Mountain Operations Course

[JO]

I‘d just like to see what people would think of an idea like this. Many foreign countries have mountain/alpine operations units (eg. the US 10th Mountain Division in Fort Drum, New York). How about converting 3PPCLI into an mountain operations battalion? They already have a mtn ops company, and they‘re reasonably close to the Rockies. Specializing the unit in mountain (and perhaps arctic) operations and giving it the requisite equipment (eg helicopters, utility vehicles, etc) might give Canada a highly deployable, well-trained, flexible, almost elite unit for operations in mountainous terrain. I remember during the war in Kosovo one of the issues was whether the alliance could fight in the mountains effectively; given the fact that Canada has much mountainous terrain itself, the army might find a battalion/regiment like this useful. Any thoughts?

 

[bossi]

Well, it‘s only my opinion ... (and, it‘s often said "opinions are like anal orifices - we all have one, and if it doesn‘t work, then we‘re full of ....)

To begin with, I feel our army is too small, and I fear will get smaller. Eventually, the budget cuts will go too deep, and we will only find out the hard way (i.e. when the bullets start flying ...)

Our infantry corps is similarly too small already (perhaps one of the reasons behind the disbanding of the Airborne Regiment was selfish greed, hoping the line serials would be re-distributed to the line infantry units ... but of course, that‘s just another conspiracy theory ... isn‘t it?)

In general, I support the concept of specialist units - BUT, only if the remainder of the "body" can support them!!

The Brits have got the Royal Marines, the Paras, and the SAS, but they‘ve also got a large enough Army - Canada doesn‘t.

Having said all of the above, I must face reality - we‘re down to three Regular infantry regiments (for now). As long as they all maintain an acceptable level of common infantry skills and expertise, there is no reason they shouldn‘t be encouraged to each develop some specialised skills (i.e. coastal battalions could, and SHOULD practice amphibious operations. Battalions nearest helicopter squadrons could, and SHOULD practice airmobile operations - heck, I wrote several articles in the Infantry Journal and Canadian Defence Quarterly suggesting airmobile, specifically.)

In this way, our pipsqueak army could at least keep some vestige of specialised skills alive. Additionally, reservists could then be allowed to go and attend training with these specialist battalions, with the eventual aim of ensuring reserve battalions were similarly tasked with specialised roles (i.e. FIBUA for urban battalions ... seems to me this was an important skill during WWII in Italy, as I recall).

Okay - let loose the dogs of ... the War Diary!!
What have you other guys got to say ‘bout this?

Dileas Gu Brath
Mark Bossi, Esquire

 

[the patriot]

Hello Boys,

All of what I see here makes total sense, except for one thing. Don‘t the para companies within each regular force regiment already take care of these issues (i.e. special ops, mountain warfare, etc.)? Also, the JTF‘s mandate already includes training of such nature. In a nutshell, what I‘m saying is that the CF already has this capability. For example, our SAR Techs could very easily adapt immediately to an Airmobile assault capability at the flip of a switch. What I‘m about to say will sound rather unorthodox, but then what‘s new. I suggest that DND buys back the Halifax Citadel, and bring back the Black Watch to the reg force Order of Battle. Montreal would stay as RHQ and have 1 Battalion, hence making Halifax the 2nd Battalion of the Royal Highland Regiment. Granted, 2RCR is already in the area out of Gagetown, but this would also solidify combined operations with the other two branches of the CF.

-the patriot-

 

[JO]

I understand what you mean by the small size of the infantry - granted, the infantry is probably too small to support a lot of specialization. In the (somewhat unlikely) event that the infantry is ever expanded, this concept may become more feasible. As to the Black Watch - I like the idea of bringing them back; my question is as what - mech or light, and which brigade? I would say mech, and put them in 2 CMBG - that way at least one of the brigades would have a full count of three infantry battalions (what they‘re supposed to have). I would say that we could use three new battalions instead of just one; one in the West (Seaforths, anyone?) and another francophone one for 5 GBMC (perhaps a second regforce francophone regiment?). Three new mech battalions wouldn‘t be cheap, but it would go a long way towards solving our manpower problems - and restoring combat effectiveness. Maybe I‘m just dreaming....

 

[madorosh]

Unfortunately, the Queen‘s Own Rifles are senior to the Watch in order of precedence, and you could never bring back the Watch and leave the QOR as reserves. Besides which, the government HATES Highland regiments - they did away with all the reserve pipe bands 5 or 6 years ago (pretty crafty, actually - they KNEW no highland regiment would not have a pipe band, even if they had to "volunteer"). Not that I wouldn‘t love to see the RHR back on the order of battle as regulars...

Would our fictional Mountain Troops also maintain a mule/horse capability? There was a British amoured regiment in Bosnia that put some troops back in the saddle for patrols in the hills - they could go where motorized vehicles couldn‘t.

Also - what FIBUA went on in Italy in World War Two besides Ortona????? I thought that was the only instance. It wasn‘t all that common in NW Europe, either, for that matter. Buron (not exactly a metropolis) and Groningen come to mind immediately, but other than that - nothing springs out.

