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pbi said:
We are, it seems to me, in several threads, here in Army.ca, skirting around a fundamental problem: Leadership ... or, perhaps, lack of same.
Does anyone else remember a book by Robert Raurk called "Something of Value?" At the start of the book, Ruark quotes an old African prover:
If a man does away with his traditional way of living and
throws away his good customs, he had better first make
certain that he has something of value to replace them.
- Basuto proverb
I think we, Canadian society at large but the CF, in particular, threw away some "traditional values" and we did not make certain that we had "something of value to replace the."
In Canadian society we began the throwing away process in around 1960; in political terms that was the Kingston Conference and the decades (1960s and 70s) of missteps that flowed from it.
In the CF we had our own major disruption: 1964-68, the process of integrating and unifying the RCN, Canadian Army and RCAF into the CAF. Not everything about integration was wrong, but a lot was; much of unification was good, but we have, since about 1975 (creation of Air Command), actually regressed, tossed out some good ideas and replaced them with less operationally effective single service 'stovepipes.'
But the big thing we tossed aside in 1966 when, mainly in an effort to solve some long standing and serious compensation (pay) problems, Minister Hellyer and the CDS (Air Chief Marshal Miller) decided upon a new rank structure which, effectively, destroyed the junior leadership levels of, especially, the army.
It may be true that the sergeants are the "heart and soul" of the army, but it is junior leaders, corporals and subalterns who actually lead, from the front, in battle. I had, and still have no problem with Mr Hellyer's plan to raise my pay ~ I needed a pay raise and i was damned glad to have it. But I, in 1966, and almost everyone else in the army did have, and still have, a problem with what was done to the ranks of corporal and captain. Creating MCpols and inflating ranks - making section and tank commander a sergeant's position - did not solve the problem. If the sergeants are the army "backbone" then the junior leaders are its very foundation; in my opinion everything rests on them and the business of selecting, training and developing them is the most important thing the army does. Selecting the CDS begins, I would suggest, at recruiting officer cadets and the CFCWO et al didn't spring, fully formed, from "dragons' teeth," they were selected and trained as leaders along the way. But what about all those people who needed (and deserved) a pay raise? Good question ...
There was a model open to Mr Hellyer and ACM Miller, one which I suspect would have been just as well received as the one they chose: the US rank model, circa 1965, which (until 1968) included several grades of specialist ...
... now that has all changed and, today, there is only one grade of specialist, equivalent to a corporal.
But, one of our other sister services, the Royal Air Force, still used graded (specialist) Technician ranks ...
I'm not interested in the "buttons and bows," just in the principle which is that rank and trade can and should be divided ... not totally separated: we shouldn't waste a Group 4 trade course on a soldier whop cannot even manage a small team, but junior leaders, especially, should be identified, trained, and streamed as leaders, albeit being required to be journeyman tradesmen, too. It ought to be possible to reward (pay) both technical/trade skill and leadership ability/responsibility.
As I understand most trade progression, today, it is:
Basic tradesman: (Trade Group 1 badge) TQ3 (pte)
Journeyman tradesman: (Trade Group 2 badge) TQ4 (pte)
Skilled tradesman: (Trade Group 3 badge) TQ5 (cpl)
Expert tradesman: (trade Group 4 badge) TQ6 (sgt)
I believe that rank, as opposed to specialist/technician qualification, should also have levels. I see a need for something like this:
Soldier: (worker): (private) and, after training, TQ3;
Those who can pass the TQ4 and TQ5 courses but cannot pass junior leader training will be specialists or technicians in the 4th or 5th grade
Junior leader 1 (leader of a very few): (corporal) - requires a rigorous junior leader course and must be TQ4;
Junior leader 2 (leader of a large team or a complex small team, say a tank): (master corporal) - requires seasoning and selection after junior NCO training and must be TQ5;
Those junior leaders who can pass the TQ5 and TQ6 courses but cannot pass the senior leader training will be specialists or technicians in the 5th and 6th grades
Senior leader 1 (e.g. armoured troop or infantry platoon 2IC): (sergeant) - requires a senior leader course, more selective, also a rigorous course and must be TQ5;
Senior leader 2 (e.g. CQMS or engineer troop 2IC): (sergeant 1st class) - requires additional management training and must be TQ6;
Those senior leaders who can pass the TQ7 training but cannot pass the senior management training will be specdialists/technicians in the 7th grade
Senior leader 3 (e.g. SSM/BSM/CSM and senior technical leader/manager): (master sergeant) - requires additional trade and management training and must be TQ6 or even 7, in some specialties; and
Senior leader 4 (e.g. RSM and selected senior staff WOs): (warrant officer) - requires selection and some additional management training and must be TQ6 or 7.
The key things are: the first junior leader ranks - team and infantry section and tank commanders - are junior non commissioned officers. They live and work with the men and women they command and lead. They have been selected for leadership training because their leaders see some potential in them. The leadership training which they undergo is, and is seen to be, tough, hard, and so on ... there is a respectable failure rate on the junior leader course to prove it. (And it's no disgrace for a good soldier to fail junior leader training ... once.)
We are, I think, already fairly careful in selecting and training junior officers. They need a system of formal examination to qualify for the training that will take them to and beyond the rank of captain. We ought not to assume that every cadet who is enrolled in ROTP is, automatically, a future CDS. Sorry, folks, the recruiting and selection crystal ball is not that good.
The key aspect of training for junior leaders ~ both junior NCOs and junior officers ~ is: integrity, responsibility, teamwork, responsibility, honesty, responsibility, leadership/personnel management, responsibility, ethics, responsibilioty, fitness and responsibility. Leaders are a whole lot of things but, mostly, they are, personally, responsible for everything that their team is and does. It is willingly accepting, and seeking responsibility that separates the leader from the led. And, you can teach or, at least, refine integrity, teamwork, personnel management, ethics, fitness and responsibility. It's hard to learn to be honest and self sacrificing and strong ... but anything worth having requires hard work.
We need to stop worrying about the CDS and the commander of the army and the CFCWO and so on ... we need to worry about the leaders who matter most: corporals and lieutenants. If we can select and train them well then everything else, cox'ns and RSMs, ship's captains, regimental and brigade commanders, even the CDS, will follow because their development and selection will rest on a firm foundation of
We need "something of value" as the very base of our system ... I think we're missing it, now, but I also think we can fill the void.
