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The rise and fall of the Royal Canadian Navy, 1945-1964 : a critical study of the senior leadership, policy and manpower management

Halifax Tar

Army.ca Fixture
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I am currently reading this and I think its fascinating.

And may be a good read considering our current personnel shortages.

If you feel so inclined:

 
I am currently reading this and I think its fascinating.

And may be a good read considering our current personnel shortages.

If you feel so inclined:

So the more things change.....that was an interesting read.
 
This YouTube fellow does a lot of Naval history and ship videos.
The part re HMCS Oakville is worth viewing. Perserverance.

The H.M.C.S. Oakville, a Flower-class corvette, was constructed at Port Arthur, Ontario. It was christened and formally adopted by the town of Oakville on November 5, 1941.
The Oakville is most famously known for the dramatic and courageous capture of German submarine U-94, on August 28, 1942, a mere ten months after its launch. While escorting a convoy of between Cuba and Haiti, the Oakville came under attack by the U-boat. With supporting fire from an American seaplane, the corvette was able to force U-94 to surface with its depth charges, and subdue it by ramming it twice.
Armed with only a pistol each, crew members Lt. Harold Lawrence and P.O. Arthur Powell courageously boarded the submarine and obtained the surrender of the 19 German survivors. Three months later, a year after the Oakville set sail, Lt. Lawrence and P.O. Powell visited Oakville, where they were greeted by the mayor and over 2,000 proud supporters.

P.S. Retired from RCN in 1965. Lawrence taught at the University of Ottawa and the University of Victoria after retiring from the Navy. He wrote three books concerning World War II. A Bloody War was published in 1979, Tales of the North Atlantic in 1985, and Victory at Sea in 1989.


The Royal Canadian Navy - Sinking you, but politely

 
Thanks for this document!

I am currently on Chapter 8 so these might not be true through out but so far I have seen a few Themes and some interesting thoughts ( not sure how else to describe them)

Themes

1. Consistent Budget Challenges

2. No Joint Force - non cooperation (not deliberately so) to outright competition between services

3. Overcommitted Forces

4. Personnel Shortfalls leading to personnel instability

5. Tendencies to lapse into reactive mode focusing on day to day emergencies ( There are key examples of the exact opposite but I don’t know if I would argue against this state of reactivity being the default)

Interesting Thoughts

1. Sub Fleet was never intended to be truely operational but as training support to ASW

2. Ongoing struggle between ASW and Big Fleet. I’m wondering to myself if there is still some element of this at play with the RCN.

3. Units at minimum manning despite service being at or both authorized manning. At this point that seems to be ubiquitous as a CAF experience no matter the service or time.
 
I am currently reading this and I think its fascinating.

And may be a good read considering our current personnel shortages.

I tried to download the pdf, but after an hour it still hadn't completed. How large a file is it?
 
I tried to download the pdf, but after an hour it still hadn't completed. How large a file is it?
At the link there's a 16.4M download. Is that it? Not particularly large (I'm accustomed to occasionally downloading JDKs).
 
Thanks for this document!

I am currently on Chapter 8 so these might not be true through out but so far I have seen a few Themes and some interesting thoughts ( not sure how else to describe them)

Themes

1. Consistent Budget Challenges

2. No Joint Force - non cooperation (not deliberately so) to outright competition between services

3. Overcommitted Forces

4. Personnel Shortfalls leading to personnel instability

5. Tendencies to lapse into reactive mode focusing on day to day emergencies ( There are key examples of the exact opposite but I don’t know if I would argue against this state of reactivity being the default)

Interesting Thoughts

1. Sub Fleet was never intended to be truely operational but as training support to ASW

2. Ongoing struggle between ASW and Big Fleet. I’m wondering to myself if there is still some element of this at play with the RCN.

3. Units at minimum manning despite service being at or both authorized manning. At this point that seems to be ubiquitous as a CAF experience no matter the service or time.
Would be interesting to see a parallel from this from 1964- now, where we had a period of cold war build up then back to repeating most of what is above.

Those themes have been consistent for my almost 20 years and only been getting worse over time, with no improvement in sight. The personnel side in particular is in a death spiral squeezed between massive attrition and new ships with new billets.
 
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