I always thought modern armies avoided cities where possible - you can‘t sustain losses like that encountered at Stalingrad/Ortona/Berlin that often! Is there really a need for FIBUA training given the size of our forces and the types of operations they are currently tasked with? More imporantly (and I really don‘t know the answer, which is why I am asking) is it likely that our forces will need to have FIBUA training anytime in the next five years given the current world situation?

Wouldn‘t a smart doctrine be to avoid fighting in cities when at all possible? In World War Two, they simply sealed the Channel ports and left them to wither on the vine until May 1945 with intact German garrisons- tied up lots of troops, but they would have lost even more fighting street to street through all of them.

 

[JO]

My answer to the FIBUA question would be that given how often our troops find themselves in urbanized areas on deployments, this training should be a given. Look what happened in Sarajevo - or at the Americans in Mogadishu. Now, I realize that peacekeeping missions do not always reflect actual warfighting, and warfighting by all means should remain our primary business; but urban combat is looking to be a fact of conflict in the future. The US Marines recently did a series of exercises I think were called Urban Warrior (not sure on the name) because the US thinks FIBUA may be a large issue in the future. The sheer number of people living in urban centers around the world is another indication.
As to the mule/horses idea, if it works, I don‘t see why it wouldn‘t be worth a look.

 

[bossi]

oh, heck - I can‘t resist ...

Doesn‘t anybody else remember the incident whereby some weenie in Ottawa decided the Seaforths "were not Canadian enough" to put on the guard (for APEC?), and they flew in Van Doos??

Sadly, foes of the kilt abound.

Speaking of Ortona, I‘ve always thought it incredible the 48th Highlanders crept up a "goat track" in the middle of the night, basically in single file - not too shabby for an urban regiment - then repulsed ferocious counter-attacks, and eventually forced the German withdrawal by threatening their rear.

As for FIBUA in general, it ranks right up there with mountain, jungle, or desert warfare - hopefully we won‘t be lulled into believing future operations will always be in the same type of terrain as our last operation ... ?

Dileas Gu Brath

Mark Bossi, Esquire

 

[Mike Bobbitt]

Mike,

You‘re absolutely correct regarding FIBUA: it‘s best to avoid city fighting.

However, the enemy usually notices that it is an excellent spot to defend, so unless we‘re prepared to bypass any built up areas, we‘re going to have to keep fighting in them.

 

[madorosh]

Aw, heck, Mark, now I can‘t resist!

I know the 48th were called Glamour Boys and the Hasty P‘s were the Plough Jockeys - but did the number of urban v. country boys in any of the regiments in World War Two really make a difference - difference enough to distinguish between "urban" and "rural" units? Surely three years of living in England in the same kinds of conditions and undergoing the same training would have evened things out a bit - assuming you think it makes a difference where the recruits came from in the first place.

Are there any stats showing the number of Toronto boys in the 48th versus the number of farmers in the Hasty P‘s by 1943? The numbers of inductees won‘t help you cause by 43 large numbers of troops had been rotated around throughout the army, beginning as early as 1939 (I can‘t count the number of Calgary Highlanders who ended up with the Edmonton Regiment - and one of our vets at the museum (a platoon commander) went to the PPCLI at the tail end of the Sicily campaign and stayed with the unit til repatriation in 1945).

It‘s an interesting question, and since you‘ve mentioned the whole "urban" thing twice now, I get the feeling you‘re wanting to expand on that theme.

So by all means - and please - expand!

I wonder if Art Johnson has found his way here yet, too....

 

[Art Johnson]

Michael, I found my way but suffered a bit of fingeritis and my first attempt got lost in cyber space. First let‘s start with the pipe bands. Not all regiments lost their pipe band the 48th Pipe band is an official CF band and is on the strength of the regiment. The Pipe Major, Sandy Dewer (the piper at the Unknown Soldier Ceremony)is on a call out and teaching at the School of Music at Base Borden as is the Drum Major Chris Reesor.
As to specialized troops they have limited effectivness. The Americans disbanded both their mountain units and the Special Service Force in Italy. When the casualties come rolling in you need soldiers not specialist. I believe that you have referred to the German Army‘s ability to improvise in this manner in some of your postings.
Marc‘s reference to the goat trail during the Ortona battle is but one example. During the Sicilian campaign and the battle for Assoro both the Hasty Ps and the 48th were faced with night climbs up a thousand foot cliff with 8 to 40 foot terraces and they both made it to the top to the consternation of the Jerries. A well trained infantryman with good leadership can adapt to any terrain or situation, the Canadian soldier has done it on many an occasion.

 

[Gunner]

Just to add my two cents:

a. SAR Techs are not elite commando‘s...they are only search and rescue technicians...no more no less. They are trained in survival, first aid, etc, etc, not in specialized commando tactics, etc etc. The attempts by the light infantry battalions to maintain skills in amphibious assault, mountain operations and parachute operations are simply scratching the surface of skills required for operations in different types of terrain.

b. FYI. 1 CMBG will be running a large scale FIBUA training exercise next year in May. They will utilize the entire Griesbach Barracks site (1 sq km) to conduct a whole range of activities. Once details are finalized I let you know the info (unless anyone else has anything on it?). The Reserves in Western Canada will also partake in a portion of the exercise, building on the strength of the training during Ex TOTAL RAM.

