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Posted by Patrick Cain <patrickcain@snappingturtle.net> on Sat, 25 Mar 2000 11:57:14 -0500
March 25 2000
EUROPE
Britain had detailed plan for ground
war
BY MICHAEL EVANS, DEFENCE EDITOR
BRITAIN‘S planning for a
ground war against President
Milosevic‘s forces in Kosovo
was so far advanced that the
Ministry of Defence had even
worked out how many artillery
shells would be required,
according to military sources.
Underlining the pressures the
British military were under to
find resources for the potential
battle, it was estimated that the
division earmarked for battle in
Kosovo needed to take the
entire war reserve of 155mm
artillery shells. The precise
number of shells is classified,
but it is clear that the planning
of the Kosovo ground
campaign forced the MoD to
revise its strategy on
ammunition stocks. War
reserves were reduced under
the previous Government‘s
defence cuts.
One of the most alarming
lessons for Nato from the
Kosovo campaign, which
began a year ago yesterday,
was that most alliance members
were not prepared or able to
contemplate a high-intensity
war with Yugoslavia. Senior
MoD sources said yesterday
that towards the end of Nato‘s
78-day bombing campaign,
some alliance members were
beginning "to come round" to
the idea that a ground war
might be necessary. But the
Kosovo terrain and the
prospect of high casualties
remained key obstacles in the
way of any consensus. British
planners knew that a ground
war against an army of about
30,000 Serb troops in
defensive positions would lead
to significant casualties.
Cabinet Office papers
circulated to ministers reflected
the fears of a high casualty toll,
but Tony Blair supported the
British military view that
planning for a land campaign
had to begin. One senior Army
officer said that the ground war
would have presented a greater challenge than 100,000
Russian troops faced in ejecting less than 10,000 rebels
from Chechnya. The operation, he said, could have led to
much higher casualties than the Russians had suffered.
One British source said the French had estimated that
there could be 2,000 Nato casualties a day. Operation B
Minus, as the campaign plan was codenamed, would have
involved up to 175,000 troops, mostly American and
British.
Britain told Washington that its maximum contribution was
54,000 troops and about 100 tanks. That would have
required calling up the regular reserves and the Territorial
Army. The Pentagon was confident that the US Corps of
Engineers would be able to build new roads into Kosovo
from Albania and the necessary infrastructure in the
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to bear the
weight of armoured vehicles.
The US also planned to improve port facilities in Albania.
"Whenever we expressed doubts about the scale of the
improvements needed, the Americans told us not to make
mountains out of molehills," one British military source
said.
A small team of mostly American officers, under the
overall command of General Wesley Clark, the Supreme
Allied Commander, came up with five options:
Airborne: sending thousands of troops by helicopter and
transport aircraft over the border mountains into the heart
of Kosovo.
Presevo Valley: advancing from Macedonia into Serbia
to the east of Kosovo and then swinging in a "left hook" to
attack the Serb troops.
Kacanik Pass: driving armour through the mountain pass
from Macedonia.
Albanian: advancing from Albania into Kosovo along a
route constructed by American engineers.
Northern: assembling an army in Hungary and advancing
into Serbia from the north.
The aim would have been to get all the troops into theatre
within 90 days and to defeat the Serbs by the end of
October, using a combination of the listed options.
Patrick Cain
voice: 416 539-0939
fax: 416 515-3698
--------------------------------------------------------
NOTE: To remove yourself from this list, send a message
to majordomo@cipherlogic.on.ca from the account you wish
to remove, with the line "unsubscribe army" in the
message body.
March 25 2000
EUROPE
Britain had detailed plan for ground
war
BY MICHAEL EVANS, DEFENCE EDITOR
BRITAIN‘S planning for a
ground war against President
Milosevic‘s forces in Kosovo
was so far advanced that the
Ministry of Defence had even
worked out how many artillery
shells would be required,
according to military sources.
Underlining the pressures the
British military were under to
find resources for the potential
battle, it was estimated that the
division earmarked for battle in
Kosovo needed to take the
entire war reserve of 155mm
artillery shells. The precise
number of shells is classified,
but it is clear that the planning
of the Kosovo ground
campaign forced the MoD to
revise its strategy on
ammunition stocks. War
reserves were reduced under
the previous Government‘s
defence cuts.
One of the most alarming
lessons for Nato from the
Kosovo campaign, which
began a year ago yesterday,
was that most alliance members
were not prepared or able to
contemplate a high-intensity
war with Yugoslavia. Senior
MoD sources said yesterday
that towards the end of Nato‘s
78-day bombing campaign,
some alliance members were
beginning "to come round" to
the idea that a ground war
might be necessary. But the
Kosovo terrain and the
prospect of high casualties
remained key obstacles in the
way of any consensus. British
planners knew that a ground
war against an army of about
30,000 Serb troops in
defensive positions would lead
to significant casualties.
Cabinet Office papers
circulated to ministers reflected
the fears of a high casualty toll,
but Tony Blair supported the
British military view that
planning for a land campaign
had to begin. One senior Army
officer said that the ground war
would have presented a greater challenge than 100,000
Russian troops faced in ejecting less than 10,000 rebels
from Chechnya. The operation, he said, could have led to
much higher casualties than the Russians had suffered.
One British source said the French had estimated that
there could be 2,000 Nato casualties a day. Operation B
Minus, as the campaign plan was codenamed, would have
involved up to 175,000 troops, mostly American and
British.
Britain told Washington that its maximum contribution was
54,000 troops and about 100 tanks. That would have
required calling up the regular reserves and the Territorial
Army. The Pentagon was confident that the US Corps of
Engineers would be able to build new roads into Kosovo
from Albania and the necessary infrastructure in the
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to bear the
weight of armoured vehicles.
The US also planned to improve port facilities in Albania.
"Whenever we expressed doubts about the scale of the
improvements needed, the Americans told us not to make
mountains out of molehills," one British military source
said.
A small team of mostly American officers, under the
overall command of General Wesley Clark, the Supreme
Allied Commander, came up with five options:
Airborne: sending thousands of troops by helicopter and
transport aircraft over the border mountains into the heart
of Kosovo.
Presevo Valley: advancing from Macedonia into Serbia
to the east of Kosovo and then swinging in a "left hook" to
attack the Serb troops.
Kacanik Pass: driving armour through the mountain pass
from Macedonia.
Albanian: advancing from Albania into Kosovo along a
route constructed by American engineers.
Northern: assembling an army in Hungary and advancing
into Serbia from the north.
The aim would have been to get all the troops into theatre
within 90 days and to defeat the Serbs by the end of
October, using a combination of the listed options.
Patrick Cain
voice: 416 539-0939
fax: 416 515-3698
--------------------------------------------------------
NOTE: To remove yourself from this list, send a message
to majordomo@cipherlogic.on.ca from the account you wish
to remove, with the line "unsubscribe army" in the
message body.
