall out of the sky, sink or crash & burn - causing injury OR worse still - loss of life.