Still, there are several reasons to doubt the validity of these justifications, as well as the wisdom of entrusting direct-fire support to the MGS. From a technical standpoint, the system is still immature. A report to New Jersey Congressman Jim Saxton has claimed that the recoil of the low-pressure 105-mm main gun was too great to be safely absorbed by the 8-wheeled LAV chassis. This may result in stability problems when firing on uneven terrain. The automatic loader is apparently unable to recognize different kinds of ammunition. Further, the amour package intended to give the vehicle protection against the cheap and ubiquitous rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) was found wanting. As a result, US Army Strykers currently deployed to Iraq must make do with only the vehicle’s base armour plus a makeshift ‘fence’ of mesh armour to defend against an increasingly determined insurgency armed with RPGs.
From an operational standpoint, it is an open question whether the mobility claims made by LGen Hillier justify the faith placed in the MGS. The CLS noted that the vehicle can be flown aboard the C-130 Hercules. In reality, this capability has never been proven; only the infantry carrier version of the Stryker has been flown in the Herc. Not until the weight of the MGS is lowered by at least two tons (at the expense of armour protection?) will it be so deployable. But even assuming this goal can be realized – meaning that detachable armour panels would be transported separately - Canada’s Hercules fleet is not sufficiently serviceable to move the MGS in any reasonable quantity over a tactically or operationally useful distance.
From a strategic lift standpoint, the MGS is no more likely to arrive in theatre any sooner than would a tank. When the Canadian Army deploys overseas it will be required to move an entire formation of vehicles – not just the MGS. Since the most cost-effective way of doing so is by sea, the LAV-based formation will not be transiting the ocean any faster than would a traditional mechanized formation. It makes no difference to a cargo vessel if the vehicles it is carrying weigh 20 tons or 50. The ship is still going to travel at only 15-18 knots.
The Minister’s preference of relying on chartered strategic airlift may not be an issue if rapid deployment is not essential to mission success. But reliance on the open market carries with it certain risks. Due to their popularity with cost-conscious Western governments, Russian and Ukranian airlifters are being chartered with greater frequency. But there is little sign that they will be replaced when their rapidly ageing airframes wear out. This will surely limit the MGS’s deployment options in future crises deemed relevant to Canada’s security. In such cases the demand for airlift will increase while diminishing capacity will be monopolized by the highest bidder(s). Will Canada be able to secure sufficient airlift in a timely fashion? Unlikely. Experience has shown that Canadian governments are never in a hurry to commit forces to major crises.
As for the CLS’s argument that the Leopard has not demonstrated sufficient relevance, this is not the fault of the tank. When missions requiring heavier armour have come about (ie. Gulf Wars 1 and 2) the Government of Canada has kept the army on the sidelines. In Bosnia and Somalia, Canada did not follow its allies’ example and deploy tanks to shore up shaky ‘peace’ agreements.
As the army adjusts its doctrine to one focussing on operations in complex terrain, doubts about the efficacy of the MGS may arise. Urban operations require vehicles to surmount rubble and man-made obstacles – a task for which tracked vehicles hold a clear advantage. And due to limited fields of view – especially in urban areas - vehicle crews cannot always neutralize threats before they are fired upon. Thus the rationale for having sufficient armour protection to survive a hit and continue the mission. Furthermore, a vehicle cannot always expect to engage targets only from stand-off ranges; it should be able to manoeuvre under fire, close with the adversary and, if necessary, fight through an objective – often without the support of air power or artillery. In view of these requirements, the lightly-armoured MGS runs up the risk compared to the tank.
As for its relevance to peace support operations, the MGS may, as LGen Hiller suggested, be more appropriate a platform when trying to calm or earn the trust of the local population. But if the army needs ‘politically correct’ direct fire support in a non-combat setting, why bother purchasing the MGS at all? Why not rely on the Coyote reconnaissance vehicle, which is already in service?
And while the tank may indeed be too bulky for use in the narrow streets of Kabul, this is hardly the place for the MGS either. The discharge of the low-pressure gun – which, unlike the tank’s main gun, vents the pressure wave to the sides as well as the front - would cause significant collateral damage. If the requirement is for routine patrolling, it is best left to light infantry units and special forces.
One senses that the purchase of the MGS is being made in the context of a subtle yet significant change in strategic and operational focus. By opting for a medium-weight force structure, by not replacing the Leopard tank on a one-for-one basis, and by eviscerating its artillery regiments, the army is quietly dropping all pretensions to being a combat-capable force with sufficient depth to “fight alongside the best against the best” in anything other than very short engagements. Clearly, it is being optimized for muscular peace support operations, whereby the infantryman, the reconnaissance trooper, the signaller, the sensor operator, the engineer and the logistician are the key actors. Keen observers will note that there is no more talk in Ottawa of brigade-sized commitments to international crises, as called for in the 1994 White Paper on Defence.