 

[madorosh]

That‘s an excellent point, Art, about the 1 SSF being disbanded (it was actually after the landings in Southern France, though) - there was just no need for specialized troops anymore. You can look at the Rhine crossings as "evidence" that Airborne and amphibious troops were a necessity - until you realize that Patton sneaked across the Rhine a day or so earlier than Monty, with regular infantry and tankers, while Monty landed several airborne divisions behind German lines. I think maybe your point about adaptability is the best we‘ve heard yet.

Farley Mowat described the ascent on Assoro in detail - it must have been a killer. Yet they DID receive mountain training in Scotland, did they not? Wonder how much it helped.

I also wonder how those heights compared with Monte La Difensa - which were given to the mountain "specialists" of the 1 SSF. Could a regular Canadian brigade have done as well at La Difensa? Interesting point to ponder.

I am sure you told me about the 48th band before at some point, but thanks for reminding me. I am under the impression that while a small number of positions were still left as paid positions in pipe bands across Canada, and the bands still had seperate UIC identifier codes, the majority of musicians were still unpaid members (or civilians) who volunteered their time. Such is the case with the Calgary Highlanders, with but two paid positions - nonetheless the band is off to the Edinburgh Tattoo this summer. Wish them luck! I think some bands such as the Black Watch may have fudged the numbers to keep paying their musicians - is that actually the case with the 48th, or are there actually paid positions for each of the pipers and drummers on strength?

 

[armdfist]

Unfortunately, the gov‘t doesn‘t like the idea of Highland regiments representing the regular Canadian Army. This goes way back, and one of the reasons for the formation of the Canadian Guards.

If expansion was ever considered (highly unlikely), it would make more sense to add another battalion to each regiment. Although it is not historically that you see Regiments with 4 battalions (or is it?), it would make more sense than to activate reserve regiments.

Bold and Swift

PS any zipperheads or old gooners kicking around

 

[the patriot]

Hello,

Just a further anecdote to the SAR Tech discussion. One must be in the CF for 3 years prior to posting for the selections process for search and rescue ops.Essentially, within those three years, a soldier can obtain the "so-called elite commando skills" within their respective Light Infantry Battalions via courses at your local Battle School. So essentially, when they become a SAR, they‘ve indirectly now added an airmobile component to their background. Hence the logic behind the statement that SAR‘s can be switched to an airmobile role at the flip of a switch.

-the patriot-

 

[bossi]

A propos to the comment about bypassing built-up areas, I thought the "quote of the day" from the Staff College news page was quite appropriate:

"Battles are won by slaughter and manoeuvre. The greater the general, the more he contributes in manoeuvre, the less he demands in slaughter."
- Winston S. Churchill

(I find I‘m appreciating Winnie‘s gems of wisdom more, and more ...)

Dileas Gu Brath
Mark Bossi, Esquire

 

[Doug VT]

I don‘t know what SAR Techs you‘re talking about. There may be more ex-combat arms than anything else in the SAR‘s but they‘re not all infantry and those that were wern‘t all from LIB‘s. Don‘t get me wrong, being a SAR is probably one of the most demanding job in the CF, both physicaly and mentally. They have my utmost respect. However, skills earned in an infantry role are perishable and must be maintained, they do not come back "At the flip of a switch"!

 

[Jules Deschenes]

Since this is a learning site, what is FIBUA? Also what is this ire towards the Van Doos? Since I respect most of you I will be immoderate. It is starting to sound like sibbling rivalry and/or petty jealousy. I for one thought most of you were beyond this. I guess I was wrong. Very unprofessional gentlemen. I haven‘t found a perfect regiment yet and I‘m certain that if one were to dig deep enough one would find skeletons.

 

[madorosh]

HOLD ON JULES!

First of all, FIBUA is Fighting in Built Up Areas.

Secondly, all that was said about the Van Doos was that they were flown in to replace a Guard of Honour from the Seaforth Highlanders.

This was stupid because

a) It cost a lot of money to fly them in

b) The Seaforths had a guard capable of doing just as good a job, on the ground, in Vancouver (ie no transport costs necessary)

c) It seemed that certain higher ups felt that a Highland regiment was not capable of representing "Canada" and did not look "Canadian" enough. Which is BS because 1 out of every 3 infantry battalions in Italy and NW Europe during World War Two were Highland regiments.

I don‘t see where that is any kind of negative comment about the Van Doos at all. So let‘s let it lie there.

Welcome to the new site, by the way! Nice to "see" a friendly "face".

 

[bossi]

Lighten up, Jules!

As previously explained, no slight to the R22R was intended (methinks you read a little too much into it).

Dileas Gu Brath
Mark Bossi, Esquire

 

[Jules Deschenes]

I agree about the expense in flying the Van Doos out, it was stupid. Seaforth, or otherwise, a local regiment would have done nicely. Apologies gentlemen am very protective of Canadian Regiments but of Van Doos and Chaudieres in particular. Haven‘t been on for a while had nothing to say. Going north of 60 for a month on friday. Nice to chat again.